The Rest Is Classified - 180. Have the US and Israel Always Spied on Each Other? (Ep 2)
Episode Date: July 29, 2026How did Israel’s spy in America Jonathan Pollard wind up getting caught? And what does the sordid episode tell us about the nature of the spy relationship between America and Israel? David and Go...rdon explore how an US-Israeli spy stole hundreds of classified documents in the 1980s, and what this story tells us about the contemporary espionage relationships between the US and Israel. ------------------- THE REST IS CLASSIFIED LIVE 2026 at The Rest Is Fest: Buy your tickets to see David and Gordon live on stage at London’s Southbank Centre on 4 September: https://www.southbankcentre.co.uk/whats-on/the-rest-is-classified-live/ ------------------- Sign-up for our free newsletter where producer Becki takes you behind the scenes of the show: https://mailchi.mp/goalhanger.com/tric-free-newsletter-sign-up ------------------- Join the Declassified Club to go deeper into the world of espionage with exclusive Q&As, interviews with top intelligence insiders, regular livestreams, ad-free listening, early access to episodes and live show tickets, and weekly deep dives into original spy stories. Members also get curated reading lists, special book discounts, prize draws, and access to our private chat community. Just go to therestisclassified.com or join on Apple Podcasts. ------------------- Get a 10% discount on business PCs, printers and accessories using the code TRIC10. Visit https://HP.com/CLASSIFIED for more information. T&C's apply. ------------------- EXCLUSIVE NordVPN Deal ➼ https://nordvpn.com/restisclassified Upgrade your online protection with an all-in-one security app! It’s risk free with NordVPN’s 30-day money-back guarantee 🌍 ------------------- Email: therestisclassified@goalhanger.com Instagram: @restisclassified Video Editor: Joe Pettit Social Producer: Emma Jackson Assistant Producer: Alfie Rowe Producer: Becki Hills Head of History: Dom Johnson Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
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How did Israel spy in America, Jonathan Pollard, wind up getting caught?
And what does this pretty sordid episode tell us about the nature of the spy relationship between America and Israel?
Well, welcome to The Rest Is Classified.
I'm Gordon Carrera.
And I'm David McCloskey.
And we're looking at the US-Israel relationship, a special relationship of sorts, one in which
they cooperate very closely, but also shock horror spy on each other. And we looked a bit at the
modern context for some of that spying as well as how their relationship developed last time.
And then we started with this fascinating story of Jonathan Pollard, a Navy analyst who'd volunteered
his services to Israel to pass on secrets. So David, last time we talked a bit about
Pollard, slightly eccentric, fabulous character that he was.
Slightly eccentric.
Yes, yes.
Not a member of the reality-based community, but who managed to get a security clearance in the US.
Interesting enough.
And we talked a bit about his initial meeting with an Israeli.
But it's really interesting, isn't it?
Who he is going to be run by when it comes to Israel?
because it isn't actually the intelligence services we've all heard of, the Mossad, it's someone else.
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Remember in the past episode that Science Counselor is a science counselor
at the Israeli Consulate in New York,
who, the guy who had reached out,
V. M. Sella, this colonel, this Air Force colonel, who's studying in the U.S., when he gets
contacted by Pollard for a meeting, he goes to the consulate of New York, to the science
counselor and says, should I have the meeting? And that meeting gets cleared. Sella has the
discussion and Pollard volunteers. The science counselor is a man named Yosef Yegor,
and he is going to become Pollard's day-to-day handler. He's not a Mossad officer. He's
He works for an organization inside the Israeli Ministry of Defense that is focused on gathering
scientific and technical intelligence.
It's called the Bureau of Scientific Relations, and the Hebrew acronym is L-A-K-A-M.
And L-A-K-A-M, and Le-K-A-M, and Le-CAM, it's a really interesting unit.
It's run by a guy named Rafael Raffa-Tan, who is a longtime intelligence officer who had actually
been instrumental in capturing the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann off of the streets of Buenos Aires.
And you, you've met Rafi. Isn't that right, Gordon? I did. I met him before he died. So it's
really interesting. I went to make a radio for BBC documentary maybe about 15 years ago about
the Mossad and its history. And so I went to to interview Rafi about actually the Eichmann
operation. He described to me planning and being involved in this very famous operation to kidd
effectively, the Nazi war criminal, Adolf Eichmann in Argentina. I did not ask him, though,
I'm ashamed to say about Jonathan Pollard because we weren't dealing with that. But the main thing
I remember about Rafi at that point when I went to see him, he was quite an elderly chap at that point,
quite portly, quite a kind of playful sense of humour. I went to see him in his office, I think,
in Israel, was that he was then head of what was described as the pensioners political party.
So he created a political party or a kind of movement to represent the intraste.
of pensioners and the elderly in Israel.
And that was his new job.
So this kind of master spy who'd kind of help capture Eichmann and he'd run or at least overseen
the Pollard operation was then fighting for pensioners, which was a, you know, happened to all
of us one day.
But yeah, he was a he was a, he was a, you got the sense then he was a bit of a maverick,
I think, and a bit of a character.
Yes.
And I mean, Iitan is one of those guys who seems to have made a host of enemies across the
Israeli national security and intelligence bureaucracy because he has apparently earned the nickname
the stinker, which I think is, which is a phenomenal, a phenomenal nickname. But you're right,
he's, he's very much a maverick and he's keen to see what Pollard can produce. And again, I think,
you know, it's a very fascinating question, which maybe will come to it yet, which is how much
did Mossad and other elements of the Israeli government really know about the Pollard case? But it's not
Mossad is this is this very aggressive, you know, scientific and sort of tech-focused unit that
Raffa Aton is running that is going to end up getting the Pollard intelligence.
Now, here's how the actual mechanics of the espionage worked.
Three times a week, Pollard will use a courier card that actually, it's almost impossible to imagine
this today, that lets him walk out of his office without being searched with a bunch of documents
he'll then stash them in a suitcase that he keeps in his car exactly for that purpose
and then he will deliver them to a secretary it's a woman who works at the Israeli embassy
in Washington he'll take the documents to her apartment and once a month he'll visit
or sort of rotate because there's another apartment the Israelis have procured in the same
building in northwest Washington. And this second unit has photocopying and photography equipment
so the Israelis can make copies very quickly of the documents and return the originals to Pollard.
And it's in this second apartment with all of the photocopying equipment that Pollard and
Yosef Yegor, his handler, will review the materials. Pollard will probably explain what he's provided.
Pollard is paid and then he's tasked for the next round.
What do the Israelis want more of?
And it's a lot of stuff.
I mean, it's not insignificant the amount he's providing, is it?
It's a lot of stuff.
And I think this also provides a bit of a hint as to how many other entities inside the Israeli state
were probably receiving some of this information because the tasking,
I mean, Pollard himself described the task.
asking us very organized. And he said, you know, the type of guidance I received suggested a highly
coordinated effort between the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. He was getting these prioritized
lists, which had been agreed upon by the different services. And then he provides that information
to the Israelis. Which, you know, if he's getting tasking, which says, you know, we want this, this,
and this and this. I mean, that suggests that the Israeli state knows about this and is quite
organized in thinking, well, we've got a guy inside the U.S. Navy intelligence world. What do we
want from him? You know, this isn't just a kind of rogue, as it were, Raffey, Atan, stinker
operation. It's something a bit more organized than that, isn't it? Right. And the later,
you know, I think the Israelis, when this breaks, as we'll see, try to claim.
that it's a rogue operation. It's totally unauthorized. And I think the, I think the mechanics of how
it's run suggests perhaps otherwise. Yeah. Right. It's just, it's suggests that it's a much more
kind of structural effort. Now, it's very possible that, you know, the Mossad or the various, you know,
other, you know, branches of the Israeli military didn't know that it was Pollard himself and wouldn't
have actually had his identity, but had to have been aware, given the nature of product, that a, there was a
human penetration in Washington that Mossad was running.
The material, I think, is fascinating to look at because he's handled,
Pollard will end up being handled over a 17-month period.
He delivers more than 800 highly classified documents.
And again, he had estimated that they would fill a space 10 feet by 6 feet by 6 feet.
So it's a big container of material.
and some of it is really damaging.
Pollard gives up what's known as the radio signal notations manual,
which is this 10-volume product that's constantly being updated,
that lists the physical parameters of signals
that are being used to intercept communications.
So one signature said, it's the Bible.
It tells how we collect signals anywhere in the world.
So that's a hugely damaged thing because that can help the Israelis to evade those signals.
The Israelis had this particular interest in reporting.
that were being generated by what's called the Sixth Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information
Facility. So it's a report that's filed every morning about activity in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East over the prior 24 hours. And it's built from very advanced means of
intercepting Soviet military communications, including tracking Soviet subs in the Mediterranean.
Pollard hands over more than a year's worth of these reports during the time the Israelis
handle him. And when he missed a few meetings because he was sick, his handlers nagged him to produce
the backlog. That's how important they were. He hands over the National SIGA requirements list,
which basically tells NSA collection units worldwide who to target and in what priority.
The Israelis, of course, could use that to learn to hide what they don't want the Americans to see.
Pollard also betrayed what was then an exotic satellite capability called taking off-axis
photographs, which is essentially shooting targets, which if you just look at the orbit of the
satellite, would have seemed to be out of range. And so that gives the Israelis a sense of
what the U.S. might be able to photograph, for example, inside Israel that the Israelis may
not have, may not have believed we're capable of. And Pollard takes so much stuff that he becomes
one of the heaviest users of a classified Pentagon Library during 1984 and 1985.
On one occasion, he collected and took out so much material that he needed a handcart
to take it out to his car.
You would think the librarians are like, oh, Mr. Pollard again.
Mr. Pollard.
More top secret documents.
Librarians love being helpful, though, Gordon.
You know, the librarians are probably, they're probably tickled this guys using all this stuff.
Someone cares.
You know, someone's coming to the library.
Let's come into the library.
Now, all that in isolation, I mean, I guess it sounds damaging enough, but the Israelis
piece that, you know, all of that information together.
What this means is that when the Israelis in October of 1985 go and bomb the Palestine
liberation organizations headquarters in Tunis in Tunisia, the Israelis have this combined
SIGAN requirements list with all of the monitoring that the U.S. is doing at the Mediterranean
and they can outwit American collectors.
And we talked in the first episode about the Israelis attempting to maybe mask their
specific intentions vis-a-vis a strike on Iran.
This is an analog from the 80s where the Israelis might not want us to know in advance
that they're going to bomb PLO headquarters in Tunis.
Now with the stuff that Pollard has provided, they can actually work out how to evade our
collection and early warning systems.
So it's a surprise.
I mean, it's a really interesting practical example, isn't it, of that?
Because it could be that if the US intelligence community picks up signals or information that Israel's planning to do that and to bomb the PLO, it will then put pressure on them to stop.
So there's a strong interest in the Israelis going to be able to do it without being spotted by the US.
And Pollard has given them the ability to do that to evade US intelligence collections.
You can really see there that the value of what he's.
he is doing. What's he getting in return? I mean, is it, you know, ideology, we talked about
his sympathy for Israel. So that is clearly one part of it, but he is also getting money as well.
Yes, he is. And we've talked about this in other human espionage cases where, you know,
I'm thinking of the Tolkachev case, right, in Russia, where, you know, he's this, he's this
extremely valuable engineer working on advanced aircraft and avionic systems.
He's deeply ideologically motivated.
At the same time, he wants money to show, for the U.S. to show the value, you know, of the product that he's providing.
And frankly, the service that's handling somebody wants to pay them so that they have a means, even if it's loose, of control and influence.
And I think that's exactly what's going on here with Pollard, because his salary, he is paid, his salary ends up reaching $2,500 per month.
which is the equivalent of about 7,700 today, right?
So maybe not life-changing, but for someone who's in serious financial trouble,
you know, pretty important.
He's also given tens of thousands of dollars in cash to compensate him for hotels,
meals, and jewelry.
By the time he's caught, Pollard has been paid about $50,000 in cash.
And this is interesting.
And I think this shows some of the long-term plans.
that both sides had for this partnership, because he had been promised an additional $30,000
per year, which would be deposited into a foreign bank account, which was open for Pollard
under an alias that he would use when he eventually became a citizen of Israel.
And the Israelis had made a 10-year commitment to him that meant he would receive an additional
$540,000 over the life of this, you know, a planned conspiracy.
which is about just shy of $2 million in today's money.
Yeah, pretty significant.
It's, and I think this, you know, it's interesting because a lot of the, a lot of the, the, the, the sums that we talk about when people spy can sound pretty small, you know.
But in this case, I think what the plan was is basically he was providing the Israelis exceptionally valuable information in exchange for a new life.
And that meant the money and that meant Israeli citizenship.
Now, it doesn't last.
The good times, the good times can't roll on forever.
And by the fall of 1985,
Pollard has fallen under suspicion.
But it's not because some brilliant George Smiley-esque character
working inside Naval Intelligence in Suitland, Maryland,
has figured out what Pollard is up to.
It's that he's taking so many documents
that are so outside the scope of his day-to-day work
that his boss is like
what's going on?
It's such a shame
it's not the librarian
who notices
because I think that would be
that would be the best
opportunity.
Yeah.
If it was a novel,
it was a novel
you'd have that kind of
clever,
quiet librarian going,
I wonder if something's up.
But it's actually his boss
who goes,
hang on a sec,
you know,
why are you asking
for so many things
over so many different areas?
I mean,
which again is
slightly amateur hour,
but that's often
the way,
isn't it?
It is.
We know,
we should say,
we know a lot of detail about this case because of the legal proceedings of the indictment.
And the indictment itself says that Pollard had been assigned to intelligence research duties
relating to the Caribbean and the continental United States.
So when he's pulling the SIGET requirements list for the Middle East,
a bunch of like situation reports about what's going on in the Mediterranean of the Middle East,
at some point somebody was like, wait a minute.
why does he want all of this?
And he's taking this out in hand carts
and the librarians are waving them off
with sort of teary eyes about his use of the library.
So at some point, you know,
someone says, we got to look at this guy.
And I think it's great because there's a CIA damage assessment
done on Pollard.
And it says simply, at this point,
an investigation ensued,
which is very ominous.
So the FBI gets involved.
The The The Thebes are in.
The Thebes.
I mean, this story's got everything, doesn't it?
It's got the DIA.
It's got Feebs.
It's got a Navy.
It's got the IRA.
And it's got the IRA and Mossad.
So, I mean, we're just, you know, we're ticking all over the place.
We're ticking all the boxes.
So the FBI gets involved on the 15th of November, 1985, begins conducting interviews.
And the appeals court will later recount that there were FBI agents and also naval investigators
who stopped Pollard as he's leaving work and question him about the unauthorized removal of
classified information. I like the idea that it's as he's pushing a hand cart of classified material.
Mr. Pollard, what's in that large hand cart you're pushing towards your car?
Yes, your duties is it all Caribbean intelligence reports? Oh, wait a minute. The intercepts
capabilities in the Mediterranean. So Pollard is understandably alarmed by this questioning.
And that day, he makes two calls home to Amher,
And he uses the code word cactus in these phone calls, which is the signal that he is in trouble.
And I should say, I can't imagine a less natural word to use if you're standing in the parking
lot of a naval facility in Suitland, Maryland, and you're calling your wife and you're using the word
cactus. I mean, how would you, if you were doing that, Gordon, how would you use the word
cactus to signal that you were in trouble? Because it's not like you're in Texas. It's not like,
you know, there's, I don't know, do you have any cacti, cactus near you? We do have cactus,
but why would I be talking about them over the phone? I think you could be like, oh, I
pricked my finger on the cactus that is kept in the bathroom of the library of the US Naval Institute,
but that's not exactly the kind of thing you'd tell you why. I must
call you immediately, my darling, to tell you that I touched a cactus. I felt, I touched a cactus. I
felt, I touched a cactus. I don't know. He somehow, so he somehow uses the word cactus to signal
that there are problems. And then Anne phones Colonel Sella, who is not handling him, but is still,
you know, sort of involved in the case and as a friend, to say that we've got, we've got trouble.
Now, Pollard himself will call his handler. Yes, if you have,
on the 19th of November and explain how alarmed he is.
And Yagir says, chill out and just stall for time.
And then something very, I think this is quite poor form here, Gordon.
The Israelis that are involved in the case begin to leave the country.
So the embassy secretary who had helped with the photocopying leaves the country
on the 20th of November.
Yosef Jure, the handler is going to leave on the 22nd of November.
That's never good.
It's not a good sign.
But on the 21st, this is before the handler leaves,
Pollard sits down for another FBI interview about the removal of classified documents.
And after that, he basically, he and Ann get in the car,
and they drive straight to the Israeli embassy in Washington.
They go inside.
They stay for about 20 minutes, and they request political assigns.
in Israel. And this is the crazy they bet. They are unsuccessful, Gorda, in an attempt to get asylum.
Pollard apparently panics, and he actually drives into the, he goes into the basement of the embassy
in an attempt to seek refuge, but they're turned out. And as he leaves the building, Pollard is
arrested by the FBI and Anne is arrested the next day. So maybe there with Pollard having failed
to get any political asylum
and having been turfed out the embassy
as his handlers make a run for it
basically to get out the country.
Let's take a break
and we'll see what happens to Pollard afterwards.
So welcome back.
Jonathan Pollard has tried and failed
to start an escape plan
involving going to the Israeli embassy.
I mean, David, what's happened there?
I mean, do you think he was supposed
to do that to pitch up at the embassy
and be somehow smuggled out?
It all sounds pretty,
desperate, doesn't it? It's interesting because
Raffaeton, who's the head of
Lacom, this unit that's running
Pollard, has basically said
and I, maybe, I don't know, you should have brought
this up when you were meeting him about his pensioners party, Gordon.
But Raffaeton says
this was not the plan and
the operation was undone by
an unspecified mistake on the part of one of the Israelis
involved. Pretty murky.
Like, Raphaelan hasn't clearly said
the way it was supposed to go down. Now,
I mean, as I dug into this, I thought, you know, you kind of assume, especially if you're an
officiantado of spy fiction and television shows and movies, you kind of assume, oh, doesn't everybody,
every service has some kind of sexy ex-fill plan for its agents. And I think the answer is
oftentimes no. I mean, obviously it depends on the agent, but in a case where you're potentially
having to get someone out of a friendly country like the U.S., get maybe you don't.
don't actually have a plan. Now, whatever plan, if they did have one, and they might have,
I can't imagine a world where the plan is to go and hole up in the Israeli embassy. Because
then you're talking about, you're talking about a potential political issue between the two
countries. Yes, it becomes very public. Yeah, that is not a clandestine way of getting someone
out of the country. I mean, you, yeah. So I agree. It doesn't sound like, it sounds like, it sounds like,
desperation from Pollard, just pitching up at the embassy as he knows he's under pressure and just
thinking, I've got to do something. And the Israelis by this point are like, I think they've realized,
haven't they? The fact that they're leaving the country, they realize this is going to be
an absolute disaster. You know, this is, this has the Americans have found out about it.
This is going to go south and this is going to cause a lot of problems. At that point,
the last thing you want is the guy in the embassy. So you can see why they've turfed him out.
And it means Polar is going to be arrested.
I mean, he's got no way out, has he?
But this gets at the fascinating, maybe theme in the series of,
what do you, if you're the U.S. government, what do you do?
Because he's been arrested.
But you don't really want a trial.
That's going to put Israeli espionage in the U.S. front and center in newspapers
and you're going to have to comment on it.
And you don't want that.
So what happens is Pollard has offered a plea bargain in which he'll plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage, waive his right to a jury trial, and then in exchange the prosecution says, look, we will seek a substantial prison term, but not life. And we'll give Anne, your accomplice and wife, a lesser term because she's not the primary agent in this relationship.
The deal is only offered after Pollard will submit to polygraphs and interviews and critically agree to help the damage assessment.
Because that is a big question that investigators have is what did you actually compromise so we can go and fix it and plug the leak if you did?
I mean, it's very similar to when you have some of the Cambridge spies.
Like you think of Anthony Blunt, you know, who's confronted and the Brits realize he's bad.
And they think we don't want to trial for publicity.
But, you know, the deal is you tell us everything.
everything you did so we can know what happened and what the damage was and what the kind of,
you know, what the techniques and tactics of the other side were and then we'll keep quiet.
And it sounds like, I mean, it's not quite quick keeping quiet, but you can see that there's
a deal there to be done.
But it's not going to quite go to plan, is it?
Two major things happen that will sink this deal.
The first one, which I think his legal team probably advised him against or discorrived.
or discouraged.
Should have done.
But he's, you know, he's a fabulous and is emotionally unstable, as we've said.
Pollard goes to the press.
Go to the press.
So between the plea and the sentencing, which is looming,
Pollard gives two exclusive interviews to Wolf Blitzer,
who is then the Washington correspondent for the Jerusalem Post.
I had no idea that that was his previous job before CNN.
Interesting.
Okay.
Wolf Blitzer has written extensively about.
Pollard because he he met him and interviewed him after he was caught. And in these interviews,
Pollard presents himself as a Jewish hero and Israeli hero, a kind of master spy. Pollard compares
himself to a downed Israeli pilot who's been captured behind enemy lines. And Pollard writes a
public letter, which is printed in the Jerusalem Post, in which he calls his pleaed bargain a judicial
crucifixion insists his actions. Which is an interesting choice of words. Which is an inflammatory
choice of words. Suggests perhaps not the right choice of words. And he argues that the Jewish community
should put a stop to the ordeal that he is experiencing. To add more fuel to the fire, days before
the sentencing, his wife, Anne goes on 60 minutes, says the couple has no regrets because their
actions were the result of their moral obligation as Jews. Now, you could imagine that the prosecution,
which has said, look, we're going to make this quiet. You're going to tell us exactly what you gave
them. And in exchange for your cooperation, you're not going to get life. You're going to get
whatever, 10 years, and then it's done. It's quiet. It's done. It's over. And you get to have a
life beyond this. You could imagine why the prosecution or how the prosecution would be somewhat
frustrated by your wife going on 60 minutes and you having all these conversations with Wolf Blitzer.
And what they end up doing, what they will end up doing, is asking the court to give him a life sentence.
Now, the second thing that Pollard does, which is a no-no, is that he lies to the FBI.
So on the 15th of February in 1987, Wolf Blitzer publishes a piece in the Washington Post,
which runs with the headline,
Pollard, not a bumbler,
but Israel's master spy.
And in it, Blitzer describes
six categories of classified information
that Pollard provided to Israel.
Now, the prosecutors
who were, again,
still try to get a handle
on the damage assessment.
They confront Pollard with this
and say, did you tell,
did you actually give this stuff
to the Israelis and why in the world
are you talking about this with Wolf Blitzer?
Pollard denies it.
Says Wolf Blitzer's lying.
And the prosecutors say, well, we're going to put you on the polygraph and get to the bottom of it.
Pollard continues to say, you know, it's false.
Wolf Blitzer's making it up.
He's got a very, you know, he's kind of slandering Wolf Blitzer in a way.
Yeah, bad things.
Then on the polygraph, Pollard says, okay, I am now ready to at last to tell the truth.
And he says, he says, because I imagine him actually just hooked up.
He's got the, you know, sort of think around his vest for the breathing and he's got the things on his
fingers for the sweat and he's got the heartbeat monitor, you know, all this stuff, right? And he says,
okay, I'm going to come clean now. He says, yes, I did walk Wolf Blitzer through each of those six
categories of information that I provided to the Israelis. And yes, it included satellite photos
of chemical warfare facilities, U.S. assessments on the Palestine Liberation Organization,
Soviet arms shipments to Syria, lots more, and Pollard. So he lied to investigators about what he told
Wolf Blitzer. He's also caught in a tangle of smaller lies. He told, Pollard told at least three
contradictory versions of a story about offering to repay the Israeli money that he had been,
that he had been provided. Paulard said he was going to endow a mysterious intelligence
chair somewhere with the money that the Israelis had provided him, but he had repaid none of it.
So, and then this is, and this is the kick regarded.
Pollard also apparently told the FBI that he would,
commit espionage for Israel again, if given the chance.
I mean, this guy is about as dumb as you get in terms of like, you know, you're lying to the FBI,
changing your story, talking to the journalist, then we're going, going and saying, yeah,
do it all again.
I mean, you turn me loose.
I'm going to do it again.
It's not a good look.
Now, into this mess, the Secretary of Defense at the time, Casper Weinberger, his staff,
his staff writes up a memo, which is in part to correct what the Department of Defense saw as the sentencing judge's erroneous assumption that Pollard's espionage for an ally had not done any harm to the U.S.
And it's very interesting because I actually don't think there's certainly other Israeli espionage cases where there's been a desire on the part of all parties to keep things quiet, right?
and to just kind of minimize the,
minimize the public affair and be done with it.
Because it's kind of an embarrassing aspect
of this otherwise friendly relationship.
But it's so fascinating in this case
that I think because Pollard had taken so much stuff,
because Pollard had gone to the press
and made this a massive political issue
and because he had lied to investigators over and over again.
So the U.S. is struggling to get a handle
on the damage assessment.
Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense,
basically says, look, I'm worried that you, the judge, are going to go too easy on Pollard because
he was spying for Israel. And Weinberger makes clear in a number of memos that it is difficult
for me, even in the so-called year of the spy, to conceive of a greater harm to national security
than that caused by the defendant, referring to Pollard. I mean, it's so interesting,
isn't it? Because Pollard will get life in prison. And you do feel like, I mean, he brought it upon himself
because he could have got a much easier deal if he had not played the games that he plays of lying and going to the press.
He almost invites this. I mean, the US government did not want this to be a big deal. And, you know,
there were lots of other cases, as you mentioned, you know, last time in which people are, you know,
discovered maybe passing things to the Israelis, in which it's played very quietly. But Pollard is the one
who they really go for and go for life.
But it is partly due to the damage,
and it's partly due to the way he plays it.
And I mean, I guess he got life,
and that sounds like what they wanted
and what he deserved for, frankly,
stupidity as well as espionage.
Yeah.
There was a very interesting,
I think it was a New York Times piece
that came out around the time of the Pollard trial.
And there was an FBI official quoted in there
as saying, yeah, you know,
we've looked at about a dozen Israeli espionage cases over the past few years.
You know, he's talking about the mid-80s.
And this is the only one where this has happened.
Usually, you know, charges are dropped or in a worst case, someone gets a few years in prison
after submitting a plea deal to cooperate.
But Pollard, I think because of the circus around this and because of the damage he did,
he becomes this very awkward and tangled link in the U.S. Israel relationship from that point forward.
The legacy of this case is going to stretch on for decades right through to today, isn't it?
Because you get, of course, the initial fallout because it's so public and, you know, U.S. officials are obviously going to talk about, you know, how angry they are, which is...
We're shocked. We're shocked.
There's gambling in this casino. They're spying among spies. I mean, you're right.
So there's the performative bit, which is, you know, which we often see actually when spies get caught, where politicians have to go up. You know, this is terrible. I'm outraged. And, you know, things basically keep going to keep going as they were. But actually, the Pollard case is going to be different, isn't it? Because of the legacy. Yeah. It is interesting. I mean, for example, to compare it to a Russian espionage case where, you know, when Pollard is caught, there's no, there's no expulsion of Israeli diplomatic.
There's no sanctions.
There's no cuts to economic or military aid.
You know, if you read the accounts from the time, it does seem like there was obviously
frustration inside the U.S. intelligence community with the Israelis.
But it doesn't seem to have led to any rollback.
Yeah, it doesn't change the relationship.
There's no reports on this.
I could definitely see, look, if the U.S. is sharing a number of human intelligence
streams with the Israelis, maybe for some of.
six months. All of a sudden, no stop getting shared to register that you're frustrated. But
there's no structural tap that gets turned off. There's no attempt to really punish the Israelis for
what they've done. Now, Washington does demand an apology. I also found this interesting,
that there's a demand that the Israelis return the documents that they stole. They hand back some,
but not all of them. And the Israelis characterize the operation as this kind of rogue
Yeah, of course they do.
La Cama is this rogue outfit run by Raffa Eitan.
I can't believe that Raffaetan.
What was he doing?
Right.
I can't believe he did that.
The whole of the Israeli intelligence community having been probably in on it.
I mean, but that's what you do.
That's the game, isn't it?
You get caught and you say, that guy.
That guy's a bad guy.
It's a bad guy.
He's up to know good.
The stinker.
So they do shut down Lecombe in 1986 in the aftermath of this.
The Colonel Sella, who had been the initial contact for Pollard,
he's indicted in the U.S. Israel does not produce him. He's actually promoted to the command of an airbase.
Rafi Aitan goes on to run the pensioners party in Israel. Correct. And the intel relationship,
like, you know, it just, as you said, it, it motors on and deepens significantly in the 1990s,
in the early 2000s, particularly when we're talking about signals intelligence. But through all
of this, Pollard is this constant kind of pebble in the shoe.
of the relationship because he's he's just languishing in a U.S. prison. He's got that life sentence.
But in 1995, he's granted Israeli citizenship. The several Israeli prime ministers in the 1990s,
including Rabin and Netanyahu, press President Clinton for clemency for Pollard.
At the 1998, Y River talks, then Prime Minister Netanyahu,
basically insists that Pollard's release, this is crazy, be part of the price for concessions
to the Palestinians, which allegedly led CIA director George Tenet to tell Clinton that he would
resign if Pollard were freed.
I mean, it's so interesting, firstly, that the Israelis want him out so much that they are
going to tie it to the big negotiations at a presidential,
ministerial level. That's how significant they see it, which I think is, you know, it's interesting,
you know, what it tells you about kind of Israel and maybe the way they see him as an agent.
You know, and there is that thing. You want to get your agents out. And, you know, it's good for
business if you're an intelligence agency. Again, suggests perhaps it wasn't a rogue operation.
Well, in 98, Netanyahu comes out and admits for the first time that Pollard actually was an agent.
So I think the rogue, the idea that it was this rogue outfit by the late 90s, the Israelis
have dropped that entirely. And they're trying to negotiate to get them out.
But it's also interesting, isn't it? That, you know, CIA director Tenet says, you know, he's going to resign if Pollard is freed. And I think it's because you could see the
psychologically within the U.S. intelligence community if the idea is you can betray a ton of secrets and then
get away with it. It's not a great look, is it? So it doesn't happen. So what happened to Pollard?
Well, he divorces Anne after her release. She did five years. And then,
was divorced by Pollard, he marries a Canadian school teacher in prison who winds up waging
a very tireless campaign for his release. A square in Jerusalem is named in his honor. And over
time, it never becomes, I think, a major political issue in Israel, but a majority of the members of
the Knesset in Israel eventually start to back calls for clemency for Pollard. Now, his
His sentence had a mandatory parole clause after 30 years.
And so he is released in November of 2015.
I actually found the shocking that he stays in the U.S. for five years after his release.
But then he moves to Israel in 2020, where he is greeted on the tarmac upon arrival by Benjamin Netanyahu.
And what else, Gordon?
I feel like this is absolutely where the story was always going to end.
Jonathan Pollard has become a far-right commentator and a potential far-right member of the Knesset
because just this year in May, Pollard announced that he is entering politics.
He is, I think, to the right of Netanyahu, he's been critical of Netanyahu for being too soft.
Yeah, I mean, there is space there.
There is.
There is.
There is.
Believe it or not.
there is space to the right of Netanyo and he is there. I mean, that's, it's wild, isn't it?
But lest any listeners think that Pollard has a strong chance of actually being elected,
I did kind of go down the rabbit hole on this, Gordon, and I found an Israeli political
commentator who said that Pollard had about the same odds of joining the Knesset as he would
if he were running to be the Pope. So he may continue to be no more than,
of a political talking head in Israel until the end of his days.
What a fascinating story.
And it is interesting on a human level.
But I mean, in terms of what it all means, I think what it tells you is, I find it
interesting that the Israelis did it and the consequences and the costs were quite high.
But, you know, intelligence and running agents is a kind of cost-benefit decision, isn't it?
And you're constantly thinking, well, what are the benefits I get for running this agent and what are the costs if he gets caught, you know, and it gets discovered?
And the Israelis clearly felt at this time that it was worth the cost or the risk of getting caught because what he was providing them was so good.
And he volunteered.
And he volunteered. You're right.
If you translate it to other countries as well, and you think, let's say you're the UK where we don't spy on the US.
Of course we don't.
Obviously.
Obviously.
But there are things that, you know, you could imagine a bit like Israel and the US
where we'd love to know, like, what is, you know, Donald Trump going to do in terms of tariffs
or what's, you know, what's the real plans for Iran or what's likely to happen here or there.
But if you were to speak hypothetically, as I may not have done to British intelligence officials
about such a possibility, I think hypothetically they would suggest that the risks of getting
court and the fallout of doing something like that would be so great and so.
so damaging, but why would you do it? Yeah, there's a benefit in terms of knowing maybe this or
that, but the costs in terms of breaking the trust of a relationship would be damaging. But
it's maybe a different calculation if you're the Israelis. Because the Israelis sit outside the
structure of the five eyes, I think there's a sense that even though the relationship is
exceptionally close from an intelligence and security standpoint,
it's not as close as the relationship between Washington and London,
or Washington and Canberra.
So there's a segment of information that the Israelis are not receiving
and a desire, I think, to fill those gaps that they occasionally meet with with espionage.
I think it matters that he volunteered because it's almost like,
You could, if you're Rafiatan or your Colonel Sela or you're Yosef Yaguar,
any of the people involved in the case, if you have someone show up on your doorstep and say,
I am totally ideologically motivated.
I love Israel.
I want to work for Israel.
And you have to pay me a little bit because I got money problems.
But I'm your man.
And I want to do this.
I want to work for you as a penetration inside Navy intelligence.
And here's all the stuff I can give you.
in some ways, it's like
malpractice if you're an intelligence officer
to turn that person away.
I mean, Aiton actually said this.
He's like, it was so good
that I couldn't say no.
There was just information was too good.
And there's something to that.
If someone shows up on your doorstep,
you might say, look, we'll deal with the politics
come what may.
This stuff is so useful to us.
We're going to take the risk.
I also think, as we talked about in the first episode, the Israelis are continuing to spy on us.
We spy on them.
But I think it's become, like so much of the spy world, probably a little bit less human.
And there's much more spying that's happening at the world of signals, intelligence and digital collection and sort of technical stuff.
Right.
That's happening more.
Which is less emotional, isn't it?
It's less emotional if you get caught, less personal.
It's less about one person betraying their country and their secrets to another.
It's a kind of, it's different, isn't it?
It's not going to excite the passions in the same way as something like a Pollard case.
We mentioned in the first episode, the incident where, I think it was in 2019,
when the Israelis got caught putting signals intelligence collectors,
they're these kind of, they're called stingrays.
They basically spoof a cell phone tower and allow you to,
There are ways you could use those to collect a huge amount of phone numbers, but also
data off of some of the phones in some cases.
The Israelis were putting those in Washington.
They got caught doing it.
And it's an incident that most people, even who are following this closely, would
know about because, to your point, you know, if you're the FBI, well, you just, you confiscate
the equipment and you sort of work backward to maybe what's been compromised, but there isn't
a human at the center of it that makes it this embarrassing.
affair that has political consequences. You can just kind of sweep it under the rug and move on.
You know, I also think the other angle here is that as cover has become harder, you know,
this world of ubiquitous technical surveillance we've talked about makes it harder to have a
credible cover inside an embassy or a consulate. The Israelis are probably using, you know,
non-official cover commercial covered officers all over the U.S. to go after sensitive, you know,
whether it's tech stuff out in Silicon Valley, whether it's financial stuff in New York,
whether it's politics in D.C. I mean, you have a host of, you know, sort of exotically covered
intelligence officers you can use to collect sensitive information or even secrets in ways where the
people providing it don't even think they're committing espionage. And so I'm sure that is happening
at a massive scale, but it's just not something that we see,
and it's not something that bubbles up to the surface because they don't get caught.
No, that's right.
And you don't have that embarrassing problem that they had in this case
where they suddenly have to clear people out of the embassy, you know, who've been running.
Nobody's driving into the basement of the Israeli embassy and asking for asylum.
It does make you kind of realize, I think, you know, to that point that running agents like
that is very risky.
but, you know, technical collection is just less emotional.
And so there are kind of almost unwritten rules about what's acceptable and what's not.
And I guess Pollard crossed a line, you know.
And it happened, as you said, almost by accident because he was a volunteer.
But it did cross a line and the consequences were serious.
I think a lot of what we might think of as kind of spying or something that's at least
adjacent to it.
you know, with allies, I think that the mechanism for dealing with it is oftentimes
basically accusing someone in the states of not having registered as a foreign agent,
right?
Whether that's for, you know, Qatar, the UAE, South Korea, there's a bunch of recent cases
where American officials or former officials have been caught doing something that is quite
close to espionage, but isn't quite.
and ends up being prosecuted under the far less kind of stringent rules of the, I think it's the
Foreign Agents Registration Act, right, as opposed to the Espionage Act, which is what Pollard was
prosecuted under.
Yeah, it's the difference between kind of influence and interference and espionage.
So you get people who are trying to influence politics and interfere sometimes even, or push political debate,
but it's not quite the same as the handcart of files coming.
The handcart of files is that's, you get.
you get the book thrown at you for that.
Yeah.
Well, I mean, I guess as we am, we should say that it is very fortunate that the US and UK will
never have this problem and that we don't spy on each other because, of course, we are
entirely aligned as allies, never having any issues between us.
And we are part of the Five Eyes.
And we are going to be looking, I think, coming up at the Five Eyes and at the roots of
the U.S.-UK. relationship, Bletchley Park and how it all began.
So it's a chance to maybe raise that question about, you know, how.
does that really work? And do friends really never spy on friends? And how does, how do those
relationships and how does the trust work deep in that really special relationship? So those episodes,
I think, are coming up. So do join the Declassified Club if you want to get early access to those
and to everything else we've got coming up in the next few months. Got a lot of interesting
stuff in the pipeline. So do join at the rest is classified.com. But otherwise, we'll see you next time.
We'll see you next time.
