The Rest Is Classified - 86. Mossad Pager Attack: The Long War with Hezbollah (Ep 1)
Episode Date: September 28, 2025"The smartphone is a lethal collaborator. " This was the stark warning from Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in February 2024. In the wake of intense conflict with Israel, the group made a... fateful decision to abandon high-tech communications. They knew that their phones could be used by the Israelis to pinpoint their location. The solution? Go analog. Go back to pagers. This episode begins an explosive two-part series on a truly audacious operation conducted by Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad. Mossad didn't just infect Hezbollah's supply chain; they became the supply chain, creating a unique product to use against their enemy. Join Gordon and David as they unravel the complex groundwork laid by Mossad to decapitate their Lebanese enemies. This is the story of the high-stakes push-pull of espionage, where technological decisions set the stage for one of the most remarkable, and deadly, covert operations in intelligence history. ------------------- Join The Declassified Club: Start your free trial at therestisclassified.com - go deeper into the world of espionage with exclusive Q&As, interviews with top intelligence insiders, quarterly livestreams, ad-free listening, early access to episodes and live show tickets, and weekly deep dives into original spy stories. Members also get curated reading lists, special book discounts, prize draws, and access to our private chat community. To sign up to the free newsletter, go to: https://mailchi.mp/goalhanger.com/tric-free-newsletter-sign-up ------------------- Order a signed edition of Gordon's latest book, The Spy in the Archive, via this link. Order a signed edition of David's latest book, The Seventh Floor, via this link. ------------------- Email: classified@goalhanger.com Twitter: @triclassified Assistant Producer: Becki Hills Producer: Callum Hill Senior Producer: Dom Johnson Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
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visit TD.com slash small business advice to find out more or to match with a TD small business
banking account manager. You have a tapping device in your pocket and in the pockets of
your son, daughter and wife.
have it with you at home, at work, and in the car. Through this cell phone, they can hear what
you say. They download everything you have on your cell phone, the conversations, the messages
and the images, and they can pinpoint your location. They can tell in which room you are,
and if you are in your car. They can tell you if you are in the front or the back, left or
right. Do the Israelis need anything else? We are providing all of this for them. Therefore,
we have asked, and I am asking now again, that the fighters and their families should refrain
from using cell phones. Disable it, bury it, lock it in a metal box. Keep it there for a week,
two weeks a month. God knows how long this will last. Do this in order to protect the people's
security, lives and honour. These are the collaborators. You're asking where the collaborators
are the cell phones, you, your wife and your children hold, are the collaborators. The cell phone
is a lethal collaborator.
Welcome to the rest is classified.
I'm Gordon Carrera and I'm David McCloskey.
And that was now deceased Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nazrallah
in a speech posted online in February 2024.
Now that was amid Hezbollah's increasingly violent conflict with Israel
in the months after the 7th of October attacks and the war in Gaza.
And he there is warning Hezbollah members and their families
of the dangers of cell phones, mobile phones.
part of what was to become a fateful choice by the group to shift away from high-tech communications
and towards what I would call pages, David, but which you might call bleepers.
Well, I would use beepers or pagers sort of interchangeably.
Is that not the case in the UK?
I think pages.
Pages is our lingo.
Okay.
Well, we can fight about this over the next few episodes.
And that's right, Gordon, because this little two-parter we're going to do here,
on the rest is classified, is going to focus on an extremely creative, audacious, and violent
operation conducted by Israel's Mossad, their foreign intelligence agency, to seed Hezbollah's supply chain
with explosive laden pagers. Now, this is, I think, one of the most, maybe audacious
supply chain operations ever conducted in the intelligence business. I mean, there have been operations
to attempt to cede Iran's sort of nuclear supply chain with contaminated material.
We talked about Stuxnet on the podcast and sort of trying to mess with the production process.
But I think what is so unique about this operation and we'll get sort of under the hood of how
the Israelis actually did it is they didn't just infect the supply chain.
They became the supply chain and actually took over part of the production and distribution process
themselves and created a product, a unique product, that they then essentially infected
Hezbollah's supply chain with. And what's amazing, and we heard that from that speech from
Hassan Nasrallah at the start, is they are playing on people's fear of technology. So people
know that, you know, mobile phones, cell phones, as Hassan Nasrallah was saying, can be used to
spy on them. And he's talking about them as the collaborator. So it's a fascinating operation,
because they're also using the psychology of people's fear of surveillance to get them to turn to
something else, which then Israel and Mossad are going to control and use against them. So it kind of
mixes technology, espionage, even a degree of psychology. And I guess it's also, it's a covert
campaign, which is going to have a significant strategic effect on this battle between Israel and
Hezbollah, which we're going to be looking at. I think you could make the case.
that this pager operation was a really instrumental part of actually changing the trajectory
of the kind of post-October 7th Middle East, right?
I mean, it is essentially the opening salvo of what will become a 12-or-so-day campaign by the Israelis
that ends up decimating Hezbollah and really bringing the organization to its knees
in a way that I think many analysts thought was not possible.
So the pager operation is a critical piece.
of the Israelis really weakening a key member of this so-called axis of resistance in the
Middle East, right? And I think to the point around this kind of push-pull between technology
and espionage, I think this story says something important about the dynamics of this kind of
ubiquitous technical surveillance and cyber world that intelligence officers and spy
agencies are living in, because we see some of the dynamics here where, as you read up front,
Hassan Nasrallah understands the incredible risks that cell phones pose and how the Israelis have
been able to penetrate his Bala through those phones. And yet, as he goes sort of more analog in a way,
he goes back in time to try to get something that is less digitally connected, the Israelis still find a way
to penetrate his organization and create immense problems for him through this
dumber technology. So you see this kind of back and forth between adversaries in the spy
game. It's not static, right? There's a push and a pull here, and creative adversaries can
still find a way to defeat you. And I also think, as kind of a broader point, this really
shows the incredible vulnerabilities that modern supply chains have. And that's true if you're
the American military and it's true if you're Hezbollah. These supply chains are so stretched out,
so global that in many cases it has become a real pressure point. Yeah, whether you're Hezbollah
or whether you're the Pentagon or whether you're a company buying a service or some kind of
piece of hardware. Do you know what you're buying and what's buried within it, either in kind of
physical terms, as we'll see in this story or in cyber terms? I mean, certainly I think in recent years,
this is one of the most remarkable kind of covert operations that we've seen. I mean, when it
came out, people almost found it hard to believe that this was possible or understand or grapple with
it. And I think what's, you know, so interesting is we can really now, with a bit of hindsight,
pull apart how this operation was put together and how it was executed and the impact that it
had. But should we go back and just kind of lay the groundwork a bit in terms of Israel and
Hezbollah and this very long-standing conflict between this pretty large, powerful organization
and the Israeli state. Yeah, so I think the place to start this is to go back to the early 80s,
to go back to 1982 when Israel invades Lebanon. Now, Lebanon at that point is in the middle of
a brutal civil war. And one of the parties in that civil war is the Palestine Liberation
Organization, which has essentially been using Lebanon as kind of a staging ground for attacks
against Israel and is kind of a safe haven for PLO members who had been kicked out of Jordan years
before. So the Israelis invade in 1982. The goal is to defeat the PLO and to install a friendly government
in Beirut, which seem like very ambitious goals for the Israelis. And it is in the swirl of this
invasion that Hezbollah is formed with Iranian help and the goal of this organization, the sort of
raison d'etra, is to fight the Israelis. Now, we should note that Hezbollah is a Shia group,
which would put it sort of from a sectarian standpoint in relative alignment with the Iranians.
There's a large Shia population in Lebanon. There had been Shia resistance to the Israelis
prior to the invasion, right? But in the swirl of this invasion, it really is kind of the point
at which Hezbollah becomes the thing that we know of today.
And from the early 80s up until 2000,
Hezbollah gets more and more support from the Iranians,
becomes a more mature organization.
And there's really this kind of mix of sometimes there's direct conflict with the Israelis,
there's a regular warfare, there's kidnappings, there's terrorist violence.
And it's not just against Israeli targets in Lebanon.
I mean, most famously, Hezbollah was responsible for the 1983 U.S. embassy bombing,
which killed 63.
They bombed the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon.
There's actually a Marine contingent that Reagan had sent to Lebanon.
241 Americans die, and then it's the deadliest day for the Marine Corps since the Battle of Iwo Jima in the Second World War.
So Hezbollah, by the time you get to 2000, has a tremendous amount of Israeli and American blood on its hands and also some Saudi blood on its hands and terrorist attacks that's conducted.
through this whole time the Israelis are occupying
peace of southern Lebanon
and I should just note here that we talked about this
all the way back Gordon actually
some of our earliest episodes.
That's right. Episode six and seven
of the rest is classified.
If you want to go check it out,
we talked about sort of the Assad regime
and its intelligence services
and kind of set it up like the godfather.
And it is after 1989
that the Syrians, as we discussed in these episodes,
really occupy and kind of
legitimate their occupation of Lebanon. So you actually have the Israelis occupying a section of
Lebanon in the South. The Syrians are occupying the rest of the country, including having an
occupation force, tens of thousands of soldiers and intelligence officers in Beirut. And part of the
agreement to end that civil war is that all militias have to disarm. But there's sort of an unwritten
exception for Hezbollah to legitimate its fight against Israel down in the South. And this is permitted
because the Syrians want to use Hezbollah as kind of leverage and a pressure point
against the Israelis because the Israelis occupy a piece of Syrian territory that the Syrians
want back and they want to use Hezbollah as sort of a card to play or a point of leverage
in that negotiation. At least that's how it starts. So complicated dynamic in Lebanon,
a lot of different parties involved. Major point here is that Hezbollah throughout the 90s
get stronger and stronger, sort of under Syrian tutelage, Iranian patronage,
and it is legitimated as this sort of anti-Israeli fighting force in the south of Lebanon.
Led by Hassan Nasrallah, who is this clerical-looking figure?
Quite portly, I would say.
Quite portly, quite portly.
But as with all of Hezbollah, he's a kind of politician, leader of a resistance group
or a terrorist group, as well as a kind of big player in Lebanese politics.
a figurehead. People look up to him within that sheer community enormously. So a kind of complicated
figure, which I guess matches the complicated role that Hezbollah have in Lebanon. Yeah, he's always
struck me as a bit professorial looking for the head of a international terrorist organization,
but it's kind of what he looks like. He's got the glasses. He's very thoughtful, I think,
in his public remarks and speeches. He takes over the organization in 1992 after his predecessor
or is killed by the Israelis.
And he really is, I think, the architect of this dance
that Hezbollah begins to sort of dance in the 1990s
where the Israelis withdraw from Lebanon in the year 2000.
Nasrallah's sort of stock in the Arab world rises tremendously.
And even inside Lebanon, because he sort of can lay claim to this idea that he,
unlike the Arab armies of 1967,
in 1973 and 1948 and all these other wars that he has actually liberated Arab land.
The Israelis have withdrawn from Lebanon.
Now, the Israelis continue to occupy some small pieces of Lebanese territory in the south and southeast of Lebanon.
And because of that and because of the Syrian occupation, Nasrallah essentially uses this as a
justification to keep Hezbollah armed and to keep fighting the Israelis, even after they've
left most of Lebanon. And Hezbollah in the early 2000s starts to become really a central
player in what we now call the axis of resistance, which is this kind of block of anti-Israel
actors in the Middle East. It includes Iran. It included Syria when Syria was ruled by the Assad
family. Kind of really challenge Israeli and Western power in the region. By the time of 7th of October
and the sort of war on Gaza afterward, Hamas is part of this group too. It's not really an alliance per se, but it's kind of this network of players that are all lined by shared opposition to Israel, right? And critically, under Syrian occupation, the Israelis gone, his Bala really entrenches, right? It builds up its arsenal. It builds what Kim Gattis, the author of a wonderful book on recent Middle Eastern history called Black Wave, what Kim calls its resistance society. So it builds up a,
kind of state within a state. So if your mental model of Hezbollah is terrorist organization,
like you're only looking at it from one angle. It's much more complicated than that.
My one experience, direct experience of Hezbollah is around this time. In 2002, I was
in Beirut for the BBC for an Arab summit. And we actually organized to do an interview with
Hezbollah. And it was fascinating because it was the classic thing. Meet someone on the street
corner. We had hoods put over us and they were then driven into the Shia suburbs of Beirut,
which are fascinating. And you can immediately feel the difference for some of the more
Western international suburbs of Beirut. But then you just entered a big office block, which
was basically the Hezbollah kind of media office, sit down, do an interview like with anyone
else. And you kind of go, it was the kind of weird sense that this was a internationally
designated terrorist organization. And yet a big chunk of Beirut was just theirs.
So they were openly there and running the place. And I guess that is,
the kind of unusual nature of this organization. It's very different from some of the others we've
heard about. And over this period, it's going to grow in strength, isn't it? And it's going to
build up its political influence and its military strength to the point where Israel's going
to be quite worried about that growing strength. I think with good reason, because, I mean,
Hezbollah really conducts through the early 2000s a massive military buildup. The group constructs
a network of bunkers and steel-line tunnels and camouflaged firing positions all throughout the
South, they acquire increasing quantities of advanced weaponry from the Iranians, from the Syrians,
including some really advanced pieces of weaponry from even the Russians, not directly, but via
Iran or Syria, right? And throughout the early 2000s, sort of Israeli estimates, which, you know,
could be a little bit inflated, but I think are directionally correct of Hezbollah's arsenal.
The Israelis estimated in the year 2000, then Hezbollah had 8,000 rockets. By 2002, that's 10,000
rockets. By 2006, that's 13,000 to 14,000 rockets. They've constructed firing platforms
throughout the Southmen, which are vehicle-based, as others that are hidden in bunkers or in the
ground floor of garages of buildings or homes. They have a signal's intelligence capability,
right, including Hebrew speakers for translation. They field sniper teams, anti-tank and anti-armor,
what they call hunter-killer units, to go after Israeli tanks should they cross the border again.
They have an amphibious warfare unit, maritime surveillance.
So it's a very sophisticated group that at the same time to this kind of resistance society
or state within a state point, they have seats in the Lebanese parliament, right?
They have cabinet positions starting in 2005.
They run hospital, schools, provide subsidies for widows.
So Hezbollah is effectively a government.
It is truly a state within a state.
And even though it conducts terrorist attacks and has, you know, these sort of paramilitary groups,
inside it to do those kinds of things. It's not al-Qaeda. And then in 2006, the tension with Israel
is going to actually escalate into a pretty much full-on conflict between the two sides,
which is going to be a pretty brutal battle, and which each side is going to show what they
can do, if you like. Yeah. In late June of 2006, Hezbollah kidnaps two Israeli soldiers
and then take them across the border back into Lebanon. And the Israeli, and the Israeli,
hot pursuit into Lebanon leads to more casualties. And so you start going down this kind of
escalatory spiral. Israel launches an aerial offensive in the south that they hope was sort of
cow Hezbollah into suing for a ceasefire, restored deterrence. But that spreads into a larger
bombing campaign that eventually goes after Hezbollah strongholds in, you know, the sort of southern
suburbs of Beirut, and eventually an Israeli ground invasion. And this fight goes on for 30
days. As a side note, this was my first summer as an intern at the Central Intelligence Agency.
It was the first PDB article. Presidential Daily Brief that the young McCloskey ever wrote as a CIA
intern. Interns are writing briefs for the president. In this case, yes. Now, obviously, I was highly
supervised, right? I mean, I had someone kind of staring over my shoulder. I wasn't just writing
whatever the heck I wanted to. But yes, I was the principal author on
on an article that went into the President's Daily Brief and was read, I'm sure with great interest
by George W. Bush in July of 2006. That is not what most interns do, I think, at that point.
But back to the conflict. I mean, what's interesting is the Israeli military for all its power
and technology struggles, doesn't it, to deal with Hezbollah. And I mean, it effectively gets a bit
of a bloody nose, I think, from Hezbollah. It's fair to say. You know, the Israeli ground forces
are going to get stuck in southern Lebanon. They're going to be doing airstrikes against Hezbollah.
Hezbollah's infrastructure. But Hezbollah have got, you know, these tunnels and networks that they
built, which allow them to kind of hide, to continue to fire. And all the time, the international
pressure is growing on Israel because of the perception that they're bombing this country and,
you know, there are civilian casualties. This conflict does not go well for the Israelis.
Hezbollah throughout is able to actually steadily increase the rate of rocket fire into Israel,
right? So they start with about 150 to 180 per day. The beginning of the conflict,
sometimes they get up to 350 per day.
On the very last day of the war, Hezbollah fires 217 rockets into Israel that kill 33 Israeli soldiers,
which is a quarter of the IDFs, the Israel Defense Forces, fatalities.
Hezbollah does that in the final two days of the conflict.
And what I think is really critical, and it's absolutely critical for the Pagers operation,
is that throughout the conflict,
Hezbollah's command and control structure remains intact.
Its leadership is in bunkers and largely untouched by the Israelis.
And throughout the conflict, Hezbollah retains pretty high morale.
And Hassan Nasrallah and the other leaders of the organization,
particularly on the military side,
are able to communicate with their soldiers in the field consistently
throughout the 34-day conflict.
So the Israelis never, never breach kind of Hezbollah command and control central, right?
And at the end of this 34-day war, 1,200 Lebanese are dead.
There's several billion dollars of damage to the country's infrastructure.
125,000 homes and apartments are destroyed.
And even though it is a disaster for Lebanon and the Lebanese, Hezbollah can kind of come out and say,
we've won because we didn't lose.
And this idea that they are the image of resistance as being the group that stood up to Israel and kind of went toe to toe and wasn't defeated. I mean, that is important, isn't it?
It is. And I think 2006 is really important to sort of set the table for the Pagers or Beepers operation, because 2006 sets three expectations for what the next war between Israel and Hezbollah will look like. And I think one of those is that there's unfinished business between both sides. And I think you actually say that a little bit differently. I think both sides see another conflict, another round is inevitable. It's just a matter of when. So that's one. Two, is that Israel, they're not fighting a terrorist.
group, or at least they're not only fighting a terrorist group. It is fighting something
that is actually between kind of a guerrilla warfare organization and a conventional military.
Isbalah is more like fighting a conventional military than it is, just a straight-up guerrilla
group. And three is that the next war is going to be longer, more violent, and reach much
deeper into Israel. Because Hezbollah was essentially able to bring northern Israel, the economy,
the society to a screeching halt during 2006 because of its rocket fire.
And I think the real fear and expectation on the part of Israeli planners is that next time,
this is just going to go deeper, it's going to go further south into Israel and affect more of the country.
Yeah, and that's 2006.
And then Pesbollah effectively has the chance to rebuild and grow its capacity.
And what's interesting is you do get this sense of, I think, for the Israelis,
that this force is growing to their north with more and more military capacity and that at some
point, as you said, this is going to resume. And when it does resume, it's going to be bad.
That's right. And, you know, on the 6th of October 2023, so the day before October 7th,
Hezbollah is probably the most heavily armed non-state actor in the world. There's a bit of a range here,
but maybe they have 120,000 to 200,000 missiles and rockets. That's largely short range, but they do have
some medium-range capabilities there. And they possess, in particular, medium-range missiles
of Iranian and Syrian manufacturer, because over the course of the years since 2006, there's
essentially been a pipeline created, an arms production and shipment pipeline between Iran, Syria,
and Hezbollah, where these three players are sharing essentially what they have in their
arsenals with each other. Hasbala has scud missiles? Yeah, those are the tactical ballistic
missiles, which I think were originally developed by the Soviet Union, the Russians. But then famously,
the Iraqis have them and Saddam Hussein fires them. And now Hezbollah's got them as well.
Yeah. Hezbollah has anti-ship cruise missiles, including one manufactured by the Russians,
the Akkant, which is one of the most advanced anti-ship missile on the planet.
Hezbollah has 2,000 drones, many of domestic manufacture, and they're actually attempting to
sell some of those drones. So you think about Hezbollah as an arms exporter. And the Israelis
estimate that in a kind of all-out conflict, Hezbollah,
would be able to launch 2,000 to 4,000 rockets and missiles per day, which would saturate
Israel's air defenses. And, you know, when you read the books written by, you know, some Israelis
prior to the 7th of October about just how bad in Israel-Hasbala war could get, you see estimates
of Israeli casualties in the tens of thousands, billions of dollars of economic damage,
and the total disruption of sort of basic infrastructure, power, water, sewage, transportation,
things like that. And so we sort of set the things.
table with all of this, because inside the minds of Mossad, the question is, well, how do you,
how do you create an environment? How do you get the intelligence that would allow you to
change the trajectory of what this next conflict would look like, right? How do you completely
set it onto a different pathway that allows you to actually win and to disrupt his ball as command
and control so that they can do none of these things and this.
of worst-case scenario never happens. So, David, with October the 7th looming ahead and with this
heavily armed group to the north of Israel and the potential for a really violent conflict there,
let's stop when we come back. We'll see how the pages play into what happens next when that
conflict really does erupt. Hi, David McCloskey here from The Rest is classified with an exciting
announcement for U.S. listeners. My new novel, The Persian, drops in the States,
on Tuesday, September 30th.
Now, this book takes readers deep into the heart of the shadow war between Iran and Israel.
The protagonist of this book, Kamranes Fahani, is a dentist living out a dreary existence
in Stockholm, and he agrees to spy for Israel's Foreign Intelligence Service, the Mossad.
He proves to be a very skillful asset, helping Mossad smuggle weapons, run surveillance,
conduct kidnappings.
But when Cam tries to recruit an Iranian widow, seeking to avenge the death of her husband,
the operation goes terribly wrong and lands him in prison under the watchful eyes of a
sadistic officer whom he knows only as the general. Now, after enduring three years of torture
and captivity, Cameron Svahani sits in an interrogation room across from the general, preparing to write
his final confession. Now, Cam knows it is way too late to save himself, but he has managed to keep
one secret, and if he can hold on to it, he might at long last find redemption. The book drops
on September 30th and can be found wherever books are sold. Do be sure to stick around at the end
of this episode, because I'll be reading an excerpt from the Persian.
Welcome back. We're looking at the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, which is going to result in this remarkable operation using pages against them. And we've arrived at the moment, I guess, of the 7th of October, 2023. This day when out of the blue, Israel is going to get attacked, not by Hezbollah, but by Hamas.
the 7th of October, 2023, 846, Israeli civilians are killed, 278 soldiers. Hamas takes
251 hostages. It's the, it's the deadliest day in Israel's history. And this takes
Hassan Nasrallah and the Hezbollah leadership, I think, by surprise. But as we discussed
earlier in this episode, even though Hezbollah and Hamas, they fought actually on opposite sides
of the Syrian Civil War. Both of these organizations are part of this axis of resistance. They're
both dedicated to this fight against Israel. They're both partnered with the Iranians. Nasrallah is,
I think, wary of a broader conflict with the Israelis, because even though he, quote, unquote,
won in 2006, he won a tremendous cost in Lebanon, right? And he's not, I think, at this moment,
keen for a broader conflict with the Israelis. But because Hezbollah is sort of carrying this banner
as the preeminent resistance organization to the Israelis,
all of a sudden, I think with the Israelis then starting to effectively pound Gaza and Hamas,
Nasrallah doesn't think that Hezbollah can just sit this out.
For Hezbollah's status across the Middle East,
as one of the leading resistance organizations,
you get the feeling what he's trying to do is to show that they are supporting Hamas
and the people of Gaza,
but without necessarily quite getting into a full-scale war,
with Israel. So they start launching missiles and drones, don't they, you know, against the Israelis. But
it's fairly limited in terms of what they're doing and where they're doing it. It is. I think it
is limited relative to what Hezbollah might have been able to do. But of course, it's still
massively disruptive in Israel. And it's deadly. I mean, there are 150,000 civilians that get
displaced on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border in the first month after the 7th of October.
And I think Hezbollah and the Israelis kind of settle into this back and forth, almost kind of staring contest slash war of attrition in which it's not quite a full conflict, but at any point in time you get the sense that a miscalculation from one side or this sort of conflict spiral could happen where you end up back in a conflict like the 2006 war, this kind of full scale conflict between both sides.
And amid this broader war of attrition, in November of 2023, so just a couple months after the 7th of October, the Israelis began targeting and killing senior Hezbollah commanders, including members of an elite, Hezbollah group called the Radwan force, which is Hezbollah's premier special operations unit.
they start to kill these commanders.
It happens kind of throughout the winter.
It happens again in January when there's another Radwan commander and actually a top
Hamas official in Beirut are both killed in kind of an Israeli targeted killing.
And these targeted killings in the first few months of the conflict between Israel and
Hezbollah convinces Hassan Nasrallah that he's got some problems.
And he's thinking, you know, are my commanders and my fighters being tracked by their cell phones?
As you read at the beginning.
Which was the opening statement where he goes, the cell phone is the collaborator. This is leading them to know where we are. They can pinpoint your location. Clearly, that is what's in their mind that the Israelis are in the telecoms in the cell phone network, which I'm sure they probably were, and are therefore able to track and pinpoint specific commanders. So obviously they've been doing what they can to protect their operational security, but they've still got that fear, haven't they, that they're going to get hit through the cell phones or at least located through them. We should also note that, I mean, Hasbala has a private,
fiber optic fixed-line telecom network, which at this point in 20-23 is maybe 20 years old.
It runs from those Hezbollah strongholds in the south of Beirut down to southern Lebanon and east
into the Bukkah Valley. The Iranians had helped them set it up. And it's a bit unclear from
the publicly available reporting, but it seems that Hezbollah believes that even this had been
breached by the Israelis probably prior to the 7th of October. I thought banks and trading
companies were the only people who had private fiber optic fix-line telecoms networks. But clearly
Hezbollah as well. But anyway, there you go.
Yeah, it turns out if you're running an extremely paranoid paramilitary slash terrorist organization
in a constant state of war with the state of Israel, you probably want the best possible
telecommunications infrastructure. Oh, and by the way, the Israelis are also going to find a way
into it. So as the Gaza war kind of unfolds, Hezbollah's telecom specialists are starting to actually
break that overall fiber optic network down into a cluster of smaller networks to limit the damage
if it's breached again. So you get the sense of this organization that is feeling squeezed
by Mossad, by the Israelis. And on the 28th of December, 2023, Hezbollah sends a telegram message out
to residents of southern Lebanon, basically telling them to disconnect security cameras from the
internet, because Hezbollah is concerned that the Israelis have access to these security cameras
throughout the south, which would allow them to use that to create targeting packages for the
Israeli Air Force. So everyone's being told to get rid of their phones, basically. Phones, security
cameras, everything, because they know the Israelis are in them. That's right. And by early February,
so around the time of Nasrallah's speech, which you read, there's another directive that goes
out, which is that Hezbollah fighters cannot have their cell phones anywhere near the battlefield.
And there's a Lebanese source that's quoted in this period. He said, quote, today, if anyone
is found with their phone on the front, he has kicked out of Hezbollah. And so soldiers,
his bala soldiers begin leaving their phones behind when they carry out operations.
And his bala actually has administrative officers who are carrying out snap checks to make sure no one's got phones.
So I guess the question is, if you can't use your phone, what do you do?
And if you have suspicions about your fiber optic landline network, what do you do?
Well, Gordon, how about pagers, right?
What about a pager?
A pager would be an interesting way to solve some of these problems, wouldn't it?
When this happened, and I did a news report about it, lots of people said to me,
What is a pager?
Young people out there, young people out there do not know what a pager is.
So I think we should maybe just do a brief explainer about what a pager is.
Because I had the pager when I started work as a journalist, actually.
It was late 90s.
I'm dating myself.
Sorry, David.
You were probably still at school.
But we didn't have mobile phones.
So we were given pages.
And it's a one-way communication device.
So it can receive broadcast text messages from someone.
You can send from one place to many.
and, you know, you can receive a message, which normally said on the pager, please call the news desk.
So it's a kind of simple way of communicating with a lot of people.
But the idea is because it's a one-way broadcast out to the pages, it's not tracking where the
pager is.
And the pager itself is not sending data back to the other side in the way a mobile phone is
or through cell phone towers or other things.
Simply the message goes out and the pager picks it up.
So that, I guess, is why, if you're worried.
worried about being tracked, you would think a pageer is a more secure communications device.
And you would be right, wouldn't you? I mean, despite the tremendous disaster that will befall
Hezbollah here, you would be correct in that. I mean, it's not connected to the, to the
internet, and it's not going to give away your location or even your identity, and it would
still allow you to communicate, and which from the perspective of an organization like Hasbola
makes a ton of sense. So the concept for this operation inside Mossad, probably
originates in 2021 or 2022, so more than a year before the 7th of October.
The broader concept of rigging communications devices with explosives, inside the
Mossad goes back even further.
There's some reporting from the Washington Post.
Maybe this is like 2015, where the Israelis had successfully embedded explosives in
thousands of walkie-talkies that Hezbollah was using.
But the issue with the walkie-talkies is that they're only used in,
battle, large numbers of them would sit idle in kind of storehouses and they wouldn't be
kept on a person. So it's not the most effective tool for really dealing a blow to Hisbalah's
command and control structure. And so those walkie-talkies are sitting idle on the 7th of October,
even though they do have some rigged. Now, the Israelis have tremendous insight into Hezbollah's
decision making, both from a signal's intelligence standpoint and a human, human intelligence
standpoint, right? And the Israelis know that Hezbollah has been looking for sort of hack-proof
electronic networks for relaying messages. And by, at least by 2022, the Israelis see that
Hezbollah is interested in pagers. And so the idea inside Mossad becomes, how do we sort of infect
Hizbalah's supply chain with pagers of our manufacture.
And it's a simple concept, but essentially taking over part of your adversary supply chain
is really not an easy intelligence operation to pull off.
It's very complicated, and we should note here, Gordon, because we're going to go into
the nuts and bolts as we understand it today of how the Israelis did this.
we should say fair warning for listeners it is complicated the way that the israeli set this up
it is it is designed to be very difficult for anybody whether it be hasbalah or journalists
investigative journalists to understand what you're looking at when you look at the web of
organizations and people and the actual creation of these products so we're going to do this
justice but just be warned that there's a lot going on here right because what do you need
to really infect your adversary supply chain.
Well, overall, you need a seemingly legitimate operation that is fed by clean cash that has
zero connection to the state of Israel.
And there's a real balance here because to do that, you need to appropriate legitimate
legal and organizational structures, but you also need enough flexibility so that you can
essentially below the waterline produce a product that has explosives in it, right?
So that balance is very hard to strike.
Yeah, because of course what you can't do is just suddenly create a made-up pager company or brand
because that would immediately look suspicious.
And yet you still need to be able to control this enough to do what you're going to do
in terms of, as we'll see, explosives and things inside pages and to have enough control of it.
So that's the tension, isn't it, between legitimacy and control effectively in the cover story you develop?
If you're going to purchase a product, and especially if you're running procurement for a large organization, you don't want to buy from some no-name brand that has no established track record, right?
So the first thing you want is a big brand that you, the Mossad, can sort of work under or appropriate.
Because, again, if you're the Hezbollah procurement guy, it's going to be hard for you.
to justify buying something from some unknown company that's got no sort of digital trail,
no reviews, right?
So what the Israelis do is that in, again, probably 2021, 2022, the CEO of a Taiwanese-based
pager manufacturer known as Gold Apollo, it's a big name in pagers.
And he is approached by a former employee of his, a woman named Teresa Wu, and she is working
was someone named Tom.
Now, we don't know Tom's last name.
I think there's good reason to believe that Tom is either an officer under non-official
cover for the Mossad or a witting asset of the Mossad.
We don't know, we should say.
Now, Tom is Taiwan-based.
He's Austrian.
He is apparently the big boss of this operation.
And he and Teresa Wu ink a licensing agreement with Goldapala, which will allow
them to distribute
pagers under the Gold Apollo
brand. And of course, gold Apollo,
the big Gold Apollo in Taiwan, they're not going to
manufacture the pagers, right? Massad needs
to do that. And so they need
a few more layers to obscure everything
from the eventual buyers in Hezbollah.
And now a few different organizations
enter the picture here. And again,
this is confusing by design.
I'll also note that all of
all the people that we're going to discuss here
have since vanished
from public view.
after the paper attacks, right?
There's nowhere to be found.
The first organization is a group called BAC Consulting.
It is based in Hungary.
It's founded by a woman named Dr. Christiana Barsoni.
BAC consulting is a strange corporation.
It looks from the outside like a company that's got a lot of different kind of ideas
that maybe don't necessarily connect.
When you look at Christiana Barsone or online profiles,
a little bit more like she's an influencer rather than the CEO
of a company that's actually, you know, a real, real-going concern.
But she has a PhD in particle physics.
She does, from UCL.
Yeah, she has, and that's, and that's true.
She does have that.
A very prestigious university, I should add, in London, UCL, are very serious.
That's right.
And alma mater of our intrepid producer, Becky.
Now, pretty much everybody in this story has a hyphenated nationality.
So, Dr. Christiana is a Hungarian-Italian dual citizen who has her PhD in
particle physics from UCL. She's done some very interesting fabrication on her CV, even though she
does actually legitimately have the PhD. She says she has degrees from SOAS and the London School of
Economics. What does SOAS stand for, by the way, you're in? School of Oriental and African studies.
African studies. So she spent a lot of time in London, by the look at this. I mean, those are
three London universities, UCL, SOAS, and LSE. Yeah. Now, she doesn't actually have the degrees from
So, Asson, LSC. That's not true. She also says she's a board member at the Earth Child Institute,
which is not true, and claimed she was a project manager at the IAEA when, in fact, she was just an
intern for eight months. She is also trying to dabble in Morrell mushroom trading from Patagonia.
So she's kind of all over the place, right? Yeah. That's an unusual mix. It is.
Mushrooms and particle physics. I mean, that's like... Yeah. We should note here, there is a team at
Reuters that has done absolutely stellar work to break this story. And we will actually, for our
club members, be having a conversation with one of the members of that team, James Pearson, at the end
of this series. On how we did it. Yeah, it's amazing. Yeah, and exactly like how they broke this story.
But we should say immense credit to that team here, because we basically wouldn't be able to tell
the story without the exceptional work done by Reuters. So we've got BAC consulting in Hungary,
Dr. Christiana Barsoni.
And interestingly enough, Gordon, in sort of 20, 23,
Dr. Christiana mentions to friends that BAC consulting
has just recently gotten an investor,
Paris-based investor.
Reuters, again, uncovers that Dr. Barsoni actually went
from borrowing cash from friends to lending it
after she gets this mysterious investor
who sort of pumps BAC consulting with some cash.
I think there's potentially reason to speculate that it is our mysterious guy, Tom, who's maybe the investor or someone connected to him.
And BAC consulting, it is a subsidiary of a group called Frontier Group Entity, which is what does that mean?
It sounds like something that I don't know.
Universal import export.
It's in that world, isn't it?
If I was like, give me a name for my cover business.
I think chat GPT would come up with something like that.
And I think this is probably how the Israelis pumped BAC with cash so that BAC essentially becomes
a front for the Israelis to acquire the stuff to build the pagers, right? So BAC pays a firm in
Hong Kong for logistical services. They pay a firm to make the display module for the beepers,
and they sort of purchase additional parts for the beepers like metal chains and crystal display
panels, things like that. And crucially, BAC consulting acquires the license to distribute
beepers under the Gold Apollo brand. So when Tom and Teresa Wu are going to, you know,
sort of big Gold Apollo in Taipei, they are actually acquiring the license from Gold
Apollo and buying it on behalf of BAC consulting. Now, BAC is going to pay about three quarters of a
million euros to Gold Apollo to acquire that license. Apparently BAC, which is based in Hungary,
is going to use Middle Eastern intermediary banks that cause all manner of headaches for the
Gold Apollo accountants in Taiwan. And that licensing relationship goes back to like 2021 and
2022. And this takes us back to the money because again, remember, you need clean cash to, you know,
set up your front organizations here, but where's the money coming from? Because BAC consulting,
prior to this investor had not really been in the black, right?
I mean, it had been kind of Dr. Christiana dabbling in mushrooms and a lot of different
things that kind of weren't actually generating cash flow.
So here we have another strange company, which enters the picture.
It's called Norta Global and pay attention to this Gordon.
I'm actually going to read it directly to make sure I don't get any of these countries wrong.
It is a, it is a Bulgarian company that is established by a man named Rinson Jose, who is
a Norwegian Indian man who lives in Oslo and he has set up the company via the Bulgarian embassy
in Oslo. Wow. So again, purposely confusing here. And we should note here like basically
everyone else in the story, Rinson Jose, who's the head of North Global. I was going to say,
where is Rinson Jose now? He's vanished. Oh no. You surprised me. Yes. Yes. He's disappeared magically.
And we'll talk more with James Pearson, the Reuters journalist in our club interview about
this, but Reuters got Rinson Jose on the phone after the pager attacks happened. And as soon as
one of the journalists mentions Norte Global, Jose hangs up and he's never heard from again.
So anyway, while Rinson Jose is running Norteur, the company sends $2.6 million to BAC consulting
in transactions that are marked in the Norteur global books as services, right? Now,
that's probably the money used to finance the fabrication of the pagers. And interestingly,
just as, you know, started to dig into who Rinson Jose is.
He had a profile on an Israeli website,
which connects entrepreneurs with Israeli investors.
He had also tweeted once at Malala,
the activist Malala, sort of defending Israel back in May of 2021.
So again, it's not proof of anything,
but he maybe looks like the sort of guy who, you know,
if he's tapped on the shoulder by the Mossad,
might be happy to help.
And so I don't think we know precisely what he was.
He's probably not an actual Mossad officer,
but he's somebody who would have sort of looked favorably
on a request for help from the Israelis, most likely.
Now, where did the $2.6 million euro come from?
The sort of digging that's been done since,
like if Hezbollah starts to dig,
you want this to be really challenging for them
and you don't want them to end up with like,
oh, it came from a bank in Tel Aviv, right?
So the money came from two Hong Kong-based companies that handle remittances.
They're run by an Italian and a Swiss national, both of whom don't actually exist, right?
And one of those Hong Kong-based companies, Ellenberg trading, this is where you actually do get a connection back to Israel, paid Norta from a bank in Israel.
So there's another layer here.
It's a bit like when we've done stuff on criminal money laundering, we famously did the kind of billion dollar heist with the North Korean stealing money.
I'm half expecting someone to turn up in a casino in Macau here with suitcases of money in order to kind of launder it and hide the origin.
But we can see that they fairly effectively move the money to build it and create this cover story, which is pretty well distance from Israel to do it.
But the next question is you've got to actually build these pages, haven't you?
You have to make them.
And that is a little bit more mysterious, isn't it, where exactly they were made?
That is still one of the unanswered questions about this whole operation.
And Reuters looked at promotional videos of the pagers, because, by the way, the Israelis
created videos that are available on YouTube that showed the product, right?
And there's a USB stick in the video that's made by a German company.
There's a wood desk in the video where you're kind of showing the pager.
In that video, there's this kind of short segment of.
of silence, and when you amplify it, you get a hum that's at 50 hertz. That is consistent with
a power frequency in Europe or in Israel, but not in Taiwan, where the hum would have happened
at 60 hertz, right? And so we can assume that these were not actually manufactured by Gold
Apollo in Taiwan because of that. Given what we know, I don't think we're giving too much a way to
say that there's going to be something very nasty inside these pages, something explosive,
if you were Mossad, would you risk making them in a third country,
like in a kind of, I don't know, in Hungary or Europe or somewhere,
I'd have thought you'd do it in Israel to kind of,
if you've got to kind of get that much explosives and material into it,
because we're talking about a lot of stuff and to keep control of it
and to avoid any kind of thing going bang by mistake.
So as you said, we don't know.
My guess is they do it in country, but who doesn't?
I wouldn't do it in Israel.
You wouldn't?
No, I don't think so.
I mean, where would you do it, David?
Where would you build some exploding pages?
I would do it in Hungary.
I would do all of the design and testing in Israel.
I'd have your prototype built there.
You'd figure out exactly how you put it together.
You'd tested a bunch.
And then once you've got sort of your blueprints for it,
I would do it in Hungary because I would source everything from Europe.
And I would not have any of the pagers that are being sent to Hizbollah ever on Israeli soil, period.
But anyway, it's a fascinating trail which has led us to this point,
where all of these front companies have been set up,
which clearly has the Israeli hand hidden murkily in the background.
But with that, let's stop because next time we'll understand
how they come into the hands of Hezbollah
and crucially, what's inside them and what's going to happen when they get triggered.
But, Gordon, members of the declassified club,
and we would encourage all of you to join,
will not only get access or have access to the second.
episode in conclusion of this thrilling series right now, but they will also get access to
a raft of bonus content, including our interview with James Pearson, the Reuters investigative
journalist who was so critical to breaking the story. So we hope you join. We'll see you next time.
See you next time.
Hey, it's Anthony Scaramucci, and I want to tell you about my podcast's open book, which just
join the Goalhanger Network, which we're all very proud of. In my latest episode, I interviewed
Gollhanger's very own James Holland. We spoke about World War II and what World War II
teaches us about today. Here's a clip.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Well, I think he was a great man. I think he was a man of vision.
He was a man of enormous geopolitical understanding. And he was a man who offered possibilities.
When you're in a life and death struggle, you need people that
can persuade you. You need people that can bind you. You need men of vision of charisma. That's
the problem with the moment, is we haven't got those guys. I mean, you know, he's flawed, of course,
all the great men are. But thank goodness for the developed world and the democratic world,
but he was political leader of Great Britain in 1940 and throughout the whole of World War II.
He literally, in so many different ways, man of the century, I think, because Roosevelt was a charmer.
Roosevelt was a great strategist. He pulled the Americans through the depression and helped him manage
the war, but without Churchill holding ground in May and June of 1940, it would have been a much
darker, much worse world. It would have been that a lot that the Americans could have done
without Churchill's steadfastness and his inspiration to his fellow citizens.
If you want to hear the full episode, just search open book wherever you get your podcast.
Hey, this is David from The Rest is Classified again. Here's that short excerpt for my
upcoming novel, The Persian, which will be available on September 30th in the U.S. where
ever books are sold. And even though I'm reading right now, the audiobook is wonderfully narrated
by Fajar al-Qaici. I hope you enjoy. Where am I, General? Cam Ranis Fahani loads his questions
with the tone of slavish deference because, though the man resembles a kindly Persian grandfather,
he is in the main, a psychopath. The general is looking hard at Cam. He plucks a sugar cube
from the bowl on the table, tucks it between his teeth and sips his tea. Cam typically would
not ask such questions, but during the three years spent in his care, hustled constantly between
makeshift prisons, he has never once sat across from the general, clothed properly with a
steaming cup of tea at his fingertips, a spoon on the table, and a window at his back.
Something flashes through the general's eyes, and it tells Cam that he will deeply regret
asking the question again. It has been over a year since the general last beat him or strung him
up in what his captors called the chicken kebab, but the memories are fresh each morning.
Can can still see the glint of the pipe brought down on his leg, can still remember how the
pain bent time into an arc that stretched into eternity, and how that glimps into the void filled
him with a despair so powerful that it surely has no name, at least not in Persian, Swedish or
English, the three languages he speaks. And he's got more than the memories, of course. He's got
blurry vision in his left eye and a permanent hitch in his stride. What is the spoon doing here?
A spoon? Two thousand seven hundred and twenty-one consecutive meals have been served, without utensils,
on rubber discs, so Cam can help but blink suspiciously at the spoon. A mirrored? A mirrored?
An eyeball scooper? A test?
Perhaps the general plans to skin the fingers that pick it up.
The general calms his fears with a nod, a genuine one,
which Cam knows looks quite different from the version he uses for trickery,
for lulling him into thinking there will be no physical harm.
Cam puts a lump of sugar into his tea and slowly picks up the spoon.
He stirs, savoring the cold metal on his fingertips.
He sets it down on the table and waits,
listening to the soft metallic wobble as the bowl of the spoon comes to rest.
You will write it down again, the general says.
He is rubbing the gray bristle on his neck, and Cam follows his eye contact as it settles on the portraits of the two Ayatollah's looking down from the wall above.
When Cam was a child, the sight of the Ayatollah has frightened him. It still does. He looks away.
You will write it again, and you will leave nothing out. It will be comprehensive and final.
Final? Cam considers another question. The general's silent gaze screams, do not.
The first drafts, right after his capture three years ago, were utter shit, like all first
drafts. To call them stories would be like calling the raw ingredients spread across your counter
a meal. No, they were just a bunch of facts. Information wrung from his tortured lips and committed
to bloodstained sheets of A4 paper. But Cam knows he's being too hard on himself. As a dentist,
his writing had been limited to office memorandums and patient notes. As a spy, his cables adopted
similarly clinical tones. Just the facts, glitzman, his handler, the man who'd recruited him to
work for Mossad liked to say, leave the story to someone else.
it preferred he write in English, not Swedish. The general, of course, demands that he write in
Persian, and it is in Persian that Cam has found his voice. Now the cell becomes Cam's scriptorium.
In his dragging, tedious Persian script, he writes the Quranic inscription, in the name of God,
honesty will save you across the top of the cover page. Cam knows that the general appreciates
this self-talk reminder right up front. Beneath it, Cam titles this is the first part of his
sworn confession, and then signs his name. Someone will fill in the date,
later, because though he does not know the date today, he also knows not to ask.
The general's men will fill in the location for their own files.
He writes the number one in the top left corner.
But which story should he tell?
The general said it was to be his masterpiece.
Perhaps the best of each, he thinks.
He would also like to write something the general will let him finish.
He would like to reach the end.
Across hundreds of drafts, no matter the type of story, Cam has only managed to write
one version of the end.
It is the part he fears the most.
Someday he has told himself
Someday he will write a new beginning to the bleakness of the end
Will he find it here on this last attempt?
A prisoner can dream, he thinks.
As always, Cam completes a final ritual before he starts this draft.
He imagines writing down his last remaining secret in crayon
on one of these A4 sheets right in front of him.
One secret.
Three years in captivity, Cam has held on to only one.
Then he pictures of wooden cigar box.
He slides the paper with the secret inside.
In the early days of his captivity,
he locked the real secret written on imaginary paper in the imaginary cigar box into an imaginary safe.
But the general's man broke into every physical safe in his apartment,
and Cam thought he should also improve his mental defenses.
He now pictures the cigar box with his secret, incinerated on a monstrous pyre,
the lights and heat so fierce that every dark corner of his brain burns bright as day.
This way Cam's not lying when the general asks him if he's been truthful.
If the story is complete, he's written it all down, has he not?
the prisoner cannot be held responsible for how management handles the papers.
Cam presses the crayon to the paper and begins.
You are not luminous, Watson, but you are a conductor of light.
Here they are.
Dr. Mortimer, I presume.
Yes, hi.
John.
John Watson.
Who is your client?
He was my client.
Sir Charles.
Baskerville.
Keep reading.
Ah, a local shepherd noted,
I saw first that of the maid,
Hugo Baskerville passed me thence on his black mare,
and there behind him, running mute upon his track,
such a hound of hell
that God forbid should ever be at my heels.
I wish I felt better in my mind about it.
It's an ugly business once,
An ugly, dangerous business.
And the more I see of it, the less I like it,
I shall be very glad to have you back safe from sound in Baker Street Passport.
Hello?
Goalhanger presents.
You're not Sherlock Holmes.
I'm Henry Baskerville.
From one of the biggest audio dramas of all time.
Does it bother you?
Like, in a creepy kind of way?
Like in, uh, there's an evil giant hound that likes to taste.
to Baskerville's kind of way.
The seminal gothic novel by Arthur Conan Doyle.
They're watching.
Who? Who are watching?
It's not safe.
Rippon Meyer.
I could just make out its pitch black form.
Welcome to deepest.
Everything a hellish void.
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Of giant facts.
No.
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