The Rest Is Classified - Is Iran Recruiting Spies to Conduct Anti-Semitic Attacks?

Episode Date: May 28, 2026

Are groups linked to the Islamic Republic recruiting spies on Telegram to coordinate anti-semitic attacks in Europe? How are Jordanian people feeling about the war in Iran? And why is anti-western sentiment reaching new heights in the Middle East? Listen as David McCloskey is joined by award-winning CNN International Correspondent Jomana Karadsheh, to discuss her latest reporting on how what appear to be Iran-linked groups are using social media to recruit individuals to carry out surveillance and attacks on Jewish communities. ------------------- THE REST IS CLASSIFIED LIVE 2026 at The Rest Is Fest: Buy your tickets ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ to see David and Gordon live on stage at London’s Southbank Centre on 4 September: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.southbankcentre.co.uk/whats-on/the-rest-is-classified-live/⁠⁠⁠⁠ ------------------- Sign-up for our free newsletter where producer Becki takes you behind the scenes of the show: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://mailchi.mp/goalhanger.com/tric-free-newsletter-sign⁠-up⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ------------------- Join the Declassified Club to go deeper into the world of espionage with exclusive Q&As, interviews with top intelligence insiders, regular livestreams, ad-free listening, early access to episodes and live show tickets, and weekly deep dives into original spy stories. Members also get curated reading lists, special book discounts, prize draws, and access to our private chat community. Just go to ⁠⁠therestisclassified.com⁠ or join on Apple Podcasts. ------------------- Get a 10% discount on business PCs, printers and accessories using the code TRIC10. Visit ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://HP.com/CLASSIFIED⁠⁠⁠⁠ for more information. T&C's apply. ------------------- Email: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠[e-mail]⁠⁠⁠ Instagram: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@restisclassified⁠ Social Producer: Emma Jackson Producer: Becki Hills Head of History: Dom Johnson Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

For exclusive interviews, bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to series, first look at live show tickets, a weekly newsletter, and discounted books. Join the declassified club at the rest is classified.com. This episode is brought to you by HP. In intelligence work, it's rarely the obvious problem that causes failure. It's the overlooked detail or the flaw nobody quite solved. The kind of vulnerability, intelligence services, look for. And running a business is the same.

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You should have ordered from Wayfair. With Wayfair, there's no what if. Just style you love and quality you can trust. Visit Wayfair.ca. Wayfair, every style, every home. Well, hello and welcome to a very special bonus episode of The Rest is Classified. Gordon Carrera is not with me today, which is, you know, it could be good or bad, depending on your persuasion, but he is off.

And instead, I am joined by the award-winning CNN international correspondent, Jamana Karacha, who for more than two decades has been reporting extensively from countries all across the Middle East and North Africa and has been integral to the amazing CNN coverage that is coming out of that region. And she is here today with us to discuss in particular her latest investigation into whether Iran-link groups are recruiting individuals, sometimes through social media, to carry out arson attacks against mostly Jewish communities. across Europe. I think we're also going to have a really interesting and wider ageing conversation about what's going out of the region now and kind of how Iranian intelligence is conducting operations in the midst of this conflicts. So, Jamana, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the rest is classified. It's great to be here with you, David. Jamana, maybe first, you have spearheaded this really fascinating investigation into

how these Iranian intelligence-linked groups are recruiting people across Europe in an attempt to conduct a range of horrific attacks. Could you just tell us a bit about this investigation, what you found as you dug into this? Well, you know, David, back in March, that's when we started seeing these arson attacks targeting mostly Jewish sites, Jewish organizations, synagogues, in different parts of Europe. I think the one that grabbed everyone, attention was that massive attack in the predominantly Jewish area of Golders Green in North London that targeted the volunteer ambulance service, the Hitzola. I mean, those pictures at that time shocked so many in London.

That was at the end of March, and that was the first attack that took place in the UK. And it was claimed by a group that we'd never heard of before. Haraqat Oshab al-Iemin al-Islamia, known as Ha'I. And this is a group that emerged just a few days after the war in Iran began. And we started looking and it had claimed several attacks in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and then you had that first attack in the UK and then several others that followed the following week. And we started hearing from different security experts and British authorities as well. but they were investigating and looking into Iran's links to this group that appears,

appeared only really online. Their claims of responsibility, propaganda videos, would pop up on telegram channels that are run by the Iranian-backed Shia groups in Iraq. And so, you know, everything was, you know, pointing towards Iran being involved in these attacks and that this group, as some experts were telling us, appears to be a front for the IRGC. And that's really how we started digging into what is going on, who is this group, how are they operating in the UK or Europe. And, you know, when you look at the suspects, David, in most of these arson attacks, most of them seem to be young teenagers in a lot of these cases.

And the question was, how are they being recruited? Right? And that's how we started really digging into it. How are they being recruited? Because it does seem, I guess, on the face of it, that with some of these suspects, there wouldn't be this ideological impulse that's drawing them into it. But what's, as you dug into it, I mean, what is the motivation or what are the motivations for people getting involved in this?

So we're still waiting to hear from. the, you know, British authorities and others in Europe about how these young people are being recruited. But they have been looking into whether they're using criminal proxies to hire them. Are they using gangs? This is a tactic that we've seen the Iranian intelligence used in the past in places like Sweden and Germany. That is one possibility there. The other one is online recruitment. That's how we started really digging into these online channels and how easy it is to recruit young people these days. It literally is one click away. And we heard from one of the suspects of the UK, a 17-year-old who targeted the Kenton Synagogue in Northwest London.

That fire bomb attack, the 17-year-old in a statement said he had no idea that this was a synagogue, that he has nothing against the Jewish people. So that, of course, raised questions. What are these kids being told that they're doing? Did he not Google the address, like, before he did it? They just, I don't know, do you buy it? I guess it's maybe the question, like, or do you think that's part of the defense?

I mean, it's very difficult to get into because of, you know, the regulations in the UK and what was said in court. But I can tell you this. we went to the synagogue. It's hard to miss what it was, right? You can see the Hebrew writing outside. You can see a big menorah as well outside. So it's clearly a synagogue. And then in the case of another 17-year-old in Belgium, we spoke with his lawyer who described, you know, the situation with this kid. She said he was used as cannon fodder, that they're getting paid. to carry out these attacks, not really understanding what it is that they're doing and who they're doing it for.

And you just look at it. This model, it's quite a powerful tool, whether it is the Iranians, because we can't confirm that it's the Iranians behind it. But we've heard authorities in the different countries saying that this is really what they're looking into. Whoever is behind this, it's cheap, it's easy. it has a devastating impact on the communities that are being targeted when it comes to the Jewish community especially when we've spoken with people. And then it also gives them that incredible kind of plausible deniability where you have these different layers of who's doing the recruitment, how they're doing the recruitment, who is filming this, who's posting these videos. You've got

several layers to whoever is ordering this at the end, right? I wanted to ask you about that, because I know you can't confirm it, but given the, you know, your own analysis and the security experts you've spoken to, what's the best, I guess, hypothesis for how this ladders up to Iran? Like, how does it actually connect up into the IRGC, let's say? So let's look at this case, right? With these arson attacks, with Haraqqa Therlemy, online group, we've not seen it before, just popped up days after Iran is under pressure. Israel and the U.S. are attacking Iran, and all of a sudden you have these attacks taking place in Western capitals. And it looks like quite a powerful, you know, threat or message,

because at the beginning, right, up until a stabbing attack that was claimed by a Zhabili Amin, no one really got hurt in these arson attacks that were taking place late at night. it was a message in a very powerful one that this war doesn't necessarily have to stay contained in this region. You started looking into the group and its links, and we had reporting that no one else had a source that is close to Qatahib Hezbollah, the most powerful of Iranian-backed Iraqi, Iraqi Shia militias, paramilitary groups. A source close to Katab Hezbollah told us that the groups, Haraqt al-Illamin, and Katab Hezbollah are linked, and that some members of Ha'i are Iraqi. And at the same time as well,

we started looking into these different telegram groups where these claims were first appearing. Two days before the first attack happened, This was, I think, on the 9th of March, a message comes up on one of these groups that is linked to Qatab, Hezbollah, and it says, Haraqat al-Iraim coming soon in Arabic. So you could see all these, you know, links to Iran. But I think the most significant thing was this recent arrest in the U.S., or it actually happened outside the U.S. of an Iraqi individual, who, according to some media reports, was arrested in the U.S., in Turkey, and he was taken to New York, and he appeared in court.

He was charged. And this guy is a leader in Qatar of Hezbollah that U.S. prosecutors say coordinated or inspired 18 attacks, including those attacks that we've been talking about, and plots as well, targeting Jewish targets in the U.S., in New York, in L.A. and Arizona. And this guy, you know, there are photos of him with Qasem Soleimani from the old days, right? So, I mean, you look at all these, you know, different threads. And I think up until that announcement came from the U.S. recently, there was a lot of speculation. And then you see those links very clear there.

And according to U.S. prosecutors, they say that the way they got him was he was trying to recruit a person he thought was a member of the cartel to carry out attacks in the U.S. and offering to pay them in crypto. But that person was an undercover FBI agent. Interesting. And that's how they managed to get him, right? So I think that made that link between Iraqi militias, Iran, the IRGC, of course, as it pretty much backs and, you know, controls very much the Iraqi paramilitary.

groups. It was very, very clear when we saw that. You know, it's interesting on the, on the cartel front. I believe that there was an attempt, I think it might have actually been linked to the attempt to, this was 12, 13 years ago, to try to kill the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. in Washington. And I believe that the Iranians, in that instance, had also attempted to use someone linked to a cartel to either conduct the assassinations. or to help smuggle something across the border so that there's definitely, you know, there's definitely some connection there. I'm curious in your investigation, you actually interacted to some degree with this group on the telegram channel that they operate. Well,

tell us about that and what what that interaction or set of interactions was like. So, David, when we're trying to figure out, right, how are they recruiting them? Is this through the gangs? Is this through these criminal proxies? Or, you know, some of the security experts we spoke to said, look, just check out these different telegram groups out there. It's not simple. They said that this is very much your Russia Wagner sort of model that, you know, it's their playbook, right, that's being used by the Iranians now. And it sounded pretty crazy. I have to say at the beginning, it just looked like too obvious where they're saying we're recruiting, we're the Iranian intelligence. Do you want to come and help us? If you do, just click start.

And so we, myself and our producer, Flo, we went undercover online, is two young London Telegram users. So Flo starts a conversation with this group, this channel called VIP Employment. And they're offering to hire high paid agents for the Iranian intelligence. And they're open about this. They're open that they represent Iranian intelligence on the telegram channel. Absolutely. You've got the flag of the Islamic Republic. You've got, yeah, with the advertising saying that, you know, they're going after, you know,

they're targeting Zionist entities. They are offering jobs to, you know, people who are willing to help and assist. I mean, it's so open. It's out there. And so flow starts a conversation with them. And the first question you get is, where, you know, where. are you? Which city are you in? How old are you? What are your capabilities? Right? So they want to know more about you. I've heard from some experts that this is about building some sort of a database, right?

Where they've got that. They've got, you know, different people around the world they can use. In Flos case, it was they asked her to print out two posters, anti-Trump, anti-war, posters and put them up in different parts of London. And they said that they would pay her $2 in crypto per poster. And we're also telling her how to avoid surveillance cameras. So it was, it sounded like is this some sort of a, I don't know, like a test, you know, checking to see if she's going to be loyal and do this, an initiation task of sorts. In my case, they went straight into it. asking me if I had access to any Zionist individuals or assets. And when I asked, what does that mean?

They said anyone who's in the IDF, Shimbet, Mossad, do you have access to any individuals? I said, well, are you looking for people just in Israel? And they said, no, we're looking for anyone who can harm Israeli individuals or assets. And at that point, we felt we had to end that conversation there. Right. Because it sounded quite dangerous at that point. But you just see how easy it is to disrupt these conversations. Now, who's running this? Who's behind this? We don't know. But what we found is the fact that this same channel name, VIP employment, appeared in indictments in Israel last year and that they were also trying to recruit Israelis in that same way. I got relatively deep into this when I was researching by fourth book because the whole premise was looking at this kind of shadow conflict between Israel and Iran.

And I was trying to figure out the ways in which the Iranians tried or tried to penetrate Israeli society. And it's interesting the parallels because in many cases in Israel, The Iranian recruits, again, most of it's done digitally similar, right, to these cases in Europe. And the asks were in some ways quite similar. Could you graffiti, you know, buildings? Could you put up anti-government signs, right? Stuff protesting that Yahoo and his government. And it kind of ratcheted up in some cases to like actually trying to, you know, murder businessmen, scientists, journalists.

I think there was a plot actually, which I'm not sure how far it got to try to kill Netanyahu and some people around Tibetan government. What feels different here is it's like a geographic extension beyond Israel into Europe. And of course, it's happening during the war. But do you get the sense it's the same playbook and maybe the same people? Or is there a connection between these two arenas, I guess, from an espionage standpoint? Absolutely. I think, I mean, you look at it.

It seemed to have worked in Israel where you have a country. now, but is, according to Israeli officials, facing its most serious domestic espionage crisis ever, right? It's unprecedented the number of Israelis who have been, you know, allegedly hired by the Iranian intelligence, like you say, digitally. And, you know, you look at that and you look at what people were being asked to do and how easy it is that I think, why not? Why would wouldn't the Iranian regime at a time like this when it wants to put pressure on other Western countries, why not try and use that same playbook elsewhere? And that's exactly what security experts we've been talking to for the past few weeks have been telling us. It's exactly the same

thing. And they're saying they've also learned that from the Russians. Tell me more about that. It's a it's a Russian playbook that the Iranians have adopted. That's what they're saying. You know, there was another arson attack in the UK, whether there's any sort of coordination between the Russians and the Iranians. That's unclear. But that's a possibility, according to some experts. Or it's just, you know, just adopting that same tactic and using something that, you know,

keeps that distance between the state that may be behind this and, you know, your low-level guns for hire who are carrying out these different attacks. I think what is really concerning right now is where does this go next? In the UK, for example, right? You know, I've been for years speaking with Iranian dissidents and journalists who have been targeted by the Islamic Republic outside the country. And so this is not new. They're not surprised that this is actually happening.

You know, there have been plots, whether it's in the U.S. or in the U.K., where I am, where I've been speaking to people to assassinate and kill these journalists and dissidents where they would hire criminals to do this. And the concern right now is, it could get much worse, is what people are saying.

And they're really worried that, you know, right now, if the Iranians are seeing how effective this method is and using it to put pressure on these different Western governments, could they take this further? And I think what happened in Golders Green with a stabbing attack also worried people that, you know, two members of the Orthodox Jewish community were seriously hurt in that stabbing attack that was claimed by this Iranian-linked group. I can tell you that it's put people on edge,

whether it's the Jewish community or Iranian dissidents. We've talked a little bit about it, but I just wanted to focus on it because I think it's important. What do you think the goal is behind it? Like what's the why for Iran? Because to some degree, it feels like just an eye for an eye. You know, we're under attack. We're going to, you know, impose some pay done.

you, but what do you see as the strategic motivation for it? You know, if you look at these attacks, when they claim these attacks, what they're saying is, and we're not talking about Iran, right? We're talking about this front, what experts believe is a front for the IRGC that's claiming these attacks. They're saying, okay, this is revenge for the killing of Ayatullah Khomeini. This is, you know, for pushing to stop the war. I do think it's a threat to the West to these different countries that have not gotten

involved in this war. Saying we can bring this war to the heart of Europe if we want to. And it's not necessarily about using its missiles or weapons. It is the fact that you can weaponize teenagers. You can use people within these different countries to carry out these attacks. It's not the most sophisticated way, but it's this hybrid warfare, I think, is it described? And it's really, really effective to put pressure on these Western countries to stop the war on Iran. It seems really challenging to counter because it's, obviously, it doesn't involve an Iranian handler somehow getting himself or herself into the UK to physically meet with people.

As your interaction with the, you know, recruiters suggest the quantity has a quality all its own here and that they can shoot this out sort of scound. batter shot and see what sticks. It seems cheap. Like my sense from your reporting is that they're not paying great money for this. So, you know, you're probably finding people who are in some measure of financial straits who are keen to do it for not much money. What are you hearing from security experts on like how you would actually stop this? How do you counter it? It's very, very difficult. I think the British have come out saying, you know, that they're basically going to crack down really hard on anyone who's involved in these attacks. And, you know, almost every one of those attacks that happened in the UK, they've arrested suspects. And they're

fast-tracking a lot of these cases and they're moving them fast. They want to deter people from joining them saying, look, you know, if you think this is an easy way of making quick money, think twice because you're disposable for them. They'll use you. and they'll drop you. And this has been the message from British authorities. I think at this point, that's their main tactic of showing how these kids are left on their own. But it's very, very challenging. I mean, M.I. 5 last year said that they had disrupted an unprecedented number of Iranian plots targeting the UK, more than 20 plots. And, you know, I've attended some of the court hearings of some of the people who were detained and arrested before this spate of the anti-Semitic

arson attacks. Several people were arrested in the UK for spying on Jewish and Israeli sites. And it was very interesting without naming those individuals, without going into details of the case because, you know, of the restrictions when it comes to these hearings, I can tell you in the case of one of them. It was very, very interesting, David. It was a couple of guys who were just going around and taking photos and just logging information about these different targets, right, in the UK, in London. And according to prosecutors, they alleged that this was being sent back to someone in Iran. It's that easy, right? But we don't know. Is this someone who's being paid? Is this someone whose family is under pressure back in

Iran. So it's going to be very, very difficult. It's a new kind of challenge that security services in these different countries now are going to have to face. It is a war that is coming to these Western nations, right? It's not a war that is contained in this region. And I think controlling it, especially when you see how easy it is to recruit people online. especially when you look at the state of the economy right now, it is going to be very, very challenging. Well, I guess also if you just, if you look at the way that the Iranians have done this in Israel up to this point,

there is this kind of escalation ladder, not in each individual case, but kind of more broadly where it seems as they do find people who are willing to do more and more kind of, you know, extreme things, you end up with more fire bombings. I think in a couple cases in Israel, the Iranians actually tried to get people to start forest fires, you know, mass, like to do kind of mass vandalism. I'm curious, Joanna, about something that's fascinated me in looking at this conflict, because the Israelis and their ability to penetrate Iran are so unbelievably effective.

And then when you look at the stuff we've been talking about, the Iranian response, in many ways is very crude. And I'm curious if you could, this is zooming out a bit, but why is the intelligence conflict between these two countries so lopsided? Because it does, it just, it feels the level of sophistication, the scale, the scope, the level of success, like the Israelis are way ahead. And it doesn't mean that the stuff you're reporting on, it obviously has a cost and It's tremendously scary, but the Iranians are behind.

I'm just curious why you think structurally that's been the case. Look, it's crude, but it's effective, right? You know, when you look at what it's been happening in Israel and this, you know, unprecedented domestic espionage crisis that they're going through and, you know, what you were mentioning, yes, sometimes people are just hired to, you know, burn posters and, and and do these sort of things that are not necessarily breaking any laws. But taking pictures of sensitive sites, they have also, you know, targeting certain individuals.

Some of these sites, according to prosecutors, you know, that they took pictures of and provided, sent them to the Iranians, according to these indictments, have been targeted by the Iranians during the June war last year, the 12-day war, and again, during the war this year. Look, I think the Israelis have the most sophisticated, most advanced intelligence services, not just in this region and beyond. And I think over the past few years, even when people already knew that, they would still get shocked every time you'd see the level of targeting that was taking place inside Iran.

And for the Iranians themselves, I mean, for the regime, that also must have been absolutely just the impact that had on the morale, on the confidence within the regime, you know, targeting of the different figures as well as what we saw happen in Lebanon as well, that level of infiltration we saw from the Israelis. But I think what we're going to see is the Iranians using more and more of these sort of, you know, what you're describing as these crude tactics, but they do have an impact, a psychological impact as well on a population. After our investigation, David, the channel that was recruiting people on telegram, it was taken down within a few hours of a report coming out, it was taken down. And the following day, many in Israel got text messages that were saying

that it was the Iranian intelligence and calling on people to contact Iranian missions in different countries to help them. And it's about, you know, it's about their future, they said. So you can imagine the kind of psychological impact that has, sometimes it doesn't take much, whether it's this online recruitment, sending these text messages, the hacking, Iranian hacking groups and what they have been able to obtain from inside Israel, from Israeli officials as well over the past year or so, it's definitely had an impact, you know, speaking with Israelis. They're really good at these sort of siops, right? And they have this impact on a society, really. Yeah. I mean, so much so that the Israelis, I think it was their sort of public.

Diplomacy Initiative had partnered with Shin Bet, the Internal Security Service, to run a campaign that was, I think it was titled, like, easy money, heavy price to try to get the word out about this because it had gotten so prevalent. I mean, because obviously the number of indictments, I think there have been 60 or so in Israel is the tip of the iceberg, right, for the number of people in the society who have been contacted and maybe in some cases convinced. to do some amount of work for Iranian intelligence in a winning or unwitting fashion. We used to talk at the agency about, you know, high CI counterintelligence threat environments. And it was kind of, when I was in, it was like a very geographically bounded conversation.

And it's totally changed now because you don't have to go to Iran. You don't have to go to a place where you have a lot of Iranian intelligence officers or Iranian militia or anything like that to be. contacted by the Iranian intelligence services, right? You just, you could be sitting in London on telegram and you can be recruited to do things that are very useful for them. And, you know, you're the one, as we're seeing, that bears the entire burden cost of this. Like, they don't care if you get caught. You know, they'll just move on to the next person. So it's, it is very crude, but efficient, I guess. In many cases, people don't necessarily know. in some of these cases that it is the Iranian intelligence doing this, right?

It can either be people being recruited, you know, openly by these groups calling themselves Iranian intelligence or the same time, you know, you're just looking for quick money, go firebom a synagogue in London and we'll pay you this much, right? You know, this building, this address. And it's just, I mean, you look at it. I think this is in your reality that we're going to be face. this is a whole different threat level that I think is going to be very, very challenging for governments around the world and security services to try and contain and control.

Yeah, no, absolutely. And, Jamad, I wanted to ask, because I know you're in Amman Jordan right now. What's the view from Amman when we look at Iran? And it doesn't necessarily have to be connected to this intelligence story we've been talking about but just even more broadly as we look at the conflict in Iran and the possibility that it could restart. I mean, what is your sense of how Jordan, the government, the people are responding to the ongoing tension of the region? Yeah, I've been here for a couple of days, David, and people just describing what it was like during, you know, the height of the war. Jordan was never really in the headlines, right?

Everyone was very much focused on what was going on in the Gulf, right? Those images that really shocked the world, you know, Dubai and Doha and Abu Dhabi and Jordan was kind of forgotten, right? And I do think that, you know, they kind of handled it well. They were okay for the most part. You didn't have really many casualties here. There was a lot of these missiles targeting and drones targeting Israel were being intercepted in Jordan. airspace. But the impact that had on this country, it's devastating on so many levels, right? The state of the economy in the country, and that is, of course, a security concern as well.

And then I think what you have is the official government position and the population's position. So during the war, Jordan, working with the U.S. and other allies, was intercepting these drones and missiles, targeting Israel and targeting Jordan, targeting U.S. bases in this country. And so many Jordanians were against that. They saw this as their country coming to the aid of Israel. You have officials coming out and saying, look, we're doing this because we are a sovereign nation. We need to be protecting our airspace. We need to be protecting our people. We need to intercept these Iranian attacks. But people saw it as Jordan defending Israel, and that created so much tension in this country. And I think this is a byproduct of what has happened in this region since October 7 and the war in Gaza,

where you have a lot of people here who were happy to see Israel being targeted by Iran. And I was just having these conversations with people yesterday, where people are telling me, you don't understand. Gaza changed everything for us. And it's not just in Jordan. People are more open about this and they say this, you know, more freely here. But in a lot of countries, right, back to our conversation from earlier, yes, a lot of these young people who are being recruited by the Iranian regime, potentially, and, you know, other bad actors out there are not necessarily ideologues, right? These are young kids who are looking for quick money.

But you're looking at a situation now where you have a generation that is so angry at what has happened over the past few years about watching, you know, those images out of Gaza of children killed and, you know, everything that has happened there. The level of anti-Western sentiments I am seeing in my region is like nothing I'd seen before. not even, you know, the lead-up to the Iraq war and the Iraq war where you saw the recruitment of so many young people in this region to fight with Al-Qaeda. We are talking about a level right now of anti-Western sentiment that I had not seen even that. What do you think we can do? What do you think, I mean, what are Western security experts saying might be done to repair if we could use that word? or anything close to it, are relations in, you know, in the Arab world or in the region? Or is it just, is it so linked to our relationship with Israel that it's not, there's nothing to be done?

What are you hearing? I mean, it is such a difficult question to answer, right? I mean, it's, it's something that, you know, I'm sure is keeping Western intelligence agencies very busy right now. I do think it's going to be very, very challenging, and it does, you know, as someone from this region, not only as a journalist that covers this region, I do worry about where this is all headed. I do worry about how polarized our world is right now

and how people, you know, I think for a lot of young people in this country and elsewhere in the region, You know, they see, you know, the U.S., Israel, you know, Western countries. They see this as attacking everyone at them. This is not just about the U.S. and Israel going after, you know, the Iranian regime and its nuclear program. They see this as, and I hear this a lot, right? This is about going after another Muslim nation.

This is about destroying another powerful nation. And this is how, you know, they're viewing it through that lens. And I really don't know. How do you begin to change that, especially after what has happened over the past couple of years and how angry people are with the U.S. and its support for Israel? Yeah. No, I think that's the spot to end this because that sentiment, my sense is that it's either not understood here or it's. wildly sort of underestimated because I think there has been a dramatic shift. And unless you're like most Americans are not spending a lot of time in the region, not

spending a lot of time thinking about the region unless we happen to be in one of our various conflicts, there's not a sense for just how kind of deep that animosity has become in some quarters of the region. So I think that's, it's really important. And it's not just You know, in the past, you would hear it from a lot of, you know, people who you would consider to have extreme views. I hear this from a lot of educated, middle class, Christian Arabs and others. I mean, this is what worries me right now is how widespread that sentiment is. Well, Jamana, thank you so much for joining us to talk about the region broadly, this amazing report that you and the team at CNN did on Iranian linked groups recruiting in Europe and, and targeting Jewish communities, I think it's just, it's a incredibly important reporting

that you guys are doing. And thank you for joining us on the ground for Ruban. It's really been a pleasure. Thank you for having me. In intelligence information is only as reliable as the source behind it. It can sound convincing, but the real test is whether it holds up under scrutiny. And for brands, the same principle holds. It may not be called tradecraft in a media plan, but a message is only as credible as the channel it moves through. The rest is classified is part of Goalhanger, the independent UK podcast network behind the rest is politics, the rest is history, and more. Across the network, there are over

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