The Spy Who - The Spy Who Sold Nuclear Secrets to Iran | Cargo of Doom | 3

Episode Date: May 12, 2026

With A.Q. Khan now fully rogue and his network working to fast-track Libya’s nuclear weapons program, the CIA and MI6 need to find a way to shut his network down permanently.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Audible subscribers can listen to all episodes of The Spy Who, ad-free right now. Join Audible today by downloading the Audible app. February 2003, Nuttons, Iran. UN weapons inspector Oli Hayannan watches through the window as his car rumbles down a remote dirt road towards a cluster of concrete buildings. He and his team work for the International Atomic Energy Agency. The watchdog charged with containing the spread of nuclear weapons. They're here following a tip-off that this facility is enriching uranium as part of Iran's secret weapons program. Heanan is keeping an open mind.

The tip came from a group opposed to Iran's theocratic regime. It has every incentive to exaggerate its claims. It might even have been fed information by foreign intelligence agencies who also want change in Iran. But as they get closer, he sees anti-aircraft missile batteries. is guarding the site, and that sets alarm bells ringing. An Iranian guide leads them inside, down a corridor lined with photographs and diagrams for advanced centrifuges. It is designed to impress Iranian dignitaries and show them their money as being well spent.

Then they enter a vast room where more than 160 centrifuges are spinning at speed and ranged in parallel cascades. The lines run far into the distance, and the space is. big enough to house a thousand centrifuges. Ainen takes a deep breath. The opposition group was right. His mission now is not to find out if Iran has a nuclear weapons program, but how it advanced so far.

He turns to the guide. This is an impressive facility. When did construction start? Who helped you build it? About five years ago? We built it ourselves. There is information on the internet. This is highly advanced technology that designs

are closely guarded. We have very competent scientists. Another inspector moves in for a closer look, then beckons, Hayn and over. This design's familiar. I've seen it before. Well, if I'm not mistaken, this resembles the Urenko centrifuge built in the 70s. The same one Pakistan used for its weapons program? Yes.

Then that means. Both men understand the terrifying implications. This means Iran is getting help from Pakistan. But Pakistan is a U.S. ally in the United States. the war on terror. So if its government isn't behind this, someone with deep knowledge of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is, there's only one man it could be, Dr. AQ. Carlin. And if he's selling nuclear secrets to Iran, he's probably selling them to others too. Hei Annan looks out across the huge room with hundreds of spinning centrifuges with space for a thousand more. He and his team

got here a decade too late. hear from British Scandal. Matt's some news for you. British Scandal is going to Broadway. What? Sorry, not literally. I just mean we're taking it to the stage. Is this your festival crossed wires? We're all the UK's biggest podcast do live shows across iconic venues in Sheffield between the second and fifth of July. That was a beautiful read. Matt and I cordially invite you to our British Scandal live show on Sunday, July the 5th. And if we're doing the story, I think we are, it is potentially one of the most ridiculous scandals we've ever told. So grab a ticket at Crossed wires. live. That's C-R-O-S-S-E-D-Wires. Live. I'm Raza Jafri, and this is The Spy Who, an audible original.

In the last episode, AQ Khan became a hero in Pakistan for giving the country nukes. Libya became his latest customer, and the CIA recruited a mole inside his network. But as Khan's black market operation expands, the effort to stop him spreading nuclear weapons worldwide is intensified. You're listening to the spy who sold nuclear secrets to Iran. This is episode three, cargo of doom. One month after the weapons inspection in Iran, March 2003, London, England. It's late evening, and the Riverside headquarters of the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6,

is a frenzy. Britain is about to invade Iraq as part of a US-led coalition. The invasion is being justified by claims that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein has, or is developing, weapons of mass destruction. And with war close, MI6 is monitoring the situation and laying the groundwork. An officer on the Libya desk is typing up an urgent report when his secure phone rings. He snatches up the receiver, wages it between his shoulder and neck, and keeps typing. Yes, speaking? He stops typing and focuses on the call.

It's a Palestinian contact who serves as a back channel for communications between MI6 and the Libyan regime. Seriously, Colonel Gaddafi wants a meeting? For years, Libya's dictator has been a thorn in the west side and a bankroller of terrorism. But now, with America and its allies moving to force regime change in Iraq, Gaddafi must want to avoid becoming the next target. Tell him if he's serious and willing to discuss his weapons program. We're open to it. A week later, the desert just outside Syrith, Libya. Inside his thickly carpeted Bedouin tent, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi sits on a low sofa

in traditional flowing robes. He holds out his hands and smiles as MI6's head of counter-terrorism, Mark Allen, is ushered past his ring. of female bodyguards. Welcome. I hope your journey was smooth. Haddafi shakes Alan's hand. The Iraq war began a few hours ago with a barrage of air and missile strikes on Baghdad. The timing of the meeting is no coincidence. Haddafi wants to reopen diplomatic channels as fast as possible. For too long, Libya and the West have regarded each other with suspicion. But now is the time of change.

We wish to establish better, warmer relations. That will be welcome. But there is an issue that must be addressed first. Libya will have to give up its nuclear weapons program. Libya does not have nuclear weapons. Those weapons are a means of terrorizing humanity. With the greatest respect, Colonel, we know that Libya is seeking nuclear weapons capability.

We also know you are getting help with that from outside Libya. Gaddafi's confidence wavers. If Britain really knows about his secret nuclear program, America will too. I am merely the guide of the Libyan people's revolution. About these matters, you should speak to my intelligence as chief. Several weeks later, Washington, D.C. CIA officer Jim Lawler and his team sit opposite their MI6 counterparts. MI6 and the CIA have been at odds for years about when to move

against Khan. The CIA wanted a complete picture of his nuclear network first. Britain wanted to move sooner. But now, the threat's too serious to hold back any longer. UN weapons inspectors have found direct links between Khan and Iran's nuclear program. And Lawler's got intel about Khan preparing a major shipment to Libya. Ours Tinner, our source at the Malaysian factory, says he's already sabotaged production, so it's really junk. But once the Libyans realize Kahn will investigate the problem, our talks with the Libyan's going. Gaddafi wants to come in from the cold.

He's frightened he'll be next after Saddam. But he and his people are still denying having a nuclear weapons program or needs something he can't deny. We could push Eurus to get details about the shipment. Now that we've recruited his brother and father too, we can't really refuse. Can he and his family be trusted? What Urz has provided so far is checked out? The question's more.

What are they not giving us? Yep, there could be customers we don't know about. We've tracked Khan traveling repeatedly to Syria, which is why we now need to move. But it has to be a chaos. Take the whole network down in one go so it can't be rebuilt. Khan will be difficult. He's a national hero in Pakistan. The government won't act against him unless we can force its hand.

The dinners have worked closely with Khan for years. Maybe it's time to tease out whatever secrets they're still holding back from us. Three months later, Vaduts, the capital of Lichtenstein, the tiny principality sandwiched between Switzerland and Austria. In a hotel suite, Lawler lays down the law to the tinners, who arranged along the couch. This is how it works. You will remain here in this hotel for nine days, and during that time, we go through everything. Ure's tinner shares a nervous glance with his brother Marco and his father, Friedrich.

They've spent years profiting from selling nuclear tech as part of Kahn's network. Now, their CIA informers. I want to know orders, shipments, supplies, dates, routes, every document you kept. In return, we'll pay the three of you a total of $1 million. Marco sits up. We want the money placed offshore in an account in the British Virgin Islands. Okay. We'll create a false contact with the CIA front company.

Payment will be wired once you revealed everything about your contact with Khan and his associates. And that includes full access to your records. Friedrich shifts in his seat. Our records are in Switzerland. We know, which is why, while you're all here, will be searching your premises. I would prefer to be present. That's not in your interest. Cooperating with the foreign intelligence service is a crime in Switzerland.

If you're here, you can deny all knowledge. And to be clear, no search, no million dollars. Friedrich falls silent. Lawler knows he and his sons don't really have a choice. If they don't allow the search, it will confirm they are hiding something. A few days later, Switzerland. In the small alpine village of Jennins, Lawler leads a CIA search team through the narrow snowy streets

until they reach the whitewashed house owned by Marco Tinner. One of the team kneels at the front door, picking the lock, while Lawler and the other four keep watch. They're operating illegally on Swiss soil. Even the CIA station in Byrne doesn't know they're here. If things go wrong, Langley will deny all knowledge. The door opens. Lawler and four of the team head inside, while one keeps watch outside.

The team creep through the empty house. In the office room, the team's technical expert powers up the desktop computer. He then unscrews its back panel, connects the experience. exposed hard disk into a portable drive and starts downloading everything. In the living room, the team's lone female officer photographs documents spread across a coffee table. In the bedroom, Lawler checks the drawers and an inbuilt wardrobe. He finds nothing. He stands on his toes and runs a gloved hand along the top shelf of the wardrobe. Found you. He pulls down the object his fingers had discovered. A hidden land.

laptop. He takes it to the technician downloading files in the office. Yeah, have a crack at this. One week later, CIA headquarters Langley, Virginia. In a secure room, Lawler briefs an MI6 counterpart on what Marco Tinna's computers revealed. So, yeah, the Tinners were holding back, and the situation's worse than we thought. We knew Kahn's network had two centrifuge designs in circulation, the P1 and P2. But there's a third, more advanced model we didn't know about. So Iran could be closer to a nuclear bomb than we think? Yeah. There's also a big discrepancy between the volume of material leaving the factories

and the money's received. Meaning, Kahn's got a fourth customer we don't know about. The MI6 officer takes a moment to absorb the news. Until now, Britain and America thought Kahn was only selling nuclear tech to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Any indication who the customer is? Not yet. The laptop also contained partial designs for two nuclear warheads. Christ. And these are digital?

Yeah. And that laptop's still in Marco's house. It was an illegal search, and we left everything as we found it to cover our tracks. The room falls silent in horror at the Kahn Network's blazee handling of such dangerous documents. Digital files can be sent anywhere in seconds and copied and shared just as quickly. Khan's network needs to be stopped before its unknown fourth customer becomes a fifth or sixth. One month later, August 2003, the Skomi Precision Engineering Factory, Shah Alam, Malaysia. Uwuz Tinner watches as rows of blue-shirted workers prepare a shipment of 25,000 components to Libya.

It's enough components to build a thousand centrifuges and turbocharged Libya's nuclear weapons program. program. But with the shipment almost ready, URs is running out of time. The CIA is pressuring him to get copies of the shipping paperwork, but his boss, Buhari Sayad Abu Tahrir, is making that impossible. Ever since the Dubai offices got searched, Tahr's step-top security. Erz looks at the door to Tahr's office. He shuts it every time he makes a call. For all Uir's knows, Tahir already suspects him.

suspects him. Tahir finishes his call. Erz looks down and pretends to be working. Urs? Yes? AQ wants the invoice for the shipment faxed him in Dubai. Can you take it to the office lady? Me? Yes, you. I don't want it going astray. From out of nowhere, Erz has been given the opportunity he's been waiting for. The shipping invoice details the registration numbers of all the crates and the route they will take to Libya. Everything the CIA wants. in his hands. But this could be a trap. He thinks on his feet as he approaches the office lady.

Mr. Tahir wants this invoice faxed to Dr. Khan in Dubai. Uz, stands behind her, watching as she slides the invoice into the machine. But before the pages feed through, he reaches past her and presses the copy button. Why are you copying? I told you to fax it. The woman stares at him, but knows better than to argue with her bosses. Erz snatches up the copied pages, crumples them into a ball and tosses them into the bin. Now, send it. Fax sent, Urs takes the original document and returns it to Tahir.

Now he just needs to get the discarded copies from the bin without being noticed. That afternoon, the factory empties as Tahir and the rest of the workforce head to the mosque for prayers. And that leaves Uz alone. And with a chance to retrieve the copied shipping. invoice. He returns to the office room, heart hammering as he searches the bin by the fax machine. To his relief, the ball of paper is still there. His fingers shake as he smooths the pages, folds them, and slides them into the inside pocket of his jacket. A few days later, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, just before dawn. From a vantage point, two CIA officers look down on the city's

Arbor. Below them, they can see five wooden crates, each about 40 foot long, being loaded onto a container ship. The shipping invoice Eurs provided claims they contain agricultural machinery. In reality, they're full of centrifuge components from Kahn's factory. The CIA plans to track the shipment and turn it into proof of Libya's pursuit of nuclear weapons. As the crate is loaded, one of the CIA officers messages Langley to let them know the shipments on its way to Dubai. Two weeks later, Langley, Virginia. In CIA headquarters, an officer sipped coffee while watching live spy satellite images of the ship carrying Kahn's cargo as it cuts through the Indian Ocean. A month later, the Jebel Ali Free Zone, Dubai. A CIA officer astride a motorbike watches as the five crates are

unloaded from the ship and onto a waiting laureate. He follows the lorry as it rumbles through the docks before stopping at a nearby warehouse. The sign above the door reads the Ariash Trading Company. He stops further down the road and watches as Khan's crates are unloaded. He radios his team. The package has arrived. Two days later, Dubai. An MI6 officer keeps watch as Khan's crates are loaded onto a new cargo ship.

This time, it's a German registered vessel, the BBC China. Moments later, the ship departs, but MI6 and the CIA already know its next stop. The Libyan capital, Tripoli. Two weeks later, the Suez Canal. The captain of the BBC China stands on the bridge as the ship steers through the canal towards the Mediterranean. BBC China, this is Hamburg Operations, over. The captain answers the dispatcher.

This is BBC China. Go ahead, over. A manager from the ship's owner wants to speak with you, patching you through. Captain, after the canal, you were to proceed to Toronto, Italy, before continuing to Tripoli. Over. The captain's surprised. Unplanned stops usually mean trouble. Mechanical failure, a medical emergency, even war. May I ask the reason? Over?

No. These are your instructions. Understood? Over. Understood. A few days later, the heel of Italy. Just after midnight, the BBC China docks in the naval zone of Toronto's port. The captain is greeted by Italian naval officers at the dockside. With them are several men in plain clothes who don't introduce themselves.

The naval officers hand him a sheet of paper with the registration numbers of five containers. Captain, These crates are to be removed from your hold immediately. And do we wait for them to be returned? No. They are leaving the ship. No more questions, and neither you nor your crew must mention this to anyone. This stop did not happen.

Half an hour later, inside a secure warehouse, the CIA nuclear weapons expert waits as the five crates pulled from the BBC China are prized open. It's the moment of truth. Inside these crates should be proof that Khan and is supplying Libya with nuclear weapons technology. But until they see inside, they can't be sure. Ouz Tinner could have misled them or have been deceived himself.

The first lid comes off to reveal custom-cut foam packed tight around metal parts. The expert pushes it aside and lifts out a cylindrical object, a rotor assembly. This kind of steel is rare if it's for commercial use. Let's check the other crate. In other crates they find frequency converters, magnetic bearings, vacuum pumps and other components, all parts for making centrifuges and proof of Libya's atomic ambitions. 18 hours later, port of Tripoli, Libya. As the BBC China finishes unloading its cargo, the captain sees several uniformed Libyan military officials headed his way.

Gentlemen? One official thrusts a document towards him. On it, he seized the registration numbers of the five crates that were seized in Italy. These crates were scheduled for delivery. Everything's been unloaded. We don't have them. Impossible. The paperwork says they are on your vessel. I don't know what to tell you. They're not on board. Perhaps they were never loaded in Dubai.

You should speak to the shipping company. Soon after, Aikyu Khan's mansion, Kahuta, Pakistan. Khan picks up his phone and notices the caller is the head of Libya's nuclear brok. Rahmad. Where is our shipman? The ship arrived without our equipment on board. That is unexpected. We paid you a lot of money.

Don't worry, I will get to the bottom of it. Make sure you do. Khan stares at his phone. He checked the shipping invoice himself. The crates should be in Tripoli. The Libyans could be lying, but that makes no sense. They still need him and his network. And that leaves only one other explanation.

explanation. Someone inside his operation has betrayed him. A few days later, October 2003, Dubai. CIA Mole Ure's Tinner steps into the offices of SMB computers, the front company run by Buhari Sayyad Abu Tahrir. The place is deserted apart from Tahrir, who's feeding documents into a shredder as fast as he can. You wanted to see me? Everyone at the warehouse swears the crates were loaded onto the ship. So what happened? Someone must have intercepted them. The British or the Americans and they couldn't have done that without help. There's a spy in our operation. Why bring me all the way from Malaysia to Dubai to tell me this? Because you had access to the shipment. Only in the factory, not after it leaves, let alone once it leaves Dubai. If I were the spy, the crates would never

have reached Dubai. You always knew too much. To hear, for all I know, you could be the spy and now you're trying to pin it on me before AQ starts asking questions. Was that him? Aren't you going to answer? Not now. I need to find out who's leaking information. What about the people here in Dubai? The shipping company, the dock workers.

What if one of them talked? They insist they loaded the crates onto the ship. But they could be lying. And there are a couple of Turks in the network who've come under pressure from their government. So what now? I'm going back to Malaysia. I need to speak to people there.

And me? You stay here until AQ or I tell you, otherwise. Later that month, the Libyan Desert. Senior CIA officer Stephen Kappas steps into the tent of the Libyan ruler, Colonel Gaddafi. His MI6 counterpart, Mark Allen, follows close behind. Colonel? Mr. Kappas, I did not expect to see you again so soon. Kappas is used to Gaddafi's denials and deflections, but this time he's got hard evidence to confront him with. He lets the silence stretch. and fires his first shot.

A few days ago, we seized a shipment bound for Tripoli. Five crates, all containing centrifuge components for Libya's nuclear weapons program. A program you said you were willing to halt. The shipment was arranged long before our conversations began. People responsible do not know of our talks. Colonel, if these talks are to continue, you must renounce your nuclear program. And all other WMD programs. And you need to do it publicly.

Publicly? And if I do, will America stand by its commitments? Yes, the president is a man of his word, but he will expect you to keep yours. If you don't, the consequences will be severe. We want to clean the file about this public announcement. Colonel, we have your shipment. Hard proof of Libya's pursuit of nuclear weapons. You are a drowning man.

I am the lifeguard. Let me save you. Gaddafi looks through the tent opening towards the darkness beyond the firelight. We will renounce these programs so the talks can continue. Kappa's nods in approval. MI6 officer Alan, who has remained silent until now, steps in. We also need information about your supplier. One month later, a police station in Kuala Lumpur.

Tahrir sits at a metal table in an interview room. He's been here for two days and seen no one, except for the two officers from Malaysia's intelligence service special branch, who are sat facing him. When can I see my wife? Visits aren't permitted. There must be some misunderstanding. To hear knows people.

The Prime Minister's son invested in Khan's factory. If I could just make a call? You are charged under the Internal Security Act. You may be detained without trial indefinitely. The Ministry of Home Affairs approved your detention. Suddenly, it dawns on Tahir. His connections may be his downfall. Other people need protecting, and he's the fall guy.

The special branch officer notices the fear on Tahir's face. Relax. There is another way. Then tell me. You need to tell us everything. About your boss, about his network, and about your involvement in it. That's your only hope. I don't know much. I'm just a junior employee.

Enough lies. We know enough to know when you are lying. Will you cooperate or not? It was my uncle. He introduced me to Khan. I hope to learn about business from him. I didn't realize what the business was. Not at first, anyway. To hear knows he should say nothing. But the thought of prison terrifies him. The first time I was aware of what was going on was when he sold two. centrifuges to Iran. I was there to serve tea. I had no idea what was going on

until they did the deal. It was $3 million. By the time he was working with Libya, I was in too deep, I knew too much. He'd have had me killed rather than let me leave. You need the names of all the businessman you've worked with. Every firm. Every shipping agent.

How the meetings were set up, how the money was moved. Most of all, we want to know about Khan. Yes, I understand that. I can give you everything. A month later, the Magala Hills, Islamabad. Khan sits at his breakfast table, tucking into a chilly omelet. He's 67 years old, and his grey hair is thinning at the temples.

He looks at the gardener pruning the jasmine bush outside. It's shaped to resemble a mushroom cloud, but it's overgrown and needs attention, like his network. Ever since the Libyan shipment went missing, his operation has been in chaos. He sent emissaries to Dubai to burn records, told Iran to destroy evidence, and done all he can to cover his tracks. But he can't control Gaddafi. Libya is now cooperating with the West and exposing his associates. He glances at the framed photograph on the wall.

It shows him surrounded by adoring crowds, hailed as the father of Pakistan's bomb. The doorbell rings, and one of Khan's servants answers. He's eating breakfast. Seconds later, armed officers from the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency, march into the room. Khan leaps to his feet. What is the meaning of this intrusion?

We are from the ISI. You are being detained. Get your hands off me! Don't you know who I am? I am Abdul-Kadir Khan. Don't you dare treat me this way? A few weeks later, February 1st, 2004, Islamabad. Khan is marched by guards through the fortified heart of the ISI's headquarters.

They take him to an interview room. Inside, Pakistan's president, Pervais Musharraf, is waiting. Dr. Khan. What is this outrage? I am being treated like a common criminal. I am our country's savior. Without me, our country would be defenseless, against India. Dr. Khan, please be quiet. You are here because I have seen the evidence,

evidence that you have been trading Pakistan's nuclear secrets for your own personal gain. Who told you these lies? The Americans? They never wanted Pakistan or any other Islamic country to have nuclear weapons. I did what was right. You acted without authority. Selling Pakistan's technology to whoever would pay you the most. That's not true. Your predecessor's aides told me to trade technology with Iran. They would tell you so. Were they not dead? Enough lies.

You see this folder? There are many more. We have confessions from those who worked at Khan research laboratories. Details of false bank accounts in Dubai stuffed with millions. And the letters you wrote yourself asking Iranian officials to dismantle the equipment you supplied. I... You're no hero. You abused your position.

and brought shame on Pakistan. Now you must face the consequences. Khan feels his body go limp. He grips the back of a chair to steady himself. The room spins. Please. Have mercy. Please.

Three days later, February 4th, 2004. The Pakistan Television Corporation, Islamabad. In a studio, Khan sits at a desk, facing the camera. ISI guards wait just out of shot. In front of him, a teleprompter displays the speech that Musharraf ordered him to give to the nation in exchange for mercy. We're live in five, four. The words on the teleprompter begin to move in time with Khan's words. It is, with the deepest sense of sorrow, anguish and regret, that I have chosen to appear before you today,

to atone for some of the anguish and pain. that has been suffered by the people of Pakistan? On account of the extremely unfortunate... Khan glances at the cameraman and registers the shock on his face. He knows that the same look will be replicated across the country as Pakistani men and women watch this broadcast. By the time he stopped speaking, his humiliation and fall will be complete.

I sincerely regret that my actions may have placed Pakistan in jeopardy. May Allah keep Pakistan safe and secure. As soon as the broadcast is finished, he has hustled from the studio, back to his hillside mansion, which will now be his prison. From now on, he and his wife will live under guard. No travel, no interviews, no phone, no newspapers, no internet. He knows his enemies will say he is a crook, a dangerous nuclear weapon salesman who escaped justice. But for Khan, this is the greatest injustice of all. He made Pakistan a nuclear power.

He created the Islamic bomb, and now his reputation, his status and name have been publicly destroyed. A. Q. Khan spent the rest of his life under varying degrees of house arrest in Islamabad. He died in 2021, still revered by many in Pakistan, but viewed as history's most dangerous nuclear proliferator. Bohari's Sayad Abu Thakir spent four. years in detention without trial in Malaysia. His testimony helped unravel a network across multiple continents. Uzz Tina and his family, the Swiss engineers recruited by the CIA, avoided jail after years of legal battles and plea bargains. Libya dismantled its nuclear program, a move that

briefly rehabilitated Colonel Muammu Gaddafi on the world stage. He was violently overthrown and executed in 2011. Iran continues to deny the full extent of its dealings with Khan. The Khan Network's third customer, North Korea, carried out its first nuclear weapons test in 2006. The identity of Khan's suspected fourth customer has never been publicly confirmed. Next time on The Spy Who, I'll be talking with Mad Dog himself, Jim Lawler, the CIA officer who helped close down Dr. AQ Khan. nuclear network and finding out what it takes to recruit an agent.

Follow the Spy Who on the Audible app or wherever you get your podcasts. You can listen to all episodes of The Spy Who add free by joining Audible. You have been listening to The Spy Who, an Audible original. Have you got a spy story you'd like us to tell? Email your ideas to The Spy Who at Audible.com. A quick note about our dialogue. We can't know everything that was said or done behind closed doors, particularly far back in history, but our scenes are written using the best available sources.

So even if a scene or conversation has been recreated for dramatic effect, it's still based on biographical research. We use many sources in our research for this season, including Catherine Collins and Douglas France's books, The Nuclear Jihadist, and Fallout, and Shopping for Bombs by Gordon Carrera. The Spy Who is hosted by me, Raza Jaffrey. The Yellow Ant production. This episode was written by Lizzie Enfield and researched by Louise Byrne, with thanks to Inner Bruce, D. Cook, and Paula Richardson.

The senior producer was Jay Priest. The sound designer was Joshua Morales. Music supervision by Scott Velasquez for Frisson Singh. For Yellow Ant, the story editor and executive producer was Tristan Donovan. For Audible, the executive producers were Estelle Doyle and Theodora Leludis.