The Spy Who - The Spy Who Sold Nuclear Secrets to Iran | The Seeds of Revenge | 1

Episode Date: April 28, 2026

At a secure lab in Amsterdam, scientists are working on tech that can enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. But when India tests a nuke, employee Dr. A.Q. Khan, turns spy to help Pakistan get the bomb too. And soon he’ll spread atomic weapons worldwide.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Audible subscribers can listen to all episodes of The Spy Who, add free right now. Join Audible today by downloading the Audible app. 1974, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Fritz Vierman steps out to the brick factory building he works in and into the drizzling rain. He unfurls his umbrella and hurries towards the nearby bridge over the canal. He looks back to check no one's following him. Then he checks again. Viemann works for a company called FDO.

It designs components for ultra-centrifuges that enrich uranium. These advanced centrifuges are mainly used for nuclear power, but they can also produce uranium for nuclear weapons. And that's why FDO's designs are classified. Viamen reaches a street with a smattering of shops and approaches a phone booth. He checks he's not being tailed once more, then steps inside. He calls a number he's jotted down on a scrap of paper. A secretary answers.

Director's office, Jurenko. Yerenko is FTO's biggest customer, a nuclear technology consortium founded by the British, German and Dutch governments. I need to speak to the director. He's busy right now. I must speak with him. It's very important. Well, he's unavailable.

I can take a message. Viemann isn't sure what to do. He's not even sure he should be making this call. But if his hunch is right, the world is in danger. Sir, uh... Yes. Yes, I... I work at FDO

as a technical photographer and... Shall I ask the director to call you there? No, no. Listen, I am concerned about a colleague of mine. Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan. He does things, things I don't think he should. I don't follow. Viemann Gulps.

He's going to make him say it. Say what was, until now, only a private thought. I don't know how else to put this, but I think Abdul's a spy. A spy? Yes, for Pakistan. A spy for Pakistan?

Yes, you must tell the director this. Viemann hangs up. His emotions now a sea of relief and horror at what he's just done. Khan is his friend, one of his only friends, and the only FDO scientist who treats him with respect. Verman wonders if he misread the situation. He hopes not, but he also hopes he has. Because if Khan is a spy, then he's stealing advanced nuclear technology,

technology that could make atomic bombs. And if that happens, the risk of nuclear war will become even greater. I'm Raza Jaffrey, and this is The Spy Who, an audible original. Beneath the veneer of the everyday lurks the realm of the spy. It's a dank, murky world, full of dark corners, sinister motives. and corrupted morals, a place of paranoia and infiltration, sabotage and manipulation. In this series, we tail Abdul-Kadir Khan, the Pakistani scientist spy who sold nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and more.

In his homeland, A.Q. Khan became a national hero, the man who gave Pakistan the bomb. Elsewhere, he's seen as one of the most dangerous men who ever lived and devious enough to leave Western intelligence struggling to shut down his atomic bizarre. What you're about to hear are dramatized reconstructions of events based on the information that's been made public. But remember, in the shadow realm of the spy, the full story is rarely clear. You're listening to The Spy Who Sold Nuclear Secrets to Iran. This is episode one.

The seeds are revenge. A few months before Fritz Viemann's phone call, May 1974, Amsterdam. A.Q. Khan wanders a canal side with Viamen, their work colleagues, and on their way to get lunch. Viamen's an awkward man, shunned as a child because of his German mother, and still living with his parents despite being in his 30s. He's an outsider, just like Kahn. Kahn came to Europe from Pakistan a decade ago. He planned to study methodology, then go back, but fate intervened. He completed his studies, married a Dutch woman and took a job at FDO.

He and Viamen met on his first day at FTO, and they bonded over a shared interest in photography. Now, they often spend their lunch breaks together, chatting. But today, Kahn is anything but happy. And that's because India's just tested its first nuclear weapon. can the world stand by and allow this to happen. I fear for my country. Nobody there is safe now. It's not good, but India is saying it's a peaceful test. It's a terran. Peaceful? Indian liars, they hate Pakistan. They want to destroy us. Surely not. The newspapers say the test was more about sending China a message. You don't know the Indians like I do. You don't know what India is

capable of. After partition, my family and millions of other Muslims like us were driven from our homes, villages were burned, women abducted, train loans of ordinary citizens massacred. I understand, but no, no, you do not understand. And when I left India for Pakistan, their border guards robbed me of the pen. My brother gave me for no reason. It wasn't valuable. It was only of sentimental value. The Hindus are crooks. They cannot be trusted with a nuclear bomb. But every nation wants security. And what of Pakistan's security? The airman doesn't reply. It's clear he wants to change the subject,

but as they walk in silence, Khan feels inspiration dawn. Maybe he, the scientist with access to advanced nuclear technology, is the answer to Pakistan's security. Five months later, Almello, the Eastern Netherlands. Khan follows his manager through the

Urenko's uranium enrichment plant toward a small metal structure set apart from the main facility. It's a secure office area, known as the brain box. The brain box holds highly classified designs, such as details of the G2, a new centrifuge that can enrich uranium to weapons grade. Khan isn't cleared to be in here, but his manager seems unconcerned.

He pulls several box files from a shelf. This is the documentation for the G2, but it's all in German. I need them translated as quickly as possible. Kahn is one of the few scientists involved, with Jarenko, who knows both Dutch and German, and his manager is willing to bend the rules to get the G2's documentation translated faster. Khan gets to work, translating the documents page by page, but he realizes this is also an opportunity to learn all about Europe's latest, top-secret centrifuge.

Bismillah. He takes a sheaf of paper and begins making additional notes in his mother tongue. A passing colleague stops and peers at the script on the page. What's that you're writing? What language is that? Khan looks up. It's Urdu. It's a letter to my family in Pakistan.

I'm so busy I rarely have time to write to them. So I thought I'd skip lunch, do it now. Khan smiles at the colleague. One thing he's learned in Europe is that a smile is often all it takes to gain someone's trust. The colleague smiles back and walks away. Two months later, Islamabad, Pakistan. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, strides down the corridor towards his office. An aide keeps pace beside him.

Your next meeting is with Dr. Abdul-Kadir Khan. Butto slows slightly. The scientist from Amsterdam? Yes, sir. The one who wrote to you claiming he can help our nuclear program? So he checked out. Yes, our people in Europe confirmed he's genuine. Butto enters a meeting room.

Khan is sitting but rises instantly on seeing Butto. Prime Minister, please sit. I understand you believe you could help Pakistan. I know I can. I work in the Dutch nuclear industry. I have access to the latest centrifuge technology, vital to weapons-grade uranium enrichment, and I have already taken detailed notes about that technology.

Buto's interest sharpens. Two years ago, he started a secret nuclear weapons program following a decisive defeat in a 13-day war with India. But it's enormously costly for a nation where many go hungry, and progress is slow. Boto is interested in anything that can help. Khan sits forward in his chair. I wish to return to Pakistan and apply my knowledge to our program.

Dr. Khan, I am grateful for your visit, but you must stay in Europe. But why? I understand more than your scientists here, and you can increase that knowledge. by remaining in Amsterdam. You're in a unique position. The information you have access to could save us many years of work. Staying where you are is how you can best serve your country. One month later, January 1975, Brussels, Belgium. Inside Pakistan's embassy, Khan sits with Sadiq Bhat. Officially, Bhatt is a Pakistani diplomat. Un-officially, he runs Pakistan's secret efforts to procure

what it needs to make nuclear weapons. And now, he's also running Khan as a spy. The designs you are getting are extremely useful. But acquiring materials and equipment is just as critical. What I need are details of what is needed to build a uranium enrichment plant. Shopping list, if you like. It won't be straightforward.

There are export controls. Now, I think that a few front companies and false end-user certificates won't get around. Maybe. but my specifications will be exact. Centrifuges are precision instruments, a microscopic floor in metal thickness or a tiny vibration imbalance

and the whole machine will fail. And orders with that level of precision will attract the tension. We have been doing this for some time, Dr. Khan. We take care to work with suppliers who don't understand the end use and those who will look the other way for the right price.

Khan knows this is risky. If Pakistan's friends front companies start placing precise orders based on Jureenko's designs, it could be traced back to him. But it's a risk he's prepared to take to protect his country. A couple of months later, spring 1975, the town of Zwanenberg on the outskirts of Amsterdam. In Kahn's house, Fritz Viemann sits at the dining table, finishing the last of his fried chicken. He smiles at Kahn's Dutch wife, Henny. That was excellent.

Would you like more? There's plenty in the oven. Viamen is full, but he needs a moment alone with Kahn. He's spotted something in the corner of the room that shouldn't be there, centrifuge components. Yes, please, I'd love some. It's been more than a year since Viamen called Yerenko about his fear that Kahn might be a spy. Yerenko never called back.

And Viamen convinced himself, he was imagining things. But in recent months, he's noticed something amiss with his friend. He's often on the phone speaking rapidly in Udu. He once spotted him sealing rolls of film inside an envelope at work. And another time, at this very table, he saw documents that should never have left the brain box at Almello. He said nothing. But these parts, he can't ignore them.

Abdul, why do you have centrifuge components here in your home? And then, old pieces discarded. I like them as souvenirs. Reminders of good work. I wonder what's keeping Henny. Khan gets up to go to the kitchen, but Veerman stops him. It's not the only thing. Last time I was here, I saw classified documents. My dear friend, I had permission. Any helps me with the translation.

What are all these questions? Don't you trust me? And here she is with more food. Here, allow me to serve you. Verman forces a smile. as his plate is filled. He's made the opening move in a game of chicken, but it's Khan who's made him swerve. It's six months later,

and in Basel, Switzerland, the Nuclex exhibition is underway. Engineers, salesmen, and buyers from across the nuclear industry are here, and so are two surveillance officers from the Dutch Security Service, BVD. One of them hovers near a stand, browsing a brochure of vacuum pumps.

while watching his target, Dr. A.Q. Khan. He came to the BVD's attention after a Pakistani diplomat tried to order specialist metal foils from a Dutch supplier to the nuclear industry. The specifications led the BVD to Kahn. Now he's a person of interest, someone under suspicion, but not formally accused of wrongdoing.

Khan is at an exhibitor stand, chatting to a sales rep. The BVD officer, feigns interest in a display of industrial metals to get with an earshot of Kahn. The steel will need to be strong enough for use in ultra-centrifuge bellows. What strength-to-weight ratios can you deliver? Bands in the length of the tubes. What kind of RPMs are we talking about here?

The BVD officer doesn't understand the details, but knows super-strong steel is needed to stop uranium-enriching centrifuges from breaking apart as they spin. He also knows that Kahn doesn't handle procurement at FDO, so there's no reason to be asking suppliers these questions. If you needed to perform under that level of stress, we need precise specifications. But I can arrange a quote for you. Thank you.

Perhaps we can arrange a meeting. Do you have a card? Kahn takes the salesman's card and then moves on. The BVD officer hangs back for a moment and follows. A few days later, the head. In a government office, a senior BVD officer is updating representatives from the foreign ministry and economic affairs ministry on its investigation into Kahn. We believe Dr Kahn may be engaged in espionage. Classified materials have been seen at his home. He displays an unusual

level of curiosity well beyond his remit at FTO, and he's had repeated meetings with the welding company salesmen already on our radar. At the Basel Trade Fair, he's sought out suppliers of highly sensitive components. The foreign ministry official interjects, what kind of components? Ultra-thin metal foil. We've also identified a failed attempt to purchase such foil by a mysterious buyer. The specifications exactly match the foil Khan developed for Yerenko. Then we need to arrest him. The economic affairs representative cuts in. An arrest would tell the world that a spy infiltrated one of our country's most sensitive industrial projects. A scandal like that could be disastrous for the science and technology industry.

As would a rogue procurement network. The representative from the foreign ministry turns to the BVD officer. Did you consult the Americans? Yes. And? The CIA would prefer we continue watching Khan. They believe arresting him now would squander a chance to learn more about Pakistan's nuclear procurement network. So we let him carry on and hope for the best. We could have him promoted to a position where he no longer has access to sensitive impoverimperiodes. The economics affairs official nods. I think that's a good solution. Tackles the problem without causing reputational harm to industry.

The foreign ministry official relents. He just hopes that Kahn's not already got what he needs. Two months later, the village of Sehalla in Pakistan, 16 miles southeast of Islamabad. Outside a concrete warehouse, Khan shakes hands with the caretaker. His Dutch colleagues think Kahn's in Pakistan visiting relatives with his wife and daughters. But he's also using the trip

to see the progress being made using the equipment and information he's helped Pakistan acquire. The caretaker leads Kahn inside the warehouse and turns on the light. This is where everything is stored? Khan looks around in silent disbelief. Dozens of shipping crates are stacked neatly against the walls.

Some still have their seals intact. This is it? Yes? Everything is here? Kahn walks slowly between the crates. He knows what is inside. He knows what it could become, but he was expecting to see people

already building a uranium enrichment plant. Why hasn't assembly begun? We're waiting for other instructions. Khan closes his eyes. He risked everything to give Pakistan all it needs to accelerate its nuclear program. But nothing's moving. January 1976, Islamabad.

It's several days since A.Q. Khan visited the warehouse. Now he's in the office of Prime Minister Zulfika Ali Buto. Prime Minister, I visited the warehouse at Sihala. And? Nothing has been done. The equipment is still in shipping crates. Months have been lost. With respect, Prime Minister, the program is being mismanaged.

Strong words. I have absolute faith in the director of the atomic program. Sir. He lacks the expertise requires. He only has a master's degree. He's treating the nuclear program as a bureaucratic project. It is not. It's the most complex engineering challenge Pakistan has ever attempted.

And one vital to our security. As you are aware, our efforts to build a plutonium reactor are being thwarted by the international community. Which is why I've been saying that uranium enrichment is the answer. We have uranium deposits here in Pakistan, and I can source the equipment needed without detection. The program's director is ignoring. drawing the solution that is staring him in the face.

You seem very confident. With reason. I have the designs, the supplier lists, and the experience. If you let me run this program, we will be enriching uranium to the levels needed for nuclear weapons in five years. You want me to fire the head of the nuclear program and put you in charge? Why not?

I know more than him. But if you don't make use of me, I might as well go back to the Netherlands. I cannot simply sack the head of our nuclear program. program. But there may be another way. I'm listening. What have we started a separate uranium enrichment program? Headed by you? Two programs chasing the same end goal. I would need adequate funding. You will have it. I will also need total control of the program and its facilities. If you give me that, I will not disappoint. Pakistan will have its own bomb. I'll give you my word. September 1976, Cahuta, Pakistan.

It's ten months since Prime Minister Buto put Khan in charge of Pakistan's secret uranium enrichment program. On getting the job, he immediately sent FDO his letter of resignation and got to work. Now, Khan is hiking the sub-Himalayan foothills. He is less than an hour from Islamabad, but a world away in terms of geography. Here, there are no paved roads, no power lines, and no signs of industry. Just a few goats and shepherds, sheltering in rundown shacks. Khan reaches the top of a ridge, gets out his binoculars, and surveys the area. In the valley below, there must be at least 100 acres of forested land, hidden by hills on all sides.

This is it. Kahn has spent weeks looking for sun. somewhere to build his nuclear research laboratory. And Kahuta seems perfect. Close enough to the capital for power and supplies, but far enough to stay hidden. It's four months later, and in the Alpine village of Haag, Switzerland,

Khan is dining at the home of Friedrich Tina. Tinner's young sons, Marco, and Urs play nearby. Tina is an engineer and export manager at Vacuum Apparata Technique. a manufacturer of vacuum tubes and valves for centrifuges. And Khan wants to place an order. I'm told you, a company makes the best valves in Europe. We are precise, reliable.

Precision is everything. The flow must be exact. The valves Khan wants to buy are vital for Pakistan's nuclear program. They control the flow of gas into the centrifuges that enrich the uranium. And Tinner is keen to sell. Khan's order is worth tens of thousands of dollars, but that money comes with risk. Khan wants to know if Tinner's willing to accept that risk.

What about exporting them? Are you able to ship these valves to us? Tinner lowers his glass. Clearly aware that this deal could violate export controls on nuclear technology. I've been in touch with the Swiss authorities. I believe I've found a way around this. Yes? It is illegal to export centrifuges.

but not the individual components used to make them. So exporting our valves is okay. Then we have a deal. As long as it's done discreetly, I'm a respected man and don't want trouble, but the way I see it, building a pistol doesn't make someone a murderer. Only pulling the trigger does.

Khan is used to hearing similar justifications from the other suppliers he works with. They're willing to supply the parts and take the money, but also anxious to absolve themselves from their potential use. Khan smiles at Tinnah. Don't worry. We don't want to draw attention to this deal either.

Two years later, Pakistan army headquarters is Islamabad. Pakistan's senior generals are gathered around a large table for a crisis meeting. At the head of it sits President Muhammad Zia al-Hak, who deposed Bhutto in a military coup. Next to him is Khan. A German TV documentary has just exposed how Kahn. Khan stole Yarenko's centrifuge designs to aid Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, and that's left Khan on the defensive. This is a smear campaign.

They cannot accept that a Muslim country has mastered the science, so they invent lies about me. But this is bigger than Khan. There is growing instability in neighboring Afghanistan, and the Soviets are trying to increase their influence there. In response, the US has forged an uneasy friendship with Pakistan by offering economic aid. The revelations about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program

jeopardizes that alliance. President Zia locks eyes with Khan. The Americans are threatening to withdraw economic aid. Britain is talking about tightening export controls to cut off our supplies. Let them. Who made these American and British bastards the God-given guardians of the world?

They stockpile nuclear weapons by the tens of thousands. But if we pursue a modest program, we are called devils. Satan's. President Zia raises a hand and indicates for one of the generals to speak. Dr. Khan, will this delay our nuclear program? No, we are on schedule. By 1981, we will be producing significant quantities of enriched uranium, even if there's a crackdown. Because of it, please explain. The publicity has acted as an advertisement.

Suppliers now know we are buying. They now come to us, begging us to buy from them. Believe me, I've worked with these people. They will sell their mothers for money. But President Zia remains concerned. America believes our program threatens Israel, and that may cause them to act. We need to convince them the program is peaceful.

They won't believe us. Belief is not required. Only delay. The Americans want to keep us on side. They want a reason not to act against us. So, we give them a reason. We deny this is a weapons program. We tell them all we want to do is generate electricity.

And I hope it gives us enough time for you to complete your work. Six months later, the State Department, Washington, D.C. In a meeting room on the 7th floor, officials from the State Department, military and CIA are discussing Pakistan's nuclear program. A CIA analyst stands by a projector and brings up a spy satellite picture. This is the latest image of Pakistan's nuclear research center in Kahuta.

It has grown considerably since our last meeting. There's new construction here and here. And this is new. What we have here are French anti-aircraft missile batteries, indicating that this is definitely more than a nuclear energy program. A military advisor leans in for a better look. That will make a preemptive strike much riskier. What's the current official line?

All eyes turn to the State Department's representative. The White House wants to keep Pakistan on side, especially if the Soviet threat to Afghanistan comes to her head. So we should rule out any talk of military strikes. So we're looking at sanctions then. Realistically, sanctions are unlikely to change anything. Pakistan's program is driven by fear of India aggression. India already has nuclear weapons capability, so Pakistan feels it needs that too.

And publicly they will, of course, continue to deny this is a weapons program. One of the CIA officials clears his throat. There is another option. We remove the man behind the program. Dr. Akew Khan. The room falls silent. The idea of assassinating Khan has been floated before, but it sits uncomfortably between them. The State Department official breaks the silence.

Facts. The site expansion shows the ambition is clear, but what we are looking at is buildings. Uranium enrichment requires advanced technical knowledge and equipment. Does Pakistan really have access to that? The CIA analyst responds. Our view is that they don't, and they are decades away from developing a bomb. They may want India to believe otherwise,

and the site and the anti-aircraft batteries may do the job of the terrorists. But the agency view is that they have a long road ahead. We can continue to monitor the situation. There's no need to act now. Eight years later, January 1987, Tehran, Iran. Khan emerges from a private jet, bearing a tailored suit and clutching a briefcase. An Iranian delegation greets him on the tarmac and ushers him into the back of a waiting car. A small motorcade pulls away and races through the suburbs of Tehran,

heading south to the surrounding countryside. An hour later, Khan arrives in Barchin, a military industrial complex dedicated to weapons development. Khan is led into an Iranian intelligence safe house. Inside, a large portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's supreme leader, presides over the room. Khan nods to the image, then greets the Iranian officials who've been awaiting his arrival.

Welcome, Dr. Khan. I trust your journey went smoothly. Very. Thank you for arranging it. The pleasantries continue, but everyone understands why Khan's here. Iran is wounded. It's been at war with Iraq for six years, and the Iraqi's use of chemical weapons has heightened the Iranian regime's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran hopes Khan can help with that, as does Pakistan.

President Zia wants to build an alliance with Iran, against the US, India and the Soviets who are occupying Afghanistan. Khan opens his briefcase and removes a clutch of sales brochures. We can provide you with everything you need to enrich uranium. The official starts to read. Iran has uranium, but lacks the technology needed to enrich large amounts of weapons-grade material. B-1 and B-2 centrifuge components. High-strength rotor tubes.

electric drive equipment. And you are willing to sell this to us? Absolutely. And we offer more than technology. We offer expertise, too. Blueprints, equipment, assembly instructions. In short, everything you need. The official turns the pages slowly, as if unimpressed.

But Khan knows it's a bluff. No one else will offer a run, this. This is technology. No one wants to be. you to have. America, Russia, Israel and India can threaten the Islamic world with their nuclear bombs, and they will do all they can to stop us having the same weapons. We offer protection for your people. The official points to the multi-million dollar prices listed in Khan's brochures. At some cost, we will need to discuss figures. But in principle, yes, we are interested in this offer,

Pokeda Khan. Khan smiles and rises to leave. He is no longer just a scientist. He's now a proliferator of the world's most dangerous weapon. A few months later, Dubai. In a modest eighth-floor apartment, 28-year-old Bohari Sayyad Abu Tahir watches his uncle show a delegation of Iranian nuclear scientists

to centrifuges. Tahir is a slight, shy Sri Lankan, with dark curly black hair, and today he's assisting his uncle in closing the deal arranged by Khan. His uncle keeps talking as the Iranians inspect the devices. These centrifuges are manufactured using designs and components sourced from trusted supplies in Europe and beyond. Tahir's uncle nods at the two German businessmen seated on the low sofa. Like his uncle, they are among Khan's most trusted associates.

They've been secretly supplying Pakistan with nuclear technology for years, and now Kahn's brought them in on his lucrative deal with Iran. Tahir, pass me the file. It's Tahir's Q. He steps forward and presents the Iranians a document. Dehers' uncle smiles. This document, gentlemen, offers step-by-step details about how to cast uranium metal into hemispherical forms,

essentially how to construct the core of a nuclear bomb. No, please, take your time. and decide what you wish to buy. Tahir? Yes, uncle. Please bring our guest refreshments. Tahir slips into the adjoining kitchen. He dislikes his uncle.

He dominates his entire family. Tahir wanted to study accountancy in London. His uncle vetoed that and made him his assistant. Tahir returns from the kitchen with tea and sweet pastries to find his uncle and the Iranians discussing prices. Fine. The two centrifuges and technical documentation will cost $10 million US dollars. So, we are agreed then? After the Iranians leave carrying suitcases containing the nuclear secrets they've just bought,

Tahir listens to his uncle and the Germans, as they discuss how to share out the money. Most of it will go to the suppliers in Khan's network, but his uncle will pocket $2 million, as will Khan. to hear vows that whatever it takes, he needs to get close to Khan and make himself indispensable. Shortly after, Khan research laboratories, Kahuta, Pakistan. Khan paces his office, waiting for a call. Dr. Khan speaking. Ah, Farouk. Yes, that is good news.

And everything went smoothly at the bank? Iranian friends were happy? Excellent. Khan smiles to himself. His deal with Iran isn't official government policy, but he's doing it with tacit approval, and he knows that President Zia will be delighted at how Khan is bringing Pakistan and Iran closer together,

and no one in the know will care if he profits on the way. But now he's had a taste of how lucrative selling nuclear secrets can be. He wants more. Yesterday he was a civil servant on a modest salary. Now he's a millionaire businessman in charge of a secret global network of suppliers that stands ready to sell nuclear technology to whoever has pockets deep enough to pay. Follow the Spy Who on the Audible app or wherever you get your podcasts. You can listen to all episodes of The Spy Who add free by joining Audible.

You have been listening to The Spy Who, an Audible original. Have you got a spy story you'd like us to tell? Email your ideas to the spy who at audible.com. A quick note about our dialogue. We can't know everything that was said or done behind closed doors, particularly far back in history. But our scenes are written using the best available sources. So even if a scene or conversation has been recreated for dramatic effect,

it's still based on biographical research. We use many sources in our research for this season, including Catherine Collins and Douglas France books, The Nuclear Jihadist and Fallout. and Peddling Peril by David Albright. The Spy Who is hosted by me, Raza Jaffrey. It's a Yellow Ant production. This episode was written by Lizzie Enfield

and researched by Louise Byrne, with thanks to Inner Bruce D. Cook and Paula Richardson. The senior producer was Jay Priest. The sound designer was Joshua Morales. Music supervision by Scott Velasquez for Frisson Singh. For Yellow Ant, the story editor and executive producer was Tristan Donovan. For Audible, the executive producers were Estelle Doyle and Theodora LaLudas.