The Team House - Assad Loses Aleppo & Israel/Hezbollah Ceasefire | EYES ON PODCAST

Episode Date: November 29, 2024

Today we talk about the 60 day ceasefire reached between Israel and Hezbollah, the pick up of of fighting in Syria and Keith Kellogg tapped to be the special envoy to Russia\Ukraine.Subscribe to the new EYES ON YouTube channel.⬇️https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJytcQbSOEKLGyhNwkqpd3ASupport the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseFind Jason here ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=ios_apphttps://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.socialFind Andy Milburn here:⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023https://amilburn.substack.com/https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operationshttps://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialFind Mick Mulroy here:⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/https://fogbow.com/https://x.com/MickMulroy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthorhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.socialBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the podcast if you're not already. To support the channel is to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Team House. channel and podcast if you'd like to and we really appreciate that so go it and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house all right guys welcome to another episode of eyes on i'm not doing andy's accent we have andy milburn jason lyons micmoreoy happy thanksgiving to

everybody listening and watching hope yours was good uh a lot going on from last week ceasefire with Israel, Lebanon, or ceasefire with Israel and Hezbollah, really. It's 60 days. It's going to come right into about five or six days into President-elect Trump's new term. So what are your guys' thoughts on that?

And is there a chance of a ceasefire in Gaza, too? I'd like to touch on that after. Who wants to take it first? Raise your hand, guys. I can start if you want. Go for it, Mick. I mean, obviously it's a good thing whenever you get a ceasefire in here, right?

That means the killing is halted and there's an opportunity to potentially to end it diplomatically. Right. Start with. Obviously, what's really going to matter to Israel is whether they can get their 60,000 displaced citizens back to their homes in northern Israel. And whether Hezbollah adheres to the agreement, which of course was required under the, 1701 unskir. But they weren't complying, obviously. So there's a lot to be seen, but the first step is there.

They've started. There's skirmishes and both sides accusing the other of breaking it, but it does seem to be holding, and I think that's important. What hopefully will happen now is what should have been the case before, which is Hezbollah withdraws to Littani River, the lap, the Lebanese armed forces, gets down into southern Lebanon, ensures that all their positions, you know, their armaments, their arsenals, and them aren't there anymore. And that could give Israel confidence to be able to allow their citizens to return.

And the second part, although I think it was fair to say most people had given up on a ceasefire in Gaza, I think this puts Khamas in the position. where they're more likely to accept something they wouldn't have accepted before. Why? Because they're isolated more, obviously, Hezbollah's bowed out, at least for now. They realize that there's an incoming Trump administration who could be more supportive, even than the Biden administration of Prime Minister Netanyahu's efforts. And I think they can see the writing on the wall when it comes to that. So hopefully that does translate primarily to the ceasefire and the release of all

hostages. And then, of course, a dramatic increase in humanitarian aid, which is down to, I think, around 30 trucks a day, which is just not sustainable for human life. So for all those reasons, I do think, you know, a lot of people said it wasn't going to happen in Lebanon. So hats off to the negotiators, Amos von der Kohn and Brett and all the guys that work so hard on that. They deserve credit because they certainly got a lot of.

lot of, you know, criticism for not getting it done. So that's one thing. And then I think, I think that could could actually help when it comes to the negotiations for Gaza. Andy? Yeah, I think, no, I mean, I totally agree with Meg that. It's, a tremendous job by the negotiators because, frankly, they didn't have a lot on their side. You know, there wasn't like there was a a strong effort from the Israeli team to support them. I mean, we had Enette Wilf on the other day. And remember, you know, I just want to remind listeners that although some people seem to think that what she was saying was extreme, what she was saying kind of represents mainstream

Israeli thought in many ways. I mean, she was recommended by many people that I know in Israel. And so what she said on Lebanon was, hey, listen, our jobs to go in there and mow the grass whenever this happens and it's up to everyone else to fix it. Right. So that kind of attitude was prevalent to, you know, facing the negotiation team. So they did. I thought a tremendous job is an uphill struggle and, you know, good on them. And the killing has stopped. As Mick points out, some three to four thousand Lebanese, you know, with their civilians or, I mean, obviously mostly, mostly. civilians. I'm dead and and families really moving back into southern Lebanon. The but is this. And it's it, it, there's, you know, the Israelis obviously, I won't have any obstacle to this. And the Latani River, yes, was specified by the 1701 resolution. It's a blatant effort to

enforce that. But some might argue that it's almost irrelevant now for a couple of reasons. One is the, you know, although Hisbola is on the ropes, they certainly have, or capable of getting more missiles and rockets that range further than the Latani River, you know, and a lot of their sites are in the Bacar Valley or around Beirut for the longer range missile system. So that wasn't the greatest threat. And the other part is the part of 1701, we've talked about this before, 1701 was, don't get me wrong, and you know, back when it was imposed, back in 1706, it was the only possible solution. But the point in 2006, right? What's that? Was it happened to six, right?

Yeah, it was after the 2006 war. But what is perhaps not recognized is the fact that a lot of, you know, most of his bolas fighters are from that area, are from, I mean, they're not imports. They live there. They live in the village. So it doesn't make sense to say pull the militia back.

Now, if there is a concerted effort to disarm people, you know, conducted by the Laf and Unifer, back by Uniform, back by the international community to disarm militias south of the Tarney River, then, you know, then it all has some teeth. But that is a really, that's a hard task. I mean, at least before the Israeli offensive, his followers. in any way stronger than the laugh as far as weapons inventory. And as far as kind of, I don't want to say moral weight within that community, but certainly credibility within that community.

And that is a problem. And so I'd like to see a concerted effort to bolster the laugh both morally and, you know, with trainers, with weapons, to. to get them back in the game. I don't know, you know, Mick knows this, but I mean,

I'm not, the laugh, certainly, the laugh has actually been a success story in many ways since 2006. It is, it is cross-denominational, and has held the line

pretty well as far as remaining that way. And the special operations forces are very good indeed. So there is something to build on that. They're dismissed. and talked about contemptuously by the Israelis, but part of their problem is being lack of political backing, both internationally and within the country itself. So that has to change. And if there is that effort, and if there are, you know, international, they're going to need trainers, but they're going to need lots of weapons and support. And given that, then maybe this

this piece the ceasefire has some legs on it a commitment I'm saying yeah and just for everybody laugh is Lebanese armed forces um

Netanyahu and his some of his comments said like now is the time to focus on Iran and I mean you know I'm gonna editorialize

maybe you should focus on ceasefire and Gaza you know what I mean Like maybe you should focus on that rather than, you know, more. It's causing tremendous, you know, again, tremendous internal dissension. By the way, it's interesting when the ceasefire is not tremendously popular in Israel. It's not unpopular.

It's about, you know, 30. I think it's like 38 percent, 4, 32 percent against and the rest that kind of, you know, let's wait and see what happens. But the real issue for a lot of Israelis is return of the hostages and, you know, and a ceasefire and Gaza that leads to that. And to them, and it's, you know, I don't want to hazard a guess as to, you know, percentage of the Israelis, but certainly every, everyone that I know is very concerned about a resolution on the hostage issue.

And they feel that this, well, now is the time to, you know, hit Iran is kind of a hand wave and a distraction. They don't, you know, there isn't a feeling anymore that Iran is an imminent threat after the Israeli strike and the kind of, you know, the empty bombast that followed that, I think. And most people see that. Now there is the potential, as we talked about here, of Iran ramping up to nuclear weapons capability, but that's going to take some time. And for a lot of people, the most imminent problem on both sides is,

is attaining a ceasefire in Gaza. You know, for those who care about the Palestinians, as Mick pointed out, the crisis there is off the charts. I mean, as far as humanitarian crisis, lack of food, influx of disease now, and it's kind of dropped off the front pages of the papers because of what has been happening in Lebanon.

And for those who, you know, who care about the hostages, then there is nowhere near resolution at all. And that is, that's becoming, I mean, it continues to be a very emotional issue within Israel. Yeah. Jason, what do you got? What are you thinking about to ceasefire? I was just the part that stuck out for me was what Andy was just saying about the hand wave,

the sleight of hand on Netanyahuas's part about focusing on Iran. I think as, as he pointed out that the Israeli people in the world period, are, they're quote unquote, hit to the game, you know, they see it. It's not, you know, I'm not saying that Iran is not the threat that everyone believes they are. What I'm saying is that these little pinpricks of hits that are going on, the back and force, it's not distracting from, like he said, you know, the hostage situation and the potential for the ceasefire to hold or not hold are greater. And I think the world and Israel is understanding that.

So that's where the focus needs to be. Yeah. One side note to what we're talking about is, I mean, BBC, I'm just looking up here, is reported that the rebels have gotten into Aleppo. So this is all intertwined, right? So a lot of the support for the regime in Aleppo was, of course, Hezbo, Ronnie and back militias, who decided that they had a better fight to fight. and that's probably one of the consequences

of seeing that in a good way, I guess, to certain extent, except for these rebels are mostly jihadists. I know we're getting into that, but this is all, this is all connected, right? Yeah, no, that's perfect, actually. Yeah, that's an interesting thing too. I love to, yeah, more about the rebels, right?

They're all jihadis, right? And it's, you know, obviously we, it Syria, the complex maze that Syria is, is like something that somebody should write a book about because there's so many like world powers, regional powers playing in there. Are we giving jihadis, you know, were we giving jihadis like equipment and training and stuff?

It's just an insane, like, labyrinth of, like, you couldn't even, like, you need a decoder ring to understand what's going on in Syria. And like you said, like, I want a little bit more on, like, the HTS, like those jihad, like, what are there, what's, what's their deal? That is complicated.

I know. I mean, if you even look at their Wikipedia page, you try to tagline. That's what I try to do. It's like 14 different groups, right? Yeah. And it's aligned with Turkey and it's,

yeah, I mean, ultimately it's, you know, these groups, they have interpersonal political issues, squabbles, but at the end of the day,

they're primarily dunei jihadist who are, who want to see a lot of these Shia militias, the hell out of their country, of course. A lot of them aren't from there. And they're backed by Turkey,

which has been an issue for us, the U.S. for a while. But you're right. It is a very complicated association, I think. I think, you know, I mean, Syria always makes me not angry, but yes, a little bit angry

when we talk about it because we squandered so many opportunities there we the united states and you guys hopefully know that i'm not at i'm not a hand ringer on this stuff but having having kind of um uh being on the on the sidelines uh both you know in in in in 2016 and then at sox cent um we actually involved in the problem indirectly since 2015 you know remember when when when it's It all started back in 2011. And, you know, it's fair to say back then, the majority of rebel groups, the groups opposing Assad, were probably not jihadi or the majority of people who had, you know, seized arms to oppose them were not jihadi. But then through a combination of factors, complex factors, not, you know, I'm not saying it's all the United States is false.

But remember our talk of a red line, our efforts to arm a Syrian militia that were honestly, you know, they were well intended, but they had embarrassing results. If you remember, you know, the testimony to Congress by someone who's, you know, prominent administration now being questioned closely about how many fighters we had raised and it was, you know, pitiful numbers, right? Because, you know, for we, it is, it is a, it's one of our failed efforts of by with and through. Meanwhile, while we're stumbling along, you've got Al-Nusra Front, which was Al-Qaeda affiliated and ISIS. And initially they had an alliance. Somewhere around 2014, they parted ways violently, right? They were fighting against each other, the Islamic State against Al-Nusra Front, against a Assad at the same time.

ISIS won. And remember the, you know, the Islamic State had this propaganda machine that was unbelievable. And young people opposed, young Muslims opposed to the Assad regime. And that was, you know, that was their primary motivation flocked to the Islamic State, right? And then, of course, they, I'm not justifying people who joined the Islamic State. but the motivation among, you know, certainly among detainees who were questioned, if that would be believed, was to oppose the Islam Assad regime. And we lost that, you know, we couldn't, we West, we, the United States had nothing really to offer

in return when we were trying to recruit our own rather cack-handed attempts. Now, some government agencies did better than the military. but we in the military have nothing to be proud of until the SDF came along. Well, the SDF was not of our making. The SDF were a Kurdish anti-Assad organization led by a very charismatic guy named Masloon, Maslun, right? Yeah. Yeah, around 2015, special operations basically J-Socq,

saw the opportunity to side with SDF. And initially it was supporting them with indirect fire and CAS, and then we started to put trainers in there. And that was our success effort in Syria back in the SDF. But it wasn't of our making. And then as the SDF, you know, as we kind of pulled a lot of our forces out of Syria, as the SDF became, you know, the Turks hated. STF. And this gets to, you know, there's a method to my madness here. This gets to why the Turks

are now supporting the YTS, who by the way are Al-Qaeda affiliated, because they think any rebel group is better than the Kurds, right? So the SDF got kind of whittled away. And frankly, they were never really after Assad. They just wanted to carve out an area for them where they could live in some, you know, kind of autonomously in the same way that the Kurds did in Iraq. But every time they're raised the head by the parapet, the Turks would pound them. And that is kind of how we get to where we are now, where we have an al-Qaeda-affiliated group going, besieging Aleppo or entering Aleppo if the latest reports are to be believed. And the sad thing is that these, that yes, the most capable groups,

fighting Assad right now tend to be extremists and be the ones that we, the United States, don't want to see in power. But the Turks, I mean, as long as it's not, again, as long as it's not the key word, they're fine with it. Yeah, if I can add two quick points to Andy's points.

I would agree, certainly, with the effort to, for the regime overthrowing. And I can't get into the details, obviously, of the COVID program. But as it's been reported, I would agree. with Andy, it had more success. The issue really was it had potentially so much success that Russia felt the need to become actively involved, right? So, you know, you go for in 2011, you know, when the, when the whole Civil War really started to what I guess it was 2014,

correct me, experts out there were wrong, when Russia became fully, fully involved. And there's only so much, you know, any proxy element, covert or not, can do against you know, not only a regime like Assad, but, you know, a superpower, you know, or rump superpower in Russia. So, and perhaps the mechanism was working, but the political will and, you know, what they could, what's reasonable for them to be able to accomplish simply wasn't there. And that I would just also add the Andy's assessment of the SDF and the effort by J-Soc primarily, supported by others. that was a great example of what a proxy force could do. They did 99% of the fighting.

They were very capable. We enhanced their capabilities. And that led to the defeat of ISIS in Syria and the enduring defeat for the most part. So it's one of those things that I think we're getting very good at doing it. It just has to fit in the right policy dynamics with realistic. you know, determinations of what they can actually accomplish. But I would certainly agree. And yes, all the stuff with the Turks,

that was one of the reasons why we had such a tumultuous time in the Pentagon when I was there with the STF and being told to leave a couple times, which we never have, by the way. We're still there. And I'm curious. Go ahead, Jay. Go ahead. No, I'm just curious as to what Russia's commitment to this will continue to be, given what's happening in Ukraine.

Obviously, they have the numbers to do it. But I suppose backtracking that it would depend on the progress or lack of thereof that's being made in Syria. But maybe one of you two would be able to answer your thoughts on how long their commitment will last in Syria. Andy? I think you feel. I mean, I mean, yeah, difficult to say. It's a great question, Jason. I mean, to them, to them, Syria is a success story and continues to be.

You know, we talk about, we talk about using, you know, by with and through, using a relatively small amount of forces to achieve strategic games. And I hate to say, but that's kind of what the Russians have done in Syria. I mean, they at a cost to them, yes, they, but remember, even when we, even when we pummeled them back in, when was that, Mick? Was it 20th? No, it was 2017, right? We killed like

300 Wagner guys? Yeah. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah, and I think that's what everybody concentrates on. That's why I think everybody, the average person like me, thinks, oh, you know, we kicked their ass over there. Yeah, no. But they continued, because remember,

the guys they lost were guys that they could disassociate themselves with. guys they didn't have to answer the families about, right? And that's, and so, I mean, they've got mainstream Russian forces there too, and they've certainly stepped down their mainstream effort, but they continue to, you know, some would argue they didn't need to maintain a large force there because they have tremendous influence and they continue to to achieve their strategic ambitions. And the last thing, the fact that I would say is that, remember, they also had help from Iran, whether they, you know, they've had bumpy relationship with Iran. But in Syria, they've generally got along

pretty well. And the Iranians have done the brunt of the actual fighting fighting. I mean, again, you know, Russian military has plenty of advisors there. But the frontline troops, Russians are using, in the past, at least, have generally been contractors. So they're achieving, yeah, and look, they've got a Mediterranean port. They've got tremendous. I mean, if you talk to people who've been journalists

who've been, you know, into the regime held Syria, you hear Russian voices everywhere. You even have Russian tourists going to the Mediterranean, you know, resorts there. I mean, it is heavily under Russian influence. That's right.

The strategic games is all they care about, right? 500,000 civilians dead. It doesn't matter. The Wagner guys that were killed, and we can see how much they care about troop lossage in Ukraine now. So those things are inconsequential, really, to the Russian thought process. So they think, I think, as Andy said,

that they've been successful there. I don't see them leaving any time. Yeah, I just was, it was curious because, like, I as I said average guy like me average citizen is probably like holy shit Russia is still there like they they just hadn't you know didn't even think about it until this came up yeah so talking about Russia uh yeah yeah not a hysteria by the way but you know across across Africa too I mean look at the pants the hell region in in Africa I mean the Wagner group uh it is still going strong there carrying

up Russian Russian strategic games the French have no influence in Mali at all now I mean it is the it is basically Russians running the show yeah

Trump has nominated Keith Kellogg former national security advisor and retired lieutenant general to be the special envoy right Ukraine Russia envoy so he's going to be taking part most likely in the negotiations in terms of what like a peace deal or ceasefire deal would look like. What do you got, Mick, you mentioned this.

Like, what do you think about the plan? Where do you think it goes from here? Is this guy a good pick? Give me everything. Everything you got. I do think he's a good pick. I mean, he's extraordinarily experienced. He was a national security advisor in addition to being a retired three star.

But I think he's like 80. So God bless him for Gil Sorbonne. You know, I tend to be at the BFW. almost exclusively in Whitefish. But so some of the points that I point out from General Kellogg, he he was actually critical of not supplying more weapons to Ukraine before the invasion and that the decisions to provide weapons to Ukraine after which were came faster with less deliberation and certainly more effect on the battle.

Now, part of that might be, I'm just criticizing the other guy kind of thing. But I do think, you know, if he agrees with that, then his overall posture should be that he wants the Ukrainians to win, which is a good thing. Now the question is, how is this actually going to work? I looked specifically into what it seems like they're proposing. Yes, it's a freeze in the conflict. Yes, there'll be some kind of demilitarized zone with NATO troops,

who, for my knowledge, haven't signed on NATO troops non-U.S. To do it. But from my understanding, it won't require that Ukraine, if they agree with it, of course, they have to agree, give up on their claim to their own sovereign territory. So it isn't a concession of these, you know, 20% of Ukraine. It is a stop in the fighting, and I potentially an agreement not to try to militarily take it back during the terms of whatever the ceasefire is. And then, of course, they can't join NATO until, you know, a specified time in the future.

But the question really comes down to, yes, okay, that's potentially, and then there will be something they call it a levy on, there'll be some sanction relief for Russia, but there'll be a levy on their foreign assets that pays for the reconstruction. That's my understanding. So, you know, I guess I'm not advocating for that plan, but I think we should look at all the details because oftentimes it gets short script when it comes to the explanation in the media of what it entails. Others that are not associated with the incoming transition team have said, you know, let's take a look at it. Because ultimately, this is this is up to Ukraine and obviously

Russia. The other part of this equation is how many people believe Russia would adhere to this? I mean, why did they launch an invasion just to, you know, to end up with this stalemate with, you know, a lot of the region where they have is simply not valuable terrain. So, and then, of course, how many times have Russia broken agreements with Ukraine? So how valid is the agreement when you have somebody like Russia on one side of it and their word? So there's a lot going into this, but I do think, well, and I do think he's a good selection. certainly his experience. He's going in this with decades and decades of experience. And somebody who, by all statements I've seen, is supportive of our partner in Ukraine,

you know, being successful in the lockdown. Mr. Milburn, Colonel Milburn, apologies. No, I agree 100% with that. Yeah, we, I mean, no, no negotiation. I mean, no ceasefire. and whatever we're calling it is going to be perfect. It's not from the point of view of anyone who supports Ukraine. But on the other hand, as I said here before, I mean, Ukraine cannot continue losing the number of people.

They're losing the best part of their population. And it's, I think, you know, I think if you look at polls, even the majority of Ukrainians now are, are realizing that and saying that some kind of negotiated, they would accept some kind of negotiated ceasefire, even if it meant ceding some territory to Russia at the time being. But I would, I hope that there are two parts to this, okay, that one is, the moratorium on joining NATO makes me very uncomfortable. I feel like that's an over-concession, right?

You know, I mean, Russia wants to end the war, too. We don't have to trip over ourselves and saying, oh, here, and by the way, You know, I think we should hold that off as a in the wings. Say, hey, we're going to look at this, see how the ceasefire works out, all right? Before we make any commitment on not bringing Ukraine into NATO because Russia, if you start, you know, if anything starts happening, then we're going to rush to bring Ukraine into NATO. We need to have that there as a kind of a clause to make sure Putin does it here to this because he's terrified of that happening. Number two is I hate to see any moratorium on providing weapons to Ukraine. All right.

We should not agree to that. We should say, hey, you shouldn't worry about what we're providing Ukraine as long as you adhere to the rules of, you know, this ceasefire. And then we should flood the Ukrainians with weapons to ensure that the ceasefire holds, right? And if the Ukrainians are the ones who violate the ceasefire, well, you know, there's going to be penalties, obviously. for them. But the point is, again, to a mixed point, you know, Putin is still in control in Russian. Putin is not someone you can negotiate with. He's not a man, as I think one of our own presidents said, that you can come to a deal with at all, unless he is afraid of the consequences of it going wrong. And so we need to hold those consequences close to our chest.

With a stronger country, by far. You know, we've got to be wary of building with. We've got to be wary of building Russia up into this, you know, this bogey man. And with, you know, talks of new non-uclear kinetic weapons, blah, blah, blah. Remember, three years ago, everyone was in think tank land was pissing themselves at the thought of the Russian army, you know, facing the Russian army. And we find that the Russian army is a peeper tiger. They can't even invade Ukraine, for Christ's sake, a country one fifth of their size. And they've been stymied.

They're losing, as we said on this show, a thousand men a day, and you can look that up. And, you know, a thousand to include casualties a day, to put that in some kind of context, the Allies during the breakout from Normandy were taking that many casualties with an army many times the size of the Russian army in Ukraine, right? I mean, it's phenomenal casualties. So Russia may not consider it. on the ropes and may, but at the same time, there's strong reasons for them to want to end this conflict too, and rather than trip over ourselves by giving them concessions, we need to

bear that in mind as we go into this. But yes, absolutely. I agree with Mick. You know, a solid guy, at least, not a Fox News presenter who's in charge of the negotiations here, perhaps a guy who understands the Russians as well as anyone in DOD. And I think that's all positive. And I do, to Andy's second point, I do think, if I read it correctly, that it would maintain the level of military support for the very reason you said. So that they will be able to not only defend themselves, but continue to rehabilitate their army and strengthen.

So that if there is some kind of breakdown in the ceasefire, that they'll be prepared, which would just only enhance the idea that Russia would stick to the ceasefire if they know that was happening. And you're right, we shouldn't throw all of our willingness to concede on the table

to start the negotiations. I mean, that's something we should probably consider maybe General Kelloggwell. Yeah, sure. I mean, because you look at like the deal points, like the points in the planet, it's basically like somebody in the Kremlin drafted it up, it sounds like,

you know what I mean? it sounds like Ukraine's going to lose everything. And why would they, why would they do that? Like, they're not the bad guys here. It's a pretty clear and cut who the bad guys are here, right? Yeah. Yeah, for sure. Anything else, boys.

What are you thinking? That's a lot. That is a lot. That is a lot. We touched on Africa, mix in Africa now with Fogbo. doing some humanitarian aid doing the damn thing while everyone else is stuff in their face in turkey yesterday mixing in africa providing food and you know how many metric tons did you say mick before we started well i don't i don't i don't want to get into a lot of them

okay sir sorry um you can certainly talk about sudan yeah okay so okay great let's do that so sudan has been going through this civil war since uh april 23rd I think is when it started between, I mean, the recent issue, Sudanese armed forces, the rapid support forces, which is a branch insurgent group out of the Sudanese armed forces, essentially. The deputy of Burham, who runs the, Sudanese armed forces leads this group, as far as out. they have essentially brought the 50 million plus people of Sudan to bring it's definitely the biggest crisis even dwarfing Gaza right now so over two million have left it's about 25 million that are very food insecure 10 million on the verge of starvation and they are actually predicting that up to two and a half million people could die by the beginning of the new year right so people many people many people hundreds of thousand people are surviving on boiling leaves and water ponds. So in the UN requirement to even deal with the current is only 50% funded. So this is a crisis that's only going to be more and more prominent to people around the world.

This is Ethiopia in 1984, quite frankly. We're going to see thousands, potentially tens of thousands die. in a week if something's not done. So yes, I'm not talking about us, but there's a lot of folks groups here helping, but there needs to be a lot more and it needs to be funded. It's, there is no positive, but the rainy seasons are about to come to an end.

And when they do, it'll be easier to get food to people that are somewhat isolated, but it also means that the fighting will just intensify. and it'll be all over Sudan, which makes it even more complicated. And both sides, I think to some extent, not equally, or limiting humanitarian and getting to populations as means of poor pair, particularly the RSF. So those are things that have the international community has to be interested.

It should be interested in for the sake that we shouldn't allow people to starve to death. But also because this is going to create, I would guess, and not just to be guessing, but it's already being predicted, massive migration flows of people who aren't just going to sit there and let their kids start. And they're going to go throughout Africa, obviously causing instability in the region and potentially headed toward Europe. So this is something that the world should be concerned about not only for the sake of the Sudanese, but the sake of their own stability. And I think that's something that everybody should give up. Yeah, those numbers are staggering, too. I mean, they, you know, Gaza, the problem is that we all, that the numbers become kind of meaningless, don't they, unless they're projected.

You know, Gaza, which is what's happening there is horrific, being 40-something thousand people dying there is horrific enough. But at least that news is being brought forefront to the world via the world's media. It is a, I hate to say this, but it's a trending topic. Sudan is not. And yet there are multiple countries involved in this. It is a proxy war, right, in many ways. And there are members of the international community to include countries that we are friendly with,

who are fueling this with, you know, no one to put the brakes on them. And the effects on the African continent and wider are liable to be. I mean, it's going to happen. This isn't something that is confined just to Sudan or even to the African continent, is my point. Very true.

And it's going to take the international community, especially as you said, Andy, with the countries that have influence on both sides to really push them to our ceasefire and a resolution and get democracy back in place. Yeah, so guys, if you want, want to help mix organization. It's called Fogbo.

You can Google it. The links will all be in the description. Yeah, I'm spent. Things are fucked up, huh? Yeah, for folks that, obviously, folks that want to know, Fugbo is primarily veterans, people who've served in the US armed forces,

lot and soft, that are taking those skills a day, that they acquired to, enable humanitarian operations. Mike, I'd love to talk to you. Go ahead. Yeah, if you're interested, definitely the website will be in the description. You could check it out. Sorry, I cut you off.

But I'd definitely be interested in making talking to you about like, you know, what you're doing now, more specifically, because I had this. Like, you know, you were in the CIA as a paramilitary operations officer. I think that's safe to say. you've been in war zones a lot you've seen it go down and um what you're doing now really like I don't know it's like you I don't know if you've gained perspective from what's gone on in the last 20 or so years where you're like doing more to help people not saying you weren't helping people before but you was more of a kinetic place where it wasn't like you weren't really thinking about aid to impoverished people and stuff like that so I'd love to like sit down with you for like a long

form thing and talk about like that kind of arc you know what I mean yeah and I like to talk about it from perspective of what veterans I think really bring right so not about me but there's a whole group of veterans and I don't need to tell you guys because you already know a lot of them are a little I want to say angry because that just plays into a stereotype but you know the way that the wars that they fought in ended but they they I think they should be proud of what they did do and there's a lot of skills they have that could still be put to use, right? You know, the U.S. military does more humanitarian operations around the world than any other group, period, and they do it more effectively because that's their, their capabilities are

astounding when it comes to the ability of expeditionary operations and basically figuring shit out when nobody else can. So it doesn't need to be with us for a small group, but there's a lot of groups out there. There's already groups that exist. And there's probably more groups that could exist and should exist of veterans if they're looking for that. So I'd be happy to talk about it from that perspective and maybe bring some other folks on that are doing that, maybe a group thing to really give veterans that are looking for something potentially different than they might think is available to an idea. For sure. I'd love to do that.

All right, boys. That's the show. Andy Milburn, he's got a book. Check it out. when the tempest gathers. The link is in the description. All of our social links will be in the description. We're all on Blue Sky.

Check it out. It's in the description as well. It's getting yelled that because I didn't put it in the description by people. Everything you need to know. And he's got a great substack. Mick's got a great substack. Jason, Jason's on LinkedIn and Blue Sky.

Blue Sky. And the best, yeah, the best way to support the show is Patreon.com slash the Teamhouse. You get ad-free shows. So no annoying ads. interrupting and uh yeah thanks guys this is great thanks jents and thanks guys thanks everybody

Have a great weekend.