The Team House - Ceasefire in Gaza: Does it Hold? | EYES ON PODCAST

Episode Date: January 20, 2025

Today we deep dive into the Israel\Hamas ceasefire and what to expect over the next 42 days and beyond.Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseFind Andy Milburn here: ⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023https://amilburn.substack.com/https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operationshttps://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialhttps://open.substack.com/pub/amilburn/p/journal-of-a-plague-year?utm_source=app-post-stats-page&r=emo6q&utm_medium=iosFind Mick Mulroy here: ⬇️https://fogbow.com/https://www.loboinstitute.org/https://x.com/MickMulroy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthorhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.socialFind Jason Lyons here: ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=ios_apphttps://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.social#israel #hamas #ceasefireBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey, everybody. Welcome to another episode of Eyeson. We got the full crew here, Andy Milburn, Jason Lyons, Mick Mulroy, and myself. A lot going on. First and foremost, the Gaza ceasefire is currently underway as we're shooting this right now, 12 o'clock Eastern, on Sunday. What are you guys looking at, Mick? I know you've been tracking this pretty tight. Yes, tracking it from both ABC perspective and the fact that my group is doing it.

humanitarian aid in Gaza right now. So obviously it's a great, a great thing that we have a ceasefire that's now coming to place. It was very tedious and tension ridden because neither side trusts each other at all. I mean, they're moral enemies in the purest definition of the world word. So there was some fits and starts. One of the biggest issues, I think, that's been revolving around these negotiations is the lack of clarity of who's alive and who's not, right? Normally when you do hostage negotiations,

you start off with the proof of life so you know what you're negotiating for. So it's still unclear to the Israeli side and the mediators, for that matter. Out of the 97 that are still left, how many are still alive? And it's believed that even in the first 30, which is women, elderly, and children, that there are already going to be remains rather than people coming out. So where we are right now, the three females that Israeli hostages have been relieved. They have been checked by the Red Cross. And they're in the process of free patriation. At the same time, there's about 90 Palestinian prisoners, some of which were in prison for our life.

A couple actually committed significant terrorist acts that killed innocent civilians. They're in the process of being moved. And that's even more complicated. You know, where are they going? I don't even sure where they are. I follow this pretty closely. Some may actually end up in like out of the country. And Qatar in Egypt is what part of the chatter is.

And then with all that going on, you have the idea of having to relocate from population centers, not all the way out. And there's supposed to be 600 trucks per day of humanitarian assistance, much needed going into Gaza. 300 are supposed to go all the way to the north. So that is a logistical difficulty because of the damage to the infrastructure. And, of course, a large portion of that is fuel that is needed for the hospitals to be able to get up and running, which is also very much needed.

And this is all happening at the same time, and it's going to go day by day. We should all hope that it continues to go without any disruption, but there's a big chance that there could be disruption because of this. complicated manner. And of course, just to add to that, not everybody listens to Hamas. There's plenty of jihadists in there that, you know, might want to disrupt this for whatever reason. And if they can do something substantial enough, it's potential. So this is a very tenuous situation. Andy? Yeah, I mean, well, Mick's the expert on this. I've just been reading some of the kind of the human interest side of the story, too, when one of the first three women is actually a British citizen, a dual national.

And so the British papers have been, you know, going wild over this. And, yeah, I mean, there's some quite touching coverage. Evidently, she has been a tower of strength as a hostage. Other hostages who are released have said that and not simply because she's British. But Tottenham Hotspur football club, which I believe is, you know, another football club, not one of the best. They're pretty good out there. Yeah, I'm joking.

It's just for all the Spurs fans, who are deplorable human beings. But aside from that, because she was a fan of Spurs, you know, they've been releasing yellow balloons during their matches and making announcements, you know, throughout the hostage crisis on her status. and, you know, good kudos to there.

The other thing is, you know, to Mick's point, of the Palestinians being released. And I think this plays into Sinwa's original calculus. Now, remember, when Sinwa was released from jail in 2011, it was part of a hostage release. And, you know, there were a thousand, I believe a thousand Palestinians released in return for the body of Gilak Shalil, who was an Israeli soldier who'd been kidnapped and killed. And so, Sinwa's calculus, through all of this, was partly based on his own experiences. Remember, we talked about Sinwa's time and an Israeli jail, how he studied through the British Open University courses on Israel, on Zionism.

but he's also a keen study, an analyst of an Israeli national psychology, speaks very fluent Hebrew. And so it's ironic, you know, all this time later, a number of deaths later, since 15 months into it. And, you know, his predictions are kind of coming true. I mean, listen, from a personal perspective, I'm for this ceasefire. I'm not criticizing it. But some of these high-profile prisoners being released are indeed high-profile. One is the Cario Zubedi, who is a senior member of the Alaksa Martyrs Brigades on the West Bank. He'd escaped from a Gilbauer prison back in 2021 was caught again.

And he was behind waiver bombings in Jerusalem. There's another prisoner also who's been held personally responsible. responsible for 42 deaths of civilians and bombing attacks back in this second infidata. So again, this kind of plays into Netanyahu's stance on the hostages, in other words, his apparent unwillingness to negotiate and to, you know, any terms of ceasefire. and I'm not suggesting he's driven by principle. He's driven by trying to hold his coalition together. But it flies in the face of kind of Israeli national ethos,

which is regardless of cost to bring back their own alive or dead. And it'll be interesting to see what happens to his coalition now that Ben Gavir has finally, finally quit. He's packed up his toys. Ben Gavir represents the Jewish person. power party, which is, of course, on the right wing. But it looks as though, because the consensus in favor of this ceasefire is, I won't say it's universal, but it seems as though a majority of Israelis support it. And there have been parties on the center who have offered to help

support Netanyahu's coalition in order to carry this through. which is an extraordinary, because Netanyahu is hated by these people. I mean, he's hated by a significant part of Israel. But the fact that they're willing to align with them in order to make the ceasefire deal go through just shows the kind of the level of hope and expectation that a sizable chunk of the Israeli public places on this ceasefire and the return of the hostages. So I need to, I want to ask, and I guess I'm not sure if, either of you know this, but is it normal for that, I guess what seems like a lopsided exchange, like three of the Israelis for like 300 of theirs? Is that normal?

Yeah, with 2011. 2011, I think it was, I forget how many it was for a thousand prisoners, but it was in, I think it was like in the double digits. Really? Yeah. And it seems like the ratio this time is 30 to one. Okay. Right.

So there's three coming out today and there's 90 being released. And some of them are, I think out of the pool that might be released in total, over a thousand, there's about 190, 200 that have serious life sentence like Andy was just talking about these people that are. So it's causing some tension, of course, with the family members of the people that were killed. But ultimately, I think for the greater good to get the people that, you know, there's the first 33 include children for Christ's saying you know it's it's I mean it's I can see how the families of the ones that were killed in the past would be upset but you know there's very difficult decisions to be made and it's going to be even more difficult to go from phase one into phase two

because phase two is a full withdrawal IDF from Gaza right so that is that is a huge political decision that's going to be fraught with you know collapsing of governments and uh And it, of course, makes it more difficult if Hamas then decides to start fighting again if they can regain the capacity because, after all, there was a ceasefire on October 6th, right? So, yeah. But right now they're focused on getting through phase one and getting these 33 people out. So can we break down a little bit of what the parameters of the ceasefire is? Is there a day count on it? Like how they had it in Lebanon, Hesbola and stuff like that?

Like what does it look like at 33 hostages, obviously? Like what are the, what's phase one to? It's so it's 42 days, phase one to get 33 hostages out when there's 30, 30 Palestinian prisoners per hostage. I don't think the amount of truck aid going in changes. I think it's 600 and 8 per day every day. There is some withdrawal requirements for the IDF out of population centers. But. that's another

that's the ones I know and then you go to second phase it's a full withdrawal and then third phase in generally speaking is the reconstruction of Gaza right so which is going to take decades

so if you're looking at the overall strategy of a Moss I heard this this morning which I thought was kind of interesting pre-October 7th the economy of Gaza was essentially equal to Morocco right so there's this concept

that it was an open prison and everything was without hope, but it wasn't actually the case. So Hamas, for their strategy, is completely devastated Gaza. It's about 85 to 90% uninhabitable structures. And I think I've seen an estimated $50 to $60 billion required to reconstruct. It'll take 10 to 15 years. That's where they put their people.

Wow. And 46,000 dead right now. What's the situation on the ground look like humanitarian-wise? It's very dire. I mean, we've all heard the most, I don't think there's any functional hospital right now, partly because there's no generation, no power. So the stuff that you need for any kind of advanced medical care is not there. The medicines, vaccinations have been a problem.

So there's a concern that, you know, otherwise, diseases that would not be coming back are coming back. And of course, it's winter there. So there's a big problem with exposure and food. I mean, the food is just not flowing in. But it should now. And I think that from my understanding, and we were just talking to our team this morning, there's two things.

They need to get the food in. They have to have a place to store it, right? Because if they don't, people are hoarding it. People are stealing it. People are then selling it. and, you know, the people who don't have money. So there has to be a rebuilding of some of the infrastructure that the UN specifically used to use to hold large food stores to get them in there.

So it calms down the population. They can look over there and see that there's enough food for the next two months. So they don't need to fight each other for this bag of rice or, you know, attack the truck driver. That's, this all needs to happen simultaneously. so I can kind of decompress a situation, but also get food. Not just the other issue, and I know getting deep on this, but when they come into one particular ground entry point, it's very difficult to convince the population that it goes through first

that they should let it go because there's a population further away than them. They're starving. It's kind of a situation where it's a, you know, every man, woman for himself, kind of a Darwinian type thing. So they have to come in from different directions. I would say that there's still a need for a maritime corridor just to be done different than it was in the first place. Because you can come in a different, including the North, and really bring a large-scale humanitarian assistance to places that just aren't getting it because they can't get trucks down. So, Mick, with speaking on humanitarian still, do you know or do you think there might be a hesitation from humanitarian groups outside of the ones that are already set to do.

do work there to come in because of past attacks on humanitarian, you know, trucks and things like that? Super risky. Absolutely. They've proven that they still are willing to go and risk at all. I think one of the issues is there's a resistance on the side of humanitarian groups to fully coordinate with the IDF, which involves tracking, right? So most of us know that, you know,

coordination across the battle space is super important. And you don't want to, you don't want to blow that off because it's generally you that will pay the consequences. And that is what happened. I understand their issues, you know, from their perspective on allowing themselves to be tracked. But that's one of the issues that leads to these deaths of humanitarian workers, for sure. But it's very dangerous to work there. And I think the more we can do to coordinate, potentially like a military level coordination of movement and a battle. space would be beneficial not only to the individuals who are brave enough to go and serve this humanitarian purpose but to get the aid to people right because if if everybody was confident that

they wouldn't get attacked and accidentally on route then there would be more people willing to do it right so it's it is a it benefits the people on the ground as well as the humanitarian is and a brave enough to go there. About a thing about the hostages, like you said, like there's possibility that there are multiple groups they're holding them, not just Hamas. Is Hamas like coordinating with them to try and get whoever, you know,

whatever hostage they have out? Because I remember when it first went off, we had Alex Bleets us on and he said that there was real trouble, you know, locating the hostages because it's not just Hamas, not just one body. It's like multiple people that hold. these people.

Yes. So I'm assuming. Yeah, go ahead. Please. I think they believe some, a lot of them being held by just families, right? In places that are the least likely to, uh, draw attention of, you know, if they're with around a lot of Hamas fighters, um, that is going to draw attention, uh, just from the, you know, the sake of the battle, right?

So that's one of the reasons why Hamas says they don't know how many people are still alive. They would have to send people around, uh, to places they believe the hostages are being held. to make some kind of proof of life determination. So certainly not making excuses for them. But that is the difficulty of recovering these hostages. They're spread all over the place and often in places that wouldn't be considered

for where a hostage would be. It's the internal, there's a couple of things that are going to be really interesting to watch play out. One is, you know, as the Trump administration moves into position here, what their stance is going to be if the Israelis make the call that Hamas is not cooperating with the ceasefire and that all bets are off and that the IDF will go in and finish the task of destroying Hamas. Now, Netanyahu tells his colleagues, his right-wing colleagues, who are left, notably Smoldrich,

who represents the ultra-Orthodox MK, I think it's MK's party. You know, he's telling him, look, Hamas is going to break this deal and everything's going to be fine because then we'll go in and finish the task. This is just kind of a hiccup. But, you know, no one really knows what the Trump administration's status is on that. You know, it does seem as though Trump wants this to end, that it is an unnecessary distraction from what he sees. I don't have any insights here, I'm just saying, from what he and his foreign policy team see as being dealing with the real adversary, which is Iran, and moving forward on achieving some kind of a resolution there. But nevertheless, that's, you know, that's kind of what

Netanyahu believes in that. And Smoldrich called this week Netanyahu a lying son of a liar, which is an interesting juxtaposition of adjectives and nouns. And so he's hanging on by a thread, and something has been, you know, something's been promised to him because Netanyahu at the same time against his will has started, not, well, he hasn't started, but the Israeli government has started to enforce the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews.

and actually this week issued warrants for the arrest of those who are trying to evade conscription. This has been a live wire issue in Israeli politics for some time. And Netanyahu opposed it, and it was the Supreme Court that overall, you know what the government's appeal, that this was not, the government's attempts to block it, I guess, is what I'm trying to say. And so you can see Netanyahu is done. very he's he he he not to mix metaphors but he is walking a tightrope here trying to try to keep the the right wing trying to keep the ultra orthodox within his coalition because those are his power base rather than having to rely on centrist parties uh who will desert him probably as soon as

the you know as the uh the the deal is over yeah now that i'm sorry andy with the um this conscription Is that something that would still be in effect? Let's just say everything stopped today. The ceasefire held, there was no more fighting. Would that be something that would still be put into effect? Or was that only because of what happened on October 7th? No, October the 7th might have been a catalyst. You know, the mass mobilization of all the reservists, I think, probably made it

very clearly apparent to a number of Israelis that the burden of military service was not being equally shared throughout the population. But this has been an issue that has been going on for at least five years, because as you guys probably know, the heretic population have under an understanding, I believe, is going all the way back to Ben Gurian when they were kind of imported into, Israel from Eastern Europe after the war to keep the traditions of Jewish religion alive. The agreement back then was that they would not be called into service, but they have, you know, they've grown. They've multiplied. And so now it's very, you know, when you have a large segment of the population who is not serving in the military,

and this isn't coming from me. It's coming from a lot of Israeli friends and their views are not really tangibly contributing to Israeli society in any other way. I mean, they continue the religion. Yes, they study it and they propagate it, but they're not defending the country and they're not working at business.

That adds to the GDP. And so it doesn't, you know, modern Israel doesn't accept this exemption. in the way that it, you know, that Ben-Gurian intended it to be justified. So, a lengthy answer. But, yeah, this week, a thousand ultra-Orthodox men received their draft. I'm sorry, not this week. It was months ago.

It was back in last summer. It was in July they received their draft notices. And now warrants are being issued for arrest. It doesn't, I don't know how many who are. being classified as as deserters, but it's apparently a significant portion of those 1,000 who are called up. And at the same time, the ultra-Orthodox parties of which, of whom, now, of which Smoldrich is a representative, oppose this and have opposed it from the start. Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support

the podcast if you're not already. To support the channel is to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes

for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Teamhouse channel and podcast if you'd like to. And we really appreciate that. So go out and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house.

Yeah, so you guys, Andy, you mentioned, like, the Trump administration's real aim in the region is Iran. And last week, I saw a report where France, Germany, and the UK met with Iran to talk about whether it's options or what's going to happen if they do get hit in terms of, like, their nuclear capabilities. And, like, there was some speculation that Israel had a plan ready to go. And they're waiting for the Trump administration to come in just because I must. assuming the Trump administration would probably be a bit more lenient, at least in the press. Have you guys heard anything about that in terms of where we're at? It sounds like it's just ready to go and they're just

waiting to hit the button, basically. So there's been a plan, of course, by Israel for the day that they believe that Iran's in a breakout mode toward a deliverable nuclear weapon. I think it's important to point out that, yes, they could get four weapons or at least enough material to make four weapons, but then they have to, and I'm not a nuclear bomb expert, but they have to come up with the triggering mechanisms to make it functional, right? And I've heard up in open source, I've heard up to a year that would

take. But there is a plan, and I do believe it's being discussed more openly and more along the idea that it will happen if Iran, if there's a plan. enough intelligence that indicates that's where it's heading. And I think the Biden administration was talking about it with Israel and now the incoming administration was probably part of those conversations during this transition. And we'll see. But it could be that they're openly talking about it or at least talking to media about it because they want Iran to look at that and say, okay, you know, we've had several strategic setbacks, right? We're out of Syria for the most part. We've seen Hezbollah and Amos decimated.

We've shown that we can't actually conventionally fight Israel, and we don't really have any air-missile defense systems as our S-300 have been destroyed by Israel. Maybe it's an opportunity to go back in the negotiations for an agreement that President Trump would find acceptable. And that would likely include all the proxy operations, which wasn't included in the first agreement, the JCPOA, which is why they got criticized. So this might be real in the sense that they are really looking at, you know, how are we going to do this if we need to? But it also might be, at least in part, to really send a message to Iran. Like now is the time to try to come up with a new agreement and it might be effective.

They might come to the back of the table because they are not doing well economically. The regime is incredibly unpopular. And they've proven that they really don't have much money. to their bark, they're pretty much all bark, military. I mean, I'm assuming here, and I'm speculating, would Israel really want another deal, even if it involved proxy forces? I think so.

I think Israel case. Oh, sorry, go ahead. All right. Yeah, just quickly and then over you, Annie. I think if you include the proxy forces, it would be a difficult discussion of the United States going, okay, so they don't get a nuke, and they stop. funding the proxy forces and you're against it.

Right. So like, what is it you want? I mean, do you want to conflict with Iran? I don't think that would be good for the region, right? Or you? So I think if you include that, it'll change the discussion. I'm sure there'll be some people there, but we have to focus on the majority because that's what counts. Andy? Yeah, no, I was going to say, I don't think there's going to be, I don't think there's much room to maneuver if the Iranians do agree. Of course, they've got to convince the negotiating parties of a means to monitor this. But if Iranians agree to prevent, to stop funding, Hussbala in particular, and of course, Hamas, and, you know, from the U.S. perspective, the Houthis too, then I think that'll keep, you know, all parties, Israel, Saudi

Arabia, United States, happy. But it's, yeah, it'll be interesting to see. Certainly, as Mick says they're on the ropes, but that is such a, that's such a central part of their foreign policy, right? Because that is how, that's how they exert influence. And for Coots Force, the, you know, the IRGC and Homania himself to kind of give up on that is almost unimaginable. Propagation overseas of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the destruction of Israel have been, you know, it's been an open strategy of Iran. It was a shared strategy with its proxies to step back from that. It's going to be a tough call on their part. And perhaps the threat of a strike on their nuclear program is the only thing that will bring them to it. All right, going back to the ceasefire for a second,

I want a little bit of speculation from you guys. Does it hold? Does the fort that we get to the fort, not even hold, does it get to the 42 days? Hmm. So I think it's in both sides' interests to get to the end of the 42 days. If done, if it's done by the letter of the agreement.

So part of it's just hopeful optimism, but I think it's a good chance. After that, it's really tough because it, I mean, if you were in Israel, you're going to withdraw the idea of who's filling the security vacuum, right? So my understanding, and I've been here talking to a lot of folks about policy stuff and also what we're doing overseas, my understanding is the U.S. has gone to Gulf allies and talked about a multinational security force that could potentially bridge the gap between, you know,

obviously not Hamas and something that's Palestinian, but not Hamas. And they've all said, hell no, right? So then who's going to fill the security vacuum? And it's, for practical reasons, that's a tough answer and a tough decision to make. You know, is it going to be a private company? Is it going to be at multiple private companies? And what would be acceptable? What kind of outside are they going to train Palestinians?

I mean, it's, and then, I mean, that all has to happen before we go into the second phase, or there's no security that Israelis would be comfortable with. So I don't want to say we will not get into the second phase because that just seems defeat us. But the challenges are very real. And it's hard to see that unless the international community, which says a lot and does little, steps up in some capacity, there will be a very difficult decision to pull the idea out. Yeah, especially since all these prisoners have just been released to include 200, with, you know, who are serving multiple life sentences each.

You know, so yes, Hamas's leadership has been destroyed, but Hamas has not been destroyed. And that's clearly evident in some of the film that we're seeing, some of the video clips of Hamas fighters driving through Khan Yunus and being shared by the crowds. And of course, that's predictable. You don't, you can't destroy an organization like Hamas by just whack-a-mole, by sheer destruction.

I mean, that's not the way to go about it. We've talked about this over and over, and who knows how many nascent Hamas fighters they have created by doing that. You know, if you've seen your whole family killed by the Israelis, you might have been a fence-sitter before, but I think anyone here on this video call and most of our audience would probably want to pick up a gun

and get vengeance because that's human nature. And now, and, you know, now you've got all these embroiled leaders returning to the fray. It just doesn't, you know, it doesn't bode well. The destruction of Hamas was always just an empty phrase. And I don't think Israel is any nearer now than it ever was to doing that. Yikes. I mean, so I have to completely agree with you, Andy. 42 days still phase two.

And you need some sort of security force there. that's not the IDF and they're not in the plan in like you should be not even in the beginning talks of it you should be like in the middle of like logistics how it's going to work who's going to be there and there's nobody it's like okay I hope we get to I hope we get hostages out I hope we get humanitarian aid there but to think that like the IDF's going to pull out in phase two is madness because there's nobody else who else is going to do it I don't think there's U.S. there's political capital, even with Trump, to bring U.S. troops in there.

And if the people, if other countries in the Middle East aren't willing to step up, it's like, who the fuck's going to do this? I think it's just such a, such a problematic situation. Because, you know, first of all, I mean, the only, the only potential realistic solution would be to cobble together some of the more powerful and richer families among the Palestinians in Gaza to oppose the rebirth of Hamas. But that's impractical. Yes, there are a lot of influential families,

but they've had to collaborate with Hamas to this point, simply to survive. And then putting a peace force, peace community. force into there is all risk and no gain as far as certainly as far as, you know, the Arab countries are concerned. And the Israelis aren't a peacekeeping force. You know, they have, they have zero credibility in that regard. And certainly among the Palestinians at this stage, and they don't want to do it. Nor they contribute to the, to the rebuilding Gaza. They don't subscribe to, you know, our philosophy or colonel and palace philosophy, if you break the China or whatever it was by the China shop, right? You've got to help rebuild it. So there's simply no one

who's going to be willing to step up to the plate. And sadly, or not sadly, I'm going to look to the United States to take leadership on this. I can't see the European Union doing this. And with the administration coming in, that's disavowed involvement in any such operation overseas. it just yeah there's no there doesn't seem to be any solution at all is there any cat political will or capital in the u.n where like you can get nothing well i mean the u.n probably would have to be part of it and certainly maybe even lead it but to andy's point and all of our points there's no country's going to want to roger up to us certainly not us yeah this is this is nation building, of course, because

we build Gaza. But could a private company that falls under the authority and legitimacy of the UN? I mean, as a guy who tries to look for some solution, because

if not, it's basically going to be a continuous cycle of pilots, I think they have to look at it. You know, the private security companies do get, you know, bad reps, but they can serve a purpose if they're if they're overseen correctly and if they fall under the legitimacy of an international organization like the United Nations.

And if they don't do that, I don't know what the other options are. Because Israel is simply not going to leave a security balcony which Hamas will absolutely fill immediately if they just precipitously leave. So, yeah, it's a challenge that the world should look at as one to solve, not just to admire. I mean, listen, I'm happy the ceasefire is at least getting the 42 days, you know, knock on with hopefully. And, you know, kids kind of stopped starving in the fucking street. You know what I mean? Like where there's just basic humanitarian aid getting there and hospitals getting up and running and stuff like that. Yeah, this is a rocking a hard place.

And I'm having a hard time picturing a guy like Eric Prince sending his boys in. to Gaza to like start helping prop up and keep security going on. Maybe there is another person outside of Herrick Prince, I hope to God, that'll be able to do it if the private option was the one that got the most steam. Yeah. I keep going back to these prisoner, this prisoner exchange or the exchange thing. I wouldn't put it past the Israelis to as there. releasing these guys to give them a wink and say, we'll see you again soon because I don't see them

just letting them go and run around, run amok, you know, and it's kind of like this weird cycle. It's like, we let them go. They start their shit again. We capture, kill them. It starts tension. We, you know, it's just this, I don't know. I just don't see these people, even if they go to other countries, I don't see them living much longer, you know, or it's just being forgiven and let go.

Maybe I'm wrong on that. No, certainly there's a history of following up by assassinating prisoners, high-profile prisoners who have been released. But remember, there are 200, I mean, there are some 1100 prisoners getting released. And of those 200 are serving multiple life sentences. I don't know among those how many are potential leaders, but certainly there's some high-profile names with, a long resume of what they would call resistance action against the occupier, in their words,

going way back to, you know, their 90s. And so, yeah, and Wackermole works, as we found out, it works if it's combined with other efforts, right? but Wackamol alone has not, you know, it has moan the grass for the Israelis. It's brought Hezbollah to its knees, but they're not out. You know, neither Hezbollah nor Hamas is out, and it would be a mistake to think they are. It's not, I'm trying to think of, you know, when you think of the way we went after, God, I mean, There's so many things that we didn't do well, the United States, but we did do good job of going after al-Qaeda in Iraq, right?

But it was a combined effort, and it was counterinsurgency combined with assassination and, you know, the whole intelligence cycle, and it was many more actions, and a number of those actions are what some people might call soft. But it did work for us, of course, until we withdrew and the Islamic State came in. But the point is, no, we let's, you know, let's not undermine our own efforts. It worked well, but that's not what the Israelis do. They assassinate and someone else moves into the position. If you look at all the lead members of Hamas, Sinwa, Daif, you name it.

They all, a position opened up for them because the Israelis killed the guy who was there before. And you very rarely get someone in coming into dead man's shoes who is more benign. than his predecessor just by nature of the beast because he knows the risks so he's bound to be more of a zealot than the guy before and i mean like sinwar got released in 2011 right and uh you know he was operating for the most part i mean i'm sure there was some like people were tracking and looking to smoke them but from musso yeah in uh and and in 2014 uh he was the guy on the political bureau who coordinated the al-cassan brigades you know the military military wing and directed action. And the Israelis didn't manage to get him. And then he emerged from

the tunnels in 2014 afterwards to declare victory. Daif, who was kind of his right-hand man, who took over the Al-Qasun brigades years later and was really the guy who did a lot of the military planning for 7 October. The Israelis tried to kill him seven times. They got his family. They killed his wife, his infant son and his daughter. And that wasn't, you know, that wasn't likely to make him step down and go, okay, guys, you got it. He went ahead and planned seven October, right? So you think, you know, again, it's an understanding of mentality. I think sometimes the Israelis forget they're dealing with human beings. You see your wife and your kids killed, all right? What's your mindset going to be? Are you going to care about killing a civilian?

of your adversary who did that? No, of course not. And I guarantee most people who regard themselves as being compassionate, human beings wouldn't think that way. You take a guy who's a jihadist anyway by background and do that, then you're going to have trouble on your hands,

and sure enough, they did. And they got that eventually, but someone else took over the Alcotton brigades, someone else who probably lost a lot of people during these attacks and is probably planning something and going to be planning something, something as soon as, you know, Hamas gets its feedback under it.

I mean, it seems to me so obvious, you know, all this cheering every time they get someone. It's like, dude, what else are you doing? What are you doing to consolidate your advances? Nothing. You know, you've left a city level to rubble, a population that is bound to hate you. You're doing nothing to help them rebuild it. As bad as we were at times, and we made some mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but for the most part, we understood that a strategy cannot simply rest on killing, killing, killing. And certainly not when you're dealing with a group that not a conventional adversary with fixed lines. You're dealing with an insurgent group.

Yeah, so one quick thing before this, Netanyahu politically. I mean, it's good that he's, you know, it was a big push for the hostages and stuff like that. But he is losing, starting to lose a bit of his, like, right flank in terms of Ben Gavir and stuff like that. Is he able to keep a coalition together enough where he's not going to get, like, hit with, you know, getting booted, you know, snap whatever election or whatever that, you know, their system works, how they're just. works. I think that, again, I'm no expert, but I think that the, you know, as I mentioned, that there are, there are Israeli politicians who are more centrist who are willing to align themselves with Netanyahu for the sake of the ceasefire deal. So I don't think that his government is an immediate danger of falling, but that could change. You know, if the ceasefire deal ends, depending on how it

or any other of a number of factors. But of course, remember, there are criminal charges against him that can only be brought when he is no longer prime minister. And so it's more than his political future at stake. It could possibly be, you know, his way to avoid being locked up is to continue in power. And I think most people, even his supporters, will say he will do anything to stay in power. And he's a survivor.

He's the longest serving Israeli prime minister, period, longer than Van Gerean. And he's been a lead player in Israeli politics since the early 90s. And it's the phase two negotiations. I think they start next week. Next week, that could be the biggest challenge to that. He agrees with it. He's going to have to really explain what we already talked about. How do we ensure that Hamas is to take back over?

become the threat that they once were before October 7. I mean, you could see how hard these negotiations were, right? The two sides I fucking hate each other where it's like this face two things should have been planned for months ago. It should have been part of the initial ceasefire in terms of like, how is it going to work? Who's going to be there? You know, the actual nuts and bolts of it. But at least as-

I'm sorry. No, Netanyahu always said, you know, he, he took, took a stand on the requirement for the Israelis to withdraw from Gaza, right? And even when the military said, hey, we can go down to the Philadelphia corridor and still be ready to respond from there. And Halievi, who was the chief of staff, said publicly, as did, oh, gosh. Galant. Yeah, Galant, right?

They both said that, and they were both fired. And so, you know, that that was the way that he kept, he kept slow rolling the ceasefire. Even when his own general said, hey, those terms are acceptable, he found a way to they weren't. It might have been just a strategy when it comes to negotiation that if they were to talk too much about phase two, they would have been a rapture on the actual on phase two and never even gotten a phase one. Yeah. All right. So cautious optimism, man.

they keep bringing that humanitarian aid in because I'm not interested in like little kids fucking starving in the street. It's a bummer. Yeah. And Mick is, you know, involved in that humanitarian effort with Fogbo. You could check it out. The link is in the description.

There's some other stuff too about the TikTok band and stuff like that, but we could do that on another time. This is awesome. All right, so Mick's companies, Fogbo, Longbow, everything is in the description. Check that out. Andy Milburn. He's got a great book when the tempest gathers.

Link is in the description. Find him. If you wanted to talk to Andy Milburn, maybe he'll answer you. The links are in the description. Stop asking me. Jason Lyons, same thing. Links are in the description as well. And the best place to support the show is Patreon.com slash the team house.

I missed you guys. It's been a little bit of, it's been a week, an entire week. I haven't seen you guys. Yeah, great show, guys. If there's anything else you guys want to add, please feel free. No, good. Good. Good. Good.

Good. Thanks, everybody. Oh, yeah. Thanks, sir, man. Take it.