The Team House - CIA Spy Discusses Russian Disinformation | EYES ON PODCAST

Episode Date: November 2, 2024

Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseSubscribe to the new EYES ON  YouTube channel.⬇️https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJytcQbSOEKLGyhNwkqpd3AToday we're joined by recurring guest Mick Mulroy. We talk about Iran's plot to attack Israel by way of Iraq and Russian disinformations effect on the U.S. election.Find Mick here:https://www.loboinstitute.org/https://x.com/MickMulroy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthorhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/Find Andy Milburn here:⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023https://amilburn.substack.com/https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-OperationsSubscribe to the new EYES ON  YouTube channel.⬇️https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJytcQbSOEKLGyhNwkqpd3ABecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey everyone, Andy here. I just want to put in a quick plug for the new channel, Eyes On. Previously, we fell under Team House and we shared subscribers. And what we're doing here is branching off, still within the Team House franchise. But it is important that we build up Steam with our own subscription base. So please, cost you nothing. Click on the subscribe button. Thank you. Hello, everyone. And welcome to another episode of Eyes On.

I'm Andy Bourbon. I'm Jason Lyons. I'm Demich Contacos. And today's guest is Mick Moroy and normally I say, and he needs no introduction. He does need no introduction. So I'm not going to introduce him except to say he is a super loyal guest on both Izon and Teamhouse and a very distinguished background in the CIA and the Marine Corps. And of course, in the US government.

see i did introduce you me and welcome in any case d back to you uh yeah so we have a lot cooking today obviously um we're going to do it a little bit different than we normally do it's going to be probably two to three of like the most pressing things in the headlines uh the first thing that stood out to me because it's kind of been like a theme of this show i mean just the timing of it is uh iran planning a strike on israel again for from Iraq. My biggest question about this is like, is this ever going to end?

Because obviously Israel is going to hit back. There was word also Israel is going to hit back because they targeted Netanyahu's Summerhouse and stuff like that. So like, does this end? And I have a bigger question too, the de-escalation by escalation theory, which I don't exactly,

a little editorializing, I don't really exactly buy that. So yeah, Mick, fix this for us. fix some. I don't know if I could fix it. I can't. Explain it. Talk about it. Will it end? That's a good question. I mean, even if there's a long pause in between, you know, strikes from Iran to Israel, Israel to Iran, it probably won't end, right? I do think Iran realizes emphatically that

its use of proxy forces is much better, a much better strategic policy for them than conventional engagements, right? So they've proven that they really don't have. have much capability to do much to Israel. Yes, ballistic missiles, obviously. But it's a really bad idea for a country with limited to no air and missile defense and almost no air force to pick a fight with a country who has one of the most advanced air forces in the world and now probably the most sophisticated if you had our bad into it, air and missile defenses.

So if you want to do that conventional fight, you probably should go back to the military military drawing board. But, you know, the old adage walks off, we can carry a big stick is not what Iran does, although they came out of the gates trying to minimize the Israeli strike in response to the October 1st, I believe, 200 plus ballistic missile attack on Israel. But I do think they realized that they got kind of their ass handed to them, right? So most of the Iranian-era missile defenses were either significantly degraded or destroyed, including the Russian S-300s, and a lot of the production facilities and launch facilities of ballistic missiles. So it does look like they're going to try to do a version of proxy warfare where they'll launch

them from Iraq. Unfortunately, everybody on the planet knows it's going to be Iran now, so I don't know how much of a, you know, a hidden hand that provides Iran, I'd say zero. And it really does depend on how Israel responds, you know, whether they just view it. Like I think they will was just a direct attack by Iran and Israel and attack accordingly in Iran again. And this time without much of the air and missile defenses that they saw the first time, or the last time, I should say. And then the question is, do they escalate? Does this go beyond air and missile defense as it go into?

naval assets, other military assets, IRGC headquarters, and then energy infrastructure, which obviously the U.S. doesn't want to see, but that doesn't mean it's still not on the table. Mick, on that note, from a U.S. standpoint, right, we want to see strategic stability, but you only see strategic stability in Middle East or anywhere for that matter when one of two, you know, one of two conditions maintained, and that is, you know, either kind of an equilibrium. And until October the 7th, there was kind of a shaky equilibrium, right, between Iran and Israel, in that, you know, the Israelis felt that Iran knew Iran could hurt them badly via use of proxies. And Iran, as you pointed out, knew that that militarily, they were, you know, the weak or the two

adversaries. And so there was kind of that understanding. It was an implicit agreement not to cross red lines and not pretending they were by any means, you know, they're benign towards each other, but they, you know, they both understood there's kind of a lower gray version of mutually assured destruction. So that was that shaky equilibrium. Now, arguably, that's gone because, I mean, Israel is arguably, I'd say inarguably, in a strategically much stronger position than it was prior to 7 October, Hezbollah is on the ropes.

And I haven't said destroyed, but it's unable to launch an attack that would significantly hurt Israel and will be in that position for a number of years. And as you pointed out, Iran's being denuded of its anti-eat defense. But Israel doesn't quite yet have hegemony, which is the other condition of stability. So, you know, my question would be. It's a tough one I know. but what is the right course here? I mean, from both U.S. perspective and perhaps from an Israeli perspective to maintain that stability.

Oh, that is a good question. And if you look at both of your factors that you brought up, you know, the proxy force preference of Iran, it did have an impact. It wasn't, it wasn't, you know, a knockout blow, if you will, but it certainly did have an impact on Israel, right? We've got the Hamas attacks, you know, how many were killed, the loss of confidence by the Israeli people and their security, the displacement of 60,000 people in the north of Israel. So they definitely have an impact, but they're reaping the consequences, right? So if you want to pull that trigger, the consequences are there. As you point out, Hamas is effectively being dismantled.

Yes, it's never going to be eradicated. It's an ideology. but from the military perspective, they came to a point where they're just not a direct threat to Israel. And Hezbollah is being dismantled as well. So they pulled the trigger and they're reaping the consequences. As you say, conventionally, Iran is not anywhere close to Israel. I think sometimes we, just like with our own adversaries, Russia, for example,

we try to make a parody when it doesn't really exist, mostly so we don't lose our eye on the ball. kind of thing because there are a significant adversary to Israel and they need to look at them that way. So how do you get equilibrium? Well, it's tough, right? So what are you going to do to try to get Iran to a point where they not only decide one, not to seek a nuclear weapon, right, which is they're getting close to, I think, making the determination that they have no other alternative, right? That's one of the problems that having a weak conventional military is you soon realize that the only real safeguard you have is to acquire a nuclear weapon. Look at North Korea, right? We went from, you know,

there's absolutely no chance we'll ever let North Korea get a nuclear weapon to, you know, engagement with them, you know, barugs on the border and all this stuff. So they see that. They see that compared to, you know, Gaddafi, for example, Libya when he gave up his, and they're probably going to look at that and say the only way we can get to something we consider, you know, an equilibrium with Israel is a nuclear weapon. And then the United States is going to have to decide with Israel. And Israel might decide unilaterally, of course, that they won't let that happen. It all comes down the capacity to do something about it that's effective. And of course, the political willingness to take the first strikes. If we think the intel says that they're

within a breakout period. Other than that, then I don't think Iran will ever really get to equilibrium with Israel. They'd have to compete not only with Israel, but with the U.S. security assistance, which nobody can compete with them if we're all in. So, you know, what the U.S. can do on our side? It would be better if we were more aligned with Israel, I think, at least publicly.

I don't, and I know this is about the ceasefire, but I don't understand why we, we, USG, continuously characterize the status of ceasefire negotiations, which then turn out to be completely incorrect. It just makes us look like we're not really aligned at all with Israel. Maybe that's the case in some of these things. But it doesn't do, it doesn't serve us any purpose, I don't think, to do that publicly, where it's just obvious that we're out of alignment. I think we should do more behind the closed door.

discussions and then where we can agree come out in agreement. But it is clear that the U.S. is ready to defend Israel. I mean, we just saw this week the deployment of, you know, several B-52s, more destroyers and other aircraft, uh, fire aircraft squadron. I mean, we have got more assets in the region right now that I don't think we have in all the time. So, um, we're trying to balance this to a point where Iran sees that it could be catastrophic. if there's a conflict that kicks off to the point where there's no pauses.

There's no time for posturing and political statements and Diayatollah giving, you know, tough guy speeches to students. It's just nonstop and Iran will get decimated if that's the case. Are you concerned that perhaps Khomeini is, you, you know, I know this sounds like blasphemy within pro-euranian circles, not that that matters, but that, you know, maybe he is, maybe people are questioning his, within Iran, his kind of placatory attitude towards the last strike.

And what I mean by that is, yes, he came out, you know, with usual chest beating, but the undertone was, it was, in the end, it was, it wasn't slanted necessarily towards peace, but it's certainly towards de-escalation. And yet now you've got Ali Fadavi, who's a deputy commander of IGRC, coming out and saying,

we've never left aggression unanswered in 40 years. That sounds like an implicit criticism of Khomeini. And, you know, to your point about Israel, yeah, there's not, you know, there's perhaps not much that Iran can do against Israel. But yes, break out towards nuclear weapon, number one. But number two, also in the background is if anyone goes after Iran's oil supplies, you know, Iran could arguably destabilize the region by going after the Gulf states' oil supplies too

and could do so via proxy. So they don't ostensibly have responsibility. plausible deniability for those attacks. And I suppose that's, you know, are those real concerns? Or do you think that more rational minds will prevail within Iran at this stage, given their domestic problems too? Yeah, so several good points in there, Andy. So the first one, you know, when it comes to the messaging of the Supreme Leader,

I mean, he's got two audiences and it makes it inconsistent, right? So he came out for us and said, nothing to see here. They didn't do any damage. You know, it was just a lot of hot air, so this speak, because he's talking to internally, you know, the Israeli response. And then he turns around and says, well, we have to, this can't go unanswered and, you know, we'll make them pay for this and it'll be catastrophic and, you know, Hall of Brinston and all that stuff,

because that's externally. So, but it's not consistent. But it does appear that, to your point, that within the IRC, they don't agree with the idea that there shouldn't be any response. So then the question is how they're going to do it. And is it going to then elicit a larger response by Israel, which is poised, I think, to do so and do so in a way that could be substantial. If they go after the energy to your last question,

it'll obviously, you know, I'm not an economist or a global energy guy, but it, you know, I read people that are and it will have an impact on the global, you know, energy market and the world economy. What Iran can do if there's a lot. Yes, they can go after like the abcake strikes in Saudi Arabia, you know, a long time ago. But they also have the capacity essentially shut down the flow of energy by shutting down the Straits of Hormuz. Right. They have, I think, the capacity to. mine that to a point where no ship would essentially be would go through there.

Nobody would ensure them to go through there. It'd have to be completely wiped clean and the only military in the world, Navy in the world that could do that is the U.S. Navy. And that would take a considerable effort and probably require direct strikes by the United States on Iranian positions to be able to do that safely because, you know, mine clearing operations and I'm no expert, but I've heard how these work, are slow, moving, and very vulnerable. So it would escalate immediately. They would essentially lock down 40% of the world's energy supply, in addition to the Houthi's strike in, of course. It would be catastrophic

in many ways, and they have the ability to do that. And whether they're willing to let the world burn, I think probably they are. It's only a few decisions by a few people that would, that could cause that to happen. So we have to look at all those things. It doesn't mean we sit and don't do anything. Israel law, but the consequences should be thought up when you're making the original decision. So, Mike, sorry, Andy, that's interrupt.

We've been talking about Iran, Israel, big eye, little, or big eye, big eye, and I'm thinking of little eye, the people of both of these nations. How long do you think that they're going to allow this stuff to go on, especially given the last point that you made about hitting the energy sector, Iran is already hurting. Their people are already hurting. So how do you think there might be a point? And of course, this is, you know, far out there where the Iranian people would say, you know what?

We've suffered enough, this, you know, measuring contest that's going on here. And the Israeli people, do you think there's a point where they may say the same and be, and whether it's protests or in the case of Iran on the outside of it, a full-on revolution. Do you think that there could come a point for that? I think it's possible. I mean, there are obviously very different places, but it's a very poignant question. So if you take Israel first, it's a democracy. Netanyahu's chosen, you know, under the parliamentary system.

There was a significant lack of confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu. after October 7. One, because it happened. And then I think subsequent to that, because of the, what the perception of many Israelis, obviously they're not a monolith, but spent a lot of time there, his lack of emphasis on recovery of the host, right? Or the prioritization so far below everything else. But you also have to point out that at least politically, his successful operations against

leadership targets, you know, the whole covert pager system, I think has given him some credibility and he's kind of crime plan back up in the popularity. It's my understanding that I track Israeli politics that much. But it's ultimately that has to do with whether there'll be a administrative change, political change in Israel, right? It comes down to the will of the people. And there's just coalitions are a bit odd there. But as long as he keeps the far right.

of his coalition, he'll stay there. And he's got other reasons to want to stay there, you know, illegal. But it does seem to be shifting toward him, you know, and if there's a political analyst out there that thinks otherwise I would concede. But that's what I've seen. But I, but, you know, the Israeli people, the one, you know, factor of their military, which is in many ways exceptional, is it really does rely heavily on reservists.

So these people have essentially put their lives on hold. Right. You can talk to, you know, your everyday average Israeli, everybody has kids that aren't going to college, right? They just constantly get sent to Gaza or now Lebanon. And their lives are just completely disrupted. And yes, when a country's at war, that's, I guess, in many cases to be expected. But it does have a serious disruption not only on the individual generation's lives, but also the economy. But some would say, That's why you should have a force that is reliant on civilians, right? Because then it impacts civilians and wars don't go on for decades and decades because it isn't just fought by, you know, professional military members that have decided to do it as a career. Another discussion, but that's all part of the Israeli calculation. If you flip over to Iran, you know, you've got an autocratic society, theocracy, if you will, with a literally call them the Supreme Leader, right? So just by the title,

I don't think you're really supposed to question somebody who's called the Supreme Leader, right? But that, but they have a very diverse society. They're very sophisticated in many ways, especially for a society who's lived under this, this type of despotic rule for so long. And I think there's always a chance. You shouldn't oversell it because, you know, we haven't seen it yet, but we've seen spikes where the people of Iran, which could, I mean, Iran could be a phenomenal place. It could have a burgeoning economy. It could be at the height of modernity in the Middle East, if only, right? They could get rid of these guys. So, and I don't think we, I mean, they don't need Americans to tell them. I think they know that. So the question is whether they have the

gumption collectively to toss off this type rule and whether they could do it. because the whole system is set up to prevent it, right? You know, they have the Iranian military. They also have the IRAC. There's multiple layers of it. They're all fighting each other or they're set up to be, you know, contentious with each other. It's a hard system to crack.

But I do think it's really going to come down to the Iranian people. And if they do get to a point where they can fully realize what Iran can be, that after it happens, the U.S. should embrace it. and the region should do because we'd all be better for it. Agreed. Thanks. Yeah, I think there's like two factors that, right, Mick. I mean, one is that Americans don't necessarily understand because we are so, especially just in military, we love the thought of unconventional warfare and nurturing

a kind of a democratic revolution from within. But you've got to understand the Iranian psyche, which is they're extremely proud and extremely patriotic people and that as much as though they may hate the regime, if it is seen to be attacked from outside, they will rally behind the regime. And the regime has used that before. Number one, and I'm talking about counter-revolutionary forces within Iran, which are strong. That's number one, which is kind of part of their national psyche. And number two is part of the regime itself. The fact that, and I hate to say anything that sounds like positive about the Iranian regime, but they're quite smart in their management of a popular discontent.

You know, they do have nominal elections, right? They do seem concerned about the emotions that swell up around those elections, and there have been continuous concessions made recently to domestic opinion. However, as we saw in 2009, when it looks like regime is under threat from inside, turn, they turn like, you know, Genghis Khan very, very quickly to put it down. And so, so raising that momentum, that critical mass to a point to overcome the counter-revolutionary forces, I think is probably the real challenge within Iran and why perhaps, you know, it's not a good idea to get too optimistic about the thought of regime changed from within.

I think that's fair. And often that is what happens. People see something that sparks a revolution. And then there's almost an overconfidence. And in some ways, it hurts in the future when people say, we already saw this. It didn't work. It really does have to be organic. I'm obviously somebody who's a big supporter of U.S. covert capabilities. But even when it comes to covert capabilities, especially in this sphere, it has to be organic. You really can't create something like this at this level, no matter how sophisticated your services. Basically, you just have to enhance something that's already happening. And so it really has to come from within. The U.S. could overtly and covertly support. But it really does have to be a movement within the Saudi Arabian people or it's not going to be successful and it won't stay. And steering clear of our own domestic, we're not staring clear. We have to talk about our own domestic politics because.

there's a major factor in the uncertainty in the Middle East is Israel's relationship with the United States, right? So, you know, I think someone said the other day, I think it might have been New York Times, that equilibrium in the Middle East lies somewhere in Pennsylvania right now, you know, which is a clever phrase. But there is some truth in that. I mean, there's no secret in the fact that, you know, the Israelis would like to see one administration more than another. out there and there is also the possibility that if we have an administration that gives Israel can't march to do what it wants okay just hypothetical if that happens and you see the right you know Netanyahu um going to new strengths as he has done with with uh the extreme right in Israel what we call the extreme the right wing in Israel that could that could potentially

appear a Black Swan event to threatening strategic stability. You know, and I bring this up because I want to get into disinformation. And again, we're non-partisan here. But you see that as a concern too. In other words, the moderating force of the United States, moderating influence of the United States, and a now energized hegemonic Israel, no longer fetid, could also potentially threaten strategic stability. You know, we focused on Iran, but this is a potential too. Yeah, I think that's a fair point, Andy. And I'm non-partisan and a political, certainly as an analyst, but I would start with,

I think during, you know, election seasons, the whole point between parties is to highlight the differences, right? So every possible different, because it doesn't do any good to say, I agree with it. Yeah, it should. I mean, but it's just not what gets people election. It's not how it works. And I bring that up because oftentimes when the election's over and everybody gets, you know, in the Pentagon or the agency or over at the White House, there's a lot of consistency when it comes to U.S. foreign policy. That just wasn't talked about during during the election, because again, that's not how you get elected. So I would caution anybody that thinks there's going to be too big of dramatic shifts

when it comes to overall global U.S. foreign policy. One, because there isn't as big of a rift within the parties, and two, a lot of the people who are responsible for it are in the parties. They're consistent. They don't leave. They're staffers at the White House or staffers at the Pentagon. They're careers at the CIA. So, and that's a good thing, you know, I'm highlighting it, but I think it's a good thing because

consistency and foreign policy is what both your adversaries and your allies need to see. Not that it'd be completely consistent. And we, I know we're going to talk about potentially the differences, but I just wanted to start with that. Because if you don't, if you don't explain that part, I think people think we just do dramatic shifts, you know, between, you know, whether you're a Republican or a Democrat. But I do think you're probably right. I think Prime Minister Nanjou would view a second Trump administration is potentially more favorable to them,

at least when it comes to unfettered security assistance, you know, military support. We've already seen the shots across the bow from Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin on, you know, get these humanitarian assistance up to, you know, a certain amount of trucks, 350 or potentially lose security systems. I don't know that that won't be carried over in the Trump administration if there is one. I'm not sure. I'm pretty sure that will be carried over, maybe even enhanced in the Harris administration. So, you know, I'm involved in the humanitarian issue in Gaza, so I have positions on that.

But I do think it's important to point out that there will be issues that will be difference between a Harris and a Trump administration when it comes to Israel, but there'll also be a lot of consistency that we just won't talk about because generally speaking, you don't talk about the non-controversia. And I don't think the U.S.,

I think the U.S. relationship with Israel will be enduring regardless of who is elected, for sure. Oh, shift. Go ahead, go ahead. No, I was just going to say that for me, it seems like if there's any kind of an issue coming, it would come from externally, like almost like, you know, kids will, especially toddlers, will test their limits. How far can I push this? So depending on whether it's Harris or Trump that is

elected, I think there are world leaders or even non-state actors out there will say, let's test this. Let's see how, you know, let's see where the rubber meets the road here. And let's see how far we can push this. So I think it won't come internally the big shift. I think the tests will come externally. That's just my non-expert opinion on it. I think you're right, Jason. I think we're going to see that almost immediately. One, because all we do is highlight the differences.

And so they're seeing the same thing. And they might just overplay their hand, whether it's Russia, for example, or Israel. You know, we might see Israel, okay, Trump's elected. So we're going to take strikes on the nuclear facility. And I'm just hypothetical, of course. And he's going to support us. So we're going to go ahead and plan for that. And then he gets in there and sits down with his advisors, gets an intel brief on, you know,

which changed since he was president last time. And he, you know, might decide something different. Or Russia might overplay their hand, you know, one way or the other. You're right. Because they see the same thing and they might try to push it to see if they can get an advantage, especially during the transition, which might be rocky, you know, if it's obviously a transition between parties, just like the transition that happened in 22 has been rocky by our normal standard.

Yeah, shifting. I mean, obviously this is a show that's not political at all. We try and stay as nonpartisan as we can. But the U.S. election is coming up, and we did touch on a bit. And we spoke about Israel and what that would look like with the different administration. What about the rest of the world, namely, obviously Ukraine, Russia, what's going on there and Europe broadly and China? I mean, like, you know, pick your poison here. So we can start with China.

I mean, China is probably a little bit more nuanced. I mean, China has a complete need to have the world economy stay stabilized, right? Including ours, right? It's so intertwined. And they have, I think, a lot of reason to want to ensure that order to a certain extent. I would agree that their ambitions have gotten exponentially more. troubling. That said, I mean, if they're looking at the next administration, obviously former President Trump's talking about tariffs. It's in the economic side. I don't think they

would like that that much, obviously. I don't know who would ultimately bear the burden of that. Leave that to economists. Probably wouldn't want to see large-scale tariffs put on their goods into the U.S. if that could have a negative effect against their economy. But then the question is, who's who support, what party is more willing to defend Taiwan, right? So, good question. There's certainly hawks on the right side of the political spectrum on that. But the question is, from their perspective, which, which, and I think they might think that the Democratic Party is just by rhetoric. I don't know what that's true. And the question of that. Sorry, I got to ask, do you think either party, either party, any administration would go to

the defense to Taiwan. That is exactly what I was going to say, A lot of people talk a big line of, you know, what we need to do and shift all U.S. national security strategy and it's all in on the Indo-Pacific. And then you go, so you really think that we're going to send American women to fight and die to defend Taiwan.

And they'll say, well, I don't know. I mean, it's a big question. It's a big question. Yeah, it's a stringent ambiguity. because I think we don't know, right? It's not a deliberate thing to mislead. I think there's a big question where the U.S. population goes, hey, man, we're all

about support in Taiwan, but are we going to, you know, dedicate the entire Marine Corps and potentially, I mean, if you look at all the war game scenarios, it's bad. It's bad. It's a Pyrrhic victory at best. I think they all say that we win, but winning is, you know, again, Pyrrhic in the sense that we don't really win. I mean, we get decimated. Taiwan's completely obliterated.

Japan's, you know, not too. and too well and most of the Chinese amphibious naval forces. And it also, of course, risks higher, more catastrophic warfare as China's obviously not a few point out. But so if you really throw those scenarios out there, all the Washington, D.C. rhetoric kind of fades really quickly. So I don't know that either side of China and everything I've read, especially when it comes like disinformation with China trying to figure out who they want to win, it's a wash.

Right. At least that's everything. They're like, yeah, we don't know. I mean, China just throws in disinformation for the stake of destabilizing, you know, U.S. Western society. I mean, for instance, did you guys know that the wildfires that ravaged Hawaii last summer were started by a secret weather weapon used by, you know, U.S. armed forces, all that. that you know, American USAID is spreading dengue fever in Africa.

You know, both? I mean, there's no party that benefits from that, but it's just generally sewing this sense of United States being a destabilizing force in global geopolitics. Yeah, so they just want us to be set. They want to separate the American people from the American government writ large, right? That helps them. But I think, I don't think they would have a problem picking aside. in trying to put their fingers on the scale.

I just think they don't know, right, who's better for them. So, I mean, and then, of course, Russia, when it really comes down to it, they've made the, I think, I think the strategic miscalculation that invade Ukraine, which has done nothing but enhance NATO, its relevance and membership, right? And they have proven that they are not the, you know, 20-foot monster that we made, them out to be, right? Now they're dragging in North Korean soldiers and they're threatening

nuclear holocaust every other week because they realize that that's what they have and they don't have a lot else. So, and then you have to look at the statements by the candidates. And when you can't say that you prefer Ukraine to win over Russia, then it's obvious that Russia is going to say, we want those people away. You know, once we start teaming up with our, adversaries there's got to be a lot of questions i think of why why that would ever be in the u.s interest but i think you know not from my perspective but from russ's perspective that they'll see any crack and fissure and support for ukraine and want to enhance that because that's that's in their own but it's important to point out there are a lot of uh folks on the right side of the political

political specter that are as adamant supporters of Ukraine and anti-Russian as anybody else in the political specter. So hopefully those voices will, I think, prevail. And we never know once the consequences, once the intel is briefed and whoever becomes president gets the realization of just how significant a Russian victory in Ukraine would be to the stability of Europe and the Yeah, we had Doug Livermore on in our last episode. We talked a little bit about disinformation. And it's a fascinating topic because it is always evolving, right? And so there are, you know, the Russians have gone, have taken some rather ham-fisted moves that are well publicized, for instance, paying off U.S. influences to, you know, to weigh in.

on social media. I mean, our friends in, allegedly, our friends in the gray zone are among those, you know, the gray zone denied 501C3 status because of their ties with RT. This is, you know, this was publicized, I believe, recently. But those are all, you know, well publicized. But I was really interested to read a little bit more about methodology. And it is, quite, it's becoming so sophisticated. You know, they will, both Chinese and Russian and disinformation, they'll start by seeding things and gaining momentum. And the way they gain momentum is establishing trust with an audience. And the way they do that is to establish, um, uh, kind of expertise in areas that are of huge interest, but have nothing to do with politics. For instance,

with a British audience, it's a royal family and it's football, right? The two staples of, you know, the British mind. And, you know, or they will do that seeding the Chinese technique. They will start in Africa and they will build up momentum there, just like building a snowball before tossing it kind of into the Western world and already has, you know, they have platforms with huge following. And when they start generating this stuff, other stuff, just by sheer weight of numbers already, it's not the topic, it's their information and the platform combined with AI now, very clever use of AI,

that it just seems almost unstoppable. And so I'm coming to a question here, and it's a tough one. But what can be done to counter that? You know, we always say, well, the truth, you know, the truth. Well, yeah, right. But how do we use technology to counter those sort of, you know, these increasingly sophisticated techniques? Yeah, and so, I mean, to start with, and I didn't, I did, you know, without getting into details, I spent a lot of time on that covert community, mostly on the paramilitary side, not the influence side,

but I did some on influence, and it is, it is like three-dimensional chess. And part of it is because our side of the board is almost handicapped, right? So, you know, all of our adversaries have state-controlled media completely, you know, have remained out your service, whereas our media is completely open for the most point, especially now you add social media to it. So there isn't even filters, any, any, any, any reasonable filters. I mean, if you look at Twitter right now, it's just nonstop. I mean, it seems like it's it's hard to even keep up with kind of the propaganda that's on it. And, you know, I don't know how much of it is state driven, but I think a lot of it, right?

I'm hearing from my friends that do cover this, and it's in like a majority now is actually being created by state entities and then propagated by their trolls, etc. So, and we can't do that stuff because, you know, and most of our adversaries countries, they control it completely. And if there's any negative things set about the, you know, the regime, it's not even allowed up. So we are starting out as a, I think, as a disadvantage when it comes to that, but that's part of a democracy. And I'd really be a democracy that have an even slate, so to speak. Right. The other aspect of it is, you know, this is baffling to me. But when I've seen messaging before, when the U.S. looks forward, they really do look for stuff that they think people would naturally believe is true.

the Russians send us stuff that I think everybody on this panel would think is ridiculous but somehow large portions of our population believe it I mean I'll point to the Q&ON conspiracy I mean the idea that that would be you know I don't even go into the details of it an actual thing it just baffles most people but there's a huge portion of our population for whatever reason that bought into it and it's the most far out their ideas. Like most, I think, U.S. influence people would say, we can't do that. They're, that's great. But then we buy into it. So I don't know what we can do about that part of our population having a propensity to buy into, you know, those kind of really far out there

thoughts. But that leads to your point of your question, Andy, is what can we do technology-wise? Because we can't obviously tell people what to think. Well, and I'm no AI expert, but I would hope that an AI expert would find an ability for AI to detect AI and then immediately label it as such. The example would be the Haitian, the false Russian-graded Haitian. I voted three times in Georgia. And then it just says it on the screen. This is a Russian fake instantaneously, right?

It's done by a machine, so it shouldn't be done for partisan reasons. I would hope you could take partisanship out of our official intelligence. And then, of course, if the social media platform dictated, it could be immediately removed. It doesn't even have to be labeled. That would be really helpful. I don't know enough about AI, but it seems like if you could create it, you could also identify it. Isn't that? I mean, that's, you know, I agree with you 100%.

I just think that it's that coordination that is the long. Paul, yes, you're right. I mean, we need to, and this obviously got to be, it has to be a government initiative backed by the U.S. government, the ability to share information, spot patterns, and then enable tech companies to label, muzzle, or remove deceptive content. But in order to do that, you know, we've got to have access. We, U.S. government has to have access to data And that's the long pole because, you know, in today's world of algorithm feeds, only tech companies can tell who's reading what. And under American law right now, these companies are not obliged to share data with researchers. So it seems to me that we could do so much.

But it's, we kind of hammer it, as you pointed out earlier, we are, we are impeded by our own laws. and in Europe is the same thing. They've got a Digital Services Act. Oh, no, no, actually Europe's better. The Digital Services Act mandates that are sharing. And so perhaps that should be a template for other countries to and through the United States. You know, the last thing I'd say, and again,

I'm not an expert. In fact, I'm holding on by my fingernails here, but I've heard that Taiwan is kind of considered the gold standard for dealing with disinformation campaigns it's probably because of how many they have to deal with. And I think, you know, there, I don't know if that's a useful template. I mean, it helps the country small. They've got trust in governments high, and the threat from the foreign power is clear.

But to me, it's clear that we have to look at changing our laws on data access before we can become kind of a global player in information, disinformation, countering disinformation. And maybe that's the way to do it. We look for best practices around the world. You know, good ideas aren't just generated in the United States. See what works. And then we have a lot of good ideas.

But, I mean, that's the way to do it, is to see where it's already been tried. And then we can see the experiment played out and whether we want to do that. And, again, I am like you hanging on my fingernails here. but one of the issues is there's legal exclusions to these social media sites, right? They have some kind of protected status that if you said that on a major news network, they would immediately counter it because they have liability, right? Yeah. You know, and this idea that these social media sites are some should be exempt from that,

I don't agree with that. But certainly this is a choice for the American people that there should be accountability. these are obviously private companies that make a profit off of this and many of them propagate the disinformation because it gets people to use their site I mean emotions are what

drive people you know mostly I think and I think they realize yeah and so they should have the same consequences I don't know if we should hold them on a different standard but the same as any other media site and then potentially look at the European

model for data sharing so we can identify certainly external threats, right? I mean, that's part of the main responsibility of the U.S. federal government is to protect American citizens from abroad, and then see what other countries have done to really counter this better. Because right now, it's clear that the U.S. is being inundated with this, particularly from Russia and probably from Iran as well. I just think Russia is better at it. and it's dividing the country and it's not it's not helpful and we it's easy for us to become obsessed naturally enough the u.s elections and you know obviously the most influential in the world but it's worth mentioning that literally half the world seems to be having elections this year so and

and disinformation disinformation is is aimed to pollute the kind of the public sphere right and and destabilize the democratic process. So the implications are absolutely global. And we've talked about, you know, what does the U.S. government do, Europeans, you know, it's almost the next step would be perhaps global cooperation among, you know, like-minded nations, Western liberal democracies. The Australians always get pissed off when I say Western liberal democracies,

but, you know, when there is superpower, they can be upset. yeah we always include Australia in the West right and New Zealand yep they're at a club they're at a club I think something on a smaller level not smaller but less

talked about level is the basic premise of what the definition of a bad guy is in this country as far as this country is concerned because you can take one person two people having a conversation and they talk about Ukraine one immediately says oh you know Russia is the bad guys Putin's bad guy

And then you have the other person who says, you know, no, they're just, you know, follow this is their sovereign right, blah, blah, blah, whatever it is. And then you ask each of one of those people, why do you say that? And then one of two names comes in. Well, because Trump or well because or Biden, I should say the Biden administration. And that usually is what runs their opinion on both of those things. So if you took that same conversation 20, 30 years ago, there probably be no question about who the bad. guy is. But I think we've gotten to this point, and again, AI and disinformation has pushed this along. We've gotten to the point where it makes people question who is the real bad guy in this. And so it is easier to muddy the waters and, you know, stir the pot a little bit. I agree. I mean, I said at the beginning, I'm nonpartisan, but that's for a reason. I think

often the parties become more of an alignment than the country itself. and people just tend to go with whatever their party says without any, I'm not saying everybody, obviously, but the ones that do this I would advocate for not doing it is look at every issue separately, decide your own position on it and just be that instead of being told by somebody who generally doesn't care about your opinion of these political parties, what your opinion is, right? We've been bored about political parties since our exception of our country.

So it's not just starting. I mean, this was, you know, even Washington warned about this. But every American, I think, you know, this is what I will say, should take every issue on their own and make their own determination based on facts, not on what somebody necessarily says the facts are and or what your political party tells you you should buy either side or no political party. And my understanding is one of the fastest growing political parties in the United States is no point in our part.

So maybe this is being heated by American pop-line. Absolutely. No, that's it. I mean, this is great. A lot going on. I don't know about you guys, but I'm watching with kind of baited breath

for the election and see what's going to happen. Hope it goes smooth, easy, no matter who wins. No real turbulence. I'm praying. I mean, we'll see. Now outside that, Mick does some great work, some great writing too about like stoicism and stuff. I love that article you sent.

That was really good. I'm going to put all the links in the description. Of course, the Lobo Institute. How's the, how's the humanitarian aid going for Gaza? Are you guys, what's going on?

So, you know, I'll get in too many details because it does, it's ongoing and very dynamic, put it that way. We're expanding to other areas of the world.

world. Our whole concept is generally to take a lot of military veterans get out and they're really looking for other things to do with their skill set. And we think we found one, which is really to enable humanitarian operations around the world through our efforts. And we're now in multiple different places and we're doing things that kind of combine the skill set of mostly soft, you know, military folks. But we're also a company of of humanitarian, former UN Peace Corps folks. It's a combination of the two. So we're seeing the need.

Unfortunately, the need is just growing, whether it's conflicts that continue and get worse or climate-induced disasters, right? Famine, for example. That's the realm we're in. I think there's a significant need and we're trying to play our part, just one part.

but we every day we turn around somebody else comes to us and has an idea of what we can do that that's this so we're proud to do so great yeah um it's Lobo Institute right so everything all the links will be in the description of course Andy Milburn esteemed author former

so the company so Lobo Institute just I mean the details anybody can reach out that's interested in this certainly if you have those skills that would be, but it's Fogbo is the company that we utilize, that graciously supports us around the world. So it's Fogbo Institute is the group that me and Eric Holrick started. A lot of the people in Fogbo come from Lopo. Fogbo is the company that really has made a mark on this, we think, I will abide,

on this kind of fear of humanitarian enablement. Yeah, of course, Andy Milburn, his book, When the Tempest Gathers, picked that up. All the links will be in the description for Fogbo for Andy's book, for Andy's substack, Mick Substack. Mick, Substack. Mick, you still working ABC? Yes, I'm a, yep, National Security House.

So check out Mick on ABC. Guys, don't forget to subscribe to the new channel, eyes on. We've struck out on her own. We're leaving the team house behind. Don't forget to subscribe. Don't forget to like the. engagement is important. And of course, to support the show, patreon.com slash the team house.

Thank you. Thanks, everybody.