The Team House - Deep Dive into Middle East Geopolitics w/ Joyce Karam | EYES ON

Episode Date: September 12, 2024

Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseToday were joined by Joyce Karam, she is the Senior News Editor at Al Monitor and an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University.Find Joyce here:⬇️https://x.com/Joyce_Karam?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5EauthorFind Andy Milburn here:⬇️Twitterhttps://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substackhttps://amilburn.substack.com/Andy's bookhttps://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-OperationsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the podcast if you're not already. To support the channel is to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Team House. channel and podcast if you'd like to, and we really appreciate that. So go it and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house. Hello, everyone. Welcome to another episode of Izon. I'm Andy Lorber, and there's Dee Carcos. Hello. I told you it's save you having to introduce yourself. Thank you. More importantly than either of us, we have a guest today, Dr. Joyce Karam, who is the senior news editor at our monitor, which is a major Middle East news agency outlet. And she also teaches at George Washington University. Choice, great to have you on today. And so topic du jour is the Middle East. And I think

we can all begin by saying, this is a very uncertain time as we have every single episode for the last 10 months. So what are your thoughts? What? What? What? What? what are prospects of the peace in the Middle East? I never thought I'd actually be able to ask that question, but there you go. Now, Andy, great to be with you. I've been reporting on that region for over two decades, and I have to tell you, we've seen nothing like the last 10 months. The level of fragility, instability in the region is different this time.

The Gaza War, the Kuzzi, conflict on both sides, Israel and Hamas is more charged, has a global echo to it than other conflicts and wars we've covered in that region. Unfortunately, I wish I had good news for you on where the conflict is. It's nowhere good. We were a little bit more hopeful about a ceasefire, maybe three months. ago in June. Right now, it looks less likely. It seems both sites are dug in in a zero-sum game. The Israeli Prime Minister is determined on a mission to defeat Hamas. It's unclear what that means

on the ground, because 10 months in, Hamas is still there. They're still calling the shots in Gaza. You've seen what happened with the six hostages that were killed by Hamas. We still have 97 hostages held in Gaza, but the prospects of a ceasefire are dim. U.S. officials are finally coming to that conclusion. So it's a matter, you know, in this time, that each side is trying to buy between now and the U.S. elections, how each party can operate and achieve minimal goals until November 5. That's a very interesting point. So arguably Netanyahu stands to gain by waiting until the elections, hoping at the very

least that the United States will be distracted and at the best that whoever comes, comes in will be a little more conciliatory towards what he wants. But what, you know, we know that, obviously, I mean, we talked about Netanyahu's motivation for that. But what are the sticking points? What are the, what kind of sense are you getting from the dynamics of the negotiations from both sides? What are the sticking points?

and who is really blocking them? Very good question. So over time, since these talks have been ongoing to try to get to a ceasefire agreement, there has been three major sticking points. One, who controls North Gaza? Can Hamas militants move back to the north? That's something that the Israelis have given a hard note on that this is this is not negotiable so that's one the second that's more important now is who controls

the um eight kilometer uh strip on the border with egypt it's known as the philadelphia corridor uh the israeli side i mean it depends who on the israeli side but they're saying uh the prime minister is saying this has to continue to be ours because that route uh they say is used to move arms and weapons to Hamas. That's a hard no for the Egyptian side, because according to the Camp David Agreement, 1978 that established peace between Egypt and Israel, this route, Israel has to be away from it.

So that's the second point. The third one, and that's been consistent throughout the negotiations, is the swap between which Palestinian prisoners get released and which hostages get released. So the U.S. had put out a plan, you know, face one, you have this number, and Palestinian prisoners that would be agreed upon that would be released. What we're hearing from the Israeli government, now what we're hearing from Netanyahu is some of the names on the Palestinian side. He doesn't want to budge on them. So these are the three

main sticking points. Of course, there are other questions who control Gaza. Would the Palestinian authority be able to come back in what happens to the Israeli troops in Gaza? But these are seen to be in phase two and three of any agreement. The three points I talked about these are in face one and there is no agreement about it. Wow. So again, it's the, it's who among who's released in return for the hostages and the Philadelphia corridor itself of the two, you know, the two main sticking points. And I'm sorry, the philosophy. Yeah. And the Philadelphia corridor that becomes a bigger issue because you have Egypt involved. Is Israel going to risk the peace agreement, the first ever peace agreement it had with an Arab country to control the

Philadelphia. Here, we're seeing divisions among Israeli officials, the defense minister, Yoav Galant, he's saying, you know, hold on one second. Why? We don't need to control that trout to block Hamas's weaponry. We can coordinate with other parties. But you have some say that. that Benjamin Netanyahu is actually using the Philadelphia corridor to block an agreement.

Yeah, it's quite interesting just for the benefit of the listeners. So the Philadelphia corridor, as Joyce mentioned, is it's really on, you know, almost on the border with Egypt. It's kind of the southern boundary of Gaza. And the question, of course, long-running kind of question between Egypt and Israel has been on the tunnels and so there was a school of thought within the Israeli military that you had to control the Philadelphia Corridor in order to control the tunnels. However, a couple of things,

and I think this explains the shift within the military and why Galant is saying other things, the Israelis realize that there are other ways that they can control those tunnels. In fact, possibly a third of the tunnels are not even, you know, they're not even under Israeli control now, and yet there are other ways, you know, you find out where the entrances are, et cetera, et cetera. Number one, and sitting on the Philadelphia kernel makes them a target. That was, Halevi, you know, the chief of staffs come to say, look,

we're sitting here on ground, but the problem is underground. We have expertise, technology, to pursue the problem underground. Let's not sit here on ground. And we're offending, you know, are the Egyptians at the same time. There's all kinds of reasons not to. But thirdly, perhaps the strongest argument. This isn't coming from outside. It's coming from within the Israeli military. And that is almost 100% of the munitions that they are finding now, have been finding in the last two months were manufactured in Gaza. They were not brought in from outside. To include components, you know, components from, so the point is that there are those within the U.S., within the Israelis, right, military who are claiming that Netanyahu is making

the Philadelphia corridor a blocking point when it should not be so. And that's something, yeah, and that's something Bibi Netanyahu is very good at. I mean, this is a guy who is an expert at maneuvering U.S. politics. He did it under Bill Clinton, he did it again under Barack Obama, under Trump even. and now with the Biden administration. He understands how to pull the levers. He goes to Congress when he's upset with the White House. He plays to the U.S. public when there's a message he wants to send out.

He saw, you know, he gave an interview to Fox just recently. He gave a press conference just to U.S. media just in the last few days. So he's a very shrewd operator when it comes to addressing a Western audience and his ultimate game, and he's been successful at it. So stay in power. As a reminder, perhaps some of our listeners didn't realize. Netanyahu kind of cut his teeth in debate in the U.S. on the TV circuit in the 80s. writing became quite a popular figure. I mean, he's articulate. He's, you know, he appears to be very bright. And he appeared, and obviously to have a grasp of the topic way beyond the American

public. And so it appeared that he was explaining things that they didn't know while kind of presenting his view of the world. Absolutely. And I mean, this is a guy, he's an MIT graduate, you know, he spent time in Pennsylvania. And you don't have anybody from the other side. No. You don't have any, not even Palestinian, any Arab official that may. And that's what I was going to ask you about, Joyce. It's got to be supremely, you know, I'm not talking about Hamas.

I'm just talking about the Palestinian cause. Do you see anyone on the horizon at all? You know, Abbas is, Abbas has lost, I think it's fair to say, all credibility, you know, his people. And Hamas has led them down this path. But there is no one who has the charisma and the smarts except for, and you're going to remind me of his name.

He's in Israeli prison right now. Marwan Bargoti. Mar-on, but yeah. Totally agreed. Abbas, he's 87 years old. He's viewed as corrupt. He's viewed as just somebody who's not championing the Palestinian cause. Mind you, this is a guy that came to power after the second intifada,

saying we have to pursue peaceful resistance. We have to fight. What people wanted to hear at the time. But did liberal two. No, for sure. So he came with, you know, U.S. backing. He's close to Russia. And there were high hopes for him.

But when it came to governance, when it came to establishing agreements, past agreements, implementing them with Israel, it was miserable failure for the Palestinian Authority. That's now from all polls is seen as very unpopular, not just in Gaza, but also in the West Bank. Marwan Baruguti, the guy you mentioned, he's the most popular among the Palestinians, but there is very little chance that Israel would release him.

He's charged with terrorism and is serving a jail sentence. You've had, of course, you know, the former Hamas leader, Ismae al-Haneye, he was a little bit. but more popular than Yahyasan were, the current leader, but he was killed, as we know, in Tehran. That's, you know, that's kind of ironic, isn't it? That we've talked about this, that the path of targeted assassinations sometimes leads you to a worse, often leads you to, we've seen that in the United States.

And so now we're left with nothing but extremists, except for Marwan, Barclay. Gouti, who is in jail. What is the Israelis? I get it. He's accused of terrorism, but so are, so are they all. And in fact, the Israelis have released Palestinians with Israeli blood on their hands. So there is a precedent here. You know, I'm going back to the release of prisoners. It seems now that this is maybe an arbitrary opposition to, you see what I'm saying? the Israelis have already been, have they've already waived that concern about releasing Palestinians who killed Israelis. So now they have a chance to release someone at least who can provide more moderate leadership in Yaya Sima. They have, but in this case particularly, I don't think

they actually have a plan on what to do later. Their immediate plan is, you know, we're going going to drive full force in Gaza. It's been 10 months. Hamas has not been completely defeated. So the only plan on the table is to just prolong the war. There is no day after plan on who takes control. Will it be the Palestinian Authority? Will it be a different offshoot of Hamas? Will it be an Arab force that comes to Gaza? So particularly because they don't have these plans in place and they have they have not made these decisions it's hard to see them making the political decision of releasing marwan uh burhouti because they would be just undermining the Palestinian authority he's he's more popular than Abbas and then they

it is just he would also be undermining Hamas in in Gaza so it's a little bit of complicated at the moment in terms of seeing Barghouti out. I think the more immediate projection is, you know, they're going to continue with this war until something happens within Israel or with the U.S. election on November 5. In the meantime, what is some of the things that are happening, some of the things that you're observing that, you know, causing you concern? You mentioned activity in the West bank, but on both sides, violence, you know, flaring violence on the West Bank, that's kind of of being, I'm going to use a cliche, simmering powder cake since 7 October. And now that there

doesn't seem to be any prospect for a ceasefire or if there is no prospect, do you see things getting worse there? They are getting worse. I mean, we've seen three US citizens, at least three US citizens, haven't been killed in the West Bank since October 7. by Israeli forces. We are seeing Israel launched an operation recently in the West Bank, in the Jalene camp, to just confront militants there. At the same time, we're seeing hundreds of Palestinians have been killed. Another issue that's a powder keg in the West Bank is settlers' violence,

settlements, you know, for those who don't know, are illegal housing projects and units that Israel has established in the West Bank since 1967. It's illegal because it's an occupied territory. Just between, and between October 7 and now we've seen these these settlers attacks go over 1,200 by the numbers I saw actually just a few days ago, 1,200 attacks by settlers against the Palestinians. So you're seeing even between the settlers and the Palestinian population a higher degree of animosity. And within the West Bank, there are more militant groups.

There are people that are very upset what's happening in Gaza. so they're protesting. But you're seeing also like a group, for example, its name is the Lions Den. That's a fairly new group. And they're expanding. Hamas is gaining popularity in the West Bank as well. So can Israel handle a war in Gaza and an eruption in the West Bank? It's getting much more complicated to Israel, to the status agreements that were signed

in Oslo and later on in the West Bank. So it's an important issue to monitor and to see how the Palestinian Authority as well can navigate this one. Are we seeing Israelis move into areas that formerly were not administered by them within the West Bank? You know, I mean, there's a key categories of areas. In other words, I'm sorry, go ahead. Yes, so you're seeing more rates happening at night in Nablos and Janine, as I mentioned. And these are areas that we've seen more Palestinian autonomy around them after Oslo.

But because of the situation, because where the Palestinian authority is today, you're seeing Israel just move more aggressively within the West Bank for, you know, For me sitting here in Washington, I can tell you the administration, the State Department, the White House, they're worried if the Palestinian Authority can actually handle the situation in the West Bank. They're worried that a collapse of the Palestinian Authority could also mean a collapse of the security situation from the Palestinian side in the West Bank. Yeah, just so very quickly. So after Oslo, all of the territory that had been captured by Israel in 1967 became subject to kind of the three categories. It's either security and administration provided by the Israelis.

I think that's kind of whatever. It's like ABC, right? So either Israelis provide security administration or B, the Israelis provide security, the Palestinians provide security, the Palestinians provide administration, or C, the Palestinians provide security administration. And the concern from the U.S. perspective is that you were seeing more of the Israelis, you know, of the Israelis going into B and C areas on these rates. The areas A are those areas that are de facto, you know, it's where settlements have sprung up and it's only Israelis. But, you know, as Joyce has said, even settlement, you know, area A's are technically illegal, but they're. just the fate of complete, so the Oslo Accords are recognizing. We are now three decades after Oslo.

It's hard to see what's left from that agreement that stands today. It's, you know, the areas you've mentioned, the ABNC are very much, just that status is no longer there, and part because militants have emerged, new militant organizations have emerged in the West Bank. Israel has moved in more aggressively. And the area A that you mentioned, where the settlers are, we're seeing more clashes. These are coming sometimes into Palestinian areas. And there has been a push since October 7 to get the Palestinian population out of areas

that are close to settlements. So we've seen some Palestinian people. locals leave because of they're worried about settlers' violence and attack. And it's very much undercovered. I think few outlets did reports

MSNBC, CNN did reports about that. So it's really untenable when you're talking about the Palestinian is really status quo. And Andy here, I think it's really important because we forget sometimes that we haven't seen. negotiations between Israelis and the Palestinians since 2013. And that's a major reason that we cannot

overlook and how we got here. The Trump administration was the first administration in a long time that did not have the Israelis and the Palestinians talk and negotiate around the same table. The Biden administration tried to reverse some of the Trump administration decisions, but we still didn't see negotiations. And the failure of diplomacy, that's why we are where we are today. It's not just because, you know, Hamas controls Gaza, of course. That's another reason. But, yeah, failure. There was no negotiation outlet.

it. And arguably, the U.S. kind of lost its way in negotiation stance. So it had always been the U.S. stance for a two-state solution. And to begin with that, and then to sort out the more tangled problems, the settlements is one. The right of return for Palestinian refugees potentially is is another. But now it appears that the two-state solution is just hard. It's hard to imagine getting there from here, two states living side by side, you know. It looks like a mirage. I mean, honestly, if you look at that map, how do you even connect the West Bank to Gaza now? Let alone, how do you even connect the West Bank within itself? And then we have Jerusalem is another issue. We have the Jordan River. Israel wants control there. So it's, it's, we are in a

really bad place in this, in this conflict, and I don't say this likely. And there is, I hope we can get to reassess, but the, the assumption that you could, you know, overlook the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and just focus on outside agreements that has, you know, fell flat on October 7. Of course, you can get an agreement with Bahrain, with the United Arab Emirates, normalization. But unless you address the elephant in the room that has been for 80 years now, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there is no stability, long-term stability in the Middle East. you're seeing the Pentagon overstretched sending aircrafts, aircraft carriers, you know, reinforcing its presence in the Middle East.

At the expense to the Pacific. It's expensive. Ronald Reagan. Musilitary group. Then that's unsustainable. I mean, this is just not a good situation. The alternative would have been a more aggressive diplomatic push from the Obama. administration, going to the Trump administration, and maybe, you know, we can dream that it would

have been concluded in an agreement during the Biden administration. That didn't happen. Instead, we saw these elements of conflict spiral out of control, and that's why we are here today. And in fairness, in fairness to the U.S. too, although, you know, we normally, we don't shy away from criticism. and arguably with the death of Yitzhak Rabin, the kind of the anchor point for the piece,

you know, for the conciliatory movement disappeared within Israel. You know, it took a while to become evident. And it was a process that began, you know, back then in, what was it, 1995 or 90s? Yes. And arguably just, and 7 October kind of completed that process of absolute polarization. that's one way to look at it.

The closest we've come to a deal was perhaps Camp David to in 1999-2000 with Bill Clinton. At the time, he actually ran out of time. He couldn't conclude the agreement. The Palestinians were divided among themselves within Fattah. And Arafat said at the time, you know, he couldn't get the concessions. he wanted on Jerusalem and the right of return. But after the 2000 talks, it's just been, Andy, just downhill.

Yeah. You saw the second. That's right. Jerusalem is the other, the right of return, Jerusalem, um, were two of the settlements. Settlements.

Yeah. Security. And we haven't even got to there. It's like now for the Gaza piece, the real issue is what happens next within Gaza. and that isn't even up for discussion gosh

so it was painted a extremely gloomy picture facts on the ground so we haven't even talked about the north Joyce what are your thoughts about that we talked about problems simmering on the West Bank

in a way that perhaps they haven't previously we've talked about the lion's den right is that a Hamas affiliated group or are they They claim to be just their own Palestinian military. They have tremendous support on West Bank. They have. They have support.

They've claimed responsibility for more attacks and before October 7 even in the last year and a half. And just the situation just makes it for these groups to get popularity because you have the Palestinian authority that's just, incapable of delivering to its to its people and you have the Israeli occupation that keeps feeding into their their ideology. So what about up north? Yes.

That's another area that we haven't talked about yet. I was just in Lebanon in July. and at the time it was the specter of war was was high between Israel and Hezbollah. What we are seeing at the Lebanon-Israel border is something is an escalation that we haven't seen since 2000. So that year Israel left with Drouflam Lebanon unilaterally. there was no agreement. They, they, they withdrew. Dee, can I just mute my computer?

Yeah. Okay. Yeah, I'll snip. I'll cut this. 2006. It's muted for some reason, but it's, okay. Hopefully it won't buzz again. I apologize.

That's right. We didn't hear it. Yeah, it wasn't. Good. So 2006. we had the big war. Yeah. And the Israelis assumed then that Hasbullah will be contained.

It was this, they call it mowing the lawn strategy. They can come in every few years or they can hit Hezbollah and they can just contain and deter the Iran-backed party in Lebanon. The problem is, you know, 18 years since. 2006, Hezbollah is much larger than it was. It has now presence in Syria. It has presence in Iraq. It has presence in Yemen. It rearmed and is very confident within Lebanon too because it has a friendly government. There is no president in the country. So the situation is fragile. But we were able to avoid an all-out war a couple weeks ago when Hezbollah retaliated against Israel.

Having said that, this situation is also unsustainable because you have the Israeli population in the north. They had to leave their towns. They had to leave their homes. You have a situation too in South Lebanon where displacement has happened. Schools, a reopening in September. So can the U.S. arrange a deal between Hezbollah and Israel, between Lebanon and Israel, that includes Hezbollah without a Gaza ceasefire? We're hearing more about this lately. Hopefully, if this happens, that problem will be at least contained until we see what happens in Gaza.

up. The issue, of course, Hasbullah has maintained that they will not stop their attacks until they see a Gaza ceasefire. So it depends what U.S. negotiators can deliver on this issue. Is there any, what do you thoughts about what's going through Nasrallah's mind? You know, I mean, there's this speculation about whether he is waiting for the go from Iran, whether he's an independent guy, but he's concerned about, you know, I'll use a crude American expression. He's concerned about shitting in his own nest at this point in time, right? Always a concern for him. Always, you know, but he doesn't love Lebanon. He's not a Lebanese patriot. It's a, it's purely utilitarian relationship, right? He needs a haven and Lebanon is his haven. So what do you think?

We'll pay you extra if you get this right. I mean, we'll pay you. No, this is not. I mean, you know. But if you get this right, that's quite a... Hassan Nasrullah is a very interesting guy. He is by far the most formidable leader of the group. And that's why it's sustained.

You tell us a little bit about him. You know, we use his name a lot. Yeah. He's in a sense a different, I'm not talking about ethically. I'm talking about just his penchant, his charisma, his quality as a leader. So I can tell you as an Arabic speaker, as somebody who listens to his speeches, his Arabic is formidable. As an orator, as somebody from that region, when you look at other leaders,

when you look even a Hamas, militant, or officials, there is nobody that excels in delivery of the Arabic language like Hassan Nasrallah does today. Of course, that doesn't negate the fact that his calculus is just independent of what happens to Lebanon. He dragged the country to a war that destroyed much of the... Lebanese infrastructure after it was rebuilt after the civil war there. He admittedly says we get our money, we get our food, he said in his speech, we get our

water from Iran. So you want to come at us with the Iran thing? We welcome it. He says he does his decision independently. I'm not so sure because it seems since October 7, Iran has been reluctant to wage a full front war against Israel. And we've seen Hezbollah stage attacks against Israel, but those have been contained.

Even when Hezbollah lost, Nasrallah himself lost close friend of his fo'at Shukar, the head of the missile production in the party, the response was, was you know I mean sure Israel downed many of the drones but it could have been more

there was no border infiltration no red line no no red line crossed it exactly so this is a very calculated guy and I think at this point in time his priority is

maintaining the power he has in Lebanon that's the their base And he seems to be enjoying, you know, having larger influence, Capagon trade in Syria, having presence in Iraq, Yemen, as we mentioned. Very interesting. So they've got a, they've got disrupting their revenue stream

would be another consequence possible, the consequence of going to war. again, Nasrallah points to Nasrallah as being a pragmatist and the fact that he is adhering to the rules of the game that both Hispola and the Israelis talk about, right? Without talking about to each other, they both understand the rules of the game. It's, you know, you start off by hitting in the vicinity of what's that area called Shabar Farms, you know,

what happens in Shabar Farms doesn't, and then as long as it doesn't go south, And then, you know, the next step is as long as it doesn't go north of the Latani River for the Israeli strikes, for the, and for Hezbollah, interestingly enough, the red line, they, they worked out Israeli red lines. Don't go off to Tel Aviv, right? You know, if you go off to Tel Aviv like that, now you're in their face. Now you, but. Don't kill too many people. Yeah, focus on mostly military targets, et cetera, et cetera. And you keep the pot simmering and you keep the support coming without. escalating into regional conflict. And that's more of a BB Natanyahu also calculus here. Because ahead of the Hezbollah retaliation for the assassination of Shooker, some in the Israeli military advised to hit Beirut,

to head, Hizballah headquarters as a preemptive move. And from the reporting that we've done that others have done, it was Bibi Netanyahu that said, no, I'm going to wait, I'm going to see what they do. We have U.S. carriers. We have U.S. intelligence helping us, and then we would fend off that retaliation instead of doing a preemptive strike. So in a way, a full-blown war is not in the interest of Hezbollah nor Israel at the moment. Could this change? Could there be a miscalculation, of course?

But, Andy, at this point, I think it's not in their interest. What about Iran? Yes. So we're still waiting for that Iranian response to Hanay's killing, right? As we wait, it seems the Iranians also don't want to go in a full front war. There is a lot happening in Iran internally. As we know, their president was killed in a plane crash. Their foreign minister was in the same plane as well.

Their economy is not doing well. So there is so much change within Iran for a new leadership to establish itself. And then they will see what comes with their foreign policy. They seem also to be more focused on their nuclear program. They're advancing that. They're enriching more. So if you ask me, and that's pure opinion, their biggest retaliation would be, you know,

coming closer to a breakdown. Yeah, exactly. And then anything they would do in, you know, like firing missiles or other sort of attack against Israel. And by the way, Western, you know, the nuclear watchdog agencies and the, gosh, what's it called the UN? It doesn't matter. You know, the UN nuclear monitor. I hear you.

Yeah. And other experts. So together, they estimate worst case scenario that Iran is six months from breakout. Now, by that I mean developing enough enriched uranium to manufacture a weapon. Now, you still have to weaponize it. It could take two years beyond that, you know, to put it on it or longer to actually weaponize that. But that's worst case scenario. Other estimates have it, you know, a couple of years from breakout.

And then, you know, you add a few years onto them. But the problem is that there is not. no one can see an obstacle to prevent the Iranians from doing this. Is that correct? I mean, short of all-out war, no one can think of any diplomatic tools or any other means to prevent them from having an enriched uranium, if that's what they want to do. Now, they, at the same time, are aware that once they do decide to break out,

the West will find out. And that is that that's, you know, and they've crossed the red line too. so there's this delicate balance. Is that a fair way to put it? You've put it much better than I would do. I'm not a nuclear expert, but even within estimates that you hear from regional countries, sometimes you hear from Israelis,

that period is shorter than six months. Yeah, I've heard, yes, the Israeli is referee. So I'm trying to err on the side of conservative estimates. Right, and we had, you know, Until 2018, you had an agreement that was not perfect, but that capped that program, the JCPOA. The U.S. withdrew from that agreement under Trump. And now most of the clauses in the agreement are about to expire anyway. So you can't return to that.

The conversation will have to, again, come to November, who wins the White House, what kind of a new nuclear deal you can reach with the Iranians. Can you tempt them into, you know, accepting a deal that would give them sanction relief, would give them more financial incentives than going for a nuclear weapon? Perhaps, but that has to wait for the, you know, for the new administration to come into, to office, there is no time and there is no room at the moment for negotiations. The Europeans have been trying to, you know, be a back channel in sending messages, the Swiss, particularly the Omanis, to at least contain the nuclear program, but it's not in a good place.

The bigger question as well, Andy, is, would Israel go unilaterally for a strike? have the weaponry to do it, the sort of bombers that you know more about than me to do that. Would they inform the U.S.? Would they not? That's a big one. Yeah.

Yeah. We in the U.S. military have lived with that prospect. As you know, and a lot of what I did personally in the military was to try and avert that happening. you know, to offer other alternatives or to bring military pressure on Iran below the level

of armed conflict or bring pressure on Iran below the level of armed conflict to alter course. But at the same time, dissuading the Israelis, that this would be a disastrous move and that the U.S. would guarantee Israel's security, but the implicit return on that is that Israel would not attack Iran. You know, my policy viewpoint of that is, I think, is that it's remained the same, you know, that is the policy is at all costs. Well, we're trying to prevent that happening,

the same time U.S. does not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. So walking that line has been a very, is what continues to happen. I have tremendous, you know, you are, you're there in the Pentagon far more often than I am right now. What is your kind of feeling about, you know, the political partisan about handling Iran? Is there, is there, is there,

do you get the feel that there is, there are lines of communication for negotiation or has Iran kind of, turned off the phone and said, okay, we're going to get a head down in our own business for a while and let you worry about what we're doing. So good news, they haven't turned off the phone. They haven't turned off communications despite the escalation around the Gaza war. We've seen at least two meetings, not direct, indirect between U.S. officials that went to Oman, the small country in the Gulf and Iranian officials came and the Omanis were mediating.

That was purely about the nuclear issue. The Pentagon, and rightly so, they're very concerned that the aftermath of the Gaza war is dragging the U.S. deeper into the Middle East. It's diverting resources and it's a big burden on the on the strategy. I mean, this is not, I mean, Secretary Austin didn't come to office wanting to spend most of his resources in the Middle East. As you mentioned, there is the Asia Pacific.

There are other challenges between, you know, Russia, Ukraine, that the U.S. would rather spend more of its assets there. So in that sense, the priority is now to contain. the situation to still act as a deterrence. But we need a ceasefire in Gaza because absent of that, it's hard to contain the other side. It's hard to get to a situation of at least cold peace between Iran and its proxies, especially the Houthis.

I mean, this is a group that's very helpful for Iran and the... And it's disrupting the global economy right now. All things mitigate, well, you know, absolute U.S. interests are for there to be a ceasefire. I would say, you know, the U.S. interests, absolutely. It's very interesting to hear also what Netanyahu is saying, because I've heard this among some, you know, a number of right-wing Israelis. a couple of things. One is, you know, two-state solution is off the table. You know, this is, the concerning thing about this, though, Joyce, is it's not just right-wing Israelis. That's like

most Israelis since 7 October. And Netanyahu's kind of embodied that fear and emphasizing it. But the other piece is that there is this kind of attempt to continuously deconstruct what's happening in Gaza from the threat up. north on Netanyahu's side. Hey, these are two separate issues. You know, the Palestinian issues separate from Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a existential issue. You shouldn't tie them together. Whereas Israel's adversaries are making it clear, no, we see these as very much tied. And that is, that's presenting a negotiation, a problem for the United States, right? Because now you're, now there's a clear possible divergence between U.S.

interests, regional stability, and Israeli interests, or Netanyahu's interest in particular. And for the first- Not Israeli interest, but a fact-in, a faction. I think for the first time in this conflict, when you talk about non-state actors in the Middle East, you're seeing a multi-front war against Israel. These are separate fronts. So we've talked about Lebanon. We've talked about Gaza. of course, but you're also, you know, Yemen, Iraq, Iraq through Syria. So this is new in this conflict. I mean, of course, you had the Fidei-Ien, the PLO fighters back in the 70s and the 80s,

but it was nothing like this. You've had state actors fight Israel, 1973, 1967. This is different, and this is a challenge for Israel. how it addresses different threats. But on the two-state solution, yes, there's a lot of reasons to be skeptic about it.

But the main argument for it still is what is the alternative? Yeah. I mean, are we going with John Bolton, the three-state solution? That's a, I mean, that's a joke. Yeah, that's... Give Gaza to Egypt and was back to Jordan.

is not. One state, more so after October 7, the Israelis would not want a one state. Do you prolong the occupation, the status quo? Those don't end well, you know, in history. So this is just, there is no alternative. The two-state solution is still the strongest argument on the table. How do we get there? Has always... Because ignoring, ignoring the problem, arguably, has got us, by us, I mean collectively, in the position where we are now. Yes. No negotiations for nine years.

And yet, in the meantime, several operations that took place in Gaza. And life continued and everyone thought that the problem had gone away. And this is where U.S. Congress is also liable. for this one. Because for the longest time, they were, they allowed, they allowed themselves to be, to be used by Benjamin Netanyahu as a, to exert pressure on any president who's in, who's in office. And that came at the expense of U.S. national interest, which is to achieve a two-state solution, which is to proceed with negotiations. I mean, this is not sustainable.

Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I mean, I, I mean, if I was, we weren't hoping for a solution necessarily to this, but Joyce, we've very disappointed you didn't give us. I know. We'll have to do it again. Yeah. Is there anything, this has been terrific.

Is there anything else that we haven't talked about, anything we've talked about that you'd like to mention? I mean, just to end it on a hopeful note, you know, you talk to Palestinians and Israelis, and there are people on both sides who want this to end. There are figures in Israeli and Palestinian politics. There was a paper by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmered and a Palestinian negotiator, Nasir Kedwa, just in the last few days proposing a solution. So there are voices that can still get us out of this chaos that we're in, this, this

bloodbath. They've got to rise above the anger. Yes, exactly. And you have to have the create the political climate that would get us, that would get us there. And I personally believe this, this region is meant for coexistence. it's been the case in the past. It can be the case in the future.

It's just we really need to do diplomacy better as Americans, as U.S. administration. And I don't know, we can only hope for better days ahead, Andy. Well, choice on that. Less than happy note, but absolutely honest, fascinating discussion. Thank you so much. And yes, we will definitely get you back, hopefully, hopefully to analyze things as they get better. Let's hope so.

Thank you. Yeah. In the meantime, please, to whoever that you're going to appear on, on eyes on, it will be terribly impressed on Monday. And I'm looking forward to it. This was a great episode, D. Oh, yeah. And Joyce, so you can be,

found at George Washington University and also our monitor where you were the senior news editor. I'm not telling you that. So you don't know it. I'm telling everyone else. And Dee, over to you for closing comments. Yeah. So all of Joyce's links will be in the description down below on the show notes. So take a look there.

She's on Twitter at Joyce underscore Karam. Great Twitter feed. She's very much plugged into the Middle East. It's a great follow. And yeah, for us, Andy's info is down in the description, is Substack. Everything you need to know is amazing book. I have to say that every every episode.

I pay into it. One day you'll read it. I did read it, actually. It's one of the only books I've ever read. Awesome. And, of course. The best way to support the show is Patreon.com slash the team house.

All the information is down in the description. Thank you. Cool. Thank you so much.