The Team House - Is the Middle East About to Explode? w/ Mick Mulroy | EYES ON | Ep. 34

Episode Date: August 6, 2024

Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseToday we talk about the powder keg that is iithe Middle East with former CIA Paramilitary Officer Mick Mulroy.Find Mick here:⬇��https://www.loboinstitute.orgFind Andy here:⬇️Twitterhttps://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substackhttps://amilburn.substack.com/Andy's bookhttps://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operations/dp/1526750554Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the podcast if you're not already. To support the channel is to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Team House. channel and podcast if you'd like to and we really appreciate that so go it and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house. Hello everyone. Welcome to another episode of Myzon. I'm Andy Mawber. Jason Mayans. I'm Dimitri Comtacos. And most importantly, we have as a guest, Mick Maroi, who is becoming a regular. And in case you haven't been fortunate enough to catch Mick before he's a very important man in a lot of spheres, although he would be the last one to claim that title. You know, probably most notably he's a former Marine. So we always have to have a high ratio of Marines on this, Marines versus Greeks. But also former senior CIA, operative,

and operative, sorry, I didn't pronounce that very well. Dasdi, for the most. For the at least. That's a assistant secretary of defense and, you know, which time I was fortunate enough to work with him, very much below him, but with him. And then since then, has run the Lobo Institute. And if you're interested in the Lobo Institute and who could not be, if you're interested in world events, if you care about things like war and prevention of war and child soldiering And, you know, all the peripheral tragedy that comes along with geopolitics, then Mick and his team are your guys. And I'm a very junior member of the Lobo Institute.

So waiting for my T-shirt and my laminated card, but nevertheless, very proud to be a part of the organization. So enough intro, Mick, over to you. And, you know, first and foremost, let's talk about the astounding news emerging this morning about Mossad outsourcing assassination attempts or successful assassination efforts. That's right. Hey, great to be with you guys from Vuliag Many Greece,

where I'm waiting for a flight into Israel, which apparently has been postponed due to Armageddon. I will get there. I will get there next week, I think. I love it when you see that flash up on the airline screen, you know, not technical, difficulty, but it delays according to the Armageddon.

I mean, it kind of kills any complaints, isn't it? It does. It does. Some people go the other directions and some people want to go, you know? Who knows? But it's, we're still working on our humanitarian mission. But yeah, as a former covert Bubba, I got a

tip of the hat at least when it comes to the ability of Israeli intelligence to do what they did, right? You know, there's some discussion, you know, if you're talking about the Mack and Tehran that killed Israel, I mean, yeah, the political leader, you know,

I think most U.S. media outlets are reporting that it was a planted bomb, right? And now we've got IRGC saying that it was some kind of close proximity guided ammunition of some sort. So I don't know which one it was, but obviously to be able to get into, your most senior adversaries adversary is a country

which is obviously very controlled being top down autocracy and do something like this is pretty impressive now I'm sure the United States would have wished they didn't do it

because they would like to see a ceasefire negotiation succeed and this individual of course was the main negotiator for the Moss but from Israel's perspective He was one of two individuals that were primarily responsible for the attacks on October 7. Yeah, we're in the United States and Israeli.

But this is certainly two-progged on that. Yeah, Mick, you know, you touched on something. I think it's a good point to come back to perhaps later in the conversation about strategically, this may not be in anyone's best interest except for a political party in power and one man in power. in Israel, you know, potentially, I am not saying that is the case, but strategically, that could be the case. What is, but when we're talking about the, um, the, kind of the skillful mechanics of this hit, um, and make you, you, you know, you know more than any, most people on this, but there's a, there's an opportunity. I mean, there's a cost once you, once you execute, right?

I mean, they had the, according to the daily telegraph this morning who, you know, supposedly has half a dozen sources within the IRGC. This was prepared like three or four months ago. You know, three bombs were placed in three separate rooms. The IRGC, you know, the guys, the informants are saying that that it was an inside job in that Mossad hired agents from Ansar Almadi, which is the protection unit that the IRGC uses for domestic protection of VIPs. So it really is kind of,

And these guys are super screen for loyalty and everything else, as you can imagine. So it's an extraordinary. You know, you almost sense that maybe, I mean, if you want to be a conspiracy theorist, you've come up with some thing where Netanyahu is in cohorts with Iranian administration here, right? I mean, it's just bizarre. But anyway, they execute it. Now they can't do it again. You know, so question number one, was this the right target?

You know, whatever the ram of get? We probably can't answer that now. But number two, what's the immediate fallout? I mean, Garnie himself came out yesterday and said this was like a huge humiliation. The outside, what these informants are saying is that the IRGC's reflexive response was, oh, this was a missile, and they claimed to see a projectile outside the paint of glass, whatever, whatever. But that was kind of an instant reflexive reaction to shit.

this was this is really really fucking embarrassing how do we explain this um what what do you what do your thoughts about that i know we can't verify any of that stuff right now um but what what do you kind of general thoughts about that the latest news that's right anything i can't verify it because i don't know it's it's just what i read on the media and and people well you know like to reach out and tell me things but i essentially think um if you look at it this was done it was an exceptional intelligence, covert operation, no matter how you look at. Whether it was strategically smart or not,

it was technically sound, and to be an ability to recruit somebody that close and that screen, as you point out, is impressive. And then get these certain explosive devices in place, which could be detonated, obviously, remotely, once you realize that your target was there. And they must have had an idea that Hainia and people like him stayed in these,

they said it was like a veterans, type, almost like a BOQ or something like that, something, but they put BIPs that were, you know, associated probably with their proxy forces, right, in this area. And so they must have, they had to figure that out. They had to get it in there. And then I had to figure out when he was there, right, because it doesn't do any good, just to clack it off and, you know, the wrong people are in there. So, you know, from a technical and technical covert operations perspective, it was pretty phenomenal. Now, I know people are saying, well, they did it, you know, with the intent to embarrass.

Potentially, right? It was the presidential inauguration. He was invited as a guest of, you know, the Supreme Leader. It does look like it was almost intended to just really just like stick it to him, right in the eye. And maybe it was. It very well could be. I'm sure they could say, well, we only had the opportunity then because that's when he

was there. But either way, I think, you know, the United States came out, the U.S. government, Secretary of Blinken specifically and said, two things. We have nothing to do with it, which may or may not be the case. Obviously, the U.S. Intelligence Service CIA and Mossad works very close together. But since I don't think we want to see this happen, I doubt that we had anything to do with it. So I think that's probably a fair point. I don't know, but it's unusual that they would not have given us a heads up. And that is because, of course, we have a lot of military assets in Iraq and Syria that are very vulnerable.

And we would like to know when, you know, our key partner countries do things that would significantly antagonize Iran, which would then potentially generate its proxy forces and militias. So I don't know if that's accurate. I wouldn't question Victor Lincoln's honesty, of course. So that appears to be the case. And we did not know and we did not participate. But we are going to be dealing with the consequences, right? I mean, we can get into their sending, you know, the USS Abraham Lincoln over there right now.

They're sending another squadron of aircraft. You know, they already have the WASP, the abuse group out there, multiple destroyers. It's just everything that I'm talking to folks in the Pentagon is they're sending everything they got. because they expect that Iran will not only have to respond, but they'll have to respond more significantly than they did even in April, what, April 13th, I think it was. Because that was, I mean, it was a big show had no effect. Yeah.

They, you know, they're going to have to do something at least as substantial, but I think from their perspective with way more of an impact or it's just going to be viewed as like a fireworks show. Yeah. And of course, Hezbollah does too, not just because they essentially work for Iran, but, you know, Fawad, Shuker just got killed in Beirut, right?

So that's, that's, so it's a double way. I think we're going to see something potentially from multiple different directions to try to overwhelm their missile defense system, which is not going to be good, obviously, for Israel, but obviously the United States could be pulled into this thing.

Yeah, on that, no, I'm sorry, go ahead. So I'm just thinking, any idea on who's steps up next to fill that vacuum after that assassination? Jason, you're talking about for Hamas and at Hezbollah? I don't, I mean, they always have, that's a good question because this does go to the point that someone make is every time you assassinate a leader, they get replaced. So, and I'm all, you know, I've spent a lot of time, you know, you might imagine chasing people down. they did bad things in the United States

and I was always, you know, proud of, you know, whatever participation I had with, you know, taking them out, you know, battle space, so to speak. But, you know, and I'm asking, you can ask a lot of the guys in the last 20 years, they always get replaced. It's like, that's what they call it mull in the grass, right? So at first it seems like it's going to have a huge impact.

You know, okay, well, nobody can replace, you know, his male, hyenae. He's been around forever. He was, one of the first. time the commander, the head of Hamas in Gaza. You can say all these things. And Fulad Shokker went all the way back to the Beirut bombing. I mean, he was wanted for that.

But so I'm 100% especially with that guy, seeing him gone. But you do have to calculate that in with, okay, what's the strategic impacts? What is this going to do? It's not about that guy. That guy deserves to be gone a long time ago. But you have to calculate that in the fact that he will be replaced. I'd be replaced, everybody would replace all the way up to, you know,

in our system, I'll put the commander chief. So who's going to replace him? I would imagine that they would keep that somewhat hidden. So we didn't just, they don't just put a giant, you know, bull's eye on his head. But I would say that that is something that's, you know, we're going to be trying to find out, but they always replace them. So it is worth taking them out, but it's always important to realize that it's not going to change the trajectory of the group as much as we would like. And you have to deal with the consequences, which in this case, the ceasefire negotiations, at least for the near maybe medium term or completion.

Yeah, I always, with what you just said in mind, Mick, I always think of, um, is it call me, a QI-A-E-A-Q-E-A-Q-E-A-Q-E-E-A-Q-E-E-A-Q-E. Al-Qaeda in Iraq killed more people after Zikawi's death than before. And yet, you know, you remember when we got the news of Zikawi's death, I don't know about you, but I mean, we're all high-fiving, think, okay, they must come to an end, you know, I mean. But no, it was near at the beginning. I think we love the cult of personality. And so we think that removing personalities from the picture will affect the overall situation, but our enemies are more pragmatic.

Perhaps one exception I can think of is Nazrallah. You know, I think if he disappeared, that would have a cataclysmic effect on Hezbollah. But going back to how clever it was, the fact that it has caused so much internal questioning and dissension, And, you know, there's an internal blame game going on now in the IRGC. You know, you've got a former Iranian intelligence minister coming out and saying, hey, I warned you guys this would happen. All the officials said the Islamic Republic should be worried about their lives. You know, this is exactly what Israel wants, of course, you know,

for everyone to be looking over their shoulder and blaming each other. Yes. I mean, the perfect covert operation, which, of course, has a clandescent side to it so you don't know who did it, right? If it's obviously, it's covert in a sense that they're not going to claim it and they do it, you know, under a certain cover and tradecraft. But the perfect one is, and they obviously know this is visual, is when they don't really know what happened. Right. And that didn't happen to this case. But if you can do that and make them think it was an inside job and, you know, without given details, it was one,

specific mission I was involved with where the group came from the sea right this is this a small thing but it really helped and it wasn't even the intent remember those uh shoes used to wear running shoes got real popular they were actually like feet they just they just kind of stuck around your feet and everybody started running in them and then dudes were falling out because like destroys your feet and stuff but anyway they got real popular so the people that came that you know the the group that was involved in this came in and when they all had those things on. So when they took off their, you know, here,

they were running around in those things. By sputes. Again, not intending to try to be sneaky, but the side effect was when they left, the group that went, the group that we were going against, who had guys leave and get killed with all this stuff, they thought it was an inside job because they're like,

this isn't Americans. They're barefoot. America's don't run around barefoot on the beach. up into the, because they could see the, right? And it was really, it really caused consternation where they started killing each other and saying it couldn't have been the Americans. I mean, they always, you know, they have all the gear. They're not going to do this stuff.

So I know it's kind of a funny story, but the point being is anything you can do in a COVID operation so that you don't want to take credit, right? You don't go into that business to be able to take credit and, you know, pound your chest. Anything you can do as a country that's trying to carry out these things where it really confuses them whether it's an inside job and all that is better way better that's the best way to do they a really interesting point too which is you know a very insidious thought for the iranians is that that in order for this protection unit the ansal-a-a-a-marti protection unit to have been infiltrated must have involved someone higher in the organization

And, you know, there's a quote in the Daily Telegraph today, again, from an anonymous senior Iranian official. And he says, it's still a question for everyone, how it happened. I can't make sense of it. There must be something higher, right? So leaving, you know, does he need someone higher involved or something? But it would seem to me that seems, you know, again, I realize we're speculating. But it is extraordinary because if you look back, you know, I was looking up on this protection unit. And their mandate is laid down by the Supreme Council of National Security.

And the Supreme Council of National Security essentially does a mission analysis on every mission determines the number of designated bodyguards where they should be, blah, blah, blah, for each official. So, you know, again, you wonder if there's so much attention from high up on higher up on security of VIPs and yet the organization being infiltrated. That's, you know, that's the, I think that's an interesting point. Number two, what happened to these guys after they plotted the explosives? Well, the reports are from the Iranians that they escaped the country.

Well, how did they do that? It's extraordinary. But it's an interesting point. And Mick, you've dealt with this many times, is what are your obligations to your sources, right? In the past, when Mossad has recruited local. They have been less than protective in the aftermath. And there's been some internal criticism about that. Hey, as an intelligence organization, we have to value our sources and our accomplices.

So this may be a sign that they've evolved. They haven't, you know, in order to secure this kind of cooperation going ahead, they have to establish reputation of looking after their sources. Mick is, you know, with all your background intelligence, Any thoughts about that? I mean, anything unusual or am I off the mark? Well, you're definitely not off the mark. Andy, when it comes to intelligence organizations,

at least a good one, your protection of sources is absolutely critical to the success of your organization. So if your organization gets a reputation for, I don't lose lips, I mean, people don't want to work with it, period. And they get out there, right? even about how much money you can provide them or whether it's because it's not all money right some

some people work for us a lot of people actually based on philosophical and ideological reasons right they're in a despot type of country and they want to see a change that is that that has actually happen a lot but either way whether you're motivated by money or ideology if you're not going to be around that long because either sloppy gradecraft or, you know, the need to get out there. And usually the boisterousness doesn't come, obviously, from intelligence professors. It comes from political folks that want to take credit for it, right? I mean, we've seen that happen before where even it was great.

And then all of a sudden it's like officials that know stuff want to say stuff. Why are you to talk about that? I mean, how about we just say the guy's dead? We just, you know, just go with that, you know? I mean, it's usually I don't think. done for, you know, vindictive reasons. It's just not really understanding the consequences as it's coming from a political entity and not necessarily the intelligence service.

Intelligence service should never talk. They should just be willing to stay in the background, no parades, no, no public matters. You know, you get my point. It's really not about that. It's about, it's about, you know, just being proud of what you did and then you're keeping it to yourself. you owe it to the individual and you owe it to the organization long term, which is ultimately.

I have a question and a thought kind of. Like, obviously Musa knew where this guy was going, right? He lived in Qatar. They're not going to do it in Qatar, obviously, because like Qatar is like Switzerland or the Middle East. So for Musa to be able to penetrate essentially the IRGC Secret Service, right, that protects VIPs. And for them to like,

burn that card. How deeply penetrated is the IRGC by Musad or other Western intelligence agencies for that to just like fuck it. You know, we, you know, we've been planning this and we'll blow our cover and that's that. They have to be, you know, extremely like infiltrated.

I mean, yeah, I think that's totally true, Dee. I mean, it really does show that they had incredible access, placement, and the ability to task, right? And then they had to get exposed to enough to do what they did. So, and, you know, again, this is just what we see in the press and what's being able to put a budget on. I think one really interesting aspect of the, you know,

as this kind of falls together, someone should write a book about it. Oh, wait, I'm supposed to be doing that. But, you know, kind of the role as Mossad has emerged in the last few months, I mean, Mossad has had, despite its reputation, as you know, like any organization has gone up and down and has had some catastrophic failures as well as some astonishing successes. October 7th was a catastrophic failure. Well, that was really Sinnbet. You know, I mean, that's my point. That's a great point.

But the contrast between the, you know, lead up to and Sinnbet's failures, and it's as though, you know, the country's regained. meaning its status as a intelligence organization, which was, I mean, as an intelligence-focused country, you know, and very sophisticated in both technological and human. And yet you had this enormous internal failure with Shimbab. But Masad is really, you know, Regardless of whether we think that the strategic outcome is going to be positive for Israel, Mossad is certainly performing some extraordinary feats here.

Something that, you know, I would dare say even with a couple of agency guys here, that our organizations may learn from, although we can't do this sort of stuff. I understand that. Indeed. I'm sorry. I think, too, going back to what you were just asking and saying, And as far as the penetration and how deep it is, I think after this operation, there's going to be a hard reset within. So I don't think they need to, I'm not going to say they don't need to worry about it, but I think there's going to be a big purge.

And so I think that once they get the answers or while they're getting the answers that they want on how deep did this go, they're just going to get rid of everybody, however that is and start all right. Right. So that's what I'm saying. Like, why do that? if you can get this guy almost at any time outside of sending a message that like we can get you anywhere anytime in the in the Blair house essentially where you're staying and you know it's nothing you could do about it the fallout though is what kind of annoys me it's because like when Israel pops off and gets everybody upset we have to move carrier groups we have to bring in 30 you know 50 fighters

to knock down missiles that are going to be shooting at it. Like, they know, it's just, I know, it's kind of frustrating as an American because, like, I'm not exactly pro-Israel on this, specifically Netanyahu. I'm not a Netanyahu guy at all. Because I think he's doing this for political survival. It just goes so much more deep. And that's what I'm saying. As I'm not an intelligence guy, but I would think, like, if you have an adversary

completely infiltrated, isn't it worth more? in the long term rather than just burning that. I don't know. I think someone in Israel, someone meaning some group of people, sat down and thought about that and said that it was worth. You know, the juice was worth the squeeze in this case because of just what you said. Okay, yeah, we're going to piss some people off with this.

And maybe we're popping off a little early, but we're also going to get probably another character group out of this. So we're also going to get political support from many in the U.S. and Western governments. So they were thinking that the Jews was probably worth the squeeze in this case. Yeah. And it might also cause pause

in Hamas itself. Some people are probably saying, whoa, whoa, hold on. I was supposed to go to Iran next month. You know, can you guys actually protect me? You know, and also on the other side of that, there are some of Iran are probably saying, do we really want to bring these people here?

If they're going to be, we're going to get bombs dropped on us, it might get some of our people killed. So I think someone sat down and thought about all that internal strife that can be caused is worth the gain on the back end. And Mick, if I'm wrong, please let me know. No, I don't think either of you guys are wrong. I think this is all part of the discussion, right, and the calculates going in here. So there's plenty of people, as you know, Prime Minister Nandiyah

who's not that popular in Israel, right? There's plenty of people, including I think President Biden's even mentioned this, I think he wants to extend the war because he realizes one of the wars over the far-right part of his coalition is going to say we don't need you. Then he's got all sorts of legal issues. He's got to go against. That's his political issues, right or wrong. That's what some people think. There's also a part of the IDF, even with its risk, that thinks this is inevitable.

Like, they think fighting Hezbollah is inevitable. Not that they want to. They've got enough on their shoulders, so to speak. But there's a lot of Israelis. It's like, look, we got, what, 50,000 displaced Israelis sitting in hotels in Tel Aviv. They can't go back to their homes around the northern border, right? So they think it, I don't think they want to see this war, but they think it's inevitable. So in some cases, you could say, why not just get this over with?

And then, of course, there's this other factor, which hasn't got a lot of talk, is, according to news reports, Iran's only like a week away from getting enough fissile material. So uranium and rich to a certain level where it can make a nuclear weapon, right? So there's a lot of bad stuff that could be happening. And from the U.S. perspective, you know, yes, there's obviously an issue between the current U.S. administration and the current Israeli administration. We are longtime security partners, country to country. So we are going to defend them. We're not going to let them fail.

So that's an issue they know. Right. So if we start thinking, as they're thinking, they realize if this is an inevitable, and they're going to have to do something to mitigate a nuclear-armed Iraq, they know that we're going to be there. So, again, I think all your points are valid, and this is something we've got to consider because we've got to look at it from their perspective, whether it's Netanyahu's, you know, from his political survival or the country of Israel,

including the security services and the IDF, thinking that a lot of this stuff is going to happen, and they might as well get it over with this. Yeah, there's definitely a, you know, it's definitely part of a plan intended to bring things to a head, you know, and you look down, look across the board. You've got this assassination of one of the chief negotiators, you know, after a period where Israelis have been, you know, I'm just making a comment. I mean, the negotiations, frankly, have been a huge humiliation for the Israelis and seeing someone with the power of life and death of 200 or so innocent people and kind of milking it out, that's the perception the Israelis have of this guy. So there was a revenge quotient in this for sure in a way to appeal to that very kind of basic instinct. But of course, you know, the families of the hostages

are not happy because they see Netanyahu cutting yet another kind of lifeline to getting, you know, any survivors out of there. But at the same time, yeah, I'm sorry, go ahead. I was going to point out, Andy, I mean, one of the aspects of the intelligence services has really come to light in this. I mean, it's always been there. There's always been this kind of cloakroom diplomacy.

Right? So if it's sensitive and you wouldn't really want your secretary of state out there, meeting with people like Hamas, right? Or any terrorist organization or unsavory characters. Oftentimes you use not just a CI director, that's actually unusual, but other people down the ranks, right, that do this sensitive diplomacy. And it's always been there, but this is really highlighted. And in some ways, even though it does work pretty effectively, it hasn't worked that well here, not for lack of effort.

But this is going to set that back. Because a lot of people are going to say, wait a minute. So the whole time they've been negotiating, it's been all the intelligence services, then the other guy's negotiator gets swat. Like, I don't think it was. I certainly don't think it was from our side. But people could step back and say, this was like, this whole thing was stuff back. Right? When you got the chief of Mossad, Mossad looking across the table,

at the same time he's trying to negotiate, the same time he knows what's going to happen in this whole thing's plan. Right. And now an interesting development. The head of Mossad, the Shimbab and Mossad chiefs, have apparently landed in Egypt today for talks on hostage release. And so that's unusual in that. Previously, Netanyahu had sent lower level guys from both organizations.

But now you've got both cheats landing in Egypt, right, to continue negotiations, which suggests that, I don't know what it suggests. I don't know. But it's yet another piece of the puzzle, right? Why would they do that? why would they send their most important guys to Egypt to meet with, you know, that head Egyptian, the intelligence chief, Abbas Kamal there, who of course, you know, I wouldn't say they're friends, but they know what they've worked with him.

Right. Close. So something's going on here. So there is a line of thought, and this could go straight to your point, bringing that up, that Hainia was the problem. He's obviously not under a director. right. I guess he was actually, but he didn't think so. Whereas the Hamas commanders in Gaza, when they got pressure, that's when they started saying, okay, maybe we don't need a permanent

ceasefire to get this off. Okay, you know, like you could see the ship where at first it was Hamas that was the problem and then, you know, then Israel started moving the goalpost. There is a belief that Heinea was what kept holding up an actual ceasefire. Ultimately, he's sitting in Qatar, Doha, that, you know, fancy pants, five-star hotel,

he had under the same pressure, at least he didn't think he was. So that could be to your, if they're down there, and this actually starts moving forward, but the people that thought that, I think, would have some validity.

Very interesting. A very interesting take, right? You know, despite all of our talk about, hey, this was intended to push this to a crescendo, maybe it wasn't. Maybe it was intended to,

aid negotiations. And if that is the government, Israeli government's claim, then sending two of their two intelligence chiefs to Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the assassination does kind of, you know, it's meant at least, I think, to get that perception. It's because they could have kept that visit absolutely secret. I mean, they could have. They know how to do that. So the fact that the press knows about that visit, again, is all part of this. I mean, it's interesting. Jack will not appreciate this as an investigative journalist, but a lot of times investigative journalists are following in trace of government breadcrumbs, right? Not here in the States. I'm not sure we're that smart.

Please. That's what the New York Times does. We're too much of a democracy. I mean, democracy is messy. We can't make all these things happen. And thank goodness we can't. But it's really, yeah, it's another layer. Listen, Mick, I know we've only got you for another.

21 minutes and 10 seconds, not that I'm, you know, not that I'm counting every second with you with such value, but I, of course, I do. So what do you want to talk about? What else do you have going on in your life? So, I mean, we've been working on the humanitarian corridor with humanitarian aid and the Gaza, and obviously the decision is made to pull the J-LOT. Yeah, can you talk a little bit about that? I mean, because we all, not we all, but I, for one, kind of grew up since, you know, 2010, 2011 in the planning community, thinking logisticians had it, you know, I mean, this J-LOTS thing was awesome and doesn't, you know, it seems to, so there may be some issues. With the cost of robust.

Yes. And, you know, what I can start with, it was an incredible effort on the part of a Central Command, particularly the Army Department. It was, I mean, you could just look at the manual and see that there was a very important. going to be a challenge. The jailups does work in relatively calm seas or a lake and that's not what they got, right? The Eastern Mediterranean this time of year was not those things and most of the time it was above the capacity of it to withstand it. So the criticism is use it. I think, you know, it's fair one way or the other. But I can say it brought in a lot of food, even the short time it was

up. They've brought a lot of food into Gaza that is desperately needed by the people of Gaza that wouldn't have gotten it. And at the end of the day, we were proud to be our small part to support it. It was actually got to more people without being looted than other parts of Gaza. So it felt a critical need at a critical time. Yeah. And I would like to see it continue, right? Our, you know, Sam Mundy and I, you know, and I, you know, and it came up with a plan, I kind of, we came up with a plan that didn't require the jail launch, right? So we'd like to see it go back to that where it would be a port facility temporary that needs to meet the standards of the Israelis that could withstand every sea state in the eastern

Mediterranean, right? So it would have to be moved. Yeah. We'd like to see that, but that's those, that's not up to us, obviously, they're already be happening. But we built, we, the U.S. government, well, we built the beach landing zone, the angel, delivery zone. It's already there, right? The Cypriot government and everybody set up the system in Cyprus, that's already there, you know, with the screeners and all that stuff that had to go into play. And now there's no... So hopefully, you know, the powers it be decide it needs to happen. It's not us. It needs to be somebody else. It doesn't mean they shouldn't have the ground corridors or they should be opened up. But let's face it, the desperate problem

there needs to have every available means to get food, clean water, medicine in there. And eventually, when this war is over, how are they going to do reconstruction when 80% of the buildings have been significantly damaged to the point of you can't live in it without, you know, access to the seat? Where you can see how many problems they are just bringing 40, 50 trucks in a day. How are you going to move that many, that much rubble out and that much, stuff in. So this is a much bigger issue that I think once this war is over, the international community needs to rest. But we're still working there. We're doing what we can inside,

working with the UN, working with the NGOs that we've been supporting the entire time. And obviously, we're looking forward to the end. You know, think about this. And all, you know, great points, Mick. It's very, it's very easy, of course, to, you know, jump on as almost every newspaper did and attack, not attack, but just kind of ridicule the J-Loth's effort. But, you know, for a historical reminder, remember, the Mulberry Harbor was smashed, was smashed up in the immediate aftermath of the, you know, the D-Day landings by a, not a higher C-state than expected. It's something they thought they prepared for, but it was decimated, and they put it together

again and learn from it and and built up an enormously robust logistic, over-the-shore logistics system based on the lessons. So, you know, we forget, I'm pounding kind of the, I suppose, the jingoistic drum here that, you know, we, one of our greatest strengths as Americans is our ability to innovate. I got a question. Yeah. And learn from what has happened. And that is, that's really the question going ahead isn't so much. What happened? What happened? why is what do we do now how do we develop it how do we learn from the lessons and you're right um very quickly i mean you mentioned 50 trucks i mean think about it 150 trucks was a kind of sustainment level um throughout this crisis but as you point out when you get to reconstruction

it's going to be many times that uh you're going to absolutely need over the shore um the ability to deliver material over the shore otherwise it's just not going to happen So for the permanent peer, what's, what's holding it back? Like, what's the rub, really? Money or is it like political will? Like there's funding. Actually, international media, there's funding. It's approval by Israel.

And it's the agreement by the United Nations and the NGOs to keep using the system. So part of it's like a chicken and egg thing to be fair. It's like, well, why am I going to send my stuff to Cyprus? If there's no barriced on quarter. Yeah. And then Israel is like, well, no maritime court, what am I approved? So obviously, a little bit of the advisory group like us can't make this happen. We're happening to talk to anybody, but it's going to have to take, you know, leadership, the UN leadership in the United States and the EU, right?

Because the Almatya plan coming out of Cyprus is really an EU thing. It's a Cypriot-led thing, but it's a new thing. So we're just going to keep doing what we're doing inside and helping as many people as we can until hopefully that gets resolved. We can start right now, and the funding's already there. So we can, it's a temporary facility. I don't want to get too nerdy on you, but essentially we drag out. Get as nerdy, get as notice you like. That's 70% of our audience.

Oh, okay, cool. We dredge out a slot that a barge can come straight into the beach, and it's a nest. So it's secured. And then there's a sea break, if you will, a temporary one that depletes the, the wave issues, right? And then there's a platform with a crane on it that can take containers off and put it straight on the trucks. So you avoid the, okay, put on a floating pier, and then it has to be put on smaller craft to bring it into the causeway, and then down the causeway to the Trident Pier, and then it's on, that was the J-Lons.

Ours, it just barge comes straight to the beach. And, you know, the group that we've been working with, the engineering group, the shippers and the logistics, They've already done these. So it is enough. We can, we can, we could show that it works. So it's not,

theoretical. It's not, yeah, it's not theoretical. So why didn't they do this? Why didn't they do that instead of the jailout? Don't know. We came up to this plan that's referred to as a blue beach plan.

Basically, because the first beach we looked at was a blue beach and then we had to move it, but we couldn't chase the name because everybody, you know, knew it was movie. But, um, you've got to have a blue beach. This could be a blue beach. in the Red Beach. Otherwise, it's a worthless.

In December of 23. So this is way before the jailots. But, you know, that is what it is. What I would say to those that, I mean, I get the criticism of the jailouts, but the criticism of the United States is, you know, everybody else is talking about, you know, what a crisis it is.

What do you do something about it? Yada, yada, yada. We heard it all. And all of a sudden, it was only the U.S. It pushed up here. from Virginia to gun. So, you know, I get the criticism, but it's like, hey, man, you know, it's not the critic that counts.

It's the, you know, as Teddy would say, it's the man in the arena. At least these, these servicemen and women were in the arena and a lot of other people were just holding, you know, big fancy conferences about what should be done. Yeah. No, I mean, I couldn't, I couldn't agree more with that sentiment, Mick. It's, that, that's kind of a sub-modo of our body. here, right? If we could figure out how to make it in one sentence, you know, without sounding so cliched. And also, you know, the fact is, and this is a reminder, I think, for the U.S.,

and as we come to an election, and regardless of which party wins, and we start looking at, you know, there's a very alluring thought that is, that has taken hold, perhaps both sides of the aisle, that we can kind of retreat into ourselves and stop, you know, helping the world and just focus on, you know, our Appalachian problems or whatever it may be. But the fact is that we depend on, you know, we depend for our standing on our last, and the things that we want to do because we have that obligation. And the aftermath of the 7th October, the phone didn't ring in Moscow or in Beijing. it was everyone looked to the United States for leadership and was highly critical when you know the perceptions were that the United States had dropped the ball but but no other

country was there and no other country was willing to do this and and so I'm you know I'm with you make I mean I'm a I'm a logical patriot in that sense I just just want to give you guys a heads up they usually call me uh 10 till now Stephanopoulos to wait bro Oh, yeah, that's right. Yeah, one last thing I want to ask about. This is a little bit out of left field is the whole deal with KSM that was now rescinded. I was going to ask that.

I mean, that's crazy. I'm a New Yorker, right? Like, the guy planned 9-11. I'm going to be a little crass with this. The last 20 years, we've smoked a lot of people. let's just let him out and put a couple slugs in the back of his head and let him go. No deals, no Guantanamo, no lawyers. Hey, let's just.

Do we have an editorial policy? That's my editorial. That's my opinion on that. I couldn't believe it when I saw it. It was wild. Look, I've rescinded. I know, thank you. Yeah, rescinded.

Secretary of rescinded that. I think, you know, chances are, I don't know. lawyers are working this deal, working this deal. Apparently we're informing their chain of command, right? Because there's like 0% chance they're going to say, you can cop a plea, you kill 3,000 Americans, and we're going to take the death penalty off the table. Like, I imagine that thing went onto his desk,

treaded, thrown back out of his door. But the fact that it hit, it didn't even know about it. It hit media. It hit the media before it reforming. It just, again, it just kind of looks. little bit like a yes maybe maybe their lawyers tried to leak it so they

because they thought maybe they put them in position where they couldn't yeah yeah I mean Lord was like nope who knows maybe we can get General Austin on um eyes on sure we could try

Mick help us out talk about this and Afghanistan and other we went under surgery and didn't tell anybody why can't he hop on here you're right yeah you know i know i know his personal assistant one of his personal assistants and he swears he wrote it sticky he put it on back that store but it's just you know how it is hey man's got what 45 almost 50 years of service you got to keep that's right that's right

you know honestly i thought that was a huge deal about nothing you know i mean we're all about not the person but continuity Anyway, all right, Mick, over to you for rapid comments before you go on to your lesser station. What is it? APC. Yes, yeah, analyst. You're going to take a giant jump down in circulation. So you have this massive audience before it's yours. Well, it's great talking to you guys again, as always.

I'm departing here and heading into Israel as soon as they let the planes fly, right? And then we'll be there for a while doing it. We'll look forward to talking to you guys again. Excellent. Hopefully on the other side of Armageddon or not Armageddon, right? Be safe over there. Thanks, Mike. Guys, don't forget to check out.

Don't forget to check out the Lobo Institute. The links will be in the description. Andy Milburn, his substack is book. Everything will be in the description. Patreon.com slash team house. Keep our lights on. Mick is not cheap. So.

No, he's not. Help us out. He's worth every pen. Absolutely. Yeah. Thank you, guys.