The Team House - Munich Fallout: NATO, Iran, and America’s Credibility Crisis

Episode Date: February 16, 2026

We break down the fallout from the Munich Security Conference, the growing strain between the U.S. and Europe, and what it means for NATO’s future. We also dive into the Iran talks and the U.S. military buildup in the region, asking whether diplomacy still has a chance or if conflict is becoming inevitable.Andy's article: https://warontherocks.com/2026/01/gaza-and-the-conduct-of-urban-war-civilian-harm-risk-and-responsibility/Montana Security Conference ⬇️https://mi1.suitsandspooks.com/Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseSubscribe to our new newsletter!!!!https://teamhousepodcast.kit.com/joinNew merch, patches, and stickers! ⬇️https://theteamhouse-shop.fourthwall.comCheck out Mick's new podcast here:⬇️Apple Podcasts:https://podcasts.apple.com/at/podcast/pub-and-porch-applied-stoicism/id1836955475Spotify:https://open.spotify.com/show/1k3QPmkAMwnGJxMLDwUSSd?si=n6piIu8XRcag1Z0K43A3bQYoutube:https://www.youtube.com/@UCd0Hq6QFk8CoTu5j-VU0Ong Find Mick Mulroy here: Fogbow ⬇️https://fogbow.com/Lobo Institute ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/Twitter ⬇️https://x.com/mickmulroy?s=21&t=-Ze3F_Ix2vlJ18KFvORTCALinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/Bluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.socialMick’s publications ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/publications/publications-of-michael-mick-patrick-mulroy/Find Marc P here:https://x.com/MpolymerFind Andy Milburn here: Twitter ⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substack ⬇️https://amilburn.substack.com/Andy’s book ⬇️https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-OperationsBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialFind Jason Lyons here: LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?uBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.social"Karl Casey @ White Bat Audio"00:02 Start03:15  Munich Security Conference: Rubio vs Vance, U.S.–Europe tensions15:20 Can Europe go it alone? Intelligence, NATO, and military capability gaps30:00  Iran talks in Geneva: nuclear deal, sanctions, and negotiating positions36:30  U.S. military buildup: carriers, air defense, and the risk of war with IranBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

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Thanks a bunch. Hey, everybody. Welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm here today with Andy Milburn, Mark Polyloropolis, and Mick Mulroy. Some housekeeping, Mark is going to be joining us regularly now. He's going to be taking over my role as, like, host slash moderator, because I never wanted to do it. And I just did it because the team needed it.

So I got, yeah, I'm replacing my. myself in terms of hosts. I'm still going to be here and rule with an iron fist. Don't get her twisted, but with another Greek. And thank God, not another Marine. So Mark, welcome. So I can see we got the Greeks in the left and the Marines in the right. Is that where we're going with their?

Drop the soap, Nandi agency at the bottom. Yeah. Drop the soap. Do you get to be careful. Yeah, well, it's another, yeah, be careful. It's another CIA guy Which, you know I mean, that's what I was my order from the agency

To get another CIA guy on So we can continue the CIA propaganda here But no, no, no It's a, I don't know if Mark is exactly On the CIA Christmas card list Or anything like that anymore. Yeah.

He's going to be higher on the list Than that guy you head on Who is now in the big house, right? Yeah, Dale Bendler Yeah. Yeah, yes, thank you, Andy. It's for reminding us always. We also got to be quiet when I pointed that out.

I named him. Listen, I can't be perfect. We've had 400 episodes of the team house. We're going to have a couple of... You've only had a handful of pedophiles and traders. We've had one pito and one trader that we know of. True. That we know of.

Right. We can take a look at the Epstein list. All right, Mark, take it away. Dee, thank you very much, Andy and Mick. It's an honor to be amongst both of you. You guys are, of course, both my friends. I've known you both for a while. Andy, you and I were on a kind of little bit of a mini jihad on a separate issue in terms of Gaza war crimes. And I'm proud to have supported you on that. Did you ever do The War on the Rocks episode, by the way? Yeah, yeah, I did a podcast that's coming out this week. Good. Look forward to that. Ryan. And written a follow-up article that, by the way, totally debunks all this ridiculous BS that those two particular guys were bringing up. And Mick, always an honor to be with you, of course. We have a long and assorted history together from the mountains of northern Iraq to the plains of Pactica province in eastern Afghanistan. And Mick, your acclaim to fame is you were one of the two former ground branch officers who gave me a really terrible news.

name in Iraq. If you remember the fighting lamb shop, which I will, when I'd walk down the halls of CIA, when I'd see one of you all from your tribe, when they would scream that out, I would like duck into a corner in shame. Why? It was about the stash. It's a good. I know. It was good. I had some good, good jobs going on. But let's let's just kick off on here and just, you know, first and foremost, again, great to be with you guys. I think I've been on the team house about a million times. So it's fun to be back and especially on eyes on too. But I think the biggest kind of the story we should start with is the is the Munich Security Conference wrapping up today, in fact. And, you know, and after last year's kind of debacle where Vice President Fance basically insulted

everybody on the planet if you're in Europe, probably everyone in Europe, certainly. I think Secretary Rubio and his speech was certainly something that people were looking forward to to see if there was perhaps a softer tone. And I have my thoughts on this. I have a very good analogy I want to make, but I'm going to save that until after I get both Andy and mixed views on that. So Andy, what are your thoughts on Munich? A good place here. But what did Rubio accomplish or what did he not? Yes, so I'm going to keep my comments brief, which will please much of the audience so that I can defer to the, to you to who are going to be able to speak far more profoundly on this topic. But I would say this. Yes, you know, Vance's comments last year, I think were like nails on a chalkboard for most of us who have had anything to do, even at the point of the sphere of foreign policy and understand a little bit of history.

And I think, you know, I think this was, honestly, I thought this was Rubio trying to walk the line between what in his heart of hearts. I'm not inside Rubio's heart, but in his heart of hearts, he realizes is important. and the fact that the United States depends on partnerships and alliances and that we represent something in Europe, something that, you know, as Rubio points out himself, he grew up with, security, stability, all of these things. But at the same time, there was that pointed message, right, that Europe needs to step up to the plate to take charge of its own security, which I don't think anyone in this group would argue with, right? So it was a balancing act. Act, it didn't, like most balancing acts, it didn't give any of the audience exactly what they wanted to hear.

But at least there was a little more placatory than Van's speech last year and didn't leave the United States looking quite such an outlier. Thank you, Nick, your thoughts. Yeah, we'll force us out with this shameless plug. So we have, we're starting the Whitefish Security Summit this year in April. Hopefully all you guys will be coming out eventually, if not. Where's the invite? This is it. It's called the Montana Intelligence Summit.

And now Lobo is a partner to the group. So it's now the White Fish Security Summit. It's going to be, we hope, similar to the, we don't want to be too cocky here, but similar to the Munich, but really heavily intel and special operations. So like this year, General Stan McChrystal is one of the headliners and a bunch of former senior CIA folks, but it's annual, right? So we hope to have eyes on and the whole crew out here. Open invitation, obviously, for that. But again, it's going to be broad foreign policy, national security topics, but it's always going to keep its kind of core uniqueness, which is the special operations and CIA type.

spin. So specific to the actual Munich conference, agree with Andy. The issue I think if I was Europeans is everything that Vice President Vance said that was controversial is codified inside the national security strategy. So even with Rubio's, I think, a moderated tone, which I do believe is more in line with his actual philosophy. I think he's more of a traditional Republican on the foreign policy stage. But even with that, even with his comments that were more conciliatory and more positive toward Europe and, you know, our tied heritage and everything like that, if I was a European leader, I'd still look at the strategy, right? It didn't change the actual plan for the U.S. going forward. It just was a better way to present some of it. So, and we saw a lot of comments

from, you know, the Chancellor of Germany, Mertzen, that, you know, really question U.S. leadership going forward. And I think we saw that from several countries. Obviously, some European countries like Denmark are super upset about the whole Greenland thing, not to go down that road. But there's a lot of resentment in Europe right now toward the U.S. It was probably, and I'm not saying a lot of it isn't earned. I mean, I agree with Andy.

They kind of didn't take their security serious. They thought, okay, we have the big brother that is the United States so we can spend on social programs, right? That shouldn't have been the case. But now, I think primarily because Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe is taking its security serious. And my last points on that part, we need Europe. We need our basing in Europe. It's actually super beneficial to the United States. If not, we have big problems projecting force around the world.

If you take out all the European basing and access and the fact that we have pre-stage forces there. Also, Europe, even though it's, you know, as I just said, not taking its security serious is now. It's going to be the partner that we always wanted, right? It's in the future. So that's even more of a reason. In addition to longstanding ties and being the pinnacle of our security structure, since the end of World War II, they're going to be even more on par with what we wanted soon, right? These countries are spending a lot more on their own security, and eventually they will be the partners

that we always wanted, and we don't want to rupture the relationship at a time when that's going to happen. It would make no sense for the U.S. We'd actually have to spend way more on national security if we didn't have the strong partners and allies that I think we've always had in Europe. And yes, they might have neglected some of their own defense, but let's not forget that they did go to war with us for 20 years after Article 5 was triggered after September 11th. So they are the partners, I think, you know, philosophically, and they're going to be the partners that we want practically in the sense that I think they're taking their security very serious right now. And also, remember, Ukraine is still fighting Russia.

Russia's only taken 20% of their territory, and they've basically fought them to a draw, right? That's one country in Europe, not NATO, but one country in Europe who's probably now the most effective fighting force in Europe right now. And I think the lessons learned need to be brought into the rest of NATO. We just heard about this NATO exercise where the Ukrainian has essentially wiped the floor with NATO, right? That needs to be incorporated into European NATO, and that needs to be a benefit to the United States. So anyway, I'm getting on a diatribe here, but these are all the things that I'm sure were discussed on the sidelines of NATO, and hopefully the U.S. delegation understands this. So, you know, one of the things that I think I always try to find kind of an interesting analogy that kind of the layperson can use.

So I'm going to throw this out here. I'm going to use it later on on some TV hits. And so, Mick, I want to see if you do as well. We could kind of compare this. This to me is like, and this is not reflective of my current relationship, I'm happily married. So let's go back to college. When you get a middle of the night drunk text from your ex-girlfriend saying, hey, I want to come over. And it's all giddy and you have a great time.

But then you wake up the next morning and you realize what the hell did I just do? The Europeans kind of embrace of this, the standing ovation, I thought was a little preposterous because, you know, they're, they're, you know, this is the whole idea of signal versus noise. So, so, so Rubio had a nicer speech. Well, great. That's your, that's your, that's your ex-girlfriend calling you up and saying, hey, I want to get back together tonight. But that, you know, the next morning when you realize, well, wait a second, my ex-girlfriend is really maybe not a nice person. And I think that's what's happening right now. I talked to some, some, some European officials who were actually leaving Munich right now. And they said, look, we're trying to kind of understand what

happened here, but I think that some of that initial, oh my God, the big relief. I think I had the Munich Security Conference, like, said this is a sigh of relief. I found that to be preposterous because you're not talking about actual facts on the ground. And if you take a, and so Rubio's tone was nicer. Got it. Vance was a total jerk last year. But if you look at actually what was said, the substance of it was not all that different. And there's a couple of pieces of this too, which I still think are a bit weird and insulting. I mean, you know, this whole idea that Rubio talks about, The State Department tweeted this out about, let's, you know, we have to celebrate our old heritage. I mean, you know, that's like a dog whistle for some weird shit in terms of kind of white nationalism.

The notion of the U.S. now supporting think tanks in Europe that kind of promote the far right. I mean, look where Rubio then jetted off to, Slovakia and then he's going to Hungary. The two European countries that actually are not for unity on Ukraine, for example. And so, you know, I'm looking at you guys. You didn't like my analogy about the girlfriend thing, the middle of the night text. I couldn't like that. I thought it was great. Okay.

He likes it. Good. I've been married for 32 years, man. I don't even under, I mean, I went to high school with my wife. Don't you get done with college by someone like middle of the night and you went back to them and you realize the next morning was stupid it was. Yeah. I understand the concept. Dee, that happened to you last night.

They just had a concept. No comment. One girlfriend and one wife. Kind of abused. spouse syndrome. Okay, that was the other one. It was, uh, you know, thank God we're not going to listen to another brow beating session. And by the way, I, yeah, you absolutely agree with all you guys. And I think we should probably get, uh, someone who's really obtuse on this shows that we have more argument. Uh, you know, I'd like to point out too, because I'm hearing, I, you know,

there's this undercurrent of, yep, we, we told them and now they're really fixing house. No, they started fixing house in 2022 and the message came not from us it came from the Russians that is when Sweden and Finland I mean that is when you know Finland decided to join NATO that is when Poland made the decision to up their defense spending you know and it's already one of the you know the leading countries in Europe as far as military strength and if you look at the rhetoric coming from France to and Germany it all started there in early 2022. Yes, the U.S. may have thrown cold water on any lingering belief that the United States was behind it all on the side of freedom and all of this. But that wake-up call was

already under effect thanks to Putin. Mick, let me ask you a quick question about our old world, the Intel world. And then Andy, too, we can, we'll get on to another topic right after this. But one last piece, because it has to do with European agency. And that's the notion of how much can Europe actually go it alone. I mean, one of the things that that kind of struck me is that there's still this notion of dependency. But the dependency, if you think about it, is probably in the intelligence sphere and things like big items such as satellite, you know, ISR, things, things in which, you know, perhaps Europe can't, you know, deliver to Ukraine as much as we can. But how much of that is actually true?

I don't know the answer to this. But with the amount that Europe is actually providing to Ukraine now, I mean, the fact that they're not at the negotiating table is preposterous. And why the U.S. is even leading, it doesn't even make any sense since we're not giving them any. We're selling weapons to NATO under the Pearl program to get to Ukraine. We're not giving Ukraine as anything. But let Mick, just start with you quickly on the intel side. How much independence can Europe actually seek to get? which would, and because in some ways, I think maybe the solution to all of this is actually

Trump gets bored, the U.S. goes home, and then Europe actually does fully take over, because then you'd have a much more kind of equitable idea of your support for Ukraine as being critical to Europe. Yeah, so, I mean, Intel, like all the security, our partners around the world, not just in Europe, they rely on somewhere, as you and I did, knows this, right? because basically they teach a lot of their chiefs, basically how to get information from the CIA station chief. Right.

And it's not just human intelligence. It's the functioning role of DNI, right, representative. So it's going to take a long time to replace that. But I believe from talking to several friends, both in Canada, which is 40 minutes that way and then in Europe and then even in the Far East, they're planning to do so. They're planning to do so because we've already had. a few circumstances where the U.S. is threatened to cut off or actually has cut off intelligence,

and that shot a shot across the bow that, you know, I mean, if you put yourself any of us in their shoes, would you ever want to be in that position again? Right. So it's, again, I think it's going to create a more independent ally and partner group for the United States, but how we do it matters and, you know, we're going to have a lot less leverage in the future for what we would like to see, which sometimes it needs cajoling with our allies and partners to go along with when they become completely independent and they did it in this manner. You know what I mean? By force, by threatening to cut off intel during a, you know, a war, for example, in Ukraine. So I think that's going to be a pretty substantial issue going forward.

I do think all these countries are looking at it, but it's not just Intel. What else did the Europeans rely heavily on? Well, Europe does have nuclear weapons, but they don't have anything near what the U.S. have, like 500 compared to thousands in the U.S. So there's already countries, especially the Nordic countries, and the countries that don't have them, they're talking about acquiring nuclear weapons. And now that we've jumped out of the New START Treaty, essentially didn't renew it or extend it, that sends a message, right?

It doesn't mean that every European country can end up with a nuclear weapon, but it certainly says that we are not, you know, entirely interested in stemming the potential for a nuclear arms base, right? And I don't know that we're even negotiating on a new one, although that was the issue, you know, including China and such. I know that's not, it's, I view these a lot together. So Intel is an issue for the Europeans. all of their security is, and I think they're going to re-look at it.

Again, if we did this right, we come out with stronger partners. Like, we would be going to our, you know, fellow chiefs of, you know, the intel services and getting more information from them, right? But, you know, one of the big issues, of course, you just said, and that is a lot of our intel is up there, right? So, and that is expensive. So they have to be ready to, you know, start spending a lot more on their national security and defense, which might mean less, you know, available.

for their own social programs, but that's the decision they have to make. But it seems like they're being forced to make it right now. Andy, on the special operations side, one of the things, I was just in London for a couple of days, and I actually made it to the venerable special forces there, which is kind of cool place. And one of the things that, you know, when you talk to European national security folks kind of in the background, they're very hesitant, especially the Brits, to say anything, is the role, for example, the British Special Operations Community and SAS and others

in Ukraine. who I think have done incredible work. I think they actually were probably more forward-leaning than the Americans. I just based on the limits that the U.S. placed on our folks. But talk a little bit about the special operations capability of European governments, because I think that's something that we don't hear a lot about. Nobody, I guess, no one writes books on it. But I think it's pretty significant and could play a factor in the future as well.

I mean, think about the Poles, the Estonians. There are some badasses in these countries who've done some really crazy shit. everything I hear on this, I can't confirm any of this, but I think they're out there. So what do you, what's your view on their country's kind of capabilities now and then going forward if the U.S. is going to take a step back? Yeah, that's, I mean, that's a great question. I think, well, not not think, but, you know, here are the facts that the U.K. definitely has been more involved in Ukraine than the U.S. on the special operation side.

They have deployed continuously a SAS squadron to Ukraine since late 2022. What exactly those guys are doing, of course, isn't open source information. But, you know, there's a good deal of training, but there's also assistance with tactical intelligence collection, drones, you know, precision strike at the tactical level. as well as a conduit of intelligence collection from ground up, which is intelligence dissemination, rapid dissemination. Collection dissemination has been a problem in Ukraine. And so the SAS are probably, remember I'm speculating here, enabling that. To your wider question, you know, we always pride ourselves

on having the most capable special operations forces in the world. And of course we do, blah, blah, blah. but it is a massive enterprise, right? You know, there's like 70,000 people in Stockholm. It's not particularly cost effective. The Brits do this very well, and they do it with a kind of different view of special operations. So what they call special operations,

or rather special forces, and let's not get into this whole Green Beret bullshit about what special forces are because they have a different... In the UK, special forces, special operations are used interchangeable. And so you've got a very, you know, you've got essentially you've got the, what's it called the SR. It's just going to get carved up for forgetting the acronym here.

But there are, you know, they're, the unit that they turned one parent into, it's SS, SRRG. It's, it's, it's. It's a personal group. You've got them and then you've got the SAS and SBS. And that's essentially it, right? And so there you've got obviously an exquisite, very potent ability. This isn't all about door kicking anymore, as you guys know. It's mostly about special reconnaissance.

And that combination, the S-A-S-S-PS and the S-R-R-G or S-S-R-G are a, they willed you know they punch away about their weight in doing that but that's again that's quite a small force but what the Brits do well as far as a conventional force instead of the parts are they

have institutionalized the ability to work by with them through other forces so foreign internal defense is considered one of the mission essential tasks of any of any battalion and the Brits also have formed a ranger regiment whose specific purpose

is focusing on military assistance, which is training foreign militaries. So in their aggregate, still fewer numbers than SOCOM, even when you add, you know, all of these assets together, far fewer, but a significant capability. And they are heavily embedded in Ukraine. I would say the Brits are foremost, you know, I think that's indisputable in Europe as far as wielding that capability. and they understand they also have a couple of advantages on their side they're not quite they're not they there was no church commission in the UK right so they don't always have to declare what the

SAS is doing and the chain of command goes very directly from the director of special forces up to cabinet level so you've you've got a a not just a really exquisite tool but one that can be used without a lot of deliberation and frankly not a huge amount of accountability which you know is pros and cons right now you mentioned the polls and we know thanks to Sean Naylor and and our own jack that the polls have been up to good inside Russia itself or at least that's you know what the evidence indicates that the poll are doing a lot of things that are pretty active against the Russians and have been doing that for years. And so, yeah, the Polish Special Forces, the Grom et al, are not particularly big,

but they have significant experience, regional experience. They know how to operate effectively in Russian territory itself. They've proven that. And that's something that we in the U.S. don't have either. So, you know, round off my answer to your question. And the French, too, are very capable, you know, it's all tier one, but they have very capable special operation force too. Their use in support of the Ukraine conflict unknown.

But bottom line, yeah, Europe fields, say, a really capable special operations capability. You know, I just like to add to what you guys said to the, you know, what does, what does Europe need the United States? and they have indeed been strength bolstering their capabilities since 2022. They probably, you know, and I would say they rely on us still for ISR, right, at the strategic level. No one has the same long-range strike and air superiority as the U.S. Although Europe's trying to get there with the Eurofighter, you know, in the Gripin. Air defense and sea had, although the Norwegians and Germans have pretty advanced system,

they still lean on U.S. technologies and architectures in NATO. Now, whether they need to do that for much longer, I doubt. And then you have joint command and control, right? If NATO goes to war, Europe has so many multiple collaboration, communication frameworks, but lacks a fully integrated kind of battle management, C2, joint C2 comparable to us. So that's where they're going to rely on us. The last thing I'll say, though, is some areas like industrial defense capacity for things that are really required in the Ukraine war.

Europe is ahead of us, creating manufacturing of drones, expendable drones, 1-55 munitions, because they don't have such a laborious acquisition process, and because their industry is already tuned to turning out these things. So let me just kind of close this segment on the Munich Security Conference. I think with the notion, I think everyone here would agree that, you know, national security is a team sport. And, you know, we need our European allies. They need us. But I still think it remains to be seen at the level of U.S. commitment to the alliance. And one other kind of final point is, you know, Rubio goes and he makes nice, softer tone. All of this can be blown up in one truth post, ex post, whatever it is by Trump, if he wants to, you know, invade Greenland.

or say something insulting to NATO partners. So the other part is that has to do with the reliability issue. So everyone's going to kind of maybe be a little happier right now leaving Munich, but I'm certainly not sure if it's sustainable. Mick, let me just turn to you with the kind of this second subject for today's podcast, which is the Tuesday talks in Geneva. Hey, by the way, maybe we can have some peace talks in whitefish one day. If you crush this security conference, you're going to hold in the summer.

We can have a whitefish summer. But right now it's the Geneva Summit. And so it's Iran on the table, Jared Kushner and Steve Whitkoff, the U.S. envoys for everything under the sun, including when the next Super Bowl is going to be played, or it's my own stupid quip, are going to be there. And kind of the big question, I think, and perhaps, Mick, you're in a perfect position to ask, is not in the sense of what is going to happen a month from now. We don't really know.

But what do you think the Iranian negotiating position is going to be? Because all eyes are really, you know, in my view, at least, to see if the Iranians are going to give even just a little bit, just enough to have these negotiations continue. There are some indications that the U.S. has kind of softened some of the positions on the zero enrichment of uranium. It's caused a bit of a stink in the national security world because, you know, Trump at one point said no, no enrichment's allowed, but I think that might be on the table. Do you think the Iranians are going to come? with anything that would be required to actually have negotiations continue. And then we'll get on to the next piece,

which is actually critical in terms of the U.S. military buildup. But first and foremost, the Iranian position in your view. Mick, you, I mean, this is what you did in the past at DOD, not only at the agency, but, you know, Iran was front and center on your portfolio when you're kind of running the Middle East shop. Up, you're muted. You're going to hear me? Yeah, got you.

All right. I didn't do anything. But, yes, you're right, Mark. So we would like to pull out of the JCPOA when I was there. DoD, by the way, was more inclined to stay in and then address issues like proxy force support ballistic missile program separately. Maybe there is still an element in there talking about that. And maybe that's one of the reasons why it does appear.

The U.S. has softened a bit. Remember Secretary Rubio was like, has to include no enrichment nuclear proxy force support. ballistic missile capacity and human rights is where he started before the negotiation started. I think we're now at least pretty close on, at least we're focusing more on nuclear. And I think that's one of the issues why Prime Minister Nanjahou got in a plane and came early, right? Came early and stood right next to the Oval Office door until, you know, he was let in. Israel, of course, doesn't want to see an agreement between the United States.

States and in Iran, that is anything less than very, very stringent to the addresses, I think, all of the above. I think the U.S. is more inclined to compromise. And to be frank, that's what negotiations are. If you can't compromise, and chances of successful negotiation are very slim. So I think both the U.S. and obviously Iran should be willing to do that. And we'll get into the significant force buildup. But all this is happening as, you know, another aircraft carrier strike group, the U.S.

as Gerald Ford is on route to the region, right? Huge capacity, added to another huge capacity, and then we'll get into the details of just how much they have looking down the barrel, so to speak, literally, at them when it comes to these negotiations. I think politically the issue is going to be, it has to be more stringent than the original JCPOA, right?

If he gets back into the same agreement, he will be in the president of the United States, we'll be like, well, what was that all about? Right. You know, and that's a fair criticism if that's the case. So he has to get it more stringent. I imagine there's going to be more of, you know, a testing and validation program that we know exactly what they're doing and not doing. I think the U.S. is still going to go in with a zero enrichment, potentially throw on the table, bring in enriched uranium for civilian purposes done somewhere else, right? If it's truly about, you know, using enriched uranium for medical purposes, then it's about the actual medical purpose, not necessarily your ability to produce it yourself. So I think there's a lot of room there. And of course, they're going to want to see the uranium that's been enriched to 60%, not needed at all for civilian purposes removed from the country and maybe brought to Russia or Turkey. That's been on the table in the past. But I do think, lots of writing on it. I don't think we have a day yet, but it's

this week in Geneva. Hopefully, you know, Mr. Whitkoff and Mr. Kushner bring in some of these real experts, potentially going back to the original discussions. This is a incredibly complex, incredibly technically detailed set of negotiations. And if you don't have that expertise, and listen to them, of course, you might not end up with the agreement you think you're getting kidding, right? So being on Team USA, I think it's a, important that that happens and that we get the smartest people at least maybe not at the table, but behind the people at the table. Either way is good. And see if we can't solve this diplomatically because this is, in my opinion, heading toward a military confrontation if it's not decided that way. I just don't think the U.S. would send this level of, you know, military power to the region.

Lose at the negotiations and then just turn them around and send them home. I don't see that happening. So this is either going to go to the diplomatic path or probably the military path. Andy, let me, let me, I'm going to ask you in one second about the military buildup and what it means and if we have enough forces there. But there's one thing I just want to kind of throw out there too for both you. All of us here have been involved in promises made and promises broken to our allies. You know, Mick, you and I were up with the Kurds. I remember having discussions with our Kurdish partners. And of course, at one point, one of them, and you know who it is, I won't say his name.

but he reminded me that, you know, the Kurds had been lied to and betrayed me just about everybody, and they fully expected us to do it again. And we did. Same thing to the Syrian opposition with Obama's red line, you know, Afghan or Afghan partners in Afghanistan, we can go on and on. And I raised this because of President Trump's several weeks ago saying, quote, help was on the way, Iranian protesters stay out on the streets. And so one of the things, and this is not saying I advocate for a military option or operation, but if there was a diplomatic solution, which would include even if you could call it a good deal, the regime stays in place. And can we not understand that we've then betrayed the Iranian protesters who are out in the streets?

That rubs me wrong. Is it enough to go to war with Iran? I don't know, but there's just a part of that. I just want to kind of throw that out there. And both you in a second when I turned back to you, both you can comment on that kind of ethics and morality of it. But Andy, do kind of jump in in terms of the force structure. Because I think when Trump made those statements several weeks ago, we didn't have the right forces in place. But I guess the question is, do we have the right forces in place now? And comment on the

notion that was that, of course, an anonymous U.S. official said the other day is that the military campaign might take weeks. You know, I guess is that sustainable? Do the American people support this? I mean, it seems like we're so obsessed for rightfully so with things like the Epstein files and Minnesota and ICE. We're heading down to potentially a major war in the Middle East like that we haven't seen for some time. Andy, take it away. Yeah. So, you know, first of all, I just want to follow up on something Mick said that these talks are, in order for them to be successful, they have to be, they have to go into

a great deal of detail. I mean, even if they were just exclusively focused on Iran's nuclear capability, the monitoring of that and linked to sanctions relief, some kind of progressive plan for sanctions relief that lifts sanctions once you know actions are verified on the Iranian side I mean this is that itself is very complex I think all of us here if I can speak for you guys would like to see you know the big problem with the Jukpoa one of the problems was that it did not address proxies at all and it looks as though maybe we're going down that path now right but all of us know that that

as far as direct threat to US interest it is Iran's use of proxies in the region. That's even greater, arguably, than possession of a nuclear weapon. I know I'll be challenged on that. But the proxies have given us a headache for, you know, since the 80s. And so, you know, most people would say, why would we walk away? We've got everything in the region. And to your point about, are we ready to go to war? We are absolutely ready to go to war. When you look at the order of battle there in the Middle East, It's got everything for sustained air operations. I mean, sustained air operations.

We are talking about weeks, both land-based and carrier-based aircraft. We have a significant, obviously, non-kinetic capability out there too, which, you know, EW in particular, which we would use regardless in any sort of campaign. and I'm sure that there are cyber options lined up too. And most importantly, we've sent air defense batteries, and we've almost emptied when you look at our inventory and you look what our commitments are elsewhere, places like Korea. We have pretty much emptied our inventory of air defense batteries

and sent them all to the Middle East, which has been a double-ed-sword, because that in particular, I think, is what has caused the Israelis to change their mind. You remember in early January when, And when the president was saying, I'm coming to your rescue. Remember, Netanyahu actually said,

hey, revolutions are best carried out internally, right? The Israelis were cautious. They were concerned about the prospect of regional war. Now when they've seen that I'm only guessing that the number of assets that are stacked up in the region, especially air defense, which they care about very much, their tune has changed. You know, the, so, yeah,

and answer your question. We are absolutely prepared. And there is two, I mean, no one can really answer you quite everyone's question about are we going to go to war. But even our allies in the region have pointed out that, yeah, there's kind of a credibility factor too. In other words, we need to raise the bar on these talks and include things other than nuclear agreement. if, you know, aside from proxies, we need to talk about ballistic missile threats, right? That's the always care about the most, in fact. Yeah, absolutely. And so that needs to be on the table.

We have to force it back at home. I don't want to mean to sound like a hawk. I think, you know, there are many downsides to a regional conflict. But there is a point of here about credibility, rhetoric matching what we intend to do. And what we intend to do can be quite rational and reasonable if we want it to be, but we do have to address those two additional threats other than nuclear, enhanced potential nuclear capability. You know, Mick, you are, and I say this honestly, you're a better man than me in terms of your ethics and morals as a CIA officer.

I mean, you are one of the most moral and ethical people I've ever met in our place. Mark, clearly that's true when now we've heard about your college years. Yes, I know. But I do want to get, you know, that notion of kind of betrayal and ethics and morality of making a promise, like Trump did. I mean, that promise was so front and center. And the Iranian people responded, you know, what are your thoughts on that? You know, even if it's a really good deal, but the regime stays in power. You know, how does that sit with you? Because that bugs me. I can see why it bugs you. I mean, in order to be the leader of the free world, you have to

promote freedom and democracy in part of the world. It's not free, right? It's not just criticizing Europe, right? you're actually supposed to promote democracy over autocracy. And that is what the president was essentially doing when he was talking about supporting the protests, you know, help us on the way. So the second part of, you know, promoting being the leader of the free world is be careful what you say, right? So, you know, walks awfully and carry a big stick. We obviously have the stick, but people really pay attention to what the U.S. says. And because we have the, you know, the most dominant military in the world. and we have traditionally, historically, been the leader of, you know, individual liberties and democracy,

which is what I believe the protests are primarily about. I mean, there's a lot of reasons for the protests in Iran. Yes, I get it. It's economic. But there's a lot of groups that have been promoting, you know, women's rights and the rights of, you know, ethnic minorities and, you know, go down the list. Will the U.S. be portraying that? Potentially, yes. But if we would have taken out the, you know, those comments,

I still think we should support the protests, but we're not going to go in militarily and do a regime change. That U.S. has learned our lesson. Iran would be, I don't know, 10, 20 times more difficult than Iraq, for example. Therefore, 20 times more cost prohibitive, and we'd lose thousands of people. So I just don't think the U.S. is willing to do that, and I just, regime change from the air is almost an impossibility, right? And then, of course, the question is, even if you said, well, I'll just drop up a lot. bomb on, you know, the Ayatollah. Well, I mean, that doesn't mean that who replaced them isn't just going to be worse, right? So I think there's a, I think we should have a very practical view of it, but be careful what we say. And I do think we should support the protesters,

just not by military action. So we've got two things, we've got the threat of military action trying to lead to a better agreement, nuclear agreement, which to be fair is in the regime's interests because it'll get the economic sanctions removed, which is a predominant purpose of the protests, right? So in a way, although I think we should be negotiating, we should try to get to a better nuclear agreement, it's going to be, it's going to run counter to the actual protests who are going to have left over reasonable to a revolt and the regime's going to be stronger and they're going to be allowed to sell their oil. If they don't, there's secondary sanctions that the administration's looking at to try to prevent China for buying. I mean, there's all sorts of things.

it'll make the economic circumstances in Iran even worse if these negotiations don't happen. But it's a fair point. You know, I think the United States, even if we get an agreement, should do everything we can to promote legally, of course, freedom and democracy in Iran. But that's predominantly going to have to come from the Iranians. Let me do something I actually told myself in my notes today. I would not do, but I'm still going to do any house. Again, it's prediction, which is not a great idea to do. But what do you think, Andy, let me start with you.

Military confrontation with Iran or no? Just given everything you know right now. I think there will eventually be military confrontation with Iran. It may not follow in the next days or even weeks, but I think that will. I cannot imagine, frankly, and I know this sounds right down, very pessimistic. But I can't imagine an agreement that's going to satisfy that we can monitor. United States can monitor effectively that's going to satisfy our concerns. I can't imagine Iran agreeing to such an agreement they may do so just for the sake of deliberation

and sanctions relief, but I don't think they're going to follow through. So that's why I think some kind of confrontation, military confrontation is inevitable. Mick, your thoughts. Yeah, so the Iranians never seem to miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity in my opinion. Right. So they seem like they're headed in the right way. You can, you know, if you remove yourself as a partisan in it, you can see why it would be to their advantage to get a nuclear agreement, a new one, because of these massive sanctions that are on it and what it's doing to their grip on power, if you will, even if you're just looking at it from their perspective. But they seem incapable of understanding that.

They seem like they really believe that having a nuclear weapon will make the regime impervious to being overthrown without thinking that there's no way that Israel alone, let alone the United States, is going to allow that to happen. They're just going to, and we've already seen that Israel has the capacity to go in there, eradicate their air missile defense, eradicate their air force, and basically own the skies. So if I was looking at it from their point of view, I'd say, well, we're not even giving up something that we can actually acquire because they're not going to let us acquire. So why not give it up so we can, you know, bolster the economy, bolster our position here. If I'm in the regime, I'd want to stay there. But I don't think they'll do it. I think they'll come up with yet another reason to scuttle this thing with this idea. They're staying almost half pregnant, right? They're in the worst possible position. I don't have this good analogy, but they, they, they, they, They don't have a nuclear weapon to use, but they look like they're trying to acquire one because it's way above the need for civilian use. So they're basically making themselves a target, a legitimate target, my opinion, yet there's really no path forward other than an agreement that would relieve the sanctions and basically acknowledge they're never going to get to a nuclear weapon. So that's a long way of saying that I think this probably will fail, unfortunately, certainly not pulling for it. And then the U.S. either will get tired of negotiations dragging out and start using the actual force to be an influencer, or they'll just fall apart. And I do agree with Andy.

They're setting up. I mean, we've got like eight destroyers, six cruisers. We're going to have two aircraft carrier strike, multiple squadrons of fighter air jets. I imagine from what I'm hearing from media that, you know, there's been a lot of preparatory warning orders given to our strategic bomber command. And I mean, this could be a very long, sustained, multi-week campaign to not only degrade the nuclear programs to target ballistic missiles, particularly the launchers, of course. You can have a lot of missiles, no launchers, does not make any difference. And maybe even a regime target. So maybe he'll address the point you just asked me about Mark and say, okay, I'm going to target some of the regime because of what they've done killing thousands of protesters and jailing tens of thousands.

I'm not so sure. So I'm going to take a little bit of a different tact, only in, you know, if, you know, we all kind of look at the crumonology of the Trump administration. I think there's too many people in there who are not in favor of this from the MAGA world. But also Trump seems to like these kind of quick, easy, decisive wins, the Soleimani strikes, first administration. Maduro, a couple hours. The strike in the Iranian nuclear program. Again, incredible strike, you know, one day at most. And I would imagine that, you know, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others are telling us.

telling Trump, hey, this could be sustained over weeks. And I don't know if he has the appetite to do that. And certainly, I don't know if the American people do as well. I think there is some domestic politics involved in this. We've been kind of sleeping, sleepwalking in here. So I'm not so sure he has this stomach for this. But we'll see. But Dee, I got to throw it to you.

What do you think? Yeah, so listen, the goal of like doing this, like a sustained weeks-long campaign bombing Iran, outside of like totally trying to actually destroy their nuclear program, what's the fucking point again just to get them back to the negotiation table and like maybe fingers crossed me, maybe make the regime collapse? Like that's the reasoning. Like to me, that reasoning outside of the nuclear problem doesn't make any sense. As like a layman domestic, you know, civilian here.

I would throw into that too that, you know, and, you know, maybe we can close on this on this note. Do you guys agree that there, I mean, there should be. be a Trump addressed to the American people. I mean, good Lord, we're going down the road of a major, major military campaign. Congress is sleeping. I would imagine you're going to see calls for war powers, resolution, stuff. But what about Trump at least explaining the American people, what in the heck we're doing? And by the way, if it's going to be a sustained campaign, and this is the horrible part of this, we're going to lose people. The idea that this is going to be kind of pain free, which so many of these, I think Trump's gotten lucky with a couple of these military operations because nothing,

you know, really bad has happened to U.S. forces. But, you know, if you take the country to war over sustained, you know, multi-week campaign, we're going to lose some servicemen and women. So do you think that Trump has to then make this case to the American people? Andy? I think that would be absolutely leadership, right? That's what presidents do. Do I think it's going to happen? And do I think ultimately it matters? That's a different question. I don't think, And here's why I don't think it matters. I don't think the American public gives a shit about what goes on, about what the U.S. military is doing overseas.

Now, I may have overstated that. I think they would be upset if we got involved in a, you know, an attritional ground wall. But strikes, I don't think it means anything to them. I mean, you know, and frankly, I don't think it means that much to Congress either. I think the average representative does not understand his or her role in the process, checks and balances. And I think, you know, we saw this atrophy over 20 years in Iraq and Afghanistan. We've talked about this. The AUMF being continuously expanded without any real discussion or deliberation. I think we're at a point where no one has skin in the game. I mean, really, you know, the American public's

focused on the economy and focused on what's happening domestically. The average representative, as far as having people who are in the military within the country, their constituents or families of those within the military, they're always going to be a minority. And so there's no real incentive to challenge what the executive is doing, regardless of party. That's sadly where I am on. So to answer your question, I don't think that the administration will feel a compulsion to talk directly to the American people. And I don't think that, by and large, the American public cares either. Well, that's a heck of a place to end. That's a depressing note. I hope they would do it, but maybe you're right on that.

Andy, I don't know, man, because, like, you're right. You're probably, you're right. Most people don't give a shit in terms of, especially if, like, we don't have 100,000 troops there and hundreds of billions of dollars being wasted. But, like, it is a midterm election year, and I could totally, if I'm a political strategist or ad maker, I'm making, like, whoever's not saying anything, there's ways to, like, nudge people along into, like, this, Trump was supposed to be the president to end all wars and do that.

And he's bombing everybody he could find, you know, anybody like you pointed on a map, he'll help do it. I'm just saying like there is like a wedge there. There is like an angle there, I guess, to like to put pressure on congressmen, especially if, I mean, Congress has been feckless for the last year and a half year or whatever. They have done nothing specifically when it comes to Venezuela or they punted it multiple times. Um, so I don't know. Most people don't give a shit, obviously. They care about their Netflix and, and their TikTok and stuff.

But I don't know. I think there are ways to move the balance a little. Yeah. And I know with wrapping hip here, I agree with you, Dean, but I think that that's not going to be enough to move the needle at all. And I don't think what the American public wants or doesn't want or polling matters at all to the administration, you know, and it's not just this. administration. I think we've got to wait for a determined effort from within the Senate. And of course, that is where this effort should come from. When I say effort, I mean, just simply to do what the Senate is supposed to do constitutionally, which is act as a check and ask the right questions before we go

to war. You know, on that point, then I think there's probably a limit to this because come November, or really next January, there could be a flip in the United States in terms of balance of power. And so, you know, that would argue that this whole Iran thing has got to be wrapped up before the midterms. Dee, how'd I do? I think you did incredible. So like, let's, let's just do it, wrap it up a little bit more. I want everyone to check out Andy Milburn's book when the Tempest gathers. That link is in description. Mick mentioned the Montana Security Conference, that link. If you want to go there for tickets, that link is in the description as well. Is he sending you there? Is he going to, are you going? We're talking about going. Yeah,

like me. Your way. Me and, no, I'm not paying for anything. I'm not paying for anything. Jackson, Jackson, Tokyo right now, when he comes back, we're going to figure it out if we're going or not. We're talking about possibly, yes.

So we'll do some team house and some eyes on from there if we do go. Mark, you got a book, Clarity and Crisis. Check it out. That link is in the description. You know, I'll put all your links in the description as well. Your Twitter, your, I don't know, all the stuff. All your stuff. to find Mark and Andy and everybody else.

That link is in the description. And Patreon.com slash the team house. If you want us help support the show both Aizon and the Teamhouse, go there. Thank you. Thanks, guys. That was great. I want to tell all of you today about a new newsletter that we're launching that encompasses both the Teamhouse podcast, the Aiz On podcast, and the Highside News

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