The Team House - Netanyahu vs Everyone | EYES ON | Ep. 25

Episode Date: May 29, 2024

Support the show here:https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseToday we talk about the ongoing feud between the prime minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant the Defense minster and the entire Defense establishment in Israel. we also discuss the 9 year long intelligence operation Mossad has been running on the international criminal court.Find Andy here:Twitterhttps://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substackhttps://amilburn.substack.com/Andy's bookhttps://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operations/dp/1526750554Team House socials https://www.instagram.com/the.team.house/https://twitter.com/theteamhousepod?lang=en#netanyahu  #gallantBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the podcast if you're not already. To support the channel is to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Team House. channel and podcast if you'd like to and we really appreciate that so go it and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house hello everyone welcome to another episode of eyes on i'm andy mdmore i'm jason lyons i'm demitri contacos be no shortage of news as usual yeah it's pretty it's pretty wild what do you want to kick off with i mean this um this horrible news of uh you know the fire and some 35 to 40 deaths in in raffa and I you know I for one I don't really have anything to to pile on with at this point and honestly it's you know it's just the images

are horrible and I have written about deconfliction procedures the you know the issues with deconfliction procedures the you know the issues with deconfliction procedures and the Gaza conflict or lack they're off. And so, you know, I'm not going to pile in at this point and make assumptions. But just to say, you know, it's again, another very tragic incident. Anything else on that, that guys? No. I'm treading carefully because I know it's, you know, the lot of people are, are, as when these things happen on both sides, become very emotional. Yeah. Yeah, I figured, yeah, we definitely have to mention it because it was in the news this weekend, front and center, obviously. Seems like Israel doesn't, this is my opinion, doesn't really care about deconfliction whatsoever. Certainly there, you know, it's fair to say, as I've written their standards, and I've been detailed about this and shown how their standards are a lot different than ours in the U.S. military. Let me put it that way.

But how about this? And U.S. papers kind of, they didn't gloss over it, but I'm talking about Israeli defense minister, Yov-Galant's declaration on Wednesday night made a public address, accusing the government of mismanaging the war. Let me say that again. That is the defense minister accusing the government. of which he is part of mismanaging the war.

But specifically, of course, he is targeting Netanyahu. And I think, as I said, this wasn't kind of front-page news necessarily in U.S. papers, but this is huge in Israel because, not simply because he is the defense minister, but because the belief is that he is not just representing himself or a political, you know, more political group within the government, to include Benny Gantz, those, you know, the so-called centrists, but indeed that he represents the institution, the IDF and the Shinbet in particular. And ranged on the other side, of course, are, you know, the extreme right-wing members of Netanyahu's cabinet, the most notorious of which are Ben-Gabir and Smallridge.

And so this is, you know, in Israeli eyes, this is the final showdown. And there's no doubt where, you know, the sympathies of, I think, most Israelis lie in this. Galant is, he is an icon. figure. Yes, you know, he's by no means a centrist, but he is a certainly a national hero. He was in as a, I mean, from the late 70s, Israeli Special Operations Forces, specifically Flitla 13, which is their equivalent of the seals, just fewer movies and books. But I mean, he was, you know, he was tier 1 of T1. I mean, he was involved in, um, these targeted killings overseas that Ron Bergman has written about in that excellent book,

Rise and Kill First, Yov Galant, appears very frequently in that book as leading these targeted killing teams. So, you know, certainly he's not by himself on this. And he and Netanyar, who have had a long falling out that, precedes even Netanyahu firing him back in March of 2023. And you'll notice two other things that have happened this week that are not necessarily being, you know, that haven't been connected, at least not in US media. The same, this last week, the IDF made and now released documents

that showed. that Netanyahu they had warned Netanyahu four times about Hamas in the period of late 2022, early 2023. All right. So this is probably not coincidental. That's kind of a bombshell. And then the IDF spokesman, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, you know, the guy with those massive ears. looks like Dr. Spock.

Not Dr. Spock, Mr. Spock. Anyway, so he is, he made a comment today, I mean, not today, on Tuesday, that implied that the IDF, the IDF was having to take a step back, or all the gains made by the IDF were slipping away because, And he worried it such like it would be different if we had some kind of national goals, right, or strategy. You know, that's, and that's the public affairs guy from the IDF. So, you know, none of this is coincidental. So Galant went came on, on Israeli TV, and he asked three questions. And the first, I thought this was very well delivered. It wasn't a rambling, long rambling speech.

but the first question was to Netanyahu do you want a short war or a long one and you know this this question's really at the heart of Galant's demand that the government discussed at least discuss and then decide on an alternative to Hamas and Gaza which would inevitably hasten the end of major fighting and give the IDF some direction

so the second question he asked a lot, well, it wasn't really a question. He asked Netanyahu to declare that he opposes, get this, that Netanyahu opposes an Israeli military or civil governance of post-Hamas Gaza. In other words, he's insisting that the Prime Minister tell the country and the world that he would not pursue occupying Gaza and managing civilian issues. the way that a, you know, a military government would, you know, as happened in the territories, for instance, after the six-day war, you know, with a lot of institutional bad memory for the Israelis.

And he doesn't want to, you know, and also, of course, Galan, memories of Lebanon. Galant doesn't want Israel to end up in, you know, another quagmire like that, or indeed the West Bank, you know, in which it is in a situation that it rules over millions of hostile Palestinians, you know, to the security forces, that's a, that's a terrible scenario that could possibly even destroy the state, you know, in the near or long term. And, you know, nor does, there's no doubt about it that on Netanyahu's right, and Ben-Givance Moldrich have been quite open about this, the right-wing want to resettle Gaza with Israeli settlers, right? Galant knows this, and 20 years ago, Galant was the military advisor to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, when Sharon ordered the withdrawal, oversaw the total Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, to include breaking down and removing the settlements.

You know, and I mean, the reasons for that, of course, are quite separate. But so interestingly, you see what I'm saying, that this is a really fundamental split now. And that was, you know, that was, although he didn't say so explicitly, Galant's not opposed to the Palestinian Authority playing a role in management of the Gaza Strip, which is something that Netany is ennathema to Netanyahu in the extreme right wing. And Galant thinks that that is because, well, he knows, he thinks he knows or whatever. You know, the plain is that the right wing is, essentially support Hamas because Hamas is the unacceptable face of Palestinian Authority,

small A, right, to the Israelis. So as long as Hamas represents Gaza, then there can be no talk of a two-state solution. They know that and therefore want Hamas to continue front and center. But they can't say that, you know, so that's the riff there. Right. And then so that was the second to make a statement, you know, we absolutely have no intention of military governance of occupation of the Gaza Strip. Galant, by the way, so it is said, has been in discussions about, you know, with the U.S., about a solution that involved an interim Palestinian. Indian authority, government backed by Arab states, notably Jordan and UAE, possibly Egypt. So anyway, the third decision, though, that he's asking Netanyahu is about the future of the government, the Israeli government. You know, it's basically which side are you on?

That's what he's asking. Are you going to stand with me and Benny Gannes? and Gaddi Eisencott, you know, two fellow generals who are relatively centrist, although, you know, really right of center. Or are you going to go with the far right ministers? It sounds like Bielzab, Bezazel, Smodrich, and Idemar, Ben-Gibir. And that was the, you know, that's the subtext. but the question is what is

what is the future of the government Gallant called for advancing the national interest over all other interests all right that's you know that's very thinly coded text for yeah you know

ditch your political ambitions and stop putting them before national interests But, you know, so Netanyahu has to make a decision. I mean, there's no way that Galant's going to make this public challenge and then just back down. But Netanyahu knows that a decision to place governance of Gaza in the hands of the Palestinian authorities will lead to confrontation with both Smoldrich and Ben-Gavir. and possibly loss of their support, the right-wing support. That's not going to bring the government down immediately,

but it's certainly going to hurt Netanyahu's chances, which, you know, I mean, it's surprising he believes he does have them. It's a political future. So, Andy, sorry, let me ask real quick. It seems, and this is just my limited observation that these public back and forth between politicians is normal there, like it is here. But is that normal between a defense minister and the prime minister to be so public? No. No, no, not at all. This is unprecedented. Absolutely.

I mean, there have been, you know, circling confrontation within the cabinet is. is something that is more public than it is here. And it's almost an expectation at times. But nothing like this has occurred before. I mean, this is monumental. It's not more of the same. And I think, you know, from anyone's perspective, it's good news. So anyway, any decision by now,

Netanyahu to fully withdraw from Gaza, you know, in turnover governance to someone else, is going to lead the far right ministers, parties, you know, which represent religious Zionism. And I think the other one's called Yehudit, Otsma, Yehudit, it'll cause those parties to exit the coalition. And that's what's kind of hanging over his head. and then so so then Ben Gavir and Smolterich they come tearing out of the wings right

and they demand that Netanyahu fire Galant right you can't make a shit up calling him a Trojan horse all right this is you know this is a guy who's again national hero but

the thing is Netanyahu can't fire Galant he's you know he's He's not as strong as he was when he's fired previous defense ministers. And, you know, counting Galant before he's fired three. But he's got no choice, not only to endure this kind of revolt, but to make a decision. You know, I can't. It's going to be really interesting, really interesting to see what happens.

Because I can't see Netanyahu making a decision. I can see him just keeping, you know, trying to edge it along and edge along. And so that puts the ball back into Galart's court. But what's, you know, what, I mean, this isn't even mutiny on the King Mutiny. I mean, mutiny on a, what is it? The Kane Mutiny. Sorry, Mutiny on the bounty was on. But it's, I mean, it's not like you're taking over a ship.

How are they going to seize power against Netanyar whose will? That's really what it's going to come down to, because I think it will come down to that. And Netanyahu is in a corner because, you know, other liturred members not connected to the defense establishment have come out of the woodwork and said, hey, you know what? Yeah, I warned him about Hamas too. And I've been saying for a long period of time that, you know, that we needed to come up with a solution for Gaza. So anyway, I pause that. See if you guys, I'm not laughing about the situation, but it's, yeah, it is going to be interesting to see what happens. I wonder how much of this is being pushed publicly as well to, to, I mean, as usual, sway public opinion one side or the other and maybe force one hand or the other, you know, publicly.

Yeah, absolutely, Jason. And that is, that's what I was kind of hinting at earlier is public opinion, manipulation of public opinion via, you know, leaked memos or open off the record comments by senior government officials or generals are fairly common. But, you know, these things gather momentum. and it really looks as though that the, you know, I don't want to use the analogy of rats leaving a ship, but, you know, it does look as though people are running for the exits a little bit, distancing themselves from Netanyahu. Gotcha.

Oh, and, you know, and there was something else that I wrote it down here. Gallant came up with something on Wednesday night. Okay. The day after Hamas will only be. be achieved through the rule of Palestinian elements that form an alternative to Hamas. Unfortunately, no such plan has been brought for debate. And worse yet, no alternative has been presented in its place. So, you know, I mean, that's, that's, that's, that's, that's, that's, that's, That's pretty unequivocal.

And he has said openly that he has no problem, that not only no problem, that he thinks the only alternative to Hamas is a rule of Palestinian elements, whether that is a Palestinian authority, or there has been talk of turning the responsibility of governance over to a coalition of influential Palestinian families, who, you know, may have the trust and support of the population, certainly more so than either the Palestinian Authority or Hamas.

So, you know, there are, he's open-minded enough to look at all these alternatives that involve Palestinians running either the interim, I mean, running the government. So, and that is, yeah, that is absolutely an athlete. to segments of the Israeli population, but what's going to be interesting. To your point, Jason, is how far would the public manipulation go? Is there going to be a point where just the sheer pressure, you know, not violence, but all threat of violence, but just kind of this sheer political, social pressure for Netanyahu to go, you know, we're forcing to do so to resign.

I mean, there's already demonstrations in the streets and now open revolt in this cabinet. What more do you need other than to be physically forced out of power? And we all hope that it, you know, it doesn't come to that. Yeah. But, you know, in the meantime, the campaign continues. while one, you know, an entire division is focused now on Rafa and you'll see that the, you know, this time they are sealing the Philadelphia corridor that cuts off Gaza from Egypt.

Hence that incident the other day, D, you mentioned when we were chatting about this before and for the benefit of our listeners. The incident was a shooting incident involving both Israelis and Egyptians, resulting in the death of an Egyptian soldier this last week. Nothing released publicly. What I am hearing is that it was released. This is what is coming through. The IDF, that it was a kind of a crossfire incident,

the IDF thought that they had received shots reported they received shots, returned fire. The Egyptians thought that they were under fire. You know, you've seen this play out anyway in our own forces, unfortunately. So essentially a blue-on-blue. But still, you know, contributes to considerable tension between the Israelis and the Egyptians, but they are united for the moment on ensuring that that border is sealed and that no one from Hamas or even the population of Gaza crosses that border. The Egyptians have so many problems of their own and the Sinai.

But within Egypt, there are mounting tensions because Egypt is being hammered by problems in the Red Sea. Of all countries, Egypt is, you know, the country that's suffering worse. So Egypt, in turn, has been trying to make, has been making some money on the situation in Gaza. For instance, the price of getting an aid truck from Ariris or Alexandria, the price that has to be paid to the Egyptian government is something like $5,000 per truck. you know as opposed to pre-war as $1,000 a truck so there's like a you know five-time markup on these on these transit fees surge pricing essentially for fucking humanitarian need yeah same thing for customs and so you know but still the Egyptian economy is suffering and and of course the population is is as amped up as as

populations and indeed some Western populations throughout the world over the situation in Gaza. So, you know, the Egyptian military, of course, it's a military rule there. They're just holding, they're holding the lid on a simmering part. The Israelis suspect that the Egyptian army is heavily infiltrated by the Muslim Brotherhood and that this occurred under Morsi during the one year Morsey was in power prior to CC overthrowing. And Morsey was a Muslim Brotherhood leader who was elected to power in Egypt before being overthrown by a coup. But in any case, according to the Israelis, he has heavily infiltrated the Egyptian army

with Muslim Brotherhood, which is going to be a problem, if that is true, for Cecee, more so than the Israelis. I mean, remember of the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, it's been. one of violent revolt or action followed by incredibly, incredibly brutal repression. It was the Muslim Brotherhood who killed Ahmad Sadat in 1981 during a military review. You know, the reviewing troops, I don't know if you've seen the video of it. I've seen it. Yeah, jump off one of the, you know, the vehicle in the drive past and kill him.

And yeah, those were. And so, you know, so there's there's all kinds of domestic tensions on both sides of the border that mean, you know, have resulted in this kind of this fragile agreement between the Israelis and the Egyptians. But certainly not a lot of goodwill. I'll pause there for a moment. Any any questions, guys? or what are you um uh oh yeah sorry sorry go on jay no i was going to uh talk about the uh video that was uh not leaked but posted by netanyahu's son who yes yeah yeah yeah do it jason go yeah just uh outline that for yeah so briefly uh speaking of um public opinion swaying public opinion uh so

on saturday the uh idf authorities uh stated that they were going to launch an informal investigation into a video that was posted on to telegraph by Netanyahu's son, Yair. And in the video, it shows an alleged IDF soldier

and fatigues, holding a rifle. He's wearing a black mask, and he's standing in what appears to be a blown-out building, rubble, graffiti on the walls behind him, all that. And so in the video, video, he says, we the reserve soldiers do not intend to hand over the keys to any Palestinian authority, adding that they would not see power in Gaza to Hamas or Fatah. And then he, so this is being addressed to Netanyahu, but he, that he is specifically talking about Galant. And addressing

him Galant directly, he said, you cannot win a war. resign. You cannot win the war. You cannot command us. We will listen to one leader and it is not the Minister of Defense. It is not the Chief of Staff. It is the Prime Minister. Think carefully to whom you intend to give the keys after this. And so later in the video, he told Galant to change your record, change the record and understand that we want to win and or we will go only with the prime minister. Only with whoever decides that we should win, we will follow him. Here I tell you did you want a military coup? And then he goes on to say, we're the reservists who can no longer return home.

We will show you what a decision is. We will show you what a victory is. And we will show you how real Jews win. So, you just can't make this up, can you? I mean, you know, Golan, and that may have been what prompted, you know,

one of the things that prompted Galant to do what he did, because this is absolutely absurd. So first of all, Yail, Yeah, Netanyahu isn't even in Israel. In fact, he's not far from where I am now. He's in Miami, living in a luxury condo where he has been since before the war and hasn't, you know,

doesn't for a day to go back to Israel to do anything else, you know? And the Israeli papers have written about this, even the, you know, right-wing ones showing, you know, I mean, the Peepest love doing this, you know, photographs of his apartment, the tennis courts, spa, game lounge, private cinema, wine cellar, cigar room, you know, I mean, anyone who's been to Jack's house will recognize. But so now he comes, now he emerges, right? And, and this, and produces this video, um, the IDF, of course,

went apeshit, launched an investigation of its own, citing all the violations of various rules. Jason, I thought, you know, I said earlier that I'd heard that the guy in the video wasn't even a reservist, you know, which is almost hard to imagine if he is, you know, in Israel and Israeli. But I can't find, you know, I don't know now where I got that information. So it could be it could be bogus, but regardless, it doesn't really matter whether he's a reservist or not. This was clearly a staged video for the benefit of his father. But just the fact that he thought he could get away with it really blows my mind. Yeah.

And he even said, he made a, Yairm made a separate post on telegram and said, in light of the reactions to the reserve video circulating on the networks, let's sort out the question of what a military rebellion is. an army that announces that in times of dispute it will only obey the government and the prime minister it's not a rebellion but on the contrary is an army that obeys the law hey you know what i've written about that you know uh when you were compelling when um it is your duty to disobey orders but no that doesn't fall into that category but um but you can see how you know we talk when i say we but i mean from

time to time there's somewhat hysterical speculation in the States about the prospects for civil war. But I can tell you that the divisions in Israel feel far far more raw when you're there than they ever do here. I mean, part of that's a function of geography, but part of it's a function of the times. It's also a function of polarization and not left-right polarization, but polarization of issues. You know, the day, and this day after in Gaza is one, what to do about the hostages is another. But, yeah, there was an unprecedented breakdown in discipline from a government point of view in the military back in March when, Netanyahu was fiddling around trying to change, trying to get essentially better control, greater control,

governmental control over the judiciary, right? And there was army, the military pushback, popular pushback on that. And the military took front and center stage. There were reports, you know, of pilots not reporting to duty. Galant himself resigned and Netanyahu back down. So all of this happened even before the war. war, the divisions were there. The war has exacerbated them. And I think, you know, Rafa and, and this question of the day after has brought them to a, to a crescendo. And, and I think, you know,

what all this is going on? The question is, what's Hamas doing? What's, what's happened to Hamas and I've you know I've read a written article about this just you know just yesterday but if you look at you know let's let's throw aside all this just talk about what Hamas was seen here here Hamas was seen there let's just look at you know Hamas leadership infrastructure that fighters you know their units and their ideology and I'm not going to you know for you guys but You know, bottom line leadership, the Israelis have, they say, killed 113 of Hamas' leadership, you know, or mid-ranking guys.

Well, the BBC didn't challenge the claim about leadership. It challenged the names on the list because it was finding, like, you know, found the name of a janitor. It found a name for, I mean, not a journalist. It found duplicate names and all of this. So the list may not be accurate. The Israelis again claim that it represents 70 to 80 percent of Hamas' leadership. But I would argue whether it's accurate or not is irrelevant

because of the way that Hamas is structured, all of those guys will have been replaced seamlessly. You know, Hamas, you'll see in IDF briefs, you know, the Hamas referred to as though it's a military structure. brigades and battalions. And indeed, Hamas uses that terminology. It uses brigades for, you know, for regional organization. And it uses battalions just kind of a loose, as a loose method of authority. But most of all, for succession of command, right? So if someone does get killed, they get replaced quickly. So the whole structure is designed to replace people in a hurry. So whether or not they killed 113 are these people,

little difference. And you know of the top three, the three guys who who organized and who planned and executed seven October, only one, Mohammed Isha, I'm going to mispronance his name Esha, who was killed just as last week. Only one of them has been killed. So leadership are pretty much intact, you know, infrastructure. You don't have to take it from me. I, you know, I can just tell you about Israeli targeting techniques. They target tunnel shafts, right? They have to. I mean, it's the most visible, detectable part of the tunnel.

It's the most vulnerable. The thing is that the way the tunnels are structured in Gaza, the shaft is insulated by an outbron. The only thing I can call it is another kind of an out shoot from the main tunnel. So the shaft doesn't even lead to the main tunnel. And the main tunnel will have, you know, maybe four or five shafts. And the tunnels on the tunnel framework, which is one single tunnel of all those offshoots, is not connected to another tunnel.

So you see, you've destroyed a shaft and you've destroyed a shaft. And that's how the Israelis are reporting tunnel destruction. You haven't even destroyed the entire tunnel, let alone touch the network by hitting that shaft. So when the Israelis say that they have destroyed 400 tunnels, whatever, that means 400 strikes on shafts in which they could see they've destroyed just that, you know, close the shaft. You know, there's an, and there was an expert quoted in Israeli papers this week. I forget her name, doctor at one of the main think tanks, but her area of expertise is an underground warfare. And she says, in her words, it would be impossible.

to destroy that framework of tunnels, Hamas's framework of tunnels. And so, you know, the most important of those are the tunnels that connect Gaza to the outside world to Egypt, that go under the Philadelphia crossing. And those have not been destroyed and are not being held right now, although these Israelis are sitting on top of them. So you'll see that when you're talking about destruction of buildings above ground, and you're talking about destroying Hamas's inventory of ordinance, which Israel has been quite successful in doing.

If you haven't touched Hamas' means of replenishment, then it matters little what else you have messed up. So a lot of destruction, but I would argue that very little of it to Hamas' critical infrastructure. And then you've got, And then you've got the fighters, right? Units or fighters. It's what I've said.

It makes no sense to talk about. Below battalion, you are talking about twos and threes. All right. The largest, one of the largest attacks, infiltration attacks in the entire war. And it tied down a battalion for three days was conducted by six guys. Right. And I heard that from repeatedly Brigade Command of Battalion. And that was one of the largest attacks.

These guys are operating in one. two, threes, even ones, you know, RPG mines, IEDs, you name it. Yeah, how do you destroy something like that? Exactly. Exactly. So that is why the IDF is so focused on body count. You know, one senior general commented to the papers. you know, we've become Westmoreland, which, you know, I'm not focused on that. But, but the problem

is that for the intelligence guys, they're like, look, you, you can talk where you want about destroying brigades or battalions, but it doesn't mean shit. The only way to measure the effect you're having on him is to kill his people because they, because his, those, those little groups are his main component of combat power and the way to hurt them is somebody to kill people. That's, that's the argument and that's why it's been reported. So then take a look at, you know, before the war, the Israelis said that Hamas had around 30,000 guys. By that, I mean, they meant 30,000 guys in Gaza who were being paid to do Hamas things most of the time, right? Full-time, more or less, full-time fighters. They claim to have killed 13,000. Now, if you look at total figures of those

killed 35,000 something. And yes, the figures come from the Garson Health Ministry, Hamas control. But you know, there's two of the UN, not just the UN, but independent as a UK NGO tracking casualties. But anyway, there isn't a lot of dispute about the number of figures. Percentage of those women and children, there isn't a great deal of dispute, you know, two-thirds. just over two thirds as they um um so my point is that if two thirds of 35 000 is you know 24 000 so so even if every single military age male who was killed in gaza was a member of hamas that's 11,000 guys okay which is not the 13,000 so that might be a little steep when they say they killed 13,000 people. But on the other hand, you know, they probably incapacitated two to three times that many,

right? Wounds and everything else. So it's not unreasonable to say that they could well have, you know, for one-tenths and purposes, destroyed Hamas's personnel, you know, destroyed, they killed more than killed or incapacitated 75%. Okay. Does that mean Hamas? is done though you know I mean how how deep has the ideology seeped into the population I mean some say that the ideology was already deeply steeped in the population from decades of being hold up in Gaza together right but the question is you know has what has happened since 7 October increased that support or reduced it to zero and I would say it's very and

likely that it's reduced it to Zillow. And that ideology may be Hamas's most deadly legacy and the greatest yet and the greatest threat yet to Israel. Yeah. We got one more. I mean, yeah, by itself, it seems like a completely futile enterprise to be trying to do this. We got one thing that came in just before we started from The Guardian about a former Israeli Spice chief threatened the international criminal court process.

prosecutor over war crimes inquiry. That was prior to October 7 and like the kick off of all this. Jay, you wanted to talk about this a bit. Yeah. So this is a classic. We talked in like, I think one of our first two episodes about a motivations for committing espionage and which is mice, M-I-C-E. One of those is coercion.

And it seems that in this case, that was the goal. So the ex-Missade chief, Yossi Cohen, it was alleged that he headed up himself personally, a operation to coerce the international courts prosecutor. I'm going to screw her name up, Fatal Bensouda, into dropping any pursuit of, you know, any kind of charges against military personnel. or a higher ranking political figures. So the operation was like, first it started out kind of like, you know, whispers in her ear about that this may, you know, it would be in her best interest to let this kind of thing go. But according to her, it got increasingly hostile and persistent.

And most Intel ops don't normally start that way. It's, you know, it's usually pretty, or I. should say they don't normally start full steam it usually ramps up that way depending on the intel agency uh but these veiled threats eventually got to like an old school mob style hey it's a dangerous world out there got you know why don't you let us protect you and your family so that was the backhanded way of uh issuing a threat that you never know what's going to happen um you know it's a bad world out there. A lot of wolves at the door.

So let us protect you. And then eventually it would be, well, we're protecting you in exchange for that. Why don't you back off a little bit? So sometimes that works. A lot of times it doesn't. And I'm going to say this in my own little bubble that I worked in. I do not speak for the U.S. government or intelligence when they say this. We don't use or we're taught that we don't use coercion.

I'm not saying that in, you know, way above me that someone hasn't done it or authorize it. And I'm sure it was done a long time ago. But most of the time it doesn't work. It's just like, you know, if I beat you long enough, you're going to tell me exactly what I want to hear, whether that's the truth or not. So coercion can, it can go one way or the other. And so that's why most Western intel agencies don't use it. So like you'd said, you said earlier, it happened before October 7th. And Cohen, I don't know what his influence is now.

I do know I'd read that he had been a rising political star, some political steam. But Andy, maybe you know a little better than me, what? I don't. But actually, I've got a question totally off, not off topic. but going back to your comment about coercion. So is blackmail regarded as a form of coercion? Yeah. Certainly, I mean, but that seems to be,

when we look at motivation for essentially U.S. traders, right, who turn over, what is, is it money that is the biggest single? from what I've studied. It looks like usually it's money and ego going hand in hand. Most time look at Hansen, Robert Hansen, he needed the money, but he also was 100% sure that he could get away with it because he was a smart guy, you know, very, very smart guy. He knew his job. He knew the ins and out of it. So he knew how to get around all of it.

But his, those two things, his ego and need of money, although it. a certain point he really didn't need it. It just became a thing. Um, overtook him. And, uh, plus he got, you know, um, well, I shouldn't say him, but others got family involved. So once you start adding those loose ends, as they say, um, in, it's something's going to go wrong. So coercion, at least from a U.S. standpoint, um, doesn't, I don't know of any incidents. And I'm sure someone can tell me in the comments. Um, ideology. I think more played into it towards the end of the first Gulf War and the beginning of the war on terror. You had people who had been radicalized.

And so eventually, you know, if they were in that position to give information, they started doing that. But mostly it was money and ego. And they usually go hand in hand, just like coercion and compromise, usually go hand in hand. So, yeah, that's really good. So coercion and compromise. So I would say, the initial for the U.S. traders, essentially he'd sell secrets motivated by greed, but regardless of motive after that initial contact, there's always coercion, right?

And even for a U.S. case officer, after that initial hook, after the initial transfer, there's implicit coercion. even if he doesn't intend it. Exactly. Even if you don't intend it. Yeah, because part of what your relationship with that recruitment is, is you want to ensure them that their safety is your priority. So you have your training, but you also want to impart on them that you're going to use your training

to keep them in their family safe and, you know, their job safe and all that stuff. So that's the implied coercion. It's like, okay, well, now you've taken a little money. You've given me a little information. Even if they haven't taken money yet, it's like you're not going to actually come out and say it, but it's like you just took a step down that road now. You know, now I have to keep you safe. So that's always in the back of their head.

Like, you know, you don't come out and say it, but it's implied. and in the back of their head, they're thinking, well, shit, I just gave him information. So now I have to, you know, rely on this guy. And now I have to keep it going. And some do somewhere down the road or early on say, you know what, I'll take my chances. I'm not doing it. And okay, you know, here's your little bit of money or whatever. Thanks, you know, for, you know, for working with us.

But some people just eventually something else takes over, whether it's, I think it moves out of coercion after a while and it becomes the money is great. The medicine for my child is great. The promise, possible promise of being bought to the U.S., you know, all those things start to take over. Whereas when you have somewhere like maybe the Chinese MSS or something like that, where it's like that guy's in a hotel or that female's in a hotel and they come walking out of the closet with a camera like, hey, gotcha.

You know, I think after a while that. fear um i'm not going to say it starts to wear off but because they become some desensitized to it and that's why a lot of them at certain points just choose to defect they just choose the well i'll take my chances to get the hell out you know so uh yeah and i know this may sound you know a little bit hokey to some but it's fair to say too do you think that they're in in the for the u.s at least I mean, only that I can speak of, but when a case officer establishes that relationship, trust has to be involved, building trust. And that protection, physical protection of sources is central to, for instance, the agency's ethos now, you know, regardless of whatever happened in the past, it is absolutely central. And to each case officers, you know, you're never, I mean, it's almost, it's like it goes beyond attorney-client.

privilege, right? Because people's lives are at stake and it's very, and the whole, you know, the ability, the institution to do what it does well depends on that. Absolutely. Yeah. And that's why as you get to an early point as early as possible in the relationship, you want to move that relationship from public, whereas, hey, I just met this person at a embassy ball or, you know, on the tennis court as quick as possible, but as safely as possible, move that into a semi and then a fully clandestine relationship behind closed doors, you know, and at every meeting, you are reiterating that their safety is paramount and that you are doing everything in your power to keep them safe, which behooves them to listen to what you're saying to them and heed your instructions, those kind of things,

because I always, you know, it was taught to me and I always say that usually depending, you know, depending on the situation that the country you're working in, the most you're going to get, I'm going to get, you're going to get is, you know, thrown in jail, they're going to, you know, if you caught, they're going to, oh, we're going to keep you here forever, you know, blah, blah, that kind of thing. And behind the scenes, state department, depending on your cover, is working on getting you back, or trade, whatever it is, you kick. that other country, your persona on Grata, you don't come back. But you emphasize to them,

you get caught. It's your life or your freedom. So it behooves you. So think about now, on the front end of that, if you just coerce somebody into doing it, hey, I have these, you know, I've got these photos of you with this prostitute. I'm sure your job doesn't want to find out, blah, blah, whatever. Well, situations change. What if six months from now, that guy and his wife or that woman and her husband are getting a divorce and they don't give a shit that you have the papers anymore the pictures anymore so now your coercion is just fizzled out so i think it's easier to go with the money and the ego and possibly the ideology as well yeah ego is a big one yeah yes it is just finished that just reading the book fat leonard by the way i recommend it to

everyone and you want to talk about you know fortunately fat leonid was not a foreign agent because he would have been, he would erect havoc, havoc, not just on US 7th Fleet, but on US security. But you want to talk about greed and ego as motivations. 91 admirals were caught up in that investigation. And, you know, in the view of many,

many more should, I mean, a number of them should have gone to prison. Only one ended up going to prison in the end. But when you refit, it's incredible. You know, is our peers, Navy captains, a Marine colonel, just making idiots to themselves for, you know, party favors, prostitutes, champagne, artis. Yeah. But most of all, having their egos stroked. Absolutely.

It's just unbelievable. It is. That was great. All right. So stroke Andy's ego a little bit. Check out his book. It's a link is in the description. It's a great book, award winning.

Stroking. It's like pocket book. That's enough stroking for you. I already had to spend a night at your house. Don't forget to like and subscribe if you're listening to us on audio, rate and review it. Best thing you could do also is share it, tell a friend about it. And our Patreon, patreon.

Patreon.com slash the team house. You can find Andy. All the links are in the description from his Twitter to his book, to his LinkedIn, to his substack. Jason, no, not happening. And I got a shout out. I got a shout out, Deep, real quick. Okay, I want to try and get this message to the second battalion,

Royal Gurkirka Rifles. And they're a CEO, Colonel Nick. Thank you so much for just a awesome time. Last Friday I got to speak to the regiment. And I tell you what, if you are, at all intrigued by elite forces, then read up on the Gurkha's most extraordinary group of individuals, and they remain so, and it was my great privilege

and honor to be able to talk to them. Awesome. So, yeah, roll Gurkirr, whatever they say. Ayyar Gakir.