The Team House - On the Brink of War: Israel vs Hezbollah w/ Joyce Karam | EYES ON PODCAST

Episode Date: September 30, 2024

Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseToday we are joined again by the senior news editor of Al Monitor Joyce Karam to give us insight on the intelligence that lead to the operation that killed Nazrallah the leader of Hezbollah and the impeding ground invasion by Israel into Lebanon.Find Joyce here:https://www.al-monitor.com/authors/joyce-karamhttps://x.com/Joyce_Karam?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5EauthorFind Andy here:https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023https://amilburn.substack.com/https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-OperationsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the podcast if you're not already. To support the channel is to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Team House. channel and podcast if you'd like to, and we really appreciate that. So go and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house. Hello, everyone. Welcome to another episode of Aizan, and we are delighted today to have Joyce Karam again. She would probably argue with us with our use of the term expert, but we have yet to encounter anyone who does know or, has researched what is going on with Lebanese Hezbollah to the extent that Joyce has particularly of interest now in the aftermath of Nasrullah's death. Joyce, welcome, welcome.

And perhaps, first of all, what happened from your perspective on how it happened? And we know Nasrallah was killed, but you made some comments. before we came on, very interestingly, about how Israel had penetrated Hezbollah and evidently has done so to quite an extent. So, yeah, we'd be very interested to hear what you heard. Yeah, so it's really been a roller coaster since Friday and the attack that killed Nasrallah, one of the most formidable leaders in the eye of his party, Hezbollah. This was not the first time that there was an attempt to kill him, to go after him. So Al-Manitor reported that there's been three times, three instances where Israel had located him,

was ready for an operation, but the cabinet blocked. What was different Friday, the third time is Benjamin Netanyahu gave the go-ahead. So the first one was October 11. The second one was last week. But that tells you that there is a serious and significant reach when we talk about Hezbollah's infrastructure, whereabouts, logistics, and just going after its commanders. We were seeing now there's over 10 senior commanders that have been killed. What we're learning more as we also see how Israel penetrated, I mean, truly the most

powerful and organized non-state actor in the Middle East. It appears that Syria was their weak link entering Syria in 2012 to fight and help alongside Assad. Has, on the one hand, expanded their reach, as on the one hand gave them regional clout that they didn't have as much before. But at the same time, it exposed them. It heard their legacy as, you know, fighting on the side of an authoritarian leader, but it really left them exposed from an intelligence gathering point of view and from Israel collecting data, collecting information about their travel where they're going. That's been extensively reported in the Financial Times on Sunday,

and then holding on to that data and not using it till the time proved right. So what we're seeing now play out in Lebanon is essentially Israel executing its intelligence, its tech, its military superiority when it comes to Hezbollah capitalizing on what now can be organized. is a bad decision by the party to enter Syria. Yeah, that's a really interesting comment about Syria, Joyce. And I just, for the sake of listeners, I just want to unpack something very quickly on Syria and on this, you know, what has happened. I mean, it was clear that Hezbollah has been penetrated,

it. You know, the big breakthrough was not technical. It was human, human intelligence. And that was the missing part in 2006. I remember when they were going after Nasrallo. They just couldn't get the human intelligence. And so interestingly enough, by extending into Syria, they've created controversy, both within the organization and external, perhaps created motivation for people to be resentful against the organization. And they've also created that greater access, you know, within Syria, the Israelis clearly had greater access, greater freedom of movement, hardly enough than they did within Lebanon to penetrate the organization. Exactly. And I mean, Syria was already penetrated by Israel before the Arab Spring. I mean,

the Imad Mugniyy assassination, I believe that was in 2006 or need to check me on that date. But he is one of the most known operators for Hezbollah. He's held responsible for many of their biggest attacks, you know, the Marines attack in Beirut, the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. So he operated from Syria. Saifiddin is another name that was taken out in Syria. So we've had precedent for the Israelis going after Hezbollah and Syria. What's different at this time is they use that presence and exposure in Syria to collect more information and use it in Lebanon.

That doesn't mean that they don't have also assets in Lebanon. I mean, obviously for them to be able to trace Nasrallah's location when he arrived at the headquarters, when he went into the bunker on Friday and hit him at exactly 11.20 a.m. local time. I mean, you know more than me, but that also takes a great deal of intelligence present. or sky presence in Beirut as well. Yeah, yeah, yeah, certainly. And, you know, obviously the main part of this conversation is the implications what happens next,

but it is very interesting unpacking the sequence of events. You mentioned Shuka's assassination and kind of the chain of events that started that all off in late July, a Hezbollah rocket attack aimed at an Israeli military base, overshot, killed 12, youths, kids playing soccer. And that seems to have sparked kind of this chain of events from Shuka's assassination to the pages to Nazrallah. Yeah, that was in the Golan Heights. not for sure. That took the escalation into another level.

Because it broke the rules, right? But it was kind of disingen. But it broke the rules, but everyone understood why it broke the rules. It was an error. But nevertheless, it's almost as though Netanyahu's thought, okay, he's broken the rules. Now is our chance to go after Nasrallah. Maybe that is why, you know, he didn't go after him earlier in the war.

Now he had a very clear case. had totally exactly yeah yeah no I I agree with that in a sense you can't but notice that Israel

is seeing an opportunity they see momentum to go after after Hezbollah that's evident not just after the Golan Heights attack but also

you know as they wrap up the operations in Gaza, they're shifting north. But what I would say here, it's not just maybe Natanyahu, and that's what's very dangerous on the Lebanon front, is you have the military, as you have the intelligence, as you have the full government coming together, and now he has a larger coalition, Natanyahu,

with Gideon Saar joining the government, saying we agree that we should shift focus to Lebanon, we should shift focus to Hezbollah. There is no such agreement on Gaza. The Israeli military would prefer to wrap up things in Gaza. So what they're seeing now is just significant momentum, and that's why we're hearing even more the talk about a potential ground invasion. Yeah, it's, so going back to the strike for a moment, the, the, the planning, obviously, you know, this was not something that was thrown together, even in a few days. I mean, it, it looks like something that there must be planned for weeks, because the only thing missing probably was the trigger. In other words, they had the location of that, you know, at the, the underground, um, uh, of, uh, of, uh, uh, of, the headquarters center, right?

Because it was essentially a command and control center in underneath, oh, gosh, what was the suburb? I'm not Javier. But, yeah, within, within Beirut. So they knew about that. They knew about that. They probably heard, you know, they confirmed through signals intelligence,

you know, initial reports with human intelligence, all of that. All of that had been lined up. And they were just waiting for the trick. for that meeting than Nazrallah and the others to be there. The fact that they knew the meeting was going to be in place, the fact because, you know, Hizbollah is very, very careful about their tradecraft. That's how Nesrallah has survived so long.

Again, suggests that this was a human intelligence tip that came from quite high up. Certainly absolutely catastrophic for Hesbola. Wouldn't you say, Joyce? I mean, for sure. I mean, you know, growing up in Lebanon, watching Lebanese politics closely, Hassan Nasrallah is no ordinary leader of Hezbollah. He's the one that transformed the party from a militant organization, fighting Israel on the border to something that's much more larger.

That's something that's fighting in Syria and Iraq in Yemen. That's a party that entered the government in Lebanon in 2005 and has morphed into the most influential political and military organization in Lebanon. Today, Hezbollah is seen as more powerful than the Lebanese army itself. But for Hassan Nasrallah particularly, he was seen as invincible. he was seen as for his supporters he's seen larger than life, an inspirational leader for them, somebody that they see has a legacy that pushed the Israelis out of Lebanon in 2000. And just the way he talks to them, this mix between colloquial Lebanese and classical Arabic. That's just very distinct.

At the same time, he had built a, he had also some of the decisions he's made, has created a lot of criticism for him. He's seen by his critics as somebody who dragged Hezbollah into Syria, as somebody who was at the head, at the helm of Hezbollah when they assassinated Rafik Hariri in Beirut and became just so power hungry. So this is the legacy of Hassan Nasrallah. In both cases, he is seen as transformational in what he's done. But this is why the shock and the understanding what happened on Friday is a process for many. Many still don't believe he's actually gone. So that's why this is not like Israel taking out Haneye in Iran or assassinating other leaders because of what Hassan Nasrallah represented in Lebanon and beyond. It's interesting choice because I think I can't remember if it was during our discussion, but certainly during a discussion with Brian Price who headed the Combating Terrorism Center.

talking about assassination, the efficacy of decapitation, you know, of removing leadership and when it works, when it doesn't work under what circumstances. It's very interesting conversation. But, you know, and this was before Nasrallah was killed, but we both kind of, we both agree that Nasrallah would probably be an exception to, you know, to some of the rules or some of the the trends that he was coming up with simply because of the force of personality that for almost four decades, no one else has had such an influence, not just on Hezbollah, but on indeed that part of the Middle East, you know, on Lebanese politics and indeed on the defense of Israel.

I mean, yeah, and that's a debate that probably will continue in the counterterrorism circles. I'm not exactly an expert on how these things work, but I mean, you look at, for example, taking out Baghdadi. It worked in a sense it was a psychological boost for the U.S. It worked as a big moment in time, but it's not by itself. Defeating ISIS took more, you know, ground operations, strikes, a coalition on the ground. And even now, you see ISIS actually making a comeback underground in Syria and Iraq. The difference, however, here is Lebanon is much more complicated.

And with Hezbollah, it's not just Mastrallah. I mean, they've taken out, as we've mentioned now, Shukar, Akil, Karaki, Kavuk, every other day it's been a commander that's in the hierarchy under Nasrallah that's been taken out

it was essentially every single operational field commander plus I think I believe two were their senior intelligence guys too yes

so that's that could yeah and that could bring a question is Hasbullah back to where it started in the 1980s, will they require Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces to come back to Lebanon and help them train and held them, you know, unscramble the situation they're in. I mean, the pager attacks, you don't know.

Do you think that's already happening, Joyce? I mean, I saw something from the Iranians saying that they were intending to send people to to Lebanon. Right. And then we saw the Israelis warning, don't think about it. We're going to head the airport. We're going to head the border of Syria if we see anybody coming in. Yeah, they turned back in Israeli. They turned back an Iranian plane, an Iranian plane coming into land at Beirup International Airport, I think two days ago, right? I may have seen something like this. I'm not sure. Yeah, the Israelis had hacked into the tower and they sent the plane a message basically saying turn around.

So that's that's one element, but we know from Friday to from the strike that there was an IRGC commander that was in the in the room and that was killed with with with with Nasrallah. So that tells you there's already this coordination. There's already this mechanism that's ongoing. What's more likely though, I think in this particular time in Lebanon is for. has will let to go a little bit underground. They have to retaliate

for the killing of Masrallah. But I think they will need to put their things in order. They'll need to refigure their command structure. Who is going to be calling the shots? Is it going to be

Saddiyuddin or is it going to be Naim Kossum or is it going to be commanders on the ground in Syria? We don't know Can I just talk to that? So Sophia Dinn and Kassam. So Sophia Dyn is Nasrallah's cousin, right? He's the younger guy or younger than Kassum, who's kind of an old. You know, he's more of the 80s generation, right? Naim Kosson is older. So, yes, so you have two different names that are emerging as possible successors to Nassarlla. Hashem, Safiyadhine, he's somebody who's Nasrallah mentored him. But he's 60 years old. So he's not that young.

No, he's not that young. And that's important because he represents also the old guard in Hezbollah. You have a cadre of young fighters, young commanders who want to do more. Safileadine is closer to Nasrallah, but he's seen as more hawkish, as more ruthless. I was watching some of his interviews, and he talks very confidently about a strategy to just erase Israel. And he actually, in one of his interviews, he gave a timeline that was in 2020, that Israel will be gone by. by 20, so he said in 25 years. So.

So. Yeah, it's, yeah, that, so this is Sophia. This is Safia. This is Safia Dene. He's very close to Iran. Yeah, he, in fact, he's related by marriage to Soleimani. Like his son. Exactly.

His son married. Selimani's daughter. That's right. Zaynab. So that's one. A lot of people know that. His brother is also the head of Hezbollah branch office in Iran. So now we're talking about, you know, a return of the Safiyadhian, basically, family as the most influential within the Hezbollah Shia community.

and in just managing the ties with Iran. So that would be a different pick than Na'em Kassum, who is older, who's seen as more of a Lebanese political broker-player, less so in the military sense. he's seen as more involved in, you know, theories and the ideology of Hezbollah less so in its military architecture and how it works. There could be other names.

He's been more of a functionary, isn't he? I mean, he's. Yeah, and he doesn't. Not an operational guy. Right. But neither of these guys have the present. and the command of that Hassan Nasrallah had with the base. And that's, you know, very important at a moment that you want somebody to keep the base together,

to rally with a lot of political propaganda and all of that at this time when they're facing all kind of challenges on the ground. I think so to your point, Joyce, kind of interestingly, I have friends who live in Lebanon and are, but certainly not pro-Hizboha, but nevertheless, when Nasrallah speaks, they listen and they've all commented the same thing that he is a mesmerizing speaker. and it's not too much of an exaggeration, I think, to compare him in that sense to, you know, to NASA, right? And, I mean, and in a sense, Nasrallah, until his death, never really, I mean, he remained iconic, whereas NASA kind of lost his luster after the 67 wall. You know, so really unusual here, in a sense, you see a figure that is, is, is, is, fame not beyond just his kind of his sect, but also it's a trans-ethnic appeal, right? I mean, there are, he appeals to Arabs, to Persians. And so perhaps we haven't seen the full impact of this loss. You know, we're talking in terms of Hezbollah and, yes, you know,

I'd like to hear what you think about Iran, but, you know, that nebulous thing called the Arab Street still exists and the level of anger on the Arab Street right now is through the roof. And so there is kind of a black swan, there's possibility of a black swan event of just, or just continuous terrorist attacks. In other words, you keep ratching it up, ratching it up. and this is an argument for or against assassination either way. But my point is that unless you're going to absolutely finish the organization altogether, which seems impossible, then in the longer term,

the problems certainly will not go away and will probably return even stronger. So, yeah, a lot of what you're saying is true. I mean, looking at the aeropolitical landscape, There is nobody that can command an audience like Nasrallah dead. Yes, I agree. In terms of comparison to Jamal, Adnanazir, very interesting. I think after the 2006 war, he was similar to Abdel Nasr after the 1957, Suez Canal crisis.

But it's almost that five years after that, and going, into Syria, very much damaged Nasrallah's legacy. So that halo around Nasrallah that, you know, bigger than the Lebanon and all of that can attract a lot of supporters on the Arab street, that's no longer the case at the moment. I mean, when you look at Arabic Twitter, when you look at commentators on different Arab satellite channels. Many are bashing him as, you know, trader of Capagon, as, I mean, just look at the reaction for his death in northern Syria. They were given out baklava and all kind of.

Yeah, exactly. Even within Lebanon, the situation is actually a little tricky from a sectarian standpoint where you have in Tripoli. There were some celebrations after his death. you're seeing the army deploy more in Sunni areas to just prevent this clash. But it's not Sunni Shia. It's because of what Nasrallah did after the Arab Spring. He also, you know, when Saddam Hussein was beheaded, he supported, executed, he supported that. So that turned him from Jamal Abdu-Nasar to.

something that's more viewed in a sectarian and Iranian lands in the Arab world. That doesn't mean he doesn't have big support. Interesting. I mean, the proxies in Iraq, elsewhere, Yemen, they very much. You bring up a great, Joyce, you bring up a great point when you talk about Lebanon. So this is actually, you know, I'm just saying this for the sake of argument. And it's actually good news for Lebanon, right? I mean,

I'll let you finish, yeah. Well, one, potentially, let me just caveat that, potentially good news for Lebanon. If you view it through the lens of the fact that you have a sovereign country that has been strangled by this organization that has been bigger and more powerful than it can ever be, and therefore,

cannot hope to accord with any of the UN resolutions that have been passed in reference to Lebanon. I mean, at one point of view, right, so now this big bully peering over the shoulder the Lebanese government is not so much of a big bully. It's, you know, the sentiment from Lebanon, people are panicking. People are, what is going to happen next? Do we leave? Do we evacuate? Do we cross to Syria? You already have over 50,000 who have left. You have a country with a very weak government. I don't think this will make the government better. There's no, because Hezbollah is still very much in the thick of Lebanese politics. politics and there is no guarantee that the killing of Nasrallah will bring a ceasefire to the border

there there just isn't and the government cannot at this point force Hezbollah into doing that so unless you see a ceasefire on the border unless you see the implementation of 1701 this is just terrible for Lebanon if we're talking about a ground invasion I mean the last two were catastrophic 1982 yeah I I wasn't for a moment taking that into you know the invasion I'm just thinking I'm thinking back to the cast of the various conflicts for Lebanon you know and I was thinking back to I mean I get it that Hezbollah the party of God is is kind of the guardian of Lebanon's rather grubby political order, right? So it's more than it's embedded.

It's almost as though it is there to ensure that the political system runs a certain way. You know, I mean, HESBOLA helped crush the pro-reform uprising back in 2019. And then when there was that massive explosion in Beirut's port, They strong on the state into halting the investigation. You know, so these, all these things that they've been doing to prevent the rule of law in Lebanon, you know, I guess my reflective comment was based on, well, now the chief architect of that is gone, surely things are going to be better. But as you point out, the system is probably so atrophied within that it's, that you take away his Bola.

there's you don't have a strong government system you have just a vacuum unless we see a ceasefire I think it all starts with what we all know how this should end anyway we all knew how 2006 will end it's it it always has to end with a ceasefire was with a return to rules of engagement between and deterrence between hasbalah and Israel so in the absence of that that, Hasbalah is going to keep launching missiles. Israel is going to keep carrying out strikes, even that might be more. So unless you see you compartmentalize that problem and you bring stability to the border, we're going to be spiraling into this tit-for-tat into violence that just will be very destructive for Lebanon.

The army has to remain in a neutral position because it's weaker than Hezbollah. It still is. So it's a very tricky situation for Beirut. Maybe, perhaps, we can see that this could bring the Lebanese together and elect a president. So you have a more functioning state. It's been two years almost since Lebanon

had a presidential vacuum. But absent of that, these strikes, these big military, you know, scores, those are good for Israel. But I think when you talk about Lebanon, it's they're, they, they don't have tools to deal with the problem on their hand. What about Iran, Joyce? What do you think? Very interesting comments from Khomeini. It seems as though he has avoided painting himself into a corner when it comes to revenge, specifically for Nazrallah. In fact, the wording is not as strong even when after Haniyah was killed.

I mean, is this Western observers, I think, just kind of wishful thinking? or do you think that Iran's stance on this is going to be kind of to wait and bide its time? That's a very, I mean, that's the million dollar question, right? What will Iran do? We're getting mixed signals. On the one hand, Hassan Nasrallah is their most, was their most important ally. There was their crown jewel when you talk about. leaders in the region that are allied with them.

So they have to do something. On the other hand, they are finding that their hands are tied. You know, what are they going to do? They've tried to, they haven't retaliated to Hanya's death, even. The last time they tried to fire missiles on Israel, it didn't, I mean, most of them were interesting. So I don't think Iran is necessarily in a strong position at the moment to retaliate. They might wait.

They might coordinate with Hezbollah a response that could happen outside Lebanon, targeting of Israeli interests. Or they might pursue what they wanted to do in the last two weeks, return to the nuclear negotiations. And we'll see what happens November 5 in the U.S., you know, wait it out and see who wins and then decide a long-term strategy based on that. I mean, the U.S. elections November 5, Israel seems to be also assessing that and waiting for that. Do they continue strikes after if Kamala Harris wins or do they negotiate a ceasefire? with Trump they have more room to operate and they'll probably continue with the strategy they're doing now

yeah interesting so we're all on kind of temporary hold until after the elections for um from from the point of view of uh hesbola though i i think probably that their options you know they they simply they don't have the options now they don't have the ability to command and control and they don't have the leadership. So as you point out, what Israel has done, has removed a couple of options from Iran. And so, you know, you mentioned nuclear negotiation, but there's also the possibility that they will have resolved simply to go for breakout. But at the same time, that's going to be risky for them because they don't, you know,

having seen how their own security apparatus is being penetrated. by the Israelis, they don't know now that whether they can keep a breakout secret up until, you know, the point of no return, as it were. So they, and they've also, I mean, I think it's no, well, the Israelis used, you know, bunker buster bombs to, to go after Nasrallah, demonstrating that these things are effective. They've already demonstrated that they know where the you know the Iranians are keeping their

their real centrifuges so so all of this you know the messaging has taken place that hey if you do do this then then we know we'll be able to tell when we'll go after you I mean from the Israeli's point of view but still I can't think of another

you know and more another face saving option right now other than just focus on building up these proxies again. I mean, it's taken decades to get where Hezbollah is now or certainly, I mean, since 2006, a couple of decades. Yeah, and I think, yeah, that's exactly the questions they should be asking themselves. The technology that Israel used in bombing Dachia and hitting that deep, that bunker,

is that something that's enough to hit Iran? I'm not a military expert. You would know better, Andy. I'm not sure. But on the other hand, I mean, can Israel carry out a unilateral strike on Iran without alerting the U.S.? They're actually sending every indication that they're willing to go on their own.

They've heard before the – sorry, we've heard after the strike in Beirut that Israel – the Israelis said they hinted to the Americans that they will carry out something big. But we've heard from the Pentagon, from the White House, from the State Department, there was no advance warning. This is not the first time that this happens since October 7th. And that tells you, Israel is just, you know, doing what it wants and not always consulting with its closest ally. As we've discussed, you know, the U.S. military is also scrambling, moving its forces to the region to prevent an all-out war. But everything that's happening is just, it's not helping de-escalate this situation. Luis, I got a question. Go ahead.

You remember nice haircut. I'm so sorry, by the way. Thank you. I appreciate it. You got a ways to go. I know before. Almost. They're coming in a little bit.

The 21-day ceasefire that they were talking about prior to the Netanyahu going to the UN and prior to Nisrala getting schwacked. Was that a diversion? Was that just buying time? Is there a chance of a ceasefire happening now that like we possibly hours away from a ground invasion by Israel? So that's a very interesting question and to best answer that we would need to look at the timeline. So the plan that was proposed that came out on Wednesday night. Our understanding then was that Israel was on board with it, that Benjamin Netanyahu and

Ron Dermar were supportive of it. The plan goes out Wednesday night. Thursday, very early morning, as BB was coming to New York, he indicates, yes, maybe I'll look at it, I'll see where it goes, Channel 12 reports, he's willing to consider it. then Thursday morning Washington time, we learn that it's a no. Natanyahu says, I'm not going to accept it. At the same time, you've had the Israeli military, you've had Benghavir, and others say this plan is a no-go.

Friday in his before and during his speech to the UN, he hints that maybe we consider it. So looking at that on the one hand and looking at the timeline of the operation, I think it was the Wall Street Journal that reported that this was, they knew about the meeting and everything on Monday. But it wasn't approved till just Friday in a matter of hours for them to make, to make. to make sure. It's hard to say for sure if this was a diversion or if they actually just were waiting to see where this operation takes. What's clear here is the political climate,

the military climate in Israel is not ready for a ceasefire in Lebanon. They see a high degree of momentum and going after Hezbollah. And Natanajo, I mean, is a very slick political operator, not just in Israel, but also in the U.S. So he's reading the room, his room, well, and moving along with it. At some point, and, you know, as I mentioned, this is, there's only one way for this to end, and that will be a ceasefire. So it's on, it's always been on Israel's flock, and it's always been on Israel's timeline when they decide and what is to be done. The bigger question then becomes what Hezbollah agree. And we don't know yet.

Yikes. And talking about Netanyahu being a slick operator, did you guys see the video he posted addressing like the Iranian people in English? So basically saying like how the regime is, you know, terrible and you need to like kind of overthrow it and the Israeli and Persian people are. Long time friends. Was this today? Yeah.

Yeah. In English, too. I mean, it kind of seems like after the Nizrala hit, Netanyahu's got a bit of momentum, I would say. For sure. For sure. I mean, he's riding high. Yeah.

He's, I mean, he's just expanded his coalition in the government. Yeah. So he's made it sure that no matter who becomes president in the U.S., he's not going anywhere. he has a trial in December where he has to go to do testimonies in the bribery and other allegations

but politically he's fine he's not as reliant on Ben-Givir as he was just the day before yesterday so he knows it this is the last week is his best week in power since returning to government.

Yeah. Yeah. So, yeah, we'll see what, how far they go with Hasballah, how Hasbullah response. Does Hasbullah agree for a ceasefire just to buy time and redo their ranks? Is there enough U.S. diplomatic leverage to, to have Israel agree? It's really all playing out in real time. Well, Joyce, I know we're coming to a to an end. And I feel as though, you know, by the time this comes out, we'll be ready for another episode.

Because things are changing rapidly. So we do, yeah, I mean, by the time this comes out, there may or may not be a ground incursion. I think if I was a betting there, I would say there would be a limited ground incursion involving mostly special operations forces. But some conventional elements from the 98th division, you know, there are a number of things that, that could happen. And I wouldn't even rule out an amphibious up in the north of Beirut. You know, if you look at what the 98th Division was training to do back in 2022. And Cyprus, that's exactly it.

They were planning an invasion north of, north of Beirut and the link up. The link up may not happen. But there's all kinds, definitely some kind of ground incursion, definitely involving mainly. special operations forces. I think the Israelis are less confident about their ground forces, their normal infantry guys, plus they're still be constituting from Gaza. So I think it'll be limited and it'll be special operations heavy and what happened the next. I mean, yeah, that might be the most likely scenario, but I would just point out,

you know, Nasrallah's last speech, last words, the last few minutes we've seen him on TV who was telling the Israelis, if you want to come in, welcome, said it in Arabic. Ahlana and Sahelan. Please come in. This will be a gift for them. So this is just very treacherous

territory and waters we're in. I would just, you know, like just with Beirut, that's, I don't know how much that city can. handle. Economic collapse,

port explosion and now potentially an invasion, it's, we're just, I guess, hope for the best and prepare for the worst. Well, on that, on that upbeat note, Joyce, thanks, thanks so much. And we do plan to get you back

as things, I want to say, develop or unravel, whichever way you want to look at this. um d over to you for uh for closing comments yeah a little bit of house you notice um i now am displaying my book very nice you could find that book in the description there's a link when the tempest gathers it's a great book it's one of my favorites um you could also find andy substack everything is down in the description choice i'm going to have links for you too in the description as well guys youtube is crushing our soul i don't know why revenue is down over a percent since earlier this year. Best way to support the show is patreon.com slash

the team house. You get completely ad-free audio and video and early access. So thank you guys. Joyce, thank you as always. Thank you so much. Have a great day.