The Team House - Peace in Gaza isn't Going to Last | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS

Episode Date: October 15, 2025

In this episode, the hosts discuss the recent ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, the return of hostages, and the challenges that lie ahead in the peace process. They explore the political dynamics involving Netanyahu and Hamas, the feasibility of international stabilization forces, and the internal conflicts within Gaza. The conversation highlights the complexities of disarming Hamas and the humanitarian situation in the region, ultimately reflecting on the uncertain future of peace in the area.Check out Mick's new podcast here:⬇️Apple Podcasts:https://podcasts.apple.com/at/podcast/pub-and-porch-applied-stoicism/id1836955475Spotify:https://open.spotify.com/show/1k3QPmkAMwnGJxMLDwUSSd?si=n6piIu8XRcag1Z0K43A3bQSupport the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseSubscribe to our new newsletter!!!!https://teamhousepodcast.kit.com/joinNew merch, patches, and stickers! ⬇️https://theteamhouse-shop.fourthwall.comFind Mick Mulroy here: Fogbow ⬇️https://fogbow.com/Lobo Institute ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/Twitter ⬇️https://x.com/mickmulroy?s=21&t=-Ze3F_Ix2vlJ18KFvORTCALinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/Bluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.socialMick’s publications ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/publications/publications-of-michael-mick-patrick-mulroy/Find Andy Milburn here: Twitter ⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substack ⬇️https://amilburn.substack.com/Andy’s book ⬇️https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-OperationsBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialFind Jason Lyons here: LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?uBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.social"Karl Casey @ White Bat Audio"00:00 Ceasefire Developments and Hostage Returns04:40 Challenges Ahead: Humanitarian Aid and Disarmament10:50 Political Dynamics: Netanyahu, Hamas, and Future Conflicts16:25 International Stabilization Forces: Feasibility and Concerns22:31 Internal Conflicts in Gaza: Gangs and Governance28:25 Conclusion: Optimism and Future ProspectsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey, everybody, welcome to another episode of Aizond Geopolitics. I'm here with Mick Mulroy, Jason Lyons. We may be joined by Andy Milburn later in the show. How's it going, boys? How are you? Well, good. Big news, obviously, this week is a peace deal, ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel.

All the living hostages, I believe, have been returned, or in the process of being returned. last time my soul was about the deceased hostages. They were going to get word on when they were going to be returned. Hopefully in the next hour or so if it happens, that'd be great. I did see that because Hamas, they're saying Hamas is dragging their feet. That aid has been halved going into Gaza, which is like, why is that the first thing they take away?

It's like the aid for like people, like children and women. Anyway, where are you guys track? I know Mick, you've been all over this last week or so. Yes. So to address the good stuff first, right? So you're right, 20 living hostages have been returned, and it's impossible to watch those reunions without feeling the emotion of those families. And obviously, the former hostages themselves.

So that was a great thing. And I think what led to the ceasefire, was a combination of political pressure and military pressure, right? So political pressure, President Trump, his team, putting pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu in the White House to accept it. I think that was deliberate. And then his relationship with Qatar and Egypt and Turkey to really put pressure on Hamas. At the same time, the IDF is putting intense pressure on Hamas, basically put them in a situation where they're looking for the last hole to hide in, literally, our tunnel. And I think that's what led to this. They simply, it wasn't because of their concern

about the Palestinian people or, you know, wanting to release the hostages. It was one of their only leverage points left. I think it was clearly because they were told by all their countries that had influence over, I will call them supporters, that influence over them, times you're done. And they were probably physically done because of the IDF effort. Good on them, welcome aboard Andy. Now for the stuff that's a little more difficult, right? So the first phase requires the return of all living and dead hostages.

They've only been four of the 28 dead hostages that have been released. and then the first phase also requires the Israelis to allow in 600 trucks of humanitarian assistance a day, food, medicine, etc. Either Hamas had promised something they didn't have the ability to carry out because they don't know where the dead parties are. Seems like they should have said that. Or they're deliberately not holding up their end of the bargain. Because if they have them, what's the hold on? They had 72 hours to do this, and they're running out. I agree with you, D.

I don't think that isn't a reason to hold up aid going into Gaza. The starving kid in Khan Yunus has nothing to do with Thomas decision to turn over the deceased hostages. I guess Israelis are looking at it. That was part of the deal. So it could fall apart in the first phase. That's all hope it doesn't. it could easily not. They simply need to turn over the deceased and let the families grieve as any family should be able to.

And Israel needs to allow all the aid to come in. And then we could get in the second phase, which if the first base was difficult, second phase is going to be even more difficult because Hamas hasn't actually agreed to disarm. and Hamas didn't sign the peace agreement at Shaan al-Shake. That was signed by everybody but Israel and Hamas, the two parties to the conflict. So, but anyway, so that's where we're on the first phase, and then we could get into the second phase of all the issues that could exist there.

Mick, what about the withdrawal of the IDF to a certain phase line? did that was that part of the first phase uh first phase and did that happen it did yeah they withdrew to the yellow line i think there's a yellow and a red and a security buffer um i think it's like gives them control of 60% of gaza or something there's a percentage it's all part of it uh they did but you know gaza is small remember it's only 25 kilometers long and like eight or nine kilometers of light so uh if if this doesn't hold the czefar doesn't hold we could be in us. Yeah,

keep going. Sorry. Yeah, Jay. If it doesn't hold, if it doesn't hold, we could be back in war. So the war would not have been over.

Oh, there is. Yeah, I think the percentage was 52%, right? Like for the phase one, I'm almost positive. I could be off on that. Makes sense.

Andy, what are you, what are you hearing from your sources? I know you got them. No, I just, But, you know, it's just hard to be optimistic. I don't think anyone, you know, there was the euphoria in Israel and in Gaza,

very understandably that the hostages have been returned, at least alive hostages at last, and the killing has stopped in Gaza. And I think that that is good enough to be grateful for, for now, but I don't think anyone honestly on either side is very optimistic about the future. You know, Mick touched on it. I mean, there's already

there's already problems. We've talked about the fact that neither Netanyahu, and I specifically mentioned Netanyahu because he's a he's a force of nature by himself. on one side, and Hamas neither Netanyahu nor Hamas really has an incentive.

They're not invested in this peace process for different reasons, of course. The hard part, as Mick pointed out, is yet to come, the really hard part. I mean, even the withdrawal lines are kind of drawn in a blurry crayon, and it gives the IDF great latitude to move back and forth, as undoubtedly they will, because Hamas disarming. It was a very vague term and what does that mean? And who's going to enforce it? And who's going to ensure that it happens?

And why should Hamas do it? You know, at the very most, I think we're going to see some token rocketry profit. Hamas has no incentive to do that. Destruction of Hamas' military infrastructure. That's going to mean the tunnels. That is basically how. Hamas has existed for the last two years. I just don't see this happening.

It doesn't matter what the leadership in Qatar has said. I just don't see that the military commanders of Hamas on the ground will agree to that. And, you know, it's fair to say, too, that there was a lot of discussion when this all kicked off on the Israeli side about, hey the Palestinians are Hamas population of Gaza Hamas or 2 million of them are supporters of Hamas that may or may not have been true back then

or may not may or may not be true now but the point is that life can't ever go on as it was you know I don't think on on either side you can't expect a population that's being devastated that's lost

67,000 people to return to normal. And the Israelis will never return to normal after 7 October. There's never going, you know, so where I'm heading on this is you've got the immediate concerns, you've got disarmament of Gaza, sorry, disarmament of Hamas, you've got, you've got the administration of Gaza, which still hasn't been sorted out. It hasn't, there's no details about that. And that's, that's going to be a hard sell for, um,

it's going to be a very hard thing to do. It's all very well to wave you, you know, wave your hand and say, well, these Palestinian technocrats will have an interim government before the Palestinian administration gains enough credibility to, you know, regain authority. I mean, there's so many problems with all of that happening. Again, I'm sorry to sound like a naysayer, but who's going to step into that void? It's a lose-lose situation.

And the Palestinian authority is never likely to address. admit to reach that criteria where they are. They are essentially a defunct, a morally, I'm sorry, yes, in morally defunct organization, ministerally defunct, efficiently, competently defunct. I mean, and they have been ever since the Osloor Accords. That was a big obstacle for progression of the obstacle courts, even, you know, even before the assassination were being. So all of these things sound good, but those who have been paying attention to recent history,

I think will say that there just is so little charts of all these things coming together, sadly, sadly, because, well, I mean, the alternatives are so dreadful too, right? Yeah, now there are some positive things. Iran is off, Ron is no longer, I want to say no longer a player. but no longer bringing influence on this whole process, negative influence. You know, Iran's on the sidelines, licking its wounds, regaining it, you know, planning to regain strength, I'm sure, but for now they're not a player and neither is as ballas.

So those are two positive things. But everything else, I'm afraid. The only thing that I can see will carry this through. or has I hope of carrying this through, is that the U.S. government, U.S. administration continues firm diplomatic pressure on both sides with both the carrot and the stake. Thirm diplomatic pressure,

not raging and threats and cajoling, and although there may be times to use that, this is going to take patience, but absolute determination and consistency. And those haven't been our hallmarks of late. And President Trump was asked in the press conference that he just had with the Argentinian president, who would, what happens if Amos doesn't disarm? And he said, we will forcibly disarm him.

So the question now is, what does he mean by we? I don't think he meets U.S. forces that would be contrary to every statement he said about, you know, withdrawing from wars or overseas. I assume means the IDF, but to forcefully disarm someone is combat, right? I mean, just think about how that. That just means the war starts again, right? You know, to forcibly disarm Hamas,

who doesn't want to be disarmed just means armed combat. And that means it just starts the war again. And that's terrible. Obviously, nobody's rooting for that. But that is going to be a serious problem to the remaining parts of the 20-point plan. And I think it's fair to point out the IDF is being trying to disarm Hamas

for the last two years, has killed 67,000 people and has not succeeded in disarming Hamas. You know, and I was reading a Rusi estimate that there are 10,000 armed fighters left in Hamas. 10,000. You know, it's hard to me. I mean, because, yes, many have been killed, but many have also joined Hamas.

During this time, I mean, the killing has been a, it may have deterred many, but it's also sadly been a recruiting incentive for many too. And you can imagine that we've talked about this, anyone, any one of us for many of our listeners too. If you're, you've seen your family slaughtered, are going to want to get revenge. human emotions. So anyway, bottom line is disarming Hamas has proven to be problematic and it's led us to where we are right now. And so your game, hard to see a positive outcome. But I'm open to, I'm open to pushback. I hope you've proven wrong. What do you guys think the reason was that like Netanyahu and Hamas leadership weren't at the signing.

And why didn't like the rest of like media kind of report that? Because it wasn't really a big thing. It was just like all, you know, champagne. I think they were just trying to make it a positive day. Sure. I don't know. I'll speak for the media. But I mean, the media did report that they didn't sign it.

It just wasn't highlighted that much. But, you know, you had all these world leaders there, obviously wanting to see the end of this conflict. but Hamas wasn't there. It could have been because they have a representative there. That's how this negotiation was done finally in Charmel Sheikh. If you listen to the media story of what happened, President Trump in the presidential limousine

asked Prime Minister Netanyahu to go. He said yes, right? if President L.C. from Egypt would ask him, President Trump then, of course, called LCC, who then called Prime Minister Dan Yahu, who accepted, and then reportedly the right side of his security cap, and said, well, no, you're not going there and signing this agreement. And so then he declined based on it was close to a Jewish holiday. But all my Israeli friends said that's, it's purely political why he didn't not go. He could not sign this thing

and stay in his cabinet stay intact. So this is going to pop off again. Essentially, is what you're telling me, right? Because how is you going to stay in power with a coalition that's far right? That doesn't want to sign on a ceasefire agreement and also want to, you know, occupy

all of Gaza. They've gotten their hostages back. That was the biggest leverage point, right? Right. So from the Israeli side, that's it. That's off the table now. I mean, maybe they have to worry a little bit about, like, domestic, right? Because, you know, you could tell, like, the Israeli populace is kind of sick and tired. They got their hostages back.

Maybe they'll exert a little bit more pressure on the government. Maybe not. But, like, what's to stop Netanyahu in the war? Netanyahu doesn't want to have an election. He still wants to stay at war because he doesn't want to go to jail or get, you know, brought up on more charges or go to court. Which is why President Trump asks the Israeli president department in the middle of his speech. Yeah. That's just a madness.

That's political, but it has a direct impact on the continuation of the conflict, right? And then the other issue is this international stabilization force, which I certainly agree with in concept. But I don't see it materializing. It's just not going to pop out of nowhere. It's just insert itself into Gaza. Like 20,000 Indonesian troops are going to show up, like, out of, like, from thin air. They need to, like, I don't know, pre-stage some of the bases in Egypt. ship, start integrating, what's the command of control?

If they're going to be any training? I mean, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country, but they're culturally not. They don't know anything about Gaza, I imagine. So they need that. They need peacekeeping training. Peacekeeping training isn't the same as basic infantry soldier training. There's a lot that needs to be going on right now to even have a chance that we get into the second phase and that the IDF withdraws to the red line and then this international

stabilization force comes. comes in, it needs to be, that all that needs to be happening, or best or good case scenario would be, we go over the second phase and this happens, but if we're not prepared for it, then we could be stuck. There's nobody to come in and fill the vacuum the IDF is late. I mean, have the Indian nations, have the Indonesians for sure agreed to do this? President Proboa has said it publicly and even said the number, if I recall correctly, 20,000. And he, went to the signing ceremony in Sharmal Shake. There is

reports that they're interested in being part of the Abraham Accords. But I'm sure they can't afford to do this all on their own to deploy 20,000 soldiers from Indonesia to Gaza in perpetuity right now because they're not in perpetuity. But you get it, there's no really insight. Somebody's got to pay for it. And it's got to happen.

It's got to start, you know, the integration, the training. Did the IDF or Israel at all, like, indicate that they were open to this and like, it's in the 20 plan. They've agreed to the principle to the security force, but they're not, I mean, the Israelis aren't going to help the process. You're not going to see the Israelis involved in reconstitution in Gaza or contributing money. You're not going to see the, I mean, and nor would they know what it be politically viable for them to offer to train the security. security force, but to mixed point, you know, as, I mean, you don't have to be a military planet to realize that a lot of things have to line up for this to happen.

I mean, you think about when a UN security forces, peacekeeping forces deployed, you know, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, well, those security force, those peacekeeping forces have normally been programmed anyway for UN missions. but it still, it takes months to go through that and they have to go through a training program. And with the UN, funding's already in place largely. In this case, it is not. I mean, as Mick says, no one's rogered up to pay for this. And you can see what happens when there is no park planning.

I mean, look at, what is it, Kenya in Haiti right now? Look at, you know, what happened in Somalia with Pakistanis. I mean, it's a recipe for a disaster. So, of course, we don't listen to history, sort of learn from history. The Turks, I mean, the Turks were talking about sending a contention. Is that off the table, or are they still? I think my understanding, it's going to be majority Indonesian, Turkish, and Egyptian. I don't know how much the other, the only numbers I've heard is from Prabol, because he said it publicly.

Yeah. They would make more sense for the Egyptian, Jordanian. Pretty quickly. They could, yeah. And they would way more culturally matuned, obviously. It wouldn't cost, let me think about how much would have cost to move 20,000. Yeah, say that again, sorry. I was saying Egypt's occupied the Gaza Strip until 67.

Right. I mean, just the expense, if Egypt was the bulk of the force, it would cut the expense down substantially. You're just coming through the Rafa Cossack, right? And your force is already in to Sinai. I'm not a little decision, but how much would it cost them of 20,000 soldiers from Indonesia? Egyptians have a massive army, too. I mean, I don't know how I'm not an expert on Israeli politics, but I don't know how that right wing of Israel is going to be with 20,000 Egyptian troops and Saudi. Gaza. I was going to say I'm not sure.

Good point. You'd have to suspend the treaty, actually. They can't be amped about that. I think he, I think you'd have to suspend the treaty. Really? The conflict. Man, this gets complicated the more we're talking about. But it has to be worked out in a way that, or they're just going to get to the point where the idea of won't withdraw because there's no, there's nobody to fill the vacuum.

And they're not going to let just let just let, Hamas reconstitute itself. What's the, that ain't going to happen. So then we just need back in conflict Even if like the IDF and Israel Were gained for this and each everyone was game for this where there was some kind of like Muslim Uh security force there They would have to be working on this from like months ago right for it to be like viable and like get just get the logistics going and

Mobilize troops and do whatever you need to do And it doesn't seem like that's a priority whatsoever It's something like a target Unless I'm missing it. I don't see it happening. Can we jump back for a quick second? Now, if I read correctly, there are currently 200 U.S. troops in Israel right now, correct?

And what is their role? Yes. So they said they're at an air base. They said their role is predominantly logistics. The U.N. has 160,000 metric tons of food ready to go. to Gaza. As we know, the U.S. military's best at many things, but certainly the best at logistics, getting things to where they need to go. So I think, and this is what they're saying, that their primary purpose is that, not to go into Gaza. So no plans for any in the cards.

I don't know. If there's this stabilization force, they would probably be part of the command and control of that, certainly coordination. So they might have to search. But again, we haven't seen any of this stabilization force materialized. So right now, now I think they're there just to focus on the logistics of moving. And of course, there's Palestinians going back up to northern Gaza by the tens of thousands right now. And there's no a distribution points up there, zero. So they're going to have to start, I think, if they want to do that, opening up other crossings, not just Rafa, to get the food into them. So it's going to be, and in winter's coming, right? So it's going to be, there's going to be more stuff, tense, hardened

tense, you know, so you can heat them, all sorts of stuff that goes with, you know, the winter there, which, you know, it's not horrible, but if you're outside the elements, it gets pretty bad. Crazy. Milburn? I know you got something going on in that at Braney yours. No, I'm, I, you know, again, it's, I'm afraid I'm not, I'm not optimistic. I think, and, and, you know, you're already seeing, you're already seeing some internal

pushes for control within Gaza, right, between Hamas and rival groups. And you've seen some sporadic shooting there. I mean, to the IDF, all these guys are the enemy. And I think sooner or later there's going to be enough reason in the Israeli government's mind to send the IDF back in there. And it's all going to be on again, as we pointed out. it may not seem as though the IDF has shown much restraint at all to this point when you look at 67,000 dead, but they've got no reason at all to show restraint now.

And I can't see that achieving anything. Again, we talked about the fact they've been unsuccessful in defeating Hamas. They've been unsuccessful in disarming Hamas. So it just seems as though this is a path to endless counterinsurgency and endless war. the only thing that I can see as a restraint on the Israelis is the fact that in order to occupy invade or go back in occupy Hamas they're going to have to keep a large number of reserves activated and that has become extremely unpopular and it's been destructive to the Israeli economy over the last two years that's number one and number one and number

Number two, you know, Netanyahu is, yes, we talk about his right-wing support and the fact he's clinging under power. But I think if you look at polls within Israel, he's incredibly unpopular right now. He's got another year until the elections. But he may be playing, undoubtedly will be playing to a domestic audience. And the domestic audience is tired of war. The memories of 7 October will always be there. but they're not as fresh as they were two years ago, so that impetus for going in and exacting revenge is no longer as strong,

and it's been counter-weighed by the fact, again, that the economy, everything from tourism to the fact that many small businesses have gone under because the people we've been running them have been called up over the last two years. us and the economy is not doing well. So I think all of those things potentially will act as a restraining influence, but sooner or later, I can't, I just can't anticipate any other outcome than this kicking off again, sadly. But again, I want to be proven wrong.

Yeah, I hope you're wrong too, to be honest. And that's not a criticism. That's not a criticism of the peace process. It's not a criticism of the 20 points. It sounds as though it is. But that was, look, it got us to this point. It got us to a ceasefire. It got us to a point where we are actually talking about feeding starving people in Gaza.

It got us to the point where the hostages were freed. So, you know, all of those are positive things. And it was a peace process that was made out of pure cloth when it seemed as though it just wouldn't be possible. So credits who have been involved in it. I agree. I got one more question. I don't know if you guys saw that Palestinian reporter that was killed over the weekend. And a lot of the reports said it was from gangs inside of Gaza who were collaborating with Israel.

Can you guys give me any kind of like any kind of like a little bit more info on that? So there's one clan called Dagamush. I don't know if I'm pronouncing it right. but at least in English it's spelled D-O-G-H-M-U-S-H. It's a pretty big, it's a gang. They have an army of God, right? So, Jaish-L-Islam. But I think essentially it's just a criminal mafioso type thing.

And they have been fighting with Hamas pretty substantially. I don't know if they have any support by Israel. But, you know, oftentimes that's done, especially in the Middle East, where you fund your enemy, right? And across Africa, we've done it before, too. So that could be the case, but that's a big one that I know exist in Gaza City, I think, is their primary hub. And then there's others, right?

There's other groups that compete with Hamas, potentially equally bad and with little care for the Palestinian people. But that's why there needs to be a force that comes in if the IDF isn't going to be there. So he might end up with this internal civil war, which causes, you know, almost the same amount of death and destruction that the IDF has. But this would be internal.

So I don't know if they're supported by the Israelis, but that's probably the group they're talking about. Andy, you're anything on that? Yeah, no, I mean, I've still been used. I don't really have any insights on that. They're tremendously sad, of course, but no, I don't. I mean, there, there are, it,

it reminds me a little bit of the situation in, you know, northern Syria with all these different, all these different groups backed by various, either various forces or factions. I mean, that's, you know, that, that is certainly potential. And then you've got just criminal gangs that we saw, uh,

throughout the conflict, looting trucks, right? And at one point, ironically, and, was close to the problem here. At one point, Hamas were essentially the police, right? In Gaza, they were, I mean, I'm not saying a force for good,

but they were essentially running the police and fighting off criminal gangs. They were in power. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, they were, they were, they were, they were the government. The government's gone. It's a, it's a, it's a vacuum now in there until.

That's my point about not just this. security force, but getting in a government to actually run the strip and having that government coordinating with the security force. I mean, these are complex tasks that we found difficult in Baghdad when we were better prepared to do it. And there was no, aside from the cultural divide between the State Department and the Army, in the military, there was no, you know, we were all of the same. We were all under the same kind of mandate under the same government,

and we found it very difficult to do that. And we went into Iraq with the thought of, like, actually, nation building, right? Like setting it up and having elections and stuff like that. I don't think the IDF is really interested or Israel is interested in that whatsoever. No. Like 0.0% and that's my opinion. I think you're right.

I think they said that. They're not like to, I think your point, Andy's point earlier. They're not paying anything for the recent. construction of Gaza. That's going to be this fun mostly by the GCC countries. Wild. Obviously, we're going to have a lot more to come.

We'll be back probably over the weekend sometime. We pushed this a little bit. Damn, I thought this would be a cheeryer episode, guys. I'm not going to lie to you. I thought we're going to talk about the ceasefire and like road to peace and stuff. Not optimal. There's a path, but it's a lot

It's going to be, there's a lot of bumps on the past. Yeah. I want you guys to do me a favor. I want you guys to go and subscribe to Mick's new podcast, the pub and the porch, applied stoicism. It's really good. It's a lot of fun. I want you guys to go and check out Andy Miliburne's book.

We're waiting with Bated Breath of for his new book about the Gaza War. Jason Lyons. Check him out on blue sky. Send him a DM. Tell him how much you love him. and Patreon.com slash the teamhouse for ad-free episodes.

Thanks, guys. This is great. Quick and easy. Everyone. Thanks, chance. Take care, everybody. Hey, guys, how's it going? It's Dee.

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