The Team House - Reacting to the Taiwan War Game Video by the WSJ | EYES ON | Ep. 20

Episode Date: April 25, 2024

Support the show here:https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseToday the guys react to the WSJ's video with the CSIS’s Mark Cancian (Ret Marine Col.). Andy has some issues with the wargame and Jason adds the perspective of what the CIA's role would look like in a conflict between the US and China over Taiwan.Find Andy here:Twitterhttps://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedInhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substackhttps://amilburn.substack.com/Andy's bookhttps://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operations/dp/1526750554Team House socials https://www.instagram.com/the.team.house/https://twitter.com/theteamhousepod?lang=en#china #taiwan #wargameBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hello, everyone. Welcome to another episode of Aizan. I'm Andy Milburn. I'm Jason Lyons. I'm Dimitri Contacos. I'm the producer of Aizan and the team house. We have a weird, not a weird one, but an offbeat episode today about China and Taiwan. I came across this video from the Wall Street Journal about a war game of what it would look like if China were to invade Taiwan and the next steps.

And I figured I have a military strategist here, supposedly. we could take a look at this video and react to it, add to it, and see where it goes. So thank you guys. Yeah, as they say, as Monty Python line goes now for something completely different. And obviously Taiwan and China, not just looking in the background, but it's in a stage. And perhaps increasingly so as the world turns to shit elsewhere and the topic close to my heart. Just a very quick comment before we begin this. You know, let's say this is certainly a credible war game run by the, run by CSIS.

And Mark Kansy and the guy presenting, and not just because he is a retired Marine, is a, you know, a credible expert. He would probably push against that title, but as close as it comes on China. And I think we should welcome any war game scenario, even if we don't agree with the assumptions or the outcome, simply because it has great minds such as ours and focused on this problem. So, yeah, let it roll. All right, great. What would happen if China invaded Taiwan? What you're seeing are training drills performed by the Chinese and Taiwanese military. Both sides are preparing for a conflict, which if it took place, would likely include the U.S.

in some capacity. Analysts say there are two causes for concern. One is China's long-standing position that Taiwan is a part of China, and that it would seek reunification by force if necessary. The other is its military buildup. The gravity of a potential war has now become a commonplace discussion in the U.S. national security community and raise questions about how a conflict would unfold to answer those questions. I have a question here. Do you guys, when you're at the war college or wherever, this is what you guys do?

This is how it looks, usually? No, this is. Or is like for laymen. I'm pausing, yeah. I mean, they're at the beginning of my career. Yeah, you're talking about the board game type approach. No, the, you know, the old school approach is, I think, quite unusual. But yes, war games, we play them all the time at the war colleges,

and they run from just kind of scenarios, talk through of scenarios in faculty groups, to full-blown war games either, you know, with the whole communications network set up, the E. COP and all of that involving the entire student body. And in fact, there are cultural war games that involve all the war colleges simultaneously.

Interesting. Okay. So war games vary, very much in scale and intended outcome. We can talk about that, you know, at the end of this one. All right. Let's rock. But yeah. Experts. I'm going to run it.

Look, to war games. Classic movie. This was a brilliant movie. It was great. Unlike in the movies, What the hell? In real life, war games conflicts board games.

In 2022, the think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, developed a war game for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan. Most of the war games that have been done about a conflict between the U.S. and China have been classified. Rumors indicate very adverse outcomes. outcomes, but the assumptions and the mechanics are not well known because they're classified. We wanted to do something that was entirely unclassified so we could talk to a very broad audience. Separated from China's... How do we get the classified one?

Well, you know, I think Mark's got a good point here. We don't have to necessarily get into, you know, to run a decent war game. You don't necessarily have to, it doesn't have to be classified. but you do need to know capabilities of the various involved, right? So you don't have to name the weapon systems and all of that. But through open source information,

you can get all the critical information to run a war game. It doesn't need to be classified. You don't need to know that, you know, the ex-blah, blah, blah, counter-ship or counter-counter-ship missile has a range of blah, blah, blah.

You just need to know generally. that the US has the capability to do X sort of things, right? But the good thing here is you know, Kansin says up front, hey, look, this is, you know, we are, we're pitching for a wider audience, much wider audience. Yeah.

Southeast of the coast by 100 miles of sea, Taiwan is a self-ruled island that China claims as its own. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates the Chinese leader Xi Jinping, has set 2027 as the deadline for his military to be ready to take the island. CSIS based its war games on a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan taking place in 2026. CSIS's war game is a turn-based strategy simulation after each turn is played. Andy?

Yeah, I've, so this is where I think things go a little awry. A turn-based war game. Now, that's not bad, as long as people understand that that's not the way wars are fought. But there are a couple of things wrong with this approach with several weaknesses. One is, as we get into the turns, they're starting from Chinese boots on the ground in Taiwan, almost, right? I mean, they're talking about the amphibious, the landing craft already being in the stray close to it. So my point is they're missing out a ton of shaping actions. And as we as we progress, you know, we have to ask ourselves,

hey, wouldn't the Chinese have thought about this already, right? You know, capturing a port, suppressing, you know, ADA threats, you name it, doing something to counter U.S. submarine threat in the Straits. I mean, if we're undoubtedly, the Chinese have done this. My point is simply this. War games are a great indicator, but the human element is all important. And, you know, and that's number one. Number two is you can't stop with, you can't start with Taiwan because the war,

arguably the whole scenario is one or lost in actions leading up to the actual amphibious assault. To begin with actions now. no sheeping actions. For instance, you know, the U.S. having a strong logistics base and a method for dissemination, for distribution, sorry, of logistics in the Pacific is our biggest challenge, right? And preparation for that needs to begin now. As it has started to do, you know, we set up stocks in Australia and, you know, various other Asian countries. I'm sure we will follow in trying to do the same. But you see what I'm saying, that all of this preparation, all of this stuff, that shaping is all important, to start a board game, a turn-based war game, I move, you move,

once the war has already started, kind of misses the point, I think. And there are certain things that you can't really war games, such as the diplomatic side of it, the intelligence side of it, you can make assumptions, you know, or you can whole cloth make things up and say, China's We've discovered through, you know, SIG and human and sources that China intends to do this, blah, blah, blah, because like you said, Andy, those things can make or break the outcome. They could actually prevent it from even happening in the first place. You know, we send a diplomatic note that says, you know, hey, this is what we know. And then all of a sudden they roll up the pieces and say, we're going home. We're not doing this.

So it's, I mean, we're recognizing for everybody out there that this is a manufacturing. scenario because there is certain things that probably in this game itself, they can't talk about and they just won't on camera. So something's keeping in mind. You know, like one other point on this, D and the importance of shaping actions, undoubtedly, not undoubtedly, but I mean, well, look, they, you know, they've chosen to begin with this scenario. And I know that with a structure of the war game as such, they can start with many a series. is I would suggest that if you're not going to underestimate or wish away or assume away an adversary's capabilities, then you have to assume he's going to begin by establishing a

blockade over Taiwan unless he's pushing for surprise. But China knows it's got very little, you know, they have very little chance of launching a surprise attack. So the blockade is important because it doesn't reach that threshold of armed conflict, but it's putting, you know, pressure on Taiwan to begin with very heavy pressure. I mean, if you think that a blockade, it can be carried out not by surface ships, by submarines, even unmanned vehicles, you name it. I think that is a very dangerous start to the conflict and kind of puts the U.S. in the position, again, of having to respond from a distance.

Right. Players turn to combat results tables and computer programs to calculate combat outcomes. Today, CSIS research assistant Chris Park will be helping facilitate gameplay. Players are divided into two sides. The red team represents China, the blue team represents the U.S. and its allies. Of the 24 scenarios played, the version you are about to see is the most likely. As the game begins, the Chinese are moving their ships around Taiwan. around Taiwan and their aircraft over Taiwan.

The United States is responding with its own. So I guess they're moving their ships. That's the blockade. I would assume that they would start with. No, I think he, I mean, he's launching right in the attack here. Okay. But, you know, the biggest, one of the biggest controversies about defending Taiwan is getting there, right?

getting a footing within an area that is covered by, you know, I always forget the acronym, area and anti-access area denial, right, weapon systems and getting our platforms, mainly aircraft carriers within range to support Taiwan. That's a big issue here, and he kind of skirts around it. But the point about landing on the south of the island, yeah, I mean, absolutely that's legitimate. Maybe not, I mean, it's worth a discussion because all of the critical infrastructure in Taiwan's in the north, you know, to include the capital. But of course, that's where Taiwan's ring of defenses are. So, you know, Mark uses the metaphor, I mean, the summary of Italy.

Not sure that's useful, but I, I, it, his point. and he's right is that this is going to be a long, hard, attritional ground slog fest. Because Taiwan, and it was visited there, will tell you that, you know, inland, away from the roads, you know, that area is all, it's rocky, mountainous, pine forests. It's not, it's not designed for mechanized warfare. where it's certainly designed for defense. But you know, there are so many other things going on as we talked about at this time, and massive, massive cyber attacks on Taiwanese command and control capabilities,

which I don't think Mark mentions in this would certainly have a player. So the ground fight and talking in terms of World War II is not, I don't think it's a helpful analogy. All right, let's continue. But yeah, Role. with its bombers to attack the Chinese naval forces and also with its surface ships that have been sent forward as part of the US effort to deter the conflict. The United States also has submarines in the streets.

CSIS's war game is played with three maps. Two operational maps represent the regional operations of the US and its allies and the Chinese forces respectively. Another ground map is used for the operations on the island. The Chinese have now invaded the island. They've landed forces in the south. Strategically, it'd be better to...

Not like that, I hope. ...in the North. That's where the capital is. That's where much of the industry is. The problem is that most of the Taiwanese military capability, also in the north, that makes it very difficult to invade there. Several of our teams tried to do that in some of the iterations. It was just too difficult.

There were too many defending forces. So most of the Chinese... teams decided to land in the south. The challenge there is to occupy the country and to take the capital. They have to fight their way up the entire island. The campaign looks much like the Allied campaign in Italy during the Second World War, bit by bit, very difficult terrain. Here we see that the Chinese have landed. First, we have troops landing on the beach. There There are only a handful of good beaches on Taiwan for landing troops. These are indicated on the map.

And then around the airfield, we have Chinese parachute and air mobile troops. That is troops coming in by helicopter. And the purpose of doing that is- Would they be able to get a lot of enough airborne guys in through helicopter? Hmm. The really tricky part about this is, you know, I think that's, I forget, Pintung Airfield in the south, you know, imagine how that figures in Chinese war games, right? So the problem with this particular war game, the way it's talked through is that they are trying to seize these places, you know, after the conflict has started and they're trying to do it in a very conventional way.

You know, we've got to give the Chinese credit to being a little more innovative. But yeah, certainly they will want to seize control of that air. feel and I would think, you know, and also a port, whether they're going to set up their own temporary port or try and seize the port at Kaohsiung, which is, you know, obviously a massive, massive port would really help them out, but is, you know, is going to be defended. Now, they've got to do something about Kaohsiung anyway, some major metropolis, you know, so they either contain it as they advance, or they do indeed, go in and and sees key terrain there.

And sort of the port, there's nothing more key terrain than that port. But yeah, tricky move. You know, you just have to look at history of airborne operations in conjunction with an amphibious assault from Crete onwards. You know, at best, the Chinese are going to suffer very high attrition. But I just, you know, I cannot imagine, I don't want to minimize the threat, but I cannot imagine a successful assault conducted

on that airfield and that has been that is so coveted by both sides and for which the Taiwanese have had a long time to practice how to defend but could be wrong it will be an objective in them if they can capture the airfield

intact then they can fly in troops and supplies are not dependent on ships and craft bringing troops and supplies across the beach. After both sides play their turns, the game is paused for an adjudication in which the losses for each side are calculated. What we see is that the Chinese amphibious units have successfully gone ashore.

They've moved 10 kilometers inland, and they eliminated one Taiwanese battalion out of the defenders. The air mobile and parachute troops were less successful. Let's stop it there for a moment. All right. Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the podcast if you're not already.

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But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Teamhouse channel and podcast if you'd like to. And we really appreciate that. So go in and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house. this is where I start to get a little irritated because it seems as though the war game has gravitated down to just kind of a hey this is a board game when we talk about the kind of casualty intensive fighting here you know Mark removes a battalion from the board

I think I decided this stage to be lucky to avoid to lose only a few battalions And remember, you know, what's the battalion? I mean, I forget in PLA, it's quite small. Someone's going to contradict me, but I believe it's three to four hundred guys. What, are we doing a war game where we're counting, you know, casualties like that? It just seems a little archaic because that's not what's going to sway the course of events here. It's going to be major moves like the Chinese destroying or the, the,

denying our ability to use Japan as a base. That is a game changer. You know, that's the sort of thing that we should be talking about. Not one or two battalions being a trite hero there. We're not learning that way. It's my view. All right. That's a much more difficult operation.

They landed around the airfield, eliminated one, defending Taiwanese battalion, but they lost three of their own battalions, This is a very risky operation, and they have not captured the airfield yet. Once the losses for the last turn are calculated, the second turn is played with dramatic results. There's not much change on the U.S. side. Tremendous change on the Chinese side. Let's take a look.

So you got to assume, like, even in this initial amphibious landing, they got to be looking at hitting a carrier strike group. Like, you know, things are spinning up. we're probably sending more strike groups in well yeah this is why kind of movement to the objective is all important right to show to really talk through in the war game time space things involved the role of for instance the marine littoral regiment who's supposed to be already in place here mostly in you know in islands particularly japanese islands southwest is one that's less than 100 miles from from Taiwan. It's southwest of O'Connell.

So, you know, and they are, in their role is to attract the, not just the amphibious fleet, but the main surface vessels to supporting or that assault. So there's, and also, I mean, think about what is already in the area. undoubtedly U.S. submarines in the strait and you can imagine even one or two would wreck a huge amount of that and that's the Chinese biggest fear undoubtedly. The U.S. is continuing to focus on attacking the Chinese ships around Taiwan trying to get through the picket screen there to get at the amphibia ships. The submarines are still in the straits. The The one that was in the straits last turn has moved back to base in Japan, Yucca, to reload.

The squadron that was outside the straits has moved in and a new squadron has moved forward. Now looking at the Chinese side, here we have a lot of change. And the big thing is that the Chinese have decided to strike Japan, and they've decided to strike in a major way, rather than just strike one base. We decided to strike all of the Japanese bases with Japanese aircraft and U.S. aircraft. What you're seeing here is the flow. So that's a huge part of this. I mean, denying, undoubtedly denying Japan as a base for U.S. forces is going to be a Japanese goal, you know, initially, maybe even in shaping operations. But what Mark's talking about is quite ambitious.

You know, he's talking about massive attacks. Yes, certainly airfields would be a target. But at the same time, the Chinese have to focus on critical infrastructure because the weight of their, I mean, these are, yes, this is going to be a role for their, you know, there are mid to long range rockets and missiles. Not just US aircraft, though. The big thing is going to be logistics supplies, taking out those, particularly things like jet fuel or just gasoline altogether. I mean, that China knows, again, that are one of the first. of our, perhaps how biggest vulnerability is going to be our logistics chain, chains. Oh, of Taiwanese forces from the north where they- Let me ask you, Jason, like, what's going on now if this is happening and this is kicking off?

Like, where's the CIA in this? Like, what are they doing? What's their role? Well, from my low-level point of view, it would seem that focusing on Chinese leadership, what are their thought process right now? We know that what their end goal is, but how far are they willing to take this? You know, they're talking, they're listening to SIGN, they're talking to what few probably human sources they have. Hey, what are they thinking?

How far are they willing to push this? You know, is there any kind of dissension in the ranks? Because if this was a right now scenario, there's corruption in the PLA. There's questions of loyalty within the PLA. So those are the kind of things that Intel officers would want to be finding out. Is everyone on board with this? And if not, who isn't? And how far are they willing to go to stop this kind of thing?

Cool. They were initially stationed, protecting the capital. Now they're coming down both coasts to engage the Chinese landing troops in the south. There are more amphibious units that have come across the beach here. They are attacking the Taiwanese defenders. There are a few more air mobile parachute units that have landed around the airfield. They've surrounded the Taiwanese, which are holding out on the airfield. But both of these Chinese forces are attacking the Taiwanese.

After the second turn is played, the second adjudication round takes stock of the losses on both sides. This has been a massive term. Both sides have taken very heavy casualties. The results are that the Chinese lose one. battalion over here and the Taiwanese also lose one defending battalion. Around the airfield, the Taiwanese lose one defending battalion and the Chinese lose one attacking battalion. We now fast forward about three weeks. So wait, one battalion, I feel like there'd be way more casualties than that.

Am I crazy? I'm just an idiot. I'm just an idiot. So I don't know. No, I mean, this is the problem with this particular war game. It's kind of devolved into, you know, the kind of war game we played. as kids, we threw dice and decided how many casualties and each side had taken. And it's really not, you know, I don't think they're talking about the major actions of every phase.

Mark did touch on it with the submarines and Japan, but we need to talk to, you know, he talked about three boards and this one on Taiwan is just one board, all right? There's also stuff going on potentially in Korea, right? China's influenced North Korea and so diverting our attention. there's things happening on the biggest stage that have bearing on what is happening in Taiwan and vice versa. You know, lastly, we're talking about kind of wishing away an adversary's capabilities. You know, we have to be careful not to wish away his ability to innovate and imagine, especially imagine, right?

So give you an example, this was a kind of single-axis amphibious, a single-axis, amphibious, a single-exist, assault followed by a two-axis, you know, kind of advance up the coast. Why would the Chinese be, you know, kind of approach that way? There's many disadvantages without, without trying to put the time we need Taiwanese on the horns of a dilemma. I didn't say that very well, on the horns of a dilemma. I trotted that cliche out well. You know, so a faint, a demonstration, a massive, you know, towards Taipei, a landing on the North Coast, either the main or a subsidiary landing. I mean, there's, we've got to, when you have, when you have a piece of terrain that both sides have looked at and prepared for for a long time, you have to use deception and you have

to employ your imagination. And I think for just, like, I think Mark knows that, obviously being a Marine Colonel and you know doing this this whole life i think this is you know for the wall street journal they kind of want to like probably make yeah but i think someone should make that point editorially you're right and and the other point is they did mention that there are three boards so why not talk about what's happening on the other boards that's my point because it's so important i'm not you know just throwing dots as i said i welcome this we're talking about this war game so it is substantive and it starts the discussion.

To the last turn of the game. The Chinese have moved up the East Coast, but they've bumped into Taiwanese units that are coming down the East Coast. That movement has been slowed by the Chinese aircraft, which have been attacking the transportation system, but eventually those troops get there, and they've formed a pretty solid line on the East Coast.

The Chinese were able to clear the airport where the Taiwanese have been holding out and have moved forward here in the center. They've bumped into a Taiwanese defensive line and that has been reinforced by fortifications. They've moved into the city down here in the south. The reason for moving into the city is to capture the port. Finally, we're right. So he says that almost casually. They move into the city, right?

I would think, I mean, Kow Shung, that's Taiwan's major port. They wouldn't, you know, the purpose of moving this, no, they would launch, I think, a very determined attack on Kau Shun, as I said before, either to seize the port or to isolate the city or both. Last adjudication and the end of the game. This scenario concludes with the Chinese establish ashore, unable to expand their forces there. Much of the Chinese amphibious fleet has been destroyed the United States and its partners have been attacking those ships

relentlessly. So their ability to bring troops and supplies onto the island has declined. Over time those forces will weaken. The Taiwanese will push them back. Most of them will end up as prisoners of war. When we ran this game we considered it a a minor U.S. coalition victory. It was a minor victory because it was going to take a lot of time and there was going to be a lot of damage to Taiwan. But it was a U.S. and coalition victory because the Chinese were unable to establish themselves on Taiwan. And Taiwan endured as an autonomous and democratic entity. All right.

Let me just, so in the beginning, I want to give Mark a little bit of credit. In the beginning, they mentioned that they ran it 20 plus times and stuff. like that. So I really do think, like the Walshie Journal, like, this probably took them like nine hours to film and they cut it down to 10 minutes. So like I want to give Mark a little bit of credit in terms of that, right? Because I'm sure they do good work at CSI. Yeah, 100%. But that, but, you know, and this isn't about criticizing Mark, Michael Lippet, but again, the methodology, it isn't just scale. It's the methodology of turn, turn, turn. And he didn't cover shaping actions in any. you know, at all during the war game, regardless of length. And if he did, he should. So, yeah, absolutely, absolutely distilled. And it's a, it's an absolutely wonderful thing to have done because it has five million views,

people who are thinking through this problem. But, yeah, I mean, hey, you asked me to criticize this. You're right, you're right. No, you're not wrong. You're definitely not wrong. You know, it's just that people. people need to understand, like you said, that this is a base. This is a baseline warging.

This is not all encompassing at all, you know. Exactly. But I think to make it a really good one, you'd have to change some of your assumptions and the methodology of how it's conducted. Absolutely. And I mean, like, you got to assume the casualties will be enormous, right? Especially for time, for every side. Yeah, I mean.

Politically, how to, like, because, you know, CCP wants to stay the ruling party of China, if they lose 50,000 guys or more, which they've never had before. No one cares. What do you mean? No one cares. I mean, you know, China's probably even less sensitive to casualties than Russia. Because it's only in functioning democracies where there is a feedback loop. Sure.

Opinion to the government, through the government's survival, where casualties matter. at all. So we shouldn't mirror image. The Chinese could lose a million people here. And if, you know, if they could continue fighting and it was still political objective, they would continue pursuing it. And nothing says that this is happens as a singleton. You know, nothing says that China can't take their beating, withdraw, learn your lessons and then come back again. You know, it's the, the question is, how long can we hold out? Or how long are we willing to do this in the Taiwanese? So it's, Is there in a CIA or NSA or whoever, Army SIE up, whoever, like, is there, there's got to be a strategy in place to, if they did take a beating or if it's ongoing and they're losing tens of thousands of guys a month, how do we get the Chinese public to turn on the CCP? That's going to be.

There's got to be a strategy, though. I mean, I'm sure. Yeah, I'm sure there's something on the books, but like Andy's saying, that's small. that's way down on the list. Yeah. Can you what, though, when we're talking about not solving this problem, but taking a clear-eyed approach to preventing this scenario unraveling war, I think STRATCOM is an important issue.

And it comes down specifically to the United States policy towards defense of Taiwan, right? So to this point, we say strategic ambiguity, which is one of those wonderful, meaningless phrases, right? But it was born in the Cold War when it was, you know, it was a very simple fact that the U.S. enjoyed overwhelming military dominance against China in the waters and airways, you know, of the Western Pacific. And, you know, so although Taiwan's only 100 miles from China, thousands of miles, you know, from the U.S., the U.S. dominance, I'm trying to avoid saying our U.S. dominance was so clearly pronounced for five decades. decades that there was no doubt that we would have come to Taiwan's defense and won. But strategic ambiguity now, when China could have the upper hand in such a conflict, counts against us, right? We should be saying, look, it's going to really be painful for both of us if you do attack Taiwan, but you should know that it is U.S. policy to go to the defense of Taiwan. So if you initiate,

conflict. You know, it's going to be a wider war, just so you know. So we raised the calculus for China going to war. Now strategic ambiguity is a danger. Strategic ambiguity, arguably, is what it got us into the first Gulf War. You know, I mean, not messaging clearly to Saturn before he rolled into Kuwait that we would crush him if he tried, if he did some. I mean, we had warnings of plenty. I mean, our U.S. ambassador was almost briefed on the plan, right? So we've got to get over thinking that we're being coy because other countries don't appreciate, don't recognize, don't understand our coinness. We should simply say, hey, if you invade Taiwan, games on, you know, and say it publicly.

And that way, maybe we don't have to deal with these step-by-step war games where we're losing a battalion, you know, every few seconds. So I feel like the only way we'd be game on 100% is if we lost a carrier and like, you know, thousands of sailors died. And then the U.S. populace is outraged, right? Oh, you mean on that? Yeah, the U.S. I mean, look, it's hard to, it's really hard to gauge the U.S. public's capacity for tolerance

for a war with China. I mean, I can't gauge the U.S. public's tolerance for anything 24 hours in advance because it shifts so quickly. Right. Yeah. I mean, we're going to see, you know, I mean, any estimates are meaningless because they depend on what scenarios you set up. But every scenario expects to lose at least a carrier. I mean, that would be realistic, right? Yeah.

You know, one or two of those thousands of missiles are likely to get through. So yes, we're going to see we're not going to lose guys so much in ground fighting except for the, you know, perhaps the Marines out there, but with the MLR. But who cares about them, right? They're Marines. No. You know, all of our casualties are going to be either naval or aviation. And when they were talking about hitting. But they will be significant.

I'm sorry. I'm sorry. When they were talking about hitting the, trying to make the decision to hit bases in Japan, those aren't just Japanese bases. You know, those you're not just going to lose Japanese personnel. So.

Yeah, he was talking about U.S. bases. And that's a great point, Jason. I'm sorry. Yeah, totally, totally for good. It's like,

yeah, thousands. I mean, dependence. Yeah. Yeah, because, and then what does it become?

Like, what was never addressed was because I'm sure for time and, and classification. What is our response to that as far as hitting inside of China? Do we go after their leadership? Are we just focusing on Taiwan? You know, because now it becomes a bigger issue. Yeah, what are the rules of the game?

That is, it's, yeah, Dee, this was a great exercise. Yeah. I mean, it was a great not, it was a great exercise that they did. did in the sense, again, that they went through these steps and look at all the questions from asking, right? I mean, undoubtedly, we're, I mean, I, we've learned from it. So,

kudos. I just like, I'd like to see more of these. Yeah. No, this is super interesting, yeah. But most of all, I'd like to see the United States just say, hey, yes, we're going to defend Taiwan. Any questions? Yeah. Come on. That would certainly help.

Absolutely. The Chinese would understand that, right? Yeah. Let's wrap this one. Although the U.S. and its allies came out on top in this scenario, the U.S. was not always successful. There were some scenarios where the United States did lose the conflict. A key requirement is the use of bases in Japan. The United States has many bases there. If it cannot use those bases, then it has no way of getting its fighter and attack aircraft into the fight.

Regardless of the scenario, is there like those bases have to be heavily defended? right? Having been based at one, I don't know about heavily. The one that I was at Iwakuni, it just relied on its, on the aircraft. I never saw any strategic air defenses there or anything like that. Not saying that they're not there. I'm just saying that that wasn't something that was readily seen. So yeah, air defense is the air defense is the key thing. And the answer is there is never enough. You know, A, number two, the answer is what, even if we could defend them now, the chances are in a few years, they are, the defenses to be overwhelmed. Just it's, it's battlefield calculus, right? Yeah.

Chinese are just generating more and more sophisticated precision, long-range precision missiles. And you have to assume, even if it hits an American base in Japan, Japan's going to spin up, right? like yeah but what does that do for us i mean we're ready i mean listen i mean it's gonna i i know you're right we're so it's a full war japan's in the war you know i mean yeah they're in it no matter there's no doubt about it and japan knows that um and and has started to uh prepare in its own weight for a war with china which is kind of interesting in the in the last five years in particular uh part of it is sadly kind of a perhaps a show of lack of confidence in the US.

But also a positive thing, you know, because Japan could be a really strong regional player. Again, you know, historically probably wary of having a large military force. But my opinion, something that we should strongly encourage. Because what other ally do we have that combines loyalty to the United States with military, with technical capability. And, you know, dare I say, Western values, democracy. There were very few, right?

In the world, I've been Southeast Asia. Australia, New Zealand with its massive military. Any iteration? Someone's going to call me out on that. Or games found that the cost for all sides would be devastating. The big takeaway from the project is that the United States and its coalition partners can, sustain in autonomous and democratic Taiwan, but it comes at great cost to the Taiwanese economy.

The U.S. and its partners lose very heavily, but so do the Chinese, enough so that the grip of the Chinese Communist Party might be endangered. All right. That's the end of it. It's just hard to imagine the grip of the Chinese Communist Party being endangered in China. You know, that's, I don't know, that's like saying the grip of God, over the you know Catholic church I mean what else is that but yeah thank you Dee

that was good that was awesome don't forget to like and subscribe if you're listening to us on audio rate and review at five stars that helps just as well Patreon.com slash the team house that helps support the show Andy Milburn's book When the Tempest gathers link is in the description all the links will be in the description

uh yes thank you and Andy welcome back from the Oh, yeah, man. Hey, it's an award-winning book now. Oh, yeah. Congratulations. Congratulations, man. That's awesome.

The expensive outlay, I believe, of around $18. But if you get it, affordable, you can get it free. And Kindle has a really good knockdown rate. Awesome. And follow Jason on Twitter. Good luck. Jason's on Twitter? No, good luck.

All right. Thanks, guys. That's right. Take care, Jans. Bye.