The Team House - Rift Inside the Trump Administration on CHINA | EYES ON PODCAST

Episode Date: January 7, 2025

Today the whole crew is back together, we talk about the potential rift inside the incoming trump admin in terms of how to deal with china, we also touch on what we will do if Iran gets closer to a nuclear weapon.Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseFind Andy Milburn here: ⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023https://amilburn.substack.com/https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operationshttps://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialhttps://open.substack.com/pub/amilburn/p/journal-of-a-plague-year?utm_source=app-post-stats-page&r=emo6q&utm_medium=iosFind Mick Mulroy here: ⬇️https://fogbow.com/https://www.loboinstitute.org/https://x.com/MickMulroy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthorhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.socialFind Jason Lyons here: ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=ios_apphttps://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.socialBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey, everybody. Welcome to another episode of Eyes On. A full, full crew is back. So happy New Year, guys. Andy Milburn, Jason Lyons, Mick Mulroy, and myself. A lot cooking. We've had a bunch of episodes dropped the last week or a couple episodes of the last couple of week. So check those out for sure.

One thing I need to tell everybody up top is to like and subscribe. Don't forget to do that. And if you're listening to us on the audio platforms, you can subscribe and like it rated five stars there. it really helps and if you really want to go above and beyond tell your friends share it send it out there so we can keep growing this thing um busy i mean it kind of slowed down over the holiday break and then it's kind of picked up domestically and also you know gearing up for the new administration um there was some word make you want to talk about like what

uh china plan is going to look like in the new administration and uh if there's a little bit of schism in the administration in terms of what side wants to do wants to defend Taiwan what side doesn't want to defend Taiwan if it were to come to that and yeah I'll let you rock and roll yeah well yeah happy New Year's fellows happy New Year's to everybody uh in the audience um I think the biggest thing going on right now in the national security realm is trying to predict or at least try to guess how policy will change, foreign policy in particular, of course, with the transition between the Biden administration to the second Trump administration. So on the China front, having got a call from somebody who remained nameless, but was okay

with the discussion, saying that, you know, there is a, he didn't call it a schism, so I will call more of a debate already in the transition team on the national security side. on how they're going to go about the strategic competition with China. You know, there's a pretty significant element within the Trump team that is what I would call China. So they are wanting to put a maximum effort on the strategic competition with China, which means defending our allies in the region, of course, Japan, for example, the Philippines, for example. and also the defense of Taiwan,

specifically beyond just the legal requirement under the Taiwan Support Act. So there's those that want to get more aggressive and spend more of our resources and contribute more of our resources to the end of Pacific. And then there's an element in there that I would just call more on the business side, which could include, you know, Elon Musk and others that have a substantial influence with the administration on not tweaking China too much.

Now, I would imagine that it's not an either-or. There's probably good arguments and good points on both sides of this. We're intimately tied to China when it comes to global economics. but it's apparently already become an issue with, I think, Senator Rubio, likely the next Secretary of State being more on the China Hawk side. That's my characterization. And others that have direct influence on President Trump potentially not completely aligning with what they intend to do. So it's going to be interesting, I think, on that front on just what we do. Yeah, I think – sorry, go ahead.

No, I was just going to ask, is there any – indication on which way President Trump is leaning? Good question, Jason. That's exactly what I asked him. Now, to be fair, he's biased. He is a China Huck. So he thinks that President Trump's firmly in their camp, but does have a much more pragmatic view of a strategy or a policy when it comes to this, that he won't fully commit either way. make the decision as it plays out and he's going to listen to all sides. So I think they realize they be in the Chinahawks that they're going to have to make their case continuously, which might make it a little bit difficult for a long-term strategy. But that's just the way President Trump

has done it in the past and likely he's going to do it again. So it's going to be something that might not be either or and it might change as the circumstances change. Of course, all these tariffs that might come out could force this into a significant competition right so a tense competition for sure sure thank you sorry Andy go ahead no it's just saying that um that you know of all the of all the global threats that most threatened to pull the united states into you know out and out war peer on peer um it it's certainly Taiwan and It's kind of interesting. I mean, the Biden administration never really abandoned the policy of strategic ambiguity, right?

But, you know, Biden kind of edged forward in some of the things that he was saying, that you're coming bordering on the United States is committed to defend Taiwan. But he never actually came out and say that. But Rubio and the other guy is waltz have been pushing for strategic class. you know, to actually declare that the U.S. will back Taiwan in the event of attempted Chinese invasion. And whether or not you believe, you know, the prognosis of the commander of Indo Peacom, who said recently that he expected that, you know, China would by the end of the decade try and invade Taiwan, certainly there are indications that Xi is edging towards, if not out-and-out

confrontation, certainly ramping. you know, upping the ante by, you know, by declaring that Taiwan is, you know, renegade state, that the, you know, the premier there has been, has been intolerably belligerent. You know, all of these things, it's not just the rhetoric, the fact that China's stepped up, it's patrols and the air-sea patrols, that it's, you know, it's old news that it's been building bases on reclaimed land, you know, along the nine dash line. I mean, without being kind of chicken little, it does seem as though some really hard decisions are going to be made.

And I think central to those decisions are this question of whether the U.S. is going to kind of go on pretending that or being opaque about its intentions should China actually invade Taiwan or whether they will kind of jump on, whether Trump will jump on the platform of out and out, saying out and out commitment to defend Taiwan, which honestly, I've got to say, it's just difficult to imagine, isn't it, that any administration, we talked about this before,

would commit U.S. troops, U.S. lives, the defense of Taiwan. And I can't imagine, you know, I'm not coming down either way on this, but I can't imagine that the American public would support such a thing. And it seems to fly in the face of what Trump has been saying about not wanting to be involved in wars overseas. That's a good point. It's one thing to have these discussions inside the, you know, the D.C. Beltway, it's another, you try to convince the

American people that they need to commit a substantial amount of force to be able to defend Taiwan. And all the war games, some of whom I think have been reported in the media, they play this scenario. It's not good. I mean, we win in these scenarios, it's somewhat of a pure victory in a sense that we lose a lot of troops. We use a lot of ships, a lot of aircraft. Taiwan gets decimated. Japan potentially as well. And China, of course, is the biggest loser in it, but I guess you can say everybody could be a loser in it. And then, of course, it risk an all-out, which would be an all-out war between two superpowers, nuclear superpowers. So it's a huge, it's one thing to have a policy discussion in a think tank at D.C.

It's another one to see this actually play out. And I think maybe makes a good point. I mean, when the American people start hearing discussions about the U.S. going to war up with Taiwan, they're going to start looking at a map and say, what's this Taiwan? Right? Because it's not an easy decision, that's for sure. I mean, yeah, it'll take something dramatic to happen, like, you know, an aircraft carrier sinking or something like that to get the U.S., just like how 9-11 happened, to get the U.S. electorate or populace to be like, yeah, let's go for it. Like, it would have to be, oh, yeah, we need to get some payback.

Because that's how it goes with the U.S. for the most part. It's like if, you know, if we look, we're seeing to have been attacked in any way, we're like, okay, it's time to let it rip. But they were coming off to be a corrective strike. That would be changed. I agree. D. All right. Yeah.

The really tough part about the Taiwan question is the fact that we cannot prevent an invasion of Taiwan. We can respond to one. But we, you know, we, there's just no way that we can get forces in place to prevent. event crossing, you know, that the Taiwan straight. I mean, China will have, I mean, it's going to be up to what is on the island now for that at the initial defense. I'm not saying it's going to be easy for China to gain a, you know, a lodgment, a beachhead. But nevertheless, it's likely to happen before we can get forces into the region. So you see what I'm saying. It's, it's going to take a conscious decision to respond rather than us to responding to a U.S. attack on, I mean to a Chinese

attack on U.S. forces, which would be easier to back with the American public. It's going to be, you know, the Chinese are going to have, be able to present us with facts on the ground. Yes, the fighting will be fierce or be ongoing. The Chinese will take tremendous casualties crossing the strait, but nothing there now and nothing within range can prevent them from doing that from at least seizing a bridgehead. I mean, I'm not an expert on this, but that's what the war games suggest. And so it's going to be up to the U.S. to respond

and to dislodge them. And that's not only politically tough, it's a military tough proposition. Yeah. The second scenario is it wouldn't be an all-out invasion. It could be some kind of attempt to isolate Taiwan. Blockade, yeah. Blockade, which then,

the U.S. would have to make the determination of whether to, you know, run that blockade. Yeah, in which case, we would still have to make an aggressive move or an offensive move. I got a question. Like, if the U.S. comes out in a strong, you know, comes out in strong support of, like, we will do what it takes to defend Taiwan, whether it's blockade or actual invasion. and does that do enough to deter China from doing it? It's a speculative question, but. That's the question that Andy was talking about, strategic ambiguity or strategic clarity, right?

It's been, we often do the strategic ambiguity, just don't tell them and they can guess. But many argue why we do that? Why not be, you know, clarify? I guess the question is, if you clarify, you better be willing to back it up, right? Because you can't do that many. too often before people just don't care whether you're what you're saying you don't back up what you say

it's it is a tough question i mean arguably do you remember the invasion of uh you know i know d was not born then but the invasion of Kuwait back in 1990 I was born then and um yeah I mean I was five but that in it you know in any case so the the argument was that I mean The strong argument was that the U.S. was not clear enough about how it would react. You know, and the ambassador in Baghdad was actually blamed for being ambiguous when Saddam Hussein started ranting about what he intended to do in Kuwait. So, you know, strategic ambiguity does not sometimes counts against us. But as Mick points out, this is such an enormous decision. And if we commit to it, then we really have to commit to it.

And announcing it, I think one of the reasons why we haven't announced it isn't just because we don't want to be tied to it. It's the enormity of the announcement to the American public, right? I mean, as long as we're ambiguous, it doesn't become front and center as a domestic issue. Or, I mean, an issue for the electorate. But once we announce it, it certainly does. And it's a very easy, very easy. stance to attack. Yeah, and the reference you just made, Andy, I believe Saddam, he stated that he thought

that gave him tacit approval. He had ambiguity. Obviously, that wasn't the case. But that's the risk of not being really clear with what you'll do. But it does kind of lock you in. What other ways can we kind of deter it without being like, yeah, we'll straight up send five carrier groups. and fuck you guys out.

You know what I mean? Like what are like the economic ways or diplomatic ways you can put pressure on China to like not invade Taiwan? You can make Taiwan very, very tough to swallow. You know, that's probably, I mean, militarily, that's, that's one of the things. The only things we can do is really, you know, take a, if we're still sticking to strategic ambiguity, we nevertheless put facts on the ground.

helping Taiwan build its defenses, building a militia, you know, Taiwan's already working on this, but that, you know, prepared to go underground and make the seizure of any part of Taiwan extremely painful for China. You know, all of those efforts are kind of playing, I mean, they're playing in the gray zone, which is playing China's game, but they're sending a very clear message to China without coming out and saying anything. you know, putting U.S. soft on the, you know, I'm laughing because of all the media attention that this has already received, but U.S. soft on the island now to help train and prepare. And of course, you know, what we are doing to an extent, which is giving Taiwan top-end weapons systems specifically designed to repel an amphibious and airborne assault.

Yeah, I think they were calling it the porcupine. strategy. You know, you're going to get it, but you're going to hurt, you know. Yeah, and that's the Taiwan Relations Act. I'm looking at it here, 1979. It doesn't require that we come to their defense militarily, but it does require that we provide Taiwan with the military capacity to resist, you know, any attempt to remove them from power and take over Taiwan.

So that is something. that we have legally required ourselves to do. And that's, I think, going to your point, is that we're going to make them so difficult to actually militarily dominate that China will hopefully not decide to do that. So who's the prick in the Trump transition team that doesn't want to go get tough on China?

You could say, is that? No, I didn't. The person I was talking to was China. No, yeah, I feel. figured that, yeah. Yeah. I mean, I think he's referred to it as the business side of this, which is obviously important as well. It's not all military, right? There's an economic component. And he didn't reference him. I'm referencing, you know, that there's people that have significant influence with the president that have significant interest. Interest in the

China relationship. Yeah. And obviously, you know, Musk is one of them. Right? That's like the board of. Yeah. Commerce Secretary is his name Lutnik could be I mean it has has talked about

striking a deal approaching a deal approach to China yeah I'm just guessing here but yeah I mean of course it's Elon Musk

he's got the biggest voice I mean the move is to definitely just put that riff there it's going to happen at some point between musking

and Trump you know they're just too to to to narcissists narcissists that can't will not get along over the long haul and that's the move if they're doing them they should be doing that internally if I were them doing whatever I can to make them

break up for lack of a better term I mean right everyone's waiting for that explosion that that you know those fireworks when it when it eventually happens I try to rush that as soon as possible if I were them because he does have a significant interest in China it's a huge market for yeah yeah yeah And I think that's, I mean, it's going to be something that plays out. There's no, I don't think there's going to be a straight line. I think there's going to be multiple decision points and we'll see how it goes. But, you know, the China Hawks have been a big part of the right side of the political national security spectrum for a while. So they're pretty excited about this.

And I guess they get, they were surprised by the parent early pushback. Yeah. You know, Tim, Dave, before we leave the. topic. One thing that hasn't been talked about, and I think maybe because it kind of flies in the face of Trump's ostensible distrust of alliances, of committing to alliances, but one thing that we haven't really done is focus on a network of bilateral relations in the Pacific. You know, there's no, there's no organization that parallels NATO there, and it would be hard to start one. but we're in a strong position to establish these bilateral relations and that is what china's

working on right now you know china is simultaneously defending its position along the nine dash line but at the same time working you know on appeasing some of the major players in the region japan um korea south korea and and so we need to play that game more and and we have plenty to offer. I'm just, you know, we all this empty talk about to pivot to Asia over a decade ago, but we really have done very little to back that up. Now would be the time. Yeah. And you could do it both security-wise and economic-wise to these alliances. And the U.S. was my former boss, used to say, maybe all our former boss, the Secretary Mattis, is the U.S. always fights with a coalition, Right. So coalitions are built of alliances and it's just part of, it's always been part of warfare. It's not like it's a modern thing.

So, yeah, I think you're right. President Trump looks at a lot of these with some skepticism. Sometimes that's good because they wake up and realize that they got to start contributing more to the alliance itself. Right. And, you know, but hopefully the traditionalist, I would say, and his administration can really highlight the importance of these alliances when it comes to competing with China, because China certainly realizes how important they are. And the time is right, especially with the Philippines and Vietnam. You know, I mean, Vietnam, do you remember when we pulled out of a longer Poe, I think it was way back in the early 90s? I mean, we pulled out of Clark and Subic Bay in the Philippines, and then under Duterte, we didn't have a great relationship with the Philippines. but now under Marcos, Bongbong Marcos, with all the Chinese that are doing, they're reaching out to us again.

And Vietnam has done for a long time. I mean, that would be a great place to establish a base. It's ironic, though, it may seem. I mean, Cam Ran Bay no longer called that, I know, but it would be a superb location to have a U.S. Navy base. And that would send the Chinese up the wall if we established, you know, we lodged the Pacific Fleet back in the Philippines and Vietnam right on their doorstep. And it would also help solve some of the distance, time distance problems for a defense of Taiwan or the, you know, counterattack of Taiwan.

Yeah, they're taking notes. We're stacking all our eggs, you know, in South Korea and Japan, you know, in areas that are heavily targeted by the Chinese. And I think, you know, my feeling is we should diversify and to take advantage of, you know, particularly in the case of Vietnam. And I think that economically and everything, that would be just a great location. How ironic, too, you know, I mean, they kick her ass. But in the end, you know, we get, I mean, yeah, 50 years, 60 years on, we get what we needed. It's a bulwark against communism In a communist country

Anything else you guys got on China I mean we'll have a lot more to say on China as we go forward Yeah no we covered it all Yeah The next big thing of course Is what's going to happen with Iran Hey guys it's Jack I just wanted to talk to you today

About a way that you can help support the podcast If you're not already To support the channel is to become a Patreon member So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Teamhouse channel and podcast if you'd like to.

And we really appreciate that. So go in and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house. It seems like the administration's a little bit more on lockstep in terms of being more hawkish on Iran At least from what like the reporting and like the Messaging coming out of them I mean Iran is actually like it seems to be on the back foot right As well as decimated Hamas is decimated the Houthis it looks like we're gonna like I think we just hit the Houthis again We're gonna they're gonna be in our cross-airs again and

And I guess the big worry for that, like, you know, if I'm, if I'm the regime in Iran, I'm thinking about nuclear weapons too, right? Like, what's going to secure my regime? And it seems like that might be the only move. But, you know, so what are you guys seeing on that? Well, if you look at the Axi House report, National Security, Visor, Sullivan, brief President Biden, I guess about a month ago, all the options to either eliminate or significant, reduce their nuclear capacity because in the last four years they've really advanced it. I think they're a threshold nuclear state right now is the official talk. And I think the IA said that they have enough enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

Now, that's obviously a horrible thing. I do believe, and I'm only doing this based on reporting I've seen in the media, that we think it would still take a year to make the nuclear. detonating explosion device that would have to go with the uranium. So I'm not a nuclear scientist here. So we still have some time. But the concern, of course, is you laid it out, they've lost their proxy forces, or at least they're significantly degraded.

Why not go for a nuclear weapon? We have to be ready, I think, to be able to take that focused military action to deny about that if that's what the Intel says they're going to do and I think there's a very real chance that they are going to try that so this is more than theoretical this could happen in short order if the intel says they're racing toward a deliverable nuclear weapon Andy yeah I mean I don't I don't know it's it seems like a matter of time before Israel strikes against Iran's nuclear capability. I mean, but there have been several points where the time seemed optimal.

Netanyahu was advised by his, you know, his own generals to do so, and he didn't. And, you know, there's a lot of, there's a complexity with Netanyahu. I mean, he's become, you know, we see him as the Hawk of Gaza. This is neither a defense or an attack on Netanyahu. I'm just saying, you know, he's seen now as the hawk of Gaza, but traditionally he has opposed getting bogged down in major military strikes or wars because he's seen how that leads to the demise of politicians in Israel. But definitely there's a school of thought within the Israeli high command that no time is better than now to go after the Iranian nuclear program. We've talked about

this before. And I think part of the question is perhaps, you know, they're waiting for the new administration to come in where they perhaps think that they're going to get a green light because President Trump has indicated that he will give them one. So I don't know, but it seems like that's, that could be one of the preconditions that they are waiting for. In other words, this may not be a wholly U.S. decision. This may be simply just giving the nod to the Israelis. The second question, of course, is can they do it alone? And it used to be, you know, the consensus used to be, no, they cannot. But they did execute a remarkably complex air strike, air campaign, actually two of them in the last few months, one on Iran involving over 100 planes to include F-35s, where they totally

penetrated the Iranian ayads and supposedly knocked out all their S-300 radar. In other words, blinding them. And the other was the recent one in Syria, which was actually the largest air campaign Israel has conducted since the 73 Wall. It didn't exactly go under the radar, but it wasn't heavily reported here in the States. But that was saying it. So what I'm saying is that they, you know, when you look at all the capabilities, ground penetrating, you know, deep bunker penetrating bombs, aerial refueling, stealth technology, they have leapt far ahead, far ahead of where they were a decade ago. So that's a fair point, especially the fact that they've depleted the air and missile defense of Iran, which is the biggest factor when it comes to taking this right.

and then the question is, do they have the proper munitions? You already referenced it to be able to do this right. That's why the U.S. is going to have to make a determination on whether we get involved. Because if we don't get involved, if we do get involved, the chances of success are high. And if Israel does it alone, don't we still have the same consequences? Like that's a question that the U.S. is going to have to ask itself

if Israel's going to do this alone. So given their capability, that they've proven they have and can use. Is there a red line where they will not even wait for a decision from us? Not not our permission, just a decision and say, we're just going to do it. Because, I mean, obviously, they're the closest geographically and they're probably the target. So I just wonder if there's a, hey, Iran is that our intel shows Iran is at this point in the process. We're not waiting anymore for U.S. to give us a, you know, green light.

I think so. I think that's right, Jason. I think they probably already relay that red line to us. I don't know that it's, you know, I don't know what it is. But certainly where they think that they cannot control it and it's close to happening. And of course, they could get an injection of from Russia or others in technology that could speed this up. So this is all going to, I think, the intel driven. And there probably is a point where Israel would do it regardless of our even political support. the problem, but they wouldn't certainly hope. And then, of course, this leads to can we get a grand bargain? Can we get another agreement that deals not only with the nuclear weapons issue in Iran, but also in their support for proxies like Asgelana Moss, the Houthis, of which they could get full sanction relief, you know, obviously there be something in it for them? Could we get to a point now that they feel so vulnerable that they would be willing, willing to do that?

I think that's another factor the incoming administration is going to be looking at. Are we going to have negotiations? Are they willing to, like, really have these negotiations and verifiable proof that they're not going toward a weapon system overt or covert? And then are we willing to believe the sanctions? Because that's what they're going to want to be. I got a question for you guys. What was your take on the Obama administration's deal, the nuclear deal with them? Was that good, not good?

I mean, I'm sure it had pros and cons, but would they be at this point right now where they're six months to a year away from a deliverable nuclear weapon if we stayed in it? That's a, you know, it's a fair point. I think to look at both sides, the JCPOA was an agreement that focused on their nuclear intentions and the critics would say did not address the malign act of use of proxy force,

which made it, you know, not a very, a perfect agreement. The supporters would say, yes, but it did curtail their nuclear ambitions. So getting out of it, the argument would go is that you could have addressed the proxy malign activities separately, but we didn't. And obviously, that's only gone up, right? The attacks from Esmalah, Moss, since we got out, gone up exponentially. But the question is, since that's water under the bridge, if we do another

agreement, I think everybody would agree. It should include both because that's what it failed at before. It's all depending on whether Iran wants to include both and then they're willing to, and they might because they're super unpopular back home. They literally can't keep the lights on in a country that produces a substantial amount of energy and their economies and somewhat freefall. So it might be perfect opportunity, but I think everybody would agree, even the supporters of the JCPOA should include it should be a comprehensive agreement. Yeah, that's a really good point. Mick brought up about the regime sensitivity to its own citizenry is surprisingly high.

In other words, they are concerned about the feeling of the population towards the administration, and they were alarmed. You know, they had kind of these half sham. elections that and and there was regional elections which were held last year and there was a really, really low turnout and that concerned the regime. And there's a there's a bubbling discontent for some time against all this adventurism abroad. And a lot of it is mixed point of that is driven by the economic freefall that the Iranian population know it feels that they're in. And and and so sanctions relief will be a big one. It is a big incentive and we should certainly use it.

And the other piece, I agree with Mick on Jikpoha, you know, pros and cons. It was poorly framed and poorly enforced. But one thing it did do was it gave us access and a certain amount of visibility to Iran's nuclear program. Okay, yes, things can always be hidden. But since we pulled out, it's been, we have no visibility at all. It's become, absolutely opaque. And so, you know, I mean, any, any sort of engagement is, I think, is better than none to an extent. And it's concerning. I mean, it's like, you know, as much as I, as much as I hate the Russia, I mean, I hate the Russians. I shouldn't say this, right? As much as I'm distrustful of Russia or anything, you know, it was a big loss to us when we, we, we could no

longer communicate with the Russian military in Syria. You know, any sort of open communication lines at whatever level with potential adversaries can only be positive. Yeah. All right. Plants for Ukraine. What's going on? There's a new push that they just got into and to Kursk that supposedly Russians are retreating a bit. Is this a move because Trump's coming in and they're going to try and freeze the lines?

So they keep a little bit of Russia while Russia keeps a whole lot of Ukraine? Is that part of it? I think there's a lot of maneuvering right now. I think there's a lot of maneuvering to try to get ahead of what they think it's going to happen, which is negotiations based on General Kellogg's plans. I'm sure he's obviously working with an income president. The idea I think right now would be to freeze the lines at where they are doesn't mean that Ukraine concedes the 20% of Ukraine that they've taken. but it does essentially stop the fighting.

What does Ukraine get out of it? Well, they should get some kind of security guarantee. If that's not part of the deal, I don't see them agreeing with it. But I do think President Zelensky realizes it's going to be extraordinarily difficult to militarily take back the 20% that Russia is currently occupied. So what is it from his perspective that he loses by freezing the conflict, like getting the security guarantee and then building up his defenses to ensure that no more of Ukraine could be taken by the Russians. Again, not conceding that part of Ukraine is currently

being occupied by an unlawful invasion of Russia. Now, I don't know. I mean, it seems like President Zelensky is really talking about this as a viable option. I think the question is, will Putin, will Putin accept that as a viable option? option. Will he be able to sell that to whoever he thinks he needs to sell it to? This was all worth it to get that part of Ukraine. And now there's some kind of security guarantee for Ukraine. And will he be the one that actually Hems and haws on doing this? I think the one thing that could really push him to not is for the U.S. to say, okay, if you don't, they're going to double the security assistance You got to have a stick, right?

You can't just rely on Putin to be a fair broker of this ceasefire agreement. So we're going to have to be ready to tell him that we're going to open the floodgates of support if he doesn't. So it has to be some consequences to his not participating in this agreement if that's what we're going. Andy? Yeah, no, I mean, at risk of sounding like I'm echoing Mick, I couldn't agree more. that there has to be, part of the agreement has to be that we continuously reinforce Ukraine during a, during this phase of frozen conflict, of negotiation, because that's the only, that's the only thing that Putin is going to pay attention to. You know, right now,

Ukraine does have an incentive to, to make peace. And despite, you know, the incredible fighting they've been doing for the last two and a half years, that, biggest problem right now is manpower. They are really hurting at the front. Their units are way under capacity. They have problems with desertion, which is just not surprising when you think what a meat grinder, the front is there. And it's becoming increasingly difficult to hold the line. And, you know, while everyone applauds quite rightly what they're doing in Russia itself, both drone strikes, sabotage, assassinations, and what they've done in Kursk, These things are kind of side shows.

They're not going to have a strategic effect. And in the theater that matters, or the battleground that matters that is in Dombas and that matters to Russia and Russia's plans, they're still giving ground. Pock Rost is holding on by its fingernails. And the streets of Pock Rost now are just impossible because of the Russian drones.

You know, I don't know if you're, you're tracking this, but the population are sheltering in sellers and have been doing so for weeks, those who haven't been able to evacuate. And the Russians are closing, you know, they're, they're closing the noose on Pockwofs. Pockroofs is the large, last major town. And it's a very important one, I mean, before Krematosk, and it's a very important one. It's a railway hub, and it's been a mainstay of logistic and manpower supply for the, for the Ukraine. so far on the war. And if it falls, that is, that's very serious for them.

And there is no doubt about it, that that is the Russian plans to make it fall as soon as possible, certainly before talks begin for a possible ceasefire. Jay, anything? No, when it comes to this kind of stuff, I'm just, I'm learning from these gents. But I, as an outsider, you know, a neophyte, I agree that any kind of talk should include us continuously um uh,

arming and supporting them because I feel like if we don't and the whatever the talks break down they're just going to be on the back foot so so I got a question about in terms of that. Uh, what are the chances that that's part of the, that's something we could commit in terms of like if you know, we will support you militarily or you know, whether it's anything logistics,

whatever you call, name it. Um, what are the, I mean, it barely got through Congress this time, this past time. With the new administration, I feel like it would be uphill, an uphill battle to get that guarantee in there from us on our side. Well, certainly if President Trump was pushing it, that would help, right? Of course, yeah. I'm sure somebody's going to tell him, like, Mr. President, this is on you now.

So do you want to be the president that loses Ukraine to Russia? I don't think he does. and if he supports this and it's Putin that is the problem under the scenario I'm laying out, then if President Trump is telling the Republicans who there's plenty of Russian Hocs that are still Republicans. I think I think you'd have all the Democrats. You'd already have the traditional Republican, I'd just call him Reagan type, national security types. And then President Trump's influence over the MAGA folks, I think could push this over the line, especially if it's part of a strategy to push Putin to the table, right?

Because if he's not coming to the table because he doesn't believe, he believes that our support is going to wane and potentially even go away. But obviously this idea that he's going to, President Trump's going to actually end the conflict. It's not going to happen. It's going to take his direct involvement, I think. So he's the guy they need to, they need to convey. I mean, it makes sense.

He's the president, right? And he runs that party with an eye and fist. Let's be real. they would all fall in line if you were to come out strongly in terms of like supporting Ukraine and whatever that number is or in terms of material or whatever. So there's one guy. I'd be enough. Yeah. It'd be enough to put to get the security systems approved through both the house and I think.

Yeah, I agree. All right. So switching back towards like us domestically. You know, we've seen what's happened the last week with the New Year's Day. attacks and stuff. Iceland's inspired and another one was a both former U.S. Army soldiers. Both, I guess, radicalize in their own way because for you to go to the point where you're blowing yourself up

to send the message, something's gone wrong. We just had this note. The overall terrorist threat in the U.S. has it. I mean, I don't think it's ever gone away, really, since 9-11. I think it probably has gone up. since 9-11, if I'm being honest. What do you think? I mean, Nick, Jay, you guys are the experts.

I agree that I believe that the threat has gone up a little bit since 9-11. I mean, I guess it depends on what you're talking about as far as gone up. Some people would automatically say it's the border. But those are the same people who are believing that there's what, 100,000? ISIS fighters in the United States waiting to attack us, you know, those sorts of things. So I think it's a combination of things. For me, I think the biggest issue is the threat has gone up, but not to me externally. I believe it's internally. Radicalization has gone up due to, you know, social media and things like AI and all those sorts of things. So I think that's our

our biggest thing plus you have the the uh inherent divisiveness within our country anyway so uh those sorts of things are causing people to look out elsewhere and they're finding that inspiration and and i think in some cases i don't know yet but i think even with this guy in uh new Orleans what was it a year ago or so you're supposed to have been radicalized um i think some people just throw on that mask that ISIS mask or whatever mask just to do whatever it is there's doing and aren't committed to it. So you have all that stuff that's all mixed in there. Yeah, for sure.

I mean, there are two separate incidents and I don't think they're tied. One in Vegas appears to be a suicide, essentially. You know, horrible event, horrible. The veteran suicide is a whole other issue. You can do several episodes on that. And then to Jay's point on New Orleans, I mean, the guy was actually thinking, like, should I get my family all together and kill him or should I go do this terror? So it seems like he was just a completely disturbed individual who was looking for some kind of, although it completely warped, rationale for doing what he did. It's a big problem.

It's, you know, radicalization, self-radicalization. I do think they'll look into his foreign travel, which seems to be verified by the FBI today, that he traveled to. Egypt. Was there any kind of connectivity that kind of boosted them over the edge to do this? I don't know the answer to that, but certainly the FBI and CIA are going to be looking into that in detail. And then I think he traveled all into Toronto, Canada. But those kind of things will be looked at. But I do think, you know, one of the things we tend to think that we can just call an end of these, the enemy gets a vote, right? The ISIS exists to attack us. So this is not going to go away. We have to accept that this is going to be, it's almost like a

bunch of cops sitting around talking about the end of crime, right? It's not going to end. Terrorism's not going to end. The ideology still exists. ISIS, you know, went from, you know, one country, Iraq, Syria, two countries, to I think 24, 28 countries right now spread throughout the world. So this is going to be something that we're just going to have to accept. It's going to be, we're going to have to dedicate certain parts of our security apparatus to fight, period. It's not going to end. I wish it would, but if we have that mentality, we're constantly be surprised when they rear their ugly head and attack. And I think they are in many ways looking to attack the West because that's why they exist. Al-Qaeda, ISIS. Right now, I just saw

something today where the UN predict or not estimates there's 20 different terrorist organizations in Afghanistan today. And there's not a whole lot of checks on them and there's not a whole lot of visibility on them. So we have to accept the fact that we're still at war with terrorism and that it's not going to be something we can just opt out of or just declare an into. And also too, something to think about is if this, all the talk of the incoming administration is looking to designate cartels as terrorist organizations, now we're adding that into the mix. You know, So it's not just Middle Eastern countries. It's not just Muslims.

It's not, you know, there's, if this happens, if this, they are designated and there is a direct action that's taken against them. That's something else we have to think about because, I mean, there are people living Brownsville, Texas or wherever who are looking right at what could possibly be, you know, hey, you've designated those terrorists. Now we're coming right across to, you know, hit these towns. And so it's not just, we have to be able to look in more than one direction at once. I don't know, but I would guess that law enforcement is, yes, concerned with, you know, with all those things. But I would guess that they're very concerned about domestic extreme right-wing terrorism, too. You know, I mean, of course, you know, I mean, think back to the Oklahoma City bombings. And I, and there have been, since then, there have been, there's been near run after near run that have been of attacks that have been preempted by law enforcement.

You know, nothing on the scale of Oklahoma. But, you know, these groups exist and they're active. And, you know, as we've just seen, there are some pretty extreme attitude. out there from people who ostensibly seem to be normal. I think that's definitely of concern. Yeah. And that goes back to keeping our eye on, you know, many different things at one time because they're going to take full advantage of that. We designate cartels as terror organizations and at the same time we're looking at ISIS.

Well, what's behind us? These extremist group, far-ray groups that Andy's talking about. And they're going to take full advantage of that. Yeah. And one of the populations we definitely need to protect, for lack of a better warrant, is veterans. And I say that because, you know, oftentimes we undercut just how much training, somebody who's served in Afghanistan and Iraq actually has when it comes to being able to carry out a terrorist attack. I mean, just a rudimentary training, not even to get into the special operations type stuff.

you know, one of those, one of our individuals, I should say, that's radicalized can do an extensive amount of damage, which is the knowledge they have in their, you know, capacity. So that's, that's when it comes to the fact that both of these two individuals were veterans, that's something the Pentagon's going to be looking at. How do we prevent radicalization to protect our force and to protect our population? Because, you know, five veterans put together could exponentially do more damage than just a bunch of knuckleheads that happen to believe in the ideology but have no actual capacity to do anything. So that's something I think is going to be looked at very closely by Department of Defense

and how to prevent this from happening. Boys, anything? Good discussion. You guys have anything on the actual terrorist attacks? I mean, like we touched on that a little bit in the last couple episodes, but we haven't had Andy or Mick on that. So if you guys have any thoughts, please feel free. I think we covered it.

I do think they're going to, I mean, this is, you know, you do the immediate triage when it comes to the intel of whether there's an ongoing threat. And even though it started off saying that they thought this was multiple individuals, which would indicate a more planned ISIS main involvement, now it looks like it was just him. But they do have to realize, they do have to find out whether there was direct direction, not just inspiration to the New Orleans attacker. And I think we won't find that until they've completed their both law enforcement investigation and the intelligence gathering and analysis that's here to come. I mean, I really don't. I mean, I think you guys covered it very well. And I was in the UK enjoying myself when you were having these serious discussions. Yeah.

I have nothing, nothing positive to add. All right, boys. Mick, what do you tell us about what you're working on with Fogwell and Lobo. Yeah, I appreciate you guys. Let me bring this up. So this book's actually been out a while for those that are looking at it. I'm holding up. It's called All the Glimbering Stars.

It's by Mark Sullivan. It's a great author here in Montana who met me and my business partner, Eric Ulrich. We had done a documentary on a child, two child soldiers, actually married right now. that were abducted into the LRA and forced to fight and eventually escaped together, started a family and went on to rescue many other former child soldiers. So I just wanted to highlight this book is out. You can get it just about anywhere you can buy a book. And a portion of the proceeds goes to Eric and my 501C3 in child soldiering, which is completely dedicated to the rehabilitation of children and forced to fight. against their will by adults who, of course, are the ones that start to war.

But I appreciate you guys allowing me to highlight this book because it really does do a lot of good when it comes to the NGO. Yeah, I'm going to put a link in the description for the book as well. I can grab it there, and I'm going to put a link in the description for the NGO. Links are always in the description. So check it out. Incredibly good cause. I feel like there's no real, unless you're running the child soldiers, like who's against who's for childs?

You know what I mean? It should be really easy. And a lot in the audience, I might add that were participants in Operation Observant Compass, which was a U.S. effort to counter the LRA. And I imagine there's a lot of folks in the audience that participated in that would know this individual, Anthony Opoka. He worked with us very closely because of his knowledge of Joseph Coney and know him very well.

that are very familiar with this story. It is an operation that I thought was very unique in that. It really did focus on the influence aspect of special operations fights the kinetic part because, you know, there was no Green Beret that was with me on this operation that really wanted to go fight kids, right? So it was really focused on the messaging of getting them out without the fight and it was very successful in that regard.

And much of it because of people, Anthony and people like Anthony, that knew how to talk to these 12 years. Yeah. So check that out. The link is in the description. I'm going to put the link in the description, too, for the documentary as well. Andy Milburn, how are you? First off, great book, When the Tempest Gathers.

Check that out. That's in the description as well. Jason's links are in the description. He doesn't have a book yet. He's going to be coming out with some erotic fiction. I know he's been talking about it for a while. Not under my real name. Some memo.

Yeah. Lusely based on actual events. Guys, this was great. I think I'm forgetting something. Oh, I'm going to tease it a little bit because Mick gave us the green light about the work that he's doing in Sudan. So we will get into that with a bunch more of the people you work with at Fogbo. I think probably make it an episode by itself. and what else?

The email. Patreon.com slash the team outs. It's the best way to support. And thanks, guys. This is great. Thanks, everybody. Awesome. Bye, around. Just have a great evening.

See you next time.