The Team House - The Assad Regime Ends | EYES ON PODCAST

Episode Date: December 9, 2024

Today we're joined by Mick Mulroy to talk about the Assad regimes collapse in Syria.Subscribe to the new EYES ON YouTube channel.⬇️https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJytcQbSOEKLGyhNwkqpd3ASupport the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseFind Jason here ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=ios_apphttps://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.socialFind Andy Milburn here:⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023https://amilburn.substack.com/https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operationshttps://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialhttps://open.substack.com/pub/amilburn/p/journal-of-a-plague-year?utm_source=app-post-stats-page&r=emo6q&utm_medium=iosFind Mick Mulroy here:⬇️https://fogbow.com/https://www.loboinstitute.org/https://x.com/MickMulroy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthorhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.social#syriaBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the podcast if you're not already. To support the channel is to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Team House. channel and podcast if you'd like to and we really appreciate that so go it and check us out at patreon.com slash the team house. Hey everybody. Welcome to another episode of Aizan. I'm Dmitz. Of course, you have Andy Milburn and Mick Mulroy. And the big news today is the Assad regime in Syria has fallen.

Mick, what's on your radar with this? So I think the first thing to say is not only was it. unexpected how quickly the Assad regime collapsed, but also that it happened, quite frankly, just to be, just to be, you know, straightforward with it. I don't know a lot of people, even the people that follow this very closely. I know we had Charles on, Charles Lister on, just recently, who follows this probably as close as anybody that I know. They really predicted this was going to happen. That said, if you look back in hindsight's 2020, right, you can see the issues that could have led to this, which is Russia fully engaged in a war of

their own choice that has significantly degraded their capabilities, especially outside of the Ukraine theater, Iran, Hezbollah, obviously getting systematically dismantled by Israel and Lebanon can't afford us to have all their, or a lot of their forces fighting for Assad in his country. So that was some of the factors that led to, I think, this really quick collapse of the regime. And strategically, it's a big failure for Iran and Russia. So that's a good thing. And obviously, Assad himself, 13 years of the Civil War responsible for hundreds of thousands, if not over 500,000 civilian deaths, half of the population being displaced. And many, millions leaving the country. So there's no love loss there shouldn't be for anybody when it comes

to the Assad regime. But the question, of course, is who is HTS? Are they truly moderated version of what they started, which was affiliate essentially of al-Qaeda in Syria? Is Jalani this, you know, new kind of leader? Or is he essentially just saying what he needs to say right now, just like the Taliban did during negotiations for our withdrawal. And even if he is, how is this going to play out? Is this really going to be a transition to a government selected by the people? And during that time, what about the significant weapons that Assad have, the chemical weapons, all these things falling into the wrong hands?

Does this turn toward a civil war within a civil war? So there's a lot of questions, I think, that are still out there that we can, of course, talk here. But it's something that I think is very concerning not only to the United States, but the region, right? The region is concerned about a mass exodus of refugees. And, of course, we have 900 servicemen and women still active in Syria and the eastern part. And according to the president's statements today, he's essentially doubling down on their need to be there. So that could change with the incoming administration, don't know. But that's another factor in this whole, this whole saga that's played out of the last 48 hours.

Yeah. When we were talking to David McCloskey just, you know, just last week, it seemed like it was going to be, even though, you know, Hamer had fallen and they were advancing on harms, I think, I mean, the consensus among us. I mean, not that that's a very low bar, I know, but David, at least I'd say, has quite an interesting take on this. But the perception was that Damascus would probably prove too tough and not to crack, and that the Russians would at least rally to defend the capital. But obviously that didn't happen. I think, you know, to mix point, follow on, it's interesting when unexpected

strategic events happen so quickly like this to see who is, who among the major players do have a kind of a backup plan. And, you know, clearly Russia and Iran didn't. They didn't anticipate this happen. Russia was involved in kind of a, you know, it was focused, has been focused in the last week or so on evacuating its citizens, getting its essential personnel out of that, even out of Tartis, the naval port, doesn't mean it's given up on these bases. So I would add that as a note of caution and that there's negotiations already taking place in Qatar between the Turks who are backing HTS and the Russians. So something may evolve from that whereby the Russians still maintain a presence in Syria,

so it's too early to celebrate. So the Turks are well placed. It may be good news for Europe and the United States, Assad, no crocodile tealists for Assad, if there is a measure of stability, and that's the big if. And from the U.S. perspective, aside from hitting Islamic State targets as a kind of a warning, preemptive warning, it's not clear that we had a contingency plan or have a contingency plan on the shelf to handle this. Israelis obviously did. I mean, they're conducting a series of strikes right now to prevent major weapon systems from falling into the wrong hands. They moved almost instantly into the

area beyond the Golan Heights as a buffer zone. So clearly, you know, that wasn't something they threw together on the fly. That is something they had anticipated and be reacting to. But, you know, as a note of caution, typically when brutal dictatorships end, good things don't happen, at least not immediately. Think about Yugoslavia, Detito, perhaps not a brutal dictator, definitely a dictator. Think about Libya after Gaddafi, you know, still a mess. And of course, Saddam, after the fall of Saddam. So history does not suggest that this, regardless of whether Jolani is sincere about what he's saying, about having an inclusive, supporting an inclusive administration, and he's even saying HDS doesn't have to be the leader in this administration,

even if he is sincere in that. Recent historical examples suggest that we're in for a period of extreme turbulence. Syria. Yeah, agreed for sure. One thing real quick on Jalana. I was interested to see that he was rolled up by the Americans in Mosul in 2005, which happens to be, you know, it's funny how things come together. Carrillo, who now had CENTCOM, was a battalion commander in Mosul, 2005, which I know because I was attached to his battalion as an advisor. And according to the Washington Post spent five years in Jolani we're talking about in U.S. detention,

was a friend or at least a colleague of Baghdaddy who headed the Islamic State before they, you know, they broke with the Islamic State back in, I think it was 2014. And as Mick said, the Al-Nusrefront, which Yolani headed, was definitely and openly an al-Qaeda affiliate. Now, since then, you know, Jolani's gone after both ISIS and Al-Qaeda. But that means little, because even if he is reformed, there are other factors at play. And the guys who entered the prime minister's office who made it into Damascus kind of in the circle, government buildings first, were not HDS dudes. they were other Sunni extremist rebels.

So it would be a mistake to say that Jalani, that the future of Syria is even in Jalani's hands. That's true. And we might see this breakdown. They're a coalition, so it's not in their interest to be a coalition, right? Like I said, their main objective has been accomplished. And now we'll find out, you know, whether someone would like to see it, a wholesale Islamic state under the guise of ISIS or whether there's any inclination really

to do what Jalani's telling Western media, right? So, and on the, it seems like every one of these guys got indoctrinated or got their PhD from being incarcerated by the United States in some form or fashion. Those are the ones that usually go on to lead the organization of which they started in, right? So that's something we might want to review in the future. Yeah, I mean, it's fair. That's a really good point because everyone is saying, wow, Jelani is like, he's like a very professional military leader.

When you look at HTS, they have drone units, they've got tank units, their tank infinite, you know, they've even, if you watch some of the videos, they seem to have figured out tank infantry integration, a lot of things that, that in the, not all Western militaries are done. You're thinking, where the hell did he learn this? It wouldn't be surprising if he spent some time in incarceration, learning much of this doctrine, our own doctrine. Yep.

I mean, after all, that's what Sinai did with the Israelis. That's exactly right, right? They learned their enemy. So what's happened to Assad make? I mean, is it, I know he appears to have appeared in Moscow, but you think that's for real. Jason commented it might be his body doubles, and there were comments,

and it looked like credible comments in Twitterland, suggesting that his plane had been shot down last night. Yes, and a lot of media organizations were following that that thought it was credible. It was an IL-76 that apparently was shot down. Maybe that was the case, and maybe he just wasn't on it. Russia, their official spokesperson is saying that he has received asylum and his family in Moscow. So could it be a body double?

I don't know how long they would or why they would necessarily find that helpful to do rather than just acknowledge his death. But he'll have to make some kind of appearance soon. But it's clear he's not going back. So even if he made it out, he is going to be living in Moscow for the rest of his life. Yeah, Twitter was on fire yesterday about the plane crash and stuff. Yeah, I think Jason was joking, honestly, about the body double thing. I mean, does he form a government in exile and stuff like that and play, you know, sing that tune of like, you know, I'm going to become, I'm going to come back and all that? Or what, what do you think?

It's difficult to imagine because his, even his loyalists left the sinking ship like rats, you know what I mean? even it seems like there was a negotiation saw never heard of them you know yeah yeah I mean look how fast they just melted away right yeah I don't see I mean he has no real popular support he was a strong man he used his brutal tactics to get people to vent to as well and that didn't work it had to be Russia right he had to have support to even get to where he was I don't think there's any chance that he would even entertain the idea of being a government and exile that would have any opportunity to come.

I suppose, I mean, it's, as we said, it's early days, and I'm not, I'm not looking for false glimmers of hope, but it is remarkable, actually, that the transition has been as orderly as it has, I mean, not transition. I mean, if you look, the ETS imposed a curfew, that doesn't appear to be widespread looting, except in, you know, if you exclude Assad's personal, personal house, and a few other places. There's been some clashes between, I believe, between the Turks or rather Turkish-backed rebels

and the Kurds in the northeast of the country. And, of course, some clashes between the Israelis and rebels in the vicinity of Golden Heights. But aside from that, so far, things seem to be relatively quiet. The rebels have had, the other thing is rather than launch into kind of a deep authentication process, the rebels or Jolani has appealed personally to police and civilian authorities, you know, Assad loyalists remain in their posts pending the announcement of, he says,

a unity government. So again, I don't want to be polyanerish, but at least these are good signs. It's more than we did when we invaded Iraq. Yeah, right. We're responsible for the debate. mathification. But the prime minister did stay. Jalalili, not to be Confucius, the HTS leader, but the actual prime minister of Syria did stay, apparently. And he's made statements that all the opposition forces have agreed to this transition. So, I mean, we should want it to be the case, right? So we obviously shouldn't root against that happening. So it's a trust, maybe, but verify. kind of scenario. Let's see what they do rather than what they say. But to your point, Andy,

they are saying the right thing, even the opposition forces. So. That's so far so good. But, you know, just kind of taking a step back, I mean, there are there are really, and I know there are multiple, there are more factions. I'm simplifying this absurdly. Syria, you know, Syria analysts will no doubt say. But I mean, there are the four main factions, right? They're the Turkish-backed Sunni rebels of which HTS is the strongest, but not the only group. And previously, they're up in the northwest. They governed an area around it. There's the Kurds, you know, who essentially the SDF, but also the YPG, who are in the north and east. And then there's, and I'm not sure this is still the case, how strong these guys are,

but there was a, there's a kind of a Jordanian slash U.S.-backed rebel group in the south. And then you have the Aloite loyalists who are along the coast. And each one of those groups has its own army, right? So, I mean, the potential for civil war to continue is still there. But perhaps, you know, one incentive for that not happening aside from, you know, Turkish, Kutari, diplomacy with well, basically Turkish Qatari diplomacy. One is the

fact that the Turks and Qatar have a plan for a gas pipeline to run from Qatar to Bulgaria across Syria, which would be good news for everyone in Europe

because it would reduce dependency on Russian gas and of course good news for U.S. interests, if that comes, and of course, Qatar and Turkey. So, you know, so that's important because both those countries have funded HTS and the most powerful rebel groups, and now they stand to benefit from having that gas oil, a gas platform. And then there is the incentive of reconstruction itself. I mean, Syria has been devastated.

You know, the cost for reconstruction is estimated around $200 billion, money coming in. and all those groups could potentially benefit from that. So if presented in the right way, and then I hate to turn things over to Oduan and the Qataris, but certainly I'm not sure how much of an active stance you, United States is going to take in this, then at least there is a strong incentive to maintain order. And that's important, right?

So, you know, whether Turkey and Qatar benefit, as long as it benefits to Syrian people, and in the case of the oil pipeline, Europe, right, encountering Russia, I mean, that is obviously something. And it would, I would assume it would bring some kind of resources to the Syrian people, right, if they're going to have this pipeline going through their country, that they would get some of the benefits. And obviously, the reconstruction is to benefit them. So, you know, if countries are willing to go into a conflict area and help do the reconstruction,

then good on them, to be frank. It's not for the countries that sit on the sideline and criticize. So that, I think, is super important. The other part that you brought up, Andy, that has a lot of people questioning is just what is Syria, right? So you have large segments of, you mentioned all the different groups, the alloy, on the coast, the Sunni Arabs, you know, in the northwest, the Kurds taking a large portion of the country in the east. And then the Arab group, which I do believe took part in actual going into Damascus on the Jordan border. I mean, if they don't come up with a comprehensive way to

incorporate all the groups of Syria, they don't have a Syria. I guess it's another way to put it. They're just going to, they all have an army, as you said, and they all have territory. So unless other sides are willing to fight and have the ability to win, which they don't, we're essentially going to see a completely partitioned Syria that isn't actually a functioning country. So if the groups that are helping in the transition don't go toward incorporating all other groups, then they're not going to run a Syria as a country. They're going to run whatever section of the country that they already are running. I guess it's not a way.

Yeah, that's, I mean, that's a great point that took. very nervous about and have been about, of course, about the SDF and the SDF, again, the Syria Democratic forces at the Kurdish Bank and the YPG. And the area of Syria that they control right now is actually a very important part of Syria. I mean, it has, it's the, most of the oil fields, I believe, and it's, I know the term breadbasket is overused and it's difficult to think of a breadbasket in Syria, but it is Syria's breadbasket. It's the most arable land up there in the northeast in a country that is largely desert. And so there's certainly, you know, the probably strong Turkish and certainly Turkish proxy incentives to take some of that land

back. And that could be behind some of the fighting that's taking place now in Manbiz and Raka on that scene between the Kurds and Arab. Turkish-backed forces. But, Mick, what do you think about the Russians? I mean, first of all, do you think they were taken as by surprise as everyone else? Do you think this was a conscious decision to kind of step back? I think they were surprised. I do.

I think we would have seen some effort to surge forces there to try to quash it early on rather than allow it to get momentum. I think they were caught flat-footed, just like the rest of us. And by the time they made the decision, you know, the ball was rolling. And they realized that they would have to contribute a lot to a fight that would largely probably require some ground forces since Hezboe removed a lot of theirs. And they weren't willing to do it, nor did they have it. And then when they started moving their assets out of, you know, Tartus and Latakia,

I think that was an indicator to everybody that they weren't going to fully support the regime. And that's when, you know, all of his regime forces can see that too. And then it just starts building on itself. They start abandoning their positions and withdrawing and just disappearing. And then it just becomes a fait accompli. And that's what happened. So I think Russia realizes that it lost quite a bit in this. But they also realized that they didn't.

have the ability once it was really Roland to do anything about it. So kind of the man of the hour, I mean, it seems to me the guy who emerges from this as far as foreign leaders in the best position is Odoin. And I know it's impossible to guess what he's going to do, but the Russians are going to be asking him for some kind of concessions to be allowed back in, I assume. And yet Odoğan heads a country that is part of NATO. And it would seem to me, I hope that the United States is leaning on him the other way to say no. I mean, what are your thoughts on that? Which way do you? It's an impossible question.

To which way do you think he's going to lean? It is a difficult question. But the question that isn't difficult is that U.S. should be leaning on. We should be. They are part of NATO. They are a long time key, a strategic ally of the United States. We have an opportunity to hand Russia a significant defeat, strategic defeat, and we expect them. At no cost.

At no cost to us. No cost to us. So this is, I think, yeah, exactly. I think this is, now, of course, he's going to ask something for us, right? So that's the way the world works. But I, you know, and we've, you know, when I was in Cunningham, we had these discussions all the time about the YPG, the Kurds, BKK, et cetera. My take, and I don't know if it holds any sway with President Erdogan is, if you're concerned

about the Kurds, then us being with them should make you feel better, right? They're not going to attack our strategic treaty ally in the presence of the United States. I don't think the SDF would do that anyway, but, you know, without getting into the, you know, the whole discussion. I always thought the best argument we had, but certainly was, it did hold sway with many of our Turkish allies, was that the United States being with the Kurds is a positive for Turkey. Right. So if that's going to be the quid pro quo, I hope that we don't go down that room. We need to stay. We need to ensure that our partners are, to your said, it's a very minor contribution that has had a very significant outcome, not just in terms of defeating ISIS and

ensuring the enduring defeat, but strategically against Iran and Russia. And the proof is right in front of us today. So hopefully that he can see that as well. What, you mentioned concessions. What other concessions do you think he may ask for it? Did we ever give, end up giving him the F-16s that were such a huge issue back in? 2016 17 35s no no 35s you know so the question was the

the S300 said he was purchasing from Russia I don't believe he I don't think they got the F-35s him on turn the F3 and I think they might have I don't know

maybe we'll somebody we should look that up I thought that we had offered to give them the F-35s, but they haven't been delivered yet. That's my last recollection of the, and maybe that's the deal, right? Yeah. Don't use Russian air muscle defense, one, because it sucks. Two, you can't, there's an issue of using that in close proximities to the F-35. So that was the other issue. It was an operational security thing. Yeah, so they never got the F-35s because they were

getting the S-400, like you said, the S-400. Yeah. Yeah, S-400's right, the most advanced one. So maybe that's part of the discussions when it comes to making sure that Russia is soundly defeated, does not, is not allowed to go back in to maintain its warm water port or its air base, just a diplomatic presence like anybody else. So in terms of like U.S. interests and national security interests, I mean, we have a legitimate interest in making sure that Syria doesn't become like Libya and like a bastion of like where terrorists can have camps, whether it's ISIS or any other. HTS is technically a terrorist organization, right? So like outside of like the economic, because I don't think we're going to have like a foot to stand on in there unless Turkey really does a lot of a lot of like helps us out. What are those security goals?

Like what are the objectives from now? Well, what do you think you'll... I'm sorry, go ahead. No, you go ahead. Oh, I'll follow you. Yeah, one is to negate that, to deny that area to our enemies, but are adversarial or countries that are whose interests are

inimical to our own, namely Iran and yes, Russia. It's long concerned us that Iran had. I know it's a cliche, but had developed a land bridge from Iraq to Lebanon. And so any interruption of that, because all the disruption that came with that was against our interests. Of course, it's against our interest too, although some may not think so to deny Russia a war border port in the Mediterranean.

That's, I would say, number one. Number two is just having a stable energy-producing country, there and no longer a sucking chest wound that is disgorging immigrants across Europe. And it would be difficult to understate the destabilizing influence that the war has had across Europe since 2011. I mean, the flood of Syrian refugees, Turkey alone is home to what make. I mean, it's millions, right? I think something incredible like four million. but so is the rest of Europe.

There isn't a country in Europe, except for some Eastern countries that have actively blocked them, that is not home to large numbers of Syrian refugees. And the effect on the economy, the effect on geopolitics, you know, the Brexit, the rise of populist parties, certainly in Hungary and for while they're in Poland, and other countries in Europe and the rise of the right, the new right in Germany, all directly related to the inflow of refugees, most of whom are Syrian. So you see what a destabilizing influence to war on Syria has had, you know, across, at least across Europe, I would argue, across the world.

All of those things, negating all of those things, and enabling reconstruction, a stable government, an alternate source of energy for countries in Europe are things that are definitely within the interests of the United States. Yeah, and it's important to point out that the U.S., the only authority we have to be in Syria comes actually from the 2002 AUMMF, right, the authorized U.S. military force related to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, right?

So, yeah, you start with al-Qaeda, you end up with al-Qaeda in Iraq, and then ISIS, and therefore we are there, the authority, the legal authority to stay there is from that. So it's an important mission of itself, obviously to defeat ISIS and sure it doesn't come back. But the secondary benefits that I would say we got is everything Andy just said, right? So it's pushing back against Russia. It's pushing back against Iran. It's cutting up the Iran corridor that brings arms to Hezbollah. It's all of these things. But the authority is the AUMF, the original AUMF. So,

So we're there to help enable a partner to defeat ISIS. But our presence there is beyond just that. And we get a lot of strategic benefit from it. And by the way, if we were, every time we talked about reducing any of the forces when I was in the Pentagon, the first thing we heard from was Israel, then Jordan. And then it went down the list. The countries in the region do not want to see the United States leave Syria, period. period. They might have questions about, you know, what we're doing, who we're doing it with, all that stuff. But there's almost a universal, for my experience, belief that the U.S. does help bring some stability in what would be complete chaos if we left. And that includes on top with this in the southern border area of Jordan and obviously all the positions with the SDF in the east. But the U.S. is there primarily for countering terrorism, but the secondary is countering Russia,

countering Iran. And I think that's just as important. And now it's shown to be that it's actually effective. Al Tath, by the way, is a very interesting place. I've been there a couple of times. I mean, it is, I've got to be careful about using the term shithole, because every time I say shithole on this podcast, we get multiple complaints, because it turns out it's someone's hometown. even Brooklyn. But TAL TANF is the classic shithole, but a very strategically important one.

And for a while, we held it down with, you know, what was an AOB. It was a kind of reinforced company with a partner nation force. And everyone was asking, you know, the media was asking why we were there. But it was a, we were a strategic speed bump and we were

carving out. I mean, it was more than that. But we were, we were establishing just by our presence there. establishing a buffer zone that now is more important than ever. So to mixed point, yeah, I would hope that we retain a presence there, 900 dudes total in, you know, the mid, lower Euphrates Valley, which is, it's a very small amount. But again, goes, and by the way, you know, a large not all, but a large portion of those, the special operations forces. So it goes again to, Why do we have special operations forces, small numbers achieving strategic effect?

I think it's a great example, working by with and through part of nation forces. The other thing, the other thing in answer your question, as far as negating bad consequences and what follows on is, remember this, the Russians have been pouring money and Iran to a lesser extent, have been pouring money into the Assad regime's defense industry for a while, all right? I mean, Assad has, we know he has poison gas. He's used it multiple times, or at least, yeah, it's fair to say more than once multiple times. You know, obviously he's got a fleet of jets. He's got to, even after the Israeli attacks, a significant anti-air defense capability, goes on and on.

All of those assets falling into the wrong hands could spell bad things for stability in the Middle East and for the United States. It's interesting, we may not have had a contingency plan, but as I commented, the Israelis did, and looking, you know, on Israeli official Twitter sites, their Air Force conducted a series of strikes yesterday in over 100 locations, okay? according to them, the biggest air campaign that they have conducted since 1973, since the Yom Kippo War, and what are they focused on weapons production facilities, air defense systems, Syrian fighter jets? I don't know about, you know, WMD doesn't mention that. But clearly that was part of their contingency plan to deny all of these weapons to, you know, prevent them from falling into the wrong hands, which is a good thing. interesting side note because i got a text from a friend of mine uh this morning on this is one of the

issues that may be resolved um if you recall when we went into iraq we were on the hunt for weapons of mass destruction and didn't find many uh some people believe that some of those were transferred to syria so i don't know i'm not going to i don't know i was but a young paramilitary officer at the time on that team. But it would be interesting to know because I imagine there would be some kind of records maybe if they didn't destroy them that, you know, some of these chemical weapons may have came from Iraq. That's for the analyst and the IC to determine. But it's an interesting side note is there's going to be a pretty significant intelligence effort now that largely these folks has abandoned their posts. The intelligence

service especially and they're going to try to see not only that which is of interest to the us iC as a whole but everybody that helped the regime in the last you know 20 years certainly the last 13 years and how they got around sanctions and how they did that it could all be there so there's a lot of nervous people i think companies etc and maybe they should be uh because i think this is going to be this is maybe even politicians maybe even politicians that's right it would be i That would certainly be something that I hope in negotiating with the Turks for our, you know, our intelligence community to get their hands on. I mean, let's see. That would be a significant find.

Finding the W&D at last. 20 years later. Yeah. Hey, on a, no, that's not Richie's sign that we need to be ending. It's just going to go on. on a on a lighter note you know i regardless of who was doing it it was great seeing all these dudes being freed from uh from prisons you know there was um uh something like the big prison in harm i forget the name it begins with s but uh something like 13 000 prisoners being freed

from there and these people were having gone through you know just an imaginable hardship over the last few years. There's one guy who was imprisoned by Assad's father, Hafez, because he beat him in a horse competition, like a show jumping competition, and has been imprisoned since then. You know, but these guys being released and just wandering down the street,

it's just, I mean, you can imagine how that must have felt. I mean, I got a lot of, amidst all the chaos, I got a lot of vicarious pleasure and relief from watching that. Yeah, and I actually got a chance to meet Caesar. If you remember the Caesar Act, it's named after him. He was the guy who smuggled out 100,000s of photos of what they did in the prisons.

I mean, even when he came to the Pentagon, he had to have mask on and all that stuff. But then his efforts led to the Caesar Act, which, of course, and it's got to be super emotional. I have a lot of Syrian friends, some of these to or still do work for the white helmets. So they've been texting me, you know, reuniting with people that have been in prison for 10 years, tortured the entire time. It's, we shouldn't go past that worrying about everything that we should worry about. But we should, to your point, Andy, recognize that for the Syrian people, this is absolutely a hugely emotional experience and one that will never be forgotten in the country. For sure. In fact, and I remember when we were going through Iraq,

we came down from the north. And it was a similar situation where the prisons were being let out. And we were talking to some older man who was going through a translation with his son. And he kept whispering like really, really softly. And finally he started crying.

And, you know, he said, why is he crying? He goes, I told my dad he didn't have to whisper anymore. You know, and now it stuck to me going, oh, wow, yeah, he should never whisper again, right? He's free. And it's something that we should remember, right? We get, you know, we're analysts.

We focus on the national security implications, and that's what people, I think, want us to do. But it's also, there's a very human part of this. And right now it is on display in Syria. Yeah, very well said. I mean, how do we not end it there? That was perfect. Guys, don't forget to check out mix.

organizations, Foguo and, oh my God. Lobo. Thank you. Jesus. Sorry about that. Of course, Mick is an analyst for ABC and eyes on. Don't forget that. I'm coming for George Stephanopoulos.

Don't worry about that. Andy Milburn, his book, When the Tempest gathers, his substack, his link in his blue sky. All the links that you will need are in the description. I've made it very easy. any final thoughts from you guys Andy you said it all not from me stay tuned this week we're going to be extremely busy

we're going to have multiple shows a South Korean general I forgot his name Andy what's his name Lieutenant General Chune yeah won a Korean version of the Medal of Honor in the 80s right when we were nominally at peace

with North Korea because it never really has been peace But when you read the story of how it happened, when you hear it, it's extraordinary. But also a big YouTuber in Korea. Good to see your retired Lieutenant General doing that. Big following, you know, to include among the young with comments about a recent, it's being called an auto coup, right? Auto, not as an automatic, but being imposed from above by President Yun in Korea and what the implications are. And also, his comments about threat from within South Korea.

and from North Korea, you know, something that has dropped off the radar, perhaps, with all these other events around the world. Yeah, so excited for that. And also on Thursday, we're going to have Charles Lister on to give us blow by blow of what's going on in Syria. At that point, we should have a little bit more information coming in, maybe what a government would look like there or like the makings of a government. So it's going to be a busy week at Aizan.

Don't forget to subscribe and like the videos. If you're listening to us on podcast, rate and review it five stars. That helps as well. And support the show. Patreon.com slash the team house. Thanks, guys. This is good.

Good stuff. Thanks, guys. Bye, everyone. Have a good rest of your day.