The Team House - The DC Shooter Worked for CIA | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS

Episode Date: December 1, 2025

In this episode, the hosts discuss various geopolitical issues, including a recent shooting incident involving National Guardsmen, the implications of PTSD on military personnel, and the challenges faced by Afghan allies seeking immigration to the U.S. They also delve into the effectiveness of special operations forces in military engagements, particularly in the context of Venezuela, where military action is being considered. The conversation touches on the legal and ethical complexities surrounding military orders and the importance of congressional oversight in foreign policy decisions.Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseSubscribe to our new newsletter!!!!https://teamhousepodcast.kit.com/joinNew merch, patches, and stickers! ⬇️https://theteamhouse-shop.fourthwall.comCheck out Mick's new podcast here:⬇️Apple Podcasts:https://podcasts.apple.com/at/podcast/pub-and-porch-applied-stoicism/id1836955475Spotify:https://open.spotify.com/show/1k3QPmkAMwnGJxMLDwUSSd?si=n6piIu8XRcag1Z0K43A3bQYoutube:https://www.youtube.com/@UCd0Hq6QFk8CoTu5j-VU0Ong Find Mick Mulroy here: Fogbow ⬇️https://fogbow.com/Lobo Institute ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/Twitter ⬇️https://x.com/mickmulroy?s=21&t=-Ze3F_Ix2vlJ18KFvORTCALinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/Bluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.socialMick’s publications ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/publications/publications-of-michael-mick-patrick-mulroy/Find Andy Milburn here: Twitter ⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substack ⬇️https://amilburn.substack.com/Andy’s book ⬇️https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-OperationsBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialFind Jason Lyons here: LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?uBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.social"Karl Casey @ White Bat Audio"00:00 Start01:25 The Shooting Incident and Its Implications09:44 Understanding PTSD and Its Impact on Veterans16:38 The Role of Afghan Allies and Immigration Challenges20:06 The Efficacy of Special Operations in Modern Warfare25:04 Trust and Partnership in Military Operations30:27 The Role of Advisors in Warfare36:17 Venezuela: Military Action and Its Implications45:55 Legal and Ethical Considerations in Military OrdersBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hey, guys, welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm Dmitz Contacos. I'm here with Mick Mulroy, Andy Milburn. Not going on as usual. Start off with, we had that shooting incident that happened in D.C. Where two National Guardsmen were shot, I believe one has passed away over the weekend. The other one is in critical condition. You know, it was a former Afghani.

He wasn't a commander. He was a translator. He was a translator, right, that worked for like the zero units that were connected with the CIA, make you obviously have, you know, pretty intimate knowledge about what, you know, what the units were doing there and stuff like that. I saw a lot going on in terms, not, I guess, politically where, like, you know, the administration pulled away, like, any and all immigration and visas for, like, any pending visas for folks coming from Afghanistan to the United States. Um, so there's, it's become kind of this like back and forth. You see it in the veteran community and people who have worked with, you know, indigenous folks that helped us, you know, tremendously.

You probably wouldn't have been able to do any of the things we did there without them. Uh, they're kind of being demonized and stuff. And, uh, obviously what this guy did was abhorrent and fucking horrible. And he should rot in jail. Um, but I don't think that, you know, labels the entire community. Right. So, Nick, what are you thinking about like that? I know you're pretty tight with, you know, you know these people, a lot of these people and stuff like that. So you have intimate knowledge. Okay. So I don't know this individual specifically, and I agree that this was a deplorable cowardly act. And the person that did it should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. And now that this young soldier has passed who is simply doing her duty, the fullest extent of the law is going to include potential for the death.

So my thoughts are with the surviving soldier, the staff sergeant, and obviously the family of both. It's just a horrible. I do agree that don't condemn the entirety of the group based on the depraved actions of one individual. If you look at this year alone, we've had a service member run a car through people in New Orleans. We had been killed 14 people. We had another one. So the first one was a soldier. Second one that I'm just off top of my head.

You attack the church in Michigan, Marine. The third one that I could think of the time of head, shut people on a pier in North Carolina, another Marine. So obviously horrible on all fronts, but we don't condemn the Army and the Marine Corps in its entirety for the actions of those individuals. So that's where I'd start. And yes, I'm very familiar. There's certain restrictions on what I can say. The person to my knowledge, and this isn't from my bit, knowledge from being in the service in the agency, it's just from the press releases. He was a, he was a salter with one of them, one of the main units that we had over there.

And he, according to the, again, media, 10 years, he was in service. And I could tell you that that unit saw some of the hardest fighting in Afghanistan. It was almost nonstop. Right. So even if you look at folks that went over and came back, went over, then came back on our side, these guys never left. So it was operations every night. I would like to point out, although it's not really relevant to this, is this idea that they were like a walking human rights violation is patently untrue.

And if it was the case, then there's a whole generation of CIA officers and military officers that condoned it and essentially were okay with it because we were completely embedded in charge. So I just find that to be, it's one of those things. agencies you can't defend itself because we can't really talk. But it's just untrue, whether it's, you know, a foreign journal writing it or a U.S. And if it is the case, then they should have had a DOJ investigation and the oversight committees should be going crazy. But you know why they're not?

Because it's not true. That's it. And I don't know the exact process. I was involved with the T.F. Dunkirk, because this is long after I got out of the government, of helping get Afghans that worked with us out in this special immigrant visa process, which is a law that was passed, and I think the 2009 NDA, which gave the criteria. And I do believe that we had an obligation to get the ones out that met that with the strong caveat that they still have to be vetted.

and if they're a threat to the United States, then that would void the obligation, right? I think inherent any obligation to bring you in and make you a potential citizen is that you're not a threat to our fellow citizens. So I do think what should happen here is they should follow the facts. This could...

It's probably a PTSD thing. I don't know that. but if I'm looking at what happened, a revolver driving across the country, the ambush style thing, but again, the facts should lead or the facts lead, not speculation by me or anybody else.

I don't think there's a problem with, you know, reviewing our vetting process, but I think we should accept that any vetting process is mitigation of a threat. It's never going to be elimination of a threat. And that includes us, like going into the military or the CIA or, you know, vetting to be a doctor or a lawyer or whatever.

It's, it is, I think we have a very festive system. There's nothing wrong with reviewing it to determine whether we actually do. That's one side of this. I also would strongly urge not condemning an entire population of people based on the actions of one, obviously, that's un-American. But some of the, you know, the flip side, not of that, but the flip side of re-looking at who we're letting in is a lot of these countries don't have records. They don't actually have what we need to do vetting. Not this, SIV, because we kept those records.

But a lot of people coming in from some countries, like there isn't anything there or there. They can't really inspect, it is my understanding. If that's not true, then I don't know why we would have a ban on them. If it is true, then we're going to need to review that. But that, because this expanded from this individual and this program to like everybody coming from, you know, 30 countries, I would just caution that that should be reviewed. But ultimately, if we can do solid vetting, I don't think they should be restricted, but we should really look at our processes. I think that's very fair. but hopefully, and I saw several people who have been champions start coming out of these groups,

and I, you know, on behalf of them, I appreciate that, because it's not easy to be talking about this right now from that perspective. It's way easier just to be the one saying, boot them all out and all that, and that's just not, I think, fair, just like it wouldn't be fair to veterans to base our values, and worth on individuals that might have had a psychological event. Yeah, I, you know, whenever anything like this happens, there is always a surge of kind of a desire understandable in the public for vengeance, right? It's kind of closing the door, the stable door after the course is bolted. And yes, the crimes are horrific, and so everyone feels compelled, of course, to express rightfully sympathy for the victims. But these are such complex issues, right?

You know, Mick, you mention that PTSD was likely involved. Well, of course, it was likely involved. You know, you mentioned to the scale of combat that these units were in. And, you know, I wish you could talk a little bit of more about, about, you know, in general terms about these units because, yes, indeed, they were. And they had a degree of combat and for a period far longer than most American troops could even imagine, you know, Americans rotated in and out. But the Afghans and the Iraqis, for that matter, they lived these wars. There was no escape from them. Again, you know, every time we start talking about this, we feel compelled to say.

But what they did was horrible, but, you know, PTSD is an awful thing too. You don't, and that sounds like such a vapid, facile thing to say, but it, it changes people traumatically, right? I mean, doesn't it? You know, I mean, it, it makes good people do bad things. We know that. We have seen that. There's no denying it. We've, and, you know, on a, on a, on a, on a different scale, we've all known guys who've come back and taken their own lives as a, as a result of PTSD.

And, and in every case that I've known of in the months, sometimes years before they have taken their lives, they were no longer the individuals that they used to be. So, again, I mean, this isn't, this isn't just a. an empty rant about the tragedy of life. It's a fact that we cannot, you know, we want to feel this desire for vengeance. We want to strike back. We want to now say, okay, ban every Afghan from ever coming in. But that's not the solution, you know, because the problems that cause what the things that have happened are infinitely more complex.

It's the same thing with the Marines you mentioned, Mick, and the discussions that we had leading up to this podcast, the two Marines who did horrific things and murdered innocent people, right? And you look back, though, at their, they weren't always like that. So what changed them, you know, again? And, okay, so what's the solution? Well, the solution obviously isn't to let these people off. And the solution perhaps is to look, I mean, there's multiple things.

things, but it's a social issue, deeply buried social issue. And the answer is not simply to cut off immigration. And last thing I'll say in this, Mick, I'm sure you agree. I like saying that anyway, because it gives me some sense of authority. But, you know, this country's made it hard enough for Afghan veterans, the friends of the United States to come in. The last thing that we need to do is make it even more difficult. That's my opinion. You know, we've deserted our allies in many ways. We've we've raised barriers, we've left them, you know, not just Afghans, you name it. I mean, before them to some extent, Iraqis. And of course, you know, the Vietnamese, I mean, we haven't been good about enabling people

who have helped us in these wars to come to the United States. We don't need to raise even more barriers. That's just my thought. Good point. And we have a long history of, unfortunately, leaving our allies behind. And then the community, military, intel, special operations community stepping up. Right. So I'm in Montana.

If you go down to Missoula, on a Saturday during the summer right now, there's a farmer's market. And you get there and you'll see a bunch of mong, a lot of mong. and they have most beautiful vegetables, by the way. And you're like, how did you guys get here? Well, how did they get here? Because a bunch of CIA paramilitary and military special operations vets brought them from Laos when we decided we didn't want to do that anymore

and all those people were going to get slaughtered. A lot brought them over and Vietnam. Right? So now there's a memorial in Arlington. Not a lot of people know. but you can Google it, find it, to our indigenous partners from Wales and Vietnam and their service to the United States

to turn that conflict. That's not any different with the Afghans who put it all in the line, and quite frankly, they've been annihilated by the Taliban for working with us. So I'm all about making sure that they are sound and not a threat.

I think if they're going to review things, now, they should also review who's helping them. Right? So sometimes you get into a status where you can be here, but you can't work. Think of the problem with that. Right. So if there's something keeping somebody from going, get gainfully employment, and then we're complaining about them not being employed, you can see the problem there, right? So, and I understand there's a lot of bureaucracy, and there's only so much folks can do. But I think if we're going to do a review, if we see it, we ought to also do a review to how to help people, essentially help themselves. So if they're in some status that doesn't allow them to work, let's change that.

Let's change that and let them work and basically make a living and not be, you know, a burden to others, either taxpayers or other folks. It's a big issue of self-worth. I think we all know that. So let's review it for everything, both suitability to be here and what are we doing to make them successful because that's, I think, in all of our interests, including society at large. But again, absolutely a horrible event, and I certainly understand and share in the outreach. Mike, what can you tell us about the program that he was involved in?

So it's, you know, obviously, I usually just talk analytical stuff, but there's a lot out there on this program. It's a sensitive issue, you know, because it's easy to write about CIA stuff and then write all this bad stuff. The CIA doesn't generally doesn't answer. So I want to take the opportunity to point out that that's not the case. And I can tell you there's people in the U.S. military special operations, you know, Socom, all the way to the top, and the H.T. All the way to the top, that have worked on these programs and spent a lot of time years like myself with these programs. They, I think, to put it bluntly, we would have lost thousands of more soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines if it wasn't for these units, not just what they're referring to as a zero units, but also the commandos and the other units that work directly with the U.S. military exclusively. If it wasn't for them, we would have lost meek and Google how many casualties they had.

Those would have been Americans, right? And by the time we left, and that really disastrous withdrawal, very few Americans were on the front lines. We were losing very, had very few casualties, which is why I was so opposed to just the way we left, rather than leaving a residual force. We largely got to that position because of these other units stepped up to the fight. And they did so without hesitation. and I think that has to be remembered. Another interesting point for these particular units is there was never a friendly fratricide ever.

And that was an unfortunate occurrence in other units, but we never had one. We never one attempted one. In fact, when I was at the Pentagon, I would be asked because they did a review of the whole green-on-blue fratricide in Afghanistan in and I was pulled in, not as, you know, the policy guy, but the guy who spent a lot of time with these units and the question was why. I think it was because we were completely embedded

with them. We had folks that went back continuously to the same area. And, you know, I'm not saying that wasn't done, but it just wasn't really done, but by the military. And I don't really know the answer. But it's an important point, and it's actually been studied. So the idea that this person would come here and then do this. It's just, it's an anathema to me, and it's just horrible, obviously, for the individuals, but also for the community and everything that's been done by so many people to try to help these folks get into the United States.

I just hope we review that and do the right thing going forward. And that's both the security of our citizens and also carrying out our obligations to those that should be here. You know, picking up on something that you just kind of mentioned, Mick, that perhaps people don't realize now because it's been a long time, but it's been 11 years. Really, the conventional war in Afghanistan ended. I know people are going to critique me for that, but that's true. Conventional troops pulled out basically in 2014. And from then on, the war was being fought by units like the agency and by special operations.

forces, by with them through Afghan forces. You know, obviously, in the end, the war was not successful, but by and large, those efforts were more successful. I'm generalizing here than our conventional type operations. And that's kind of a trend, right? Wouldn't you agree with, see how I'd do that? But, you know, the lighter touch that we have with more specialist troops, better we do. You know, you think about El Salvador, you think about Colombia, you think about

the Afghanistan after the, after 2014, as you put it, that we were continuing the war. You know, we were holding ground. We were doing relatively well with very, with relatively low casualties because of our use of indigenous troops and special operations troops. It's a really, it's of an interesting comment and yet when we go in large scale conventional forces we kind of make ourselves a target and operating that sort of environment and counterinsurgency does require it requires specialist troops people are going to disagree with me for that but it does you know i think about our time and i was with a conventional infantry unit i was a commander of a conventional infantry battalion before i went over to special operations

And yeah, we did, you know, of course, I'd like to say we did a great job and, and, and, but we paid heavily for it. And the average battalion going through Anbar back then was losing. And you know, this is no exaggeration between 25 and 45, sometimes higher than that dead and several hundred wounded. And our gains were very temporary. But then going back as a commander of a siege of SOTIF where we took very few casualties. we were able to have a tremendous effect on the Islamic State. Yes, different environment. But my point is simply this, that that is, I think, an important thing to learn about going ahead,

that the light touch is maybe we consider going into Venezuela now, that the big invasions just don't work so well for us, right? But the influence, the putting in highly trained teams to work with Indeastern. indigenous forces, that's worked pretty well over the years. Even in campaigns, things did not. I agree. In fact, I mean, we obviously have the best, most powerful military in the world. Conventional forces are what's going to be necessary to fight and win wars, right? But the long-term, irregular warfare-type scenarios of counterinsurgency,

it's in many ways counterproductive. It's counterproductive as it tends to build more insurgents. It's counterproductive because it's very politically sensitive, which matters in a democracy. When you see, you know, young men and women coming back in wars that don't have an in date. So it's absolutely essential that we have the ability to do partner force operations in these long-term low-intensity conflict, although they don't look so long intensity to the people that are in them. But you know what I mean? it's imperative.

So, and this is now, now you can see how this is coming back around on each other. In order to have the ability to do this, you have to have trust. You don't have, if you don't maintain your obligations, if it's simply, everything's temporary and no commitment is valid, it's going to make it very difficult for the U.S. to do significant partner force operations in the future. And not that I'm running to get into the next one at all, but if it happens, we have to have the ability to do that. And it really is a combination of the advisors, for lack of a better description, and the force itself.

It's a combination of the two. You can't just have like some remote proxy force like Iran does and expect it to be that effective. It has to be the combination, which fuses experience, operational planning, intelligence support, all these things. And with a unit that's willing and able to have this joint mission. And of course, abide by human rights, just like it was a union. U.S. unit. But that's going to be necessary going forward. You never know what's going to happen. And we tend to find ourselves in more regular wars than we do conventional wars. But we have to be ready for both. And I think this kind of ties the two together. I know I think we're talking about

Venezuela next. Hopefully we're not talking about a long-term counterinsurgency operation there. But we need to have the capacity in our in our quiver, if you will, going forward. You know, I was there when we did the irregular warfare annex. That was a big part of it. You know, we got to understand that the history of warfare is primarily, if you look at the majority of them, irregular. Right. So we have to be able to do both. And one's not better than the other or anything like that.

Conventional forces, you know, if there's, you know, if there's a third world war, You know, the special operations folks like myself and Andy are going to be, I think, participants, but aside, you know, compared to, you know, the major efforts are going to be conventional. But the irregular wars, we've got to be ready to fight it. Part of it is having a word that you can trust from all the groups around the world. You know, the other thing that I thought was very interesting that you said, Mick, about the low number. of incidence of green on blue. And by the way, for everyone, green on blue is when we refer to that as intentional fratricide, right, from our partner nation indigenous forces. And that became a

prevalent trend in Afghanistan, sadly, for a period of time towards the end of conventional force involvement. These advisor teams were taking casualties not from the Taliban, well, from from hidden Taliban as it were among Afghan troops, and yet among Special Operations Forces, those incidents were far lower. And I think, you know, what is different, I think part of it is, and again you hit on this Mick,

was just the nature of how we operate, those Special Operations Forces operate deeply embedded in indigenous forces. They don't go home in the evening to a separate camp. you know, the contrast was clearly there in Afghanistan. You can look at the numbers and the fact that, yes, fractal side. It did occur on the special operations side, but it was at a lower rate. And in Iraq, it was almost unheard of among special operations forces,

and yet it did occur among some of the advisor teams and certainly against conventional forces. I mean, in Mosul, 2005, Fob, Marez, one of the worst suicide bombings in Iraq against U.S. troops occurred. And it was sadly an Iraqi soldier blew himself up in the mess hall on Fob, Marez, killed 14 soldiers, number of contractors and some locals. And yet, you know, I was in Mosul at the time living in a ruined hospital. with an Iraqi company with, you know, six other gringoes and same, you know, literally living in the same room as these guys. And it never, it just never occurred to us, you know, even after that incident. And I think it gets to, you know, why am I talking about this? Because it gets into the nature of what special operations do, right?

Our security is that, that trust, that sense of share. danger with people. And I know, for instance, serving an Iraqi with an Iraqi battalionist and FISA, I know some of those dudes were bad dudes, but for some reason they didn't try and kill us, you know, because we were maybe just too close to them. I don't know, but it didn't happen. But again, it gets back to this mentality of what is security, right? Security is not, and the Israelis are learning this, we'll learn this, have learned. this. Security isn't putting yourself behind layers of security fences and high-tech, automated weapons, etc., etc. Security comes from really understanding not just your adversary,

but the population, the people you're working with, what motivates them. And as hokey, though, it may sound, it comes with sharing their experiences and the danger with them. And the last thing I'll say on that is, so returning as a siege of Sotomaster, to Iraq in 2016, when there was this policy of remote advise and assist. I don't know if you remember that, you know, where you virtual advise and assist, right? You had this virtual kit that you could give your partner and they went on and fought the enemy, the Islamic State,

and you stayed on the thob and you could track them like it was a game, right? And you knew where the lead trace were so you could call in air support. And there were people who really thought that was going to work just as well as having soft teams. moving with, living with Iraqi, you know, Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. And of course, we learned that, no, it doesn't. In the end, we ended up having to accompany them. And of course you do.

And there's always going to be that human element. It's never going to be replaced by technology. And that is, you know, that's your security. And that's your path to success really in those environments. Yeah. And if I could, I'll throw in something for D here. There's a pretty famous episode in Greek history during the Peloponnesian War in Sicily, right? So, Sicily was aligned with Sparta, and the Athenians had decided to go take out basically a proxy or partner with Sparta.

Sparta couldn't, you know, obviously was outnumbered during the whole Peloponnesian War. Couldn't send too many. So they sent what would be what we would call advisors, like six of them. right? And there's a, it's actually written about, as the Athenians were coming up, and they were trying to take the last, last elevated area that the Sicilians were in control of, and then they saw the scarlet capes, right? They saw the Spartans standing there. And part of it was just already the Spartans had the reputation of, you know, the ultimate warrior. And part of it, they didn't. know how many more Spartans would be coming. But it completely changed the battle. It inspired the Sicilians. It challenged the fortitude of the Athenians who were slaughtering the Sicilians until then. And so I use that often because it really does, I think, show what advisors or special operation forces, grain berets, seals, Marsok, raiders, paramilitary folks can do with a willing

and capable indigenous partner force. And it's not new, obviously, that was Middle Asian War, but it has that effect. And I think we could do a lot more, which would save a lot of American lives, if we embrace that as one of our main models in a regular warfare. And it can be, it can play, apart obviously in a substantial confessional fight too right because that was as we saw in the last 20 years we had both going on at the same time so it's almost always relevant and i know this is we've gotten now talking about partner forces but it does have relevance to what we started which is this yeah this event terrible well hugely you know and i think uh i think conventional forces understand that uh but they but i don't think that

that, for instance, Army and Marine Corps leadership has struck the right turn and how do you select and train these guys, right? It's not any soldier Marine can do this type of stuff. That's why Special Operations guys tend to be so good at it, but they're low-density, high-demand. So, you know, there have been efforts like building this S-FAB brigades, which have now been, you know, that plan has been abandoned. And in the Marine Corps, I know we... What does S-FAB mean?

Security force assistance, right? Brigades. So they were brigades whose sole mission was to do what we were talking about, working with indigenous forces. The British have formed a rater regiment, a ranger regiment, right? Out of, you know, it's not, it's mission not the same as U.S. Raider Regiment. Sorry. Ranger, Regiment. I keep defaulting to the better. Rangers do real well too. We kept that. I've included them. Yeah, but, you know, but they formed a Ranger regiment out of three infantry battalions and their purpose was security force assistance, which is, you know, working with foreign militaries.

Because everyone realizes that, yeah, that's, that is one of the aspects, likely aspects, future war. And we could talk on this show about the rise of private military companies too, and the resurgence of private military companies across the battlefield, where they're talking Ukraine, from my own experience, or most recently in Israel, because they fulfill a lot of functions. Of course, using soldiers to do the same things, a little bit different. The governments have more skin in the game, but nevertheless, the principle is the same that you're leveraging foreign forces to do, frankly, your dirty work, right?

To take the casualties through the brunt of the fighting. And it's a good idea. But striking that right formula of using the right guys, because again, not every soldier or a Marine makes a good advisor. So you have to have some kind of selection process. Maybe it doesn't have to be as tight as the special operation selection process. But you need something there. There's a unit called the, what's it, Seesore in Canada?

I think they do fit in also like direct action. They're like a mixed between. Yeah, it's Canadian Special Operations Regiment. Yeah. Very, very similar, actually, in makeup to the Marine Raider Regiment. We, I had a contingent of those guys in the Seychasotif in Iraq. They're very, they're very good for Canadian. We just had a guy on too a few weeks back on the team house that was in Csor who was in, yeah, who's there.

Also, if you guys are interested in learning more about the zero units or the Omega teams or whatever, Jack Murphy and Sean Naylor wrote a pretty in-depth article about them on the high side. So you could check that out. No comment from Mick. I think Mick was commented in it, but you didn't, it was like, you didn't do anything. It was like a normal regular comment. You didn't confirm or deny anything. Yeah, so let's push on to Venezuela and what's going on there.

It seems like every week we're hearing more and more that it's going to happen, more staging happening. There were some pictures that came out today of some F-35s and stuff like that in Puerto Rico. President Trump tweeted out something that like, like, what is it? It was like an unofficial. no dam basically like no one should be flying or doing anything near around the area of Venezuela where are we at with that what's it look like is there any diplomatic talks why are we even doing this I mean we've asked that question a million times yeah have you noticed before

mick says something that's insightful and serious have you noticed though then when we talk about Venezuela a numbers plummet it's like no one gives no one gives us shit. I mean, we could be... I think the national security, like people who are interested in this world, do give a shit, but I think for the vast majority of American citizens, they can give too fucks. Yeah, it doesn't affect that lives. No. Only 30% support any military action in Venezuela. But the buildup is there, right? We've talked about it a lot, so I don't reiterate. Everything's set for some kind of action. And when you're making statements like closing in the airspace over an entire country.

One can expect that that means something, unless this is some giant bluff. We have also talked about how poorly run Venezuela is and how abhorrent Maduro is, which is all true. Just to give you an idea, it should be one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America.

Instead of that, and 8 million people have to leave the country because they couldn't find food. So it is terribly run, and Maduro's illegitimate. So if they were to uprise and install somebody like the recent Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Maria Machado, that'd be great. I just don't know how we can necessarily orchestrate that,

unless that's what's going on right now behind the scenes with the clandestine diplomacy, if you want to call it that, probably led by the agency. If he leaves, then I think he will get credit. He'll be in the president, we get credit for Oikogi. and that would be good for the people of Venezuela. If it doesn't work, and there's stuff on the internet saying that he is scared to try to leave because there's Cuban intelligence officers around him that won't let him. I don't know if that's true.

Then it's either a big bluff or we do something. And I think that something is probably going to be limited to airstrikes, but it's important to note that if we start attacking them, even if it's the drug infrastructure, which could include ports, airports, they might attack us, right? So conventionally, it's not even a match, but it's important to point out they do have anti-ship missiles.

Air launch from the SE30s, I think they have KH31 alphas, which are Russian-made supersonic. launch from an aircraft, I think there's like 140 kilometer range, and they do this weird deal where they, it's kind of like nap the earth or the ocean. It stays very close, so it makes it very difficult to intercept. And then as to get closer, it gets closer and closer to the water, right? They are effective against destroyers, which we have destroyers. I'm not an expert in that.

If we have listeners that are, they should, hopefully they'll chime in and say, Yeah, it's a threat, but it's not that big of a threat. I think from people I talk to that they're like, yes, it is a threat. And if they launch them all at the same time, it could be problematic. But we have a lot of ways to mitigate it. But my point being is, we blow up a drug factory. They launched these anti-ship missiles. And there's also sea-based ones.

So they have Iranians versions. One destroyers hit casualties, Americans. That's how this escalates. We all know us. if we take casualties, we're not going to stop. We're not going to say, okay, let's turn around and go, that's not the way America rolls. That's how this could escalate. So I would just highlight that.

That is a potential. And if we are actually going to do any kind of ground-based operations with troops, potentially like special operations to apprehend Maduro, that brings a lot of risks too, a lot of risks. You know, there is, the place is completely, apparently submerged in surface-to-air missiles, thanks to Russia. So that's also a significant issue. We dealt with that before. I'm not saying that means we don't go. But these are the risks that the administration is taking, especially with the level of sport that you pointed out the American people and no authorization of Congress that I can see.

So that's, that looks like where we're headed. You know, your guess is good as mine, but we see all the indicators. This is either a big bluff and hopefully it works, or they're going to have to transition into an actual error missile campaign or something to that effect in Venezuela. And that brings risk with it. I would, I think, you know, not that anybody's asking me, if this is where we were headed, I would seriously talk about the consequences. the worst-case scenarios, and try to bring a U.S. population on board rather than distract toward it, listening to it. Yeah, it kind of gets back to the end of the day.

What do we get out of it, really? And it's a, I'm not arguing either way. I'm just, I don't see, I suppose I am. I mean, I don't see, I don't see solid American interests being forwarded. And as you pointed out, there's a significant risk. I mean, we've all been at the point of the point of the American foreign policy before. And sometimes, you know, sometimes when it's for a coherent purpose,

of course, that's the way it goes. And when they're a discernible American interests that justify that risk. But it's hard to discern what those interests are right now. They're not connected to the drug trade. are we going to overturn an unpopular and tyrannical despot maybe but we don't have a good history in doing that either i mean we can we can overturn them but we're not good at dealing what comes afterwards and we just don't seem to be collectively learning that lesson right and there's

no guarantee that machado is going to be like uh on a ticket tape parade and they're going to crown her queen and everything is going to be perfect and democratic right like yeah it'd probably be his henchmen the takeover so that's a that's a very good point the other the other other thing, of course, if we go into a full conflict, our adversaries are going to make a of it. So Russia, Iran, all of them. And the issues that we're concerned about Venezuela could likely intensify. So they already have a significant humanitarian issue thanks to the incompetence of the government, right? 40% at least are on humanitarian assistance of the country. That could go up to 80, right? If there's an actual conflict and where are they going to do, they're going to leave.

Are they going to try to come here? That's an issue that's caused the consternation against Maduro. Potentially, a large-scale conflict could enhance it and give our adversaries an opportunity to try to further embed themselves in a country in our atmosphere. So these are all, I mean, there's never going to be a right or a perfect decision in this complicated manner, but hopefully all these factors are being considered when it comes to,

Because this could go in the wrong way and right. And even at the start, there doesn't seem to be a U.S. interest from the population, from the polls, in doing anything. Because the poll question is simply military action, which could include just airstrikes for one day. Right. So this should probably be talked through and they should either gain some support or rethink what they're doing. Obviously, I think stopping the drug flow is important, but this is well beyond that. Columbia, Peru, even Mexico are bigger contributors to the drug. And I don't think anybody's talking about going to war in all three of those countries.

And yeah, you could just keep double-tapping narco boats, you know, to stop the drug flow. That's going to be. We have to see what the true facts of that. That's serious, a serious situation. I think that that should basically let the facts, and it shouldn't be condemning folks. Because that would be condemning folks up and down the military chain of command. And I don't think that's fair to them, just based on them. Yeah, yeah, because, you know, and I don't need, we don't need to go down this path,

five minutes from the end of the show. But this whole thing about following orders, illegal, illegal, it's one of the hardest parts about this topic is there isn't always a clear distinction between legal and in an illegal order. I mean, there just isn't. I mean, there is when you look historically, right, because the victor decides what is legal and what is not illegal. So quite rightly, and Mick, I know you saw this movie, I want to see it, you know, quite rightly. We held the Nuremberg trials. And that was, and that was, that was good, right? Not just because we are the victors, but those were in accordance with international norms, and there are such a thing, it's international

norms of behavior, and, you know, murdering people, killing unarmed civilians, killing innocents, killing prisoners, let alone, you know, what happened during the Holocaust, all those things are clearly on the dark side of good and bad, right? But there is definitely a gray area, and when you're working for, when you're serving the military of the United States of America, and you're automatically, default is that what you're going to be ordered to do is legal, it's not always easy to tell what is legal and what is not. We've dealt with this ourselves in our own recent history with enhanced interrogation. Okay. And I'm not, you know, I'm not taking sides on that. I'm saying

that the Supreme Court came out and said subsequently that a whole bunch of stuff was illegal that at the time people, some people thought was legal and were ordered to do. You know, So it's not easy. And people need to be aware of that. It's not, you know, I think a lot of a senior military leaders, I hope, are knowledgeable enough and think enough about that profession, that they know that there is that gap. There's that space where we are supposed to not be automotence and simply follow orders. There's supposed to be a space where we make that decision, deliberate decision, is this a legal ethical order, right? And that is why we're the United States of America.

And that is why those of us who held commissions, held commissions, because we're not automatans. We don't simply, we're not something you press the button, we do it. And if we don't do it, we disloyal fucks and we get charged with treason. That's not the way the United States military works. It's an immensely, it is a complex issue. So I just want to throw that out there without jumping on either side, just to say that in this debate right now about illegal and legal orders.

It's clear to me that many people do not understand the issue. And they're going to do an inquiry into this from the Senate Armed Services Committee. I mean, that was said by both the chairman and vice chairman. So that should be what leads this, not just, in my opinion, speculation based on one. Yeah. And it is good to see the Senate actually doing its fucking job for once. Oversight is supposed to be done over every element, really, especially in national security. You know, this oversight committee on foreign relations, military, intel, and that's their job.

Bipartisan review. And, yeah, you're right. They need to do that not just because there was an article written up, but just in general. That's their job, yeah, right? It's what they're paid to do, a part of why they get, why they're on those committees. Yeah. Congress is supposed to do many things constitutionally, right? I mean, they don't always, but I mean, I agree with you.

The Senate is generally the more mature, obviously the more mature chamber, but you hope that the Senate can be counted upon to carry out their constitutional duties, regardless of political affiliation. Sure. I mean, yeah, I brought it up because. I brought it up because of like the vote that they did to not have a vote about. Yeah. You know, we talked about that, yeah.

Yeah, that's why. And that's concerning because the role is oversight. The role is absolutely supposed to be a check on the power of the executive. I mean, that's part of, that's all part of our constitution, right? It's supposed to be messy. And at times, a seesaw. That was the intent of the founding fathers. I know that's an overused argument.

but it's absolutely the case. We should be frightened by the prospect of a weak Congress, of a Congress that does not ever want to challenge the executive, regardless of who's in power. Anything else, guys? That's it. I want everyone listening in Washington to do us a favor. I want you to like and subscribe.

I want you to rate it five stars on Apple or Spotify. I want you to check out Mix New Podcast, the Pub and the Porch, Applied Stoicism. Those links are in the description as well. Andy Milburn's got a great book when the Tempest gathers. That link is also in the description. And you two are working on something new that should be coming out soon,

and I'm excited about that. So I don't know if you want to say anything now or we'll hold it for later. It's up to you guys. Yeah. Unless you want to talk a little bit. Let's get it done first. So we're talking about it. Yeah.

We are working on it. It's real. We're working on, it's a regular warfare study. Yeah, so, you know, keep your eyes on, ears off for that. We'll obviously let you guys know when it comes out. And thanks, guys. This is great. We're also awaiting our invitation to the Team House Christmas party.

There is no Team House Christmas party this year. Yeah. I don't know. Just decided against it. You guys wouldn't have came anyway. You're halfway around the world. Mick is too. He's in Montana.

Virtually. How the mighty fall in and the weapons of, of war perish. Thanks, guys. You guys are going to have to come out here one time and do it at the Whitefish VFW? I'd love to talk. A podcast from the Whitefish VF2. Yeah.

It's a crazy bunch. I bet it is. No shortage of snow either, I would imagine. No, not at all. Is that snow in the background? Yeah. Oh, yeah. Great.

Everyone must be happy in Montana. Thanks, Mick. Thank you, Andy. All right, fellas. Hey, guys. Hey guys, I want to tell all of you today about a new newsletter that we're launching that encompasses both the Team House podcast, the Eyes On podcast, and the High Side News outlet, which I run with Sean Naylor. The newsletter is going to be once a week. It's going to come into your inbox and you're going to get the most current podcasts on Aizon and the Team House and whatever's topical or current on the high side. So it's another way for us to get the information out to you as social media algorithms are pretty iffy and you never really know what you're going to get.

So this is a once a week email. It'll slide into your inbox and it will have, you know, the greatest hits of that week. It's really good, man. Checking it out. The website for it is teamhousepodcast.com.com slash join. Teamhousepodcast.com.com slash join. you go there and you enter into your email list or you enter your email into the little thing on the website and you're good to go and that'll be it. So we really appreciate your support and hope you'll consider

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