The Team House - To Strike or Not to Strike? (Iran) | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS
Episode Date: March 24, 2025Today we speak about the potential strike on the Iranian Nuclear infrastructure, whether the U.S. does it with Israel or green lights Israel to go it alone. we also talk about the ongoing airstrikes o...n Houthis positions in Yemen, the failed ceasefire in Gaza, and the Ukraine war ceasefire deal and how our own special envoy is parroting Russian talking points and how that probably isn't the best way to negotiate.New merch, patches, and stickers! ⬇️https://theteamhouse-shop.fourthwall.comSupport the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseFind Mick Mulroy here: Fogbow ⬇️https://fogbow.com/Lobo Institute ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/Twitter ⬇️https://x.com/mickmulroy?s=21&t=-Ze3F_Ix2vlJ18KFvORTCALinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/Bluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.socialMick’s publications ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/publications/publications-of-michael-mick-patrick-mulroy/Find Andy Milburn here: Twitter ⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substack ⬇️https://amilburn.substack.com/Andy’s book ⬇️https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-OperationsBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialFind Jason Lyons here: LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=ios_appBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.sociBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.
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Discussion (0)
And they only have a one-track economy, energy infrastructure.
So he wanted that because that's the one thing that would advantage him.
And then all the other things you said, it's complete maximus, give away nothing,
ask for everything, and then try to get the other side to fight each other.
They're beyond getting the other side to fight each other because they literally have a special envoy repeating Russian talking points,
which even, obviously we should be on the sign of Ukraine, but even if we're just a media.
You don't repeat any side's talking points.
That's not the point, right?
You go in, especially in public, as a mediator, you just keep talking about the end state.
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Hey, everybody.
Welcome to another episode of Eyes On.
Dimitri here with McMulroy, Andy Milburn.
Lock cooking, since we've last had an episode.
So, you know, get a comfortable seat, sit back and relax.
the world's falling apart.
I'm just joking.
Not really.
The big news coming out of the U.S.
is it seems like the rhetoric
that's coming out is that the U.S.
is gearing up for a possible airstrikes
on Iranian nuclear facilities.
It started earlier this week
with us bombarding the Iranian-backed Huthis.
I love when, like, media companies say that.
That's like they got like a notice from
wherever they get a notice from that they always have to say,
Iran back to Houthis.
And they've been hitting the Houthis.
I feel like it's been harder than other air strikes that we've seen over the last year or so
since they've been scurred around in the Red Sea.
Yeah, let's just start with that because everything kind of like entangles into each other.
And Israel is sending a delegation to D.C. this week to talk about an attack plan,
whether the U.S. is involved directly or gives Israel the Green,
like to just let them go with, I'm sure, support from us.
Because you know Israel's like clamoring for it, you know, hitting Iran.
So Mick, what do you got on this?
Like, what are you tracking?
Well, there's a lot to cover there, D.
Yes, there's quite a lot.
Absolutely.
Let's start with the Houthis.
So Ansar Allah, that's the other, that's their name, actually.
As you said, Iran back, they are a proxy of Iran.
They're not the greatest proxy of Iran if there was a scale, I think, has a
what would be on the top as far as being able to direct them and taking orders, etc.
The Houthis are a bit of a wild card, but they are Iranian back and a proxy.
And ultimately, Iran has the influence if it's not just stop giving them weapon systems that they can hit ships with.
So you got to be a little skeptical of Iran's claims that they don't have the influence they have.
So I would first start with commending the current administration with taking a harder stance in my view against the Houthis.
Not only have they been a threat to U.S. military assets, which includes, of course, are sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines.
they have been conducting direct terrorist attacks against commercial vessels,
killing and injuring civilians that have nothing to do with any of the conflicts going on.
And it's important to point out they were doing a lot of this before the war in Gaza even started.
So they use that as their reasoning behind it, but they were doing this prior to that even happening.
So I think it's time that we take all the necessary military steps to degrade them to a point of being unable to continue the attacks.
They're never going to change their philosophy on attacking the U.S. and Israel.
It's literally in their national motto.
But we can kill all the leadership and we can destroy their ability to attack innocent civilians board commercial vessels.
which of course this region, about 40% of the energy of the world comes out of this region.
It's mostly dependent on by the Indo-Pacific region, not us.
So good on them for that.
Some would say this could also be a reason to flow a lot of assets.
Some you just mentioned.
The USS Carl Vinson is also steaming from the Pacific to the Middle East to link up with the Truman, another aircraft carrier.
So we're putting a lot of regional assets out there, which I think sends a signal both to the Houthis in the signal being we're going to attack you harder than you've been attacked before, but also a signal to Iran that you see how we're dismantling your proxy force here if you don't come to the negotiation table for JCPOA 2.0 or whatever we're going to call it, which hopefully will include addressing Iran's.
use of proxy forces in the region as well as nuclear ambitions, then you could be next.
So I think that I think there is a very, I don't, obviously no decision has been made yet,
I don't think, but I think there's a very real possibility that the U.S. could be
looking at if Iran has a breakout toward a nuclear weapon.
They have, they could easily get to the amount of enrichment they need.
They have to come up with the triggering mechanism, which they could get from Russia or North
Korea. But if they do that, I do think there's a real possibility that the United States,
either in conjunction with or unilaterally, strikes of facilities and tons and the other
nuclear facilities you mentioned. Andy? Yeah, I agree with Meg that the strikes on the
Houthis are, you know, renewed strikes are, they're overdue. But, you know, the concern has
never been so much the number of sorties were flying against the Houthis. It's been it's been having
intelligence that is useful enough to result in real-time targeting. In other words, I mean,
just the nature of Houthi operations means that no matter how sophisticated are intelligence is,
they are able to shoot and scoot and clear the area before we can cause really serious damage.
Now that's, you know, we are plinking away and we are causing casualties and, you know, essentially we're creating a tremendous attrition for them.
So one hopes they cannot sustain these efforts for long. But they did fire another rocket at a missile at Israel the other day.
So, you know, they aren't, they aren't yet completely on the ropes. And it is the way we're doing things.
Again, it's the only thing that we can do. This isn't a criticism. But it is.
is inefficient and it isn't as effective as it may appear.
And to really go after the heart of the problem would be bring pressure on Iran.
And so it's hard to tell what the administration is thinking,
but definitely that must be foremost in their mind at the same time.
To mix point, you know, Iran, by the end,
certainly, you know, the last,
by the last information that the IAEA has,
that's the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran was able to,
was producing about seven kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%,
which is just below weapons grade every month,
which would be enough to make about two nuclear bombs per year,
if enriched further.
Okay, so that was towards the end of last year.
since then the IAEAEA says that their intelligence, their information has kind of dried up.
At the same time, the Israelis are saying open source, their intelligence guys are saying
that they are certain that the Iranians are making a determined approach for breakout,
that they are doubling up on their centrifuge activity and that perhaps even more worryingly
they've moved their centrifuges into areas that are deeper than before.
Let me just say that much.
Okay.
And so it's kind of interesting.
Ahud Barak, who's a former Israeli prime minister and was until recently a firm advocate
of the Israelis going after, kinetically going after the Iran's nuclear capability,
is now saying that he doesn't think it's going to take, do any good,
that the Iran's program is now too advanced, too deeply buried, to take out without U.S. help,
all right, without bunker busting bombs, as the media likes to say.
So that, where does all this put it? Oh, the other thing is, do you remember back in 2020,
the Israelis killed the most prominent Iranian nuclear business?
I mean, it was the end of a, it was a culmination of a campaign of going off to nuclear
physicist, but this guy, his name was Mosen, I'm going to mispronounce it, Farisadei, and they took him out
using that.
It was like an automatic machine gun.
It was a very unusual type operation.
And the problem is now, apparently, and this is according to the Israelis, that there are now
five or six of these guys who've replaced him.
which is probably predictable and are working even harder at upgrading enrichment process.
So all of this is to say that, yes, there are, you know, Israel has been a really bad,
I'm sorry, it's been a very bad year for Iran.
You know, they lost their president and helicopter crash.
They had been struck twice by the Israelis and were unable to.
to bring down a single aircraft, according to the Israelis
and certainly open source information
seems to back the fact that they've been largely denuded
of their anti-aircraft
or their integrated air defense systems.
And so it does seem like a good opportunity to strike.
And from our own president's rhetoric,
when he talks about taking the next step,
obviously that would be the next step.
But perhaps not quite so predictable.
And when we look at some of the internal politics within the administration,
two of the biggest Iraq Hawks, sorry, Iran Hawks are out of favor.
Remember, what was his name?
Brian Hook was a big opponent of, he was the Iran envoy in Trump's first term.
And he and Pompeo,
were all about going after Iran.
And now they've had their security clearances withdrawn.
And actually, Hook was fired shortly after President Trump took office this time.
And then you look at Eldridge Colby, right?
And it's kind of the pen against policy chief who's saying that we did that the intent now is to focus on the Far East.
I mean, absolutely do it this time.
So, you know, hard to tell, it's hard to read anything, any coherent messaging here.
Yes, I'm tracking the movement of aircraft down around, you know, to include supposed
the landing of F-35s in PSAP, which could be, you know, for a number of reasons.
I mean, we, and moving the aircraft carriers to the region, we do these things all the time
as kind of a signaling mechanism.
It could just be part of our messaging to Iran that we intend to play hard.
But I don't know.
It's a long way of saying this, but I don't know.
I mean, there's certainly mixed messaging.
But I'll finish by saying that last year, I posited that the Israelis, if they wanted to,
could strike and have serious effect upon Iran's nuclear capability.
And that appears to be no longer the case because of Iranian moves.
So they would, apparently, if the open source information, we believe, they would need U.S. support for this.
Yeah, and on that point, the munitions, when it comes to doing this is very important, right?
So the GVU 57, I think.
To my understanding, we're the only ones that have it.
It can, it's about a 30,000 pound massive ordinance, penetrating bomb that can go around 200 feet below the surface before it detonates.
And to Andy's point, it's probably necessary to actually have the effects we want on the facilities based on what they've done with them.
So that would kind of necessitate the U.S., I believe, unless there's only a certain amount of aircrafts that can carry that, too.
So I'm not an air guy, so I'm not going to get too far.
Yeah, I was just looking that up.
Who carries it?
I think it's B2.
Only to B2, like the F-15 can.
I mean, it's that big?
I'd look it up, but there's only a certain amount.
It's 30,000.
Think about it.
We talk about, you know, these huge J-Dams that are 2,000 pounds.
It's 30,000 pounds, right?
Yeah.
So that's one point.
The other point I would make that Annie made earlier,
certainly agree it's more than just your intent when it comes to
to demission the Houthis part of the way the intelligence apparatus
in the United States work it's the most effective I think in the world
but it is finite so they only have you know what they have
and they often shift based on policy interests of senior leadership right so
and I don't know this to be necessarily true but when the Biden administration
de-emphasized the Houthis, took them off the terrorist list, the chances of the intelligence
community than shifting collection on them as high. It doesn't mean they just dumped it, but, you know,
based on these signals, they would shift. So now that there's a new administration,
who's obviously more interested in being effective against the Houthis militarily effective,
the intel has to catch up. So it can catch up pretty quick, but it has to be retasked in some
cases to really get that solid picture. And I think one of the reasons why they're talking about
leadership targets in the hood and Yemen right now is because the intel is catching up. So good for
us, bad for, you know, the hoodies. Hey guys, it's Jack. I just want to talk to you for a moment
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Thank you.
And yeah, it can only be carried by Big Bombers, B-2,
and probably the B-52.
Okay, that...
Yeah.
You 57?
Yeah.
Yeah.
So that means also to Andy's point, you got to get rid of the integrated air missile
defense system of Iran before you really conduct these strikes.
Right.
These are big, big aircraft.
And they're going to be coming in, you know, the way they do.
So they're going to have to take out a lot of Iranians.
So the best case scenario is they come to the table and we come to an agreement that keeps them
from getting a nuclear agreement, stops them from paying every.
militant group in the region to attack its neighbor and it gets sanctions removed off the Iranian
people so they can join the world economy and do well, right? That's the way we want to go.
We shouldn't want to end up with a military strike because the question is, what's the reaction?
What comes from that? And it's, you know, let's say we don't do it. But I think the diplomatic
path forward, which I think the administration wants to see is the path. But it's really going to come
down to Iran, who so far don't seem to be interested, probably I at all.
Yeah, I mean, in fairness, not in fairness, but to be accurate, you know, Iran's,
Iran's in a quandary too. I mean, they've lost their missile stockpiles last year,
their air defenses and regional allies, you know, with downfall of Assad and also the demise of
Hamas, Hezbollah on the ropes, and now the Houthis. And so on one hand, that does make a nuclear
option more attractive. But on the other hand, they're in a very poor position to weather the
fallout if they are caught in the process of dashing for a bomb. And, you know, the Israelis have
shown, have demonstrated a remarkable degree of penetration of Iran over the last year, too,
which means that the Iranians are probably concerned that they cannot break out without the rest of the world
or make a rush for a breakout without the rest of the world finding out.
You know, so there are, I mean, they've got a new president who seems a moderate,
but was it, Pezeshkin, but he's a, you know, he's a weak president with very little nuclear,
has very little say on nuclear policy.
So, you know, even but those with real power within the administration, the Iranian regime, do have good reasons to cut a deal.
They're in a, you know, they're in dire economic straits.
And I've said, you know, they've lost their allies.
And they must be, you know, even if a combined Israeli-U.S. strike doesn't achieve its objectives.
that's still going to leave Iran in a very poor position just from the fallout.
So I think, you know, I would be surprised if Iran doesn't broach some kind of negotiated settlement.
But to mixed point, and I agree absolutely, the missing part from the Jigpoa was a lack of leverage,
are both our inability, but we didn't even try to bring pressure on Iran to stop its, you know,
its gray zone activities, use of proxies in the Middle East. And now, of course, specifically
the Houthis are the main problem. Just for anybody listening to Jikpal is the first Iranian nuclear
deal with, on the Obama administration, just FYI.
Yeah, and you know, Britain, France and Germany, who are rarely aligned on Iran, have all said that they would be willing to, you know, reimpose just the full gamut of pre-2015 sanctions in Iran.
And they said that, you know, as recently as December, focused on nonproliferation.
So there's certainly a lot of pressure.
and Iran must be sensing the pressure to negotiate.
And they've got internal problems too.
You know, they can probably talk about it better than I can,
but they're dealing with, they have never been totally impervious,
certainly not in the last two decades,
well, not since the Orange Revolution,
whenever that was 2009.
Was it orange or green? I forget the color.
But they've never been impervious to public opinion.
I mean, they have, yes, their elections are shall.
elections, but they, nevertheless, the regime is concerned when there are rumblings of discontent,
and there are increasing rumblings of discontent within Iran. They've got a very highly educated
middle class that wields probably more power than the most countries in the Middle East,
or more influence, and they are unhappy. They're unhappy with Iran's adventuring overseas.
They're unhappy with the isolation, and they're especially unhappy with the economic
situation. That's true. They are very unpopular. And another thing you reference is the president
actually is more focused internally, right? So the Iitol and all the, they make all the big decisions,
the nuclear decisions, you know, frolicing overseas and IRGC and all that. But they are, they are a very
unpopular regime in Iran. And, you know, if they do enter into the JCPOA 2.0, this could be very
good for the country, which wants it. So there's a way ahead that's clearly best for the region
and best for Iran, or at least the Iranian people. But right now, the regime seems to be only
focused on the regime, which is what usually regimes focus on. Staying in the area,
Israel restarted its military action on Gaza, a ton of airstrikes, ground force movements.
they've really like turned the heat up i would say um they've also started bombing southern
lebanon some hesbala positions as well so ceasefire seems to have you know be gone make uh what are
looking at there yeah so i mean part of this was because israel wanted to extend the first
phase of the ceasefire right so that would mean hostages still come out uh Palestinian prisoners
are released and humanitarian aid comes in in large quantities.
Hamas wanted to go to the second phase because that means the IDF has to withdraw
and essentially the wars that were.
And the third phase, of course, gets into reconstruction on that.
So Netanyahu wasn't going to be able to hold his coalition if he withdrew the IDF.
Not that the world should care necessarily about Prime Minister Netanyahu's political future,
but that's the reality for him.
So Hamas then rejected the extension.
So that's just looking at it from their perspective, right?
So there's no humanitarian aid coming into Gaza right now.
That shouldn't happen, but it is.
Hamas doesn't apparently care, right?
Because they could extend the first phase and they could release hostages
that never should have been taken hostage in the first place.
And we could be where we are.
But they aren't.
So I think because the administrators came back into the government,
Smoltrits and Ben-Gabir,
there's probably a good likelihood that we're not going to see a ceasefire anytime soon.
I don't think they would have came back in without talking to Netanyahu,
and then there's a ceasefire that that's the reason why they left it in the first place, right?
So that's my speculation.
I don't obviously know anything specific,
but I think we're going to be set for a pretty long, extended period of fighting here.
It's in the north, it's in the central, and it's in the south.
I think the whole time during the two-month ceasefire,
they were collected intel as I would be too, and preparing for this phase of the operation.
So that's why it happened so quickly when it did.
And that's why it's quite frankly been very effective going after, you know, what's left of the leadership.
And I think this is going to keep going.
Israel is claiming that they're going to create these humanitarian zones where people in Gaza would be going to, hopefully to receive humanitarian assistance.
But anybody left out would be deemed, you know, enemy combat.
And that, you know, from a military perspective, would be easier.
But it does appear to be, you know, serious population control.
And then, of course, we still have these reports that countries have been approached about taking Gossans, which, again, is very impractical and likely unlawful.
But that's where I think we are now.
There's also, and I know, you know, I stick to national security and politics, but there's a lot of politics going on in Israel right now.
So the beginning of the fighting again was super unpopular by some.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has fired Shimbak.
They're basically their internal service chief.
Apparently the cabinet's now removed the Attorney General.
I would call it a constitutional crisis for Israel,
but they don't have a constitution, which is one of the reasons.
So there's a lot going on right now, internal strike inside Israel.
You know, the far right thinks it.
The judiciary has too much, sound familiar, has too much authority.
The far left thinks basically Prime Minister of Yanjahus went from a traditional conservative
to some kind of French monarch where he hits it on himself the state, right?
The state is meat.
That's kind of, I think, a thumbnail sketch of the current situation.
But it does affect the war, right?
So this could have a profound effect on the war.
And so that's why I bring it up.
But those are what I see going.
Now, Lebanon, let's hope it doesn't kick back off the people of Lebanon and certainly
people in northern Israel.
But they have to be able to get control.
That's one thing.
The government in Lebanon has to get control over the armed factions in Lebanon.
They have to.
They have to figure it out.
Or Unifil needs to figure out how they can do more.
which I don't have any confidence in.
But they're literally, if they just say, well, it's not us.
It's that group of people that are in Lebanon that are attacking you,
then it's going to kick back off.
What are you in?
Yeah, so I mean, the war is intimately bound up with Israeli politics.
You know, Netanyahu did a number of things to kind of line this up.
following the previous chief of staff of the Australia Defence Forces and bringing in
Lieutenant General Zameer, who is a, I wouldn't say a Netanyahu loyalist, but seems to have
used to have aligned with Netanyahu.
And Zemir has said, you know, he favors a longer campaign, bringing armored divisions in on
the ground inside Gaza to root out Hamas fighters, which is, you know, obviously having a
catastrophic effect on the population there. I mean,
the repossessing, re-displacing population again to these so-called humanitarian zones.
And, you know, infrastructure has pulverized. They've been dealing with near starvation now for
months. So, you know, again, we shouldn't forget the scale of misery within Gaza.
That doesn't affect Israeli politics. I don't think most Israelis really.
that really factors with them. But the deploying the number of divisions that Zemir envisions for his war plans is going to have a severe effect on the Israeli population. It's going to include tens of thousands of reserve troops who've yet to be mobilized, okay, with all the following effects on the economy and disruption of lives, that will have an effect. You know, for Netanyar himself, the timing of his results for a renewed attack on government.
was politically fortuitous.
His coalition was in danger of losing its majority
on the eve of a critical budget vote.
And if that had failed to pass,
then it would have prompted early elections.
And then, you know, as Mick talked about
within hours of the strikes on Gaza,
Itimir Ben Guevier,
who's an old friend of this program,
leader of the far right Jewish power party,
and he had left the government back in January,
and then he returned to the fall, which indicates, yes,
that there was some kind of deal between him and Netanyahu.
Certainly, Netanyahu is anxious to rally his base
because of a controversial attempt to fire the head of the Shint Bad,
and the Attorney General.
There are investigations into Netanyahu's close aides
who were alleged to have leaked classified documents
and received payments from Qatar.
and then, of course, the corruption charges against Netanyahu himself, right?
And then, you know, it could be that the Supreme Court could block some of these efforts,
Netanyahu's efforts, political efforts on the grounds, a conflict of interest,
which would, again, lead to a constitutional crisis, which has been building since before the war,
frankly. I mean, remember the fact that his coalition wanted to pass sweeping legal reforms to weaken the powers of the Supreme Court. And all of that was kind of eclipsed by the war, but it goes bubbling on in the background.
So it does look as though, you know, regardless that there is going to be some kind of political crisis in Israel. And the renewed offensive in Gaza provides, I'm sure, well, not I'm sure.
short provides a welcome distraction to Netanyahu and his, uh, his prodigies.
Uh, yeah, I mean, Mick, I remember when, uh, the ceasefire first came into effect or they
were like close to it and we were talking about the points of it where like phase two kind
of didn't seem like, uh, really viable of an option where like the IDF backs out and then some
other magical security force comes in and keeps the law and order.
stuff. So, I mean, it's, as a cynical person that I am, it doesn't really seem that shocking
that Israel wanted to extend phase one because phase two was, uh, fanciful. Yeah. And there's,
and part of this is the rest of the world isn't stepping up, right? So yeah, I remember when Secretary
Blinken last administration went around asking all the countries in the region about a multinational,
you know, peacekeeping force, if you will. They got a,
big no, right? So, so that's off the table. So what's left? Is there some kind of version of,
can they train, you know, the former Palestinian police? Can they train Palestinians that are
vetted and not associated with Hamas, for example, or PIG or J, excuse me? I guess they could.
Maybe that should be happening. Seems like something that the international community could be doing.
Or they could go with a private company. And, you know, there's always issues with
private security because you know who's who's who's who's who's lost they fall under who are they
um you know when something bad happens all of a sudden the government's it hired them are pointing at
them so i mean i'm not saying any of these are easy but i mean from israeli's perspective
they're not going to turn it back over to hamas like that's just not going to happen i don't
care what side of political spectrum you are in israel that that solution is is a non-star what about
the palestinian authority it's like
I know there was some talk about like, no, they're not, not them either.
Well, I mean, the reason why the last administration called them the revitalized Palestinian stories,
because largely they're viewed negatively by the Palestinian people.
They are, for the most part, ineffective and certainly corrupt.
So there has to be some new version of that.
And then under that, there could be a trained, you know, keep the peace force, right?
easier said than done.
And I spent a lot of time training partner forces like that.
But the best day to plant a tree is 20 years ago.
The second best day is today.
So if they intend this to ever have a time when the IDF can withdraw and Palestinians can take care of their own security,
which means also Israeli security, right?
So not allowing any group in there to attack Israel.
It's got to start.
So it doesn't seem like anybody's talking about that.
Yeah, so one interesting thing about, a number of interesting things about what's going on.
I mean, the IDFs really, they're not, it's not so much, well, they are fighting on forefront.
So they're maintaining a robust presence on forefront.
There's Gaza, where they are going on the offensive again.
Southern Syria, you know, beyond the Golan Heights, maintaining a presence.
that in accordance with Netanyahu's declaration that he did not want the HTS pushing south of Damascus.
The HTS, of course, is the ruling party in Syria now.
Then you've got the West Bank, where the Israelis have mobilized reserve battalions
to bolster their presence in the West Bank.
And of course, Lebanon, you know, they've got five.
they're maintaining five fortified locations in southern Lebanon,
which, by the way, you know, you can look at this as you want.
You can say it provides, you know, in justification of the government,
it provides a buffer zone and for the security of Israeli civilians in the north.
But on the other hand, and the Israelis encountered this during that 20-year-long occupation of Lebanon,
it provides Hezbollah caused detra to rise again.
again, right, to expel the Israeli occupier as a kind of focus of effort.
And it continues to keep kind of the sheer resentment simmering.
So, you know, it's a double-ed sword.
The other reason, I mean, it's unlikely, who knows whether the U.S. administration will
come down on the Israeli government and have them downscale any of these military presences,
anytime soon, but the pressure is likely to be internal and it's likely to be economic.
You know, Israel's economy has suffered hugely since the events of October the 7th and they
continue doing so.
Not is not, we're not just talking about loss of tourism and all of that.
We're talking about, of course, the cost of the economy of having a significant proportion
of the population mobilized as reservists.
and a lot of the guys in all of these locations are reservists.
And as I mentioned earlier, in order to continue the offensive thing, it's a Gaza,
they're going to have to mobilize many more reservists.
So there's going to be there's significant economic pressure to kind of downscale these commitments,
but there doesn't seem to be an end in sight.
Mike, you got anything?
I mean, it was pretty succinct.
We covered all that.
I just want, yeah, go ahead.
Yeah, I was just saying there's another aspect here that Netanyahu doesn't seem to care about.
I think probably some of his generals and some of the more moderate members of his coalition do too
is the fact that they are burning bridges rapidly with two of their most important partners
and regional partners.
Partners are a strong word, but their neighbors, Egypt and Jordan.
And relations had never been worse.
well, not never, not since
73, okay?
Relations have not been worse with those
than those two countries
and they are now. And there's, you know, I mean,
you can say where you want and
Netanyar, you can pound his chest and say,
we're the biggest bully in the neighborhood.
But on the other hand, if
you're going to burn bridges like that,
there's going to be a cost.
And it's worth
remembering that 50% of Jordan's population
are Palestinians and are
incensed about what is going on.
in Gaza and there's a long, porous border with Jordan. It's quite easy to cross. And so, you know,
you can't, and of course there is with Egypt. You can't help thinking that that Israel may be
sowing the seeds for serious problems over the next decade. Jesus. All right, let's go to a little bit
more about this for a long time. Yeah. Let's go to season 10 of Aizan. We'll be talking about this.
happier news, I guess, which I'm joking.
The Ukrainian ceasefire.
Lots of gone out since I think we last spoke.
The U.S. and Ukraine came together and had a ceasefire proposal for 30 days to not hit infrastructure,
like an energy infrastructure that didn't last more than like four hours.
Putin put out his own plan, which seems to be, you know, zero concessions on his side,
obviously, like what to be expected.
Why would he give up anything when our own side is the United States anyway is happily happy to give him as many concessions as he's like as he'd like.
Trump and Putin had a two-hour phone call the other day.
And a very, I'm going to bring it up.
The very interesting interview with Tucker Carlson and Steve Whitkoff where Steve Whitkoff, I mean, was, you know, I guess describing the relationship between Putin and Trump.
being the best of friends.
And it's just,
it's kind of wild to see that this stuff's coming from inside the house,
where Putin is somehow,
some way,
somebody who could be trusted in any way to negotiate.
And it's coming from our own officials, for the most part.
And it's disheartening to say the least.
And forget it if you're from Ukraine.
I mean, at that point, or Europe.
So that's just me running my mouth.
Nick, what do you think?
Well, I'll try to start with one positive is, you know, at least we're talking, right?
Because you're never going to get to a ceasepart negotiated settlement without talking.
And the other point is, you know, Ukraine is not losing, right?
I mean, talk about a group that's been completely underestimated from the beginning until now.
And there's a plausible way ahead if Europe steps up, that even if the U.S. steps out, which would be a huge mistake, not just for Ukraine and our status in the world, but for all our relationships going forward, who would deem us a completely unreliable ally and partner.
But there is a way that Ukraine can stay in the fight.
I want to be easy, easy, but Russia is losing so many troops right now that,
even though they could care less about that personally, it eventually runs out.
And they're gaining very little terrain with the amount of expenditure force.
On the issue of the ceasefire, essentially Russia rejected the ceasefire proposal by the United States.
We keep saying, oh, they said yes and then said, but only infrastructure, energy infrastructure.
And by energy infrastructure, I mean our infrastructure.
because they immediately turned around attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
And really the only reason why they're focused on energy infrastructure is because Ukraine has been incredibly effective against targeting Russian energy infrastructure.
And they only have a one-track economy, energy infrastructure.
So he wanted that because that's the one thing that would advantage him.
And then all the other things you said, it's complete maximus, give away nothing, ask for everything.
thing and then try to get the other side to fight each other.
They're beyond getting the other side to fight each other because they literally have
the special envoy repeating Russian talking points, which even,
I mean, obviously we should be on the sign of Ukraine, but even if we're just a mediator.
Right.
You don't repeat any side's talking points.
That's not the point.
Right?
You go in, especially in public, as a mediator, you just keep talking about the in state.
But you also don't talk about what's called, you know, for the policy,
you know, for the policy, once.
I think it was a final status issues.
That's what's supposed to come out the other end.
You don't talk about it publicly because that's the whole point of the negotiation process.
So, you know, I was not taking advice for me.
But, you know, I would advise that we are openly for Ukraine because there are partners
and we did Promise M Security guarantees back in 1994.
before and that General Kellogg should be running this thing as he was.
But at the very least, stop talking about it publicly, stop, stop issuing declarations on final
status issues and start coming up with sticks for Russia because they're not going forward
with this unless we start talking additional sanctions, enhanced security assistance.
So more, not just what we were given, but more.
and then, you know, whatever else we can come up with for sticks,
and then give Russia a reason to come to the table.
They'll start losing terrain if we double down on our security assistance.
They'll start losing the funding to pay for the North Korean troops,
the Iranian drones, if we further damage their economy through sanctions.
So that's how you get across to Russia.
You could complement them all day long.
They'd be happy with that, but it's not going to make it Hill of beans.
they only understand consequences.
And if there's no consequences,
then they're just going to drag this out until...
And the last point that I make is
Prime Minister Maloney made this, right?
So the conservative Italian prime minister,
the only reason why Russia cares about security guarantees
is because they intend to attack Ukraine.
If you don't intend to re-attack Ukraine,
then what do you care about security guarantees?
It doesn't matter, right?
So I think Europe's waking up, and that's a good thing.
And they should have woke up a long time ago.
They're going to work on their own defense.
And I think they're going to quadruple down if they need to on Ukraine because it's definitely
in their interest to stop Putin in its tracks in Ukraine and eventually, you know, get
Ukraine into the European Union and then whatever version comes out of NATO, if that's really
where we're headed, which would be a mistake if we leave it.
Oh, one more point of that.
if we actually get Europe to the point where it is an extraordinarily effective military force,
all paying twice as much as they used to pay on their own defense, and then leave NATO,
that would be from a strategic perspective, incredibly short-sighted.
We would literally have to make up in our defense budget where we just cut ourselves away from
by leaving the NATO, although I don't think it's going to happen.
But since people like to talk about this so much, it would make no sense from the U.S.
solely the U.S. perspective to leave an entity that's now a incredibly effective fighting force,
which Europeans will be one day.
All right.
Off the soapbox.
Andy.
Yeah, you know, the problem is that Mick and I agree on too much stuff, so I'm not going to.
You know, I couldn't word it better than Mick did.
You know, I agree with him and all those counts.
So I'll just approach this from a very different and perhaps a personal level.
So first of all, you know, I'm not going to rail away about.
about the, you know, are my concern about the fact that we seem to be cozying up to Putin.
My feelings about the Russians are well known.
And maybe I'm just overly emotional because they did try to call me on a number of occasions.
And I take that very personally.
And, you know, it's a mixed point about Europe stepping up to the plate.
And actually playing the mature party in all of this.
I think it's, you know, spot on.
And, you know, just as a comment, too, because invariably, and I read, when I read the comments about our appearances on, on, on, on eyes on, and we've got some great supporters and we've got some people who reappear and, and I call them supporters, too, but they're kind of, they're motivated by hatred and resent, but, and they regularly critique us increasingly for a lack of loyalty to.
to the United States, which seems to be absurd.
But I would like to comment about this,
you know, this whole discussion about what the defense of Ukraine stands for,
et cetera, et cetera.
You know, I mean, I spent 31 years in uniform 14 wars on the behalf of the United States
from Mogad issue all the way through to the fight against ISIS.
And, you know, one thing that that I never really,
never really made sense to me is when people thanked me for defending our freedom.
because our freedom has never, has never been at threat.
This country has not been, not during my lifetime.
And, you know, while I certainly acknowledge and appreciate the thank you for your service and all that,
but this constant talk about how we're defending the freedom of the United States was all bullshit when it comes down to it.
We were doing what we had to do.
you know, I'm not
undermining the patriotism
of my comrades and arms, but
we were doing what we had to do on behalf of our country
on behalf of the national interest, but we weren't
defending freedom at all.
Ukrainians are defending freedom.
Okay, maybe not of the United States, but of Europe,
and they're defending ideals
that I sometimes found difficult to align
with what we were doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
That is why it makes sense for
guys like Nate Fants
who we interviewed the other day
or indeed myself with the guys in the Motsar Kru
to have been in Ukraine when we were doing what we did
and you know that's probably why I need to say on this
and why it makes perfect sense now
and continues to make perfect sense
that Europe is stepping up to the plane
and that it makes no sense at all
to rely on Putin all the Russians to hold the peace
I mean, you don't even have to be a student of history.
You just have to read the news over the last decade or so to understand that.
And it probably brings me, and I'm sounding like an angry, you know, one of our angry listeners.
But, you know, I think a lot of the problems with this cozying up to Russia right now,
and I'm watching the welter of weirdness on social media.
It comes from people who are really, really fucking ignorant and just don't.
They don't even read recent history.
They don't understand geopolitics.
That's really what it comes down to.
And it's sad.
And it's, but the isolationism in the last century has not worked well for the United States.
And it won't work well now.
That is all.
Yeah.
And if I can make one point on it, what Andy just said.
You know, as far as patriotism versus the alternative being, I guess,
treachery.
When I look at it, your patriotism or lack of their up has to do with your fidelity to the
Constitution and your service to the country, right?
So you could be, you know, Mark Kelly, to use the example, somebody who was called a traitor,
obviously isn't, or Mike Walsh, right?
It shouldn't be based on your political position.
If that's the case, that's not patriotism.
That is, that's just partisanism.
And, you know, that's the way I view it.
So if you're calling somebody a traitor because you disagree with them politically, I mean,
you might want to redefine your definition of patriotism.
And that's not just what, you know, names we recognize, but, you know, obviously have a lot of friends that served.
In fact, most of them.
And they're from across the political spectrum, right?
But I don't define their service to their country or their status as a patriot or not based on, you know,
whether they're far right, far left, or somewhere in the center.
if you do then we just fundamentally disagree on the definition of the word yeah very well said by both
you guys um i have a question um there is a prevailing thought that i'm seeing um that the russian
economy now how it's constituted because of the war is heavily reliant on the war continuing
and that might be a reason why Putin is apprehensive to make it
deal. I think that's bullshit, but that is a prevailing thought that's going on right now.
Because at some point, I mean, you lose enough guys. I mean, what is your economy without the
people in it to work it? The next generation. I mean, I don't know. I'd like to hear somebody
who kind of thought that through. I'd be interested to hear from somebody who knows more about
economies, economics than I do, but explain it. I don't know. I do think right now he thinks
he could still gain territory and potentially, I think that's one of the reasons. But if this is
another, I'd like that. I'd like to hear it. Yeah, I don't, I haven't heard that D. And to me,
I'm not an economist, but it simply doesn't make sense. You know, the, his, his, the economy's
taking a shalacking. And I think it's, I mean, I think it's just much more basic than that. Putin has
state everything on this war. It was his war. You know, it was a, you know, it was a, you know,
it was a GRU war and FSB war.
It was not a military.
You know, his military weren't telling him to do it.
They were pretty docile in the face of it,
but there has been since the outset of the war,
increasing a resentment against the administration regime
from within the military.
Remember, Progosians kind of attempted coup
and the fact that he was almost embraced
by many within the army's leadership.
Putin knows that.
He must know that,
and he knows that his position is precarious
if he cannot
if he cannot show
some gains from this war.
You know, I mean, he hasn't
to begin with
for the first 18 months of the war,
he was more or less able to
kind of isolate
the Russian public from the effects
of casualties, but
the war
is becoming increasingly,
is increasingly unpopular,
and he's had to take increasingly
draconian measures to stamp down on
opposition.
If it is shown subsequently
the outcome is shown to be
anything but a victory,
he looks very poor indeed.
And again, you don't,
you know, however strong
insulated he may feel,
just to look at, again,
post-Soviet Union Russian history,
It shows that you've, as a leader, you've got to be dynamic in Russia.
In other words, having success, either with the economy or in some other way,
or you're going to sink and someone's going to come after you.
And Putin knows that.
That is why he wants to prolong the war.
As long as there is a war, there is something to focus on.
There's something to focus.
his repressive measures within the country on something to justify them by without the war
once it ends there's there's there's going to be a backlash and he knows that yeah yeah very well said
um i have one more question having to do with russia i've heard and there is another thought that
the reason why we're trying to reset things with Russia is because we want to drive
a stake in between Russia and China.
And that's why we're doing that.
That's why we're being buddy, more buddy, buddy, buddy with Russia.
I agree.
I feel that's bullshit as well.
It's always, it's been a long-term policy objective of the United States,
the Sino-Soviet split going back to, you know, Kissinger and all that.
I mean, it's not a bad idea, especially you're in the Soviet Union times, a Cold War.
It's not going to work.
I mean, it's just not.
And, of course, ours is going to cycle, right?
So we'll have, well, we haven't really ever had anybody who's pro-Russian as president.
So let's say that.
Yeah.
But as it cycles, we're not going to stay consistent, put it that way.
the Soviet in in China I mean excuse me the Russian and China leadership is probably going to stay consistent
considering their autocrats so it's just it's just not going to work I mean I think we could try to
drive a wedge but we just have to be realistic and the fact that it's never actually worked
and that coasing up to the Russians is only going to last as long as it's added advantage to the
Russians. So I looked up how many times Russia has debated a country since like 1940, I think,
1930s, late 30s. It's like 11 times, including two countries twice, one of them being Ukraine.
So like the idea that you can trust these folks for a ceasefire, I mean, it just defies,
you know, Wikipedia. Just Google it, look it up, right? So, I mean, the past is prologues, man.
So if you want to see what they have done in the past when they've signed agreements or said they wouldn't do something and then did, there it is.
So be careful who you buddy up to.
It is not in our interest.
Never has been.
And at least with somebody like Putin in charge, it won't be.
The fact that anyone actually believes that cozing up to Russia is going to help us against China shows a level of ignorance that's beyond comprehension.
You know, I mean, let's just be clear.
Russia is a second rate, 10-part fucking autocracy.
It's a paper tiger.
Okay, China is a powerhouse.
We do need to be concerned about China.
But dividing a wedge between the two countries, A, as Mick pointed out, is impractical.
And B, does us no good at all.
And certainly not by cozying up to Russia.
You know, I mean, let's, you know, Russia's our adversary.
You know, we've said this before.
Russia is not our friend.
NATO, the countries in NATO are our friend.
The countries in NATO, as we talked about before, but I was just remind people,
because apparently there are still those who don't understand NATO.
The only time they've activated Article 5 in NATO was in the defense of the United States.
And by the way, that was a very generous extrapolation on those countries' part
so that they could come to an R-Aid in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yeah.
It's, you know, I mean, what, Canada's our enemy now?
I mean, come on.
Right.
And Russia's economy is about half of that of California.
Yeah.
If we want these folks which have zero to trade to be our primary trading partners,
we're in a lot of problems.
They are everything that Andy just said.
And I just need to be careful on this.
Yeah.
again, I didn't believe that.
I'm just saying what I've been hearing in terms of like other shows and folks that think
they're like folks that are in this sphere, I guess.
I've heard that a few times and I'm just like, how does that make fucking sense?
I mean, you just look at like a guy like Medvedev who was like the president there for a little bit while Putin was, you know,
running things in the background before he changed the constitution in Russia.
You know, it looked like there was like a great relationship between him and Obama.
You see him now.
He's full on, you know, full on crazy warmonger dude tweeting off, shooting off tweets that are like insane if you read them.
And the fact is, and we've talked about this before, Andy, you said it.
Like, he was full of shit then.
Just like he's, you know, this is who he really is.
And this is how Russians, the Russian power, you know, power players really do it.
Like, they're full of shit for the most part.
It just frightens me the level of ignorance.
Honestly, I mean, within our own country, and I don't know if it's the education system.
I don't know if it's the fact that we feel insulated by two oceans, even in this area of globalization.
But just kind of, it's more than lack of education.
It's just kind of lack of real interest.
It's as though we just don't pay attention to what's going on in the world collectively.
And it's quite, it has frightening consequences at times.
And watch, there'll be a deluge of people accusing me now of being a traitor and undermining the United States and being a U.S. hater and et cetera, et cetera, against whom, you know, I will again remind you guys that I spent 31 years in uniform defending, not defending freedom.
But on the behalf of the United States and obviously, obviously, in real terms, say Patriot.
Yeah.
Well, boys, that was spicy.
getting Andy worked up and read how he makes for good, good podcast listening.
All right.
Well, Tom.
Don't forget to check out the show to subscribe to the show, like the show.
If you're listening to us on audio, rate it and subscribe there.
Andy Miliburne, when the tempest gathers, a tremendous book, read it.
The link is in the description as well.
Any and all of his links to Twitter, just any link that you want to find Andy, it's in the
description.
Mick Mulroy, Lobo, Five.
doing great work.
All of his links are in the description as well.
If you want to follow Mick on social media, links are in the description.
And yeah, this is great.
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