The Team House - War Plans Leak: A Rift in US-Israel Trust? | EYES ON PODCAST

Episode Date: October 24, 2024

Subscribe to the new EYES ON YouTube channel here:⬇️https://youtube.com/@eyesonpodcast?si=35Wp8hpxwpqEO41nToday we talk about the leaked top secret U.S documents about Israeli movements and preparations for a strike on Iran, the attempted drone strike on Netanyahu's summer home and 3,000 North Korean troops in Russia.Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseFind Andy Milburn here:⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023https://amilburn.substack.com/https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operations#geopoliticsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

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So the link is in the description for the new Eyes on YouTube channel. So go ahead and go to the description, click that link and click subscribe so you don't miss a single episode. Hello everyone and welcome to another episode of Aizan. I'm Andy Milburn. I'm Jason Lyons. Demichun Tacos. Dee, what do we have lined up today? Zalak cooking.

First and foremost, we were talking before the show about what's going on. It seems like there's going to be an imminent attack on Iran from Israel. Yeah, that's the big. This is old news. That's happening in the open source, sadly. Yeah, no, exactly right. That is, you know, that's part of this story. But the attack itself now is not the main story.

The main story is the fact that news of such an attack was leaked, number one. And number two, that the U.S. administration is staying. Actually, when I say that, not publicly, but that they are confident that Israel will not attack either nuclear facilities or Iran's oil infrastructure or reserves, which were the two big questions because we didn't want a global economy to be sent down the toilet. And also, you know, the obvious escalatory ramifications with going after nuclear facilities. Now, whether we've changed Netanyahu's mind remains to be seen. In other words, whether this was really a mind change

or whether he'd already resolved to do what he's going to do and avoid those two things. Or who knows whether the extreme right within Israel will still sway him into taking stronger action, although that does admittedly seem unlikely. So when I, you know, I suppose, I mean, it's so difficult when you're tracing the cause and effect in this type of thing. And I'm not trying to do so by mentioning the Hezbollah drone attack that exploded near Netanyahu's home on the 19th.

He's got like a country home out in Cesarria, a very nice place. And it, you know, neither he nor his wife, no members of his family were home, the blasted. did hit the house, caused damage, no casualties. But he takes these things, he takes these things very personally. And there was an incident back in 2019 when he he was talking to an audience

and an attack by, a rocket attack by, I think it was Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Yes, it was. Definitely interrupted this, political rally and he had to be rushed off the stage by his bodyguards and the photographs were in Israeli media. Okay, now, you know, a lot of people would think, okay, that's, that's kind of cool as leader of the country being shown also to share the same dangers as their people. But this isn't what, you know, who wants. He doesn't want to share the same dangers. And he found those, you know,

the pictures back then very humiliating. And apparently, um, and apparently, um, He, you know, he drove to the headquarters of the Kirae, the headquarters of the Israeli Defense Ministry and ordered the killing of Islamic jihad leader, Baho Abu al-Ata, right, 2019. So, you know, my point is he makes decisions reflexively based on, on threats to himself personally. So let's not discount that attack, you know, and the effect of that attack. that having been said that you know these mysterious israeli and american security sources who keep discussing things and sidebars to the media are apparently saying that there is a u.s-Israeli understanding it's been reached promising to reward israel from refraining from attacking Iran's oil industry and nuclear power infrastructure. And in return, the conversation is going to include

lifting U.S. suspension of certain arms and ammunition shipments to Israel and even accelerating their supply, right, to include the famous D9 bulldozer, which has been a mainstay of Israeli operations in Gaza. Indeed, you know, the D-9, the D-9, as anyone has been involved in an early. fight in the last two decades, the D-9 will tell you, anyone will tell you, is worth its weight in gold. It's like a combat bulldozer and it has multiple uses. And it is in many ways more useful than a tank in those environments. The only thing it lacks, of course, is a significant direct fire capability. But now that there's so many ways to protect such a thing, especially in an environment like Gaza,

It is a, it is an iconic and very effective weapon, although perhaps we're not going to see a rush to be a D-9 bulldozer driver anytime soon in the US MOS lineup. But in any case, so they were also involved in the, apparently in this agreement to provide compensation for the Israeli restraint has been an agreement to step up U.S. attacks on Houthi weapons depots and other strategic targets in Yemen. Cynics might say for what it's worth, you know, for all the good that that has done to date. but there is a feeling now that those are becoming increasingly effective as as u.s. intelligence perhaps gets a little more acute you know on a topic that we have discussed here and and the u.s is already you know the last strike we did was uh it's on the 16th i think and it was yeah that's right and then they went off for the major hootie weapons depot um and by all accounts was effective so we

shall see and maybe I should not be a cynic about our ability to suppress the hoofies. Andy a little bit that B2 hit there was talk about it being more of like a strategic place showing Iran like hey

because like why would we use B2s for hit Houthi targets I just wanted to point that out because like when it happened people were talking about how it's like a strategic move to show I ran like hey what's what's what like we're here yeah i think there were i think there were three reasons one was iran second was israel to show hey look we you know we really are uh serious about that and the israelis now care about the huthies because the huthies have been striking into israel with limited success

but they did get a missile into tel aviv which was symbolically a big deal um and and inflicted a inflicted casualties. But the where's like, yeah, so those two reasons. And then the third reason, of course, is that if you're a B2 pilot, you're watching your career go down the shitter

because all your compadres are getting plenty of trigger time or toggle time or whatever they call it in the Air Force. And even the drone dudes, you know, in Nellis are getting PTSD and stuff.

and metals galore, whereas the B-2 guys are stuck in that, where they're stuck in that basin, Missouri. I forget where, I mean, not Middle East. Missouri. Midwest, yeah, Missouri, yeah. And there's nothing to relieve their routine. So I think, you know, I'm only half joking here. That played into it too.

I'm sure there was a B-2 pilot, senior B-2 pilot involved in the planning of this whole thing. I mean, the strategic level decision to use that platform. And then, you know, on the topic of compensation, the Pentagon is said to be considering, all right, I love that vague phrase, deployment of a second FAD anti-missile battery in Israel. And Fad is also a big deal. You know, the Israelis, their three-tier air defense system is effective,

but not effective enough to, you know, to stand against another onslaught, perhaps like the one that Iran sent by itself, all right? Israel knows it's never going to have to do that by itself, but nevertheless, you know, I don't, everyone's aware that perhaps it has not seen its full saturation, where there is an external attack, and then you have two internal groups, Hezbo and Hamas attacking Israel at the same time. a possibility that until recently seemed very likely, but now seems increasingly unlikely because neither Hamas nor Hisbola is probably capable of launching physically capable launching such an attack. And Iran just doesn't, you know, there's nothing to benefit Iran by doing so. And if you look at all of the rhetoric coming out of Tehran now, it is de-escalatory. You know, that's the last thing Iran wants is to go to war right now. So the third battery, yeah, it's symbolic, but on the other hand, it does, it really does bolster an element of what the Israelis used to be concerned about being one of their critical vulnerabilities, their defense, their vulnerability to being overwhelmed by a mass simultaneous attack.

So what are the Israelis going to attack? I like, yeah, so you said, like, it's going to be a bit of like Anandine, like kind of attack, right? Because we paid them off. Isn't it a bit crazy that we're basically or expediting what we were going to give them already? That we're talking them off the ledge of like hitting nuclear facilities or oil fields or whatever or make like a real deal attack with just, you know, arms. Like, isn't that nuts? I mean, it's probably the way we do business anyway. in the world, but it seems like we're being very blasé about it.

Yeah, I think, I think it's far from nuts. You know, I mean, I think, I mean, if you look at some of the best U.S. foreign policy over the ages, you know, going all the way back to, to the early parts of the 20th century, in the Middle East, you know, the interactions in Middle East history, the, you know, the Karen the Stick. The carrot sticks always being something that we use with effective diplomacy. And we know persuasion by itself doesn't matter at all. And it matters doesn't count much at all, especially arguably as the United States

that opposition in the world stage becomes, some would say, less prominent, right? And we are no longer the indispensable ally to Israel that we thought we once were. You know, I think Israelis are starting to think, hey, we can do this by ourselves. and especially now with its leak, you know, the United States Alliance may, does seem, especially the right-wing Israelis, as more of a liability than a help. And so I suppose under the principle of striking

while the iron is hot, Secretary of State Blinken, Anthony Blinken arrived in Israel yesterday morning. I'm going to his first stop in a regional tour. but clearly he's there to not just monitor Israeli preparation for a possible attack, but to limit its extent. And, you know, he's probably arguing that, you know, having killed the heads of both Iran's main regional proxies in recent weeks, his bolshev, Nasrallah, and Hamas head, Yawar,

the part's now clear for Israel to reach arrangements ending the war on. all fronts if that's what Israel wants to do you know so so in a sense I hate to say the region has reached this decision point or a historic crossroads um but in the sense it has you know I mean according to you know Israeli assessments has Bala wants to win the war all right not even in you know I mean even in 2006 that that message was that they weren't getting such a clear message but they've now been dealt the worst blow in their history and and you know they're exhausted um iran wants to end it as i pointed out and um kamas is stop functioning as a government or a military body uh it's got no leadership at all all right marmud

sinwa unlikely you know he or i mentioned his name as sinwa's brother because he's he's the most extreme of those who are left but but he's buried deep somewhere in gaza are either alive or dead and has no influence. So the authority has defaulted to the political leadership, and they have always been more moderate than, you know, than the military leadership of Hamas. So, or situate, or, you know, from a point of view of Israel's adversaries,

things seem right now, you know, things seem to be in the right place for some kind of settlement, okay? but, right, Black Swan, Ben Gavir and the hardliners in Netanyahu's Lukud Party, who don't want the war to stop until Hispola and Hamas are crushed to a pole. And this week, on Monday, there was a rally attended by Ben Gavir and other Nesit members, all right, Ben Gavir in particular as a cabinet member, calling for the rebuilding of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, which is rather than dismantled in 2005.

In other words, saying, hey, look, now we've purged this whole area. Let's move back in. So, and you can't dismiss. I mean, these people were once a fringe movement within Israeli society, but no longer. And these kind of megalomanic ambitions you're hearing among, you know, mainstream politicians

like Ben Gavir, like, who's the other guy, And, you know, we keep using those two names, but they represent a sizable and influential part of Israeli politics. And then you add to that, okay, so, you know, Blinken's already out there. You add to that U.S. mediator, Amos Hoxton, okay, he's now on the ground trying to engineer a deal between Israel and Hezbollah, all right? And, you know, not nothing, not with Iran or anything, but he's focusing specifically in the local area. And, you know, he's saying that there needs to be a new mechanism to enforce UN Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war, which everyone realizes there needs to be.

But the question is, who can enforce that? And is it enforceable? Okay. And we've talked about a little bit about before. Now, for the first time, this is from, you know, kind of, kind of, you know, kind of. of his perspective, I think. Now, for the first time, the Lebanese government no longer has the boa constrictor of Hezbollah around its neck, and it can make policy decisions, such as enforcing an internationally agreed mandate without opposition. Okay, that's how the U.S. is thinking. However, on the ground, a little bit different, okay? So the 1701 resolution calls for all armed militias to be pulled back north of the Latani River. And, okay, that makes sense, all right. But there's a couple of reasons why that alone, it's going to be hard to enforce.

And even if they do enforce, it's not going to be particularly effective. Okay. Affected. Number one is, you know, the rank and file of Hezbollah is heavily embedded in the towns and villages south of Latani. In other words, you know, you could. there are families whose husband and brothers within that family, all the male members are part of his Bala, right?

And, you know, they may do other things. It may not be a full-time job, but they are his Bollah fighters. And for a number of them, it is a full-time job, right? So it's more than just moving a militia of, you know, when you have an organization like that heavily embedded in the local community. And number two, you know, even, I mean, obviously with ranges of the rockets and missiles, as Bala has now, most of the long-range rockets, those that are surviving are up north, either in the Bacar Valley or vicinity of Beirut. They're not south of the Latani River. So

simply moving people, militias, weapons is not going to work. But what might work is a concerted attempt effort to disarm, you know, to make disarm people south of Latani River, right? So leave them in place. Leave them in place. but disarmed. Yeah, I just don't see how they have any other option to leave them in place. You know, what are you going to do? You're going to have to drive the whole population north of the Latani River, and that's not what the resolution says.

You know, but, but, I mean, nevertheless, okay, that's kind of my cynicism. The Israelis are still saying we need an arrangement that moves Hispola north of the Latani river and strengthens the Lebanese central government, because if 1701 is not enforced, then, you know, the Israelis will remain there to do so, you know, arguably, although they don't want to, obviously they don't want to remain there. And then, so Hezbollah, but, you know, the advantage, though, for the side of, of, I don't know, peace, I guess. The advantage here is that Hezbollah, as I said, does seem now. to want to rest by it, right? Obviously. And so, you know, if there's any time to do this, it is now.

And at the same time, with Hamas, there's an opportunity to renew negotiations for a deal. There's, you know, people forget, well, not families are hostages, but in the States, it is sometimes forgotten. There are still some 100 and so hostages in Gaza, right? haven't been recovered, 105, I think it is. And so negotiations to free them and hope the fighting in Gaza is still a priority. And as I mentioned earlier, you know, now there's been this shift in the balance of power within Hamas since Samoa's killing. That passes the baton to Hamas' exiled political leadership, which, as I've said, is, is far more, you know, far more moderate.

And then the last time you mentioned the Egyptians, right? Yeah. And, you know, it's been kind of unhelpful. Well, you know, I think a lot of Israelis might agree with you. But interestingly enough, so the Egyptians had a long time, a long time head of their intelligence. And this is quite unusual, and any intelligence service, perhaps except for Western, you know, CIA for an intelligence chief to almost have kind of rock star status.

But the, but Abbas Kamal did. You know, he was, he was very, he was very, well, he was feared and revered, I suppose, within certain circles in the West, Abbas Kamal. And he's well known to the Israelis. And they certainly they could negotiate with him, but there was always a feeling that he, you know, he was keeping some cards on the side and not giving, you know, a full, full court press to Israeli Hamas negotiations. Well, his replacement's a guy named Hassan Mahmoud Rashad, unknown quantity, but certainly determined to prove himself. and it seems, you know, for him, perhaps the sign of success would be for the negotiations to go ahead. And it would be a just got a great feather in his cap if he could make that happen. So the conditions are ripening for that to be a peace settlement. That's not to say that there will be one. Do you think any of this is going to be or is being slow rolled for the sake of the U.S.

US elections to see what the outcome is going to be. And, you know. Yeah, yeah, that's a great, that's a great point, Jason. And there is no doubt about it that around the world, everyone is watching US elections for a possible outcome. There was no doubt about it that, you know, I mean, Trump and Netanyahu are far closer than anyone likely in a Democrat candidacy. And in fact, Netanyahu has called, I mean, Trump called Netanyahu.

who were a good man recently, you know, I mean, it, so the Israelis certainly have an eye on that. When I say the Israelis, I shouldn't say that. I shouldn't act as though they're, you know, homogenous and all that, but I meant the right wing of the Lekud party, undoubtedly is, is awaiting that eventuality, well, possible, possibility. Are you guys, so before we get into this leak,

which is, you know, In the end, I mean, like we've said before, when you look at what was in that leak, it's nothing really to see here, you know. But nevertheless, the leak itself is significant. I mean, top secret information, leaf on purpose. And what this stuff shows, and it looks, you know, at the, it's, you know, at the, it. If you're following this on Twitter, you know, there's a school of thought in Twitter, right? An informed school of thought that thinks that this came from the Office of the Secretary of Defense himself. You can't prove that, obviously, at this stage because actually this is stuff that comes from,

oh, what am I thinking, Jason, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, right? So it's, yeah, it's, yeah, I should have just said NGA, which analyzes satellite imagery. And also, you know, the NSA, which does communications intercept. So it's coming from more than one, it's coming from two agencies. So the leak is likely that have been more central, but that's not to say that it, you know, it could have come through any number of hands as it was passed into OSD's. office. I was reading, I'm sorry. I was reading in the Jerusalem post or Jerusalem post that apparently a name is being

floated around as a possible source of the leak, which the Pentagon denies. Her name is Ariane Tabatabi, Chief of Staff for the of the assistant secretary of defense will special operations. Again, Pentagon is saying that's not true. you know, FBI obviously would have the lead on this, so they would be the final sale on whether that's true or not. But apparently she was under, yeah, she was under fire back in 2023. Some members of Congress, yeah, wanted her. Iranian connections, right?

Yeah, because her communication. Yeah, so she, I guess she's in the spotlight again. Yeah, not just Iranian family members, but pro-Iranian. you know, allegedly pro-Iranian family members. Yeah, I remember all that. Yeah, I haven't heard anything more on that. But I do know, you know, the documents, what they describe is, it's nothing surprising. It just, you know, it involves.

Jason, I don't even know. Can we talk about it? Do we talk about it? And I talk about it? The point is, I don't know. man, let's move on. Okay. But it's not, you know, it's got to do with, with capabilities.

And it's not a, you know, it's not, my point is it's not a, it's not a serious blow. Yeah. I mean, they read like executive summaries. There's no imagery. It's just the fact that it was. Yeah. Yeah. It's just, man, it's just talk.

It's just talk about capabilities. And I think they, because on what I'm reading, is, is, is it, the question. is, is it a leak or is it a hack? And if it is a leak, is it an intentional leak? Meaning, did someone in the Pentagon, in the U.S. government say, okay, let's let this slip out purposely, I don't know what for, or was it leaked by someone trying to derail this whole thing? So again, FBI would have the lead on it. They would want to know who had access to the documents all the way up the chain. Who had the most, who has the most, who has the most, who has the most likely hood of wanting to leak something like this, whether it's, you know, to derail it

for monetary gain, stuff like that. So there's definitely an active counterintelligence investigation going on and we're just going to have to wait to see. But at the end of the day, when this first happened, you know, people got together and said, what is the damage to Israel here and to the U.S.? And it's really there isn't any, you know? There was, no, I mean, you could, you could have, you could have just assumed what was in these documents. Exactly. Doing those things. So, but to your point, I think it's clearly pointing now to leaked, a purposeful leak, because they, it was screenshots.

So the documents that appeared on, on a telegram channel. You know, that alone doesn't differentiate it from a hack, but the FBI is saying, not the FBI, but, But at least, you know, official statements are now saying that it was not, it was most likely not a hack. And it would have benefited, if it was a hack, it would have benefited if it was Iran for them to say, look, look at what we found, you know, instead of letting someone else. Yeah. Yeah, exactly. You know, and I think, I mean, what's concerning is, of course, this isn't the first significant leak of sensitive intelligence, right? in the last few years.

You know, last year, there was that, you know, a trash classified U.S. assessments of the war in Ukraine and other foreign policy matters appeared on Discord, right? And that was that guy, what was his name, Jack or something or another? Yeah, the National Guard did. Yeah. And, you know, he's an enlisted airman in the Massachusetts and National Guard, so you could say, well, what has that?

got to do with policy or anything. It has everything to do with policy or it has because you know we need to know is a key part of of sharing classified information and there was just you know when you trace all of this there was just no way that this dude needed to know that stuff and so if this you know and I don't know that may have been a local policy it may have been just a local commander being an idiot or not adhering to national security policy But definitely, definitely, you know, a violation in it. And it had outsized ramifications, you know, a junior dude in his early 20s.

Jack Tashara, that's his name. Yeah, a gamer causing damage to U.S. national security. But we allowed that to, I mean, we allowed that to happen by giving them this information. Well, frankly, I'm pretty surprised it doesn't happen more often with so many top secret clearances over a million or whatever it is. it's pretty shocking that it doesn't get things don't get leaked more yeah and i'll tell you it's it even starts at the at which they realize later on at the lowest level of the basic um rule is when you get up from your desk if you you know when you get up from your decks you whatever it is you pull your card you you know control all delete and lock your screen you do something and from what

i understand this kid had nothing to do with these programs but he was some kind of uh repairman like telephone or or something where he was able to get access to these desks and people just leaving their screens open hey i'm gonna go you know i don't want to stand over your shoulder i'm gonna go get a cup of coffee or they just walked away for whatever reason and he's able to see these things and um that's like 101 when you first start these jobs is lock your computer screen put all your classified away before you leave your desk yeah i i didn't realize um that that that's was it i you know i wonder i wonder whether that was the command just covering its ass you know rather than rather than admitting oh yeah we we let all these dudes need to know it's much easier to say

oh it was an awful it was the fault it was the fault of all these guys who leave their right cards in their computer and that absolutely could be the case you know could be it could be it could be the case but but that's a very risky way to do it yeah if you're going around other people's work stations while they go to the head or something and yeah i'm trying to pull shit that's i just don't buy that Yeah, I think it was just the unit fucked up and they, and they just didn't have enough Cohoonis to admit it. Yeah. And I think with this latest leak, I think more damaging, if that's going to happen, would

be the butterfly effect of this, as in the trust between the United States and Israel. Also, too, it could be used here as a talking point politically. like, you know, look what happened under your, you know, your administration, you know, that sort of thing. So those butterfly effects are, to me, more concerning than the actual leak itself. Yeah, no, that's 100% correct. I couldn't agree more. It puts us at a negotiating disadvantage to these parties, all right? No longer can we, you know, point out the stuff that's happened there, massive intelligence failures, massive operational failures, blah, blah, blah,

because we have them of our own, you know? And so it's just embarrassing. That's what it is. And it's not good to be embarrassed as a nation, right? And we're going to get comments about that, you know? No, arguably we shouldn't be embarrassed. You know, I mean, these things happen. And they happen because we, United States,

trying to do the right thing in the area. I'm sounding very facile here, I realize. Before long, I'm going to be accused of being a patriot. Yeah, how dare you. But of course, you know, I, of course I believe that. Yeah, so what about, so the Middle East, if we have, if we've talked through all of that, I want to talk about these 3,000 North Korean dudes

who popped up now in Ukraine, I mean, not in Ukraine yet, in Russia preparing to go to Ukraine. I think we talked about this before, right? that there were multiple newspaper reports, most notably in the Wall Street Journal, that 10 to 12,000 North Korean troops were on their way to, to, to fight on the side of Russia in the Ukraine conflict. And that news brought much speculation among, you know, think tanks, R us about the quality of these troops, et cetera, et cetera. General consensus being, hey, this is something to worry about, sheer numbers. Okay, number two,

North Korea is likely to send their best, okay, out of a million man army. So even if, you know, the majority are malnourished and illiterate peasants, the, you know, the ones they send overseas are likely to have been prepared for this. The third is that they're definitely sending their special forces, right? And anyone who's studied the Korean Peninsula problem knows that North Korean special forces, while, you know, probably not, certainly not, you know, near peer are a force to be reckoned with. And 12,000 is a lot of dudes to point in conflict like that. So this is, yeah, this is definitely concerned, but the United States government said,

and we've heard nothing about this either to support or deny it. Well, in the last day yesterday, the North Korean intelligence, I mean, not North, sorry, South Korean National Intelligence Service Director, doesn't matter his name, but Cho, Choyong, right, said that there are already 1,500 North Korean troops in Russia. he didn't specify where but but if you look on Twitter there is some geolocation work that shows exactly where it means nothing to me obviously you know it's fairly near the Ukrainian border but it's not in Ukraine yet so 1500 troops already there

and no I'm sorry 3,000 already there was initial 1500 another 3,000 and they're expecting a total of 10,000 by December all right so in the next six weeks now what geolocation was suggesting was that these guys were all arriving in one place and then being distributed

to multiple military bases for training but they are you know they haven't been deployed into battle yet so they are being they're going through some kind of training with Russian military instructors you know on in the

Russian military blogosphere confirms that. And interestingly enough, there's a comment here. There was a comment somewhere about the Russians instructors about the troops saying that, you know, they're surprisingly good quality troops. This could just be propaganda. But, yeah, and that, you know, they're eager to get into the fight. But nevertheless, they're likely to take massive casualties because they know nothing about on warfare. I mean, North Korea has not been out war since the Korean war, right?

So this is an interesting development. And I think it's, though, an indication of kind of the desperation that the Russians have for manpower right now. In addition to the troops, the North Koreans have sent, so apparently, according to South Korea, 13,000 containers of artillery missile and other conventional arms to Russia since August of last year. So that's a lot of, that's a lot of freight. 13,000, you know, it doesn't say what size containers these are, I'm assuming. But if those, you know, regardless, so these are like airlifts, I mean, a single platform airlift, then that is a hell of a lot in just a year.

Let me, I got a question. What does North Korea get out of sending potentially 10,000 troops right now, 3,000? thousand and all the equipment all the shells and everything like that like what do they stand to gain out of it yeah that's a really scary party who knows you know help with their uh nuclear weapon development yeah like tech help yeah have help with their missile program which is uh you know which has been coming along faster than we want anyway you know that's where that's where they could really use help and then of course um money you know north koreas always always strapped the cash.

Also, too, they signed that agreement in June to back each other in the case of external aggression. So in the unlikely chance that North Korea decides to pour across the border to the south again, they could turn and be like, hey, guess what you promised us? So that's in their back pocket as well. Yeah. Yeah, just not a, yeah, I mean, it's going to be very interesting to do. see what happens. But my point is that the big news here might not be the troops themselves.

The big news is what the Russians are giving the North Koreans in return, at least from U.S. foreign policy. And that's concerning. So, Dee, I know we're coming to an end of our inaugural episode as a separate channel under the Team House franchise. And if you haven't already done so, everyone, please click subscribe. now. By the end of the day, our goal is to amass as many subscribers as Team House mean. More. A million. A million. Yeah. Subscribe. Yeah, please subscribe. So the next few episodes we will be posting on the Team House channel and on Aizan's new channel, just to do a little bit of cross-promotion. So don't forget, the link is in the description. Hit the like, hit to subscribe for the new

eyes on podcast channel please and um and his you know this kind of call my eye i think it's interesting point to end on a nostalgic point perhaps this day in 1983 operation urgent fury began that was the invasion of grenada and uh and some of you d you went to life back then nope but yeah but those of us uh those of us who were um remember you know say it was another turbulent time. The Marines had lost, you know, some 241 Marines in a, in an explosion in Beirut on October was the 23rd, I believe, 1983. So it had just happened. And, and the very next day, you know, the decisions made to go into, to Grenada using a combined, a joint force, combined joint force involving army rangers, special forces, and of course, Marines,

eighth Marines, those of you who have seen that iconic movie Heartbreak Ridge will know the story in its entirety. But, you know, an important part of Virgin Fury was we learned how fucked out we are when we do joint operations, you know, I mean, urgent fury was like a massive exercise. It was, you know, I know urgent Fury veterans, so it would be upset at me. saying this, but it wasn't combat. It was a massive exercise. And we didn't do well. We really didn't. We struggled everything. You know, even in the Marine Corps, we struggled with air ground coordination, which we prize ourselves on. You know, there's that iconic, but probably apocryphal story about, you know, a forward air controller trying to call in an air strike

using a P-phone. Whether or not that is true, it's indicative of some of the issues that, you know, that we had there on the ground. There were fratricide issues. There were, you know, all kinds of stuff. We learned that we needed more jointness. And, you know, at the tactical level, we learned that we went as good as we wanted to be or thought we were. Anyway, so the legacy of urgent fury. And that brings us nicely to a closing time. Yeah. Unless you have any alibis or questions or...

I have some more housekeeping, Andy Milburn's book and his Twitter and everything is down in the description. The best way to support both the Teamhouse and Eyeson, besides subscribing to the new channel, which the link is in the description, is go to patreon.com slash team house. All that information is down below. I make it easy for everybody. Please check it out. please see everyone until the next episode in a few days thank you thank you thank you everyone