The Team House - Who Are The New Players in Syria? w\ Charles Lister | EYES ON PODCAST

Episode Date: December 14, 2024

Today we're joined by Syria analyst for the Middle Eastern Institute Charles Lister to talk what comes next in Syria.Find Charles here:⬇️https://x.com/Charles_Lister?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthorhttps://www.syriaweekly.com/Support the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseFind Jason here ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=ios_apphttps://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.socialFind Andy Milburn here:⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023https://amilburn.substack.com/https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-Operationshttps://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialhttps://open.substack.com/pub/amilburn/p/journal-of-a-plague-year?utm_source=app-post-stats-page&r=emo6q&utm_medium=iosFind Mick Mulroy here:⬇️https://fogbow.com/https://www.loboinstitute.org/https://x.com/MickMulroy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthorhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.social#syria #htsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

Hello, everyone. Welcome to another episode of Aizond. Today we have as a guest, Charles Lister, who the best way to let him present his credentials is to hear him talk about the Middle East. How's that for a setup? But, you know, not just in Twitterland, but across the media, Charles is a go-to guy for kind of a balanced view of what is. going on. And so we're looking forward to this conversation because there is plenty going on, right? Charles, where do we start? How about Syria? Maybe we can wrap that up in the next two minutes. Yeah, let's do it. That sounds easy enough to me. Yeah, I mean, my God, where to start? I mean, everything, everything has changed in the past couple weeks after more than 13 years of I'm debilitating civil conflict, you know, in which, you know, the Turks, the Americans, the Europeans, the Arab states, the Iranians, the Russians, the Syrians, the Israelis have all been engaged over Syria. And in the midst all of that, the Syrian regime just didn't seem to be budging. We saw the precipitous collapse of that regime in the space of days.

and so that has totally transformed, obviously it's transformed Syria, but it's transformed the Middle East. It's a big loss for Russia. It's a huge loss for the Iranians. And it frankly changes the map of the Middle East in terms of Iran's loss. And then on the other hand, the collapse of the Assad regime has created a vacuum, I guess, an opportunity for the actors who changed the equation to fill that vacuum. And right now we have a 100 mile an hour political transition underway in Damascus, which right now is being led by a group called Hayat Tehrir al-Sham, which technically speaking is still a designated terrorist organization by the US and the United Nations. So obviously that raises a ton of challenging,

challenging questions as to, you know, where that's heading. I'm sure we can get into, you know, what that looks like and what this group's been doing and has it changed since it was designated many years ago. But right now, in the last few days, we have had a surge of diplomatic and intel visits from just about every Arab government in the region, from a bunch of European countries, the United States, we, I should say, forget my British accent, by the way, I am American. You know, we as the US have been indirectly in communication with this group despite designating it. You know, everyone's trying to get in on the act to try to guide and to control and to influence what happens next.

And of course, the stakes there are huge. Optimistically, it'll be a new chapter for Syria. It'll be a slightly messy and chaotic one, but hopefully stable or somewhat stable. more stable than what we've seen. But on the other hand, if it doesn't, and if it goes wrong, we're turning page number one of a second major civil conflict. That's the stakes. If it turns into that, the Iranians will leap right back in again.

The Russians will be there to stay and will be back to square one in many respects. So yeah, huge stakes, unprecedented developments. And incidentally, just before I stop this, I should say, You know, Syrian people have lived under tyranny of the Assad family for nearly 54 years. So most Syrians alive today literally know nothing but the rule of the assets. And it genuinely has been tyrannical throughout that more than half a century. So we should also just spare a moment for all of the Syrians who have suffered so much, half a million dead, 150,000 people who were missing.

now that the prisons have been emptied, it can now be assumed that most of those missing people are also dead because they haven't come out in the numbers that some people might have hoped. 340 verified chemical weapons attacks, 82,000 barrel bombs, you know, you name it, I can string off the list. Unreal levels of violence and suffering. Yeah, certainly, I, and the news coming out of, what's the name of that prison in farms begins with s the sednaya it's in damascus but yeah sednaia is

the big infamous one yeah um it has been horrific and that the uh just what the regime has been up to and as far as oppressing its own population i think has been and i open it for many in the west of course not for the syrians um and so you know rather than i i know we could speculate forever about whether HDS has changed its spots, whether this is going to be an inclusive administration. But up front, I'd like to ask you, what are the initial indications? I mean, just in your opinion, we won't hold you to these. But, you know, I mean, think back to when the Taliban moved back into Kabul and there was talk about, well, you know, maybe Taliban 2 is different.

But we did see indications almost right off the bat that it wasn't a lot. different. And it seems that though that we are seeing genuine if Aleppo's anything to go by and certainly initial stages Damascus was seeing at least an effort by HDS to show that it is being an inclusive administration pulling people in from outside of the organization. Inclusive in every way, I guess is what I mean. Right. Or at least more inclusive than anything that came before it. I mean, I think the thing here is it's complicated. I'll start by saying, you know, some people have raised that Afghanistan, you know, the Taliban kind of parallel. I would say that the difference with the Taliban is we were negotiating with the Taliban's political office in Doha.

And it was an exiled political office. And it was an office of politicos, not guys with guns. And I think one of the big lessons out of that. And frankly, the same with Hamas, you know, in this situation since October the 7th. Same thing, the Bahamas political office was not connected to Yahyah Sinwar and his plans in Gaza, same as the Taliban political office was not engaged with Siraj Dinh Khani and the military leadership of the Taliban. And so in both of those scenarios, the words and the rhetoric and the plans and the promises that we were hearing from political, offices abroad didn't match up with the developments on the ground. Now, in the Syrian case,

HTS, you know, yeah, it actually does have a small political office, but outside of the country. But really what we're hearing and what we've consistently been hearing is from the guys with the guns on the ground. So I think to an extent we can we can read more into their actions, predating these recent developments over the last couple weeks. And it should also go, you know, A lot of people have sort of not been paying attention to this group for a long time. And I think that's sort of part of the problem because some of the things we've seen them say and talk about and some of the things we've seen them do over the last couple weeks haven't come out of nowhere. So, yeah, I can, I mean, it helps maybe just to do a little bit of history. So, I mean, this group was first established in Syria in late 2011.

At the time, it was secretly the Syrian wing of ISIS. or at the time the Islamic State in Iraq. It didn't publicly declare itself as such, but that was how it was established. Over the first couple years of its existence, it essentially behaved quite differently to AQI or the Islamic State and gradually sort of distanced itself from that brand. When ISIS and its leader, Bubakkar al-Baghdadi,

tried to publicly declare that actually, in fact, everyone, this is us. This group, Jabotan Nusra, is actually the Islamic State. It led to a total break, whereby this group, Nusra, which later became HTS, declared itself an affiliate of Al-Qaeda and not ISIS, and ended up actually in full-scale hostilities with ISIS going forward after that point. So for a few years, two, three years, this group, Nusra was avowedly and publicly, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria. That relationship then later broke down. Essentially, Nusra calculated that the only way it could not only survive in Syria, but to thrive would be to embed deeper within the wider Syrian revolution. And the only way it was going to be able to do

that was to shake off these what it called external ties. And so in 2016, that was the big breakpoint. We saw Nusra rebrand itself a couple times in six months and publicly proclaimed to have severed those external ties. You know, they did interviews with CNN and everyone at that time saying, you know, this is what, this is now who we are. We've changed. Blah, blah, blah, blah. At that point, not very many people frankly believe them. I thought it was all a ploy to fool the Syrian people into, you know, lending the group some more credibility and acceptance. But over time, this group, HTS as it became known, has shifted its behavior. Now, I guess a few qualifications here.

They remain a very conservative Islamist movement. Like, no question. They haven't suddenly become secular nationalists. I would say what has changed is that they don't believe that their beliefs need to be enforced on the people. So they kind of accept that they are one of many strands of Syrian society. and whilst I think they believe they should be a significant player within that, I don't think they believe in the idea that everyone has to just embrace their vision. The key thing is they remain as dictatorial and autocratic as they've ever been.

For me, that's the main concern. They're not a terrorist organization in the sense that they're going to seek to, you know, level the Twin Towers in New York or anything like that anymore. That vision has genuinely gone. They're not a democratic organization. But they're definitely not democratic, although quite frankly, I mean, the word democracy has lots of challenges in the wider region too, and not just for this group. I mean, I was part of a big multilateral convening of government officials just a few days ago

to respond to what's happening in Syria. And it was basically the consensus across the room, including Americans and Europeans, that we should not be pushing the word democracy in Syria. There are other ways to push for representation. and, you know, whatever, that don't involve that word. But, yes, I take your point, they're definitely not democratic, and they're certainly not liberal either. Early signs are good. They've embraced the Christian community in Aleppo.

They've sent sort of dignitaries and emissaries to Syria's other minority communities, the Alewites on the Mediterranean coast, the Druze in the south and in the center, the Ismaili community as well. So they're sending the right signals. But there's a lot of doubt or a lot of concern or fear amongst particularly those minorities as to whether or not this group HTS will be able to sustain this kind of good behavior forever. And I think it's just an open question. The leader of HTS, he's a fairly young guy, he's 40.

Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. He comes from a fairly elite family from Syria. his surname is al-Sharah, which is one of the big political elite families in Syria. And he's smart and willing to be very pragmatic. And he is totally dead serious about being the kingmaker in Syria. And I think a lot of the pragmatism that we've seen from the group so far is driven by his absolute first to be the new leader. And right now as we're recording this,

he's currently driving the Turkish intel chief around Damascus in a Mercedes dressed in a suit. So, you know, he's capable of playing the game. And for now, the run to Damascus by all these governments, including to an extent our own, albeit indirectly for now, shows that what he's doing is getting all of our attention and getting the right kind of attention, not the worst. Hey, guys, it's Jack.

I just wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the podcast if you're not already. to support the channel is to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that start at just $5 a month. And when you sign up, you get access to all of our episodes ad free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers. But this is the biggest and best way that you can support the Team House channel and podcast if you'd like to.

And we really appreciate that. So go out and check us out at Patreon.com slash the teamhouse. Yeah, you quite rightly called me on the use of the term. Democratic or democracy. It's just got a bad aura about it the way that we in the United States have tried to impose that term. I think probably inclusive or in some way representative is probably what I would guess the U.S. administration is looking for, are you getting the feeling that, I mean, the problem is that we're

the tail end of administration. So it almost is meaningless to say, well, at least the U.S. administration is taking a pragmatic approach and not just rolling in going, here, this guy's a terrorist. Look, you know, we arrested him. But do you see the connection with the the connection with the Turks. Can you talk a little bit about some of the implications of that, both within Syria, the possible implications for the Russians, return of the Russians, and also for the West? Yeah, so all good questions. So, I mean, prior to these recent developments, HTS was basically only present in the northwest of Syria, which placed it right in a sensitive place, right on the Turkish border. In the pocket of territory it controlled, which represented about 4 to 5% of Syria, there were 5.5 million people, which is about a quarter of the population.

So huge number of people proportionally in a very small corner of the country. That gave HTS a real sort of significant leverage vis-à-vis Turkey. Turkey's biggest fear for years has been a new flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey. You know, domestically in Turkey, there is very few, if any, issues that unify the entire political spectrum from left to far right. The only one that really does is the refugees. there is now a unified consensus and has been for a few years that Syrian refugees need to return. And so the fear of new Syrian refugees fleeing into Turkey from Syria meant that HTS's role as the kind of de facto governor of this corner of the country with a very significant number of people in it, gave it a great deal of kind of leverage. for sort of for want of a better way of describing it

HTS's governance in northwestern Syria and it had some issues was more stable than the governance offered by other actors across northern Syria of all of the ones that Turkey was keeping an eye on the governance was most stable in the HTS region in other words you know much less conflict much less you know displacement, people movement towards the border, much less drug smuggling and organized crime,

and much less terrorism. They actually cracked out a pod on the Islamic State. Yeah. So, I mean, that was one of the things. So, you know, ironically, given this group's history, it's sort of an open secret for those of us who've been working this file for a while, HTS has been privately messaging towards the U.S. government for the last about two and a half years. that it wanted to be America's security partner in northwestern Syria.

You know, sort of a wild suggestion giving its designation. But it was doing that because through self-interest but also significant ideological differences, HTS has successfully defeated al-Qaeda and ISIS in this very significant corner of the country, where both groups had previously maintained a significant presence. So it had very successfully done that. and yeah, the messages were being sent indirectly through intermediaries to the US government, both under the Trump administration and more recently under Biden, that this group wanted to be an American security partner.

That, you know, gives you an idea as to the ambition of the leader of this group, Jolani. You know, he really wanted to transform how this group was seen. But, yeah, again, from a Turkish perspective, this group offered some stability, but also some problems. HTS is also designated technically as a terrorist group, in Turkey. So the Turkish foreign ministry, for example, hasn't been able to deal with HTS. The relationship goes through their intelligence organization, MIT. And that's the relationship. That's why the MIT chief right now is in Damascus meeting with the leadership is because it can't be

a foreign ministry relationship whilst that designation in Turkey remains the same. So it's complicated. You know, militarily, HTS has rebuilt itself into a way more disciplined and capable force than it had been before. Some people have asked the question as to whether or not that was a result of Turkish military support. You know, I've worked on this group very, very closely since it first was established. I haven't seen any evidence that the Turkish state has been backing its military capabilities. Oh, really? So no trainers or anything? Not that I'm aware of. No. I mean, HTS has benefited from a number of things which has allowed it to do what it's done.

I mean, first of all, and you guys have kept a super close eye and been engaged on the Ukraine file. So they have learned a lot from what's been happening in Ukraine in terms of drone warfare. And one of the major kind of tactical differences we saw on the battlefield over the last couple of weeks when HTS launched its offensive was that it had established an entire new from scratch drone fleet. They called it Kataybal Shaheen, the Falcons Brigade. And most of these drones were like indigenously manufactured using 3D printers and loaded up with small mortar munitions and other things that they already had access to. But the complex, you know, they'd launched them in waves, but then they'd have small ISR quadcopters in the air at the same time to, you know,

detect and to guide targets. Complex, a kind of complex operation. But from what I gather, most of that was learned from Ukraine. There have been some rumors that Ukrainian military intelligence has had a small presence in northern Syria. I know I've written a bit about this in the past. There have been a few sort of mysterious attacks on Russian targets that some Ukrainian media has claimed were Ukrainian operations.

No real way to 100% prove that. But certainly there's been some connectivity in terms of lessons learned. Yeah, that's what I was heading on the, particularly on the drone piece. And I'm aware of, you know, the rumors on the Ukrainian side that they helped HTS and they vested interests, not just against the Russians, but against the Iranians, of course, who had been supplying the shaheads. And impossible to prove. But if they didn't get direct help, that's truly an impressive innovation.

I mean, yeah, you can learn techniques from watching videos or YouTube, but the way they have set it up is something that replicates what's happening in the Ukraine quite closely, you know, to your point, having working fleets of drones, each with a different mission, but in consonants, you know, the command of control of that and the planning of that has been impressive. Yeah, yeah, exactly. I'm sorry, go ahead. Also, the use of, I mean, it's hard to tell because the Syrian army just kind of broke,

but the use of armoured vehicles and armoured vehicles with small groups of infantry. Again, I don't want to read too much into that, but they're certainly not inept when it comes to tactics. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, yeah, there's no question. I mean, so they also, they've constructed a fleet of their own armored vehicles. You know, they have model numbers and model names, and they've been building these for years and storing them away in cave systems in Idlib and the Northwest. to prepare for a, you know, a scenario just like this.

Yeah, at the same time, they have, they built a number of what they call special forces units. One, which was very well known before all of this, called the Red Bands Saibal Hamra, which was a unit that until now had been used for, like raids behind enemy lines, which they would do periodically to kind of remind the regime they were still around and still capable of doing things. but the one that made the real difference was they had established a whole new unit dedicated only to night time operations. So it was about 500 men strong. Every single one of them had night vision thermal scopes on assault rifles, RPGs, anti-tank guided missile systems.

And that basically turned the tide. It meant that for the first time in 13 years of war, the opposition, quote on quote, could fight at night. in a way that the Syrian regime still couldn't. Syrian army had no unit that was equipped uniformly with night vision. And so we saw ourselves in this place where the daytime fighting for Aleppo would be really tough. And then at night, HTS would just advance because they could see in the darkness and the Syrian regime just simply couldn't. For 13 years of war in Syria, everyone went to sleep at night and then started fighting the next morning at daybreak.

So that was a really big change too. They've established a military academy a couple years ago in Idlib, quite professional with graduation ceremonies. And yet it's not just fancy imagery, but they're being trained by defected military officers. And then the last thing to mention is there have been a bunch of foreign fighter units in the northwest of Syria, mostly Uzbeks, Kazakhs, some Turks and some, I forget, there was another. and Uyghurs. And they are all former soldiers and most of them former soft guys. And they set up what they call private military companies who basically train for a fee any fighting unit in northwestern Syria who would be willing to pay for that service.

So Malhammer Tactical was the first one of these. And they kind of set up this brand of providing more specialized training. And they've played a really big role over the last four years. in creating much more effective, much more disciplined, much more capable forces. And meanwhile, the Syrian regime just stagnated. They didn't add any new capabilities, if anything, they fragmented more from within and decayed.

The one thing the Russians did do was give them access to very simple FPV drones. But they used them as a terror tactic, not as a military capability. They just launched them into people's homes to intimidate. So, yeah, I mean, there was a total imbalance played out over the last four years in terms of who was increasing their capabilities and who was decaying. And I think that, you know, really dramatically played out on the battlefield. Charles, I have a question. Ballpark size.

How big is HTS? Like manpower. So it's a good question. You know, full-time fighters, 15 to 18,000. they were fighting this as part of a wider coalition. There were nine other groups involved. And I would say those nine other groups combined probably doubled that figure. So 30 to 40,000 roughly as a sort of total fighting force,

which as you look at it, taking over an entire country is quite remarkable. And I think just says a lot also about the extent to which the regime just collapsed. They just completely crumbled in the face of a challenge. And it also showed that Assad had no real loyalty. you know, most of the Syrian military conscripts, they're there only because they have to be. You'd be disappeared into the prison and detention and execution system if you tried to skip conscription. So most of these guys, when they came up against a more capable fighting force and they saw their front lines just peeling back, they quit. You know, many of them were negotiating with HTS two days ahead of their front lines being met.

and they either negotiated safe exits or surrenders or defections. So that's how the lines moved so quickly down the map as they did. Do you see the Russians getting the way back into Syria? I mean, it was a complete evacuation that I understand, even from Tardis. But already, and I don't know if this is true, bit of the rumors that they're negotiating with the Turks in Doha to try and get back in. Which puts the Turks in a powerful position and a curious position as a NATO nation too.

Yeah, it's a tricky one. Yeah, I think the Turks hold the keys to this. So far, HTS has been negotiating with the Russians directly, which again is kind of an amazing about turn from the Russian posture before. So they've been talking directly. Until now, HTS has, I'm told, being willing to allow the Russians to keep both their naval and their air base on the Mediterranean, which in many ways

is totally remarkable, considering both of those facilities have been used to, both indiscriminately and also with precision, strike civilians for the last nearly 10 years. So personally, I find it hard to grasp that that pragmatical, stance will last forever. I imagine the reason why we're seeing that, quote-unquote, pragmatic stance is because Turkey is trying to make its own arrangements with the Russians. I mean,

we've all known that since the war in Ukraine in particular, the Turks have embraced more of a hedging strategy. They don't want to fully break their relationship with the Russians for a number of other geopolitical and economic reasons, but they also don't want to fully break their relationship with the US and with NATO. And so, they've hedged. And I think what we're seeing here is a similar hedging strategy. For Russia, that Mediterranean access is one of their biggest geostrategic gains in a decade plus, if not longer. They will not want to be losing that. If there is a prospect for them staying, they'll be surrounded. They're certainly not going to be surrounded by friendly partners. And so I suspect at the

moment the Turks are trying to figure out some kind of awkward arrangement that would allow them to stay, albeit with a much lesser presence and a much lesser force posture. But honestly, I think it remains to be seen. All bets are off as to as to where that goes. The Turks can influence, but they can't totally control the decision making of HTS and these other factions in the area. Yeah, it's interesting to see elsewhere in Syria, you know, as far as the SDF and the SDS, SNA clashes. I know our monitor published an article yesterday or the day before saying that the Kurds had, the SCF had pulled back across the Euphrates for a manned bitch under U.S. pressure.

But actually, that was just, that was just, you know, the timing, of course, was no coincidence. But from the U.S. standpoint, they were just enforcing a prior agreement with the Turks, were they assured the Turks that the S-D-F wouldn't go west of the Euphrates. But I would imagine from a U.S. diplomatic standpoint, it's, you know, time to be courting the Turks. And I know this discussion of not just what's happening in Turkey with the SDF, SNA, but also sales of F-35s and such. See how that continues. Yeah, and especially through a transition into the Trump administration, which I don't think, frankly, anyone really knows where the incoming administration is going to stand on any of these issues.

But yeah, certainly in the last six months or so, the US, this administration has been plowing energy into trying to recover some of the relationship with Ankara. And yes, talk around the F-16s and the F-35s, talk around arrangements with Ukraine, but also considerable talk around Syria. And, you know, you raise a really important issue, which from a U.S. perspective is a huge crisis right now, which is what's happening in the northeast of the country. You know, we have nearly a thousand troops on the ground, plus contractors, in a string of military bases alongside the SDF. You know, in that area, there's an ISIS resurgence very well underway

already. And then there is this Turkish-Kurdish hostility. You know, throughout the entirety of the Syrian crisis, which starts in 2011, the Turks have never been. been able to act against the Kurds without getting a tacit green light from Damascus and from Russia. For the first time in the last couple of weeks, the Turks smell blood. The SDF is more vulnerable than it's ever been. And they have no one to stop them from going in, us included. We will not stop them. We haven't stopped them before and we won't do this time. And it's an absolutely kind of existential life or death moment for the SDF right now. And if the SDF breast, breaks, we leave. Very simple. And if that then happens, ISIS has an enormous opportunity to recover

because, frankly speaking, without the US on the ground, the SDF is actually not nearly as strong an actor as they might have looked on the outside. Any time that the Turks have intervened, they've just crumbled. So there's a lot of reason to be worried. General Carilla, sent com commander, was out there a few days ago. It was essentially him who, who sealed up that ceasefire that you just mentioned around Mambidge, although I would say within 36 hours, that ceasefire broke down. We had more fighting again there today.

But the SDF is in a really tricky spot. We should sort of remind, I guess, your listeners, that the SDF was established as an umbrella to try to make it look more representative of the societies within which it was operating. I mean, they are Kurdish dominated and dominated by a particular faction of the Kurds. And that was a problem.

The key to keeping the SDF representative is the fact that they contain sizable grouping of Arab tribal factions. Most of them were former anti-Assad opposition groups. Most of them have quit the SDF in the last few days, inspired by the fact that their former brethren on the other side of the country have toppled the regime. and I think angered for a long time by the fact that the SDF never really was wholeheartedly opposed to Assad. So we're watching the Arabs peel away right now. And that presents a really significant challenge. Big concession from the SDF today was that they agreed to allow the green revolutionary flag to be flown from public buildings in their territory.

They have always outright refused to do that. In fact, they've labeled that flag a terrorist flag in the past. So huge concessions speak to the real weakness and vulnerability that they're presented with at the moment. But without serious US diplomatic intervention, and of course Secretary Blinken's been in Ankara, trying to renegotiate these ceasefires, trying to convince the Turks to back off. Without that diplomacy working, the clock's ticking on the US presence in northeastern Syria. And, you know, ISIS will be watching all of this with glee. expecting, you know, more vacuums and more opportunities to add to their resurgence.

Because from a, you know, you mentioned the Turkish, kind of the unity that Turks have in opposing, you know, the influx of Syrian refugees or wanting them to return. And I, and I would guess the other thing that unites them is their fear of the Kurds, their, their, their design. to have a buffer zone all along their border. And I know from Turkish France, they feel that the US has kind of betrayed them in its support, or betrayed is perhaps a strong word, but being disingenuous in its support of the SDF and claiming it to be something not anti-Turk, etc.

And, of course, you mentioned the SDF's an umbrella organization within that umbrella are definitely organizations, that have attacked Turks and will continue to attack Turks. So I guess where I'm heading on this, it's hard to see now that the US has, as pro-Kurdish though I am, it's hard to see that the US has strong interest in backing the SDF in a confrontation with the Turks and the Northeast.

Yeah, I think if the trend lines continue and the SDF continues to thin out to what it was originally before it was called the SDF, which was, yeah, the Kurdish, the PYD, the political party, and then the YPG and YPJ, the male and female militias, then the US is going to be increasingly, I think, unable, frankly, to justify continued diplomatic interventions against Turkish aggression. I mean, this was sort of the, I mean, I both understand why the US ended up working,

working with these Kurdish groups. I mean, to an extent, it was kind of coincidental when US special forces were dropped into Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq. We just found ourselves alongside these Syrian Kurds. And they ended up being pretty good at what they were trying to do at that time. And so we just naturally extended that cooperation across the border into Syria. So I understand that options were limited, and we found ourselves with the option that we did.

But the sort of the original sin was that we insisted at the time, this group is not who you say they are Turkey. All you needed to do was Google CIA World Factbook or State Department Counterterrorism Designations. And we ourselves said on official US government websites that this group was the Syrian wing of the PKK. And the PKK is designated here in the US too. So, you know, we sort of kicked ourselves in our own feet at the time.

We set up a line of argument that was just frankly a lie. and we've continued to push that with the Turks. The problem is that our leader, sorry, our key partner and the leader of the SDF, Maslum Abdi, is a long-time PKK veteran. He used to be a senior commander within TAC, which was a PKK wing that basically was responsible for behind enemy lines, urban bombings inside Turkish cities. So he may have changed over time, of course, and, you know, you said right at the beginning, leopards can change their spots.

But by insisting that, oh, no, no, no, no, he never was that. And there's no way he could possibly be that now. We set up a line of argument that was never going to win with the Turks. And that's, to an extent, it's a situation we've been able to balance until now, just about. But given the fact that the Arabs are starting to peel away, and the revolutionary kind of anti-Assad movement has gained steam again, the Kurds look kind of alone in the northeast because their history with Assad went back way before 2011

they've always maintained more or less a neutral stance to the regime and that's really hurt their credibility within the more kind of revolutionary anti-regime circles the only other thing I'd say here just because it's interesting is HTS as controversial as it is has been speaking directly with the SDF for the last week. And everything I've heard from sort of readouts from those calls on both sides has been, it's been super constructive.

They've both agreed. They will not come to blows. They've both agreed that Syria needs to remain united, you know, sovereignty. So in other words, the Kurds won't split off. And they've agreed that there is no need for them to sort of have their disagreements turn hostile. It's these Turkish factions in the north, the Syrian national. army, they're a real problem, quite frankly. They're very ill-disciplined. They're highly corrupt. And they were established to fight and kill the Kurds. That is literally their modus operandi.

It's the only reason why they exist. And whether or not Turkey's directing all of their actions right now, that's their mission. And just as Turkey has an open door to confront the Kurds, so do these groups. And I think they're proving very difficult to restrain. But they're the complicating factor here. do they, does the SNA have, I mean, has HES spoken to the SNA? I know you mentioned that the SNA is kind of an umbrella organization too. There's many sub-factions, but it just occurs to me that whether we like it or not, whether HTS likes it or not, the SNA, the Turks are unlikely to stop their support for the SNA as long as the SDF is there.

Right. And so they're going to be a factor. And one would think that the Turks supporting. both HDS and SNA would would kind of allow things to currently, but that's not necessarily the case, right? Yeah, it's difficult. I mean,

you know, one is proving to be disciplined and now relatively de-escalatory and one is exactly the opposite, ill-disciplined and very escalatory. And I think I haven't got a clear readout on the extent to which Turkey's is controlling the SNA's actions

recently. Turkey's being part of the ceasefire arrangements quite willingly from what I understand, but those ceasefires keep breaking, and it's mostly due to the SNA. So I think that's a problem. In answer to your first question, yes, HTS and the SNA have been in touch and contact.

One of the interesting things that happened right at the beginning of the offensive that led to all these dramatic changes was obviously the offensive was HTS led. It had nothing to do with the SNA itself. But a few days in, once Aleppo City fell, and it looked like the HTS, coalition had really gained some real momentum, the SNA joined in and sought to take a town

called Telarifat, which lies just north of, north of Aleppo that was held by, actually jointly by the regime and the Kurds. And that was kind of their attempt to try to get involved and join the fund, so to speak. A few SNA factions ended up going into Aleppo City, which obviously was captured by HTS and its coalition. And that was where some real troubles started to break out. wasn't actually much reported, but a bunch of SNA factions went into some of the northern districts of Aleppo and they basically just started looting, stealing stuff, a bunch of different reported abuses against local civilians and women. And in a sort of strange, ironic way, those communities, which incidentally had never been controlled by the opposition through

the entirety of the crisis, they'd always been by the regime. They ended up calling HTS in to try and sort their problems out. So, and HTS did come in and did sort the problems out. They engaged in deadly clashes with SNA factions on a few occasions. In fact, they publicly executed two SNA factions, SNA fighters who were accused of a rape as a way of trying to send the message that this behavior needed to stop. So, yes, they've been in touch, but that relationship is very, very awkward or very tense,

at least, if not potentially hostile, which again, just, underlines this point that I think, you know, while so many actors are trying to look towards ways to de-escalate and stabilize the situation in Syria, it is the SNA in the north that's really causing a real headache. And I think to an extent, even for Turkey, causing a real headache for that dynamic. Now, I know there's been a lot of coverage in the media, particularly the Arab media about the Israelis moving in beyond, you know, the 1974 line into the buffer zone, beyond Golan and even reports I was on BBC Arabic the other day and the other guest that was Syrian who was insistent that they had moved within, you know, 10 kilometers of Damascus.

But what do you see any, I mean, I just reading, I'm not an Israeli expert, but reading the tea leaves there, it seems as though, you know, their interests are very much, well, first of all, to destroy strategic weapons that could fall into the wrong hands. That's why they launched that massive air campaign, actually, this last week, which didn't, you know, kind of flew under the radar, no pun intended, right, as far as Western media. But it was their largest air campaign since 73. Right.

And then this move into Golan Heights, which has sparked a lot of, it seems to me almost in commensurate media attention, they have always wanted, you know, they've always argued that holding the Golan Heights, holding that buffer zone would be important if things went to shit in Syria. Right. I don't see they have an interest in advancing on Damascus at all. You know, they've got their hands full. But what's your impression there?

Yeah. So, I mean, well, first of all, on the air campaign, I'm not, I get it. I get why they did it. You know, no matter who was taking control. in Damascus, they, from a purely self-interested perspective, don't want to see anyone else in control of all the air defense systems and jet aircraft and naval vessels and everything else. And the big one was chemical weapons, by the way. There was a real, real fear a few days ago that the regime's sort of latent chemical weapons production sites had been captured.

In fact, HTS even issued a public statement saying that it was willing to, and determined to cooperate with the international community to deal with any potential chemical weapons discoveries. So first of all, I think that was the trigger. And then, of course, I think they just went after everything that really mattered from a military perspective. So I get that bit. The land grab on the go land is problematic. I mean, first of all, it's just a complete violation of a very long-standing, a very long-standing internationally mediated treaty. And second of all, it's problematic because we're in a really delicate situation in Syria at the moment. And we are in a situation where more or less at least a very conservative Islamist armed group is in control.

And Israel is naturally a pretty big trigger for folks from that community, as they have been for most Syrians who have essentially been in a state of de facto war with Syria for decades. So I get Israel's actions from the air campaign. The land thing is real problem. And everyone seems to recognize it inside Syria. HTS issued an interesting statement about a day ago where they said, without naming the word Israel, they basically said, you know, no one in Syria seeks or wants any form of new conflict.

You know, we've basically, we've had too much of that. We're looking to turn over a new chapter. and we like kind of advise everybody else in the world to hear that or something. There's a clear message to the Israelis. Like back off, enough is enough. We can't control all of our constituents forever. Eventually, if we want to be the sort of transitional government, there may very well be an expectation from the Syrian people

that there is a pushback against that. And that's a dangerous place to be because that would be a very unequal playing field. And it would be very dangerous for Syria's new sort of status. So, yeah, I mean, my kind of advice and I was speaking with a few folks yesterday who are pretty well connected with the Israelis was like, okay, I get it as a close, very close sort of Syria analyst who's in touch with all the people on the ground, I get it. But now it's time to sort of back off and just let this stabilizing kind of dynamic take place. You do not want to jeopardize that. No one in the region wants more of a mess on their hands. This is a very delicate moment.

You've done what you need to do. Now leave it. I don't think they would go to Damascus. I think that was mostly around shoring up one particularly sensitive area and the top half of Conaitra, that province in the south. But even so, just the land grab by itself is a particularly inflammatory step. Yeah. Yeah, and as you point out, despite everything else going on,

that is that is something that in public and you know in in twitterland syrians keep returning to it's obviously a very emotional issue however however much the Israelis may say hey there's nothing to see here we're just doing this right what happened by the way to was it undorf the the u.n there was a u.n unit yeah in the buffer zone right did they just disappear i think they I think they departed very recently amidst all of this. I mean, the Russians had established a string of military posts along the alpha line in the last maybe 12 to 18 months. In fact, they added two more posts just in the weeks before all of this crazy developments began. And they were there as kind of guarantors for the UN peacekeepers.

So it was a totally chaotic collapse of the regime. And I think amidst that chaos, as far as I understand, the UNP peacekeepers had departed. But yeah, with them gone, there's sort of very little that the Israelis would feel the need to do, except assert their own interests, I suppose, and seal up what they look at, just like the Turks in the north, as a big buffer zone. So Charles, we're coming near to an end. It's a fascinating discussion that we could talk for another hour. But so, you know, kind of finishing off here, what are we seeing about the emergence of the government now in Damascus? And, you know, that's first and second.

There seems to be, unless I'm just reading the wrong reports, a remarkable lack of turbulence in Damascus. I'm thinking back to Baghdad after the fall of Hussein with all the looting and everything. And even the desire for revenge in the Shia community there going after former Bathis. And that doesn't seem to be happening on the same scale in Damascus. Is that fair to say? Which again is so it's another good sign, right? Yeah. I mean, so far for now, all of the signs are really positive and encouraging.

I think a lot of it speaks to the fact that Syrians are so fatigued after, you know, genuinely 13 years of just debilitating conflict. I think it also speaks to the reality that I think was underappreciated before all of these recent developments, which was that the vast majority of Syrians really did want rid of Assad. It's just many of them felt totally powerless after seeing how brutal the regime was willing to be to suppress the opposition. And so I think that kind of euphoria of relief of like breathing fresh air for the first time in a long time has helped to discourage the more, you know, troubling behaviors that you might have seen elsewhere where conflict and that change all developed much quicker. You know, we have to remember that this comes after nearly 14 years of war, not a three-month invasion of Iraq or, you know, whatever else it might be. So I think that helps. I think also at the moment, a lot of Syrians in Damascus are also quite sort of uncertain and wary about what's coming next.

They're also very well aware that the transition taking place and the interim or caretaker government, as they're calling it, is basically HTS. They had a governing entity in the northwest of Syria called the Salvation Government, and all of the Salvation Government ministers have basically assumed their roles now in Damascus. on a fascinating level, like as an analyst, fascinating that, you know, for the past several days, Assad's cabinet, except his foreign and military and intel ministers, except those. The entire cabinet has been meeting daily with the HTS cabinet and essentially kind of sharing their portfolios, sharing their responsibilities, and, and, and, you know, conducting what was in effect to transition. And they had a whole of double cabinet meeting in the Four Seasons Hotel just a couple

days ago in Damascus to sort of formally transfer power. All very civil, absolutely no sign of any tensions, which is also totally remarkable, considering these two bodies came from polar opposite ends of the spectrum. And so again, you know, that's more of a peaceful transition than we're likely to see in this country. But, you know, I did actually consider putting out a tweet saying that, like, wow, if only this could happen in Washington. But I thought better of doing that. But yeah, I mean, early signs are kind of remarkable, but it is really early days. This transitional government has declared that they will be in place for three months.

And in March 2025, there will be a new Syrian government. The absolute key now is that this three-month period, these, a much wider body of Syrians, folded into whatever this new government looks like. It has to incorporate minority communities. It has to incorporate women. It has to incorporate different political perspectives. If this new government in three months' time

basically looks like a replica of what we currently have, which is an HTS, you know, Salvation Government in Damascus, we will be back to some form of civil conflict. There is a huge amount to negotiate. And beyond that, we have the political opposition, which has always been exiled. They expect some kind of a seat at the table. I'm not totally sure they're going to get it, quite frankly.

Inside Syria, they're known as the kind of five-star hotel lobbyists, not as political representatives of the Syrian people. But the other big obstacle to take place is the very powerful southern armed factions, southern Syria, who actually were the ones who ended up taking Damascus, they will expect a seat at the table too. I mean, for the last five years, they've been on the Russian payroll, just to make things even more complicated. They used to be the Free Syrian Army. Then they were Russian kind of proxies in the South, and now they're back to their kind of revolutionary face. And then, of course, it's the SDF. How do you fold the SDF, which still to this day expects some kind of autonomy

into a more unified central state. So, yeah, I mean, really great early signs, but huge challenges ahead. And that is where the US, the rest of the Arab states, the Europeans are all going to have to play a role to try and coax the actors in the right directions. We don't have real control, but we can have influence. And of course, the SDF, I mean, they want to,

a semi-autonomous or an autonomous region similar to more autonomous than their counterpart in Iraq. But isn't the problem, too, that the northeast is quite a prosperous part of Syria. I mean, it's got the resources, oil, it's got some of the most arable land. And so, yeah, that's going to require some delicate negotiation. Yeah, definitely. And that's where the US can really play a role. Yeah. What about, you know, things like the international,

I know you mentioned there's delegates and everything. Have they reopened the airport? Is it possible to fly back into Damascus? So not yet, although I gather that works underway to essentially make sure that it can reopen in the next few days. I believe that much like the Qataris did in Kabul, I think they're actually seeking to get involved in the reopening of the airport and all the administration and equipment and logistics and what have you. So there are steps pointed in that direction.

But at the moment, people are coming in via the Lebanese and Turkish borders. That's the route in for now. You know, another thing here is the Arab world in particular has been sort of strained at the seams by the refugee crisis from Syria for so long. And for the last 18 months, most of the Arab world thought that re-engaging Assad and strengthening his state was the key to encouraging refugees to return. First of all, that was a fantasy and completely illogical. But now, quite ironically, as soon as Assad falls, Syrians are flooding back to the country. And so, you know, it just sort of goes to show that removing Assad out of the equation was really the solution to so many of the problems that have emanated from Syria, including the drugs, which has been a huge issue. over the last few years.

The drugs trade is basically finished. An industrial level, multi-billion dollar drugs trade, has just kind of vanished overnight. Yeah, so it's amazing. Like, everything has changed in so many ways that will please the region. They just, the region needs to make sure that it plays a similarly positive role

or a more positive role in directing what's happening now. Do you have any plans to go back soon? Well, I've already had three invitations. So it's really, for me, it's just a matter of time. I think I'll, I think I hope to go maybe in January, provided that the situation remains relatively stable. But, yeah, whether it's Aleppo or it's Damascus, I think remains to be seen. But yeah, I hope to go back pretty soon.

It's me a fascinating trip. We'd love to talk to you when you get back. Or even better. Maybe you can. Or even there. Yeah, exactly. From there. Yep.

Yep. We just need to get the good internet working. But yes, absolutely. Well, this has been awesome. Charles, I appreciate it. I'm going to definitely want to get you back, but I appreciate you a time. And I'm going to turn over to D to wrap up. Yeah, great, great episode, Charles. Really appreciate it. Great insight. It's going to be, it seems like it's going to be a wild one over the next few months.

I hope it's not as violent. Yeah, too right. Charles Links, Twitter, you're going to send me everything. If you want to find out more about Charles List, so the links will be in the description and in the show notes. Check them out there. Andy Milburn, of course. His links are in the description as well. And the best way to support the show is patreon.com slash the team house.

Thanks, guys. This is great. Great. Thanks for having me. Thanks again, Charles.