The Team House - WTF is Going Down with the Iranian Protests? | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS

Episode Date: January 12, 2026

In this episode, the discussion revolves around the ongoing protests in Iran, the regime's response, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy. The conversation highlights the mechanisms of control employed by the Iranian regime, the role of the IRGC, and the potential outcomes of regime change. Additionally, the episode delves into the geopolitical implications of oil control in Venezuela and the U.S.'s approach to NATO and Greenland, raising questions about the future of international relations and U.S. foreign policy.Jon's books:⬇️Iran's Shadow Weapons: Covert Action, Intelligence Operations and Unconventional Warfarehttps://a.co/d/3CulLSGTheory of Irregular Warhttps://a.co/d/dvSYCGnSupport the show on Patreon:⬇️https://www.patreon.com/TheTeamHouseSubscribe to our new newsletter!!!!https://teamhousepodcast.kit.com/joinNew merch, patches, and stickers! ⬇️https://theteamhouse-shop.fourthwall.comCheck out Mick's new podcast here:⬇️Apple Podcasts:https://podcasts.apple.com/at/podcast/pub-and-porch-applied-stoicism/id1836955475Spotify:https://open.spotify.com/show/1k3QPmkAMwnGJxMLDwUSSd?si=n6piIu8XRcag1Z0K43A3bQYoutube:https://www.youtube.com/@UCd0Hq6QFk8CoTu5j-VU0Ong Find Mick Mulroy here: Fogbow ⬇️https://fogbow.com/Lobo Institute ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/Twitter ⬇️https://x.com/mickmulroy?s=21&t=-Ze3F_Ix2vlJ18KFvORTCALinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-patrick-mulroy-31198b52/Bluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/mickmulroy.bsky.socialMick’s publications ⬇️https://www.loboinstitute.org/publications/publications-of-michael-mick-patrick-mulroy/Find Andy Milburn here: Twitter ⬇️https://twitter.com/i/flow/login?redirect_after_login=%2Fandymilburn8LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewmilburn2023Substack ⬇️https://amilburn.substack.com/Andy’s book ⬇️https://www.amazon.com/When-Tempest-Gathers-Mogadishu-OperationsBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/andy-milburn.bsky.socialFind Jason Lyons here: LinkedIn ⬇️https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-lyons-666873316?uBluesky ⬇️https://bsky.app/profile/bgsilverback73.bsky.social"Karl Casey @ White Bat Audio"00:00 IStart03:05 The Role of the Regime and Military Options05:53 Internet Control and Communication Strategies09:12 Economic Mechanisms of Regime Control11:43 Potential Outcomes of Regime Change14:53 The Impact of Foreign Influence and Historical Context17:46 The Current State of the IRGC and Quds Force20:47 The Situation in Venezuela and Oil Economics32:35 International Implications of Oil Control34:41 U.S. Foreign Policy and Imperialism39:03 The Role of Collectivos in Venezuela41:18 Greenland: A Strategic Dilemma44:52 NATO's Future and U.S. Relations52:01 The Consequences of U.S. Actions55:39 Insights from Jonathan's BookBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-team-house--5960890/support.

When we say who's in charge, we're usually wrong. When we killed Salami, for example, the commander of the military, we thought that would decapitate the IRGC. It didn't because he's not in charge. The people who are actually in charge are not big names. They call them Sepahis or guardians that are in the background that are controlling a lot of this stuff, not for ideological reasons as their number one reason. It's more about economic control and wealth generation for their inner circle.

If the Ayatollah left, I feel very little with change. Hey, everybody, welcome to another episode of Aizond Geopolitics. We've got a special one today. Of course, we're joined Mick Mulroy, Jason Lyons, and a special guest, Jonathan Hackett. He's been on the, he's been to Aizan and Team House before. Incredible episodes. Check them out for sure. He wrote this great book, Iran, Shad of Weapons, covert action, intelligence operation, unconventional warfare.

And I think he's a perfect guest for what's going on, what's been going on for a while, you know, last week or so in Iran protests against the regime. and stuff like that, they've seemed to turn violent over the last few days. The internet's been cut off countrywide. There's been like a lot of reports, varying reports of like how many people have been killed by the regime and stuff like that. It's like all the way up to a couple thousand. They're saying that a lot of their hospitals are like overrun with people with gunshot wounds and stuff like that. Jonathan has an intimate knowledge of what goes on in Iran and stuff. So I think he would have been a perfect guest for today.

So thanks to me. Jonathan, what's up, man, how are you? Good, how you guys doing? Good to be here. Good, man. I mean, where do you want to start? You guys want to start like a basic on a TikTok and like what went down, when, and how it all popped off?

I could start with what I'm getting from media folks on the inside scoop, if you will, like stuff that's not reported yet, and obviously of interest. So apparently, obviously there's significant protests, like over 70 cities. It appears that they have been identified as enemies of God now, which apparently, and the lexicon means, you know, open fire at will when it comes to the besiege and the IRGC. I think it's unknown how many have been killed, but I've seen reports as high as a thousand. Plus, I don't think people know, but I think there's a new scrubbing mechanism that uses AI to go through social media to try to identify, you know, more accurate numbers. But either way, it's really bad. And for the protesters, I should say, and for the regime, which is a good thing, of course.

And I think Jonathan will get into all of the mechanisms that the regime has to stay in place. It's basically their main effort at all times, right? and they're just as concerned about their population, if not more so, than even external threats. The other big factor I would throw out there for discussion with the group is, and this is now reported, so this is public, is that the administration is reviewing potential military options to enhance the protests in Iran. I would assume, although I don't know, that there's already a pretty massive covert program going on. If not, there should be. I don't think that's the debate.

I think the debates is whether they would use overt military efforts like strikes, potentially on IRGC facilities or something that's directly associated with the security forces that are oppressing the people. I heard, and I think this is somewhat in reporting that the debates between the White House and the State Department, so the State Department's kind of of the mind that this won't help the protesters. It'll just potentially, you know, give the regime an out to say this is all U.S.-based, it's not real, etc. Hard to say that when it's extensive as it is, but they'll use it and potentially try to get people a rally around the flag, so to speak. And then I'm told that the White House has been very pleased with their use of military force in the second term to date and that they are more inclined to use it. So there you go.

Throw it back to you guys to hit those points. I think Jonathan would be great to really talk about what the regime does to keep itself in power. Because he's written some excellent books on the topic. And I think, as you said, D, perfect timing. Andy Zimani. Yeah. Yeah. Almost have our fire team.

So I had to throw that out there. Yeah. Leave with that. Yeah. Yeah. So it's day 15 of the protests. So that, as you're saying, Mick, it's very tough to know exactly how many are injured, how many are killed, how many have disappeared. And the problem there is that both sides benefit from whatever number they're using because it can, it can satisfy different objectives based on what that number is.

And that's similar in most conflicts and protests. So we probably will never really know exactly how many. died in this protest or were arrested. Similar happened in the past. There's been about 10 different protests that have names that are very significant in Iran in the last 40 plus years. And this always is an issue of knowing how widespread is it? Who actually is dying? Who's doing the killing? Interestingly, in this particular protest, because they shut the internet off around 72 hours ago, the only media that's being released is being released by IRIB, which is the Islamic Republic of Iran broadcasting, which is a state-owned and state-controlled IRGC-controlled news outlet, that's the

outlet that's actually releasing images of morgues and warehouses and hospitals full of bodies, which is very interesting to consider why would the regime be doing that? And I think it's more about messaging to Iranians than it is about messaging to the world. And what they're probably trying to do is intimidate the people that are, once their internet actually gained some access, the first images they're going to see are images of their dead people. And I have I think that's probably the goal of what that is right there. And that's, again, the internet has been a weapon that the regime has been using recently. They use it in June against their own people.

They actually shut the internet off when Israel and the U.S. were striking Iran. That wasn't the outside shutting them off. That was the regime shutting the people off from knowing what was going on because fear is their weapon. I think it was rage against the machine that said, like, fear is your only God on the radio. And, I mean, it's really true. You can weaponize this feeling, which will maybe prevent some people from actually. taking to the streets because what the regime does not want is more people on the streets. Even if those people don't have weapons, they have voices, and they have the ability,

they have spending power. And in an economy that's damaged like the current Iranian economy, spending power is everything. And that's a huge point about who is actually protesting right now. If you look at, for example, in 2021, during the water shortage protests, or 2019, which they called Bloody Aban, which is when fuel prices had tripled. And I could name a bunch of other There was usually a single segment of society protesting. You know, for example, during the Masa Amini protests, it was a lot about human rights, women's rights. So there's a certain segment of society that's going to stand out there and protest.

Right now, the significant news item is that it's not just one group. It's the Bazaari merchants, which were actually the people that fueled the base for the regime to take power in 1979 in the first place. And that core element of their constituency is protesting against them. This is a huge change and has never happened since 1979. So that's a very interesting development. Question for you on the internet, so we don't go past that because, I mean, they shut it down, but what about Skylake? Like, is their ability to override that?

Does it take? And if you don't know the answer, I'm sorry if I'm putting you on the spot, but this is for everybody. Like, is that able to get through? Are they actually able to interfere with Skylink's ability to provide the internet to the population in her own? or, and there's something we could do cyberwise to affect that change. Absolutely. So what you're talking about is basically a mesh network configuration, which Starlink is a branded version of a mesh network.

I actually wrote a paper on this at Naval Postgraduate School, where you can create a mesh network to provide internet and basically circumvent a state-controlled internet system, which the regime actually imported the Great Firewall from China. China came in and actually, as a partnership, built Iran's internet infrastructure. structure, which is what the regime is throttling right now. So they're able to filter almost 98% of internet traffic using this mechanism. But the regime has had a problem, not just with mesh networks like you're talking about, but also with dishes on roofs. And if you see pictures of Tehran or any other major city, you just see roofs covered in satellite

dishes because the everyday people, they want to be able to reach out to the outside world and they're using these parabolic antennas to do that. There are other ways as well, because even with the throttled internet, you can still get around it. There's two hours. applications. One is called Freigate and one is called Seifin. And both of these are used to get around the Chinese Great Firewall and Iran's what it's called National Internet Network, which is called the NIN. Both of these basically act as open web proxies that have these huge rotating server lists. They don't always work. Let's say it's like a 98% failure rate. But if you can get a 2% success rate on that, penetrating the filtered network, that's success, right? So if you couple that with a mesh network like

Starlink, you could have some success. The problem with Starlink is it costs money. You're talking about a regime where the economy is completely controlled by the IRGC and the people are protesting because they have no money. How are you going to pay for the thing with it? Well, that seems like it would be a good investment on the U.S. government's part. Just throwing it out there. That's exactly what I was getting at is that if we're talking about covert support or even overt support, maybe that means paying or subsidizing Starlink temporarily to allow people access so they can go out and arrange protest movements. Absolutely. And so the rest of the world, you know, and I would say that we should stick to the covert side and not do direct overt strikes. I kind of agree with state on this. But one of the things we can do is amplify the organic nature of what's going on right now. And that's giving people the internet to put out there what's happening. You know, hopefully that's the case. And I'm sure, you know, if there's smart people looking at this right now, how we can do that. But so you do think, Jonathan, there's a way or right. this attempt of the regime to basically put the country in the dark.

Yeah, I mean, it's going to affect most people because most people aren't sophisticated enough to figure out how to get around it. But there are other ways, too. So I mentioned the anti-filtering, those two applications, Freigate and Seifon. Then there's the mesh network like you mentioned. And there's another way, which is if you're in the border areas like in Kurdistan or Abidon down the south, if you're close enough to the Emirates or you're close enough to Iraq, You can use KOREC. You can use a Tesla lot. These are the two other internet service providers that are in Iraq and the Emirates that actually you can reach them because of the line of sight. So you could actually still transmit outside the country, totally absent of the government's control of the internet.

Can you amplify those? You could do that with computers. Yeah. So especially in a country like Iran that has a lot of high dramatic terrain. Perfect situation for computers across the top of the ridge lines to just pass that signal from. a major city to the border area. Yeah, you got to, are they doing that, I'm hoping, right? CIA, MI6, whoever. Hopefully. It's really tough because those things are so obvious that if the regime, I mean,

all you need is a, you know, a small handheld device to figure out where that signal's coming from and direction find on it and destroy it, which is what they were doing with the antennas on roofs as well. There's just so many of them. So if you could flood the environment with these devices, the regime just wouldn't have the resources to stop. Could you do a drone version of? version of a repeater?

You could, but that would require a lot of power. I know we're geeking out here, or at least I am on the tactics of this, but I'm not a cyber expert by any stretch, but it seems like that would be one of the best things that the international community, including the United States, of course, could do to amplify what is clearly an organic, not, you know, fabricated uprising against the regime, right? So, I mean, and you're a very, very, very. well-published author, which is awesome. Can you explain, and sorry, D, I know you probably have some questions, but I just want to know this because I'm going to be talking about this today.

Like, what is the mechanism other than what we all know, IRG, Bac, beseech, etc. Cuds force, like the mechanism internal that keeps the regime in place both by, you know, the kind of intelligence and the action arm of that element. And are they any good? Because we've obviously saw direct strikes by Israel on individuals that they had, you know, they were hosting and clearly they've been infiltrated. What's your thought on that? And can you kind of give the listeners an idea just how they keep themselves in power with such a opposition?

Yeah, so this grip on power that we see today is kind of a long-term development that started in 1989 when the current Ayatollah took over from the original Ayatollah. And what happened was he consolidated power economically through these organizations called Banyads, which are essentially kind of like quasi-religious charity organizations on paper. But what they do is actually funnel all the money, the regime controls into these specialized entities. That's at one layer. And then below that are things like banks, state pension funds. you know, overseas investment funds. So you think about like in the United States, we have private equity and hedge funds and things like that. The regime has something very similar to that that are owned in the person of the Ayatola. And one of them is called Setad, S-E-T-A-D, which is

interesting to look into if you have time. There was a time article, I think in the 90s, about Ayatollah Khomeini, about how he's potentially one of the richest human beings on Earth more than Jeff Bezos because of his control over these banyads. And we're talking about hundreds of billions of dollars. And there was actually a statement by the Minister of Finance in the regime's inner circle a few years ago where he admitted that 20% of the black market in Iran is controlled by the IRGC. So if the government is saying 20% is controlled by the IRGC, you can only imagine what the real number is, right? And if they're controlling the black market and they're also controlling the regular commercial market, it's not about necessarily our conventional

ideas about securitization of a state, which is what's causing repression. Instead, it's economic control of the state. So the reason fuel prices are high, the reason the toman is devalued, the real is devalued, the reason there's little water access. This is because the regime is controlling the economy, rather than allowing actual government functions to move normally as they should. I feel into it very deeply, but I'll leave it there. John, we had like, there was like a report maybe a month or a few months ago, maybe two, three months ago about Iran and their, uh, the drought, the problem with their water. Uh, has that, is it really like just comes down to the regime, like holding the, you know, the spigot open or not in terms of like getting, because they were

talk about moving the capital and stuff like that. Like it's like in Iran, like just insane things that you can't even like, you know, the scale of it is like unbelievable to even think about. Yeah. So this is not a new issue. I mean, 2021, there is a huge approach. test movement, it was water shortage and labor issues and some other stuff. The problem is this infrastructure that is in the water system is poorly maintained. It's basically Shaw era infrastructure that's not ever been updated. So you've got rotting metal, you've got pipes clogged up, you've got poorly managed dams, because there's a lot of corruption in the government, obviously, right? So the people that are supposed to be like technocrats that you'd want running these

things are not running them. Instead, it's IRGC-affiliated individuals. who are either brainwashed or sympathetic to the regime as their number one qualification to be running a dam. So that's a big problem. Also, I think it's, I can remember how many decades, this is the worst drought Iran has had in decades. Right. So they're already at a low water table. They're having issues with how the crops are being, like how the efficiency of the actual movement of water to grow crops is happening.

You have to remember, it's a very mountainous country like we mentioned. There's very little kind of lowland, flatland with, with water. water access. So it requires extra infrastructure to actually move water from mountain to mountain. There's one navigable river in the entire country at the Karun River where actual ships can move on. The rest of it are not navigable by large ships. So there's already like a environmentally low water level there. Combine that with corruption and with a drought, now you've got a recipe for water disaster, which is like one small component of the current protests. So the one, the next thing, course is what if we have catastrophic success? Oh, sorry, Jay. I'll just throw that out there.

Maybe you have, like, the questions I'm getting is what comes next, right? Like, what if, what if, you know, there's reports that the Iatollah's talking about fleeing to Moscow, etc. Like, what if the regime is decapitated? Is it just simply going to leave the IRGC is presumptive power that will fill the vacuum? Is there any change? Is there any change? that it could be a formation of a government more friendly to the United States, the West, and being part of the community and nations. Is there any leader that actually has the clout to stand up and do that? Or are we basically going to move from a theocracy into, you know, a military dictatorship? Yeah, I think there's three possible outcomes, but I'll first put a

pin on the thing about the decapitation. When we say decapitation, we're typically thinking about a person or a small group. So in this case, most people are thinking, well, if we kill Ayatollah Khomeini or he runs away to Moscow, the regime is decapitated. But there's a problem. It's like the whole problem framing concept in military planning. If we don't frame the problem correctly, we're going to be pursuing the wrong problem and the wrong solution the entire time.

The thing is with the regime, when we say who's in charge, we're usually wrong. You know, when we killed Salami, for example, the commander of the military, you know, we thought that would decapitate the IRC. It didn't. because he's not in charge. The people who are actually in charge are not big names. They're not on the news all the time. It's a small group of, they call them Sepahis or guardians that are in the background that are controlling a lot of this stuff, not for ideological reasons as their number one reason. It's more about economic control and wealth generation for their inner circle. So if the Ayatollah left,

I feel very little would change. And I'll go back to the three outcomes. One is that he leaves or dies. the second one is that the monarch returns, and the third one is that the IRGC takes over. These are very three common potential outcomes. The most likely thing that will probably happen, and I'm not a future predictor with a crystal ball, probably what would happen is the IRGC would take over. That third option is most likely. The reason for that is because the monarchy is not universally liked, even by people who want freedom in the country, because the monarchy doesn't really equal freedom.

It just equals another way of consolidating power, which is what the revolution was about in the first place. A lot of the outside Iran support for inside Iran protests talk about the monarchy, and that does not correlate to what people want inside the country. And it's the people inside the country that ultimately have to live every day with what that next government is. So that's always a question of what do the people outside want versus what the people inside want, and we have to rectify those two desires in kind of trying to predict what might happen. next and what the consequences are. And if the U.S. or Israel is perceived widely by people in Iran that they were behind a regime change and the monarch came back, I feel like we'd probably run into a very similar problem that we had with the original Shah before he left, where there was this widespread kind of consternation about who's actually running things in the country,

even if the monarch was purely running it himself without foreign influence. If people doubted enough, you're going to lose that kind of support for that leadership. to tell all of you today about a new newsletter that we're launching that encompasses both the Team House podcast, the Aiz On podcast, and the High Side News Outlet, which I run with Sean Naylor. The newsletter is going to be once a week. It's going to come into your inbox and you're going to get the most current podcasts on Aiz On and the Team House and whatever's topical or current on the high side. So it's another way for us to get the information out to you as social media algorithms are pretty iffy and you never really know what you're going to get.

So this is a once a week email. It'll slide into your inbox and it will have, you know, the greatest hits of that week. It's really good, man. Checking it out. The website for it is teamhousepodcast.kit.com slash join. Teamhousepodcast.com.com slash join. You go there and you enter into your email list or you enter your email into the little thing on the website. and you're good to go, and that'll be it.

So we really appreciate your support, and hope you'll consider signing up. Where's the link? The link will also be down in the description, if you're looking for it there. And that's teamhousepodcast. Dot, K-I-T-K-LoIndiaT-Tango.com backslash join.

Jay, what do you got? You were going to say something. I was just going to ask, as far as the protests are concerned, um, do you think that the, regime is willing to is there a red line that the regime would not want to protest across before they increase their the use of violence against the protesters and what might that look like if they were I think the regime is acting in a state of

fear and survival and they're not using logic to calculate to your question about a red line I think what they're doing is they're going to continue throwing assets at the problem to try to tamp down and there's actually clear indications of that happening. Right now they have Afghans actually manning checkpoints in eastern Iran. They have Hezbollah in Tehran marching down the streets, enforcing the law. They have Pakistanis and they have some other foreign fighters that are that were working with the regime in Syria that are now in Iran actually doing a siege-like law enforcement activity. They did this previously in, I think it was 2019 or 2017. It was 2017 during one of those protests.

They had 5,000 Lebanese Hezbollah fighters patrolling the streets in Tehran. And I think you'll see something like that continuing where rather than making a logical choice about what to do next, they're going to just continue throwing these foreign assets at it to try to tamp down. And you mentioned, which was what is their probable state of mind? And you said it's panic mode right now. Yeah. They've been this way for a long time.

And that's kind of been their main mode of behaving rather than thinking like a rational actor. They've been acting like someone with their backup against the wall, making very rash decisions about what to do next. I mean, you do see what the, what, uh, what, uh, Khamani's, tweeting and stuff like that, he's tweeting like an absolute maniac. Uh, that doesn't sound like somebody who's really, uh, in control and, and locked in to what's going on. Yeah. And if I was, you know, if I was the, uh, 90-year-old dictator and I was afraid that I might get to pose, I'd probably stay off of Twitter because, uh, every time you hit, end, you know.

Yeah. Hey, Jens, I got to jump real quick. I'll try to jump back on. I have a viable issue based on. For look. Mick's going to say, Mick's going to parachute into Tehran right now to assassinate the Supreme Leader.

You're here to hear first. Bring back some saffron. Yeah. So I know you don't want to speculate, but like you said, like the IRGC is like, if you had a bet money, likely the IRGC is the one that, would take over Iran. Also, the interesting thing I've seen, like, over the last,

it's been more than, like, the last few weeks of protests. It's been more like the last few months. Basically, ever since we, Israel and the U.S. hit the nuclear sites, was like, you see these kind of, like, puff pieces in America, like, the Western media about the Shaw. And, you know, you hear it on Twitter, too, as these protests have continued to go on, where, like, bring back the show, long live the show. and stuff like that.

And it's like, dude, this guy's been outside of Iran for 50 years. Yeah. So it's like, it really is some like secret love for this guy to come back? Or is that just what like Western powers really want? You got to think about the, a lot of the Iranians that are, let's say our parents' age that are outside of Iran, they left Iran during the revolution. So like they grew up, Pro Shah left the country, after their views and now they're speaking. And their kids grew up like that too.

the people that are our age or even younger grew up in that environment, like in California, for example, Los Angeles, a lot of pro-Shah stuff because those were the people that left the regime or left the country and came to the United States. You know, that's what we have. It doesn't mean it's false support, but it may be overemphasized or over, over, it's not, it's not representing the actual sentiment, especially, like I said, inside Iran, like, because those are the people that will have to be dealing with the new government if there is one every day.

And is that the government that they wanted in the first? place, you know, and actually Iran, people think about Iran. They think like, oh, it's this centralized authoritarian system, whether it's a monarch or it's a Ayatollah. Iran actually has had democracy twice in its, you know, recent century of history. 1906, they had a constitutional revolution. And then 1953, they had Muhammad Mossadegh, who was deposed by the CIA. Both of those times that people actually picked their government. And both times it was a democracy. So there is a big desire for that in Iran. The problem is, and I know if this crosses over to the Venezuela discussion, there's oil in Iran. And foreign interests in oil are always looking, and it's

easier to manage a single authoritarian than it is to manage a democracy if you want the oil out of that country, right? And that's just rational, you know, international relations concept. You want to have the simplest access to that resource. So whether it's the United States, Britain, Russia, or China, all of them have something in common, and that is they want the oil in Iran. And if that means that they need to keep a dictator or a monarch in power, they'll do it because that means they get what they want. It's interesting you said how, you know, folks that came from Iran, like immigrated to the states and like, you know, maybe the UK and other places after the year or during the, you know, the fall. It mirrors a lot like Cuban immigrants, right, to the states,

even like Greek immigrants to the states, right? Like a lot of them came over during like the junta and stuff like that. There are those like, they kind of get stuck in time a little bit, right? And remember like the good old days before without thinking what the actual people on the ground of whether it's Cuba, Greece, Iran, or take your pick really want for themselves.

Yeah, if you have anything else in Iran or Jay, if you have any questions on Iran, just let them. I wanted to ask if you know what Israel's role on the ground might be, or even geopolitical, as far as all this is concerned, what are they saying? From my contacts inside Iran, the consensus or feeling is that Israel is deeply penetrated the IRGC and outside the IRGC, but still in the government because there are some actual secular components of the government. And I think that's probably true. And the question is, the ones who are infiltrated are those the ones that will eventually take over, or is there a separate element that will

eventually take over. And it's really tough to say because obviously when you're doing clandestine work, it's hard to manage that because it's clandestine. So you can't actually, you know, answer every question about what your move might do, what the effect might be. I think it will be interesting because if you look at who was assassinated in June, there was certainly a select deck of individuals who were killed and then a select deck of peers who were not killed. And of course, you know, doing some inferential analysis, you could question about why did they survive? Let me ask you this, you know, because we're, you know, relatively, it's understood that it could force an IRGC.

Obviously, it protects Iran, and its main thing is to protect itself and the Supreme, you know, the Ayatollah. But, like, they're obviously deployed across the world. Are they pulling back in terms of, like, their covert stuff outside of Iran to, like, come back and be like, oh, shit, we got to make sure things are covered at home? Yeah, so it's important to distinguish between Quds Force, which is like a special operations element that does partner force training with their elite partner units like in Syria previously. And the IRGC generally, which is much larger because the IRGC also has an intelligence organization, which actually took over from the, we call it the MOIS, but they actually call it Vaja. So IRGC intelligence organization took over domestic intelligence activities from this other entity in 2009 after the Green Revolution, the John Bashi Saabs. And when they did that, they set up across every province, an outpost. So there's IRGC intelligence organization all over the country.

And there's also some other elements. There's actually quite a few other named elements that are supporting them on all these provinces. So Quds Force is still doing what Quds Force does because that's a foreign entity. Like they're supposed to only do stuff outside the country. Whereas IRGC intelligence organization is the one that's most concerning domestically and also regionally. So we call it IRCIO. The IO is all over the problem. place in like Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Syria, like the ring around Iran, basically,

whereas Kud's force is much further out. You know, they're in Latin America. They're in Africa. They're sometimes in the United States not doing very well with their operations. Yeah. They try. You know, so they're pretty widespread, whereas it's the I.O. That's inside Iran that's causing a lot of this background collection that's resulting in a lot of

what they do is they'll disappear people. to scare others. So you saw during the Masa Amini protests, what they would do is they would actually use Instagram to geolocate where the people were, and they'd go to their house and basically throw them off their rooftop to kill them that way, and then say that someone committed suicide. And they would use this as a way to instill fear and kind of like make people think twice about stepping outside, but they've turned the internet off so they can't use that tool very well right now. So going back to what I was mentioning earlier, that's why they're probably releasing these images of people and, you know, the dead essentially is to try to achieve that same outcome.

Damn. Unbelievable. What's going on. All right. Yeah, let's flip to another oil rich country, Venezuela that we, last week, obviously everyone knows. We went in and snatched Maduro. He's three miles away from my house right now, relaxing in a Brooklyn detention center.

Interesting thing this week, what happened? You know, we saw President Trump with... Secretary of State Rubio and some other folks from the administration meet with a roundtable of oil executives and a hot the Halliburton executive and I joked with you guys before the show started about how insane that would be if we did that in 2002 and 2003 when we went into Iraq and now it just seems to be normal like this is like just normal operating procedure and I kind of went through down a rabbit hole in terms of like what what's the deal with Venezuelan oil and how it's like heavy crude and it needs like serious refinement and and that like Venezuela really isn't the infrastructure really isn't there it needs like five to ten years of like modernization for them to like make it cost effective.

You know they get like they get some precursor that goes into the oil to like you know thin it out from Russia like they don't really have a great. infrastructure there. Also, the other part about the heavy crude thing is like, heavy crude needs to be at $80 a barrel for it to make sense economically for Venezuela. Also, the whole thing about them having 300 plus billion of reserves was a number that Hugo Chavez came up with back in the early 2000s to like say, hey, we're a real deal player here. And that's the number that we've taken for the last 25 years as being true. Some people are saying that it could be a third of that. That's a lot of oil still, obviously, but, you know, it's not exactly like we could just go in there, stick a tap into the ground, and then we're

rich all of a sudden because we have all this oil. You know, most of the oil execs at that round table, at least maybe they were offline, off the record, we're talking like, this doesn't really make sense for us economically. And most of them are actually more into it for getting their $10 billion for like the judgment that was against, that was like levied against, uh, you know, like, levied against Venezuela when they pulled out, when they like nationalized the oil industry there. So it's just, I don't know what the fuck we're doing there is basically my point. So, John, what do you got? Yeah, so actually, it's interesting this situation with the oil because it's, even though it feels regional, it feels local.

It's actually international and scope because we were just talking about Iran's oil as one thing. China has all these small teapot refineries is what they're called. They're basically kind of like backyard oil refineries that are designed specifically to work with this kind of crude exactly. And what has been going on with a lot of Venezuelan oil is that it's been doing ship to ship transfers over to China and being refined by these very small time, almost like entrepreneurial oil refineries, right? Well, the problem with the U.S. now controlling that, you have to think about what effect will this have on Chinese oil use? How will this affect China-Iran oil use? Because Iran is the number one provider of oil to China currently. Well, if there's a regime change in Iran and the U.S. now controls Iran and Venezuela oil production, what does that mean for China? Because if China's oil is coming from these two countries and the U.S. now controls it, the only other option is Russia.

So this is just, I mean, I don't want to speculate on what could all these third order effects. That's a very interesting thing to think about internationally about what will happen just because of the change of control over the oil. Now, with the crude oil, the U.S. is actually the only country that's able to truly commercialize what's currently in Venezuela. will. And that's why Chevron stayed there for so long. The problem is the infrastructure, of course, is breaking down. It's been breaking down for a long time. It was nationalized previously. So there's a lot of detritus in these processing pieces of equipment. But if the oil price, like you said, it needs to be $80 for it to be profitable. And right now it's in the 50s. Again, internationally, how is that going to affect OPEC? How is that going to affect Saudi

Arabia and the Emirates who we want to have on our side? Because if we push them out of this game, guess who they might start selling oil to China, right? So like there's a lot of third order questions that pop out of this single act of taking over this oil. Damn. So yeah, there's like a lot going on here. Like it's pretty unbelievable. Yeah, just this whole rabbit hole I went into about like going, like, you know, I still am trying to wrap my head around why the fuck we did it, right?

Because like we play the role as like, you know, freedom and democracy coming to you soon, but we're still, we're dealing with Maduro's number two and number three in command, right? Like the Rodriguez Simblings, you know, who. And Darcy. Yeah. Yeah. And who have been in the government for 20 plus years. They were part of Hugo, you know, they came up with Hugo Chavez.

So it's really interesting, like, you know, how the veil has kind of been lifted a little bit. And I don't know if this is like what it's, what U.S. foreign policy has been all about for the last 50 years. but kind of really seems like that's what it's been about for the last 50 years, is in just imperialism, frankly. Sorry to talk like a pink okami, but. Well, you know, we don't have the balancing force that we have with the Soviet Union previously where there was like a second actor that could come in and affect what was happening and were currently sort of unrestrained or unipolar, I guess, is the term to use.

But there are no constraints, there are no repercussions, which no matter actually who is in office, Because if you look during the Obama administration, the predator drone was used exponentially more than it was during the Bush administration, right? That's one example. And the things we were doing in Syria, you would never imagine we'd be doing that in Syria if the Soviet Union was still around, right? So because there are no checks on that, regardless of who is in power in the United States, the U.S. as a country internationally is going to act in an unconstrained way until there is a constraint placed on it. Make you back. I'm glad to see you. The Middle Eastern media is headstock collectively exploding. Really? Why did something new happen? All the reports are coming out now that, you know, obviously the White House is considering these strikes.

And according to them, the decision point or the options brief will be Tuesday and a decision will be made. I don't know that to be true, just passing on. I think they were citing the Reuters. So I know we moved on to Venezuela, but. Yeah, yeah. We talked about the crazy roundtable of oil executives and Halliburton, which again would be unbelievable to see if this was 20 years ago. Do the oil executives really, really want access to Venezuela? I say that not as a statement, a genuine question.

I'm not an energy expert. I think the only company that was really down for it was Chevron. Because I think Conoco Phillips has like a big deal with Guyana. and they have the same kind of heavy crude that Venezuela does, and it's more developed and stuff like that. So there isn't this real, I mean, obviously people are going to want to make money, but there isn't like this huge rush as people would think that there would be to get this Venezuelan heavy crude.

We're talking like a decade-long infrastructure built to make this effective, right? So this is a long-term commitment by these companies that may or may not last policy-wise beyond the next three years. Yeah. Also, like, what's the situation on the ground, like, in terms of Venezuela, right? Like, how are you going to protect these assets? You know, you're going to drop $100 billion of investment. And maybe in five years the country looks different and they say, fuck off again, you know,

which frankly, if you ask me, that's like within their rights to do because it's their country and it's their resources. But why would anybody with, you know, if I want to be profitable, if I want to be profitable, if I'm an investor or an oil company, why would I dump billions of dollars in fixing infrastructure if there's like a maybe there? Right. And is it just, we're going to keep the regime in place by paying part of this to them? And what's the difference between, you know, this and what was going on before, essentially?

I mean, the U.S. used to promote democracy around the world, right? We actually recognize that Mundo Gonzalez won the last, the 2024 election. Like that's official policy right now by the United States. So are we going to try? And I know it's much easier. It doesn't seem like de facto policy, to be honest. Right. You know.

Like, why aren't we forcing them to either let them be the interim government or pulled another election? It's because McChadro. The department just went there and met with the current government. Yeah, right. So we're basically propping them up, which is just the, the Maduro government minus Maduro. Yeah. You guys know anything about the collectivos that are on the ground in Venezuela?

Can I get a little bit of info on that? Well, like most regimes, their primary purpose is to stay in power, right? So the collectivos, the paramilitary group that's kind of like a common, at least how it's been described to me, a combination of a security force, a cartel, a gang, a street gang. They are basically affected because they're extraordinarily and violent

and they have no restraints when ordered. So that would make it very challenging to reinsert Maria Machado, of course. I think that's a fair point. But essentially, locks down everything

and anyone at the direction of the Minister of Ontario who is one of the, apparently the most powerful leader that's there. It's not under our system, of course, but under their system, it's about

the regime security, so that individual has a lot of clout, much more so than the acting president. All right. I think that's all I got for Venezuela. I'm missing something. You guys can hit me up.

I mean, it looks like another fucking quagmire to be completely honest. And it doesn't seem like we're at all promoting democracy at anywhere. We don't really give a fuck about that. We just care about who agrees with us and does what we want them to do. another another you know in the western hemisphere greenland uh you know there's talk about

you know invading greenland or paying uh citizens of greenland 100 000 to like become american citizens just like why the fuck would you do that because a hundred grand would just go to your medical bills if he became an american uh so why what's the incentive are you veterinarian bills yeah or that yeah exactly um you know if we were to ever try and take over Greenland, obviously it would be easy militarily. That's what the one thing we're good at is fucking fucking other people's militaries up. What comes after

is usually where we fucking stumble. What happens to NATO as a alliance? Right. It's, it's, this is, this is hard to believe we're even talking about. It's, you know, it started as like, oh, he's just bloviating, too. He's just

doddy and old, yeah. I mean, where to start, right? So Greenland, we have like three treaties with Greenland to include the NATO treaty, right? And they've, during the Cold War, we had many bases and many people. It's strategically important. Yes, that's true. It's like the interceptor point for, you know, intercontinental ballistic missiles come on our way. Apparently, somebody told me it's like the apoggi or whatever the top of the trajectory is is right under it.

So it's the easiest place to strike it. So that's definitely true. It's also, you know, we're seeing Arctic ice cap melt. So the access to hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals are more prevalent. And then if you look at the globe and just flip it like this, once that's the case, the world gets a lot smaller. So obviously it's strategically important. So is everything that touches the Arctic. That said, the aforementioned treaties allow us to do everything that we're saying that we need to do that we're not doing right now.

Like, if it's that big of a security issue and Russia and China are just circling Greenland, which they're not, then why aren't we there? Like, why did we degree or reduce our presence to like 100 folks in one base? So the question is, if it's that important to why aren't we doing something about now, why aren't American companies in their full throttle looking how to exploit this? So that is one issue on whether this is really about. the things that we are saying it is. And then the second issue is just the damage this is due to the United States' reputation to even talk about it. Under the UN Charter, you cannot obviously use threat against another nation. You can't even threaten it. So we're already past that.

We're threatening because they won't take it off the table, which is a threat, to use military force against a NATO party. So we're clearly in the wrong international. nationally on this. It is, I mean, you're seeing reports that NATO, I mean, European countries are going to start sending forces there. And you know why they're doing it? They're going to say, well, you said it's under threat. So now the UK, Germany, and France are going to send forces potentially, of course, Denmark as well, to Greenland right now to bolster this perceived threat of Chinese and Russian invasions. And that.

that's going to, of course, just escalate it because it's going to irritate the White House. And we'll see where it goes from here. But the other part of this, and I'd love to hear what you guys think about this, this is clearly against the treaties that the U.S. signed, which is against U.S. law. So how the military would even entertain or prepare for an invasion is a question I would have. Because it's clearly an unlawful order to invade a NATO-treated ally, per the U.S. law that established our presence in NATO unless we withdraw, which I think takes Senate action, not just unilateral executive action. So I'll stop there. Toss it. I think also thinking about

Article 5, you know, the only time it was used was in Afghanistan, right? And I was thinking back, when I was deployed there in the same base I was on, we had Danish special forces with us. We actually use their Chowhall, you know. We have Danish special forces partnered in Ghana right now with U.S. soft training the gunnian military, their special boat service. You know, like, there's active U.S. work with the Danes overseas. And I can't imagine how it must be for those teams on the ground working together, watching this happening and looking at each other, you know, because it could potentially be that the next morning you wake up and suddenly we're enemies in the same camp. It's just crazy. It is crazy. And they're very effective. And quite frankly,

I've stood at a dignified transfer for one of them. And I think this is really rubbing, not that, you know, they're taking this to account. Veterans, especially of Afghanistan, the wrong way, because this is not the way you talk and treat allies. And as Jonathan said, the only time Article 5 has been initiated has been to our benefit. And a lot of these countries sat in Afghanistan, even Iraq, which I don't even know what had to do with 9-11, for decades. And the Danes specifically per capita, I think, was one of the highest casualty.

rates per capita of any of us. As crazy as us having even talk about this is, it also begs the crazy, the equally crazy question, you know, could this be employed by this administration to drive a wedge in NATO? You know, they've already made it clear that they don't think it's effective anyway. So what would stop them from using this or even bringing this to the table just to drive wedges and form cracks in NATO to try to ultimately? get it to pull itself apart. Good point.

And it's doing it. It's working. If we, if that's a real plan within the administration, I mean, we're actively working for Russia's benefit then. Because NATO's the only reason. Like 100,

100 treaties out of the UN. We just pulled out of them this past week. Good God, guys. And it's, I mean, let's, let's go back a bit. This whole world order was established by us

after World War II for our benefit. Like, we're going to write this order and we're in top of the order, right? That's a good thing. That's why the U.S. economy is the number one in the world. It wasn't by accident, right? And we, the U.S. power is its friends and

its ability to coordinate inform alliances that matter to everybody in the alliance. The NATO alliance is the most significant, I think, military alliance in history, I think one could argue. And it benefited us, right? So if if we rupture NATO, you know, I think there's, I don't know if they're accurate, but like,

you're seeing some statements out of European leaders that they're already looking at how to shut down U.S. bases. I was going to mention that. There was an EU minister that was like popping off on the radio somewhere. I don't remember his name, so apologies, where he was like, if this were going to go down in Greenland, like, we're going to kick you guys out of every single base you guys are in. We're more than happy to take it over. I mean, listen, getting all the European countries to do the same thing at once.

whatever we'll see if that happens but even if it happened in Italy or Germany or wherever take your pick wherever there's U.S. bases that's a real like you'd never hurt something like that from it you know the Europeans always take things into consideration and they huddle and they talk about stuff and they come out with a really cool statement but like that's like real PC but frankly I kind of like to see them have a little bit of teeth and like bite back against this administration, because this administration seems to not give a fuck about Europe. It might not have a choice. And remember, all the things that have to happen to do it, I mean, if you do it by force,

here's what issue. I don't think the United States, the American citizens, going to want to view its country as a neo-colonial power. Right? So I think you'll get refusing orders for real then. And I also think that at the end of this term, whoever comes next is probably going to give it back. Right? because it was taken by force.

So there's no like treaty law, none of that. I just don't see it happening. So I wish we wouldn't have to talk about it because it sounds like just a ridiculous idea. I think the Senate would step in and cut off all funding for it. I really do. I looked at comments from senators. The only one I saw that was really significant. Well, we was talking about buying it, right?

Take the force off the table, even though it's not technically off the table. And look at the buying part. Well, to buy it, it would have to, you know, it's still part of Denmark, so they would have to agree. And then Greenland has to agree. And Greenland gets a lot of support from Denmark, right? They have a total, basically socialist system. All their health care, all their education, way more than they contribute. Unless the United States wants to give more to the people in Greenland than they give to the people in Montana or New York.

Greenland's almost like, Greenland is almost like Kentucky. Yeah. then we're going to then we can't match it nor do they and it's clear they don't want to be part of the United States for why would you want to be part of the United States seriously why would you want to be I mean they don't so if you're Greenland if you're yeah yeah no they're doing pretty good the other part is then the Senate it has to be a treaty so the Senate has to pass the treaty to actually purchase Greenland and the House has to pass the appropriations to buy it Like, I mean, does anybody, I'm not an expert on the acquisition of foreign countries, but I think that's a heavy lift that it's never, and there's no interest.

Nobody else in the Senate has talked about this until now. So the idea that they want to purchase and that, you know, I'm obviously an old school Reagan type Republican here, but the current thinking of MAGA is the opposite of this. Right. It's more on the isolationist. It's not in the neo-colonial, let's take over, you know, territory from allies. So I just don't see how this. I mean, if I was a magerbro about America first, I'd be pretty fucking pissed about seeing what's going on in the last few months. Going to be honest.

But everything I'm seeing on social media and, you know, TikTok and YouTube and all that, they are. You know, they're screaming that, you know, hey, President Trump, what happened to America first? Like, I've seen people full on who, when I feel like, when I feel, first started watching them, we're all about this administration, and in the last six months or so have completely turned on them, completely. So I think it's gone beyond them. I think them playing to their base was for elect, for votes. And then once they got in office, it was screw you, we're going to do what we want. We don't care whether you like us or not. But there's representatives in the House and the Senate that, you know, hopefully they have their own agency. And they are. I mean,

you're seeing some pretty significant. You think so? I hope so. This would require anyway. Yeah, exactly. This might not help them on the mid. And I don't do politics and I don't belong to a party. But I'm just looking at this from the national security perspective, like the U.S., not either any party. This is not in our national security interest. Even the discussion is seriously fraying our alliances.

And I don't know if it's recovered. I mean, think of, I guess I'd ask anybody that's listening, think if you were a European leader. right now. Like, what would you be doing? I'd be doing anything I can to get away from us. Yeah. Yeah. There's a lot of economic things that they could do, right? They could, like the whole bond mark is, it depends on foreign leaders, foreign decisions, right?

This could just not go well for the United. It's already not going well for the United States. I wish we would just move on. I support plenty of the things that they've done, not plenty, but some. I try to call it objectively, but this is objectively a terrible idea even to talk. And I don't think we're going to do it, which makes the talk even worse. Yeah, Mick, I would agree with you. I mean, anybody with a normal functioning brain would agree with you, but you know, you see

officials from the administration going on news channels and spinning this as a good idea. actual card-carrying members of the administration going out there and like it. And never said this before, right? So it's never been an issue. Apparently we got the Virgin Islands with some deal. Like we agreed never to make a claim on Greenland and they gave us the Dutch Antilles or something like that. And that is why we have the U.S. Virgin Islands. Like if it's just going to be a might makes right, you know, what's the famous quote,

the strong do what they will and the weak do what they must. Yeah, right? Thucydides, yeah. That looks like the new forward policy of the United States, and that has not been the United States, I think, ever. Certainly after we came to prominence after the end of, or during World War II, but certainly after, it's in our interest to be the leader of the free war.

Not the... All right, boys. Tourment. We got anything else? I'm not feeling good about this conversation. I'm not going to lie to you. Is that what we do here? No, never.

I almost never feel good about our conversations after. I want to thank Jonathan. Yeah, can you tell us something about your book, man? By the way, if you send me one, I'll put it right here. I'll put it right here. Perfect, yeah, I'll send you. Everybody on it. A lot of my buddies do that write books.

My stoic buddies and my national security buddies because it's the same view as ABC. Don't tell them that. Yeah, it's right here above my shoulder. It's called Iran's Shadow Weapons. and it's about how they use covert action and intelligence operations, both overseas and inside the country, to achieve their foreign policy objectives. And it's unique because it's based on a bunch of stuff I got declassified for the first time. So a lot of it's former CIA cables,

a lot of intelligence reports. Also, I translated a bunch of stuff out of Farsi that was from the regime itself that's been leaked to the public. And a lot of new analysis using those two sources that people never get to see. So it's almost a third of the book is just references. because I put a ton of actual analytical horsepower behind it. My idea was to kind of create like an open source product that you would hope to see on the other side of the green door, you know, but with materials available to the public. Yeah. Thanks.

I'm going to put a link into the description for that. So if anyone's interested, please grab it there. Also, Jonathan's other book as well about irregular warfare. And Mick Mulroy, he's got a podcast called The Pub and the Porch, Applied Stoic, and check that out. those links are in the description. Jason Lyons, links are in the description. Muscles from Brussels, Andy Milburn's links are also in the description.

And the best way to support the show is joining our Patreon. You get both TeamHouse and Aizon episodes at free and early, and you help support the show. You can go to patreon.com slash TeamHouse. Any and all information is in the links are in the description. John, as always, thank you, man. This is great. Make Jason, you too, awesome. We'll obviously keep an eye on Iran and what happens.

We'll keep you guys posted. Thanks a lot, guys. Thanks, chance. Excellent. Yeah, thanks to that. I want to tell all of you today about a new newsletter that we're launching that encompasses both the Team House podcast, the Aiz On podcast, and the high side news outlet, which I run with Sean Naylor.

The newsletter is going to be once a week. It's going to come into your inbox and you're going to get the most current podcasts. on Aizon and the Team House and whatever's topical or current on the high side. So it's another way for us to get the information out to you as social media algorithms are pretty iffy and you never really know what you're going to get. So this is a once a week email. It'll slide into your inbox and it will have, you know, the greatest hits of that week. It's really good, man.

Checking it out. The website for it is teamhousepodcast.com.com slash join. teamhousepodcast.kitt.com slash join. You go there and you enter into your email list or you enter your email into the little thing on the website and you're good to go and that'll be it. So we really appreciate your support and hope you'll consider signing up. Where's the link? The link will also be down in the description if you're looking for it there. And that's teamhousepodcast.com.kitt, kit, kiloindia tango.com.

backslash join.