Today, Explained - The US is obsessed with China

Episode Date: March 21, 2023

There’s rare bipartisan consensus in Washington: China is a threat to be countered. Cornell professor Jessica Chen Weiss says the American approach could lock both countries into an escalatory spiral. This episode was produced by Victoria Chamberlin, edited by Matt Collette, fact-checked by Laura Bullard, engineered by Paul Robert Mounsey and Patrick Boyd, and hosted by Noel King. Transcript at vox.com/todayexplained Support Today, Explained by making a financial contribution to Vox! bit.ly/givepodcasts Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

China's President Xi Jinping is in Moscow for a second day today to discuss a peace plan for Ukraine with Russia's President Vladimir Putin. Putin and Xi sat before cameras on Monday and affirmed their friendship. Mr. President, dear friend, welcome to Russia, to Moscow. Now both countries are framing this as a mission of peace, while the U.S. is watching very carefully. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned this week, The world should not be fooled by any tactical move by Russia, supported by China or any

other country, to freeze the war on its own terms. There's a palpable and growing sense among American leaders and lawmakers that China poses a great threat to the United States. But does it? Coming up on Today Explained, what if America's posture toward China is putting us on a trajectory to crisis? The all-new FanDuel Sportsbook and Casino is bringing you more action than ever. Want more ways to follow your faves? Check out our new player prop tracking with real-time notifications. Or how about more ways to customize your casino page with our new favorite and recently played games tabs?

And to top it all off, quick and secure withdrawals. Get more everything with FanDuel Sportsbook and Casino. Gambling problem? Call 1-866-531-2600. Visit connectsontario.ca. It's Today Explained. I'm Noelle King. So this is a week in which American officials are watching Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow with worry, but also marking the start of a disastrous war in Iraq. We called a scholar who's been sounding a warning about China and war. She thinks the United States' aggressive posture toward China could be leading both countries into an escalatory

spiral and, in the worst-case scenario, a war. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor at Cornell. She teaches and researches U.S.-China relations and policy. And last year, Jessica took a sabbatical from Cornell and became a senior advisor to the State Department's policy planning staff, where she worked on China policy. She ended up being disturbed by the type of rhetoric she was hearing on Capitol Hill, this really aggressive tone about China. To the Chinese, if you jump on the Putin train now, you're dumber than dirt. You have a view of the U.S.-China relationship that is slightly different from what we have been hearing on Capitol Hill. Can you tell me how you ended up kind of taking the position that you have?

Well, look, I emerged from my time in the administration, I think, with a really up-close and personal view of the things that were happening, developments in the U.S.-China relationship that made me really concerned that we are on a trajectory toward an avoidable crisis or conflict with the world's second largest economy, and that increasingly our efforts to put ourselves in a better position were increasingly prompting an escalation of this tit-for-tat spiral with China, which is placing strain on the international order. It's raising the risk of an incident in the air or at sea. And it's increasingly crowding out our sense of our own affirmative interests. Where is it that we are going?

What is the world that we want to live in in 5, 10, or 15 years? I thought that ultimately the conversation in Washington, not just in the administration, but especially I think on Capitol Hill, has been too much defined as an effort to out-compete China without a sense of what is that competition for and how would we define success. What is the status of the United States' relationship with China right now? Well, the current status is a really testy one, characterized by efforts to show resolve that neither side is going to back down

and characterized by increasing efforts to kind of back the other off, whether that's, you know, in and around Taiwan. Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that? Yes. You are? That's a commitment we made.

Today, the question of whether or not China will supply Russia with munitions to support its war in Ukraine. We don't believe that it's in China's best interest to be on that side of the war in that way to help Mr. Putin slaughter innocent Ukrainians. We don't believe it's in China's best interest, but obviously they'll have a choice to make. Even though both sides say that they want to avoid a Cold War or a conflict, they are in fact going around the world trying to thwart and undercut the other, seeing each other's initiatives in those terms. What does China think of the United States right now? Xi Jinping has been explicit. One thing we kept hearing over and over again from various Chinese officials is that the U.S. wants to suppress China, that it wants to encircle China and stop its rise. From their perspective, they don't see a future in which the Chinese Communist Party remains secure in a world that is dominated by the United States to the extent that it has been for the past several decades. And so I think the Chinese Communist Party is going around trying to

increase its influence and its security in the face of what they perceive as U.S. efforts to contain and thwart their rise. I want to ask you about two different dynamics that you and other scholars have identified. One of them is competition and one of them is deterrence. And let's start on a big playing field here with military might. Is the United States competing with China militarily or is it attempting to deter China? You know, deterrence is, in part, it's a matter of having the capabilities to deny China an easy victory. And so the United States is investing in its ability, both in terms of its own military capabilities, but also working especially with

allies and partners in the region, including the recent partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom. President Biden tonight joined the leaders of the United Kingdom and Australia in San Diego to announce a deal to provide the Australian military with nuclear powered attack submarines. Strengthening the Quad India Japan. The U.S. will send a new marine military unit to Japan and the two nations agreed to extend the terms of their defense treaty to cover attacks in space. Which is you know ostensibly to also deliver benefits for the region but also to China looks like a balancing or containment effort. And of course, continued efforts to pursue greater access across the region in the Philippines,

for example. The U.S. and the Philippines reached an agreement today allowing American forces to operate in four yet-to-be-confirmed new locations across the nation. Today's move is aimed at confronting China and its focus on Taiwan. But what I've argued and I think others have noted as well is that deterrence isn't just a matter of capabilities and threatening to use those capabilities. It's also about making clear that China faces a choice, that there are assurances that if China doesn't escalate, that it can expect a more stable relationship or the preservation of the status quo. We've heard a lot about China trumping the United States potentially when it comes to technology. We know that there's real worries and we've seen a response to those worries, including sanctions and including a lot of, what's the word, a lot of very aggressive talk. This is not just a military challenge. China has fused its commercial, military,

technological applications in ways no other nation ever has. So it's a multifaceted challenge. Technology would seem to me like an area in which we are competing with China, not necessarily that we need to fear China or to deter them. What are you seeing there? So technology competition can be thought of in a number of different ways. And I think that for a long time, it was believed that the United States could compete by running faster. And the Biden administration, you know, last fall in a speech that Jake Sullivan gave, really signaled that our approach to technology competition was changing. It was no longer enough to just stay ahead. We also are not going to be shy, as I said in my remarks, about tailored, careful, targeted controls on the export of foundational technologies to our competitors. But it also required taking measures such as the October 7th restrictions on semiconductor

exports and the technology used to manufacture those high-end semiconductors, that we now needed to maintain and absolutely impart by holding China back. And that, to me, reflects a real change in how we have approached this competition and I think is really raising questions about whether or not efforts to slow China down are also ultimately going to slow ourselves down. Because it's one thing to restrict the export of technology that can be sold to Chinese-affiliated military entities. And it's another to impose these kinds of controls on a whole swath of technologies that might have implications for our ability to, for example, meet our own climate change objectives. And so if we want to be able to meet our own objectives, this is an area where we need to be really careful about imposing restrictions, controls, where Chinese companies have the technological advantage at the moment.

And finally, what about values? We've done episodes of the show before on culture that make me think we're not competing. China does not want American values. They genuinely do prefer their own. How do you see this playing out? This is an area where I think it is, as you say, I think it's important to find a way to agree to disagree. We have different value systems. And that is ultimately, I think, going to be a feature of the international system, you know, so long as the Chinese Communist Party remains in power and we remain a democracy.

But, you know, trying to out-compete the other, especially through efforts to change the Chinese government or to, you know, coerce others to pursue our path, I think they're ultimately going to be counterproductive. We see a little bit of this rhetorical framing in how the Biden administration has cast this as a contest between democracy and autocracy. And I think, unfortunately, that's one of the things that is pushing China and Russia closer together. And it may, in fact, end up backfiring by encouraging China and other authoritarian states to pursue more active efforts to undermine and subvert democracy, which is the last thing that we want. So you're saying agree to disagree. Are you saying that the United States should not take an active role on China's human rights violations? For example, the internment of

Uyghur populations. What do we do about that, or do we do nothing? I think that what we need to do on issues of human rights, where we have grave concerns about the abuses going on inside the Chinese state, is to find ways that would actually move the needle. And I think oftentimes what we can do here, in addition to, you know, working with other countries, because honestly, China responds less to U.S. pressure and naming and shaming than it does to, you know, the views of developing countries around the world, is to look for ways in our own policies, whether it's, you know, making it easier

for Uyghurs and other persecuted minorities and others, even from Hong Kong, to seek asylum. There are channels here that we could use that we aren't fully availing ourselves that would actually meaningfully make a difference for those who are suffering. Unfortunately, kind of symbolic sanctions may not be getting the job done and may in fact be precipitating kind of a counterproductive reaction, honestly, because oftentimes this kind of naming and shaming from the United States in particular backfires inside China by reducing concerns in China for those very issues. Many Chinese citizens see this as kind of a nakedly geopolitical exercise, you know, rather than a principled stance. I hear you saying we've got to take down the temperature, and it does make complete sense.

Nobody wants to end up in a war with China, neither American nor Chinese. Should the United States tolerate Chinese spy balloons floating across Montana? So the quick answer is no, we shouldn't be tolerating Chinese spying. But this is a very good example of where it's important that we talk about this with the Chinese to ensure that these kinds of unacceptable behaviors don't continue. And this is just the tip of the iceberg. And so one of the really important things here for the U.S. policy going forward is finding ways to, you know, not just maintain occasional channels of communication for passing messages, but, you know, being unafraid to talk with China about what terms of coexistence might look like, the actions that we are taking that are also even if we foresee a competition that lasts for decades, allows us to do so without risking an escalation that would jeopardize our livelihoods,

the global economy, and tens of thousands around the world. Is China an existential threat to the United States? It's not yet an existential threat, but I worry that by our actions and by the continuation of this action-reaction spiral, we may end up in much more adversarial, confrontational posture where it ends up being a threat that we may deem existential. China is no doubt a significant challenge, but at the end of the day, we have to find a way mutually toward some kind of modus vivendi. Not a do or die proposition, but really, how is it that we shape a future that accounts for China's role in it, that also protects our interests as global power shifts and evolves?

After the break, Jessica Chen Weiss is back to tell us what's really making her nervous about this whole thing and it is taiwan support for today explain comes from ramp ramp is the corporate card and spend management software designed to help you save time and put money back in your pocket. Ramp says they give finance teams unprecedented control and insight into company spend. With Ramp, you're able to issue cards to every employee with limits and restrictions and automate expense reporting so you can stop wasting time at the end of every month. And now you can get $250

when you join RAMP. You can go to RAMP.com slash explained. RAMP.com slash explained. R-A-M-P dot com slash explained. Cards issued by Sutton Bank.

Member FDIC., terms and conditions apply. Bet MGM, authorized gaming partner of the NBA, has your back all season long. From tip-off to the final buzzer, you're always taken care of with a sportsbook born in Vegas. That's a feeling you can only get with BetMGM. And no matter your team, your favorite player, or your style, there's something every NBA fan will love about

BetMGM. Download the app today and discover why BetMGM is your basketball home for the season. Raise your game to the next level this year with BetMGM, a sportsbook worth a slam dunk. An authorized gaming partner of the NBA. BetMGM.com for terms and conditions. Must be 19 years of age or older to wager.

Ontario only. Please play responsibly. If you have any questions or concerns about your gambling or someone close to you, please contact Connex Ontario at 1-866-531-2600 to speak to an advisor free of charge. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with iGaming Ontario. There's an old Balkan proverb, only Nixon could go to China. How did we get to this moment with China? You write in Foreign Affairs that after President Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, Washington came to view China as a strategic partner in containing the Soviet Union. Okay, all good. It's working.

And then where do we go from there? I would say, by and large, that the United States, after Nixon's visit to China, largely pursued a policy of what was then called engagement. This was the week that changed the world. To build a bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of hostility which have divided us in the past. And what we have said today is that we shall build that bridge. The idea that bringing China into the international system would make it safer than one where China was on the outside still spoiling for a fight. I would say as China's military power grew, the United States invested more in efforts at deterrence,

but nonetheless continued to view regular diplomatic engagement as a really important or even indispensable way of managing these frictions with China and trying to shape China's choices in ways that would align with U.S. interests and values. Now, China over this time period also became much more authoritarian at home. Even under Xi Jinping's predecessor, Hu Jintao, you had, I think, a growing sense that unrest at home could really undermine the Chinese Communist Party became even more concerned about the prospects of regime change and the so-called peaceful evolution. The government became much more repressive, detaining lawyers, cracking down on non-governmental organizations, and viewing things really through this lens of external forces trying to undermine China's rise. And so this combination of increasing repression at home and, you know, an increasingly assertive effort to use China's growing capabilities

internationally to achieve deference to China's interests, that really then, I think, especially under the late Obama administration, began to seed a change in how the United States viewed China. What we have said to the Chinese, and we've been firm consistently about this, is you have to recognize that with increasing power comes increasing responsibilities. The fact that you're bigger than the Philippines or Vietnam or other countries in and of itself is not a reason for you to go around and flex your muscles. You've got to abide by international law. But it wasn't until the Trump administration that the United States viewed this and started to characterize the relationship in especially adversarial terms. That is why we will launch an all-out campaign to eliminate America's dependence on China.

We will bring our supply chains, which are a disaster right now. You can't get anything. And good luck getting a turkey for Thanksgiving. Fast forward to the Biden administration, and I think a lot of people expected that things would get a little bit better. But unfortunately, that window, I think, for reducing tension was one that was missed. We'll confront China's economic abuses, counter its aggressive, coercive action to push back on China's attack on human rights, intellectual property, and global governance.

But we are ready to work with Beijing when it's in America's interest to do so. The Biden administration, in part because of the domestic political pressures to take a tough stance on China, but also because of a kind of a shared sense that China was this ultimate challenge to U.S. leadership in the international order, ended up leaving in place a lot of the policies that the Trump administration had and then adding on to those. I'm committed to work with China where we can advance American interests and benefit the

world, but make no mistake about it. As we made clear last week, if China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country, and we did. There is growing concern both in the United States, very clearly in China, and also in Taiwan, that something is brewing with respect to Taiwan. What actions, what recent actions are leading to this concern that we might be headed for a situation here with China that ultimately a lot of people may regret? We are in very much an escalatory spiral over Taiwan, where demographic and political changes on the island have made the prospect of unification with China increasingly distasteful to voters and leaders on the island.

And the United States, for its part, I think has really leaned toward deterring China and supporting Taiwan almost unconditionally. And I think that that tendency has led to a lack of discipline in terms of U.S. efforts to support Taiwan in ways that were consistent with the past. Now, of course, a lot of these actions were in response to China's own growing campaign to penalize and isolate the island and make clear that further steps toward permanent separation or even de jure independence will be met with punishment. And so what we have now, I think, is an increasingly eroding status quo where actions by all sides, by Beijing, by Taipei, by Washington, are precipitating further actions by the other side than to retaliate. And that's what we saw after Speaker

Pelosi visited Taiwan last August. Today, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman repeated threats of military action. If the U.S. is bent on going its own way, China will take resolute and strong measures to safeguard China's sovereignty and security interests. China reacted with a series of unprecedented drills. China put its military on high alert and flew fighter jets close to Taiwan. And ultimately, that visit didn't leave the island more secure, in part because of how China responded. What are the consequences of continuing on this trajectory with respect to Taiwan? What is the worst case scenario? The worst case scenario is that we are in a full-fledged war.

I don't think that the Chinese government has made a decision to invade or attack Taiwan, but they could do so if they felt the alternative was to lose Taiwan permanently from their perspective. And with elections coming up in Taiwan and in the United States in 2024, I'm very concerned about political steps that precipitate a conflict that all sides ought to want to avoid. You know, we've already had politicians in the United States suggesting that we should recognize Taiwan as an independent state. While the United States should continue to engage the People's Republic of China as a sovereign government,

America's diplomatic recognition of the 23 million freedom-loving Taiwanese people and its legal, democratically elected government can no longer be ignored, avoided, or treated as secondary. And that would absolutely be the kind of move that would precipitate military action by the Chinese government. What are the policy positions on China that you are arguing for? What I hear you saying is we need to calm down. I wish everybody would calm down a bit. But let's put that into policy terms.

What should the United States be doing that it is not doing? First, the United States needs to discipline competition to what it is that we stand for and that we shouldn't let out-competing China define our sense of purpose. Second, we need to, in trying to deter China, make sure that we thread the needle so that we don't end up provoking China. And then third, we need to shape China's choices by making clear that if China escalates, it can expect these set of outcomes. But if they don't escalate, they can expect this other kind of better relationship with the United States and with the world. I worry that we are in a place where increasingly efforts to put ourselves in a stronger competitive position

are coming at the expense of gaining leverage over the trajectory that China's foreign policy, its ambitions are on, including its increasingly close relationship with Russia. Today's episode was produced by Victoria Chamberlain and edited by Matthew Collette. It was fact-checked by Laura Bullard and engineered by Paul Robert Mouncey and Patrick Boyd. I'm Noelle King. It's Today Explained.