TRASHFUTURE - No Bedtime for the Far Right feat. Daniel Trilling

Episode Date: June 16, 2026

Britain inches closer to legislating a national bedtime for rowdy teens and there’s another ministerial resignation over an inability to make it 1942 again by science or magic. In the second half, Daniel Trilling joins us to discuss his new book If We Tolerate This, an exploration of how the British far right and the recent riots thereof was enabled by the respectable centre. Get Daniel’s book here! Get more TF episodes each week by subscribing to our Patreon here! RILEY ALERT Check out No Gods, No Mayors here! HUSSEIN ALERT Check out 10k Posts here! MILO ALERT Check out Milo's tour dates here: https://www.miloedwards.co.uk/liveshows NATE ALERT Nate's band Second Homes has just released their debut album, which includes the song used in this episode’s outro, and you can stream it for free here! Trashfuture are: Riley (@raaleh), Milo (@Milo_Edwards), Hussein (@HKesvani), Nate (@inthesedeserts), and November (@postoctobrist)

Okay, you ever see two things? No. I've never seen two. You ever see two things? Well, because the thing is I'm a Marxist-Leninist, so when I see two things, I know I'm really seeing one thing that's different from either of them.

So I saw two things. Number one, we have orb down. There is, there's, we are experiencing orb set as tools for humanity, the company that makes the Sam Altman Iris scanning orb, is laying off. I don't want to alarm you laying off 500 people.

Oh, my God. I thought people could have a career for life at Orb. But now you're telling me that, because we don't have professions anymore. Like, it used to be, you know, your father was a toolmaker, his father was a toolmaker, but now the fucking gig economy,

you've got to be fucking, like, prime minister or, like, working on the orb or whatever. And it's all, we're losing those traditions. And so here's the thing, right? There are 500 orb experts currently going free,

and the UK is trying to implement the most well thought out and intelligent policy in history, which is the social media ban for under 16s, along with the curfew-based partial ban for 16 to 18s. I see what you're cooking. What we do is we have the orb. And that way, if a child tries to go onto the internet past their bedtime, the orb like flies in through their bedroom window and kills them. Yeah, like a servo skull in 40K.

Yeah, exactly. And you know what that is as well? that is defense investment, which solves the other thing that we've been worrying about. So I think this is a solid plan. Britain could become like a net exporter of orbs. Like of child-seeking first-person view explosive orbs. Yeah, because previously the only other country that manufactures those at scales is Israel. So like, we could seriously start to compete on the world stage.

Anyway, it's trash feature. Yeah, welcome to TF. It's Hussein Nova and Riley. We got Daniel Trilling in the back half, whose new book, If we tolerate this, how the British establishment made the far right respectable is eerily relevant, especially for the events of the last couple of weeks. Yeah, and we're desperately trying to record before the national bedtime. I mean, this is the timing difficulty is we have to do it before the national bedtime

and we have to get it relevant to the race riot that's just happened as opposed to the race riot that's just about to happen. God, there's so much. Yeah, we're going to be talking a little bit about Northern Ireland with Daniel, but we're mostly going to be talking about the broader currents of like the British far right. in a relationship with the British establishment. And I will tell you now, I say it then. That's worth repeating.

I'm currently speaking with a couple of people who are journalists based in Northern Ireland to get more of an on-the-ground view from there. But I do want to start with this completely insane social media bit, genuinely bat-shit policy that I would say can only be cooked up by the British but was actually an Australian import to Britain. Like Linton Crosby? Or flat whites.

Or calling it a sando. Yeah. There are two paths, right? One path is like, you know, good quality coffee. And the other path is the most insane shit that will never work. And we chose the second one. Which set of Australian imports are you going to get? The ones that are annoying but good or the ones that are annoying and evil.

So for those of you who don't know, the UK is announced it's going to do a total social, well, actually, sorry, not total social media ban for under 16s because telegram and discord are not included. Yeah, you can only get radicalized in one of two directions. You can get radicalized to like the four guys who are left who were in ISIS on telegram, or you could get radicalized into a resist lib on blue sky. And to be honest, the second one's way more dangerous. We're going to see, like, Trump's going to do another state visit to Britain, and every kid in the country is going to come at him like weapons. And when we see the partial ban for 16 to 18s, what we meet,

they're going to implement a curfew where you can't be on it past 830. I don't know if that's from Australia or if that is, like, like Britain putting our own annoying spin on it. That's just the absolute nanny state just like the, it's just kicking in for them. The thing is, right? We know that screen time is actually bad for teenagers, right? And so if this worked, right,

this might actually, in the most annoying possible way, be a benefit to them. It's just also not going to work at all. I think this is also it. The reason why this ban is sort of so fucking annoying is that like it kind of gets some stuff right. And the stuff that it gets right are like... The phones is fucking up the kids.

That's just true. Yeah, the phones is fucking up the kids. I know that, well, in some circles, that's a controversial opinion. But look, the phones is fucking up the kids. They are saying some, they are saying some dumb shit. The adults are kind of doing it as well. And like, a lot of the research sort of suggests that, like, the best way to, like, research from actual people who study digital culture and everything,

basically say that, like, if you want your kids to have, like, healthier screen habits, right? if you want them to have a healthier relationship. Because this is it. We've talked on the show a lot about like the kind of quagmire that the government, but also lots of governments have gotten themselves into, which is that they have sort of given up the state to tech companies. Yeah.

And they've kind of realized that there are consequences to that because the tech companies aren't making like the fancy trains or like making stuff easier. Yeah. They're just making all of us dumber. But it's like that, it's like that anti-smoking PSA, right? I learned it from watching you. We're all on our phones passed out bedtime.

Well, yeah. Well, the thing is that they've made, like, the tech companies have made things harder, which makes you have to be on screen anyway for longer because you are talking to like, if you want to try to get car insurance, you're spending like 45 minutes talking to a chat bot rather than an actual person while being on your screen. But also, like, the way in where society is built is one where like you are basically on your screen all the time and we can't, you know, and obviously we have a lot of the research to say that like this is kind of done by design. But like every time I sort of like I have read about stuff to do with this spam, like the thing that I'm sort of constantly thinking about is like, like, Well, okay, yeah, I agree with the point that, like, kids do be spending too much time on their phone. But I also think that if you are basically of any age demographic, you do be spending too much time on your phone. We, yeah, we adults made it such that to navigate society, you need to be on your down phone. And all of us are on our down phone because we have to. And we also grew up at a time where, like, you know, we also also, like, formative years of our lives anyway, were ones where, like, we were sort of told, well, actually being on the screen is good for you, right? because everything's going to go to screen.

It has been good for me. Instead of having an actual real life, what I did was I posted, and I accidentally posted my way into a career. I am a like contra-positive to the idea that going on your phone is bad, and yet I'm out here saying going on your phone is bad, mostly because I want to prevent ever being all about eaved by a younger version of me. I'm going to full boomer mode on podcasts, so you will never reply.

me. You'll be listening to me and I sound like David fucking assenbro. You know, you know how like you have like boomer types who are like got through university and everything and then now just like, well, actually it's really unfair that, you know, kids go study basket weaving and we have to pay for it. We're like that before like, for like slightly

unfettered internet access, right? We sniped the five years of Twisser where you could use it to get a job at BuzzFeed and we are never letting anyone else have that opportunity again. It's never happening again. Back in my day, I got loads of free avocado on toast. It was crazy. Yeah, you could have parlayed that into a house

if you just ate it, you fool. Now, this whole social media ban, right? It is a relatively complex topic because it's true. The phone is bad, but a lot of the reasoning behind it is that they're going to stop, say, children being radicalized, accessing dangerous content. They're going to

they're acting on bully. Basically, Kirstarmer is trying to stop the plot of adolescence from happening as though the plot of adolescence wasn't happening before the phones. The phones are just channels for the existing problems. You're trying to put out a fire by blowing away the smoke. And also, by the way, if you want to talk about radicalization, if you want to talk about the phones being in danger to democracy, it is absolutely not 16-year-olds

who are getting engagement farmed for money by Sri Lankan AI farms. It's not 16-year-old TikTokers. It's 65-year-old retirees. That's who is getting, that's who has to be taken off the phone. Or the social media ban. Maybe it should just cover, say, Radio Mill Colleen, which I'm aware the government is still posted, announced its social media ban on. They went on genocide radio and announced their social media ban for the benefit of the country that would target the people who are least dangerous. I think it's interesting that this is specifically Stama trying to secure his own legacy, right? And that's a great thing to be like, yeah, they're going to remember me through the ages because I was the one who made the kids go to bed on time. I think in 10 years, like how David Cameron still touts, like, well, under me, I'm legalized gay marriage.

Starver is going to be like, I implemented national bedtime. God, the abolished bedtime anarchists were right. They are trying to put a bedtime in place. This is a really good point, though, because I feel like, you know, one of the sort of, in the terms of the demographics and like, the sort of,

you know, the sort of obsessions of legacies, the thing that's similar with like the David Cameron sort of like, I pass, I pass gay marriage and like what this is sort of intended to be is that like the core group of people who still support David Cameron or Kirstarmer

are like a particular kind of liberal who like, in my view, also is kind of addicted to their phone. in a very sort of like blue sky way. Like they're sort of very radicalized liberals who are very much like people who kind of fall under the Jonathan Haidt

sort of understanding of like and Jonathan Haidt, I think is sort of really instrumental and sort of understanding the shape of like these current social media bands because if we're talking about like trying to blow away the smoke when the fire is he happened like Jonathan Haidt is that guy right? He's the person who has basically said, yeah, the phones are bad. Okay, correct. You know, sort of like I can sort of get on board of the opinion. But he doesn't really sort of go any.

deeper into like what these phones sort of represent or like what they sort of are designed to replace or like the tech companies that he is like sort of like adjacent to and the types of products that they are making very much like it's very much of the model of like very very superficial um and one that you know sort of ticks a lot of liberal boxes but kind of refuses to go under the hood to sort of figure out well okay how did this type of technology and how did these tech companies end up sort of subsuming so much of social life to the point where they could sort of direct, like what, how we interact with each other. Do you know what I mean? And so, and this is, and this is kind of like what, you know, to understand this band, this is sort of the way it is

because like, if you wanted to truly understand, like, okay, why are these kids kind of socializing entirely through their phones? You have to ask, well, why are people doing that? Why are, like, we, you know, what, like, how is like such a significant percentage of the population kind of, you know, it wasn't even that long ago. Like, it was during COVID where we were basically being told that, yeah, like you don't really have to sort of, you know, social life isn't a real thing. And also you can replace all of it with just like digital alternatives. Like, you know, you could do like a Zoom meeting instead of like meeting up in real life. And that kind of is the same thing.

And like, you know, talking about sort of reinvesting in like youth centers. It's like, well, austerity killed a lot of them. But actually what sort of did the death drive was COVID. And the fact that like these public spaces never opened up. There are like lots of parks that have never really opened up post-COVID. Lots of third spaces that don't exist and were justified on the basis. of like, well, you know, COVID happened and we can't really afford to do it again. But hey, here's like an app, right? Library is a similar thing. I remember lots of kind of, you know, speeches from,

you know, people like George Osborne saying, well, e-books are sort of like a good alternative and we'll sort of make loads of them available. So you don't need the building and you don't like, and what the building represents. Like, we have sort of been conditioned to believe that like these digital structures are fine, if not better than the sort of real life alternatives. And now we're sort of desperately trying to sort of like get to some of that, but not in. enough to sort of diagnose the problem. We still want tech companies to kind of manage social relations. We just think we can kind of curtail them a little bit. Because this is Britain, we will just keep on banning things. Nothing will ever get introduced or added, but also because

this is Britain. You have to remember, it'll say this before we go on. I'm sure this is not the last we'll talk of the social media ban for under 18s. By the way, November, I do want to say TF comes out in support of podcasting ban for under 35s. Yes. Yes, of course. Absolutely. Listen, we don't know what it does to the developing brain and it could cause them irreversible damage. I'm not here to be a part of a kind of a social contagion. The thing is that every podcaster is a huge problem for a sane society.

And so we have to sort of like keep the numbers as low as we can. But the other thing I was going to say is you also can't fully understand this policy and the contours of it without remembering that Britain considers every child to be an annoying subspecies of pest. Furtherest to that, And just as a segue from the podcasting being a huge problem for a saint society, I also think you can't understand this without understanding the homophobia and transphobia

that British liberals of Stelmer's generation have specifically directed at children. There is a real horror of like queer kids or trans kids or kids figuring out that they might be these things because of social contagion. And specifically, this is a thing that TURFs come back to and back. to and back to is that's just an idea that you got off the internet, right? I transitioned at 26. One of the reasons why it took me that long was because I barely knew trans people existed, right?

As rancid as sort of like trans communities on the internet were at that time, I was nowhere near them, right? And so I think there is a real determination on the part of people who are trying to push these kind of bands to make it so that you have to have your entire sort of adolescent without any access to any sort of view of queer or, trans people unless you are lucky enough to have it personally. You get no view of anything outside print or broadcast media or stuff that's around you because you have no social media. You also don't have a library. You also don't have any third spaces to go see your friends. Yeah. And so you are,

what I see this as is going back to this idea in Britain that children are property, they're your property. They're yours to do with what you will. And this is giving you control of what your, of what dangerous influences your property gets exposed to because really what they should be doing like any child is they should be reading Matthew Syed columns and getting angry. Yeah. Speaking of things that columnists like, I want to move on before we talk to Daniel. Because would you believe it, Al Karn's, the greatest labor stalwart of the last, oh, I don't know, 20 months or approximately, the minister for the army as well as John Healy, the minister of

defense have quit because of the failure of the British Army's greatest nemesis historically, the British Treasury, to invest enough to get our brave boys vibrated to death by enough Ajax fighting vehicles. Yeah, yeah, it's as simple as that. I mean, the strategic defense review is going to need another review. So I look forward to the strategic defense review review and possibly the review of that, where we once again confront the idea that there just isn't the money for this stuff. And the closest to any pushback anyone's had on this is Al Khan's guy I am thoroughly sick of hearing from got asked on TV, okay, where would you actually find the money for defence?

And he couldn't help but go to a sort of thought terminating cliche, which was changing welfare from handouts to hand ups, which, sure, man, whatever. But that is the program, right? Is we do an absolute sort of ram raid on benefits, but not on pensions, though, because that's too hard. and we use that to, you know, spend on the military. Now, we do spend very stupidly and inefficiently on our military,

but in large part that's because of our own kind of sense of vangloriousness, right? Like the two gigantic aircraft carriers that, you know, of sort of dubious necessity being a great example of this, right? And so this idea that we need to have more ambition and therefore more money is this incredible kind of sunk cost fallacy. And the idea that we need to emmiserate everyone else in order to deliver it is a huge, huge insult. Hey, hey, can I, do you want to have a little, you want to hear Swing Fun? You know who else has said that they would cut welfare to fund defense?

I'm hearing the Stone Roses in one earphone. And I'm hearing maybe, I don't know, like Oasis on the other, on the other airphone at two-time speed. Yeah. And I'm prepared to maybe do things a little differently here. Yeah. Oh, you know what? It's, um, don't look back in anger and fund the truth. groups. So this is, of course, Andy Burnham said, I'll cut welfare to fund defense. I'll do whatever.

Manchesterism is about doing whatever you're asked, like all of us, I guess. I'm sort of, I guess, more hawkish than a lot of people on the left in that I think that there is a good case for funding a lot of stuff in defense, but I think it requires you to have some kind of relationship with consensus reality about how you do that. And I think in Britain and the British defense establishment, that have been lacking for a long time. Yeah. And there are. definitely efficiencies that you can make. And in fact, there are people even on the right or in the sort of like, you know,

right part of the Labor Party who are making those arguments. But I just kind of know that the way that defense procurement is organized in this country, all of that money that you take off of people on benefits, right? That's just going to go into the hole. That's going into the fucking wishing well at this point unless you do some real root and branch stuff, which no one wants to do whatsoever.

And I think the thing is this is fundamentally, right? And I said this on Twitter a while back, not to just do Twister review, but this is a decades-old problem about Britain's sort of like status as a world power, right? Which is as Atlantisists, we made the deal that America would paper over the cracks and that sort of dividend would allow us to do some like, funds and social spending and stuff. And they wouldn't embarrass us about it, right? And now we have the Trigger the Libs administration of Trump and his dying brain determined to embarrass us. about it at every possible opportunity, right? And so even if we're doing what the Americans want, spending more on defense, right? They're still going to humiliate us, and that's kind of intolerable to Al-Karns, for instance, or Healy, you know? Ultimately, right, what Al-Karns and John Healy want is they want Britain to be proportionally as militarily important as it would have been in, I don't know, somewhere between 1880 and 1942. Yeah, think of it as it's not really a matter of spending so much as it's a matter of

grandeur or rank. And you can't really sort of buy that back. That's something that's just kind of gone now. And I would submit that, you know, significantly cheaper than, you know, spending infinity money on the armed fighting vehicle that vibrates your brain into goo is a, nice course of cognitive behavioral therapy for everyone involved in this delusion, that Britain can still be a kind of, if not first rates, then second rate and punching above its weight to world power. Yeah, and I mean, so just for to put some figures to this, so Starmer said, well, what are you talking about? Our defense spending is already going up. It's going from 2.3% of GDP to 2.6 by 2027. And this is going to fund next generation fighter jets, drones, naval capabilities,

long-range missiles, and so on. And yeah, and you, Karn's saying, you know, that the DIP, this investment plan is neither transformative enough nor sufficiently funded. My great. But our forces are being asked to operate in a more dangerous world and a budget written for a calmer one. A serious country funds its defense to meet the threat to actually face. It is not the threat. It wishes it faced. But my question is, is any amount of spending that the British state is reasonably interested in doing, going to move the needle in a conflict with anyone they think they're actually going to have to fight? Yes, if it were done well, which it won't be, is my sort of answer to that.

Like, I don't see us becoming that. What they want is they want us to become that first rate military again. And they're saying, okay, well, is there a way that you can take where we are? And let's say, we're just like, you know what, we're privatizing an NHS. We're eliminating all benefits except pensions. A teacher is now a voluntary position. So part of the problem is that all of this is a kind of a false economy, right? And this is again a military establishment that is failing to learn the lesson of like the last couple of wars, right?

If you want to be a country that has a successful kind of defense complex, right, you need to get more like Ukraine brackets in the good ways. And that's going to require you to actually be able to convince people that they are part of a society. right. And that means doing less austerity and doing more spending and doing more valuing of things that aren't directly defense-related so that you can then tell people, okay, cool, here is our society where we do the stuff, but we need to stop, you know, Putin, who is, you know, having another sort of neurological event deciding that Conchita Worst is going to make Russia gay from, like from fucking with us. And in order to do that, in order to do any kind of credible, defense of this country, said the words. You have to have people broadly aligned with that and you have

to make people see the value of it. And you can't do that if you're just tearing strips off of it to sell for parts. You have to have some kind of civic engagement with defense. And that's something that we don't want to do because I think part of this is as well that, you know, especially in Kansas case, a lot of these guys are ex-military, right? They like the stuff. They like the things. They like the prestige. And it dilutes the prestige, if you then say, okay, well, we're going to start, you know, maybe opening these things up to people feeling, you know, more included in them, right? And so, no, it's about having more and more like regiments and more and more men in uniform. And it's not necessarily about that anymore. More F-35s, for example. Yeah. Great. Yeah, exactly. And this is a big thing of what they want

to. Let's say, we're going to buy more F-35s and build more Raytheon Paveway 2 bombs. We're going to buy a plane that's designed for air superiority that has this huge, incredibly dependent on America logistics tail behind it, to the point that we can just get a couple of them stuck in India for like a fortnight because they're waiting on parts to move them, right? And we're going to have those instead of anything else we could have for the same price because we think that that's the kind of thing that we think is going to be useful to us. Also, like what I want to ask as well is this is all about preparing for war, preparing for war, of preparing for a dangerous world. Again, I don't think that they're in this current paradigm. There is an amount of spending that wouldn't be, say, society destroying that you could undertake that would make us that like that first rate power.

But even if so, what does it mean to be at war, right? Or maybe you're trying to change another country government by force, achieve a diplomatic objective by other means, et cetera. And in that way, what way are we not currently at war with Elon Musk? Right? Yeah, I mean, I don't disagree. And I think this is interesting as well because it's been a, kind of talking point in sort of like defense and security places, right, of already being at war

with Russia, right? And this is something that I basically agree with, right? Is that we are in a state kind of like hybrid warfare with Russia already. You can absolutely turn that around and go, yeah, we're in a state of hybrid warfare with Elon Musk and maybe the United States. And so like, I don't know if there's defense spending that countervails that that doesn't involve building an actual society underneath the Ajax fighting vehicle. You need a thing. Yes, you do. Um, it's It's interesting as well because I think this is true of so many things about policymaking in this country is that there's a kind of missing referent, right? And that we will sort of like spend more on defense, maybe, but not really think about what it is we're supposed to be defending. If it's supposed to be our sort of values of democracy and liberalism, we're sort of hardly defending those from ourselves.

If it's the physical territory of the United Kingdom, I mean, sure. I guess, but there are just so many vulnerabilities there that we don't seem to be addressing in the slightest, both internal and external. And before we go on, there's also one last refuge of the scoundrel that I want to bring up, which is, of course, military Keynesianism. Well, we do have to spend all this money on defense. We do have to make all these bombs in Scotland because it's important to the Scottish economy. We have to buy all these F-35s because we're investing money.

We're stimulating the economy with defense. And I just want to tell everybody who's listening now that when someone says that, they don't understand what they're talking about. Because defense spending is in no way going to stimulate the economy if you're not America. And even then, if you are America, it's a whole different box of hammers. But if you don't have the global reserve currency, doesn't work the same way. And also, the last time it worked for us was 1940. Yeah.

And that was us running up the bill on sort of like, in a way that eventually necessitated, like, decolonization, a thing that we did kicking and screaming. Yeah. And the thing is, like, it doesn't just matter how expensive it is. All government spending has an economic multiplier. The economic multiplier for teachers, nurses, engineers, and so on, is very high.

Economic multiplier for defense spending in the way that it's currently set up is extremely low. And I will explain why before we talk to Daniel. In 1940, right, we had to produce infinity spitfires using 100% of latent civilian economic capacity in a command economy. And the

Spitfires were being built to be shot down, right? Yeah. And that required British steel, British motors, British instrumentation, put together by British workers, British rubber for the tie. It was the whole of a spitfire used a huge amount of capacity that was generalizable enough that it was, you were able to just turn on every civilian, civilian factory into making spitfires. And Arraytheon Paveway 2 is not a spitfire because the value chain is almost 100% in the United States. We're basically assembling an American piece of kit in Scotland. What's interesting is it would be weird if there had been a recent conflict that had demonstrated the both advantage and plausibility of making entirely domestic munitions. That would be wild, right?

Particularly if it had specifically shown the kind of danger of relying on the United States to do it for you. Yeah, so in any real sense, any money invested into Britain's defense industry and the way that it's currently set up now is, Not money, yes, that we've taken from funding a teacher, but that creates economic multipliers that allow us to employ even more teachers, for example. Mostly, that is money that goes to the states. Yes. Yeah. We don't, we're doing. We're creating economic multipliers for teachers in Northern Virginia.

Maybe. Right? But if you want to say that certain kinds of spending are economically, let's say, productive that have high economic multipliers, what's actually in the value chain is so incredibly important. where it is is so incredibly important. And any time, any labor talking head says that, oh, we're going to boost the economy by increasing defense space. Defense prosperity.

That's not how it works. That is not worked like that since 1940. And that was a really, really, really, really specific set of circumstances. It was so specific. It is not coming back. And so we do not suck up access capacity. We don't create full employment. Never let anyone tell you that.

It actively cannibalizes the productive economy. The parts of the economy that meets pebbles. actual wants and needs. But if we actually ask these questions, then of course, like you said, almost at the very beginning of this segment, Nova, we will have to ask the very uncomfortable question at the very highest levels of what is Britain for? Yeah, we would have to completely reconfigure our society. And, you know, obviously there are a couple of ways we could do that.

The good one or the bad one, much like importing stuff from Australia. That's right. Which way Australian poster? And that is why we're the best of this. And this is why no one under the age of 35 will. ever be allowed to get a podcast again. You have two paths laid before you. One is good flat white and the other is war economy but doesn't work.

And we're going to choose, we're going to choose Velasda because for whatever reason, none of us want a nice flat white ever. What if it has a woke milk in it? That's true, yeah. That's a good point. That's a good point. Anyway, so look,

I'm going to throw over to our conversation with Daniel. Before you do, I just have a quick prediction. I predict that there's going to be a second half of this episode. And any second now. All right. So, this is now the official scientific test. Is November Kelly a super forecaster? We're going to find out.

You know what? Hey, stay tuned for a few seconds. Find out if November Kelly is a super forecaster. See on the other side, everybody. Hello, everybody from the first half. Welcome to the second half, the storied second half. Much, much disgust. They were predicting that this half would follow the first half.

And you know what? They were right. Yeah, we make a lot of predictions on this show. And I like when this kind of one is right. Nice, low stakes, easily provable, and that's it. And they say we're not a data journalism podcast. Yeah, I've updated my priors for the second half following the first. Now, in the second half, we are joined by Daniel Trilling, making his second appearance on the show, in fact.

Third. Wow. Oh, well, well, screw me, I guess. I don't have any memory. Sorry, you're out of data journalism, Quinn. I'll have to upgrade you to the special lounge. Yeah, that's right. Thank you. So Daniel is a researcher, journalist, and recently published a book called If We Tolerate

This, How the British Establishment made the Far Right respectable with some cover art of a lovely boiling frog, which I can't imagine has anything to do with the contents. No, just we thought it would be a nice picture. Yeah, just a nice picture. We are recording this several days after what can only be described as racist pogromes in Northern Ireland. And we're also recording this, I believe, the day after Nigel Farage released a polemic, which I'm just going to describe in brief. I've thought of it as, yeah, he's written 12 of the 14 words, where he says, Britain is a two-tier state, M-Dash, against white people.

Well, he's written this on his substack, which means that the last two words of the 14 words, you have to pay to unlock. I wonder what they are. And he makes a number of proposals and suggestions that would have been pure Tommy Robinson territory even two years ago, including allowing police officers to explicitly racially profile minorities, eliminate all forms of diversity and inclusion in public life, especially police race action plans, the introduction of new, quote, patriotic curricula, which takes for recolonizing the curriculum, and to make it to sort of legally mandate putting pictures of the king fucking all over the place. And it ends with a statement of the great replacement theory that stops just short of saying, the Jews are doing it. And I mean,

this is the transformation. We on this show know, right, that the distance between Tommy Robinson and Nigel Farage is a piece of paper. But I think to a lot of people, this would be shocking. And Daniel, I think this is what a lot of your book speaks to. Yeah, that's right. I mean, I suppose I was trying to explain two things in the book. One is the kind of, I suppose, the slow burn process of these ideas being made mainstream, which I think has been going on in earnest for at least 15 years. And then the other bit of it is just the kind of rapid collapse of existing standards around rhetoric in mainstream political discourse, which I think has just accelerated over the last two to three years, really. And I think, you know, Farage's move to kind of open

far-right rhetoric, as we've seen, is a symptom of that. Yeah. But something we've seen across Europe, right, with various far-right parties. But in some of those places, there's been an explicit sort of cordon sanitaire between the respectable rights and the far-right that's then collapsed. We've not already had an explicit one of those in this country, have we? I guess, I don't know. I'd say we have in certain ways. So I think actually why, you know, Farage has been the figurehead of right-wing populism, which is the kind of the bit of far-right politics focused on winning elections. And, you know, historically, that's had a commitment to democratic processes, at least in theory, whereas more extreme bits of the far-right

have been hostile to that to varying degrees. And, Haraj, I think, has been really successful long term because he's been very good at shredding that fine line between mainstream respectability and things that are regarded as extremist or scary by much of the population and by the political mainstream. You know, his usual way of moving the discourse in his direction is to do it with a nudge and a wink. So you think back just two years to the period after the murders in Southport in the summer of 2024, in that intervening. period of a few days where there were rumours going around about the identity of the perpetrator and, you know, calls for violence coming from some quarters. Farage took, I suppose, a more measured seeming approach where he just made these posts saying there's something the police aren't telling us, but not really spelling out what he

meant by that and leaving others to fill in the gaps. Whereas a vague post, furor. Yeah, basically. He's kind of a, I mean, ironically, given that he's got this reputation for being plain speaking and so on. He is kind of a king of vague posting. But even he's dropped that now. You know, if you think his interventions over the last few months have been much more explicit, so there's that substap post just now. But only two weeks ago, we were dealing with another outburst of mass racist disturbances and violence in Southampton around the murder of Henry Novak. And again,

there Farage said something that I think was markedly more openly extreme than what he'd been doing even in the recent past. And I think there's a couple of reasons for that. I mean, one is that, as you've probably noticed, stuff is getting worse. You know, I think that's the nature of this kind of politics. You give it space and it will radicalise and get worse and get more extreme. And we're seeing that dynamic for sure in Britain this year and last year. But also actually something that I think that's been missed in a lot of the analysis is that Farage is operating from a position of relative weakness as well at the moment because he has been under pressure from his right. You know, we've had.

had this chunk of reform led by Rupert Lowe, the former Reform MP, break away to form Restore Britain. And Lowe has taken a more radical position in relation to reform. He's campaigning on the claim that reformer actually sell out moderates and Farage is too weak and that he, Rupert Lowe, is the true standard bearer of right-wing populism. And just as importantly, Elon Musk has thrown his support behind Rupert Lowe and Restore. for the last 18 months has been attacking Farage as what he says is weak source. You know, Farage isn't extreme enough for his taste.

And I think what you can see in Farage's repositioning recently is an attempt to keep up with all of that and keep people on side who might otherwise peel off to his rights. Very embarrassing for us as a country that Elon Musk has been in some ways unable to get the political influence that he wanted with money alone in America, but has here. Yeah. He didn't even use money here. He just used posting. Oh, God.

He couldn't get enough money to buy the American political process, but he could get enough clout to buy the British political process, which is frankly embarrassing for all of us involved. I was going to say, though, there is, I think the best way I understand Farage, and I've described him thusly on this show before, is he's always positioned himself as a right-wing technocrat who is going to fix all of the institutions that have kept,

whether it's good working families, which is dog whistle for white people or white people explicitly said from reaching their full potential. I mean, how do you rate that as a sort of way of seeing him? I guess there's some truth in that, in that I think the kind of technocrat aspect of it is a big part of what he does, although obviously I think he would never describe it himself as technocrat. But I guess he sees himself as someone who can fix the system and restore Britain's national pride and everything else that he promises. I think really, though, it's his ability to speak

to several different groups of people at once and to say things that mean different things to those different groups that is why he's been so effective historically. You know, so he trades primarily in right-wing nationalism, and there's no escaping that when you do that, you're making an appeal to ethnic identity, for instance. And, you know, that's now coming out more on the surface of what he does. You know, he explicitly talks about whiteness in a way that I think he wouldn't

even a few years ago. But what he's been good at historically is also, you know, taking positions that appear to draw a line between himself and overt racism. So, you know, he made a big thing when he was leader of UKIP that former members of the BNP, the British National Party, were not allowed to join. His political endeavours have always tried to make a show of how ethnically diverse they are, at least at the top. And, you know, Reform UK is a very good example of that. If you look at who its prominent MPs and officials are. And Farage has always kind of managed to keep all of that together. But I think it actually risks coming apart now

because the contradictions between the different bits are really starting to show. I mean, reform began this year being talked up as the potential future party of government, which they may well be. It may be that they come out as the largest party at the next general election and are able to form some kind of government, either in coalition or by themselves. And so all of their presentational offerings at the start of this year were around how relatively moderate they were, in fact, you know, the fact they'd brought across some Tory defectors, one of whom Robert Generic gave this big speech trying to reassure the financial markets

that a reform government would be responsible and so on. Before the local elections, they made this big pitch, or they tried to make a pitch on conservationism, you know, which was briefed. they'd hired in Ben Goldsmith, who's this right-wing ecologist, to write their environmental policy. And this was brief to the Daily Telegraph at the time as, you know, this is our effort to win over current conservative voters who so far have found reform a bit too radical and are a bit wary of us. And we want to show that we're kind of nice and cuddly and about more than just bashing immigrants and so on. And then suddenly, you know, over the periods of a few weeks even, that all seems to have been ditched

and they're just kind of out saying much more hard-line things than they were previously. Let's talk about the subtitle of your book, right, which is how the British establishment made the far right respectable, because Nigel Farage, obviously, we know, didn't appear in this position. He was placed into this position. And so let's start, like, broadly, the relationship between national establishments and national far rights. We can use examples from the 20th century, modernity, but let's lay the table broadly. Yeah, well, I mean, I think you have to see the far right broadly as trading in radicalised versions of what exists in the mainstream. So, I mean, a classic sort of perennial example from the UK is that obviously anti-immigration politics is a central part of the far right here, as it has been for decades.

But the themes within that and the language is taken in no small part from the mainstream right-wing press. So, you know, if you talk about asylum seekers, for example, there have been repeated moral panics over asylum going back to the turn of the millennium. And, you know, there were ones before that, but let's just stick with that period. The drivers behind that, each kind of outbursts have been mainstream outlets like the Daily Mail, you know, the kind of the classic, as it was then called bogus asylum seekers, moral panic in the early 2000s, was driven by mainstream outlets like that. And what the far right has traditionally done is sort of latch onto it and try and turn things in its direction.

And over the years, the far right's role within that setup, I think, has grown, where you've had a kind of, I suppose, a growing normalization of far right ideas and themes and its figureheads. So again, Farage is a very good example of that in that he's been given a very easy ride by the media over the years. You know, he's one of the most frequently featured politicians on the BBC's question time, for instance. And, you know, has been even when his political endeavors were far more marginal in terms of the votes they attracted. But at the same time, right-wing populists in particular, you know, his wing of the far right have been able to take the initiative and actually lead the conversation a lot more effectively than they were, say, 20 years ago. And I think that's

also the result of, you know, the way our media landscape has changed completely, the way that they're able to build up their own audiences and base of supporters to whom they can communicate with directly. It's also because their most entrepreneurial figureheads have been very good at a form of, you know, online grifting. I think, again, Farage is a very interesting example in that, in that he is in some ways a completely old school politician. You know, he got his start in the 1990s when Euroscepticism, which was the cause that he attached himself to, was really unpopular, really unfashionable. And he cut his political teeth, making speeches in person to relatively small groups of people meeting around the country. He fast forward 20 years or so.

And he was at one point in the last few years, Britain's most popular politician on TikTok. He was running a very nice sideline in earning money from Cameo until he had to drop it recently because it was revealed that he was giving being paid to give messages for anybody, even if they were asking him to say completely extreme and shocking things. So he's somebody who has turned all of this new opportunities for building up a political audience online to his advantage.

And I think that's quite emblematic of how far-right politics works in our time, really. When we talk about the relationship between the establishment that creates this guy, right, they get something out of it, which on the show in the past, we've talked about as well, you need to give people energy for a political movement and you don't want to give them anything real. So what you give them is the ability to be cruel to people they think

are less than them. But history tells us that the far right, like Franz von Pappen never is able to tame Hitler, if you get my meaning. Yeah, yeah, totally. And I mean, you bring in the comparison with fascism from the interwar period there. And that's something that I write, about in the book. And my take on all of that is that I think quite often when we talk about right-wing politics today and the rise of whatever you want to call this new movement that is now there in most liberal democracies around the world, we get very hung up on arguing over whether is this, how much is this like fascism from a century ago? And that conversation can tend to go around in circles because, you know, there are good arguments to say, well, it doesn't share

lots of features of, say, Mussolini's fascists in Italy in the 1920s, therefore it can't be the same kind of movement and lots of good reasons to say, oh, yes, but actually look at what they're doing or look at how it relates to the mainstream or look at the effects it's having and so on. And for me, what's important is that you kind of spot the similarities in a way that's actually useful to understanding what's happening now. And ideally, like, how you can then actually stop it succeeding. And I think the kind of key overlap between far-right politics today and that kind of classic historical fascism of interwar Europe is in the way it appeals to the emotions above anything else. And I think that above all, what it's trying to do is appeal

to a very destructive form of resentment that, like, as you say, it's about getting people riled up and telling them that national revival is going to come via taking revenge on a series of named enemies, both sort of internal enemies and external enemies, you know, so it's always about the external threat in combination with the treacherous actions of an elite or some other kind of enemy within. So the discourse around immigration in Britain and in the US and in Western Europe is just full of this, you know, on the right. There's a civilizational threat or like Tommy Robinson is now putting it in terms of like that great replacement conspiracy theory. And that's not only about culturally and ethnically threatening outsiders migrating to Britain or to the West,

but it's the claim that elites have connived in this, that they're all allowing it to happen. And the remedies offered are always some kind of punishment where the being seen to punish is more important than the actual practicalities of the policy. reform, you know, particularly on matters of immigration, trade in this constantly. A really good example of that comes from just before the local elections where, again, I think because they weren't getting as much attention as they had hoped during that election campaign, just before polling day in May, they came out with this announcement that not only were they going to build more immigration detention centres to achieve their policy of mass deportations, should they ever be elected to government nationally, but that those

detention centres would be cited in areas that voted for the Green Party, you know, so it wasn't just about looking tough, it was also, and we're going to make these people over there really squeal as a result. And I think, again, you hinted at this. What makes that so dangerous is that it is, by definition, incapable of delivering on what it promises, because the promise is we're going to make you feel better about your lives and also materially make things better around you by punishing other people symbolically that that can't deliver what it promises and so for any movement that is trading in these things I think there's only really two paths open from from that point on and one is to disappoint people and flop and the other is to get into a spiral of radicalisation where you're

trying to outdo your previous promise to you know keep people's blood up keep people expect and so on I think one thing that we've mentioned on the show like a bit is that if you all sort of politics is sort of anchored in resentment and anger and frustration and like that has a lot of purchase. Like in a sort of like political culture where it feels like basically most political parties aren't promising people anything by way of like here is how we're going to sort of make your lives better. Like even the sort of like even the Labor Party during the 2024 election, we're like very, you know, insistent on emphasizing like in what was like basically the easiest election to win was sort of just being like, yeah, we're not actually going to like promise anything

substantial to actually like help people like materially. The changes that will happen will be very gradual. We're still sort of committed to a form of austerity. We're also still committed to like a type of vengeful politics that is very much like something that as you sort of mentioned, reform and restore and the conservatives are very much like, you know, very much adhere to. And I think one of the things that's sort of interesting about the reform sort of political promise is that like even even though they're sort of saying was superficially, but yeah, we'll kind of improve your lives by punishing other people and by letting you enjoy the punishment because we'll sort of make it like a big fun spectacle. Looking at like, you know, examples of the Trump

administration, like they have a very easy run in the sense that like they don't really, they have a media that like kind of sort of take, doesn't really take them seriously enough to be, to point out, as you've mentioned, like, oh, these things that you're promising, they're not workable, they're not really fundable. Like, basically, there's no way that this is actually going to happen. And so all you can do is sort of, of promise more and more punishment. But that almost gives them permission to be like, well, if, you know, the deportation camps don't work,

then we'll sort of just promise something more sinister and cruel. We'll punish, like, you know, we'll promise different types of camps. We'll promise, like, you know, capturing people in the night and, like, just flying them off to anywhere. Like, you know, you throw something at the wall. And as long as it's kind of, like, vengeful and spectacular enough, that's sort of good enough for them. And I wonder whether you had any thoughts on just like the way in which

part of the sort of image, not the image laundering per se, like the way in which it feels like reform and restore have like quite an easy run in this sort of political cycle comes from both like the dismissal of what they're trying to do, allowing them to sort of just keep on promising more and more sort of like cruel and mental things. But also like a broader political culture in which like promising anything materially beneficial to anyone is sort of seen as worse than, you know, promising like the establishment of like British Guantanamo and Milton Keynes. Yeah. So a couple of things on that. think first of all, resentment, and I draw in a book on some really, what I thought was really

useful writing on this by Richard Seymour, who's got a book published a year or so ago called Disaster Nationalism, where he kind of lays out this argument in more detail. But he makes the point that resentment is, first of all, it's something we all feel. And it's not that politics shouldn't draw on people's resentments, because actually, you know, you can resent things because they're unjust. You can resent the fact that food is becoming more expensive and yet a small minority of millionaires and billionaires are having it easier and easier and so on. The question, though, I think politically is what is done with that. And I think like any political movement that I would want to be part of is one that takes resentment and frustration and says, well,

there are reasons why you would feel this. And here are things you can do to actually constructively improve conditions for yourselves and for people around you and so on. But, As you say, what the far right do with it is just offer this. I suppose they offer the, they present the illness as the remedy. You know, they say, well, actually just wallowing this stuff and enjoy us punishing other people on your behalf and so on. But crucially, that's not something invented by or practiced by the far right itself. The politics of resentment and of diverting various frustrations in society onto convenient scapegoats is something that, mainstream has specialized in Britain for a long time. Something else I write about in the book is,

you know, the 2010s and the role that the period of austerity pushed out by the coalition government of David Cameron and Nick Clegg played in all of this. And that's a very good example, or at least it was for the first few years in the 2010s, of how the political center is actually normally or has been historically pretty good at playing the politics of resentment and keeping all of this stuff contained. So you might remember, well, those of you that are as old as me, at least. Osbourne making speeches to justify, so George Osbourne, David Cameron's Chancellor,

making speeches to justify austerity back in the early 2010s, where he gave one famous speech, for instance, about, you know, we need to make cuts to benefits because it's not fair that people who work hard get up early in the morning to do a hard day's graft and they see their neighbours' curtains closed because they're sleeping off, you know,

a lifetime on benefits or however he described it. That kind of language was echoed, liberally in much of the press, particularly the right wing press and so on. But what's happened is that the political centre has got decreasingly able to profit from all of that and to keep it all together as a project. And so what you have instead is a collection of far-right entrepreneurs really taking that and running with it and going somewhere else. So effectively, it's not that Starmor parents reform.

It's that Starrmer is wondering why reform took his, what should rightfully be his tool. Yeah, this is supposed to be my safety valve. Yeah. Yeah, I mean, and you could see, I think in 2025, there was, you know, when Labor kind of panicked at the start of the year because reform or rising in the polls, what they did was lean into a whole load of political communication techniques that Labor and the Conservatives have been using for decades. So they started going hard on, you know, how many people they were deporting per month,

using the Home Office's media channels to release, you know, video footage and photo. of people being raided and deported and so on. Well, that's something, you know, the previous Conservative government did. The coalition government did it, new Labour did it and so on. And I think what we have at the moment is both with Stama is a combination of thinking, well, these are our techniques. You know, Labour would say they've got maybe a slightly nicer version of doing it than the Conservatives have had traditionally, but really amounts to very similar things. You know, Labor thinking under Starmer, this is how we do politics. You know, this is how we contain resentment.

At the same time as having this very strong message of Britain is broken, but also nothing should change that radically, which was essentially Starmes pitch for power. And I mean, just sort of pulling that into sort of let's say what's going on right now, you know, immediately before Farage published his 12 of the 14 words, obviously we had a sort of widely publicized pogromes in Northern Ireland. that were encouraged, whether explicitly or tacitly by parts of the British far right, explicitly encouraged by Musk, their biggest cheerleader. And I think just for a moment, wanting to recognize also the Northern Irish far right is

different from the like Britain far right. I think it was instructive that we had these riots in Belfast and then sort of aftershocks in Glasgow and Edinburgh because that's where there are sort of networks of unionists and and loyalist extremism or terrorism that they're sort of like able to coordinate these things. I think it would be a mistake to think of them as like overly spontaneous. It has been very funny

on the other hand to watch Americans try to run the grift on this and be like oh these are sort of proud Irishmen who just think that Ireland should be for the Irish about people who are absolutely psychotic about ensuring that they are perceived as British. It's the inverse of what usually

happens when like Boston guys meet Sinn Féin people and are like, why don't you just drop a nuke on Dublin on the north, excuse me. But anyway, so this, but the Northern Irish far right, as Nova said, right, is it is much more militarized. And I think that's, you could actually see a much more militarized and organized far right that is distinct from the, let's say, posting by other means, far right mobs. Yeah. Well, I think also there's, there's something instructive here and that, the guy who was attacked, which sparked off these sort of race riots in Belfast, had more or less all his life been a kind of perpetual victim of loyalist paramilitaries

who had sort of tortured him at length for, you know, whatever sort of combination of reasons they could confect. So I think that's a sort of obvious example, more obvious maybe than some others, that these are not people who care very much about the people that they purport to or the communities that they purport to, but who are very, very keen to increase their own power through, you know, as much of violence as they can. It's what's quite apparent is that there's nobody who has a good response to this. I mean, if we want to talk about the British establishment making far right street violence respectable, the reason that these paramilitary organizations exist in Northern Ireland is in large part the British establishment, the security service is collaborating with them and so on.

and so on. And, you know, all of a sudden it's, oh, hey, these guys are supposed to be rioting against Irish nationalists. They're not supposed to be the kind of best-trained vanguard shock troops of this larger sort of white nationalist movement in the whole country. Well, I mean, you know, many, many cases in, you know, sort of nationalism and fascism of the tale coming to whack the dog. And I think you can look at this maybe. And I'm curious, Daniel, whether you agree with me on this as sort of a process of the, of the, the British far right, experiencing a kind of ulsterization of becoming more Northern Irish, more unionist, more loyalist.

Yeah, it's an interesting point. I mean, actually what it makes me think of is the English Defense League back in the day, which is obviously the anti-Islam street movement that Tommy Robinson emerged as the leader of. One of their frequent chance was no surrender, which is adopted from loyalist political culture. It would be crazy if there are any overlap between loyalist paramilitaries and things. football in this country, I say living in Glasgow. Well, quite. And I think the English far right at least has often looked wistfully

at loyalism in Northern Ireland and thought, if only we could do that, or at the very least, if only we had the access to weapons that they do. So, you know, even I know that from research in my first book, which was broadly speaking on the history of the far right in Britain, in the post-war period, there was frequent contact between groups in, England and groups in Northern Ireland and, you know, the groups from England going over there to kind of make links and learn and the rest of it. But I think it's probably a bit more chaotic. I see it as a bit more chaotic than how you characterised it there. There are all of these different things going on. And so with the riots in Belfast, you don't need anything in particular

happening in Westminster politics for there to be political violence in Northern Ireland, obviously. Secondly, lots of things that happen there are mapped onto sectarian divisions. So, I mean, I think that's kind of very obvious from the recent rioting that it was, you know, it was happening in loyalist areas where loyalist paramilitaries are still active, whereas in Catholic and Republican areas, there was next to nothing happening. But then also, it clearly relates to UK national politics in that these events in Belfort, fast came hot off the heels of the disturbances in Southampton a week before the United Kingdom March in London a few weeks before that and so on and so on and all the events of last year

and the year before that there is a sense from anyone with a stake in far right politics at the moment that there's we we need to stir things up and keep momentum going and so on so I think that's all feeding off each other and then the other thing that's really really important I think this is kind of the newest bit of the picture if you're looking at it's historically is the international dimension. It's the fact that this stuff gets refracted through X and Elon Musk and the American far right and all of these other things. And that creates a kind of feedback loop where, you know, I think in the early 2010s,

I remember reading, you know, hope not hate, monitoring racist violence in Northern Ireland. Then I remember there were stories about families being, perhaps even being burned out of their homes or having their homes vandalized. But it was regarded as a localised. story then, whereas now Elon Musk regards it as the front line in the civilizational race war that he thinks he's fighting or however he puts it. The far right in, not just those bits of the British right in Scotland that have got direct links to what's going on in Northern Ireland, but people all over England as well seem to think that it's, you know, it's part of the same

struggle. And the other thing there is actually it tells you something about the workings or rather the dysfunction of the British state because Northern Ireland has seen more immigration in general in the last decade or two, much like the rest of the UK. But it has also been directly affected by the breakdown in the UK asylum system and the breakdown in Britain being part of an EU-wide asylum system in that the home office has, you know, as it's looked for cheaper places to house asylum seekers, is increasingly sent them to Belfast and elsewhere in. Northern Ireland in the last decade. And then you have an issue with the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, now being a border between the EU and the UK.

And, you know, that's been in the news this week. People arguing over whether that means it's a porous border that allows illegal immigration and so on. You know, I think there's lots more to be said about Ireland, lots more probably on trash future as well, although maybe not by us. The one thing I would sort of caution against is I think there's this kind of idea from some people on the left that Irish republicanism is inherently a sort of curative to this sort of thing, which is, I would suggest not the case, not least because you know, the Irish Republican Socialist Party attempting to try and like sort of take some points away from from Sinn Féin at the moment by sort of like murmuring about migration, but also, you know, you've had race riots in Dublin in the

last few years. So as you say, it's part of this sort of like, you know, far right international in a way that I find sort of profoundly disparating. Yeah, and I mean, I would just say that, you know, far-right politics and far-right violence is primarily a problem of nationalism. And so any community, any national identity is going to be vulnerable to this stuff, which is why it's always got to be fought even when it seems relatively marginal. And I think, well, you take the differences between the UK and Ireland at the moment, far-right politics is clearly far more advanced in the former than the latter, but the latter is also experiencing many. are the same things, partly because of that international pressure you were just talking about. And so just by way of wrapping up, I mean, it seems as though, I always like to think of this in terms of what would a serious response to this actually look like from a state that wanted

to defend itself from the far right? And, you know, it seems as though anything less than jailing Tommy Robinson as a terrorist, prescribing the reform party, referring everyone who's follows UK aesthetics to prevent, blocking X the everything app from... Fork pie is illegal. Essentially, kind of. The football. Illegal. No, I mean, seriously, I think you do make a good point in that you can see the British government defending itself from the sort of the left with Palestine action and being absolutely sort of heedless of the sort of, you know, what is running roughshod over there. It has the ability to do that if it chooses to and it's choosing not to.

You actually should be sent to jail for holding up a cardboard sign that says, I support the bin men being hard. I support the Reform Party jail. You should go to jail for that. Anyway, Daniel, I want to thank you for coming and talking to us today and remind everybody that if we tolerate this, how the British establishment made the far rate respectable, is available from many fine book retail outlets. Thanks a lot. And thank you, everybody, for listening to this free episode of TF.

We will be back on the bonus episode in a couple of days. And I am working on, I'm speaking with someone. right now. He's a journalist in Northern Ireland trying to work out if there's a way we can have her on. She's talking a little more detail about like the specifics of what went on sort of last week. So do look out for that. Anyway, thanks very much everybody again and we'll see you in a few days. Bye. Bye. Bye.