TRIGGERnometry - WW2: Why We Fought & How We Won - Historian James Holland

Episode Date: June 8, 2025

James Holland is an English historian, author, and broadcaster who specialises in the history of the Second World War. Follow James on X - https://x.com/James1940 SPONSOR. Go to https://shipstation.com and use code TRIGGER to sign up for your FREE trial. SPONSOR. Express VPN. Go to https://www.expressvpn.com/trigger/ to get 4 months FREE Join our exclusive TRIGGERnometry community on Substack! https://triggernometry.substack.com/ OR Support TRIGGERnometry Here: Bitcoin: bc1qm6vvhduc6s3rvy8u76sllmrfpynfv94qw8p8d5 Shop Merch here - https://www.triggerpod.co.uk/shop/ Advertise on TRIGGERnometry: [e-mail] Find TRIGGERnometry on Social Media: https://twitter.com/triggerpod https://www.facebook.com/triggerpod/ https://www.instagram.com/triggerpod/ About TRIGGERnometry: Stand-up comedians Konstantin Kisin (@konstantinkisin) and Francis Foster (@francisjfoster) make sense of politics, economics, free speech, AI, drug policy and WW3 with the help of presidential advisors, renowned economists, award-winning journalists, controversial writers, leading scientists and notorious comedians. 00:00 Introduction 06:00 How Popular Was Anti-Semitism? 08:10 What Was Britain Doing At This Early Stage? 15:50 Was Churchill A Lone Voice In Opposition? 21:00 France And Britain Declaring War On Germany 29:39 How Churchill Became Prime Minister 34:07 Is It All The Belgians Fault? 51:07 Was Going To War With Germany A Mistake? 58:29 Could Churchill Have Reached A Peace Deal With Hitler? 01:01:35 What Were The Practical Reasons For Britain Continuing The Fight Alone? 01:08:34 How Did Britain Get Out Of This Situation? 01:21:24 Hitler's Delusional Actions 01:26:10 The Rationale For Allied Bombings Of Germany And Japan 01:32:30 What's The One Thing We're Not Talking About That We Should Be? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

What we wanted to do, first and foremost, is actually just to get you to talk to us about World War II and explain the basics to us. Maybe starting with, why did it happen? One of the revisionist's narrative I alluded to is the idea that actually that he could have done that peace deal with Hitler. You can't do peace deals with someone like Hitler. You can't. You know, they tried in 1938 and it got nowhere. You know, they've got it to. I mean, I can't even begin to say how totally absurd this argument is.

I know. I know people say it, but they say it from a point of deep ignorance. So, Britain stands alone. Not to put too fine a point in it, we're in the shit. How did we manage to get out of this situation? James Holland, welcome to Ignatometry. Well, thank you very much for having me on, Chaps. Oh, it's great. You've got a brilliant new book out, which we want to talk to you about. But you're one of the preeminent historians in this country, of particular World War II. And we wanted to talk about that.

I don't know how aware you are, but the subject of World War II is because, contemporary again. There's different perspectives on it. I know historians have always argued about it, but there's quite a lot of new perspectives on it, or perhaps old perspectives being presented again. So what we wanted to do first and foremost is actually just to get you to talk to us about World War II and explain the basics to us, maybe starting with, why did it happen? It's just a very small question. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay, so why did it happen? It happened because Nazi Germany had expansionist designs. Hitler wanted to, was ideologically driven for two things.

First he wanted Lieben's Rome, which is sort of living space. He wanted to create his own kind of, effectively his own empire. Because Germany is locked in the centre of Europe. It isn't resource rich, doesn't really have access to the world's oceans, just as a bit of the Baltic coast and a tiny bit of the North Sea, and that's it. Doesn't have to historically have a large navy or indeed a large merchant navy. So where are you going to get all the resources you would normally get from a overseas, well, you go eastwards into Russia and Soviet Union, which is very, very resource-rich.

At the same time, he developed a virulent hatred of both Bolshevism, communism, and Judaism. And so he was ideology driven through anti-Semitism and anti-Belchorism. Sorry to interrupt you, James. Are those two linked because quite a few people... No, but they are in Hitler's mind. Yes. But that's what I mean. Did he associate those two movements?

Yes, yes, he did. He goes back to 1990. He called the Judeo-Bolshevism, didn't he? Yeah, it's just... It's so mad, and one can only kind of laugh at it, and yet it happened, and it happened, you know, catastrophically and murderously to the tune of six million dead Jews and untold numbers of Soviet citizens. So, you know, clearly it isn't a laughing matter,

but it was risible that he would think this. And the reason that he kind of drew this, there were quite a lot of some anti-Semitism bubbling around in the late 19th century. It always has been, to be perfectly building into the late 19th century, into the beginning of the 20th century. What really seems to have triggered Hitler, though, is a failed communist coup that took place in Munich in 1919, of which

the leaders were predominantly Jewish. It was just pure coincidence and put two and two together. That became his mantra. And Hitler was always a very kind of sort of black and white, kind of Eva-Raw kind of guy. And one of the things where he kind of garnered support was by presenting a kind of us and them. So, you know, there is us, we Germans, we kind of true natives of Northern Europe, Harians. And then there is them, the enemy, in which case as Bolsheviks and Jews. And it's warped and mad and has no basis in any kind of reality whatsoever. But, you know, that's not really the point. The point is that.

is what he was perpetuated, what he seems to have believed. And it was very much the sort of absolute cornerstone Nazi Germany. Why did he get so much support? Well, he got into power in the first place in January 1933 because of the Wall Street crash. So the Nazis came to being because of the Treaty of Versailles which ended the First World War, which is incredibly brutal on Germany.

I mean, you know, giving them reparations, demanding reparations that they couldn't possibly ever afford, taking huge trunks of land. You know, they were extremely punitive and led to the wheelbarrows of money and all the rest of it. Then they were propped up by, Germany was then propped up, the Weimar Republic, which was propped up by American loans, which were in turn paid for by repaying of debts from France and Britain to America from war loans during the First World War. So it was sort of going right in a big circle. So this kind of notion of being stabbed in the back and the kind of sort of let down and the kind of

and the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles, that is what instigated the Nazis. But they were kind of a fringe force and kind of, you know, a joke by the end of the 1920s to a large extent. But then came to Wall Street crash, and the tap of money that was propping up the Weimar Republic was cut off.

And when you have extreme financial crises, what you tend to do is then have political upheaval. If you want to prove of this, you've only got to look at the last, you know, decade and a half, because you have 2008, you have financial crisis, then you have political up. upheaval, rise of populism, all the rest of it, you know, it's led directly to Brexit, Trump,

rise of Le Pen in France, AFD in Germany, etc., etc. Then you have the economic crisis of the pandemic. Now you've got the current American administrations, you know, doubling down on tariffs and all the rest of it, which is causing sort of further economic strife. When you have economic strife, you then have all sorts of political upheavils. And when you have political upheavals, you're that much more likely to go to war. Can I just pause there for one second? In terms of the anti-Semitism, how popular was that?

Was Hitler open about this? Would he do speeches in which he would say, or was he concealing it somewhat? No, he wasn't concealing at all. I mean, once he got into power, you know, mine can't, his kind of sort of rant, his kind of autobiography kind of treaties, whatever you want to call it. You know, was a huge bestseller.

And it's just, it's just full. of this invective against Bolshevism and Jews. So no, he was completely upfront about it. I mean, what he was doing, he was tapping into a kind of, you know, an undercurrent of anti-Semitism, which was also already there. But what he was also doing was, you know, effectively brainwashing people. I mean, you know, the last propaganda was very good. Well, you know, the point is, if you control the media, which he does, and you just

repeat stuff over and over and over again, people start to believe it, you know, whatever it might be. So, you know, he was just tapping into that truism. And what he was also doing was getting back the Rhineland, you know, forming a union with Austria, and then taking the Statenland and then taking the rest of Czechoslovakia, expanding the Third Reich. Everyone was sort of, you know, bowing down towards the might of Nazi Germany. And all that humiliation of the sigh and the defeat of the First World War seemed to be kind of sort of being pushed to one side. as Germany emerged again in this kind of new

the new Third Reich and you know it was very exciting for people there were jobs that was becoming more prosperous they were feeling good about themselves they were tapping into that kind of sort of traditional Prussian militarism which after all have been the foundation

of modern Germany in 1870 so 1871 rather so you know it's you can see why some of the more unsavory parts were kind of of Nazi ideology, of Hitler's ideology, were kind of swept under the carpet at best or at worst kind of swallowed hook, line and sinker. And so what we have now is Germany, its tentacles going into Czechos of Akia, claiming the Sudaten land,

and what was Britain doing at this point? Well, Britain is massively rearming and has been, you know, Britain was the number one armaments exporter in the first part of the 1930s, but was also struggling from the Great Depression as well, just like everybody else. You know, unemployment was high. All sorts of, you know, economic problems. The empire was in decline at that point, so it was posing all sorts of potential problems, not at least in India, of course. and it was spending its money what it did have for defence, very sensibly on the Navy, which after all was the senior service and the world's largest in the late 1930s,

to upgrade, you know, basically if you build a massive great battleship in 1915, you want it to last 30 years because it's a huge undertaking. So you're just constantly upgrading it and putting in, you know, the latest technology and all that. So they're doing that, they're building more aircraft carriers, which is just about to merge as the pre-eminent capital ship, a major warship overtaking the battleship. They are massively increasing aircraft production.

They are creating the world's first fully coordinated air defense system. But Britain has always traditionally had a very, very small army and has a formal alliance with France, which traditionally has a very large army. So the rough plan is, should it come to it, France will do the bulk of the army bit. Britain will do the kind of overseas defence and naval bit and also have the largest merchant fleet.

So we'll bring in supplies and access to around 85% of the world's merchant shipping. So they'll do all that. We'll have a burgeoning air power as well. And we'll see how it all pans out. You know, France and Britain are not the aggressors in this. You know, Nazi Germany is. So, you know, there isn't a large army. It's very, very small.

But it has traditionally been that case. And at the same time, you have to have armies overseas to kind of, you know, do empire policing and all the rest of it. Colonial forces and so on. So Britain is watching very nervously and very anxiously and kind of worrying about what Hitler's next move might be. You know, Chamberlain, who was, Neville Chamberlain, who's the prime minister in the late 1930s, gets a very hard press for kind of appeasement and appeasing Hitler during the Munich crisis of the autumn of 1938. When basically, you know, Hitler was threatening to go into the, take the Sudeten land. and you know, Britain had no legal obligation at all, no treaty obligation to Chequess of Africa at all.

92% of the nation over here in the UK were against going to war. You know, democratically alleged, it's quite hard to go against the wishes of over 90% of the population. So, you know, he was sort of juggling a very, very difficult thing. And obviously, you know, he wants to avoid going to war. So he compromised and allowed Hitler to take the Sudeten land. And there was a huge argument for saying that Versailles have been too harsh and that a lot of those German-speaking lands, you know, should go back to Germany anyway. And then this is the whole problem about going into Poland,

which is eventually what triggers the war in September 1939. It's because basically there was a little isolated pocket called East Prussia, which centers around the Baltic city and port of Kernigsburg, now Kaliningrad, or Kalin, rather, it was Kaliningrad. But that was still. separated. It was German. It was part of Germany, but it was separated by a little strip of land from Poland going up to the coast around Danzig, as it then was, now Gerdansk, which is known as the Danzig corridor, the Polish corridor. This is the strip. They're saying, no, no, no, you know,

we need to link Prussia again. This was Germany. And of course, when Poland was created in 1990, it hadn't been Poland since the 1790s. So it had been split between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. So it only became Poland again in 1919 of the Treaty of Versailles. So obviously, there's lots of German-speaking people's there, and it had been part of Germany until 1990. So you can see why, you know, a lot of Germans might be quite sympathetic to the idea of taking it back again. And also as well, I think it's deeply unfair the way that we misrepresent Chamberlain, in my opinion, because we've also got to remember this country was horrifically scarred by World War I. That was the Great War, the War to End All War.

And the amount of men who died, people who lost brothers, husbands, cousins. Why would you want to repeat that all over again? Well, you absolutely don't. But the worry is that if you let Hitler and Germany, Nazi Germany run amok, then then, you know, it's the thin end of the wedge. And once they take one, they'll clear the next one, and then the Duxans, and they become unstoppable. And the more land they absorb, the stronger they become, you know, you're kind of feeding the monster.

So that's the danger of that approach. But the problem is, is, you know, the alternative. where you said, well, you know, had we had a kind of, you know, cast iron sequence of alliances a moment, you know, Hitler gets into power or starts flexing his muscles, then this would have all been avoided. The problem is, is there were a sequence of interconnecting alliances in 1914, which don't trigger the First World War. So, you know, there are arguments against that approach as well. I mean, my own view is that, however awful it was for Czechoslovakia, it was probably the right, you know, it wasn't the right decision, but it was an entirely understandable decision in 1938.

And, you know, after the absorption of Czechoslovakia into Nazi Germany, that was the line in the sand. You know, from then on, Chamberlain was like, right, any further incursions and that's it. So, you know, we do make an alliance with Poland. We do promise to uphold sovereignty. Hitler thinks that we're bluffing, thinks that France is bluffing too, and we're not. So Hitler's big problem is what he doesn't want to do is going to Poland, and not have enough resources, and he doesn't want to go into Poland and have to watch his back, and also worry about what the Soviet Union are going to do.

So this cynical deal is announced to the world on the 23rd of August, 1949, where Soviet Union wants to take back the part of Poland that have been in the Soviet sphere up into, you know, in the Russian sphere up until 1990. And so there is a pact that they're going to divide Poland and a revolution. eradicate it once more. And part of the pact is giving Germany some of the supplies it needs. Now, both of them absolutely, you know, I mean, extreme right wing, extreme left wing. They're like the horns of the buffalo. You know, they curl in, they almost meet again in the middle. But, you know, right-wing Nazis, love, left-wing Bolsheviks. And, you know, the two are

never going to align. So this was only ever a cynical, diplomatic agreement of convenience. and was never going to go the distance. You know, the one thing that was absolutely certain the moment Hitler took power in January in 1933 was that at some point there would be a massive showdown between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, whether that took place in June 1941 or 1944 or 1943 or whatever was kind of at that point up for grabs.

No one knew it was going to, you know, not at least Hitler in the autumn of 1939 knows when he's going to go and attack Russia. This is just a temporary measure to secure the next, bite of land that he wants. And by going into Poland and getting two-thirds of Poland in September 1939, he triggers the start of the Second World War. But he does get back that territory, which enables him to link East Prussia to the rest of Nazi Germany. And you mentioned that the Chamberlain position was very democratically popular at the time. Was Churchill, effectively the long voice attempting to articulate a different position at that time? Well, no, because

Anthony Eden, who had been the Foreign Secretary. excuse me, he'd also resigned over appeasement, as it was called. So, no, there's a number of dissenting voices. And, you know, what one has to remember is all these decisions are being made in the moment. Sure. You know, they're not being made

with the kind of benefit of hindsight. They're being made in the autumn of 1938. You can only play the cards you've got in front of you, front of you and make the best decisions you possibly can. So, you know, that's what Chamberlain was trying to do. Chamberlain sort of, you know, he's a grand old man of British, British,

politics, you know, he's incredibly politically eminent, and yet, you know, he doesn't have that same sort of geopolitical understanding that Churchill does. He wouldn't say that, you know, he would say that Chamberlain's first and foremost a domestic politician, which might say I'm odd for, you know, the prime minister of the largest trading empire the world has ever seen. But, you know, he is really, whereas Churchill is a true internationalist, you know, he's an imperialist, of course, but he's also an internationalist. That's an immense geopolitical understanding. You know, This is a man who's sort of been to war on four different continents. So, you know, he kind of knows what he's about and knows his history incredibly well.

So, you know, he was very, very against at any point showing any kind of latitude to Nazi Germany. But as I say, you know, it's very difficult to kind of convert the nation when over 90% are kind of very against going to war at a particular time. Well, I think when we had Randall Robertson, he mentioned that Churchill at this point was being. called a warmonger and people thought he was, you know, way out there. And also, given some of the things that happened in World War I, he perhaps lost some of the credibility as well. Well, he actually, his credibility was pretty medium. Again, you know, he's a Titanic figure in British politics.

And there's no, you know, even in 1938, 1939, you can't, before he comes to prime minister, you can't argue against that. You know, this is a guy he's been in politics for 40 years. So, you know, he is a very, very famous, well-known figure, but he is on the backbenchers. You know, his time in government has seemingly passed. And the fact is he's not known to have the greatest judgment.

And, you know, he's pulled some wrong ones back the wrong horse, you know, without question. And talking about Gallipoli. I'm talking about Gallipoli. I'm talking about being a chancellor during the general strike. I'm talking about, you know, backing King Edward VIII in the abdication crisis. You know, there's lots of things. I mean, you know, again, it's not necessary to say that he's wrong. you know, one can argue, and I think argue reasonably convincingly that the concept of Gallipoli

was fine. It was the execution. It was a problem. So, you know, but that's not really the point. The point is, you know, he's ended up on the kind of sort of, on some sort of what seemed like bad decisions. His judgment has been questioned numerous times. So, you know, he's, you know, when he stands up and talks and says, you know, we mustn't appease Nazi Germany, you know, not everyone's listening by any stretch of imagination. You know, he's not the sort of great sage that it seems like he was to become. We've had our fair share of chaos on the show, from tech issues to unexpected interruptions mid-interview.

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Well, they have to then. They have obligations to treaty. I mean, you know, if you break a treaty, you know, then you are morally bankrupt as a nation. You know, your prestige, your ability to do business around the world, absolutely promise, because no one trusts you. I mean, you know, this is what the United States is governing at the moment. You know, the moment you start flip-flopping and treating your allies with disregard, you get a drop of respect. And one of the things that I always found interesting was France and Germany declared

France and Britain declared war in Germany when this happened but they didn't actually go and fight. They basically went, Poland, we're with you and then just erected defenses on their border. Well, France did, I mean, this is one of the sort of great debating points because France has this huge army. It has this ability, it has this very, very complex system of reserves where people are conscripted,

and then you're on a sort of reserved for three years and eight years and 16 years. There's different sort of scales of it. So, you know, literally overnight, you can go from an army of a million to kind of four and a half million, just like, literally just like that. And so it's all catered for,

had more artillery pieces than Germany, had had more tanks and bigger tanks than Germany had parity in terms of air power. What it didn't have is systems. It didn't have kind of communication network that Nazi Germany had. And so that was its kind of big Achilles heel. But there is absolutely no question that Germany was only just about ready to go into Poland,

although it kind of got to wars from 17 days or whatever, and it looked like a complete walkover. It was sort of putting sticking plaster over quite a lot of cracks in the whole system, the way it's organized, even the not entire German army was trained. It wasn't anything like as mechanized as it kind of liked to kind of show reel on the news, etc., etc. So it wasn't quite the kind of Nazi war machine of Blitzkrieg superpower that it sort of came to seem like. Well, that sounds like the perfect situation in which France and Britain would be like, well, they've invaded Poland. Let's go and deal with them. Well, yeah, you'd have thought so, wouldn't you?

So why didn't they? Well, they said French. Well, they sort of, they did. So they could have absolutely gone and threw the back door. They could have gone into West Germany and they'd have just walked in because, there was no opposition there at all. Okay. And they didn't because, really because of a lack of political will.

It's impossible to make military decisions about political will. One of the problems that France has in the 1930s is, you know, it's struggling very badly in the aftermath of First World War. It's struggling economically, just like everyone else, because of the Great Depression. And politically, as I said before, you know, when you have political, when you have economic turmoil, you have political turmoil, and that was absolutely the case in France in the 1930s, you know, succession of different governments, all of them coalition,

and we're not talking about kind of, you know, conservatives and Lib Dems, we're talking about kind of, you know, four or five party. And what that means is, communist was increasingly powerful, and the problem you have with that is it then makes decision-making process

very, very difficult because no one can ever agree. So if the senior military figures in a country don't have their political masters going, right, we want you to do this like that, is really, really hard to enact. And so that is a problem. And the whole nature of,

French military was based on defense, not attack. So it wasn't geared up for it. And that's the fundamental problem. So they have what's called the the Tsar offensive, where they go in and basically they cross the German border. There's a rattle and machine gun, and then they basically sort of scuttle back again, and that's it. And this is the big

frustrating, the big arguments over, you know, okay, well, what do you do? So Britain's Navy, as I've already mentioned, the world's largest, immediately imposes an economic blockade on Germany. It's incredibly successful. You know, the ships are just not getting into Germany from outside world, from then on. But, you know, it doesn't have, Britain doesn't have a huge job. It's a limited amount of what they can do.

If you're going to just continental invasion, it's got to basically come from France because they've got the army to do it. But as I said, they don't have a political will. So what are all other things you can do? Well, you can do other kind of sanctions in the same way that people are condemning kind of Russia when it invades Ukraine. It's the same kind of principle. You know, we're at war of them, but what that actually means is we're war,

but we're not actually going to do a huge amount until we're kind of ready to. And, you know, Britain, there's an acknowledgement in Britain that Britain is still in the process of re-arming. And you don't really want to go on the attack. It's really guarantee that you're going to win. And there's a kind of limit to what you can do. You can threaten with your naval power, but, you know, you're doing the blockade, you're doing all those things right. So there is these plans, which actually put forward by Churchill, he's brought back into the government in September 1939, into the Admiralty,

i.e., sort of Secretary of State for the Navy, effectively. And he suggests that what we should do is mine the leads. And the leads are these fjords in the northern part of Norway through which the German of the Swedish iron ore mines deliver their produce to ships, which then sail down the edge of Norway into the Baltic Sea and into Germany. This is the kind of most common way. So he was saying, well, let's try and make it very, very difficult for Germans to get that iron ore.

The problem is that the French don't agree. you know so by the time the French and the British agree it's April 1940 they've just been going back and forth back and forth back and forth and you know Chamberlain's always blamed for this but again you know that they're a part of an alliance with France and France is nervous and politically all over the place and you know it's it's very difficult to to operate unilaterally when you're part of an alliance and the lion's share of the ground operations is going to be done by your your partner in that alliance

So say, Chamberlain will get to blame for it, but by the time the decision's actually made, it's the beginning of April. And at the beginning of April, Nazi Germany then turns its attention to Norway and Denmark. And, you know, we miss the bus. You know what's really interesting is the way that you're describing this is that, look, we all agree that democracy is the best form of government. But when it comes to war, actually, it's more helpful to have a dictator because, they make the decision, the will to put in motion, and boom. You can stage an invasion or whatever it is that you want. Yes and no. It's not, inevitably, it's not quite as simple as that.

Because the point with dictatorship is the dictator is an autocrat. And the autocrat is surrounded by sycophants and people who tell him what he wants to hear. So the decision-making process for a dictator is very poor. And it's fine when things are going well. Well, it's not fine, but it's manageable when things are going well, because it means you can make things happen very. quickly, you know, you can be decisive. But when things are going badly, it's really not, because you've still got people planning you, so saying, oh, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes,

you know, Comrade Stalin or yes, yes, yes, yes, and you're, you know, a little ducho, or whatever it might be. And they're not best placed very often to make these decisions. You know, what's brought them to the top of the pile doesn't necessarily make them a very good political or military geopolitical leader. And that is certainly the case of Hitler and Mussolini, who have very, very narrow worldviews. I mean, you know, Hitler is completely incapable of looking at anything other than through the prism of his own worldview, which is obviously incredibly narrow, continentalist, warped by his very suspect ideology, etc., etc. So for him, it's all about land power because he's a continentalist, you know, he's a land lover.

Whereas for Britain, it's an island nation, it's all about, you know, naval power is key. So it's, you know, it depends on how you're looking at it. And I think one of the things that makes the ally is very fortunate is that when Churchill does come to power on the 10th of May, 1940, and when America starts to kind of get peripherally involved in the war and then comes into the war itself, they have two leaders. We have Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the President of the United States

and Churchill as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom who have immense geopolitical understanding. I mean, they just get it. They get that big picture worldview, which is incredibly helpful. And both of them are surrounded by people who are able to advise, stick up for their guns, stick up for what they believe in, and the decision-making process is way, way better.

The problem with France and the problem with the alliance between Britain and France and the start of the war is that France doesn't have that clarity of political thought because of its fractured nature of politics, which are a direct result of the financial crisis born out of the First World War and then subsequently the Great Depression. So democracy is absolutely tops when you are following a single purpose and when the political leadership is unified the problems come when it's fractured.

Absolutely. So there's one thing that I want to focus on, which is it always gets skipped a little bit as to how Churchill came to power in the UK. So what actually happened there? So what happens is Germany, suddenly does this lightning attack on Denmark. Denmark sort of falls in about half an hour. Norway takes a little bit longer. But this is just at the moment that this decision to mind the leads, there's these channels that through which Swedish iron law flows at northern part of Norway

is taken. And so it looks like, you know, to Parliament, you know, and they're still debating in the chamber and all the rest of it. It looks like Chamberlain has been faffing about, being indecisive, and has been caught napping. While he's been fanning around, not making decision, you know, the Germans have gone through the back door. That is the kind of how it is viewed. And everyone's fed up. It's like, hang on a minute.

We went to war in 1939 in September 1939. You haven't done anything. And of course, that isn't true. There's lots of being going on. Factory's being built, more Spitfires being built, more ships being built, you know, more guns, more everything. So it's not like it's wasted time.

But politics is perception, as we absolutely know, it's still very much the case to today. So there is a feeling, there is a sense that this is a great humiliation, that Britain's being caught napping, so is France, but, you know, Parliament can't do anything about France, but they can complain about their own leaders. And so there is a vote of no confidence, and, you know, Chamberl gets ousted. There are only two real people at this point who could take over.

One is Lord Halifax, so he sits in the House of Lords, and he's probably, he's probably the most respected politician in the country. He's a former viceroy, a sign of an aristocratic family, known for his sound good judgment, and

very much, you know, a firm hand on the tiller kind of type. Then there's Churchill who is this titan of British politics, but has this slightly, slightly questionable judgment and you know, track record, and

you know, there's no question that he's more charismatic, but is he the right man? And the king, George is sick, for example, you know, he knows Halifax very well, his personal friend and favours him. Chamberlain, who is a close friend and colleague of Halifax as well, favours him to take over. But Halifax doesn't have the stomach for it. He doesn't want to take it and says, I just, you know, he feels physically sick all day on the 9th of May and declines. So then there's only really one option and that's

Churchill. So Churchill isn't elected Prime Minister. It's a kind of, you know, he comes to the pound the same way that Rishishina came to power or his trust comes to the power. And he's invited to form of government and it's no longer a conservative parliament. It becomes part of the deal

and which Churchill is accepted as the new Prime Minister is that there will be a new national government of multiple of all three major parties, Labour, liberals and conservatives. And there is going to be now, there is going to be a war cabinet in which those parties will be represented. So suddenly there's a five-man war cabinet, which is Halifax as foreign secretary. Chamberlain, who is obviously deposed Prime Minister, but, you know, it's obviously you'd have him in.

He's, again, he's a titanic figure in British politics. And then there's, then there's Attlee and Greenwood from the Labour Party. Archibald Sinclair is a minister of state for air, and he's a liberal. So, you know, it's a change. It's a big seismic shift. But Churchill on the 10th of May doesn't have this huge great authority. He's come about, you know, and he's office, the office says, oh, isn't it ironic? He become prime minister when it was his idea to go and form the Leeds in in the first place,

and that's what led to Chamberlain's downfall. But Churchill had been saying, let's go and bomb the, you know, let's go mind the Leeds in September 1939. Not in April. You know, he's saying it, let's get on with it. And of course, the reason it hasn't happened to late for all the reasons that we've never just been discussing. But on the 10th of May, the very same day that Churchill becomes Prime Minister is also the same day that Germany then invades the low countries in France. And this is Case Yellow, Operation Yellow, the Blitzkrieg in the West. This is the start of, this is the real proper start of the war.

And why are, I think a lot of people in, I'm not British originally, although I am now, a lot of people in Britain love to joke. about the French. I've now adopted this as well. But is it actually the case? It was partly the Belgian's fault, the low-land countries were overrun as much as they were. Churchill talks about in his book about World War II, and they refused to let the French and the Brits move up to better defensive positions. And so because of that, the whole thing ended up collapsing. How much truth is it to that? Is it all the Belgians' fault is what I'm asking you, James? It's certainly not all the Belgian's fault by interest of imagination. That's disappointing.

It's the French as well. All right. all of you things, a little bit more nuanced. So down the eastern border of France, the western border of Germany, that is where the Maginot Line is. And that is this incredibly expensive, serious of defence projects. You know, the idea, the principle behind it is

that it'll be just like the First World War if there's another conflict, i.e. long, drawn out and static, and he who has the best defenses and best buildup of armaments and supplies will win. It'll just grind down the enemy. And this is certainly true in case of, you know, the whole principle of war that dictates how Germany fights its war, first Prussia, then Germany, is this understanding that Germany lives in the sector of Europe, it's not resource for issue, it doesn't have access to the world oceans, therefore it has to fight its wars very quickly. And this goes back to Fred the Elector, it goes back to Frederick the Great in the 18th century.

it goes back to, you know, wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, Franco-Prussian War of, you know, 1870-71. You know, the idea is that what you do is you attack with a two-fisted to prunct, you punch, bam, bam, then you kind of encircle your enemy, completely destroy them, and you do all this in a matter of days or weeks.

You know, because Germany doesn't have the strength for a long-drawn-out war. France knows that. And if you want proof of this, the First World War is the example. You know, the whole point about the way the Germans kind of invaded the low countries in 1914, was to sweep in very fast. It's a war of maneuver, of rapid maneuver, overwhelm your enemies, get to Paris, put the flag up, negotiate, win the war.

Off you go. You know, it's all over by Christmas. You know, or even, you know, all over by the autumn. That's the principle behind it. One of the reasons why Germany loses is because it gets drawn into this long, year, long war where it can't win because it doesn't have the resources and the money to be able to kind of maintain. It doesn't have the food. It doesn't have the supplies. It just can't access them. It doesn't world throughout. Well, the oceans, et cetera, et cetera. So France knows this, which is why

if you're ever going to go to war with France again, it's going to make sure its defenses are better. So in the next static war, it will be able to stop this aggressive kind of free-flowing German forces, stop them in their tracks, and then they will kind of be able to grind them down by its alliance with Britain and access to the world supplies and all the rest of it. You know, there's a sort of logic to it. The problem with that is that what you do with the bit that doesn't border Germany. So that bit is dealt with by the Magno line, which isn't sort of like a Great War of China or anything. This is a series of highly fortified fortifications, heavy guns, minefield, wire, interconnecting trenches, all the rest of it.

You know, an army's not going to try that on. It's not going to get across the, you know, the River Rhone and, you know, and force its way that way. Then there's a hinge, and the hinge is the Ardennes, which is this wooded area, which in the French bit is around the town of kind of sort of sedan. And then you've got the northern French border, which borders with Belgium. and what had happened in the first world war is most of the war had been fought in that northern part of France

which is its industrial heartland and absolutely devastated it and the French were very anxious for obvious reason not to do that again so should Germany ever invade the plan was to then go into Belgium but because Belgium was neutral again as it had been in 1914 it didn't want allied forces going into Belgium before any declaration of war or any aggressive action on the part of the Germans in 1989, 1990.

Fordi or whatever, because that would be pinning their colours to a particular mast, and they didn't want to antagonise Germany. So that's why they said, no, no, you know, you French and British, you can't come into France. So the plan for France and Britain was, should the Germans attack, they would move forward to a line, which would be the dial line, which is a canal in Belgium, and they would hold the Germans there, see where the main thrust was, then get all their reserves up, and then counterattack, but all this would be incredibly slow and methodical. The reason why it all goes pear-shaked is because they don't anticipate a thrust through the Ardenne. The Ardennes is a sort of wooded area of Belgium and Luxembourg and northeast France.

It's very hilly. It's sort of interconnected, you know, it's intercut by lots of winding rivers. And a modern mechanized force, it was felt probably wouldn't be able to effectively get through there because of all these little narrow roads. And, you know, we're not talking about kind of, you know, motorways cutting through them. We're not talking, we're talking about asphalted, you know, tarmac roads. We're talking about dirt roads, you know, effectively sort of country tracks going through this incredibly wooden, kind of sparse, wooded sparse area, hilly, river-cut area of Belgium. And it didn't seem very likely that the germans make their main armoured frost through there. But that's, of course, is precisely why the Germans did decide to do that, because they knew that this was their era of least expectation. So the Germans had this plan where they were going to do the traditional one, which is what they'd done in 1870. in what they did in 1914 of cutting through into the low countries because that's where passage is easy

because it's low and flat and easy to sort of navigate your way around and draw the Allies up to meet them and then cutting round the back while they weren't looking through the Ardennes and that is exactly what they do. The reason the Germans are able to pull it off is because of radio and what is really interesting is that

when the Nazis get into power in 1933 they immediately start thinking about how they're going to totally dominate the media. They're going to just sort of strip it better. They're going to take over the cinemas. They're going to take over the news stations. They're going to take them in the newspapers. They're also going to broadcast. And one of the things that's really interesting is in the 1930s, radio was still quite aspirational.

You know, you'd have these huge great, you know, wire sets, whether it's kind of lacquered fronts and, you know, chestnut, you know, walnut coverings and all the rest of it. And they're aspirational and middle class and, you know, expensive. There's like a 4K TV, you know, five years ago or something like that. Right. Yeah. So what the Germans decided was actually, you know, the basic principle of radio is quite simple. We can make these an awful lot cheaper.

So what they do is they create the Deutsche Fangre, which is a German radio. And then they create the Deutsche Kleinenfanger, which is the German lithal radio. And this is 9 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches, made out of Bakelite, which is a form of primitive, you know, early plastic. Incredibly simple and very cheap. and this was as revolutionary as the arrival of the iPod when it first came into being. And what that meant was that by 1939, summer of 1939, they had the densest radio network of anywhere in the entire world.

They were far off being the most automotive, but they had one of the most dense, they had the densest radio network because they made it very cheap. Over 80% of households had them, had a radio. And even where you could, wouldn't have it, they would put them up in stairwells and apartment blocks and turn squares

and bars and all the rest of it. And they would just churn out the same old stuff over and over and over again. So this wouldn't just be, you know, Hitler's speeches. This would be like music, Wagner, comedy shows, thoughtful pieces, all sorts of stuff. But the subliminal message was all the same. You know, Jesus and Bolsheviks are bad, we're military really strong, we're the best, Germans and Aryans should have the right to rule the world. We're the top dogs, we're the daddies, we should be on top. Everyone else is bad. And this was just fed this sort of diet to the German people. Who swallowed it? In the same way, you could argue that the sort of Magasporters kind of listen to Trump over and over and over and it, because they're just spouting the same

thing. You know, we know that a lot of what they're saying is just complete lies. But if it's said often enough, people start to believe it. And this is the case with nine. Germany. But the advent of these mass-produced, cheaper radios has a profound effect on the military, too, because suddenly they're thinking, ah, here's a solution. Because one of the problems was when you countertracted the first world war was you couldn't reinforce. You probe away, you suddenly have this breakthrough, but you couldn't reinforce the breakthrough, because you couldn't get your forces to that breakthrough point quick enough, because you can't communicate well enough. Suddenly you can. So what,

emerges out of that is a new concept which is the Panzer Division. Now, Panzer is a general way of a tank. It doesn't mean the Panzer Division is stuff full of tanks. What it means is a fully functioning combined arms mechanized unit in which you would have reconnaissance troops on, you know, BMW motorbikes for sidecars. You'd have armored cars. You'd have half-tracks for your troops, your infantry. You'd have motorized anti-aircraft artillery.

you'd have motorized anti-tank artillery, you'd have motorized field artillery, and of course you'd have tanks as well. And these would all be able to communicate with one another. What the French don't have is this system. So the unique thing about Blitzkrieg and where it differs from earlier German approaches to warfare, is one, they now have the Luftwaffe,

which has been created organically to directly support ground operations, what we would call a tactical air force or close air support. It's not a strategic air force which is an independent operating bomber force. It is a close air support. And they have that

and they have radios. And those two developments are the things that gives them their edge over their enemies in 1939, 1940. And it's honed substantially after the battle of Poland. The French, on the other hand, have overwhelming numbers of guns and artillery pieces and tanks and all the rest of it,

but they don't have a means of communication. So Maurice Gamelan, who is the commander-in-chief of French Armed Forces, for example, his headquarters at the Chateau de Mancén on the edge of Paris. He doesn't have a single radio in the Chateau de Mancane, his headquarters. And the French structure is very top-heavy to support this very slow, defensive, based military system. The problem of being top-heavy is it means you've got overall armed forces command at the Chateau de Van Sant. Then you've got army group headquarters, which is groups of armies. So you have a command system to command multiple armies.

Then you have army command. Then underneath that, you have corps. Then you have divisions, which is about 14,000 men, and divisions are the unit by which we judge the scale and size of forces in the Second World War. Underneath that, you then have regiments. And onto that, you then have battalions. And every step of the way, you haven't got a sufficient way of communicating. So what happens is you would pick up the telephone, and that's fine,

so long as Stuccas haven't bombed the telephone lines or cut the telephone lines, and it's fine to send out dispatch writers, as long as the roads aren't clogged with refugees trying to get from A to B in panic. So what happens is the Army Group Commander wants to make a decision and pass on his orders to the army and so on down the chain. So he gets on his telephone, the line's cut, he can't get through, so he sent out a dispatch ride. The dispatch rider can't get through, gets stuck. So that's, dispatch rider's been sent out on his motorbike at 6 o'clock in the morning.

He's still not there by 1 o'clock in the afternoon. So then sand down to another one. By the time he gets back at 9 o'clock that night, you've had a whole day of events, and the original orders have now become redundant. So what happens in 1940 is that Germans, because they were able to operate faster and quicker and respond to the situations more quicker, they have much greater tactical flexibility and operational flexibility than the French. So the French just stuck, their rabbits and headlights.

They literally can't coordinate. So the Germans are able to take out the vastly superior French forces in penny packets. They're able to take them out one by one. And there's a classic example of this. So on the 15th of May 1940, they come up against

the combination of the 7th Panzer Division and the 5th Panzer Division, which are two German units. Come up against the French first Armoured Division mainly centres around a village called Dene. It's just on the other side. They've already got across the River Meuse, a mighty river Mears.

So the first line of French defence has already crumbled. And they come to this area. And overnight, the French First Armour Division has moved up, and they're fuelled by tankers. And tankers come up,

and they get hit by Stookers. So two of the tankers get knocked out or whatever, I can't know how many it is. But, you know, remember the tankers get get, get knocked out. So they then have to send up more fuel tankers and the following morning they are still refueling

because the tank is going to one tank than the next tank than the next tank. Whereas the German system is to have trucks of jerry cans, these 20-liter fuel cans, which are still used to this day. And they go out to one tank and they go, here's your lot, here's your lot, here's your lot. And so they can all fuel at the same, refuel at the same time. Such a simple thing.

But of course, the speed of operation that gives you is far greater than those of the French. So first of all, they are good to go on the morning of the 5th, 15th of May and fight this battle in a way that the French just aren't. So the French are caught napping. They're knocked out while they're still refueling before they even come into battle. Later on in the day, what happens is the German tanks

which are much, much smaller than the French ones, much more underpowered, much less armored. They go forward. They basically sort of stick out their tongue and waggle their hands at the French tanks. The French tanks cumbersomily slowly kind of do-d-d-d-b-d-b-d-b-s sort of move off towards them. And the German tanks then pull back, leading them into a screen of anti-tank guns, which are high-velocity tank, a high-phorosity artillery pieces.

The French First Division is just completely destroyed. You know, so it's that agility, that operational flexibility that wins the Germans, their victory. And all this is done by very, very few divisions. There are only 17 mobile divisions out of the 135 that are used. All the rest are operating with horse and around two feet. So this idea that this is a sort of big mechanized mollock is just not true. The French have way more mechanisation. British army, it's only tiny as is the most, you know, it's 100% mechanised in 1940,

the only army in the world to be so. They get undone because, in the case of the British, the British forward, they move forward to the Dahl, as they're supposed to do, on the one side, on their right-hand flank of the French, on their left-hand flank of the Belgians, when the French and the Belgian start to pull back, the British have no choice but to fall back as well. So it's not really their fault.

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James, I want to skip forward a little bit, given how the time we have left. One of the things I wanted to ask you is, one of the revisionist's narrative I alluded to this, is the idea that actually Hitler didn't want war with Britain. Well, he didn't want war with Britain. That's true. What Hitler wants is, you know, he's taking care of his interest in Eastern Europe. Yeah, I'm a reasonable guy. I'm just deeply anti-Semitic.

and, you know, and I'm unbelievable racist. And, you know, it's only fair that we Germans should go around conquering the whole of Europe. Yes. Well, I guess... I mean, the idea that he does a long war with Britain, then don't be aggressive. I mean, that's just absurd. But I guess the reason people are making this argument, particularly in America, is following the war in Vietnam, following the war in Iraq, following the failed invasion of Afghanistan, there is a massive appetite for the sense in which all war is bad.

and we should seek peace by any means necessary. And did America really need to get involved in World War II? Because, look, Britain was Churchill, the chief villain of World War II, according to some people, who could have accepted Hitler's peace overtures, and then everything would be fine. Well, anyone who says that, obviously thinks it's absolutely fine

to murder the whole of Europe's Jews. I mean, that's just ridiculous. And the thing is... But we didn't know they were murdering Jews at the time on the scale that we do. now. Well, you knew that it was deeply anti-Semitic and wanted to kick them all out of the country. But if you're an American, again, I'm just putting you their argument. It's not in my argument at all. But the argument might be, well, look, if World War II had been avoided, then tens of

millions of people would have been not killed. Well, first of all, the Japanese had already gone into China. So the killing sprees are already begun in China. So that was already happening. In terms of Hitler, I mean, Hitler had repeated. showed that he was a pathological liar, that he couldn't be trusted, that he didn't stick to any of the things he said he was going to stick to. When you can't trust people,

it makes decision-making process very, very difficult, and therefore you've got to err on the side of caution. So Hitler's saying, well, you know, that's it after Czechosaki, I'm never going to go into anything else, and obviously I'm going to observe Poland, and then he immediately does a deal with the Soviet Union and then goes in invades Poland. So, you know, it may be that he doesn't want war with Britain,

but he definitely wants to sympathicoe Britain. and if Britain isn't Sympatico and isn't politically aligned to him as his strength grows, he's going to threaten that. And that would threaten the whole order. The whole reason why Roosevelt starts to think from as early as 1938, we need to crank things up here

because, you know, this guy is a menace is because he can see which way this is going. You know, he can see that Hitler is an extremely dangerous man that a victorious Nazi Germany will very unlikely to be stopped, and that the Atlantic is no longer the great big barrier that it once was. You know, Reesvals, as much as anyone, is very conscious that the world is shrinking in terms of size and scope and that, you know, in the mid-1930s, you've got the first, you know, Boeing Flying Fortress, for example, you know, all silver and shiny.

You've got the Douglas DC3 coming into being, you know, these are only a hop and a skip in a way from the age of plough-bound biplanes. And suddenly we've got all stressed metal, you know, magnesium and aluminium aircraft that can fly across the Atlantic that can fly across continents. You know, it doesn't take a huge leap to realise that Europe is not as far as way as it used to be. you know, this is why he's preparing for this. And also, you know, Roosevelt, quite rightly, appreciates that economic crisis is problematic, leads to war, and has a very pronounced vision, which is one of economic unity and prosperity.

You know, if you have economic prosperity and the markets are calm, you have political calmness, and you're much more like to continue with peace. You know, he's absolutely correct. I mean, you know, this is why he instigates in 1933 the Good Neighbor policy, for example. Good neighbor policy is an overturn of traditional United States approach to its Latin

American neighbors such as Mexico or indeed Canada and elsewhere where you are aggressive in terms of trade, you are aggressive in terms of, I mean, they're occupating Haiti, they're occupying Cuba, they're involved in Central America and Southern America in Mexico. And what Ruzov's,

says, actually, you know, we're going to stop all this aggressive stuff. We're going to stop being this sort of bullying, dominating, militaristic, overbearing partner. We're going to actually treat the rest of Latin America fairly and squarely. And, okay, there might be a trade deficit, but overall, we'll get richer on this. And also, we'll be more secure. There'll be more peace, which will be cheaper for us. We'll become more prosperous. And then there'll be less war. And because there'll be less war, there'll be great prosperity. You know, that is a lesson from the First World War. And he heeds this, understand, this and invokes a good neighbour policy in 1933.

Out of that, then comes notions of extending this to a global economic order, which first gets mentioned as the four points in January, 1941, when he's inaugurated for the third time in March, 31, sorry, March rather than January 1941, and then gets further kind of four freedoms, rather. And then in August 1941 is the Atlantic Charter, which he signs with Winston Churchill in their first proper face-to-face meeting as political leaders. Where again, you know, this is this notion that, you know, you should have free trade, low tariffs, that you should have, you know, no one should, everyone should be free of fear and want. That every person on the planet should have the right to self-determination, i.

i democracy, that Britain and America will not aggressively attack any other nation ever. All these things which are, you know, and partly that is about a sense of sort of Christian ideals and a moral compass. But it's mainly about prosperity, because the more prosperous you are, the more political unity there is and harmony there is, the greater prosperity there is, the great political unity and prosperity, economic prosperity, is less like you are to go to war. And, you know, that is absolutely irrefutable. So all of this comes to. So what by America getting involved in the war, what they're doing is is putting a stop to aggression, to aggressive, national, ultra-nationalistic policies and saying, no, let's create a new global order, which is democratic and prosperous.

We do not want a world that is about the triumph of strength over everything else. But with Churchill specifically, this is what I want to get into, is that the argument is that he could have done that peace deal with Hitler.

You can't do peace deals with someone like Hitler. You can't. I mean, you know, they tried in 1938 and it got nowhere. You know, they've got it to. I mean, I can't even begin to say how totally absurd this argument is not. I know, but I'd like you to...

I know people say it, but they say it from a point of deep ignorance. It seems... I certainly agree with you, but I would want you to also perhaps explain. I mean, one of the things that seems obvious to me is the idea that Hitler would have simply stopped there seems quite strange to me, given that he had a whole pattern of behavior prior to that. But also, wouldn't the British interest be very significantly affected if Hitler had continued to dominate not only Europe but the rest of the world? because he had very significant interest in the Middle East, for example, right?

Which would have affected British interests there. Well, he only went into the Middle East because he was fighting, you know, because they didn't have any oil. I mean, the whole interest in the Middle East was equally absurd because he had no means of... I mean, Middle East oil was not important in the 1940s. It became important later, you know, decades later. The leading oil producers in the world in the 1940s was the United States, and the second biggest producer of oil was Venezuela.

So, you know, and then you have the kind of the oil fields of Baku and Azerbaijan, which is third. Middle East doesn't even really come into it at all. Middle East oil is merely fueling British efforts in the Middle East because obviously it's closer. You haven't got to ship it around. So when Hitler goes into the Soviet Union, originally in June 1941, he does so because he's failed to defeat Britain in 1940. You know, he's defeated France, that's a big tick, and the low countries and all the rest of it. But even by Christmas 1940, the covers a bear. You know, he doesn't have enough resources.

He's completely bled mighty France dry. Like kids in a sweet shop, there's nothing left. So then you've got to man your, this new empire that you've got, which is incredibly expensive to do and time-consuming and cost manpower. Because a bigger, you're bigger your geographical area, the more men you've got to defend it, and the more defenses you've got to build. So, you know, it just goes to show. It goes to figure. So he's got a problem on his hands. But the big problem is that one of the reasons why Germany lost the First World was

because they ended up fighting war on two fronts, east and front and the Western Front. And he was aware of this. Yeah, he was very aware of this. He's been, you know, he's been an infantryman in the First World. He's keenly aware of it. And he was keenly aware of what happened in 1918 when Germany, you know, had to throw in the towel.

So he's got a problem on his hand because Britain hasn't done what he's expected it to which is, after his army got defeated at Dunkirk and scuttled back across the Atlantic, he was expecting him to sue for peace. And that's because he's a continentalist, and for him, the army is absolutely everything. Whereas for Britain, it's a ocean-going empire, trading empire, where the Navy is the most important thing. The army is not. It's probably kind of the third of the three services.

Let me interrupt you there very briefly, because here's what I'm really trying to get you to explain. Forget, look, someone who of Jewish ancestry who lost family in the Holocaust, this is a strange argument for me to be making, but nonetheless, I'm trying to put the argument to it. Forget the moral case and just look at the practical case. What is the practical rationale for Britain continuing to fight alone after 1940? Well, first of all, Britain doesn't fight alone because it's got an empire and dominions. The British Empire to fight. Well, because the alternative is the new dark age made more sinister and protracted by the perversions of modern science,

as Churchill pointed out on the 18th June 1940. I mean, the alternative is, you know, and that was incredibly pressing, because, of course, at that point, you know, Zycton B hadn't been used to gas people, but was going to be used to gas people. So, you know, Churchill was absolutely spot on. Anyone who doubts the ambition of Hitler, you only have to look at what does. did happen, Auschwitz, the death camps, the concentration camps, the three million people shot and chucked into pits. Again, very strange argument for me to make, but let's be honest, Britain didn't

fight World War II because of Jews, right? It fought it because it was... It doesn't, but it fights World War II because of the threat of what this monstrous regime might enact. But not to Jews, but rather it's a threat. Britain never wants there to be a super dominant power on the continent. It doesn't want a superpower. It certainly does. It certainly does. doesn't want to, and that is an age-old, geopolitical. So from a geopolitical perspective, what is the rationale? It's more than that. It's

more than that. It's not just geopolitical. It is absolutely profound that Nazi Germany presents a dark force of evil that has to be stopped, because the consequences are

a shroud of repression, of anti-liberty, of autotrofenes, of autocracy of cruel power that will dominate the world. You know, I don't think there's any question about that at all. I mean, you know, no one is saying, we've got to go to war against it. We've got to stop Hitler because otherwise he's going to be the global dominant, you know, there'll be a single dominant power in Europe. They're not saying that. They're saying that is part of it, but the main reason is because of what Nazi Nazism represents. You know, an anti-Semitism is a part

of that. You know, we're not going to war to save Europe's Jews, but we are going to war to prevent the spread of Nazi ideology. So we kind of are in a way. You know, and people who say, you know, if only Germany had gone in and didn't have his ideology

and gone into the Soviet Union, you could have actually used all the Ukrainians and Jews to their benefit, you know, gosh, their life would have been easier. But that's kind of missed the point. The point is they are anti-Semitic. They do have this ideology. That's absolutely part and parcel of how they operate. It's absolutely the key to understanding Hitler's ambition is his ambition to fuel and fulfill

this ideology. So you can't separate them. And nor can one say just part for a minute, you know, his anti-Semitism and just look at it practically. You can't because it's absolutely part of the whole thing. One of the things that always underscore that for me is even towards the end of the war, which is where we're now heading in our conversation, the amount of resource and, you know, soldiers and everything that they're using to try to complete the project of the final solution while their armies are being wrecked on the battlefield. That just shows you how ideologically possessed

it. It absolutely does. And there is a, you know, they know they're losing the war. And so there is this hurry to get, you know, the one bit they haven't done is they haven't got Hungary's Jews. So, you know, I'll tell you what, how can we speed this up? Hey, here's an idea. Let's build a railway. Then actually, so that the Jews, when they arrive from Hungary, don't have to kind of walk across a mile of open land. They can just go literally deliver straight into the gas chambers. Let's build an extension to the railway line that goes through the archway into

camp, into Burkinaw, the deaf camp, and that will speed up the whole thing. I mean, it's so absurd. It's not true. I mean, it is absolutely ridiculous. And even in the final weeks of the war, they're still transferring prisoners from concentration camp to concentration camp so that they can still be used as slave labor, even though they're kind of emaciated and broken and suffering from typhus and, you know, all the rest of it. I mean, you know, it is impossible to understand the absurdities of the Nazi state. And what one also has to appreciate, I think,

is the foundations of the Nazi state of very, very fragile. You know, this was a country that was broken in 1990, that was, you know, broken again in the 1930s following the Wall Street crash. and it is built this this facade, this show of red and black swastikas on a white, and it's all very showy, and it all looks very, very impressive. But actually, it's kind of wafer thin, and the foundations of the state and the economics of the state are rotten to the core. And, of course, the management of it is rotten to the core. It's deeply corrupt. it's evil in its intention

and it's absolutely right that the Western democracies stand up against this I mean this is one of the things I think is a real lesson from the Second World War is that what this goes back to your kind of original point about democracies and autocracies is what the Second World War shows

is that when democracies pull together again you know for a common cause they're unstoppable What that requires, though, is it's a much more complicated process of political will. But once you get that political will, you can do anything. So this is the lesson for now, as the enemies to the West are kind of sharpening their sabres again. And where, you know, we feel this existential threat from North Korea, from Iran, and, of course, from Putin's Russia, is what is lacking at the moment. It's starting to kind of show signs of galvanizing.

But what you really need is political will. Once you've got that political will, we'll be fine. So, you know, all our enemies in the world today can be stopped without any question whatsoever. You know, Russia's got 100 million, 150 million people. You know, Europe's got 750 million. It's got great minds. It's got resources. It's got access to the world's oceans.

It's got untold riches. Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. You know, there's absolutely no reason why we can't stop all these people in their tracks. What's stopping us is different political systems. And that's the benefit and curse of democracy. as you rightly point out. So Britain stands alone. France has fallen, most of mainland

in Europe has fallen, the Channel Islands, the Nazis are there. I mean, not to put too fine a point at it, we're in the shit. How did we manage to get out of this situation? Well, we get out of it because Germany is not as good as they seem at the beginning of the war with the Blitz Creek years.

Because it does have this, Germany does have this shortage of supplies and access to the world's ocean. And because Britain is an island nation with the world's largest navy and the world's largest merchant fleet and access to over 80% of the world's merchant shipping, and those are incalculable advantages. And also, in the summer of 1940, it has the world's first fully coordinated and only air defence system. So in the past, what's happened has been able to choose when it comes over and destroys people's airfields and aircraft on the ground, because its enemies don't know when they're coming.

But now we do. Britain does know when it's coming. It can see and it can prepare for it. So, A, it can take off its, and make sure of its aircraft aren't on the airfield when the Germans come a calling. And secondly, they can attack them. And secondly, they can attack them. So that they're best place to attack the Germans. And, you know, it's often said that the Battle of Britain is closer on Finland. It's absolutely no such thing. You know, the Germans are absolutely annihilated. Well, they're not annihilated, but they're very, very badly beaten. You know, in the whole of the Battle of Britain, they destroy, put out of action one out of 138 airfields for more than 48 hours. Wow. You know, that is not a good effort when they're used to just coming over and just destroying everything in sight. So they don't get very far and they don't even destroy the REF

not even close. Their intelligence is terrible. The tactics are appalling. They switch to bombing London, which is catastrophic and horrendous and the Blitz is the first time ever that that are cities of one country we get, have a sustained aerial bombardment.

I mean, it's never happened before. You know, Rotterdam's been hit, Warsaw's been hit, but not in a sustained way the last seven months. So this is all kind of, you know, new turf. But Britain shows that it can take it. But my point is they haven't even got to the Navy. They haven't even put a ship in the water yet.

And, you know, you've got to transfer an army to do an invasion. Well, they haven't got landing craft. There aren't any landing craft. Landcraft haven't been invented at that point. There's no Higgins boat or landing ship or anything. So how are they going to do it? Well, they're doing it in river barges, which they've taken from the Rhine,

which is absolutely scuppering their internal trade and industry because they've got no means of movement. And they haven't got enough motorised barges anyway. So the idea is one motorised barge toes the other two. I mean, can you imagine? How's that going to work when you actually hit the beach? I mean, it's just absolutely bonkers. And even if they had got there, then, you know,

they'd have been absolutely hammered by, you know, millions of people in uniform, you know, firing at them. So, you know, Operation Sea Line, which is the proposed invasion of Britain, has no chance, and it's not going to happen, and it doesn't happen. It's very, very difficult to do an amphibious invasion when you haven't had years of preparation for it. What that does do is it gives Britain the understanding that any future, once it's isolated, it's going to any future offensive operations are going to have to be amphibious by their very nature. So it does start creating landing craft, and so does the United States at the same time. same time that France is surrendering and Britain is kind of saying its navy back from

its army back from Dunkirk in late May, early June, 1940. Rousselstaff is going, ah, you know, I need to do this amazing political vault fast. I need to massively rearm, even though I got into power in the election of 1932 on an isolationist ticket and anti-militarism, we now need to change all that. And, you know, we don't have the time and space to go into how he does that. But he does that very, very effectively. so that by the time that Britain, that America comes into the war in December 1941, actively, it has become the arsenal of democracy.

But it goes from kind of, you know, nothing to this, to the huge armed forces and huge sort of armaments, factories that develops in very, very quick order. You know, it's an astonishing turnaround. But, you know, Britain is doing exactly the same. I mean, Britain produces 132,500 aircraft in the Second World War. you know, Germany produces maybe 80,000. United States creates something like over 315,000 aircraft in the Second World War, 83,000 aircraft in 1943 alone.

I mean, these are astronomical figures. You know, 83,000 aircraft is a thousand more than the capacity of Twickenham Stadium, for example. You know, imagine what that looks like in terms of actual aircraft. I mean, it is absolutely incredible. But in 1939, September 1939, USA has the 19th largest army in the world of about 100,000. 188,000, which is tiny by 1930 standards, sandwiched between Portugal and Uruguay. So, you know, to go from that, to kind of six and a half million people in uniform by 1945 is going some.

And what the United States realized, what Britain realized, is that mass will win. You know, if you don't lose in the initial strike, Germany simply doesn't have the resources to win. And I would say, on balance, Britain and America, and Britain start off with, fight a very pragmatic war. They use the resources to the best of their ability. Britain very early on realizes that the Atlantic is the battle in the Atlantic is the battleground which is going to be the most important in the entire war and it is because through the Atlantic all the shipping passes whether it's going to supplies to the Soviet Union, Arctic convoys and all the rest of it,

or to Middle East or to Europe or obviously supply in Britain. So the Atlantic is absolutely crucial. That is where the bulk of Britain's research and development goes into. By May 1941, so comparatively early in the war, Britain gets to a point where it is not going to lose the Battle of Atlantic. It doesn't mean to say it's won it by that point.

The victory in the Battle of Atlantic comes in May 1943, so two years later. But it's got to the point where it's not going to lose. And I would argue that by the end of 1941, Nazi Germany is already finished, which is obviously a lot earlier than most people would think. But just think about this. So in the middle of June 1941. Nazi Germany has one enemy, albeit Britain, it's Britain plus dominion an empire, but it only has one enemy. Fast forward six months to the middle of December 1941,

has three enemies, has the United States of America, has the USSR, and it has Great Britain plus empire. It's not going to win. And it's lost the Battle of Moscow, which was crucial as well, right by the point. Well, that was massive. I think that it's the first time they really lost a lot of men, and their momentum was stopped. They didn't capture Moscow. Well, the truth is Operation Barbarossa, which is the German battle plan for the invasion of Soviet Union, is terrible. It's a really bad plan. It's completely undercooked. They don't have remotely enough to do what they're trying to do. They're attacking on three giant thrust over a kind of vast space. They simply do not have the mechanization, the oil, the infrastructure to be able to carry it out. The only reason they have the success they do is because the Red Army is even worse. And, you know, this is because of the huge purges that have taken place in the 1930. where 22,500 Red Army officers have been executed or imprisoned, including three out of five marshals and I think 15 army commanders. I mean, you know, they are terrible.

And actually, the Red Army continues to be very, very badly led throughout the Second World War. They've always been incredibly expensive in manpower, and nothing's changed in the Second World War. You know, any Soviet, you know, any Russian leaders won't like me for saying this. But the encirclement of Stalin, the encirclement of the German Sikh army, which is such a kind of, you know, an important moment in the Second World War. While it's not Germany's biggest defeat, it is an absolutely, is unquestionably a big turning point. That only happens thanks to 75,000, you know, United States vehicles that Marshall Zuccov is able to use for Operation Uranus.

So, you know, you can't do the encirclement unless you can move fast. The only reason you can move fast is with all that mechanisation. Where's a mechanisation come from? It comes from, you know, from the United... Yeah, it comes from Lennessee. So, you know, it is absolutely no question that while more blood is spilled on the eastern front, that is absolutely irrefutable. There's no question about it.

And the sacrifice of the Soviet Union, particularly in terms of civilian deaths, rather than the military deaths, is absolutely horrific. And military deaths is also horrific. Military deaths are really, to a largest extent, result of military inefficiency. I mean, you know, just take this, for example. Final Battle of Berlin, which is launched on the 16th of April, 1945, you know, they're coming up against 16-year-olds, 15-year-olds, 17-year-olds, 17-year-olds, 60-year-olds, you know, Volkstrom, you know, basic home guard. Yes, a handful of veterans and Waffen SS types and all the rest of it. but, you know, a massively, horrifically depleted German armed forces,

which shouldn't be able to put up much of a shot against anyone. Against them, they've got thousands of tanks, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, something like 41,000 artillery pieces, you know, millions of men. And yet, in little over two weeks, they managed to lose over 900,000 casualties. That doesn't strike me as an army that's really knows what it's doing very much. And the reason they're all being killed is because their commanders are incredibly reckless with the lives of their men, and they're very under-trained. So they're just using mass and bulk to overwhelm the enemy, but that comes at a huge cost. Whereas the Western allies are very conservative with men's lives, and yes, they're a bit more cautious, and yes, that means they might take a little bit longer to do something.

But the bottom line is what they're using is they're using steel, not our flesh, to do a lot of the hard yards. In other words, they're using their global reach, they're using industrial. centralisation, mechanisation, modern technology to do a lot of the hard yards so that the number of men in the firing light is kept to an absolute minimum. This is why only, you know, of allied armies, American, Canadian, British armies operating in the European Theatre of Operations, for example. Only around 14% are infantry. Only 8% are in tanks, of which that 8% in a tank unit, only about 48% are actually in tanks, the rest of support troops supporting those tanks. 22% are artillery, 43% are service corps.

And what that tells you is that this is a very, very heavily material-based, heavily industrial-backed armed forces, which is all the more efficient and effective as a result of that. And the commanders, because they're from democracies, they're more humane, and they don't want to have a slaughter of a generation

like you had in the First World War. Now, the consequence of that, the flip side of that, is that if you are unfortunate enough to be in infantry, your chances of getting through unscathed are worse than they were in 1914 to 1918, but the numbers are much smaller. So the casualty rate as a proportion of the troops involved is higher, but the numbers of troops are much, much smaller.

And I think you have to give full credit to the way Britain and America fights its wars, that it is so, you know, it's a brotherhood of, The three services are Brotherhood of Air, Land and Sea, power, and they are using their modernity and their industrial scale and capacity and technology to do a lot of the hard yards. What the Red Army is doing is it's using technology and industrial muscle, but it's also incredibly reckless with men's lives. And so it's important to make and understand that caveat

when we start talking about, yes, you know, there's sort of the blood debt to the Soviet Union or the rest of it, which Stalin and now Putin is constantly kind of, yes, there was a huge blood debt, but to a very large degree, certainly from a military point of view, that was entirely their own fault. Whereas from an economic point of view, and ultimately it is economics that win and lose his wars for the most part. Economics is absolutely no question that it was the West that kind of had the decisive part because, you know, the fact that Germany lies in ruins is down to Western muscle,

economic sanctions and activities. I mean, you know, Germany was crippled by the West. And it's also worth bearing in mind as well, revisiting the autocrat point that as Germany was collapsing, Hitler was absolutely adamant to keep on fighting to the point of it was completely delusional. But he was always delusional. And all the Soviet Nazi commands is delusional.

And, you know, it is really, really important to understand this. You're not dealing with normal, rational people. Their decision-making process is not rational. It's always dictated to by ideology and by the fact that Hitler is surrounded by sycophants, who's always telling him that he's the best, that he's the greatest that, you know, he can do no wrong, that all his decisions are right. And you start to believe that nonsense. And Hitler was started to believe that from a very early, very early stage.

stage with catastrophic consequences. I mean, you know, people quite often ask me, they say, what, you know, what was the worst decision Hitler ever made? Now it's going to invade in Poland. I mean, you know, because of what followed. You know, it wasn't entirely inevitable that it was all going to end in tears, but I'm pretty, pretty high, I think. I mean, you know, he got, you know, the French, you know, the French were caught napping. Barbarossa should never have got, you know, they'd never have encircled Kiev, for example, as it then was. You know, they never have. You know, they'd never have encircled, yeah, for example, as it then was, you know, in Ukraine. Never got close.

You know, as I say, Barb Ross was a terrible plan. And a lot of the Nazi successes in the first part of the war were because Hitler wasn't controlling everything with such a tight leash, you know, there was amongst the better trained German troops and commanders, there was a license to operate, which gave him a kind of freedom of maneuver of tactical freedom, which meant they were kind of able to respond very quickly to the situations to which they found themselves. And because of the, to communicate, meant that you could suddenly exploit in a way that you couldn't before, and you couldn't thereafter once Hitler started to become more and more of a control freak. But yes, I mean,

he is completely delusional. But Hitler, as I was saying at the beginning, you know, he's always been a kind of an either or us or them black or white kind of guy. You know, he's always always, always said, you know, it will be a thousand-year Reich or it will be Armageddon. And that is the choice of the people. It's whether the Germans have the will to win this war, this victory that we need to survive, you know, for the Aryan peoples, the true inheritors of the world to kind of survive and prevail and rule the world for millennia to come. I mean, it's all absolutely twaddle. But such was his hold in the 1930s because it seemed that he transformed Germany, you know, they've gone from these sort of dark years of the 1920s to suddenly

this kind of, you know, genius was taking back all the lands that've been taken so cruelly in 1990, without a shot being fired, you know, everyone had jobs, were auto barns, everything was shiny and gleaming, and lots of sort of, you know, swastikas and, and, and with a sort of tinge of, of old-school Prussian militarism that made people, you know, feel good about themselves. I mean, you know, that was old principle behind the kind of, you know, elaborate Nazi uniforms they had. They were a throwback to the late 19th century militarism. Lots of leather, jack boots,

all this event. Completely impractical. Incredibly expensive. You know, first of all had proven that canvas is a much better source of webbing, for example, and beltage. And, you know, ankle boots are much more effective than long boots because it's cheaper, etc., etc. But that's not the point. The point is they need to be shiny and look cool because you're going,

put on this uniform and you'll stand a little bit straighter. It's like, you know, it's like the Grenadier-Garzman when he puts on his bare skin and his garlic tunic. He just feels a bit, you know, the spine is straighter, the shoulders are back or the rest of it. And there's a subliminal message here, which is, you know what, we are really cool. You know, and if you want to be part of our gang, come on in, the water's warm, you know, look sharp, get the fro line, what's not to like? You know, that's the message. And by the time you've got to 1939, and suddenly Hitler's invading Poland, it's, you know, It's too late because enough people have bought into this clap trap that they've already been turned.

And at the same time, you've got a whole generation of young Germans who've grown up with this. So it's absolutely part of their DNA. They've been completely indoctrinated. And they're going to be the youngsters which are then going to take on the armed forces and sacrifice their lives in the second stage of the Second World War. So you've got that kind of that fodder for your aspirations already lined up. it takes Armageddon to kind of knock that on the head. Well, speaking of Armageddon, let's just ask this question. We're way over time, but I want to ask this to, from again,

to address some of the arguments people are making. Can you explain what the military rationale was and how justified were some of the things that the Allies did in you talk in your book about victory in 1945, both to Japan and to Germany in terms of the bombings of the cities, the dropping the nukes of Japan? because I think a lot of people simply think that those were punitive actions designed to punish Germany and Japan

for the barbarities of they inflicted on the Allies. Was that true? No, no, not really. I mean, certainly up until the end of 1944, this is, you know, the bombing campaign is about stopping Germany in its tracks and making it much, much harder for it to protract war and to try and ensure that the number of young men

risking their lives at the front line was kept to an absolute minimum. You only have 14% infantry, if you've got heavy bombers coming over and destroying marshalling yards and aircraft factories and, you know, that comes with hitting cities as well, because a lot of these factories are in conurbations. So, you know, it's unavoidable. That's not mean to say that there isn't a deliberate policy of area bombing. There is, but by area bombing, you are destroying infrastructure, you are destroying civilians, you're devying workers, you're making life difficult,

and you are also trying to hit factories as well at the same time. So you're doing that. By beginning of 1945, what one has to understand is that everything that happens in Europe in 1945 has to be seen through the prism of the war against Imperial Japan. And what the war against Imperial Japan has shown is that the closer the Allies get to Japan itself, the heart of the Japanese fight. So in the Battle of Paloou, for example, there's 10,000 Japanese defenders on this tiny, tiny island, of which only about 360 pull up their hands and surrender, the rest are killed. So they're fighting to the death.

You know, on Iwo Jima, that figure is even more. There's like 18,500 defenders, 250 people surrender out of the entire. You know, so that means basically over 18,000 Japanese have fought to the death on this tiny, tiny island. And then you go to Ocanow, which launched on the 1st of April

and goes on through this period of May, 1945 into June, 1945, which is arguably the bloodiest battle of the entire Second World War. and you're thinking, yikes, you know, we've got to invade Japan here. And in May, 1945, there's no guarantee the atomic bomb is going to work or that is practicable or that morally it will even be given the decision to go with it. You know, so what there is in 1945 with the destruction of Dresden,

which incidentally was asked for by the Soviet Union because it was a major rail hub and a flow through which German troops had been filtered down to the Italian front end, the southern eastern front and had a lot of, you know, something like 135 different industries and operations working on the war effort. So it was, you know, from which way you look at it, it was a legitimate target. It's not necessarily legitimate to strike the centre of the old town, but militarily it is a legitimate target. And what one has to understand is in 1945, Germany is completely defeated. You know, it is absolutely stuffed. And,

In February in 1945, the Reichsbahn collapses. And the Wrightsbahn is the German Railway Network, and it's very much the glue that's kept the whole thing going because they don't have enough oil and fuel to be able to, you know, they're not very mechanised. So they're dependent on coal power, steam power. And that just collapses it.

So basically, Germany is totally finished at that point. I mean, it's already finished. I mean, most people, most nations surrender because they've run out of money and they're not going to win. You know, reference November 1918. Nasty Germany's not like that because of Hitler's kind of either or kind of black or white,

a Reich or Armageddon kind of approach to kind of conducting a war. So they're still going. But there is mounting frustration and anger from the Western allies that Germany just won't give up. You know, the moment you surrender, we'll stop bombing your cities. It's a really, really simple

equation, and we can get on with things. And the reason they're frustrated is because they know they need to save as much manpower as they possibly can for the prospective invasion of Japan, which they're expecting to do at the end of 1945 into 1946, and which they are conservative. to the estimating is going to cost over 2 million casualties. And that is the backdrop.

So there is no atomic bomb in the first half of 1945. You know, the first test is the 16th of July, 1945. No one knows whether it's going to work. And there was one thing detonating it. There was another thing delivering it to your target. And there was another thing, having the moral decision to actually go ahead with it. So these are huge obstacles to its operation. And this is just not clear that this is going to happen.

So there's a Potsdam Declaration. hinting that they've got this terrible weapon Japan laid down your arms, it doesn't you know, what is the alternative? The alternative is economic siege, you know, where Japan is literally starved to death which would have ended up with millions of casualties

had it gone down that route. Or you invade Japan with millions of casualties or you destroy two cities with, or hopefully one city and then a second city with atomic bombs which kill, you know, 200,000. And why did you drop the second one? Because Japan hadn't surrendered. In fact, they did try to, and then they had a coup attempt against the emperor, didn't they?

That was after the second one. After the second one. After the first one, they still didn't believe that it could be an atomic bomb. Because they'd had an atomic policy and they hadn't invented it, so therefore they hadn't invented it. It couldn't be possible. But after the second one, the emperor decided to surrender and the military guys were like, no, no, no, we're going to keep finding. No, there was then there was a cabinet split. the emperor was kind of sort of

of slightly neutral on it. Then there was a coup. Then the emperor said, I really think we should throw in the towel. And it was again, it was unconditional surrender. It set the condition that the emperor remained in place, which he did until 1987 or 89 when he finally died. James, we've A, overrun, B, covered all the questions we were going to ask you from

our substack supporters. So thank you for your time. It's been really great. I hope people read the book. No, thank you. Neither of us had a chance. It's literally just come out. We very much look forward to reading it as well. A real pleasure to have you on. And the last question we always end on is the same, which is what's the one thing we're not talking about as a society that we should be? How we properly rearm now? That's what we need to do. All right, good note to hands on. Yeah. See you later.