TrueLife - Strategy & War: Carl von Clausewitz Part 1 — The Philosophy of Conflict

Episode Date: August 12, 2020

One on One Video Call W/George https://tidycal.com/georgepmonty/60-minute-meetingSupport the show:https://www.paypal.me/Truelifepodcast?locale.x=en_US🚨🚨Curious about the future of psychedelics? Imagine if Alan Watts started a secret society with Ram Dass and Hunter S. Thompson… now open the door. Use Promocode TRUELIFE for Get 25% off monthly or 30% off the annual plan For the first yearhttps://www.district216.com/Transcript:https://app.podscribe.ai/episode/49682562Speaker 0 (0s): Hey, you guys there. Hey, it's me, George. Look, I'm over here. Can you see me camouflage? Close your eyes there. What's going on everybody. Good morning or good afternoon or good evening. I don't know when you're listening to this, but whenever it is, I hope you're feeling good. You don't so much of the human experience is based on war. We've got a war on drugs, a war on poverty, a war in Afghanistan, world war one, world war II, the war of the roses, Vietnam, Korea. We are, we love war. We just love, love, love it. That being said, I thought we'd talk about strategies of war. I thought we'd kind of really try to dig in and understand what war is. I thought we would try to just dig down deep, get to the root of all this war. One way to do that is to consult with one of the greatest military strategists of all time. Mr. Carl Von Clausewitz, one of Napoleon's greatest generals. He wrote a book called on war. I thought we'd go over a little bit of it here just to see what you guys think. Maybe just to see what I think, maybe just to read a little, understand a little, that way we can all get along a little bit more. That being said, let's check it out. What is war introduction? I propose to consider first the various elements of the subject next its various parts or sections, and finally the whole and its internal structure. In other words, I shall proceed from the simple to the complex, but in war more than an any other subject, we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole four here more than elsewhere, the part and the hole must always be thought of together. Definition, let's define what war is. I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic literary definition of war, but go straight to the heart of Speaker 1 (3m 0s): The matter to the duel or is nothing but a duel on a larger scale, countless duals go to makeup war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers, each tries to physical force to compel the other, to do his will. His immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy, to do our will force to counter opposing force equipped itself with the inventions of art and science attached to fours are certain self-imposed imperceptible limitations, hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it force. That is physical force for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state. And the law is thus the means of war to impose our will on the enemy is its object to secure that object. We must render the enemy powerless. And that in theory is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something, not actually part of war itself. So one was introduction to definition three, the maximum use of force kind hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed. And might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war pleasant, as it sounds, it is a fallacy and it must be exposed. War is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way, incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. If one side force, if one side uses force without compunction undeterred by the bloodshed, it involves while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit. Each will drive its opponent toward extremes. And the only limiting factors are the counter poses inherent in the war. This is how the matter must be seen. It would be few tile, even wrong to try and shut one's eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality. If Wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than Wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the States themselves and in their relationships to one another. These are the forces that give rise to war, the same forces, circumscribed and moderated they themselves, however are not part of war. They already exist before fighting starts to introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity to different motives, make men fight one, another hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the ladder since it is the universal element. Even the most Savage, almost instinctive passion of hatred cannot be conceived as existing without hostile intent. The hostile intentions are often unaccompanied by any sort of hostile feelings, at least by none that predominate Savage peoples are ruled by passion civilized peoples by the mind, the difference, however lies not in the respect of natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendance circumstances, institutions and so forth. The difference therefore does not operate in every case, but it does in most of them, even the most civilized of peoples in short can be fired with passionate hatred for each other. Consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting, merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and do conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion. So that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces. Comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra theorists were already beginning to think along such lines. When the recent Wars taught them a lesson. If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from them, but they will still affect it to some degree. And the extent to which they do so will depend not on the level of civilization, but on how important the conflicting interests are and on how long their conflict lasts. If then civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries. It is because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and has taught them most effective ways of using force. Then the crude expression of instinct, the invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war. The thesis then must be repeated. War is an act of force and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, there are four compels it's opponent to follow suit. A reciprocal action is started, which must lead in theory, two extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the first extreme we meet with number four. What do you guys think so far? Pretty in depth, right? I thought so number four, the aim is to disarm the enemy. I ha...

Darkness struck, a gut-punched theft, Sun ripped away, her health bereft. I roar at the void. This ain't just fate, a cosmic scam I spit my hate. The games rigged tight, shadows deal, blood on their hands, I'll never kneel. Yet in the rage, a crack ignites, occulted sparks cut through the nights. The scars my key, hermetic and stark. To see, to rise, I hunt in the dark, fumbling, fear. Heirous through ruins maze, lights my war cry, born from the blaze.

The poem is Angels with Rifles. The track, I Am Sorrow, I Am Lust by Codex Seraphene. Check out the entire song at the end of the cast. Are you guys there? Hey, it's me, George. Don't look. I'm over here. Can you see me? Camouflaged. Close your eyes. There I am.

Ha ha ha! What's going up? everybody good morning or good afternoon or good evening i don't know when you're listening to this but whenever it is i hope you're feeling good you know so much of the human experience is based on war we've got a war on drugs a war on poverty a war in afghanistan world war one world war two the War of the Roses, Vietnam, Korea. We are, we love war. We just love, love, love it.

That being said, I thought we'd talk about strategies of war. I thought we'd kind of really try to dig in and understand what war is. I thought we would try to just dig down deep, get to the root of all this war. One way to do that is to consult with one of the greatest military strategists of all time, a Mr. Carl von Klauschwitz, one of Napoleon's greatest generals. He wrote a book called On War. I thought we'd go over a little bit of it here just to see what you guys think. Maybe just to see what I think.

maybe just to read a little, understand a little. That way we can all get along a little bit more. That being said, let's check it out. What is war? Introduction. I propose to consider first the various elements of the subject. Next, its various parts or sections. And finally, the whole in its internal structure.

In other words, I shall proceed from the simple, to the complex. But in war, more than in any other subject, we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole. For here, more than elsewhere, the part and the whole must always be thought of together. Definition, let's define what war is. I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic literary definition of war, but go straight to the heart of the matter, to the duel.

War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will. His immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. will. Force to counter opposing force equips itself with the inventions of art and science. Attached to force are certain self-imposed imperceptible limitations, hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom. But they scarcely weaken it. Force, that is,

physical force. For moral force has no existence, save as expressed in the state and the law. Is thus the means of war? To impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object, we must render the enemy powerless. And that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself. So one was the introduction, two, definition. Three, the maximum use of force. Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed. And might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war.

Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy and must be exposed. War is such a dangerous business that the mistakes, which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use

of the intellect. If one side force, if one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand.

That side will force the other to follow suit. Each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterposes inherent in war. This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile, even wrong, to try and shut one's eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality. If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another. These are the forces that give rise to war. The same forces circumscribe and moderate it. They themselves, however, are not part of war. They already exist before fighting starts.

To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. Two different motives make men fight one another, hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the latter, since it is the universal element. Even the most savage, almost instinctive, passion of hatred cannot be conceived as existing without hostile intent. But hostile intentions are often unaccompanied by any sort of hostile feelings. At least by none, that predominate. Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples by the mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant circumstances, institutions, and so forth.

The difference, therefore, does not operate in every case, but it does in most of them. Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with passionate hatred for each other. Consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments, and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces. Comparative figures of their strength would be enough. that would be a kind of war by algebra theorists

were already beginning to think along such lines when the recent wars taught them a lesson if war is an act of force the emotions cannot fail to be involved war may not spring from them but they will still affect it to some degree and the extent to which they do so will depend not on the level of civilization,

but on how important the conflicting interests are, and on how long their conflict lasts. If then civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and has taught the most effective ways of using force than the crude expression of instinct.

The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war. The thesis then must be repeated. War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. force. Each side therefore compels its opponent to follow suit. A reciprocal action is started, which must lead in theory to extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the first extreme we meet with. Number four. What do you guys think so far? Pretty in depth, right? I thought so. Number four, the aim is to disarm the enemy. I have already said that the aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy,

and it is time to show that at least in theory, this is bound to be so. If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must not, of course, be merely transient, at least not an appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in, but would wait for things to improve. Any change that might be brought about by continuing hostilities must then, at least in theory, be of a kind to bring the enemy still greater disadvantages. The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defensive.

Consequently, if you are to force the enemy by making war on him, To do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless, or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. It follows then that to overcome the enemy or disarm him, call it what you will, must always be the aim of warfare. Let's read that last sentence again. It follows then that to overcome the enemy or disarm him must always be the aim of warfare. So what is the aim of warfare always? To overcome or disarm your enemy. War, however, is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass.

Total non-resistance would be no war at all. But always the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war, as formulated here, must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, there is, interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent, I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I am not in control. He dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. This is the second case of interaction, and it leads to the second extreme. Number five, the maximum exertion of strength.

If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter, though not exclusively, of figures and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it. Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy's power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly. That is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemies,

or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible. But the enemy will do the same. Competition will again result. And in pure theory, it must again force you both to extremes. This is the third case of interaction and the third extreme. Number six. Modifications in practice. Thus in the field of abstract thought, the inquiring mind can never rest until it reaches the extreme.

For here it is dealing with an extreme. A clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own. From a pure concept of war, you might try to, deduce absolute terms for the objective. You should aim at and for the means of achieving it. But if you did so, the continuous interaction would land you in extremes that represented nothing but a play of the imagination issuing from an almost invisible sequence of logical subtleties. If we were to think purely in absolute terms, we could avoid every difficulty by a stroke of the pen and proclaim with inflexible logic that, since the extreme must always be the goal, the greatest effort must always be exerted.

Any such pronouncement would be an abstraction and would leave the real world quite unaffected. Even assuming this extreme effort to be an absolute quantity that could easily be calculated, one must admit that the human mind is unlikely to consent to being ruled by such a logical fantasy. It would often result in strength being wasted, which is contrary to other principles of state craft. An effort of will, out of all proportion to the object in view, would be needed, but would not in fact be realized, since subtleties of logic do not motivate the human will.

But move from the abstract to the real world, and the whole thing looks quite different. In the abstract world, was all powerful and forced us to assume that both parties to the conflict not only sought perfection but attained it. Would this ever be the case in practice? Yes, it would if a war were a wholly isolated act occurring suddenly and not produced by previous events in the political world. B, it consisted of a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones. C, the decision achieved was complete and perfect in itself, uninfluenced by any previous estimate of the political situation it would bring about.

All right. Number seven. War is never an isolated act. As to the first of these conditions, it must be remembered that neither opponent is an abstract person to the other, not even to the extent of the factor in the power of resistance, namely the way. will, which is dependent on externals. The will is not a wholly unknown factor. We can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today. War never breaks out wholly unexpected, nor can it be spread instantaneously. Each side can therefore gauge the other to large extent by what he is and does. instead of judging him by what he, strictly speaking, ought to do or be. Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides alike and therefore constitute a moderating force. Number eight.

War does not consist of a single short. short blow. The second condition calls for the following remarks. If war consisted of one decisive act or of a set of simultaneous decisions, preparations would tend toward totality, for no omission could ever be rectified. The sole criterion for preparations which the world of reality could provide would be the measures taken by the adversary, so far as they are known. The rest would once more be reduced to abstract calculations. But if the decisions in war consist of several successive acts, then each of them, seen in context, will provide a gauge for those that follow. Here again, the abstract world is ousted by the real one, and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated.

But of course, if all the means available were, or, could be simultaneously employed, all wars would automatically be confined to a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones. The reason being that any adverse decision must reduce the sum of the means available. And if all had been committed in the first act, there could really be no question of a second. Any subsequent military operation would virtually be part of the first. In other words, merely an extension of it. Yet, as I showed above, as soon as preparations for a war begin, the world of reality takes over from the world of abstract thought. Material calculations take the place of hypothetical

extremes, and if for no other reason, the interaction of the two sides tends to fall short of maximum effort. Their full resources will therefore not be mobilized immediately. Besides, the very nature of those resources and of their employment means they cannot all be deployed at the same moment. The resources in question are the fighting forces proper, the country, with its physical features and population and its allies. The country, its physical features and population is more than just the source of all armed forces proper, it is in itself an integral element among the factors at work in war. Though only that part, which is the actual theater of operations or has a notable influence on it, it is possible, no doubt, to use a mobile fighting

forces simultaneously, but the fortresses, rivers, mountains, inhabitants, and so forth that cannot be done, not in short, with the country as a whole, unless it is so small that the opening action of the war completely engulfs it. Furthermore, allies do not cooperate at the mere desire of those who are actively engaged in fighting. International relations, being what they are, such cooperation is often furnished only at some later stage, or increased only when a balance has been disturbed and needs correction. In many cases, the proportion of the means of resistance that cannot immediately be brought to bear is much higher than might at first be thought. Even when great strength has been expended on the first decision and the balance has been

badly upset, equilibrium can be restored. the point will be more fully treated in due course. At this stage, it is enough to show that the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces. To be sure, the fact in itself cannot be grounds for making any but a maximum effort to obtain the first decision. For a defeat is always a disadvantage. no one would deliberately risk. And even if the first clash is not the only one, the influence it has on subsequent actions

will be on a scale proportionate to its own. But it is contrary to human nature to make an extreme effort, and the tendency, therefore, is always to plead that a decision may be possible later on. As a result, for the first decision, effort and concentration of forces are not all they might be.

Anything omitted out of weakness by one side becomes a real objective reason for the other to reduce its efforts. And the tendency toward extremes is once again reduced by this interaction. Number nine. In war, the result is never final. Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. the defeated state often considers the outcome merely a transitory evil for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slack intentions and reduce the vigor of the effort. Number 10. The probabilities of real life replace the extreme and the absolute required by theory. warfare thus eludes the strict theoretical requirements that extremes of force be applied

once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made and this can only be based on the phenomena of the real world and the laws of probability. Once the antagonists have ceased to be mere figments of a theory and become actual states and governments, when war is no longer a theoretical affair but a series of actions, obeying its own peculiar laws, reality supplies the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead. From the enemy's character, from his institutions, the state of his affairs, and his general situation. Each side, using the laws of probability,

forms an estimate of its opponent's likely course and acts accordingly. Number 11. The political object now comes to the fore again. A subject which we last considered in Section 2 now forces itself on us again. Namely, the political object, object of the war. Hitherto it had been rather overshadowed by the law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless. But as this law begins to lose its force, and as the determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. If it is all a

calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object which was the original motive must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you. The smaller the effort he makes, the less you need make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it, the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you may. must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified. The political object, the original motive for the war, will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of

measurement. Since we are dealing with realities, not with abstractions, it can do so only, in the context of the two states at war. The same political object can elicit differing reactions from different peoples, and even from the same people at different times. We can, therefore, take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move. The nature of those forces, therefore, calls for study. depending on whether their characteristics increase or diminish the drive toward a peculiar action,

the outcome will vary. Between two peoples and two states, there can be such tensions, such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a wholly disproportionate effect, a real explosion. This is equally true of the efforts, a political, object is expected to arouse in either state and of the military objectives which their policies require. Sometimes, the political and military objective is the same. For example, the conquest of a province. In other cases, the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and, symbolize it in the peace negotiations.

But here, too, attention must be paid to the character of each state involved. There are times when if the political object is to be achieved, the substitute must be a good deal more important. The less involved the population and the less serious the strains within states and between them, the more political requirements in themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive. Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant. Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion. This will be all the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus, it follows that without any inconsistency, wars can have all done.

degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination, down to simple armed observation. This brings us to a different question, which now needs to be analyzed and answered. All right, ladies and gentlemen, there's 11 points right there from our good friend Mr. Carl von Klauschwitz. Let me go ahead and just give you the key points again so you can have them fresh in your mind is you go through your today and you go through your battles today and you win the wars on your mind today we're all in wars we're always in some sort of psychological war with ourselves with people around us even if you know let's define war as as a battle of ideas because we're in that war. We're all trying to win the battle of ideas. We're all trying to make people around us

better. We're all trying to make, hopefully, we're all trying to make people we love have a better life. And we're trying to make all our life better at the same time. And in order to do that, sometimes you have to have a battle of ideas with yourself and you have to win that war. So if you understand what war is, I'm hoping that these key points will, in fact, help you understand what we do in our daily lives and what the countries around us are doing. I'm hopeful that brings some insight to me. This is part one. We have another 12 points to go through.

So we'll call this the part one. Let me give you the key points though. And then you can just have those as a kind of a refresher. And here's what we went over. We defined war as an active force to compel our enemy to do our will. We went through some key points in the maximum use of, force. We went through the aim is to disarm the enemy. The maximum exertion of strength. We went through modifications in practice. We went through the fact war is never an isolated

incident. War does not consist of a single short blow. In war, the result is never final. The probabilities of real life replace the extreme and the absolute required by theory. The political object now comes to the flow again. And that's where we left off, ladies and gentlemen. Let me ask you a question. Who loves you? Who loves you, baby? I do. It's me. George that loves you. All right. Use these the best you can. Aloha.