Unchained - How the Greatest Decentralizing Force for Crypto Projects Is the SEC - Ep.278
Episode Date: October 5, 2021How does the SEC determine if a token is a security? Why is DeFi particularly hard to regulate? What will regulators do about stablecoins? On Unchained, Greg Xethalis, chief compliance officer at Mult...icoin Capital, and Collins Belton, founding partner at Brookwood P.C., dive into crypto regulation, discussing securities laws, DeFi regulation, and why the US should be promoting stablecoins rather than trying to shut them down. Highlights: why the SEC and CFTC have not announced bigger crypto enforcement news at the end of their fiscal years why the SEC is going after DINO (decentralized in name only) companies what the Howey and Reves tests areand how the SEC uses themto determine whether an asset is a security or not why Collins and Greg think the SEC has recently begun been applying Reves more often why they think centralized crypto lending products should not be considered securities under the Howey test whether new legislation needs to be written for cryptocurrency-based products what makes Collins think the SEC is being “disingenuous” regarding the SEC registration process for crypto companies, like Coinbase how regulators will end up handling DeFi and why both Greg and Collins are long-term optimistic how the US government has a “great history” of respecting privacy and encryption why regulatory pressure is likely to build up around centralized crypto exchanges and what we can learn from the EtherDelta case why Collins thinks most cryptocurrency companies should be regulated why the SEC is the best motivator for forcing protocols to fully decentralize how smart contracts could theoretically be used to standardize SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce’s Safe Harbor proposal how blockchain data makes cryptocurrency companies more transparent and easier to regulate than centralized entities what Collins and Greg think will happen with stablecoin regulation going forward why the US should be pushing to make dollar-pegged stablecoins more prominent Take the Unchained survey! Have idea son how we can improve at Unchained? Let us know. This is the last week in which you can take the Unchained survey and be entered to win a BTC Candle. Be sure to end by EOD Friday. We'll be announcing the winners in next week's show. https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/unchained2021 Thank you to our sponsors! Crypto.com: https://crypto.onelink.me/J9Lg/unconfirmedcardearnfeb2021 Nodle: https://bit.ly/3AXGydJ Episode Links Greg Xethalis Twitter: https://twitter.com/xethalis LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/xethalis/ Collins Belton Twitter: https://twitter.com/collins_belton LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/collins-belton-10226283/ Cases Mentioned SEC charged DeFi Money Market https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/08/06/sec-charges-so-called-defi-company-for-allegedly-fraudulent-30m-offering/ SEC charged EtherDelta https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2018/11/08/sec-charges-etherdelta-founder-over-unregistered-securities-exchange/ Howey Test and Reves Test https://securities-law-blog.com/2014/11/25/what-is-a-security-the-howey-test-and-reves-test/ https://skrypto.sewkis.com/howeys-cousin-reves-may-be-another-way-for-the-sec-to-argue-that-tokens-are-securities https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2021/09/coinbase-and-the-sec-.html DINO https://twitter.com/hesterpeirce/status/1423637816492318722?lang=en -uniswap-labs-investigation-could-signal-a-new-era-of-enforcement Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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Welcome to Unchained,
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Today's guest is Greg X. Avalis, General Counsel at Multicoin, and Collins Belton, founding partner at
Brookwood PC. Welcome, Greg and Collins.
Thanks for having us.
Thanks, Laura.
So we are recording on Friday, October 1st, and yesterday was the last day of the SEC and CFTC's
fiscal year.
And I think a lot of lawyers in this face and I also were expecting that there might be some
enforcement actions.
And there were, but they were kind of small and not like super worth diving into.
And in a big way, we could touch on them.
But I'm curious, Greg and Collins, if you.
have an opinion as to why we didn't see any big enforcement actions from these regulators?
Well, I think from my perspective, I mean, the federal government is typically pretty good
about keeping a close lid on enforcement actions as they're going on, in particular,
where they stand. Sometimes you'll hear about information sweeps or things will leak out,
but it's typically not in the interest of parties who are being investigated or for the
prosecutors themselves to have things come out in the open.
And obviously, there are a lot of really complex issues that don't necessarily always
fit neatly into a calendar.
I think, yeah, a little surprise that the closest thing we had to a major crypto action
or settlement was a relatively de minimis settlement with Cracken regarding their margin
trading program, as well as a handful of action.
that appeared to be only tangentially related to crypto from the CFTC.
So a little surprising.
It's interesting.
You say that too, Greg, because I think one of the other things that we maybe don't
appreciate as lawyers in the space, too, is that there was some movement.
One, I think on the DMM and DMG case, I think for a lot of us in crypto, we didn't
view that as that impactful because the view was that's not really, you know, defy.
But at the same time, I think, you know, maybe there's an internal view.
that that's setting, you know, some major precedent for them potentially being able to pursue
defy. And then I think, you know, the other interesting thing, which, you know, has obviously
been in the news and we probably can talk about specifics here, given client confidentiality,
but just generally speaking, I think it's pretty well known that there's been, you know,
a slew of investigative kind of requests and not necessarily subpoenas, but just, hey,
we're looking into this space. And I do think that that may, you know, be a bit more of a blitz
than what people appreciate. So perhaps it's just that this year, a lot of the attention
was more privately focused rather than publicly focused is at least one theory I had.
And, Collins, just to make sure all listeners are on the same page, tell us what the DMM and
DMG cases were.
Oh, sure.
So the DMM and DMG cases, I think it stood for decentralized money management or something.
That was the ticker for the two tokens.
And it essentially was, you know, ostensibly promoting itself as kind of like a yield
farming, yield aggregation play.
So for those that are kind of familiar with defy, you may be aware of that, but for those that aren't in very, very simple terms, they were essentially telling people that they had a programmatic way for people to deposit money and then have it be essentially managed on a non-custodial basis in order to generate returns.
That obviously raises questions generally in the legal industry, but in particular, the issue here was that, one, these folks were not actually using, you know, programmatic enforcement or any type of non-custodial mechanism.
They were, you know, just committing fraud, taking folks money and then managing it themselves.
And then secondly, they actually weren't actually managing that.
But the important or potentially important thing is that at least the SEC framed it as,
hey, this is a defy offering.
And we're going after it because we think the tokens themselves are securities.
One is an equity security.
One has a note under that Reeves analysis.
I know we talked about that a few weeks ago.
We'll get into that.
And then they also layered in the fact that there was fraud.
and or, you know, some type of deception.
So that latter part is what I think was really material,
but the former part was really important because it suggested, you know,
two really important things.
One, they're obviously looking at what they think is defy.
And two, they're now looking at securities that go beyond just the Howey test.
I think that was the first or maybe second time we saw in a settlement or an enforcement action
where they explicitly referenced Reeves.
Greg, correct me if I'm wrong, I think that was the first or second time in a formal order
for digital assets where they referenced it.
I think that's right.
It had previously been discussed at least one of the trio of no action letters that came
out in 2019.
I think it may have been pocketful of quarters, had potentially a Reeves discussion, or
turnkey.
It was one of the two.
But, yeah, I think it's reflective of our two definitions of decentralized in name only.
This was an example where I think a lot of.
of people in the space, pointed at that action and said, well, this is not really defy.
It's, this is decentralized in name only, in that they are literally just putting decentralized
on the name, whereas that same term of Dino was used again in congressional hearings,
I think a couple of weeks ago, to refer, and I think perhaps by a couple of folks,
including Chair Gensler, to refer to decentralized.
projects that perhaps vary on some gradation of actual decentralization, but he taking the
perspective that these were not really decentralized in significant material ways.
Yeah, and I think for the DMM and DMG cases, those are the ones, as you said, they were called
decentralized a name only, but I noticed that SEC Commissioner has her purse also called them that.
And I don't know if she coined the phrase or not, but clearly there is at least somebody at a high level in the SEC who makes the difference between projects like that versus ones that are legitimately either decentralized or trying to be.
You know, I'm not sure what her view is on that. So we've mentioned this Reeves case a few times. And I just want to make sure people understand what that is and why that's significant. As you said, this was brought up in the context as another way to,
you know, look at this question of whether or not a token is a security. So after the Howey Test,
so can you give us a sense of what that case says and then how it would apply here?
Ernst & Young versus Reeves, I should say, Reeves versus Ernst & Young, I should say.
A Supreme Court case from, I think, 1990, that addressed sort of a fundamental issue of whether
or not a note is a security. And to put some context in that, there are a number of federal
securities laws. The three that we probably think most about when we're talking about
what is the definition of a security would be the 1933 Act, the Securities Act, the Securities
Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940, together with the Investment Advisors Act
Act of 1940. The 33 and 34 Acts have fundamentally the same definition of security, and it
lists out a litany of different types, from the standard stuff like equity to the more flexible
definitions like investment contracts that everyone in the crypto space is very familiar with,
thanks to the Howie Test, which is how courts will interpret whether a particular scheme is an investment
contract. Reeves takes a look at a different set of that definition, which is notes, and in some
cases, some might try and also apply it to evidence of indebtedness, which are codified as
types of securities. And there's an explicit presumption that a note is a security, unless it
fits certain families of notes that are known to be more commercial in nature than investment in
nature. So in the Reeves case, the court set out a slew of a slew of, a slew of,
of categories, I think it was seven or eight categories that were called families of commercial
arrangements. And if your specific instrument, your note, was within those seven families of
commercial non-security notes, they would not be deemed to be a security. For ones that were not
clearly within those seven families, the court established a test that looked at four different
categories on a balancing test. So in Howie, it's three or four, depending on how you want to look at
the definition, three or four prongs, and all of them must be satisfied to be a security, whereas
in Reeves, it's a balancing test. It's not quite as algorithmic. And those things, those factors that
you look at are the motivation of the seller and the buyer in the transaction. Is it commercial
in nature? Is it investment in nature? The plan of distribution of the instrument.
Is it being broadly distributed to the public or is it more specific and bilateral or closely distributed?
The reasonable expectations of the investing public would people think of it as a security?
And the presence of an alternative regulatory regime, which is probably the most important one that we look at in a lot of cases for the crypto community.
is, is there an alternative regulatory regime that applies that would make something that might
otherwise be a note or a security note, rather, I should say, into something that would be viewed
as a non-security?
And so what do you think the SEC is doing by now applying Reeves a few times here?
Like if you're kind of reading the tea leaves, what would you say is maybe the next evolution
in their application of existing case?
I guess it is to the crypto space.
Well, I think that, you know, and I'll let Collins way in here,
but I think, you know, we've looked at where they're applying it,
and it's often been in these lending type of programs
where we've also seen action on the state level.
And while the initial actions that were targeted at BlockFi
from New Jersey and Alabama and Texas and Kentucky or Vermont,
I can't recall which,
A lot of that focused on Howie, but a few of the states, particularly Texas, also referenced Reeves.
And I think some of the conversation around it targets Reeves in no small part because some of these relationships do look a little bit more like a debt relationship than an investment into an enterprise.
So I don't know, Collins, if you want to chime in on that.
Yeah, I mean, I definitely agree.
I think where I'm expecting to see it most applied or most trotted out is going to be in the context of the type of lending or potentially, I wouldn't call it necessarily re-hypothication, but re-hypublication-like activities.
I think those are probably the most prominent areas where they'll look to raise it in the defy context.
Now, obviously, for centralized entities, and it goes to a point that you raise, Laura, I think it's in some ways sometimes easier to make that argument from,
at least the government's perspective, as I view it, because it's a lot easier to say,
hey, you've got somebody who's taking in this capital who may either be managing it
or at least be, you know, subjecting that capital to whatever other downstream flows are in their business.
And, you know, like Greg was talking about the 33 Act, the 34 Act, the 40 Acts,
all of those are, you know, largely predicated on the existence of intermediaries
and how we either want to constrain their behavior or prescribe some type of behavior that they should be taking.
And so when you've got those traditional actors, I think, you know, mapping that framework on is a little bit easier.
For the same reason, I think you start to see why the distinctions that folks like Hester and some in the crypto community want to make between kind of a truly decentralized protocol versus a CD5 protocol or a semi-centralized protocol is really material.
Because in the absence of those intermediaries, some of the questions and the natures of the questions potentially change.
And maybe normatively they should is what I think a lot of.
if people want to argue on the policy side.
Okay, so let's actually just focus the next part of the discussion on things that are obviously
centralized, which would be lending products from companies like BlockFi or Celsius or this
proposed product from Coinbase called Coinbase Lent, which they ended up deciding not to
pursue because the SEC threatened to sue them that they did.
So when you look at those, what's your opinion? Do those look like securities to you,
according to this precedent that we've discussed here? Or would you say it looks like something
different and maybe it's not a security? So I'm going to preface this just by saying I did,
I've previously worked with some of the folks. So I can't necessarily speak on their particular
business models. But I guess I would generally say,
I think that if there is an argument on the securities law side of things,
it's not fruitful from my perspective to focus on the notes or certificate of indebtedness
or investment contract analysis.
I think what,
and I think my public position has generally been shoehorning in these assets and to those tests
is not the appropriate way to do so.
At the same time,
you know,
I'm happy to concede particularly with some of the arrangements that I've seen and not
with these three particular companies,
but others that I've,
you know,
talk to over the years or seen in their business models, I'll definitely concede that I think
some of these models will almost certainly constitute securities, but not because they are
an evidence of indebtedness to a company or not because it's a note-like investment that
traditionally falls in those categories. And I don't think it even is one of these things where
they're necessarily managing people's money in the way that we would expect an equity contract.
I think the more appropriate way, and this is where I really struggle with the SEC's approach
right now is to say, look, we've got, like Greg said, a litany of definitions here. I mean,
it's like 30 or 40 definitions, two of which are things like participation in a profit sharing
scheme or things like an asset back security or a bond. Those three categories are much more
appropriate to discuss. And, you know, participation in a profit sharing scheme have sometimes
relied on the Howie test, which is why I think that it shows why treating those as equity
instruments is probably not the right move. But I would say it's a harder argument to say,
say something like a central entity issuing you a receipt and that entitles you to some coupon payment
in the future doesn't look like a bond or doesn't look like some type of asset back security,
but that's going to require that they build out the jurisprudence and the case law.
And I think that's important for us to push because if we're saying, hey, we want guidance,
we want clarity, where are the lines, what are we looking to do, them saying, hey, we're going to shoehorn it into this test.
That doesn't really fit either of these parameters, but you guys should just figure it out is not appropriate,
especially if you've got a large institution that's looking to follow our laws, that's registered
publicly, that's reaching out to them, at a certain point you might have to say, look, it's incumbent
on us as the rulemaker.
We have rulemaking authority to start expanding our previous guidance and start applying,
you know, our frameworks to existing definitions.
So that's generally my perspective there without necessarily taking a view on any of those
three products.
Yeah, I think I'm sort of in the same boat with Collins as I've done a little work in the
space in the past, so I don't want to go too deep on specifics. At the same time, one thing
that I think it's worthwhile to note is this isn't the only scheme out there. Crypto is the only
industry that has relationships like this. For example, within the investable asset market,
you have securities lending programs that are operated by broker dealers, and you have
commodity rehypothecation that's operated by a number of commodity warehouse storage facilities
where you do have, you know, custodians who are rehypothicating and utilizing underlying
assets outside of a bank framework and outside of a securities framework. And I think one of the
things that you do look at there, and perhaps it is returning it to Reeves, is what's basically
the purpose of the relationship. Does it look like a commercial relationship or does it look like
an investment relationship? And it's a nice reminder that all of these lending programs are not
created and structured in the same way. So we've got two prominent programs from reasonably well
regulated U.S. exchanges. Coinbase proposed their lend product. Gemini and Genesis trading have
the earned facility that is actually a situation where Gemini customers lend to Genesis
and it's facilitated by Gemini. But those are programs that you could make an argument is
a add-on to a relationship that is principally commercial in nature, the custodial relationship,
the exchange business relationship that was pre-existing. And this starts to look
a little bit more like securities lending or commodities rehypification, it's a little different
when the entire purpose of the scheme and the arrangement is to facilitate this interest-bearing account.
So I think there are some distinctions, which may create some nuance, but I otherwise agree with
Collins that it's not apples to apples when we're trying to look at what these products
should be weighed against versus something like an ICO where I think Howie is really probably
a pretty appropriate court doctrine to look for.
And then would you agree with Collins?
And correct me, Collins, if I don't summarize your position accurately.
But it seems like you were saying that you felt that there should just be new legislation
to deal with these new types of products that maybe aren't covered by existing regulation.
Well, no, not even necessarily new legislation.
Like the definitions that I described to you are already included in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
The reason why the SEC prefers to default to an investment contract or a note is there's established case law.
And there are two reasons why that's important.
One, there's a roadmap for them to follow that can reuse prior work.
And that really does matter for lawyers.
If you don't aim to recreate the wheel every time.
But the second is that extending case law or getting new case law can be a bit of a risky business, particularly for a regulatory body.
because if they are wrong, then it establishes precedent that many, many other people in the industry may want to follow and it may, you know, incentivize behavior that they may want to dissuade. Now, obviously, there's a question as to whether they should, you know, want to dissuade behavior that a judicial body has determined is legal. But regardless, you know, administrative bodies are still political organs and they are impacted by both political realities, but also just administrative priorities. So I think that it's not necessarily promulgating new laws. I certainly think we should be
during that in some areas.
But to be frank, for a lot of the securities law matters,
I don't necessarily think that's needed.
And this is kind of important.
Again, I'm assuming we're still all focused
on the centralized components here.
Yeah.
I think in the decentralized context is a bit different.
But one of the things that we've been talking about,
and it really frustrates me that it's not more publicly known,
is that a lot of these exchanges, I don't think their problem is,
hey, these are securities and we don't want to offer securities.
For the most part, in practice,
for the end user and even for the exchanges for most of management other than the compliance
function, it's not really going to be a huge difference for them, whether they're issuing
like this asset from a BD entity or a money transmitter. They're going to have very similar
requirements in terms of customer identification. Now, yes, there are other obligations that will
apply to a securities entity that may not apply to a money transmitter. But at the end of the day,
for the most part, your customers, they're not really exposed to that. And maybe a little bit more
data collection. And even internally, most of the stakeholders aren't exposed that. It's just, you
additional compliance cause. So what frustrates me is that Coinbase has a broker dealer.
And as does do many other U.S. entities, the reason why they can't offer these products right now
is not because they're intransigent and don't want to like offer any security. Like for them
would be the same thing. At the end of the day, right? Like I come to Coinbase or you just redirect
me to Coinbase securities. I sign up the same account. You have the same information. It's not going
to be a huge difference to me either way. And then I can get my lend product. The reason why they can't is
actually because the SEC also won't allow FINRA to approve crypto custodians as BDs.
So we have broker dealers that are in the crypto business, but none or at least none that are
currently active that I'm aware of as of this month that are allowed to essentially fully satisfy
a certain set of rules that apply to broker dealers at custody securities. And so we're in this
weird catch-22 where we have people that are saying, hey, I'm willing to register and be this,
you know, regulated entity, go ahead and regulate me. And I bought an entity.
for ready to go once you approve the license.
And the SEC is saying, yeah, hold off.
We're not sure.
But also this is a security, so you need a securities entity.
It's a very bizarre situation.
And I think it's a very important point because I see so many people with these takes of,
oh, these guys don't want to follow the law or something.
And it's like, Coinbase brought this broker dealer, I think in like 2019 with the
expectation of being able to offer crypto securities.
And it's just been almost three years with no approval.
So I think it's a bit disingenuous when I hear Gary and many other.
other folks saying, hey, come and talk to us.
When it's like, hey, they haven't just talked to you.
They bought a BD.
They put it through the licensure process.
And now they've just been waiting for two years.
It's very disingenuous to put it like everyone's shooting from the hip because we're
in tech or something like that.
And I think it wasn't even just one.
I think they actually bought a couple of BDs.
I think it's a two or three.
It was two or three around, all in 2018 or 2019.
And I think it's been a significant point of frustration, you know,
I'm not a broker-dealer lawyer, but some of the BD lawyers in the space, I think one remarked to me that she had something like 50 clients in the pipeline trying to get the ball moved forward with FINRA and the SEC, which is not to say that there aren't some tough issues.
But when we look at the industry and the criticism of the industry that sometimes takes place, the level of intractability of this system.
to quickly adopt, or adapt, I should say, to what's happening in the market.
It's not just on the companies that are building.
It's also in the need to have a regulatory environment that responsibly promotes responsible innovation.
Yeah, actually, just listening to you guys talk, it made me think, and this is just me guessing,
I have done no reporting into this other than just talking to crypto lawyers.
I mean, I haven't spoken to anyone at the SEC or anything like that.
But just listening to this, it makes me think, oh, it's probably just they haven't figured out how they want to regulate the space.
And so they're just trying to keep people in a holding pattern.
What do you think of that theory?
I mean, I think it's right.
But, I mean, that's problematic when you're publicly saying to people come in or register and do it the right way, people go to do it.
And you say, okay, we'll get back to you in three to five years.
That's, it's not reasonable.
And so that's why it's like, it's extremely frustrating sometimes to see some of the statements publicly as though everyone in crypto is running around dodging clients.
And I can definitely, you know, kind of co-sign what Greg has said.
I mean, two years ago, I knew somebody saying that, and maybe it's the same person.
And they had, you know, 20 or 30 people waiting.
So I can only imagine that the list has grown.
I've talked to FINRA about this issue.
I've had people talk to the SEC.
It's not like, it's strange when you talk to them.
and there's almost like a,
it's almost like a sympathetic recognition.
Like, hey, we get it.
We're working really hard.
I would appreciate that if,
but for the fact that you,
you know,
you turn on the news and you've got somebody saying,
hey,
these guys don't want to comply.
And it's like,
what's going on?
And let's not,
let's not,
you know,
understate the reality here.
A significant swath of crypto actors
are probably not great actors
and we should be cleaning these folks up.
But that's the thing, right?
If we were focused on them,
we could do that.
And what,
you know,
what I guess I'll end my,
little miniran here, which by saying it's funny because sometimes I see people say, like,
oh, like 90% or 95% of these are valueless. Well, first of all, you know, I don't think
the hit rate in regular startup is that much higher. But secondly, you know, at this point,
there's 30,000 plus companies. That's still 3,000 companies that are valid. Like, that's,
that's a huge amount of companies with tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people
working for them. It's no longer like, oh, hey, you've got 12 legitimate actors and 50 million
bad actors. It's like even if you want to take the most draconian, you know, 95%, 99% of people
are bad actors, that's still hundreds of companies, almost as much as the Fortune 500.
So at this point, I think it's a little, like I said, it's frustrating to have the condescension
when people are acting in good faith, and there's a wide swath of actors that are trying to make
that outreach. I was just going to say, Laura, first off, you know, completely agree with what
Colin said, and there is a degree of frustration and not just with the slow progress, but also
the narrative that's being created around it. What I don't want us to lose sight of is there also
are a lot of people who are working very hard on both the political side as well as on the
regulatory side, people working within these regulatory bodies. We're taking great pains to
actually understand and try, the difference is that that doesn't always lead to policy or
affirmative movement that actually allows innovation to occur here in the U.S. So one of our
continuing themes of concern over the course of 2021 is, is this the year that more and more of
crypto gets pushed outside of the U.S., both on a development side and also on a market side?
the number of opportunities for participation in this exciting new ecosystem gets smaller and smaller.
You know, Collins can probably speak better to what we saw yesterday with geo-blocking.
And I know we're still on C-Fi, but when we get to D-Fi talking about what's going on with geo-blocking of USIPs.
And, you know, it's a shame.
And I think it's important that we work to elevate the parties in the regulatory apparatus or the political apparatus who are working to, again, try and promote reasonable and responsible regulation and to be able to foster a crypto ecosystem here in the U.S.
Yeah. So why don't we discuss Defi actually momentarily? Because we're halfway through the show. But first, a quick word from the sponsors who make this show possible.
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Back to my conversation with Greg and Collins.
So there's so much more to be said even just about the centralized crypto world.
But let's talk about defy because I feel like that's really probably the major issue here.
What would you say is, so in a way, I almost feel like a lot of this discussion is subtext for what's going on in defy.
Like when you look at what's happening with the regulators and where things are going, what do you think is going to be the regulatory stance toward defy?
I can start or Greg do you want to start since I've talked a lot on the last question and I can concede the
Go ahead Collins because I know you have opinions on this.
No I think my one-liner response is not great Bob.
No, I mean, I actually long term I actually am more optimistic than I think one, most people probably are to my public posting probably suggest.
And I guess I'll preface it's all by saying.
And sometimes I think people think that I'm like despondent,
but it's really more so that I think we have flawed.
I mean, incredibly flawed.
I mean, this is coming from me.
Like my family's history is mired in the flaws in our country.
So I'm no oligist for American history.
But while it's flawed, I think we have one of the best arguments for constantly aiming to hold truth to power.
And that's because we've structured.
a system that ostensibly gives the people as much power as you might see in the modern world.
Now, that's probably more loaded despite the amount of caveats I tried to add here.
But I think I preface what I'm about to say with that just because I think there's this view in crypto,
like all governments are bunk.
We've got to burn everything.
Nothing will ever get done.
I'm actually not that guy.
And so for most people would think I'm like a cyberpunk, I may lose some bona fides with them.
I genuinely think society has been like a pretty good improvement on the human condition.
And I think American society, despite its flaws, has been a pretty good upgrade in large part because we've had this strong respect for privacy rights and freedom of expression.
And so right now, we do have a lot of people pushing back.
There's a combination, there's confidence people that are objectively worried.
The old world is changing on them.
It seems crazy and novel.
There's real criticism and concern.
Like you've got a bunch of people flipping God knows what and people running around laughing at people to stay poor.
Probably not a great look.
And there's a host of other things that really are causing anxieties about the rise of crypto.
And I think that's translating into our policy bodies.
But we're also starting to see like I think, I think Greg, you raised this, we're starting to see some of the politicians saying, all right, hold on, hold on.
Maybe we don't have to have a knee jerk on this.
Part of that's because crypto people are starting to wield their political influence.
But part of it is because I think some of these folks like Ron White and other people were around for the dawn of the internet.
And they said, look, this was really important to us.
Not only did it help boost our economy, it significantly, you know, in large part, helped with our domestic and foreign policy, you know, spreading our foreign policy.
And I think in crypto, we're starting to see some people recognize the same things.
And so this is a long-winded way of saying immediately in the near term, yeah, there's going to be a lot of friction, particularly on derivatives, lending, those types of things, because they are both the most disruptive to the traditional system and can bring the most gain to people, which means it can displace some of the traditional incumbents.
But they do objectively represent some of the more dangerous aspects of things, too.
Because as we've seen today, right, like if you take society general is now, you know, putting in assets to be collateralized on make.
or doubt. It's huge. It's fantastic. It's like something that we've all been waiting to see for a while.
Even as like a defy maximalist, love to see defy being able to be bridging to the real life.
That said, you can imagine in the future where you've got that or something like that built on top of
spell and then those things are being lent out on something like sushi's bento box and then
bento box is being used with cream. And somewhere downstream, something breaks and suddenly some pension fund
is out $30 million because society general invested in something. Now this isn't to scare them off
from their maker investment. That's not possible today. This is years in the making. But I think
all of those things are now at the floor where people are saying, look, we've got to address this.
But I'm optimistic that the long-term view is going to be a lot of pain. And ultimately,
just like the internet, decentralized tech will not be stopped. And disruptive technology
traditionally shapes or forces society to shape itself around it versus the other way around.
So to me, this was always coming.
You know, in 2018, I moved my stuff from centralized exchanges.
In 2019, I largely tried to stop using stable coins with more than the options.
Now we've got decentralized options.
I think people need to prepare for the next two to three years before people realize,
hey, there's a world where, at least in America, I think America in particular, but generally across the world,
we've got a unique governmental body that respects privacy rights, that respects freedom of expression.
And this technology really helps to codify that.
if we do it right, we can actually leverage it to continue to spread a lot of our ideals,
which is probably important in a time where, like, your position as a hegemon is consistently under
assault. So I think it's a long-winded way of saying it's going to be painful in the short
term, but I'm not pessimistic that truly decentralized protocols won't have a lasting position
in American and global society long term.
Okay. So, Greg, give your response. And also, let's bring up this geo-fencing issue because this is maybe some of the short-term pain that Collins mentioned.
Yeah, no. And first, I want to echo what Collins said about the respect for privacy. I know the narrative over the course of the last couple of months, starting with the infrastructure bill. And Abe Sutherland has had a lot of really great thought leadership. He's put out about security.
5500 I, which is the subsection that treats crypto like cash for transaction reporting requirements
and filing forms 8300 with the IRS for every transaction over $10,000.
Despite the fact that in the post-bank Secrecy Act environment, we do have what feels like
a bit of a strangulation of financial privacy, which is, you know, one of the elements that
that defy and crypto in general hopes to ensure for its users.
But at the same time, the U.S. government does still have a great history of respecting
individual privacy or at least aspiring to respect it.
And even if we look at the way encryption is viewed around the globe, the U.S. is still a
pretty darn good actor at respecting the right to encryption, which is in an information era,
probably one of the most important rights we can have.
So I do want to echo that.
I think that's a very great point.
I think that Collins has talked about it recently.
I know it's the tension that I usually point to most in trying to figure out how defy grows in America is when you have a regulatory system that's focused on intermediaries.
not just because they're the best position to be regulated,
but because they are regulated because they are in the best position to oversee
and to bring order to a market.
It is very difficult for a regulatory infrastructure
that has been built up over the course of, in some instances,
basically a century,
for it to move and adapt to a technology
that, you know, seeks to build systems without intermediates.
So we've seen, you know, regulation adapt,
adapt rather, very quickly or reasonably quickly to the Internet.
But this is another step beyond that.
But it's also not a perfect step beyond that.
And it gets to the geo-blocking point is that defy doesn't exist in a vacuum.
It is touched and entered, if you will,
typically through interfaces that by definition are centrally managed.
And I think that in the near term is where we likely see the most tension.
If you're actually looking for an enforcement precedent that directly touched some element of defy,
the best one to look at is the Coburn enforcement action for Ether Delta,
where it was a decentralized exchange in the element that it had decentralized custody.
The website never touched the assets themselves.
At the same time, it served as an interface, and it provided certain Oracle functions
and helped facilitate the matching.
The SEC entered into a settlement order with the founder of Ether Delta, the operator
of Ether Delta, that basically identified.
it as an ATS without identifying what the actual securities that were being transacted,
but that's a separate gripe along the lines of the broker-dealer arguments.
But there the SEC perhaps appropriately looked at, okay, there is a centralized portion
of this that is controlled, that is administered, and even if the custodial portion is a
decentralized thing that we either shouldn't be regulating or that we don't
really understand how best to regulate now, they can look at the interface and say,
okay, we know pretty well how to regulate this. And so when we look at how DFI operates now,
there's, again, varying gradations of how decentralized it actually is on the protocol level,
whether or not there's still administration, whether or not there's effective control,
how we consider governance tokens, how we consider multi-sigs. But there still are typically user
interfaces, they aren't the only way to access these protocols, but for the normal retail user,
you're going to go to a website that's controlled by a central party that serves as a gate
into this protocol. And the question really to me is when we're looking at, is there authority
to regulate these interfaces, are they Verizon or are they Ether Delta? Is it an infrastructure
that isn't providing a unique and important function that is one where you identify it,
not just as a party that's capable of being regulated, but a party that should be regulated.
Is it serving certain surveillance functions that you can't just get out of the transparent
nature of a blockchain environment?
So I think the interfaces are where we're going to see, you know, I don't want to say
battlefront because I hope it would be more collaborative than antagonistic.
but I think that's where we're going to see most of the movement.
I'm going to say something controversial.
I'm so glad you raised that.
Generally, this always surprises people when I say it.
I actually think most of those types of plays probably should be.
Like in the long run, where I would expect this to go is you've got bona fide decentralized protocols,
your uniswops or whatever.
Anyone can plug on top of it, just like anyone can plug on top of HGTPS or something else.
The second you start building a business on top of that is,
when people are probably going to say, all right, well, maybe we are going to regulate you.
And so the options are you either just become a business or you say, okay, look, we don't think
we need to be a business to offer that same functionality. Instead, we think, like you said,
there's maybe a variety of folks that can provide an interface, any of which is interchangeable,
and the sole purpose of which is just to provide access to this underlying protocol.
In that world, I think it's a better policy argument or a better policy discussion to be saying,
all right, maybe all six people, all six of these people can't be in exchange for the same
protocol that this seems a bit strange. On the flip side, yes, if you're the only way that somebody
can access a protocol, maybe you control back end storage such that if you disappear, people
can't withdraw their funds or you have admin keys or keys that can, you know, take people's
capital, you start to reintroduce the exact same reasons why we do have securities laws. You're
becoming an intermediary. So for me, whenever I've talked to clients or something about that,
and they've tried to ask them like, hey, what should I be thinking about when we're designing this?
You know, I'm always earning the side of, hey, can you relinquish that control?
Because if you don't, the more of this that you have, the more that you start to reintroduce the exact same reasons why we have the securities laws.
And that's what they mean when they say substance over form.
So, and again, I feel like I'm on this podcast.
I'm on Twitter, I'm like, ah, Gary.
And here, I'm like, yeah, SEC.
But that's not really it.
To me, I think what one of our colleagues has said is probably the most important thing for, I think,
true defy maxis to really appreciate, which is the SEC is probably the best motivator of making
something truly decentralized. Like if you want the best securities law argument, you legitimately
have to be willing to say, look like, I don't get to own this entire stack. I don't get to
own this entire experience. And unfortunately, a lot of devs, particularly Silicon Valley train
devs, but other devs, they don't like that. They don't want to relinquish control. They want to be
able to control the front end experience. They want to be able to consistently, you know, capture value
from other revenue streams, but that's a business.
Like, that's what running a business is.
So I think in general, and we're starting to see this.
So I think people are getting it.
We're going to start to see people who separate their protocol development teams
versus some other type of commercial enterprise.
That's the appropriate move in my mind.
And I think the way that the SEC should kind of recognize that and maybe give a quid pro
quo, say, okay, look, that's fine.
And if the core issue that you all have had before that is, yes,
but we think that maybe the people on the protocol side should be able to be
incentivize with some of the assets that they've built without necessarily becoming some securities
intermediary, but also the commercial entity that's driving value should be able to appreciate that.
Then there's a safe harbor path there in my mind that says, okay, look, to the extent of this
protocol team is not doing X, Y, and Z and certain things are disclosed, we're not going to treat
that as security, and we're not going to treat them as intermediaries.
If you are going to do other things commercial entity, you may still have obligations, but I think
that's one path to at least allow for this bifurcation of roles, but still allow for incentive
alignment around the underlying protocol.
Because at the end of the day, that's most people's issues with being able to separate
the business and the protocol is them saying, well, how do we incentivize ongoing
devs who don't necessarily want to be building a business but may just be really
interested in zero knowledge proofs or something like that?
And I don't think we want to drive that innovation away.
So we've got, you know, a path forward here.
The other thing, Greg, that you mentioned, which is super interesting and something, hopefully,
I think Laura's product is probably one of the better places to mention this is there
is optimism that they, you know, there is optimism that they, you know,
do have a path forward to integrating technical data into disclosures versus traditional data.
And I think the best example of that is there's a system, Laura, called the XBRL system.
It's like extensible.
I forget whatever the last three things are.
It's not like, hey, it's not like, hey, Greg's laughing because it's not like they made a supercomputer.
But for like a decade, the SEC basically worked on a standard because, you know, for 50, 60 years,
we had all of these filings that were done on paper.
And obviously computers got big.
And people, analysts in particular were like, hey, these disclosures are becoming less.
helpful. You're sending us 150 pages. No one's going to read through all of this. We have computers
now where a lot of this financial information and other disclosures can be standardized and made machine
readable. Why don't you just make a standard and all the companies or anybody else should have to
adhere to that? And then that way we no longer have to even look in different places. We don't
have to have people come up with their own disclosures. That's what I would expect for crypto.
Instead of saying, hey, all of these things are securities, we might say to Hester Persis's point,
okay, look, you don't want it to be a security.
Here are the minimum things that we're going to require.
And here are the things that are going to need to be
surfacable in the smart contract
with a standard API call.
If you're not going to do that, then you don't get the benefit
of the safe harbor. You can still argue it's not a security,
but if you want the safe harbor, your API needs to surface
some key things. Is there an admin key,
total supply, you know, inflation, whatever that is?
That's, we have experience there.
So I don't want us to continue to give the commission excuses
like, oh, we have no idea what we're doing.
They've got examples, and I like the commission for the good work that they do, but I do think we've got to start holding the fire under their feet to say, hold on, there are some paths here.
That also means it's incumbent on us as an industry to come forward with some suggestions like this or some other things.
But that's the other thing I did want to raise here.
So I used to live a lot on Edgar because I would do a lot of registered product filings.
My dear paralegal Debbie Ferraro actually was one of the testers on Edgar when they first introduced it.
And, you know, I think we would all have our frustrations with Edgar from time to time.
And when XBRL was introduced, you know, within the last decade, probably about 70 years ago with the modernization movement for reporting filings, it was very clunky and hard to access.
And really, the people who were taking advantage of it were quant funds that were pulling the data.
because it's literally Excel coding of disclosure documents.
But Collins is 100% right because the SEC maybe didn't have a product that was particularly
useful when it was introduced, but they had to foresight to understand that data repositories
are incredibly important and in the future they are going to be how we pull information
and there oftentimes are going to be how we regulate markets because it's easier to see
the flat surface of the market and analyze it and pull it from a data. And the beauty of blockchain
is it's particularly when you're looking at cryptocurrencies where everything exists on-chain,
not calling off-chain resources. It is a complete set of information. And Collins is spot on.
There are tools that can be applied to this industry to provide the type of surveillance
and market integrity that we typically in the U.S. regulatory infrastructure look at those
central intermediaries, whereas in blockchain, you know, you do have a transaction record either
on layer one or in some instances on a transparent layer two, where you have the ability
to see the market. And to be frank, while we haven't seen this emerge quite as much in the SEC,
FinC has been all over this. And the success of companies like
elliptic and chain analysis is 100% driven by the same concept that you can regulate through data.
You can investigate through data.
You don't need Dragnet.
The old Chicago sitcom, or I guess drama wasn't a sitcom, funny now.
But you don't necessarily need that.
You have new tools.
And these new tools are not just market opportunities.
They're also regulatory opportunities.
Yeah.
Well, so I have to say I'm a little bit surprised that
this is actually the direction you guys went when I asked you about regulation of defy, because the way that
I'm viewing this is that the regulators want to keep imposing that system where intermediaries are,
you know, a big part and have a big role and that that's who the regulators then regulate. And I actually
feel like watching this that they are kind of painting a broad brush and often,
lumping together projects that truly either want to decentralize or actually already are
decentralized, along with ones that either are centralized or just plain fraudulent.
And I also feel, even earlier when you guys were talking about how the U.S. tends to respect
privacy, you know, a lot of, like for instance, we saw with the infrastructure bill, the crypto
provision really was going to create a lot of honeypots for hackers who were interested in
you know, who is transacting in cryptocurrency. So in that regard, like, you know, I didn't feel
that that, I mean, granted, I recognize that a lot of Congress people do see the need to change
the language in that bill. But so the fact that it came out that way and that there was a strong
push to regulate in that fashion does indicate that there's, you know, a substantial segment
of government that maybe doesn't really see the merits of decentralization or just doesn't
believe that something can truly be decentralized. And so even, you know, I keep, I, you guys keep
referencing a commissioner of purses, um, safe harbor proposal. And, you know, I think for somebody
who looks at this space and says, okay, there are projects that are legitimately trying to be
decentralized or are already decentralized. And of course, something like what she proposed makes sense.
But, you know, we haven't really seen the SEC take that up seriously, right? I mean, the fact that
she's revised. It is great for her and for everybody who thinks about the space. But when you look
at Chair Gensler and kind of some of the other commissioners or even over the CFTC, we don't necessarily
see a lot of people saying, oh, yes, this is the way to go. Let's figure out how to adopt this.
You know, let's get this in the pipeline. So I'm just curious, you know, am I just reading things
wrong or do you feel like maybe because you want it to look that way that you're maybe painting a
goes to your picture or is it just that I'm looking to you short term or what?
No, no, I think you're right.
And that's part of what I was saying.
You know, I think the next two to three years, it's going to be a combination of a struggle
and convincing folks, but also some pushback because, yeah, you're right.
There's a broad brush here being painted.
And for a while, I think a lot of the industry engage in probably a bit more good faith than
was appropriate.
Not, not, I mean, you should never engage in bad faith.
but I think I guess we assumed too much benevolence and interest on behalf of the government.
And it's not that I don't think they're not interested so much as at first it's like, hey, this crypto thing.
Yeah, these people want to make a bunch of money.
Then it became a serious thing and they still treated it that way.
And then instead of ever engaging, it went from, hey, this isn't serious to you're going to destroy the financial system and your criminals.
And so it's like, well, hold on.
How did it go from this is a joke to her criminals?
But yeah, you're right.
right now I think there's definitely more of a contingent. I'd say, I don't know, this is not a scientific
number, you know, 70, 30, 75, 25, saying, oh, yes, you know, this is just inherently problematic.
We need to reintroduce intermediaries. That's the way we protect people, et cetera. But like I said,
you know, even six months ago, we didn't have as many of the folks in Congress actively talking
about it as we did. We basically had, I think it was, I hate referring to all these people by first name.
I can know them. But I think it was like Cynthia, Lummus.
Llamis.
There we go.
Cynthia and a few of the other senators,
which I only know by first name.
I have no idea why.
And so as we start to see that roll out,
one of the interesting things I've talked about,
and it's obviously not a politics show,
but I've talked a lot about with my friends
is I am very interested to see if there's a political
realignment that occurs here,
because I've long suspected that certain crypto people
are definitely single-issue voters,
and we're starting to see that, you know,
come out in some of the political expressions, but CT is also, you know, much of an echo chamber.
So I think it'll be interesting to see in these next, you know, midterm elections, how much pandering
there is to this group and also how much that translates into political activity.
But I think if it does translate into something, you'll see a sea change almost overnight,
as we saw with some of the infrastructure bills.
But now you're not crazy at all.
One last thing I wanted to add on this is that I feel like another trend that I'm seeing is that
a lot of the pro-crypto regulators are just leaving government and going to join different
crypto companies. And I mean, like, it's almost like just looking at the A16C crypto regulatory
team is like all these ex-regulators and, you know, other people who have spent a lot of time
in D.C. And then the people that are kind of negative on crypto, they're the ones who are staying in
the regulator roles. So that's another trend that for me is kind of fascinating to watch.
And I'm a little bit like, oh, where is this going to go?
You know, because all the people who've left and now work in the industry are saying,
hey, we need new regulations and the old regulations don't apply here and stuff like that.
And then the people who are still in UC are like the, you know, the 33 and 34 acts do apply here.
And, you know, the Howie Test and Reeves do apply here.
So anyway, it was just an interesting observation.
So the last, Laura, just one last point on that is I think,
you know, there's an importance to the crypto communities, and I don't think there's a singular
community, obviously, but the crypto communities to come together, whether it's collectively
or in their own little segments, and understand that narrative matters. It's not just
building a better product, and it's not just donating money, and it's not just being active on
Twitter. A meme game is important, but that's not what's going to drive things. It's about
creating the narrative on the policy level that makes people remember that it's not simply
politically expedient to crack down, but that there's a long-term vision for the benefit that this
industry can provide the U.S. and the world community at large. And that's a different. And that's a
difficult task. It's tough to build up a narrative. It's not something that isn't happening,
though. We've seen people shift when they see the opportunity. And I go back to, and some would
probably laugh at me at saying this, but 2013 and 2014, I recall when Ben Loski at DFS first addressed
crypto in probably the late summer of 2013, he wanted to crush it because all he had done,
was read, you know, stories about Silk Road. And three weeks later, you know, he, after actually
investigating it, you know, you can have your opinion on the bit license and have that turned out.
But I do think he genuinely said, I want to build a framework to actually build responsible
innovation in New York for crypto. It didn't turn out that way. As a native New Yorker,
I still can't access a lot of services because they can't get into the state.
But it is reflective of the fact that with the appropriate view, he viewed it as an economic builder for New York and wanting to build the right way.
We should be working on the narrative.
That story is also a nice reminder that the narrative is not the only thing.
We also need the proper regulation or legislation.
Yeah.
Well, one thing that that actually reminds me of is that a lot of.
lot of people say that that bit license was kind of too early, right? That the technology and the
industry hadn't really developed enough to truly understand what even should be regulated or how
the space was going to look. And, you know, what's been interesting covering this the last few years
is that the industry has complained a lot about not having clarity. And yet at the same time,
I think in a way that that has given the industry a little bit of freedom. I understand it's a scary
kind of freedom. But if you think about how Ethereum basically had an ICO, but then decentralized
by the time the regulators were paying attention. And so at that point, they, you know, kind of realized,
okay, yeah, this is not a security anymore. I wonder, you know, so I don't know how long it's
going to take for more clarity to come clearly. I think we all agree on this episode that the regulators
are working on something and we probably are going to see more actions coming out of these
regulators. But during that time, it's like you said, maybe this just gives motivation to more
projects to decentralize and do it quickly. Because if that's the case, then I think a lot of them
could kind of end up like Ethereum in the sense that, you know, as long as they decentralized by the
time regulators really come in, then it may be the case that regulators won't be able to do much.
But I don't know. What are your thoughts on that?
Yeah, I think the timing is obviously extraordinarily important.
I think you're right that I would argue perhaps timing on the Bit license in particular
was perhaps not a question of 2014 versus 2018 versus 2021, but more so that the timing
and the application of that type of a regulatory regime to companies that were six months old
versus companies that were well-financed, you know, well-established, well-capitalized financial institutions.
You know, if you had, for example, a large regulatory framework in place for people developing silicon processors,
we wouldn't have Hewlett-Packard because you can't easily develop a financial institution in a garage.
But frankly, that's kind of how crypto companies got their start.
It was a couple of people and a little bit of seed funding.
All right.
So for this next year, what are you going to be looking for?
And why don't we just throw into this last question what you think is going to happen to the stable coins too?
Stable coins are a good place to start.
I think there was an article today, again, when we're recording from the journal talking about how FSOC and the Biden administration are looking to create a regulatory framework.
for stable coins. I think quite clearly this is an area where there's going to be a lot of focus
in the next year. And it's, you know, Collins mentioned earlier in the show, there obviously
are a bunch of different types of stable coins. But if we look at, in particular, the fiat-backed
or in some cases not quite fiat-backed stable coins, you know, that's going to be an area of
significant focus and potentially a near-term regulation, probably not legislation, but probably
regulation. And I think we'll see some clarity. I think we've already seen people address the
Investment Company Act issues in the space where, you know, USDC is now going to only hold
fiat and treasuries. And that's Paxos's strategy. I would guess that's probably Gemini's
strategy and its most decisively not tether's strategy. I think we could see some action on that
side. And that's when we're hearing people talk about money market funds. That's what we see.
I think we could, if we get significant regulation on the securities law side, rather than on the
bank reg side for stable coins, I think one project that'll be interesting for people to look at is
R-coin, a R-Coyn, which was done by the folks at California at ARCA, ARCA Labs, where they actually
registered a money market fund that holds its shares entirely on the Ethereum blockchain,
and you actually can transfer these money market shares peer-to-peer to whitelisted Ethereum
network addresses. This is probably the biggest product that no one actually talks about
because it doesn't have market traction,
but it's real thought leadership
as far as developing something
and getting the SEC on board
with an actual tokenized product,
registered product that really does live
on a blockchain. And
you could see
some circumstance where
that becomes
the not quite where stable
coins go, but
if we do see a lot of attack on
the securities law front on these
centralized stable coin issuers.
I think R-coin is something that might get talked about a little bit more.
Yeah, that's actually interesting.
I didn't know that I'd registered the money market shares on chain.
Yeah, for me, I think, you know, the next year I'm looking at a confluence of, I think,
a segregation between kind of these truly decentralized protocols, whether that's, you know,
because they are protocols and made by folks that are known or anonymous or pseudonymous
developers, kind of building primis.
and or potentially taking over previously centralized ones.
To me, that's actually the worst result from the regulators' perspective
because then it may just push things into the shadows.
But that's definitely something in a trend that I'm expecting to see,
particularly because DAO's are starting to get back into popularity,
which personally I find very interesting because it's like everyone tends to forget
that the SEC started their entire crusade with the Dow report.
So I personally, like in terms of like the idea behind DAO's,
I love them.
Like, I think people should be doing it.
I've been doing a research on co-op models and the like.
But I think it is very weird that everyone is acting as though like the SEC's not about to show up next year with all of these Dow's.
Because to be honest, that's the thing that seems the most obvious to me, like even more so than stable coins and stuff.
Only because for years, basically that was like their demarcation line.
It was like, okay, we gave you the Dow report and everything after this, like, you're not necessarily blessed or grandfathered in, but we're not going to focus on you as much.
And then it's like three or four years later, everyone was like, okay, it's been a while.
Why don't we just start doing Dallas again?
So I think that's probably the area where we'll probably see a lot more activity.
What's interesting is I think what will also bring them into the four is I'm expecting one of the first, if not more than one, major political dows to become relevant.
So I think that's going to end up kind of like, kind of smashing into each other.
And it's going to be one of the major securities law issues to see next year.
And then in terms of stable coins, yeah, I mean, I think there's going to be a lot of focus here.
For me personally, I've had kind of a laser focused on things like LUSD, Rye, and UST for the past, you know, almost a year and a half since ESD kind of empty set dollar of one of the first algorithmic stablecoin experiments kind of kicked off the imagination of the industry to see if it could be done.
And I think long term, that's kind of important.
I maybe undermine my prior rant in terms of like American hegemian and the like.
But being frank, if you're trying to use a global permissionless network, at least if I'm not American, I don't want to have to rely on something that's subject to like another country's random domestic and foreign policy wouldn't leave me feeling great.
It's like as an American, it's great if like everyone's, you know, denominated in USC.
But long term, if you're saying, hey, we're building this network that's almost a layer on top of the real world that everyone should have access to, you probably want a credibly neutral, stable currency that, you know, not only should not be.
the U.S. dollar, you also probably shouldn't be backed by it or pegged to it maybe isn't
necessarily as problematic. But if you're backed by it or you're targeting it, you're always
necessarily susceptible to it. So, well, I think what's interesting right now is the U.S.
is actually focused more on curtailing it. At some point, I wouldn't be surprised if we actually
flip on that. And instead, we try to make it such that only U.S. dollar denominated stablecoin things
get priority. I just, you know, and this is less me as like the crypto anarchist lawyer,
but more like if I'm going to be a real politic like citizen of the world and we still live in
the nation state system, then yeah, if my government's going to like be in this great power
war, I want them to kind of do it right. And so for me, I would expect at some point somebody says,
hey guys, this is spreading our foreign policy with very little expenditure on our part and very little
liability if it goes wrong. Why don't we kind of let's see what happens? I'm not don't just
unleash the US dollar on the rest of the world as a weapon, but admittedly, we've kind of done that
before. So it's one of those things where it's like, I don't approve of it from the humanitarian
view, but if you're going to do it, I would expect at some point somebody's going to be a
realist and say, hold on, if we're going to allow this, why don't we allow it in the way that
best benefits us? So I think stable coins are going to be interesting. There's going to be a crackdown,
but I wouldn't be, like I said, I wouldn't be surprised if it gets interesting.
Yeah, and Collins, on that point, I mean, I think it's also not if we're going to allow it,
if we accept that this is going to happen in some form, why would you not want to have the dollarization of crypto?
If you're a policymaker, and this goes to the narratives, it's built in.
And as it turns out, you know, depending on votes in the next couple of weeks, we're going to need some people buying some U.S. treasuries.
So, yeah, it's utterly bizarre to me.
And like I said, I get it if you're like one of the people that don't have the economic perspective, that dollar hegemony is good.
But as a general matter, our policymakers do have that perspective.
So for me, it's a bizarre situation to say, okay, our standard, you know, way of operation is, yes, we want the dollar to generally dominate in every market it possibly can.
Here's an emerging financial market that may grow to dominate all financial markets.
let's do our damned is to stop the dollar from predominating when it has no competition.
I've never, and I understand what's happening.
It's really just like the policymakers aren't, you know, engaged with the regulators right now because it's not a priority.
But it would be a shame if we do lose out and the nation state system persist.
And it's just another nation that has the hegemony because then it's like, well, great, we didn't undermine the hegemonic system.
We just gave it away to someone else.
Yeah, particularly because the bank run concept, I mean, if you're talking about state,
stable coins that have reserves that are held in regulated financial institutions, whether in deposit or custody accounts, and you're looking at treasuries as the rest of the portfolio.
You know, if we're worried about the systemic risk of a run on USDC, we have a lot bigger problems with the existing, existing rails.
Yeah, the other thing I just, Laura, just wanted to correcting myself earlier, R-coin is actually an interval fund, not a money market fund.
But his valuation in holdings is very similar to a money market fund.
So just wanted to correct that.
Okay.
Thanks.
Yeah.
Going back to Collins' point about the dollar.
So a couple of things.
I don't know if you guys saw,
but Sam Bankman Freed of FTX did write a long Twitter thread about this
and was saying that the fact that the U.S. dollar is how, like,
pretty much the vast majority of trading peers around the world are traded in crypto.
that is to the U.S.'s benefit.
And Chris John Carly, the former CFTC chair, has said that he thinks, instead of doing a CBDC,
we should just have multiple competing U.S. dollar stable coins, and it just kind of let it be sort of a free market.
But the last thing about this, I don't know if you guys have been following Rohan Gray, who...
I know he's a controversial figure in crypto.
So I don't remember his exact title, but it's something like assistant professor of law at, I think it's Lammett, maybe.
Willamette?
Willamette.
Yeah.
Yeah.
And he said, you know, the risk is that the U.S. government then kind of loses control over its money, basically.
So, you know, just wanted to offer the other perspective.
But you guys, we are overtime.
We have, and it's funny because we only really touched on like a few major topics, but there's just so much to discuss.
here. So it was super fun. I am so glad we pulled this together. And it's amazing how much there
was to discuss, given that there wasn't any big regulatory news this week. But we all know
it's coming. So thank you so much for discussing all of this with me. Where can people learn more
about each of you and your work? I'm on Twitter. That's probably the best avenue for me,
which I never thought I'd be saying in my life. And what's your handle? Just my name, Collins,
underscore Belton, very creative.
It's a well-known lawyer creative class.
Yeah, and for me, I've got one of those lucky names
where I actually typically am able to get the social media user account
that just is my last name, and you've got to figure out how to spell it yourself.
No, it's X-E-T-H-A-L-S on Twitter, and multi-coin.competal is our website.
Okay, perfect. All right.
Well, this is so much fun.
Thank you.
Both so much for coming on Unchained.
Thank you again, Laura.
Appreciate it.
Thanks.
Thanks so much for joining us today.
To learn more about Collins and Greg,
check out the show notes for this episode.
Unchained is produced by me,
Laura Shin,
without from Anthony Yoon,
Daniel Ness, and Mark Murdoch.
Thanks for listening.
