Unchained - Think a DAO Will Automate Things? Think Again - Ep.141

Episode Date: October 15, 2019

Mariano Conti, the head of smart contracts for MakerDAO and creator of SelloutDAO, and Peter Pan, the summoner for Metacartel DAO, discuss all things DAOs, including how Peter started Metacartel DAO after being rejected from MolochDAO, and why Mariano initially voted against Peter joining. (Peter eventually joined.) They also discuss how they came to form YangDAO, why Mariano almost rage quit MolochDAO after the YangDAO formed, and how other MolochDAO members felt about SelloutDAO, which Mariano describes as an experiment in "on-chain corruption." We discuss how DAOs are actually heavily built on trust and why they require a lot of social coordination off-chain. They also discuss funding for LAOs, which have a legal entity such as an LLC affiliated with them, why Metacartel is launching a LAO, and which types of projects should be funded by DAOs vs traditional corporate structures. We also cover governance issues at MakerDAO, why it has a CEO, and what role leadership in general plays in a DAO.  Thank you to our sponsors!  Crypto.com: https://crypto.com/ Kraken: https://www.kraken.com CipherTrace: http://ciphertrace.com/unchained Episode links:  Mariano Conti: https://twitter.com/nanexcool Peter Pan: https://twitter.com/pet3rpan_ MakerDAO: https://makerdao.com/en/ https://chat.makerdao.com Metacartel DAO: https://www.metacartel.org/ https://twitter.com/meta_cartel SelloutDAO: https://selloutdao.com/ Unchained interview with Ameen Soleimani of MolochDAO: https://unchainedpodcast.com/molochdao-could-this-decentralized-autonomous-organization-help-ethereum-scale-faster/ Unchained interview with Santiago Siri: https://unchainedpodcast.com/how-blockchains-can-help-create-little-democracies-everywhere/ DAO Revival: https://www.coindesk.com/in-berlin-a-dao-renaissance-begins https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-10-05/crypto-rebels-trip-over-each-other-en-route-to-financial-utopia Andy Milenius’s account of MakerDAO’s change from a decentralized to a centralized project: https://www.scribd.com/document/407743542/Zandy-s-Story CoinDesk story on the rift: https://www.coindesk.com/darkest-days-yet-purple-pill-tell-all-details-years-long-rift-at-heart-of-makerdao-stablecoin-project Two most recent MakerDAO votes:  https://vote.makerdao.com/executive-proposal/keep-the-stability-fee-set-to-a-total-of-105-per-year https://vote.makerdao.com/executive-proposal/lower-the-stability-fee-by-2-to-a-total-of-85-per-year https://vote.makerdao.com/polling-proposal/qmpem83sxjjwe1jvn2csdtetn4r3j95ejuzpbmtxef4lu5 Unchained interviews with Rune Christensen of MakerDAO: Part 1: https://unchainedpodcast.com/rune-christensen-of-makerdao-part-1-how-to-keep-a-crypto-collateralized-stablecoin-afloat/ Part 2: https://unchainedpodcast.com/rune-christensen-of-makerdao-part-2-how-dai-stayed-at-1-while-eth-crashed-from-1400-to-85/ MakerDAO vulnerabilities:  ETH could have been stolen: https://hackerone.com/reports/684092 https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2019/10/03/makerdao-security-vulnerability-ethereum-dai-stablecoin-collapse-theft-cryptocurrency/  The LAO: https://medium.com/openlawofficial/the-lao-a-for-profit-limited-liability-autonomous-organization-9eae89c9669c Critique of the LAO: https://prestonbyrne.com/2019/09/03/the-lao-demystified/ MakerDAO launching multi-collateral Dai: https://www.coindesk.com/makerdaos-multi-collateral-dai-token-is-launching-nov-18 https://blog.makerdao.com/breaking-launch-date-of-multi-collateral-dai-announced-at-devcon-5/ Are DAO’s legal? https://www.coindesk.com/new-interest-in-daos-prompts-old-question-are-they-legal Unconfirmed interview with Uniswap: https://unchainedpodcast.com/how-uniswap-quickly-became-one-of-the-most-popular-dexes/ Unconfirmed episode with Ryan Zurrer about resurrecting the DAO: https://unchainedpodcast.com/why-ryan-zurrer-would-like-to-see-a-new-dao/ Unchained interview with Aragon: https://unchainedpodcast.com/how-aragon-hopes-to-improve-on-democracy/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Hi everyone. Welcome to Unchained, your no-hype resource for all things crypto. I'm your host, Laura Shin. Heads up, everyone. In case he missed it, a couple weeks ago, I rolled out a new feature on Unconfirmed, a weekly news recap. This summer, through my survey, you listener said you'd be interested in a weekly news recap on the show. So now you can listen to my take on the top stories of the week after my guest interview at the end of every Unconfirmed. Go subscribe now to find out what I think are the biggest stories in crypto each week. cryptocurrency intelligence powers anti-money laundering, blockchain analytics, and threat intel. Leading exchanges, virtual currency businesses, banks, and regulators themselves use ciphertrace to comply with regulation and to monitor compliance. Crypto.com. Get their app and buy crypto at true cost with no fees or markups. Get a metal MCO visa card with up to 5% back in all your spending. Want more? Download the crypto.com app today.

Cracken is the best exchange in the world for buying and selling digital assets. It has the tightest security, deep liquidity, and a great fee structure with no minimum or hidden fees. Whether you're looking for a simple fiat on-ramp or futures trading, Cracken is the place for you. The topic for today's show is Dow's. Here with me in Osaka, Japan at DevCon to discuss our Mariona Conti, head of smart contracts at Maker Dow, and Peter Pan, Summoner of Metacartel. Welcome, Mariano and Peter. Hi.

Happy to be here. Let's start with introductions. Why don't you each talk about what you do in the space? Mariano, why don't we start with you? Yeah, sure. So I'm the head of smart contracts at MakerDAO. I've been at the foundation for three years now. And I'm in charge of making sure that the Maker Platform smart contracts were correctly.

So lately, it's mostly been taking. care of audits and formal verification ahead of a multilateral die. Great. And Peter? Oh, actually, you know what? I wanted also to ask you. Can you just describe Sillow Dow because that was something fun that you did that's related to our topic? Yeah, that's a hobby of mine. So I am also a member of Moloch Dow. And at a hackathon, I decided it would be fun to try to do unchain corruption. And this involved sellout Dow, which is just a smart contract that I can use as my delegate key in Mollock so anybody can use my voting power to create proposals and vote on them on the Mollock Dow. And it actually works on any Mollock-like

Dow. Wow, interesting. So we'll dive a little bit more into that later. So Peter, why don't you tell us about Metacartel? And I think it's separate Metacartel Dow. Maybe not. I'm not sure. Right. So, hi, I'm Peter, and I guess I'm one of the people running the Medi-Cathel community, right? And the Metacartel is, I guess, is a community around folks around DAP experimentation and DAP development, right? And currently, one of the projects that we've been working on for the last, like, half year, right, is our Medi-Cartel Dow, right? So the Medi-Cat-Tal is the Communities Dow, at least the Medi-Catel's Communities Dow that's focused on funding, right? DAP experimentation, specifically new business models and new use cases. Great. And can you give us a little bit of the backstory about how you started that? Because I think it started with you being rejected from Molodow, right? Right. So, yes, so the Medi-Cato Diao was kind of like birth from this, I guess, the path of redeeming myself, right?

So while the Medi-Catotel community has kind of like existed for a while now, like, since it was created like around last September, nearly a year ago, right? Or it's now, yeah, nearly created a year ago. But like, during like April, I believe this year, Mollocdial was really taking off and I really wanted to be part of that governance experience, right? Except and, you know, well, a mean pick me to kind of like join it because I was doing a lot of stuff around DAPS, right? And they wanted a new perspective within Mollictal, except, you know,

I don't have that much money. So I've pledged 10-Eaf as opposed to, was the extended 100-Eaf, right? And, you know, I didn't have a lot of friends in Monarch, so I was rejected. And basically... Can I say something publicly? I voted against Peter. Oh, really?

That first time, yes. Wait. Oh, why? It was mostly a social contract. Like Peter said the initial members mostly pledged 100th. and some of us said that we just by principle wouldn't let anybody with less than 100 for the first few months

so this is all public on the blockchain you can see I would vote down for the first couple of months people joining with 50 and 10 but I think something good came out of it this is my pen and sorry so are you saying that you would accept him now I know

the second time around well you tell the story right so I mean accept your apology mariano it was all good I understand what what came from

but yeah so interestingly you know so I'll get to how I got in later on even that was very contentious by itself but you know so

I was rejected and I was like you know what why don't we create our own doubt so for more context for the last couple months like before April right

the medical hotel Odell kind of finished up a lot of its work around meta transactions, right? Basically, it's a U-Rex solution that allows you to abstract gas fees, right, from the use experience. And as we finished up this work, we were looking for new things to kind of work on. Like, we have a great community, we have a funny meme or dancing chili. What should we work on? And it was like, why, and we realized no one was building dapps, right? It wasn't a topic or headline title in the space, right? Everyone's still focused on infrastructure and being working close to the infrastructure. layer, right? We realized that

we should be getting to build DAPS, and we were like, okay, let's create a DAP incubator or let's create a pot of money to fund DAPS, right? And as I was rejected, you know, this was like a perfect, like, I guess like, a fun little like I guess stunt to kind of

get back at it. It started off as a meme, right? But then people were like, hey, sure, I'll put Eiff in the pot and I'm like, oh, really? Cool. Yeah. and I am also a member of a few other Dows, including Mollock. And, you know, so how it got into Mollock, right, was I was working on this other Dow of Amin, right, and James Young and a few other people, Ken, Yang and Darren Mills, right,

on, like, this thing called Yang Dow, right? So, basically, one day I was running into chat by Amin and, like, it was just like, this thing could Yang Down, like, what the hell is Yang Tao? And then, like, it was like, oh, let's like create a Dow to push Andrew Yang, right? And then, like, apparently that became a thing. And worked on that. And I guess, like, some, I mean, kind of like push for a funding proposal to fund the work of Yang Dow, right? And I was part of that.

So, and even then, that was the most content. It was very contentious by itself. And even how the votes came kind of, like, fell through. It was also contentious. But, yeah. Wait, why? Well, because if I remember correctly, a lot of us voted no on Yang Dow, but this was Yang Dow proper, Moloch funding Yan Dao, not Peter specifically.

And then, I mean, since he had his votes and he had got, he had, I believe, 500 shares of Spang Chain voting aside from his own, he swing the vote in his favor. I actually considered race-winning then because I thought that Yangdao, it was too U.S. centric, too political, but I came around after watching the memes. I believe everything is better with memes, and it's a way that people can communicate and understand. And in the end, I accepted it. Yeah, well, that was actually my very first thought. Like, you're Argentine and Peter's Australian, so I was like, why would you guys

care about doing the Yingdao, but now you're saying that you're glad that you guys do that? I am from Argentina, but I do follow U.S. politics quite a bit because anything that happens in the U.S. creates ripples and in places like third world countries like Argentina, we feel anything that happens in the U.S. or Europe, we feel it bad. So if you get a cold, we get pneumonia. And I was following the elections. And I realized that this was actually a good way to proceed. That's interesting. It's also interesting to me because I feel like Andrew Yang has a much more domestic-focused platform, but now we're, like, getting really far afield. Oh, but, oh, so just to go back, I wanted to ask about Medi-Cartel, like, how much money now do you have in it?

And, like, what are the requirements for people to participate? Right. So I guess, like, we recently dip back under a thousand eph because we keep spending our EF, right? Oh, cool. But, you know, we hover up around 1,000 to 900 EF nowadays, right? and the requirements is really like, you know, so you can actually join the Dow for two means. You can either pledge funds and the minimum is like 10-Eaf right now, right,

which is about $2,000 to $3,000 USD. And like you can also join the Dow by providing work that we want to get done in space, right? And it's really like, you know, we see work and I guess like pledge funds as just like a minimum barrier, right, to filter people through. And it's really about, we just want to actually get the credit, I guess like, What we really care about is getting the right people in versus how much they bring monetarily, right? Yeah, yeah. I mean, depending on the demographic, like for some people, $2,000 is a lot for like a hobby type thing.

But if they can work their way into it, then that's, yeah. But then is there like a max? Because like otherwise are you guys, you know, then subject to like people just sort of dominating that? Yeah. Yeah, we do have a max as in like, you know, when. Whenever there's a new member that wants to join, right? You know, there's a social max of like a hundred Eve at the moment, right? But, you know, whenever a new proposal comes, we all discuss it as a doubt, right?

So whether we're comfortable with them joining firstly and them comfortable joining with that many shares or that much power. Yeah, there's some cases where we've actually not let certain people come in, you know, with as much. Okay. Interestingly enough. Well, so before we go on, I actually also want to go. go back to sell out Dow. So like what was the reaction from the other Molok Dow members to that? Like, do they like it or do they dislike it? Do they feel like you're like hijacking the process? Do they like agree that it is on chain corruption?

Internally, a lot of people did like it. And as you can see, it is not very powerful yet. Somebody can hijack my account and vote with my 100 shares. That's about it. So even though we do have some kind of voter apathes, if somebody puts a proposal through, it's very easy to get shut down. It only needs two other members maybe to vote it down. So as a social experiment, it was really, really amazing. Pretty much everybody liked it, and it gave way for other types of discussions,

like do we need shielded transactions, anonymity. A lot of people do want to vote yes or no to proposals, but they don't want to make it be public, make it known what they voted on. So, no, I think it was a really good experiment. And when I wanted to join Metacortel, this was after Sellout Dow, I got a little bit of a pushback because they said, are you going to try to corrupt this one as well? That's funny. And so then did they let you join?

Yes. I believe one member voted no to my proposal, but... Was it Peter? No, I wanted to marry a join. I'm welcome to them. I think so the member that Ray I guess like raised a concern against his crimes right

with Molok Dow was you know Makoto the yeah Makoto from Weir Kickback and the ENS yeah and he does another Dow Archie. Ohrochi yeah so I joined that one as well

what does that one do? It's an event style it was made specifically for DevCon as a way to fund and sponsor events. And it may go on after DevCon, we're still not sure. Cool.

Well, wait, so I just want to make sure I understand Sellout Dow again. So at any given moment, like, when is it that somebody can take your... Right now, the way the way I wrote it,

because this was just during a weekend, it only works one time. So when I did it a couple months ago at ETH Berlin, I managed to sell my vote once, and the member who bought it, Santa City from Democracy Earth, he ended up getting voted in because people love the experiment. Oh, cool. And this second time, I activated it again just for one other bribe, let's call it. And I was giving a presentation on sellout, and the first slide had a QR code saying,

whoever sends one ether will be the briber. And before I turn to the second slide, somebody shouted from the audience, sold. So somebody sent one ether in like 30 seconds to an unknown smart contract. And do you know who it was? I think I do know, but this person has not actually used it. They're reselling this bribe OTC. Oh, wow. Yes.

Wow, okay. So I guess you in a way almost have anonymous transactions. It is a way to kind of do that, yeah. And I think it was a great continuation of the experiment. I thought whoever sent the Eiff would just come to me and say, hey, I want this to happen. I want to try to get some money for this proposal or want to join as a member. But no, they want to resell it. Well, but one thing is, I guess I thought with like Mollockdao that part of the voting and stuff is like people sort of knowing who's proposing what or you know what I mean. And so like for a member to join, somebody has to sponsor them. So you cannot create a proposal.

Not anybody can do it. Only existing members. Oh, so wait for sellout. They can only vote. They can't also propose? For sellout, yeah. If they do it via sellout, then they can create proposals with. out my intervention. So they run through me as a proxy, that's it. Right. So did people kind of

dislike the fact that then they don't know who is behind any given proposal? No, not really, because it was still a controlled experiment. As I tell you, I only activated it twice. And for this second time, yeah, it is, we don't know what's going to happen, what proposal is going to go through. and even if it is going to go through at all, because I give the limit of one week, and after one week I will just revert to my original key and shut down the sell out of doubt. Oh, why are you putting a time limit on it?

Because the way Mollock works, cell out of doubt is a smart contract that acts as my delegate key. So as long as I have a delegate key, if it is sell out of doubt, then I cannot do anything else on the system. I cannot vote on anything. I cannot create my own proposals. Oh, I see.

And if I want to keep participating, then I need to revert back to my original key. Oh, okay. So when Santi had it, what did he do with it? He put himself up as a member. So he proposed himself as a member. This was, he was probably going to, I was going to propose him anyway,

because I think he's a good candidate for Mollock. But when he found out what I was doing, he said, no, no, I want to go to the sell-out that way. It's like there's an Argentinian creating unchain corruption and another Argentinian actually using it. We thought it was hilarious. Yeah, that is great. I did a great episode with him and Glenn Weil.

All right, so why don't we let then, why don't you just, can you guys each describe how handle the governance of, well, so MediCartel, we can talk about, but then also I was thinking maybe MakerDAO, so whoever wants to start just like in general describe the governance of your DAO. Right. So one of the interesting things is that, well, most people assume that, you know, because the governance, I guess the hard governance on chain, right, aspect of the Dow of Metacarto Dow is distributed amongst, you know, its members, that governance is conducting a distributed manner, if that makes sense, right? Like, you know, governance in MediCartor O'Dell is done and conducted in a very soft manner, right? It's mostly soft governance, actually. And how do you define

soft governance? I guess it's like, you know, before really any decisions are made on-chain membership proposals or funding proposals, it goes through, you know, the internal forum, right? Our internal discord chats, and we have weekly calls as well around new proposals and, you know, I guess there's like due diligence that's done right and we trusted people to conduct due diligence and you know we basically it's a it's actually heavily built on trust ironically right and it seems that we can't get away from like I guess you know human leadership as it as it is you know I think that's something that we realize that we're going to actually further invest into you know like that social scale scaleability if you well and what do you mean by that

I guess it's like, where Mediato-Vodal right now is Bordogne quite a bit governance-wise because, you know, we, I guess it's like, basically when you have one person doing a lot, that person tends to have a lot of information asymmetry, right? And because of that, you know, they basically, I guess like if people trust asymmetry, right, and trust that person's, you know, know how, then it's, it's fairly lopsided and, you know, you know, and, you, and, you up with just like people following one person right uh and that's quite inefficient just simply due to like input output right uh decisions that can be made and you know proposals that can be like processed right like it's not delegated so yeah right so then what are you saying that now you need what more people or so one of the things that we're looking to solve uh like i guess solve the social scalability problem of like dows right and how we govern this dow is by we're looking to well for 40 people right now, right? And soon it's going to be 60. Wait, you said 40? Oh. Okay. Yeah, there's 40 people right now and soon there's going to be 60,

80, 100. And that's like, you know, very unmanageable. So we're looking to actually set up working groups, right, and delegate trust and autonomy to each one, right? So it's likely going to be a working group that's going to basically be focused on technical due diligence, right? There's one that's going to be focused on outreach, one that's going to be fundraising, right? And we're starting to, and for example, right now, we're spinning out our first, I guess, like, group called the Raid Guild within our DAO. The Raid Guild? Yes.

Okay, what's that? So the Raid Guild's really focused on, like, you know, design and development of everything we need in the DAO, right? And, you know, like, we've been funding work in terms of, basically to service the DAO internally, right? But we just, we realize that even the teams who are running that need to scale socially, right? And so we're almost just starting to spin out working groups. and each one will likely have its own leader, right?

So I don't know if I totally follow, but it's like, if one of the projects needs marketing or something, then there's like an in-house marketing, is that what you're saying? Correct. There's likely going to be a shill dow, right? Where, well, the shillers go there. And just like we have a guild, like a, yeah. So just like we have a raid guild,

there's going to be a shill guild or DAL, etc., internally within it. And we kind of think about Medi-Cartor, the community and the DAO, not as like this, not as just like one organization. We think of it as a system, like a kingdom, if you will. We think of it as a kingdom where, you know, it creates economic value, but it doesn't optimize for just money, right? It optimizes for also our well-being.

You know, it invests, you know, resources into culture, right? You know, and we even have a visual map, right, internally on a figma board of, like, you know, MediCato as a kingdom. So we have forgery where it kind of like maps out. all the piece of software that we have shipped, right, and exists out there. We have like an alchemy lab where it's like ideas, right? It's almost like a visual CRM to map out the, I guess to map out the virtual reality of the Medi-Catto kingdom, right?

And it really helps us frame, like, how we should think about things, right? And on this map, we have one city right now. Imagine you have different, like, literal a map with, like, images representing buildings. right, and all the components of the Dow. From our Discord chat to our forum to our Dow Bank, right? It's all visually represented, right, by images of kingdoms and houses, town halls, right? And, like, we have a forge. It's literally a picture of a forge in the part of the city,

and then, like, the logos of the software projects around it, right, in a fence. And, you know, we're actually, as we're spinning out our working group, visually on the map, which is actually quite big. on the other side of, like, maybe a few kilometers, if you will, right? Away from the city, we're likely going to set up visually the Red Gild and that working group, right? And that's, like, helping us frame a lot of how we think about how to socially scale that out. Huh. Okay. And when you say that, you mean the, like, the daps that you're funding? Yes, I mean, like, the daps that were funding and supporting, right?

We almost see them as, like, I guess, you know, another piece of the pie or the kingdom, right? and they may start up very small, but they might have their own town and city eventually later on, right? Right. There's something about this that reminds me of, like, consensus, but like maybe with the incentives a little bit better aligned or something? We don't have a lot of money. Okay. Okay. But, yeah, I don't know if having a lot of money has worked out super well for some of the teams and consensus. So, all right, so why don't we then now talk about how governance is handled in MakerDAO? Yes. So Maker is one of the oldest projects in Ethereum. So we've been doing governance for a while. And it is not unlike what Peter mentioned. We now have reached a sort of cadence where everything starts at the forums. We used to do it just on our chat and on Reddit and on Twitter. But finally, we created a forum and everything starts there. And the community now, even though we have, and this was also voted in,

we have an interim governance facilitator, which is somebody who works at the Maker Foundation, to organize all the weekly votes because there are many and many more coming. The community is now organizing, and they create their own issues that they want to talk about and eventually vote on. But I will say that one of the main ones is, of course,

raising or lowering the stability fee. Which is basically like the interest rate? Yes, the interest rate of the die loans. And that went through many iterations. First, everything was called an executive vote. So people would vote directly with their MKR on whether a smart contract would, we call it casting a spell, whether it would actually raise it or not.

but then we realized not a lot of people voted on that so we created something called signaling votes which are much lighter they still require an on-chain transaction but they're much lighter and they don't require you to move your MKR from accounts so that it started gaining a lot of traction and then people got a little bored with it because nobody wants to vote once a week

and this is something that at least I personally want to see fixed by the community itself. I would like for them to... There's a lot of great communities that talk about decentralized finance, talk about maker, talk about other projects, and they should get together and via smart contracts delegate some of their voting power to elected members. We can learn something from traditional politics or whatever you want to call it.

But the good thing is, since this is unchanged, you can as easily give power than take it away. So you could say, let me call out a name, for example, Ryan Sean Adams. He talks about defy a lot. He has a great community with his newsletter. So maybe that community can delegate voting power to him. And he can vote on behalf of them. And then if somebody doesn't like what he's voting on, they can remove it.

So as you can see, it's very similar. It starts like signaling via forum, then signaling on the blockchain, and then finally voting with the tokens on the blockchain as well. And then how would that work technically if you delegate? Because presumably you wouldn't want to give all your tokens to Ryan, Sean Adams. No, of course. There are several ways to do it, and the simplest one would be just a smart contract that it receives tokens,

and people vote on one account. And all that account can do is with that balance, it can vote on this or that spell, as we call them, but they wouldn't be able to extract any money, just any of the MKR. Just the person who put that in, they will be able to take it out. In fact, I'm thinking about it,

it's probably a 40-line smart contract. It's just I would like people to do it. So does that literally not exist? Because it does sound like it would be so easy to do. And it sounds like it should already exist. It's very easy on the technical side, but it's not easy on the community and social side. Like getting people to actually use the smart contract? That's why I'm guessing that it's not there yet.

Okay. All right. So in a moment, we're going to discuss more about how the governance works and also things like user experience, security, and some other issues. but first a quick word from the sponsors who make the show possible. Today's episode is brought to you by Cracken. Cracken is the best exchange in the world for buying and selling digital assets. With all the recent exchange hacks and other troubles, you want to trade on an exchange you can trust.

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Join the over 1 million others and download the crypto.com app today. Will the world follow France and advocate banning privacy coins? Will government-backed stable coins become the new fiat? Are distributed and peer-to-peer exchanges just a flash in the pan? The answer is maybe. Virtual currencies can flourish and create a new, private, and more versatile economy. But that grand vision can't happen without keeping crypto clean. And that requires support of government and accountability for bad actors. Privacy. enhanced compliance using cryptographic controls has the potential to preserve anonymity without compromising legitimate investigations. CipherTrac is working on this vision of the future. Sign up to stay up to date on the Privacy Enhanced Compliance Initiative and receive authoritative crypto-aML reports quarterly. www.cifertrace.com slash keep crypto clean. Back to my conversation with Mariano and Peter. And then so actually, Actually, just before we kind of move on a little bit more into the governance, I just want to make sure.

So how do you guys fund both of these DAOs? Like, so I'm sorry, you said that there's a minimum of 10 either for Meta Cartel. But what about MakerDAO? Oh, it's. Well, MakerDAO, it sold MKR tokens way back during the day. This was even before my time. So. To like Polly Chain and Entrysson.

And yeah, but even before that to people on a forum, whoever wanted to read the white paper and wanted to participate, that was the initial. People say Maker never actually did an ICO. And I think that's true because not even the term existed. Oh, right. I think Rune said on my show, he gave it to like just community members who were really dedicated to.

Exactly. And initially, and again, this was before my time, just somebody would come in and design a logo, for example, and they would get MKR or they would do something for the community and they would get MKR. And then it was just after the fact a lot of people hired themselves just from community work. And then they started working more and more for the project. So that was initially. and then of course, yeah, selling it to investors. And that was pretty much the way it was funded. And right now, MKR token holders basically just get kind of rewarded for their work

literally by the value of the tokens going up. Is that it? So MKR holders, when the debt is paid for the CDPs, they, in the current version, single collateral die, the stability fee that debt is paid in MKR and that MKR is then burned. So that is one advantage of holding MKR. In multi-collateral dye, it works a little bit different. When somebody pays back their debt, they pay it in dye and that die is accumulated

and an auction is created and that die is used to buy MKR in the open market and then burn it as well. Okay, but like you're not actually being paid. it's simply that the value of the tokens that you have goes up. Yeah. And you were saying that for MedicareTel, you're kind of trying to figure out revenue. Right. Yeah. So right now, like, you know, all the members of MediCardt Jiao who have pledged, right,

have really pledged out of goodwill and the want to see a lot of the work that we're funding happen, right? But the truth is, there's no real incentive if you think about it, aside from, like, the belief that we're going to do something great. And, you know, MediCartel right now is at a point where we either, like, go, beg for more money, right? Or we actually try to like actually take, basically take charge of our destiny, right, and actually try to be sustainable and create incentive for people to actually, you know, be part of the DAL and also fund the work that we want to get to see done, right? So very soon, you know, in about a month's time, right, we're going to be deploying a new DAO, right?

We haven't caught anything, but we're working for Open Law, right, to deploy a little. legal DAL allow, if you will, right? Oh, wow. That is actually a registered entity, which we actually a Dellw or a series LLC, right, which actually we got a confirmation back a couple days ago. And that will

actually serve as a, I guess, you know, the representation of this DAL, right? And it will be able to actually legally now generate revenue and take in funds, right, pledges from accredited and non-accredited investors, right?

As opposed to right now, you know, it's just we don't have a legal entity, well, operating fairly in the grade zone. Even though we're, so we haven't really been able, we haven't really been able to capture any value because it'd be illegal and it'd be technically classified as securities, right? But now with this next, I guess, like stage, right, we're looking to create a second doubt, right, that will enable this possibility to occur and, I guess, incentive, right, for the community to be part of it. It's super interesting because, yeah, I was going to ask you guys about this open law, Dow and Laos in general. But so, yeah, I have like a gazillion questions for you.

But before we get into kind of some of these other topics, I just want to talk about the Dow itself. Because like, I think to me, I'm a little bit like, oh, I like if I were to sort of judge where Dao's are right now, I would sort of say there may be where stable coins were, like 18 months to two years ago. but like that's kind of amazing because obviously three years ago was the Dow. So I just wanted to know from your perspective, like what do you guys feel were like the main lessons from the Tao or like what do you think people in general think about what happened with the Dow? I would say that people are kind of, I don't want to say forgetting about it, but they're moving past it. It's, we're out of face. I participated in the DAO, and I remember it. I wasn't that big into, I was a holder, but that was it.

I didn't know too much about the ecosystem as a whole. I thought it was fine that the Hartford was created. I'm okay with how history went, right? And the DAO was, I think if it hadn't had happened, then DAO would be much bigger right now. We're like picking up the pieces of what happened and getting past the trauma of it and saying, hey, we can do the idea. It was okay, but let's try and learn from it and do it a little bit differently.

And what do you feel people have learned from it? Or how do you feel like the trend is different now because that happened? It was just the Dow was a product of its time. I don't see almost anything else getting that much money that quickly now. We're past that craze. So first, people know not to trust random smart contracts now. There is a lot of... People's laughing.

Like laughing, laughing. No, because there is a lot of social stigma. If you either don't have an audit now or you centralize certain things. And this reminds me that, I mean, through Mollock, he talked to this guy from compound and asking him... about the audits for... Do you have an admin function? Do you have an ampin function?

No. No, and then he said, okay, do you want us to fund some kind of thing to review the contracts? And then it's like, no, no, no, we do have an audit. I'll show it to you. And that created a whole feedback look. So I don't think anybody would be able to create something like the Dow right now. There's just we know better.

But other than that, the ideas are not that different. We're exploring something new and with the profit-sharing capabilities of maybe new DAOs wrapped up under some kind of legal, what do you call it? I guess a Lao. A Tao wrapped in a Lao? Yeah. Well, so actually, let's talk about Lao's now. I had that question for later, but like this is an interesting.

topic. So actually, before we get there, I just wanted to know, like, when do you think something should be governed by a Dow versus, like, when should it be governed by, like, a traditional corporation or, like, a conventional nonprofit or, like, any other kind of legacy structure? And I guess, in your case, you're, like, doing both, so. I guess, like, so I think the interesting thing about DAOs is that, you know, first of all, I really don't like talking, like using a word Dow for a lot of reasons, but the main reason is that, you know, there's nothing too special about DALs. We've had groups of people for a long time, right?

And there's just been groups of people have been coordinating using different mediums, right, and different governance structures. And maybe now we just are able to coordinate the same groups of people, but with, you know, on Chain Valley, right, in a distributed manner, right? I think that's a real difference. I guess when we're talking about DALs, right, it's really like, groups of people with discrete governance, right? And by that you just mean like disparate people on the internet

where they can be anywhere, they don't have to be physically. Correct. That's kind of the interesting thing actually, right? Technically, you can, you know, like, yes, it can be anyone and it can happen anywhere and very easily with very low friction. So like what if it were just like a Facebook group where, you know, there's like people in the group and then they can just put a little, put comments on a thread in Facebook and be like, you know, I vote this way or that, way, then is that a DAO?

I guess a DAO, we're getting into the definitions, but, you know, like, I'd say my definition of a DAO is that, you know, groups of people coordinating value together, right? And in our case, in our context, on chain value. Okay, okay, so that's where the blockchain aspect comes in. I would add that, yeah, groups of people coordinating, but bound by the rules of, in this case, a smart contract. So bound by the code that is in the blockchain. And to your point, if you said, do we need DAO's for everything or not?

I would say if your project is called something Dow, then yeah, because you're signaling that you want to decentralize, that you want people to make choices. But I don't subscribe to the fact that everything, every single thing has to be decentralized. We're working off of a decentralized platform that is. Ethereum. But then if the rules are clear and the code is clear, then I don't mind using something that somebody tells me, hey, I have the master key if that is told to me up front, that I have the choice to use it or not to use it. If a project says that they're decentralized or they're striving for as much decentralization as they can possibly be or get, then I do expect a little bit more from them. But I'm not, I won't say no to, maybe I won't use it, but I

won't say this project, just because it does have an owner or like a multi-sac behind, I will not use it. If that is told to me up front. So it's more about transparency. Exactly. Yeah. So actually, I want to actually dive into this a little bit more because like this has come up in a serious way with Magerdow where, you know, there's been this like governance turmoil where, um, so both the CTO, Andy Millennius and then Ashley Schap, who I guess did like business development or whatever, they, they left. And I guess a bunch of other people left also after, um, MakerDAO CEO, Roone Christensen kind of presented this choice between a red pill, which was about like making MakerDAO compliant with regulatory regimes. Um, and, you know, work with the exact.

existing financial system. And then the blue pill was basically like, if you don't agree, then, then like, you got to go. Um, so like, Andy wrote this very long document kind of detailing that whole history. And, you know, the way he tells it, it's like he really believes that Rune kind of commandeered the project instead of like allowing it to be this like group effort, this decentralized effort. So, you know, to my mind, it also just kind of made me wonder, like, you know, so Maker Dow is this decentralized autonomous organization. and yet there's also the CEO. It's literally its title.

So like, you know, how do those things fit together? For a long time, we used the term MakerDAO interchangeably with the Maker Foundation. So I think it's good to separate both. MakerDAO is the protocol, is the layer on the blockchain. And the Maker Foundation is in charge of bootstrapping that, getting it run, it autonomously with as many actors as possible and then taking a step back. So one thing is the Maker Foundation and other things like the Maker Dow. And there's only so much that I can say that I will say that I always tell my friends.

I'm 38, but I say crypto is high school. It feels like high school again with higher stakes. I don't want to minimize what happened. But I do agree that in order for us and as an Argentine, I see this a lot with finance. We try to take ourselves away from the system, and that is a bit more like cypherpunk, pure blockchain kind of thing. But then once you try to do things at scale,

then you're going to find out, then every project is finding out that you do need to play by the books and talk to regulators. and if you want to interface with the real world and tokenized assets or securities into a project, you're going to have to open yourself up for the regular financial system and change it maybe from within. So I'd say like for MediCato, I feel like we have a very pragmatic stance, right? Where we're not chasing this mirror image of like or this like mirage of what we should be,

what things could be, you know, from the very start, from the Dow, right, from the medical data, we coordinated to collect funds to fund work that needs to be done, right? And this was the easiest way to do so. There was no red tape. We just launched a smart contract, basically went on asking people, and it was there and there, and we started coordinating, right? Similar to Mullock, we would have never existed with a traditional organization, with this many tiny sums of money, right? And continually, I guess, to continue on. We're looking to create incentives and basically we want to serve more people in our community, right? We want to basically help more projects get funded, great projects that may be

great, profitable and sustainable businesses, right? So we kind of see this as like the next step that enables us, right, to create more value for the people that we are looking to help, right? We're not trying to be some random like, you know, Dow, right? This peer you took a token. endow for the sake of it. No, we want to help real people and we want to leverage, right, Dows and webpre technologies, right, to kind of like leverage and go as far as we can, right? Rather than, like, you know, spend like a whole year designing, you know, incentive mechanisms. You know, we want to, like, move fast and, like, create as much real value, right? So you're both taking, like, this pragmatic approach. Well, but one thing I wanted to know was, like,

so when it comes to something like the MakerDown Foundation or the Maker Foundation, that kind of creates like a centralization point where like if the authorities decide to come after the maker foundation then what what happens to megerdaugh well that's a great question um and i'm on the engineering side so i want to say i have no idea but i i should maybe give my opinion um the protocol the protocol continues on the blockchain it's like that's unstoppable i would say i don't know if we um The idea is to try to open ourselves up and talk to regulators, and that's what we've been doing. So I can't imagine a world where it would just be like, okay, shut it down and cannot work on this anymore. It's like everything that's already on the blockchain would probably continue.

That's kind of the ceiling that we'd be plink with, right? like until we have dows and can coordinate like military forces right to basically fight governments right it's like we're really playing under the car jurisdiction's like roof right and i'm pretty sure no government would allow anyway a doubt that funded some kind of militia but anyway i'm just i'm just surmising yeah i mean i mean the most governments operate for violence and ability to you know to operate in physical, right? Yeah. Well, so why don't we now go, I know we keep saying we're going to talk about the Lao thing, but why don't we just do this right now, actually, because this is really interesting to me. So you guys have described this, but I'll just define it a little bit

more for the listener. So Open law created this like basically a legal wrapper for a Dow, which essentially is just like a separate legal entity that could be responsible for certain things. Like if there's like violations of law that occur with the Dow or, yeah, in the case like accepting funds from like accredited investors or whatever. So do you guys feel like this is like eventually the way that all of the DAOs will have to go that they're going to have to have some kind of legal entity associated with them? I know that and I'm switching from DAO to DAO, but in the case of Mollock, for example, the members did talk a lot about it. And I forget what the exact conclusion was. So somewhere in favor of trying this out.

of doing, like, wrapping the Dow with like a legal framework. Others were against it. They say, this is too early. We don't need it yet. We're working on a, I believe Moloch has around a million dollars budget, maybe 1.2. Some members are anonymous. They said, we're not there yet. And then others just wanted to see, hey, this is a good experiment.

and if somebody's going to push it forward, then why not let it be us? But in the case of Mollock, I believe it didn't reach any conclusion yet. And like if there's some kind of disagreement or like, yeah, just something where I guess different parties cannot agree, is it literally just the rage quit function there? Or is there some way that, you know, you guys think that these DAO should intersect with real laws? So interestingly, we had a very similar conversation within Medicaretoe doubt, right? Like, you know, we need to win a position where we either, you know, as again, beg for money or become sustainable and generate revenue, right?

And deal with securities essentially, right? And, you know, Mariano's right. You know, there's a lot of tradeoffs of becoming, you know, compliant. A lot of tradeoffs, advantages, disadvantages of being, you know, completely, I guess, unregulated and in the dark, right? And we realized that, you know, we didn't know, I guess, like, yes, it's like we didn't know which one was the right move, right, but we needed to make one. And we realized, that's when we'd realize we'd why not have set up a second down rather than to make it irreversible decision, right, with the first one. And you realize that, why not?

And there's no real reason we couldn't. We had a community, right, that could operate to. And we decided, and, you know, working with open one, we decided that was a very clear next step, right? I think no one's really taken and we want to see what happens, right? And go ahead first. Oh, this is really interesting. So it's like basically use allow in the limited instances when like you absolutely need allow. And then like for everything else, just like make it decentralized.

Something like that. Is that what you're? I mean, yes and no, right? I mean, that was that comes from a different conversation where we were like, let's set up just a normal company, right, to deal with all the, you know, I guess the matters that had to deal with the real. world, right? But I guess, like, how we're looking to structure is that, you know, this revenue-generating down will be focused on profits, right? Well, like the Dow, it would be like the original Dow. Similar, yes. And the Medi-Cato-Di-Raean. But not like the original doubt, let's hope. But anyway. Yeah. And the Medi-Cato-Dal world would be focused on, you know,

pure ecosystem value on the application layer, similar to how Molek is focused on pure value on the core development layer, right? And, you know, ideally we actually have this, you know, revenue generating DAO, right, that provides value back to the ecosystem as well, right? A percentage that goes back to Medico Dow and the Molek, for example, right? Because while grant funding isn't everything and it can't be everything, they have that place in the ecosystem, right? Yeah. I also wanted to ask about the votes in MakerDAO kind of, they don't seem super decentralized. I noticed for some of the recent votes that one of them,

the top voter accounted for 40% of one vote. There was another one where the top voter accounted for 84% of one vote. And then also these are just like really small numbers of voters. It's like 20 voters, 30 voters. So how decentralized is that, you know, if it's like really like one person can kind of sway things so much and like it's not even that many people? Yeah, that is a problem that we're trying to.

to fix and and it's voter apathy as I said it's um just the fact that those were I believe some of the later votes if you look at initially we had a lot more people voting and and they were happy to do so and it was oh finally once everybody started voting with their mkr it's like okay the system is now working we're making decisions together and then next week It's like, okay, maybe we need to raise the stability fee a little bit more. Okay, I'll do another vote. And then next week we need to have a new one. And then people just stop voting.

So now we only have, like you said, a number of people voting with it. One of the things also is that there are certain institutions that have MKR and are not voting because they have their tokens under custody. And I know Coinbase, for example, is working. They have the Coinbase custody where they're going to allow people with certain tokens to, for example, in the case of MKR, vote and governance. But until that is there, then I think we're going to stay with somewhat lower voter turnout until those kind of things are in places. Or we institute what I mentioned earlier. The delegated.

Yeah. And so we kind of referred to Rage Quit a little bit briefly. This is the function where basically if people kind of disagree with what's going on in Molligda, they can literally just leave with their tokens. I've heard people saying that they view this as a really smart and important feature. Do you guys agree with that? And if so, like, why do you think it was such a great idea to implement that? Yeah, Rage Quit was...

And now talking in the grant style, Moloch-like things, it was one of the reasons that made me join with almost no second thought, thinking, okay, I can put my money towards, initially Moloch Dow was going to fund Ethereum 2.0 initiatives. That was the, that was their spiel. It was And the first grant actually was the state of Ethereum 2.0 by Kiyokin that, I mean, and somebody else, they're requested. I said, this is incredible. It was a really big amount of money for me, 100th. It's significant. But just the idea that I could remove it if I wanted to, I think that also gave a lot of people the chance to say, okay, yes, I'm going to do this.

And in any case, I don't think anybody has RageQuit, at least from Moloch yet. The closest we were was probably the Yangdou. But also, Rishquit is very simple because it's the only way for grantees to receive their money. It's like when I'm inbuilt that, initially he said, I want the code to be as simple as possible because it is not audited proper. No, it had one audit, yeah. I'm sorry. Yeah, it did have an audit. So, and a lot of eyes looking at the code.

But I don't think anybody expected it would get that amount of money. So one of the things is if I can take it out any time. Yeah. And I saw somebody else saying that they thought it was a really smart idea because otherwise you would get people that weren't aligned that would be stuck in an organization together and that you would end up with factions. But I guess now, like, people can go off and create their own. So, yes, it's a great escape hatch, which anyone can dip out under, right, at any time, really, right? It's beautiful. But the thing on factions, you know, like, that's an interesting thing about, like, large social groups, you know, people, the social asymmetry, right, where people know each other and they tend to know others, and this creates natural, you know, I guess, collects even within the large social community, right? Like, Mollock is like 80-something members, right? MediCardels 40, as you get larger and larger, right, there's different factions, and politics comes into play quite heavily at the stage, especially with, say, you know, Mollock,

where it's transitioning into, from a single, submonist leadership structure to, you know, more of a collective council structure, right? We're going to see politics come into play a lot more as the grounds become more even. Oh, wow. So, yeah, this goes back to how so much of the governance for both of your DAOs really depends on like the phone calls and the discord groups and whatever. So we're kind of running out of time. But because you mentioned security and the audits and stuff, I definitely want to, you know, discuss this. You know, obviously we talked about the DAO where, you know, a third of the value of that contract was drained and that caused the hard fork in Ethereum and everything. In MakerDAO this year alone, there were two vulnerabilities, one found in the live contract. And

then one in the upcoming multilateral die system that's going to be launched later. So in general, like, you know, and I know you're head of this. So what do you guys do to mitigate the risks and, like, you know, how do you think about security in general for DAWS? Oh, we've, the code from multicilateral dye has been almost at a code freeze for a long time now, I would say a few months. And the last vulnerability that you mentioned, It was disclosed recently, but it was found like a month and a half ago.

And it was found during the actual proper process of software development. You write code, you test it as much as you can, and then in this case you have different audits running at the same time and also a bug bounty. In this case, with the bug bounty, the hacker actually found the vulnerability through the bug bounty one day before one of the auditors found it. Oh, wow. So this is an incredibly talented individual. If they had found it one day later, then it wouldn't have been too much news

because we would have patched it before and the bounty would not have been. And then a second audit also discovered the vulnerability as well. So in this case, I think because the article first mentioned that it wasn't the live system and then they had to retract, I think it got a lot more. more attention that maybe it should have because it was really a part of the natural process of building software. Building it, testing it, and then releasing, which we haven't done yet. And yeah, in the case of the other vulnerability that you mentioned, that was in one of the libraries that we use for governance. And yeah, that was, it could have been the collateral,

was always safe for individuals. So that wasn't initially a problem there. But no, we were lucky that it was found via sepulent during audit for coin-based custody. Well, wait, but so what was at risk? Because I thought it was actually the collateral that was at risk. On the first version? On the live, yeah, contract. No, if I remember correctly, what you could do, was freeze people's MKR in the voting contract. So not the ETH collateral for the DICE system. The MKR that's locked in the voting contract to signal voting for governance.

Okay. And so, yeah, that that could have been... Which is more like about power. Yeah. And that could have been grieved, and luckily it wasn't. And it was a stressful weekend, but we upgraded the system.

And what about for the multi-collateral die? What was the amount of that bounty? I think we paid $50,000. In any buck bounty, you establish different criteria. And then you go from the highest to the lowest. And so in this case, we did manage to pay out one of the highest that we set out for. Okay. And so I wanted to also ask one other thing about the multi-collateral dialanche because it's going to depend on oracles as far as I understand.

Just like the current version, yes. Yeah, so, but, you know, now there's like a lot more oracles. So how do you select oracles and how do you, you know, ensure that they're trustworthy and can't be game to, you know, allow people to take advantage of the system? Well, we have the Oracle's fee to proposal that it's also. going to have to be voted in via governance. But what we're going to do is we're moving away from the Oracle's V1 architecture that was built around two and a half years ago. So Oracle's V2, they are a lot more, they're a lot cheaper to run.

They depend a lot on off-chain message signing and on-chain aggregation. And we are going to have the community vote on additional. feed providers to the oracles. We are still going to have certain number of those feed providers be anonymous, let's call it pseudonymous, because there are

a couple of people who know who they are. But for safety, their identity is not disclosed, but now we're going to have other projects become feed providers. And I think we announced this already. It was a zero ex nosis set. I'm going to forget one, sorry,

but Maker was one, and maybe one more. And we're going to be adding more of those because these projects, they already use the Maker-Oracles version 1. So we're going to try to bring more and more projects in there.

One of the criticisms that I get a lot is that why don't we use on-chain, purely on-chain sources? I don't think we're there yet. There's not liquidity in like order books or the Uniswap can keep

be game. I don't want to say game. But yeah, with not too much money, you can move the market. But I am always on the look at, I'm talking to, I've talked to people from like TBTC to Matt Longo. I've talked to a heart from UMA. I don't remember who else, but I know that the Hayden from Uniswap. They're building oracles into Uniswap B2.

Balancer. finance is going to come out with some sort of price sensor, they call it. So we are getting there, but we're not quite there yet. So we're still going to do, we have a blog post about our Oracle strategy. And I just want to say that in the current version of dye, we use it for two or three things to, of course, check if your collateral is safe, if your ratio is safe. in multilateral dye, we only use it for that. We don't use it when we liquidate because it's auction-based,

so we're trying to rely less and less on it. But we still have one point where, of course, we need to read from an Oracle. Okay. All right. So we're really running on our time, but I do want to know before we leave, what are you most excited about what Dow is going forward?

What are you looking forward to either doing or seeing in the Dow space? I'm really excited about how DALs, right, which are really, if you think about it, an inter-native, I'm really excited about how they're bringing people into the physical world, actually. Because the Metacartole Dau has somehow, like, you know, inside and established this thing called M-Con, were actually soon after DevCon, right, we're actually going to Denver in-person to be doing a short in-person sprint on how to launch NextDal, right? and it's just funny that, you know, everyone, even though no one's being paid to do this,

everyone thought it would be a good idea to do so, right? To travel from all these different countries and places to kind of like meet in real life and work on this, right? And it's interesting because, like, for example, there's several members of the Dow, right, which I've worked heavily and they've worked quite a bit on the medical adult Dowell, right? And I haven't even met them in real life yet, right? But you will. But I will, right?

And it's strange to see, like, us being brought together into the physical from outside in, right, by this community that can coordinate value time and effort. Cool. In my case, I just really, on a social level, I want to see what decentralized finance can do for emerging economies like Argentina and other countries. On a technical level, there's so much that I couldn't just say one thing. But social level, I really want us to tackle problems in countries like Argentina, Venezuela, and others. Yeah, I urge people to watch Mariano's talk from DevCon because it was great. I wanted to ask you a few questions about that, but I knew I had like way too many questions about Dow. So I was like, oh, I need to lay off those questions.

But I watched it. And yeah, it was awesome. Thank you. All right. So where can people learn more about you? and MakerDAO slash Saladau and Metacartel. So MakerDAO, you can go to MakerDow.com or chat.macredaO.com. And like me, Mariano personally, I'm at NANEC school on Twitter.

And you can follow me there to learn about my wacky experiments like the Salaf Dow and other stuff. You can always find me on Twitter at P-E-T-3-R-P-N-S-Sk. I mean, you can also search Medi-Cato app and, you know, always online everywhere. Great. All right. Well, thanks for coming on UnChain. Thank you. Thanks so much for joining us today. To learn more about Mariano, Peter, Maker-Dow, and Medi-Cartel, check with the show notes inside your podcast player. If you're not yet subscribed to my other podcast, Unconfirmed, which is shorter, a bit newsier,

now features a short news recap. Be sure to check that out. Also, find out what I think are the top crypto stories each week by signing up for my email newsletter at Unchainedpodcast.com. Unchained is produced by me, Laura Shin, with help from factual recording, Anthony Eune, Daniel Nuss, and Josh Durham. Thanks for listening.