We Study Billionaires - The Investor’s Podcast Network - RWH017: Fidelity Legend Joel Tillinghast
Episode Date: November 27, 2022IN THIS EPISODE, YOU’LL LEARN: 03:07 - How Joel Tillinghast fell in love with investing as a boy of eight or nine. 07:51 - What he learned from his first investment, which he’s (so far) held for... 54 years. 09:12 - Why it’s critical not to overpay, even when you’re investing in a superb business. 11:04 - How his approach differs from the strategy of another Fidelity legend, Will Danoff. 14:55 - What Joel admires about Cathie Wood. 19:20 - What he learned from a disastrous macroeconomic bet using borrowed money. 33:36 - Why it’s important to invest in “adaptive companies.” 34:50 - How he was hired at Fidelity after cold calling Peter Lynch. 39:56 - How young people can break into the investment business at a firm like Fidelity. 44:59 - What qualities made Peter Lynch a wildly successful stock picker. 53:38 - Why Joel avoids biotech stocks. 54:25 - Why it’s critical to know yourself & stick to games where you truly have an edge. 56:47 - How he thinks about diversification & why he owns a huge number of stocks. 1:11:07 - How he made more than 1,000 times his money investing in Monster Beverage. 1:10:08 - How emotional exhaustion led him to announce his retirement next year. 1:23:12 - How he was affected by a terrifying experience of an earthquake in Japan. 1:27:21 - How to handle adversity by letting go of what we can’t control. 1:29:26 - What he’s trying to teach Fidelity’s next generation of fund managers. 1:32:27 - What gives Joel satisfaction as he looks back on his extraordinary career. 1:35:24 - What he learned from his beloved father. Disclaimer: Slight discrepancies in the timestamps may occur due to podcast platform differences. BOOKS AND RESOURCES Join the exclusive TIP Mastermind Community to engage in meaningful stock investing discussions with Stig, Clay, and the other community members. Joel Tillinghast’s Fidelity Low-Priced Stock Fund. Joel’s book, Big Money Thinks Small: Biases, Blind Spots, & Smarter Investing. William Green’s book, “Richer, Wiser, Happier” – read the reviews of this book. William Green’s Twitter. NEW TO THE SHOW? Check out our We Study Billionaires Starter Packs. Browse through all our episodes (complete with transcripts) here. Try our tool for picking stock winners and managing our portfolios: TIP Finance Tool. Enjoy exclusive perks from our favorite Apps and Services. Stay up-to-date on financial markets and investing strategies through our daily newsletter, We Study Markets. Learn how to better start, manage, and grow your business with the best business podcasts. SPONSORS Support our free podcast by supporting our sponsors: River Toyota Sun Life The Bitcoin Way Range Rover Sound Advisory BAM Capital Fidelity SimpleMining Briggs & Riley Public Shopify Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm
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You're listening to TIP.
Hi there. I'm really happy to introduce the legendary Joel Tillinghast, who's our guest on today's
episode of the podcast. Joel is one of the undisputed giants of the investing world. Peter Lynch,
who hired him at Fidelity in the 1980s, has described Joel as one of the greatest, most successful
stock pickers of all time. Joel became the manager of Fidelity's low-price stock fund back in
1989, and he still manages it to this day. Over 33 years, he's racked up a spectacular record,
beating his benchmark index by about 3.7 percentage points a year. As I'm sure you know, it's extremely
rare to beat the market by such a wide margin over decades. But it's even harder to outperform
when you manage an enormous amount of money like Joel, who has something like $70 billion
of assets under management. He also has the most diverse,
a diversified portfolio of any great investor I've ever interviewed.
He currently owns about 880 stocks,
whereas most of the best investors tend to be relatively concentrated
in a small number of stocks.
So, in multiple ways, he's a total outlier.
Peter Lynch has said that he's amazed by Joel's almost unworldly ability
to consume mountains of information about hundreds of companies at a time,
analyze it, distill it, and use it to find long-term winners.
while avoiding many of the losers. I think Lynch is on to something really important here.
It's not just that Joel is great at picking winners like Monster Beverage, which has gone up
more than a thousandfold since he bought it two decades ago. It's that he's also great,
but avoiding losers. When I interviewed Joel for my book, Richer, Wiser Happier,
he listed an array of rules that help him to avoid losing money on stocks. For example,
he told me, don't pay too much. Don't invest with crooks and idiots.
Don't invest in things you don't understand.
You also warned against investing in companies that are deeply cyclical or heavily indebted or faddish
or businesses that use aggressive accounting.
This is hard-earned investment wisdom that I think all of us should take to heart.
In today's conversation, Joel shares a lot of other valuable advice that I hope will help
you to survive and prosper for many years to come.
Thanks a lot for joining us.
You're listening to The Richer, Wiser, Happier Podcast, where your host, William Green, interviews the world's greatest investors and explores how to win in markets and life.
Hi, folks, I'm really delighted to be here with today's guest, who's Joel Tillinghast.
Joel has beaten the market by an enormous margin as a fund manager at Fidelity since 1989, and it's really one of the great long-term investors of our time.
So it's great to see you, Joel.
Thank you so much for being here with us.
Thank you.
I wondered if we could start with talking a little bit about your early experiences, your
really very early experiences as an investor, because I remember you telling me once that
you started reading publications like Value Line back when you were about eight or nine, and I
think bought your first stock when you were about 10 back in 1968, which is the year I was born
actually.
And I wanted to get a sense of how you came to be interested in investing at such a precocious age.
My mother subscribed to a publication called the Value Line Investment Survey.
And my grandfather had passed away and had left a few stocks.
And they wanted to make sure that they were doing the right thing with them, although they also concluded that grandpa had made a lot of good decisions and just stuck with them.
but they wanted to be sure that they were holding the right stocks to track them.
And Value Line was one thing that they subscribed.
And Value Line runs on a 13-week cycle.
And they would offer these teaser subscriptions where for a cheaper price,
you would get about 13 weeks for a reduced price.
And they would get those every two years ago.
they'd get another teaser subscription because they like to save money and weren't trading that much.
But it was curious about them because they were interested in them.
There were lots of numbers.
And as a kid, I was fascinated with numbers and enjoyed working out things that like if you
divide or if you multiply 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 8, you get something like 9, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3,2,000,
Not very precisely, but yeah, I liked numbers and there were lots of them and tried to understand what the numbers went and liked seeing growth progressions.
And a company called Beckman Instruments had very strong earnings progression.
And my dad was a biologist.
He was excited about a piece of lab equipment that allowed him to do tests.
It was chromatography where you drip the proteins out and you can tell what's in there and did it with
much greater speed. Arnold Beckman, who had founded the company, was sort of a techn genius,
beloved of biologists and healthcare people because these instruments really did save time and
allowed them to do things that they weren't able to do before. So one of my first two
purchases, along with Central Main Power, was two shares of Beckman instruments.
And how did you come up with the money for it?
I had saved money from selling vegetables, door to door, mowing lawns, gifts.
Yeah, that was about $104 for the two shares of Beckman instruments. The commissions were huge.
And how did it turn out?
over the next four or five years, not very well.
The earnings of the company kept going up.
The starting PE had been something like 40,
and that compressed and kept falling and kept falling.
So by mid, by 1974, it was probably down to about an 8 PE.
So it was kind of disappointing, although market relative,
It probably was all right that in absolute dollars it was very disappointing.
But I held on to it and the earnings kept growing.
In fact, they kept growing at a double-digit rate because Beckman kept turning out more innovative instruments that sold well.
And they kept doing well until they got bought by a drug company.
Smith-Kline, which merged with Beecham, and they later decided that drug companies really
shouldn't be in the healthcare instrument research business. They spun it back out. So I got some
of what eventually became Glaxo-SmithKline when they bought it out, but also some Beckman
instruments, which later got bought out by Gannaher. But I still have the Glaxo-Smith-Cline shares in
the dividends every quarter or something like two or three times the initial purchase price of the
stock. I think last time I spoke to you, you had made something like a hundred times the original
price just off the Glaxo and then, you know, you'd got the spinoffs to Allegan and Danahar
and all these other things. And what strikes me is absolutely amazing. And I was going to write about it
in my book, Richard Weiser, Happier, and then I ended up focusing on a different part of your story.
But it's an absolutely extraordinary thing that you've basically owned the first stock that you bought at the age of 10 for now 54 years.
It's astounding.
Yeah.
So I guess after all that time, it should be giving me dividends of three times my cost basis every quarter.
But it gives a sense of just how preternaturally patient you are.
I mean, there's something kind of beautiful about it because obviously you also really adore you.
your father and he was a kind of hero to you. And so you were inspired by him. And there's something
kind of wonderful about the fact that your first stock pick was in some way inspired by the fact
that your father was a biologist. And so in a way, it was within the family's circle of competence,
even if not within your circle of competence. And in a way, there's something about this
original stock purchase that is kind of revealing about who you are and your family background,
your incredible patience. But also, I think it illustrates some really interesting ideas about
investing that you would later internalize. So, I mean, for one thing, this idea that even if you
buy a great company, if you overpay for it, it's a huge mistake. Is that fair to say that's one
of the great lessons of this early investment? Yeah, I guess if you have the greatest companies
like Amazon looking backwards has not really mattered what price you paid, but for really
quite excellent but human companies like Beckman.
instruments, yeah, the price matters a fair bit because markets slow, innovative companies
lose their edge, things change. And so not overpaying is really important. But I guess
I lucked out in having a really superb company with Beckman instruments. And not so much
with central main power, which paid a dividend, but really didn't do a whole lot for me.
I remember you saying that another of those very early companies you bought was Armstrong rubber,
and you're telling me that there was this kind of miracle that you would get a $4 dividend for it quarterly,
which was exactly the same amount you got for mowing lawns.
And I was just wondering, was there a kind of beauty to investing, to this idea that just by using your mind
and placing these intelligent bats, you could make money without actually having to do any very
vigorous work in a yard or harvesting tomatoes and zucchini and the like from your parents'
garden?
It was sort of amazing too much. Obviously, in three months, I could do a lot more lawns than
dividend checks from Armstrong rubber. But yeah, it was kind of amazing to say that you could
earn money without having to physically exert yourself.
There's also an interesting thing when I think about Beckman Instruments that in some ways
it illustrates your colleague Will Danoff's point to me in my book, which is that stocks follow
earnings, that eventually if a company's earnings grow very strongly, that's likely to be
reflected by the stock price, albeit you don't want to overpay. Is there something, I mean,
in some ways there's a difference between you and Will, right? And you're more valuation conscious.
Can you talk a bit about how this company maybe illustrates that fundamental
difference between you and Will, who in some ways is the other great fidelity investor of your
generation who's been there for all of this time? Yeah. Overvalue is the present value of dividends
from here to eternity. And retrospectively, unless you had a very high dividend,
discount rate, the realized dividends on Beckman Instruments have said it was really pretty
undervalued even at 40 times earnings, but that's a rare stock. And I think there are big
constituencies in the market. You can model the market as having three or four different types
of agents. One agent says, give me something that's getting much better right now in a very
visible and public way. So nobody's going to say anything bad about it. Will is good at this.
I'm terrible at that.
The second set of agents says, how can you beat the market?
It's by having companies that grow earnings and probably the rest of their business at above average rates,
further into the future than people are imagining with higher visibility than people think.
And I think that this works because people's attentions are scattered and they're distracted by what's happening now.
and wow, it's getting so much better.
But I think what Will is fantastic at is thinking about will this business be much, much bigger,
five or ten years from now.
And is it the best in class?
He doesn't want to have the number three in anything that's a cheaper multiple.
He wants the best in class.
He wants the business winner where you can confidently talk about where they'll
be in five years or 10 years. It takes big barriers to entry. It takes domain expertise. A focused and
brilliant leader, sometimes will get obsessive about this and pushes it as bet with billionaires.
Will Jeff Bezos make the right decision? Well, the track record says yes. Will Mark Zuckerberg?
Well, the track record is mostly positive, but I have my concerns, but that's part of which
you're evaluating.
So in a way, part of the moral, I think, when I look at the differences between you and
Will Danoff is that you've both found ways to invest that suit your personality.
So I remember you saying, for example, once to me that Will is great at building these
relationships and is very intuitive at judging people like Jeff Bezos.
or he was incredibly early in meeting Elon Musk and seeing that there was something special
about Musk that Musk was doing at Tesla and made a very early investment in Tesla.
Is that fair to say that in some way, part of the key to being a very successful investor
is to understand your own abilities and temperament what you're strong at?
And so you're playing a very different game.
So you're still exploiting the fact that stocks eventually, the stock price eventually will
follow the earnings, but you're much more value-oriented. You're much more defensive than will.
Yeah, I think stocks will follow earnings. I'm skeptical of people's ability to look too far out
into the future. Kathy Wood, do you love her or do you hate her? What I admire is she is trying to
look into the distant future, which I think not enough people do, but she's,
also trying to do it in the area where things change the fastest, things are the most path-dependent,
and there's little history to tell you what to do. And if you're defending her and say,
she may not know much, but she knows a whole lot more than anybody else about where the industry
she's talking about will be in 10 years. And I think Will does that with,
ingredients or assumptions that I can trust. He does look at track record mostly. Businesses are run
by human beings. And so saying this is a really amazing manager in Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos or
whoever gives you confidence in the outlook and more confidence than the market. It's hard for people
to value that, and I think that's part of what Will does so well. But I am trying to do that
with more caution because some of the businesses that I have are more commodity-like. And you can't
look so far. I can to shy away from those super commodity businesses, as does Will, which means
that something like energy is somewhat tough for us because they don't.
have as much control over their destiny. There are better managers. There are worse managers.
They're better positioning. There's worse positioning. But you don't have companies able to set
their own agenda and will gravitates to companies that are setting their own agenda where no focus
group said, gosh, we need Amazon World Services, but now it's the biggest contributor to profits at Amazon.
I wanted to go back to some of your earlier experiences as an investor because I know, amazingly,
after you had been studying Value Line as a young kid of eight or nine, you ended up getting a job
at Value Line later on after college. And I think you told me once that you were paid $13,000 a year
and worked in Queens and won the stock investing price.
I worked in Manhattan, but lived in Queens. And I was wondering if you learned anything from
the value line formulaic approach to investing in terms of how to deal with emotion or how to
just how to think about the relationship between value and growth and the like?
The value line has got its name because they have what they call a value line.
They multiply earnings or cash flow times average multiple and say this is the fair value of
the stock. And so it's undervalued or overvalued. And it's an oversimplified version of value
investing, but it is value investing. And I think that influenced me a lot. And they also have what
they call a timeliness rank, which is more a, is this a good short-term trade or trade over
the next year? And it's a bunch of things that go into the timeliness.
rank, are the earnings rising fast? Is the stock price rising? But going back to the value line itself,
it's a reiteration of Will's mantra, stocks and earnings go together, or at least the value of it
does. Did there eventually be some kind of convergence between the growth rate and the growth in
intrinsic value and the stock price itself? Yeah. The idea of value line that
If you have a fixed multiple of 10, then the earnings go up by 50 cents, then the fair value
is up $5, which is obviously oversimplified, but directionally correct.
And then you ended up spending about four years as a financial futures research analyst
at Drexel Burnham, Lambert, I think, from the early 80s around 1982 to 86.
And in your book, which is excellent, which I have behind me, which is big money, think small,
sorry, I keep getting the name wrong, but it's a really interesting book. I was rereading it
yesterday. It's a very helpful book, so thank you for writing it. In your book, you described this
really formative experience of trying to figure out whether you could predict economic statistics
and then making an early bet using futures on margin, on interest rates back in I think about
1983. Can you talk about what happened and what you learned from that? Because it sounds like
that negative experience also had a pretty big impact on the type of investor you'd become.
Yeah. For part of it, I was still, that time, I was still in business school and had lots of
student loans and a tight budget, even though I was working. And so I didn't have that money to trade.
And brought my job at Drexel was as a research economist. Part of that is putting together
hedging packages for customers that wanted to hedge their interest rate risk. But a lot of the
volume of a brokerage business was with in active traders. A lot of them traded around the
economic statistics. So if employment was looking robust, as it may have recently, then they'll say
bearish for bonds. And my job was to forecast, will producer prices,
be up 0.2% or 0.4%. And there are some tricks because some of the statistics use bits and
pieces of other statistics that have already been released. So if you have the industrial
production number, you know something about the GDP. If you leading indicators were then
got much more focus, but some of the components had already been released, like S&P prices, well,
You knew that, jobless claims and other things, so you could come up with a better estimate.
And it wasn't then completely in the market.
The problem, lots of people around me who were making much more money than I was and thought, wow, can't I?
I was moderately good at it forecasting PPI and GDP and the other statistics.
And, well, can I trade this to make money? And they did this. It started with one contract, I think. And a futures contract on T-bills, I think, was a million dollars, but you could buy one by putting up margin of $1,000 or $1,500. The problem was you had to put up the variance margin. So if the price went down, but
$3,000, you had to cough up the loss or lose your deposit and get sold out of the position
and probably get your account closed if you were not a Drexel employee, maybe even if you are a
directile employee. It went really, really well for about four months. It started in January
as I was heading to my last year of business school. And I managed to make a business school. I managed to
make about $40,000, which within my income and lack of net worth at the time was truly
fantastic. It was thinking I could pay off my student loans, which were, I guess, less burdensome
than it seems like some students today are stuck with. But then in early May, as I was heading
towards graduation, the market also changed. And my
my lucky street, I guess there's a temptation to pyramid and keep adding to the positions.
If you're winning, you want to press your bets and say, that's not a bad thing to do,
but it comes with a lot of cabcats.
If you're doing it with borrowed money, it's a terrible idea.
But if it's all mad money, it'd say push a winning bet as far as you can.
And you then found, if I remember rightly, that interest rates suddenly started to tumble when you were betting that they were worth surge.
Yes. And so where I'm going is with 40,000 inequity, I had something like $25 million worth of notional exposure, which was really disproportionate to anything else for me as a counterparty.
and you were like the long-term capital of uh yeah you were the long-term capital of college students
yeah if it was all equity and rates were going in that direction in your direction then say
that's great but it was all borrowed money and so over a couple of weeks i basically lost back
all of the 40 grand and in a agreed thing i don't know if they shut down my account or just
said, you know, I think it would be a good idea to take a holiday from this for a while.
And it was hurting so much from losing back the $40,000 because it felt so smart.
Like, wow, this is great.
Like, let's annualize that.
That's $10,000 a month that it was making.
What do you think it did to you viscerally, like, Joe, like that experience of actually
going through that pain and fear of loss?
How did that searing emotional experience actually shape your view of investing and whether you, how in some ways, conservative and defensive you realized you needed to be in order to survive as a successful investor?
Don't do anything with borrowed money unless the thing you're borrowing against is giving you an income stream that can cover it.
You never, ever want to be a forced seller.
Why would stocks sell for less than their worth?
There's a whole bunch of behavioral reasons.
But one of them is people get forced out of their holdings.
And it happens every financial crisis that something gets sold at an absurd price because they had to.
And so no margin for me.
I think it's not so much conservatism, but a recognition that interest rates.
Lots of people know about this.
GDP, lots of people know about this.
Do I have a really good edge?
Probably not as much as I might with a smallish public listed company where management and know what they're thinking.
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So is part of the moral just for almost all of us,
unless we happen to be George Soros or Stanley Drucken Miller or someone like that,
we should just avoid trying to make money off these macro predictions.
It's just too difficult that even for someone like you,
who was spending your whole life at the time trying to make macro predictions.
It just was too difficult, in a sense.
I think if you spend all your time trying to do it like George Soros, that you can do that,
but it's beyond my skill set.
And I think it's very difficult generally.
Right now we have an impending profit recession.
And analysts come to me saying, are you interested in buying?
home builders? Are you interested in buying meta, the old Facebook? And figuring out what's
discounted, even in a fairly specific case, is really difficult. But figuring out what the
moving pieces are for a whole economy and for aggregated statistics. It's a really tough game.
And you've got to be amazing like George Soros is to be able to do that well.
So in a way, when you're looking at companies, when you have a team of something like 130 stock analysts at Fidelity, right, who come to you and they pitch stuff like this, housing stocks and energy stocks and the like, are you really not thinking that much about macro stuff at all? You're just looking to see whether they're fundamental things, like whether they have a good moat, whether they have enduring competitive advanced years, whether it's cheap, whether the cash flow is predictable. What are you focused on?
If the house is burning down, you can't focus on the architectural qualities, but I do not ignore current events, but usually it isn't conclusive about what I'm doing.
I do have macro opinions, but mostly I want analysts to help me imagine different scenarios.
What if British interest rates go up another 100 basis points and mortgage rates follow?
what will that do to affordability of homes in the UK?
What will that do for consumer spending?
And how catastrophic is that for the companies that we're talking about?
And it might be not at all, or it could be a very big impact.
And sometimes companies can have a more competitive position
and be a better place to withstand those kind of shocks.
Sometimes they can have worse positions, since that's what I want from analysts.
Since the fund has a bunch of British stocks and has two home builders, it's a relevant question to sort of are they cheap because they're selling for less than their stated net asset value, or will this be too devastating for housing for them to make a decent profit in the next year or two?
So you can't really ignore the macro environment, but it seems like given your very, very low
turnover in the fund, you're also trying to find companies that are going to be okay over the long
run, sort of in they're going to muddle through difficult macro environments. Is that a fair
description? Yeah. I'm looking for what I think Will is looking for, which is adaptive
companies that have a strong hand to start with. Nobody knows the future, but some companies are
more adaptive than others. Next, a UK retailer, the fund holds used to be mostly high street
stores with a catalog business, and they could have completely lost their position during
the internet age, but in fact, have repurposed catalog.
into internet selling and now it's the majority of profits and is growing well. So there's
a good adaptation. I think you always want an adaptive management team. And I think that's
part of the secret sauce of why we'll spend so much time on meeting management and understanding
their thinking. Another legendary investor of the last couple of generations from Fidelity that you're
very closely associated with, probably because he was the person who really got you hired
at Fidelity as Peter Lynch. And I wonder if we could talk in some depth about the story of
how you came to be there and work with Peter and what you learned from him. Because I love
the story of, I mean, in a way, it goes back to, after your slightly disheartening experience
of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, you ended up at Bank of America Financial Futures. And then my sense
is you had a little bit of an existential crisis and decided, I'm going in the wrong direction,
and you started to reach out to famous investors and draw up a sort of shortlist of people you
wanted to work for.
Can you tell us what happened, who you wrote to, and then how you came to be in contact with
Peter Lynch?
My short list was Mario Gabelle, Michael Steinhardt, George Soros, Peter Lynch, and...
Michael Price, I think, was another giant...
Michael Price, the mutual shares guy.
and I tried to get interviews with them, but didn't do very well.
I did get to meet Marioca Belli in person, but not the others at that time.
And I called up Peter Lynch a couple of times, but his secretary, Paula Sullivan, finally said,
who's calling?
And she put me through.
And I was just floored.
after my other job search, I was expecting to go to a director of research or a human resources
department, all of which would be fine if it produced the desired result. But we had a good call
and talked about a few stocks. And I got an interview schedules and I flew out. And the meeting
or the interviews were supposed to start at nine o'clock, and I thought they would be done by
noonish, and my dad was going to meet me there, noonish. But the interviews kept going on,
and around two o'clock, it got brought over to Peter Lee's office, and Peter had lots of
people dropping in. Peter was a great believer in the two-minute drill, a quick pitch, and as a
screening device. He would consider absolutely anything. So the interview itself was somewhat distracted,
but I was thrilled to watch Peter Lynch in action fielding all of these pitches. And we did actually
have an interview light component, but this was supposed to go from 2 o'clock to 2.30, then wind up.
But it got to be about 4.45. And Peter was trying to wind down.
for the day. And I think he did make one of those coded calls to Carolyn, his wife, forgot what it was,
but he had a coded sort of way of saying, I'm arriving at five or I'm arriving at six,
I'm arriving at seven. So the dinner would be all right, but around 445, cut it off. And it was just
thrilled by watching all the people come and go in the different pitches. And my fabulous dad,
was waiting there down at the doorstep of Fidelity to meet with me and had been there
for five hours, which was amazing. But yeah. I also wanted to report a little, but you're probably
too modest to admit any of this, Joel, but there's a beautiful forward to your book where
Peter Lynch gives his version of it. And he says that Paula Sullivan, his assistant, said to him,
you've got to talk to this guy, Joel. He keeps calling and is so sweet. He's from the Midwest,
and I think he might be a farmer. So then the way Peter tells the story, he says, I told Paul,
I can give him five minutes, which is very interesting because, as you say, he was open to anything,
like he was prepared to take a two-minute pitch or five minutes or whatever. And what Peter said
is we ended up speaking for over an hour, and you kept pitching him stocks like Puerto Rican cement
and Chrysler and San Francisco Savings and Loan, which he was very intrigued by, he said,
despite the fact that I think you once told me he owned about 400 savings and loans, but he was
very impressed. And he said, in his account, he said he then immediately called the head of Fidelta's
investment decision and said, we've got to hire this guy. He's unbelievable. He's as strong as
anyone I have ever met. It's a kind of amazing thing, right? I mean, something extraordinary
happened in that first call. And it's interesting because I can see from this conversation that
we're having today and also from the last time we met in Fidel's office, you're a very
gentle soul, right? You're a quiet, slightly shy person. You're not like a brash Wall Street person.
And there's something kind of amazing about the fact that Peter was so open to you that he kind of
saw your talent so quickly. Yeah, I'm so grateful for that. I think it's like this path dependent
and I got a lucky break there. It's an amazing thing. I have a young friend of guy in Israel
called Samuel Goldberg, who's a really, really smart guy, former chess player and judo champion
and the like, who was also a sniper, which I think gives a sense of the sort of temperament
that he would have who's obsessed with value investing. And he wrote to me last week and was saying,
you know, how do I get an internship? Like, what do I do as someone who's obsessed with value
investing? And I sort of wanted to get a sense from you of what do young people who actually
want to get started in the business who clearly have this almost this sort of religious experience
of understanding value investing and being deeply drawn to it and want to get started but don't
really know how to break in. What do you do? Because I had no idea really what to tell Samuel at all.
Investing period, I think it's hard. I never had a summer internship, but it's become much more
important. High ring process is too long and too bureaucratic for my taste, but it's a
someone like him should send a letter to both the director of research, which at Fidelity would be Pam Holding and Tim Cohen.
And they should also send one to the designated human resources recruiter and that you can find on the website.
It is tough.
It's the people who attended Harvard, Yale, and Princeton and Wharton are fabulous people.
But they have the inside track on this because a lot of the interviews, I don't like the way this is handled, actually, but I'd say a person like him and all the hers who are out there should send a letter to the director of research at a firm that they want or to the HR department there.
And you've obviously done lots of hiring over the years.
And so you've obviously sort of seen lots of the young analysts who become stars later.
And I'm curious, like, when you think of what you look for and also what Peter Lynch saw
in you, is it that kind of intensity, that competitiveness, that deep fascination with stocks
that you almost can't explain?
What is it that you and he look for that's that X factor?
Curiosity is, like, why is this so?
I think so many mistakes come because of the huge.
capability of filling in what's not there and assuming too much about what it is you're looking at.
And so curiosity is number one.
And employers generally, they want people who really want the job.
It's like how often is too many times to tell someone, I love you?
It's never too much.
And the employers want to hear it.
Even if they know that you want the job, spell it out for them and make it real.
Because in my case, it was easy because having had a disappointing employer or two,
I really wanted to work for people who I totally respect.
So if you are interviewing with the job that you really, really want, don't be shy.
Tell them.
I was very struck in interviewing you and Will Danoff.
And many years ago, Jeff Vinnick, who was another of the giants of your generation,
who were all, I think all three of you in some ways mentored by Peter Lynch,
there's an intensity to all of you.
I remember Will saying to me at some point, I just care more.
And I remember him saying to me that the way he found Tesla was on a Friday afternoon.
He was like, well, how come we don't have, or Thursday late afternoon?
It's like, how come there's not anything after 430?
And so they went to see this one extra company.
And likewise, Jeff Vinnick told me that he would get back in the evening after, you know,
hanging out with his, I think, four kids in those days and would then do several hours more reading
after they went to bed.
Is that fair to say that when you look at the most successful investors you've seen
in your cohort of Fidelity, they're just really intense, like profoundly competitive,
driven, passionate people?
Yeah, I think it's sort of required.
Peter never really took a vacation, right?
In his 14 years, did he ever take a day off?
Yeah, it's saying he was actually more intense than any of the people just referenced,
which may be also why the years as a active fund manager were shorter.
So it's hard to sustain.
And that was why Peter needed the secret.
code to tell Carolyn what time he would be at. I think one of them was actually Mr. Johnson is
coming in. So just put the food in the, leave the food in the oven because, of course, he wanted
to talk to Mr. Jay. You said to me once that Peter was the most flexible investor you'd ever
seen, that he had this incredible ability to switch between short-term trading and long-term
trading. Can you talk a bit about that? Because I think sometimes because he wasn't around for that
long, right, he had a 13 or 14 year stint and then he quit, there's always this suspicion or sort of
prejudice that, you know, was he really that great? Would he have been able to sustain it? Can you
talk about kind of what it was that made him so special? He was always curious about how things
worked. He did, of course, want companies that were getting much better right now, but there are
companies that he held for several years, actually, Chrysler and Fannie Mae, some others, but he was
always checking in the conversations. If he would highlight, this will help you next year.
This will help you in the years beyond where in Fannie Mae's case, they had a bunch of high-cost
debt that was rolling off in the coming year, but also in the next year and the next year after
that. So the visibility to improved interest margins and earnings was huge. So what would be the
most fundamental thing you think you took from working with Peter? If there's one thing that's
really had an enduring influence on the way you manage money, what would it be? I'm not sure that I can
copy his mental flexibility. He's totally willing to change his mind when the facts are different.
And I think a lot of us get entrenched in our beliefs and try to defend something that's wrong
and trying to delicately say this. I see a lot of this in politics in both parties where
they're wrong and they pile on further justifications.
or mistakes that they made.
Peter would have none of that or little of that.
He would change his mind.
He also seems to have had an incredible ability to take information from a mass of different
sources and piece it together, which is something that I see with you as well,
because I know that you, in your early years, you were an analyst studying, you know,
natural gas or coal or all of these other things.
And it seems like part of your skill as well as his is to,
take little pieces of information from one area of the economy and apply it elsewhere?
Yes, he absolutely did that as a natural gas analyst. If I brought him the news that gas prices
are up by 25 cents, he would say, what's that mean for the pipelines? What's that mean for
the gas distribution companies? What's that mean for the producers? What's that mean for the
petrochemical companies. And there's a whole bunch of knock on. It may not be conclusive,
but it tells you what you should be asking all of those companies from one piece of information.
And he was fantastic at that. I remember Bill Miller saying to me that his early experience as an
intelligence analyst in the military before he became a money manager was incredibly helpful
precisely for that, because you would have this mosaic approach where you would take information
from one area, something that seemed minor.
But once you combined it with a few other things, you could see a pattern that other people
couldn't see.
I think it is because people, when you do it badly, it's called anecdotal and scientific.
When you do it well, I guess Gladwell would call it thin slicing.
When I interviewed you in Boston for my book, Joe, Richer Weiser Happier, I came and I asked you
basically to explain your extraordinary returns, which are really incredible. I mean, it's,
you're a real anomaly, right? I mean, I think you've beaten the market by about 3.7 percentage
points a year over 32 years. It's an astonishing performance. And one of the things that was really
striking about our conversation was that you focused really primarily on listing all of the
standard stupidities, as Charlie Munger would describe them, all of the things you try to avoid.
And I wonder if we could talk about that a bit because that strikes me as such an incredibly
helpful approach to, because it's so difficult to imitate the positive qualities that someone
like you or Will Danoff or Peter Lynch have. But it's much easier to apply this principle that you
have of at least identifying all the dumb things, the unoriginal error, as Charlie would
describe it, that leads to so much disaster in investing. Can you talk about some of the things
that you just avoid because you're constantly having analysts come and pitch you stuff, right?
You have this army of 130 analysts pitching your stuff.
What are you just saying, no, not doing that, not doing that.
These are mistakes I'm not repeating.
I think you want to start by doing a little introspection about what do you think your
approach is?
Why might you have an edge?
And if you're a momentum investor, I've seen actually lots of successful momentum investors,
maybe even more than they've seen successful value investors.
But you should know that.
And when you're in the second half of 2021,
you have to realize things are not getting better in the tech stocks that had worked so well.
And you have to think about,
am I a growth investor, am I a value investor,
or am I, in my case, a value investor who tries to include some,
growth aspects because growth is part of value, have to understand that. And those, what you're
trying to do creates your blind spots. So most of the time, the fattest piece of the momentum
profits of the momentum investor come when the stock is above their value. And it's just a colossal
piling on. So a value investor says, run, run.
run away, but that's the wrong impulse if you're trying to be a skilled momentum investor,
you might say, it's just now getting recognition and more people will recognize this stock.
At the same time, as a value investor, I kind of ignore short-term movements unless there's
something that says, wow, this throws my whole expected value into the trash. There's no way
the store will ever make the kind of profits I thought.
Now that vendors are not shipping them merchandise.
So I think some of the blind spots come from what your approach is and you have to be aware of those blind spots.
Knowing yourself and how do you react to setbacks and are you truthful to yourself?
Are you going to come up with endless justifications for why what you did was not a
mistake, or will you go to the confessional and say, yep, I blew it?
You said something that really stuck with me, Joe, where you said, staying away from your
own ignorance can make a huge difference. So it's not just self-awareness in terms of how
you react emotionally. It's knowing your circle of competence or, I guess, more optimistically,
the circle of expertise, where do you know more than the average?
guy about this industry. Do you know more than the average person about this specific company?
And there are whole industries where insurance is difficult because it's a whole series of
assumptions. And you can generically know whether the assumptions that they're making are
conservative, aggressive, or average. But that doesn't protect you.
when that's hard to verify.
So there are parts of insurance that scare me.
And I think the AIG was a case where they had gotten into a different business than they
realized where if they looked at the derivatives, they'd say credit insurance is a low rate
online or a highly correlated high severity, very low frequency business.
And they said, oh, that's kind of terrifying to an insurance company rather than this is kind of wild.
Since I lost money on AIG, I'm bitter.
And so I'm assuming that management might have not done this.
Biotech to my biologist's disappointment, because there's so much cool experimentation.
And it's so hard for me to tell the path of innovation.
There's phase one, there's phase two, there's phase three, there's commercialization.
And sometimes even if it does get approved and goes on the market, sales will disappoint.
And handicapping those odds is beyond my ability.
In a way, knowing just that you can't model that, that you can't really figure out the cash flows and the growth in the future,
that seems to be almost enough to keep you away from that.
But you also said to me, you know it's going to make you crazily emotional.
Yeah.
There are people like Fidelity's brilliant analyst, Irene Kontopoulos, and I trust her a great deal,
but as a portfolio manager, I can't do it unless I can verify her thoughts to myself.
And so it's an area that I stay away from.
You listed for me an array of things.
I love this quote where you said to me, I quote this in my book. You said, don't pay too much. Don't go for
businesses that are prone to obsolescence and destruction. Don't invest with crooks and idiots. Don't
invest in things you don't understand. Don't invest in what you don't know and stay away from your own
craziness. And I just thought that was a wonderful list of things where, you know, before we start
thinking about what we should do, just to have a list of things where we know, I'm just not going
there. It's not a game I can win.
Yeah. How do you beat Jordan? You play chess against him rather than basketball.
I actually think about this a lot recently. I think much more since I wrote the chapter
about you and Charlie Munga about just, it's called Don't Be a Fool, where I just think about
the importance of playing games that I'm equipped to win. And it's been kind of a crushing
realization that there are certain games where emotionally and intellectually and in terms of my
passion. I'm just never going to really win at the game of picking individual stocks. It just doesn't
suit me. And it's been incredibly clarifying and liberating to say, well, so yeah, so I should
be interviewing people. I should be writing books. And I should, it's just, but it's, it's kind of
painful to admit that you're not suited to a game. It is. And it's especially tough because
the people who professionally play the game disproportionately went to selective
schools and they know that they can learn, but despite years of intermittent effort, I still
don't get biotech. And it's kind of hard to tell yourself, yeah, there are plenty things
that I'm not particularly good at. I remember Chuck Acre saying to me, we can't dance with all
the ladies. And I just suddenly realized, oh, he's got this like really narrow pond in which he's
fishing and he has the discipline to do it again and again and again. So yeah, that self-awareness
and the ability to choose the right game seems to me critical. But what's also really distinctive
with someone like Gakre, he's very focused, right? He has a very narrow portfolio of a few
major holdings. You're really unusual in the, you're massively diversified, or almost more than any
other great investor. I know, I think when I looked at Fidelity, low-price stock a couple of days ago,
I think you own something like 880 stocks.
What's the philosophy behind that?
Because it's almost impossible to pull off what you've pulled off.
It's like the only, remember Bill Ruyn saying to me once,
the only other investor I've ever come across who can do really well
with a hugely diversified portfolio is Peter Lynch.
And you seem to be the second one.
So how do you do it and why do it that way?
Think of it as two portfolios, one, although it could be more.
But think of it as two portfolios.
One of them is for longstanding high conviction holdings.
I do have some fairly chunky holdings.
United Health is over 5% of the fund.
Metro, the Canadian supermarket, is close behind.
Autozone is also a very substantial holding.
If you took just the top 50 or hundreds' status,
you might say this is actually a fairly concentrated fund, even relative to fidelity.
And one of the ongoing discussions that had with Morgan and Sam is...
These are your two successes of people who don't...
22 successes is what will work for them because they want the fund to work for them.
And I think they're still figuring out what works for them.
but there was a hint that maybe 5% was too chunky because actually there are other Fidelity
funds that do not have any 5% bets, although Will Danop has several.
And so in a sense, I do have concentrated bets.
And there are concentrated bets in the sense that the fund holds 10% of metro-Canadian
supermarket, which is as large and as concentrated.
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All right, back to the show.
Do you think this is partly a reaction, Joe, like that you internalized in some ways those early lessons from when you got in trouble investing on margin and you went through the horror of losing money with too aggressive a stance?
Is there something?
So we didn't get to the other 800 companies, although some it might have to be three because some of those are 25 basis points of the budget.
fund, but 10% of the company. So they're concentrated holdings of a small company. And on that,
there are people who say, it's too small to make a difference, but do it anyway. And think for
terrific companies that are small, the fund does have a concentrated relative to the outstanding
share as holding. But then there's the large amount of companies where I see
something interesting going on, see either a possibly terrific business or a really dislocated
valuation, where I'm begging the analysts to tell me more, I'm begging brokerage researchers
to tell me more, and trying to signal to the companies reach out to me and tell me more.
And I add to those when I do get more and it's good more, here's an industry with barriers to entry.
There is really top-notch management team or it's eight times earnings, get free and earnings are growing, where it is a request for information.
Consultants absolutely hate that because you are supposed to leap to high conviction.
I am still trying to learn and I'm eagerly looking for a book on what not to do.
What signals do you ignore?
What opportunities, I think people like Buffett are great at saying, nope, not interested after two minutes.
Peter also had that capability, although his conclusion was, I think, sometimes like mine,
that it puts into the, I want to watch this space and find more.
Tom Gaynor does something similar where he has a kind of middleway approach where he
is somewhat diversified and somewhat concentrated and he looks at, he might have 100, 110 stocks
and he likes the fact that they're in his portfolio so he can concentrate on finding more
about them. But they're sort of the farm team. And it sounds like, it sounds like, it sounds
But there's more, that's true.
They are the foreign team, but it's also a set of comparators where if I'm looking at U.S. banks and say, well, what are superior banks and have a list of a couple dozen of them and can mentally compare and say, Eagle Bank of Maryland, how does that compare with East West Bank of California?
And then let's compare that with Coderus Valley Bank.
And then let's compare that with West Bank in Iowa.
Let's compare them.
Some of it is to give a comparison.
The other way, before Wells Fargo started to have their issues with compliance and
overselling, my approach might be any bank that I buy has to be as good as Wells Fargo.
needs to have a return on equity and growth prospects that are higher or the same as Wells Fargo
and some of it and it has to be selling it a lower price to book or PE than Wells Fargo.
So sometimes you can have a benchmark stock, but it's hard if I look at small cap health care and say
everything has to be as good as United Health.
There are companies that are as good as United Health, but they're much more expensive.
There are companies that are less expensive than United Health, but they're not as good.
So it sometimes helps to have a sort of benchmark stock that has to be taken.
And I guess that would lead towards a more concentrated portfolio because some might say that's a,
there's a message in there that there's nothing in small cap health care that is as good if you accept that the,
PE of 22 or whatever is acceptable.
One of your most successful investments of all time is something where I think that one
before we leave that,
Yeah.
Have you read any books that are any good on what to say no to?
I mean, I've seen books that correctly say,
it's a good thing to drop what you don't need,
but I suck it doing it and look.
for guidance on what not to do and what opportunities to not.
I haven't seen it.
Because the temptation is, let's tiss all the girls.
Yeah.
And this is a very central theme of my book, not only in the chapter about you and Charlie,
where I'm saying, don't be a fool.
I care all the things to avoid.
But also I write in the chapter about high performance habits about what I call the art
of subtraction, which is just the habit that I think all of the best investors have
of saying, these are just things I'm not going to do.
I'm going to, it's almost like having a not-to-do list.
And I remember talking to my friend Jason Swig about this from the Wall Street Journal
and him saying that when he looks at people like Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger, Bill Miller,
they all have this incredible ability to say, I'm not particularly good at this thing,
and it's not what I really care about, and I'm just going to be maniacal about focusing only on other things.
And so I think there's deep wisdom and deep practical wisdom in this idea of just saying no to things.
And it's something Warren does famously, right?
I mean, Warren says the difference between successful people and very successful people
is that the very successful people say no to almost everything.
But I, yeah, so, I mean, it's clearly a theme that I explore a lot in the book,
but I haven't seen one book that does it brilliantly.
So, yeah, it's a, but maybe I just haven't read enough.
Please contact me immediately if you or any of your listeners come up with something.
Yeah.
But your book is also very good at that.
I mean, your book does a great job at saying these are the red flags when you look at
companies.
I mean, don't look at companies that have too many footnotes and opaque accounting and
disclosure that's extensive but incomprehensible.
You know, don't invest in countries like Russia where there's not enough rule of
law or countries with high inflation like Turkey. I mean, you're very good, I think, in that book
at identifying a lot of the things not to do. But in a way, what I had to do in reading your book
and also in listening to or reading various interviews with you over the years, you have to
gather these things from different parts of the books and interviews and kind of a compiler list
of things not to do. And likewise from Charlie's list of 24 causes of human misjudgment,
He was really, I think he'd only read three psychology books, but he was compiling them in this
very intelligent way of saying, this is what I'm not going to do. These are the ways in which
people screw up. So I do think you have to kind of do the work yourself in a way. It's not,
I haven't seen it really conveniently arrayed anywhere. I wanted to go back to this amazing investment
of your monster beverage, which I guess originally was Hansen when you first invested in it.
And I remember interviewing you about it and you saying basically that your, your cost
basis was eight cents, and I checked this yesterday, and it was at $97. I know it's had lots of
splits and the like, but it was up at least a thousandfold. Can you talk a little bit?
I mean, I know you've been modest about this and have sort of said you lucked into investing
in it because really you loved the fruit drinks, not the energy drink. But there are lessons
from this investment that you've had really for over 20 years, I think. What should we be
learning from this enormous success of this massive long-term holding of yours. It's gone up
a thousandfold or more. Freight successes are often a complete surprise, even to their
beneficiaries. Don't sell luck short. But the odds were very much in my favor in that weirdly
met them at an American Electronics Association beverage service. And the stock
was selling for, I think, 10 times earnings.
I think it was debt-free.
The earnings were growing.
I liked the products and really, really like the management because they seemed very intense
like they'd had two or three monster beverages themselves.
But they really seemed strategic and motivated.
It wasn't going to go bankrupt because they had no debt.
Free drinks, like that's not very economically cyclical.
It's not going to get waylaid by cycles.
10 times earnings, totally fine.
That's a 10% earnings yield.
So there was a lot more that could go right than wrong in a way.
Yeah, it seemed like the general ways to screw up were minimal.
I just didn't see how they were going to screw up.
But how did you hold it for so many years?
I mean, you've held it for what, 20 plus years already while it's gone up a thousandfold.
That seems almost inhuman to be able to do that.
What enabled you to do that temperamentally or intellectually?
I think it was about four years or five years later.
The earnings per share were higher than the cost basis.
And this is something that tried to push on analysts.
What I really want is a low P.E. on earnings five years out, where you're imagining a sustainable world. It's not so much shipping cycles. Oh, my God. They could be huge and then they go bust. So that's not what I'm looking for. I'm looking for a huge growth in earnings. And having had the growth in earnings and realized that, yeah, when I was
20, I probably would have liked a monster drink a lot better than dropping no-dose into a Coca-Cola,
which is what I did.
Then, yeah, I probably would have wanted that.
And it's still, the multiple was higher, but the earnings were much, much higher.
They still had the same terrific management.
They still didn't have debt.
So what could go wrong?
Well, the growth could stop.
But consumer products, companies have more inertia than tech.
Technology products or ladies' fashions, which annoyingly have almost no inertia, at least the stocks that I buy.
One way that I presented it for the analyst was to take some of the amazing Buffett winners and said,
what was the PE at entry and what was the PE five years later?
It was like Geico was like one times earnings five years later.
Wells Fargo also a single digit.
Even Coca-Cola was a fairly modest multiple five years out.
So in a way that goes back to what you were doing at Value Line,
where there were these kind of three to five year,
if I remember rightly, projections.
So in a way it was training you to look further out to see what was a justifier,
valuation. Is that fair to say? Yeah, but also saying the companies where you can look five years
out or 10 years out with confidence are rare unless you're Kathy Wood. And even her list is not
that long. So I think she won't disagree that looking out five or 10 years with confidence
is difficult. And it's easier to hold on to companies where you can
look with at least some confidence. I wanted to ask you a little bit about the emotional aspect of
investing because you set this extraordinary thing in your book where you wrote, are you willing to
do the digging and endure the pain, loneliness, and worry that go with superior returns?
And I was thinking about this question of how to handle the pain. And I know, for example, that
there was a period during this crazy bull market that ended recently where assets were kind of
flooding out of the Fidelity Low Price Stock Fund, I think in the first half of 2020, it went
from something like $33 billion, which is an enormous fund to maybe $20 billion. And so you could
see people acting irrationally and being hasty and betting on crazy stocks. And you're there
just being patient and prudent and long-term and value-oriented. And I'm just wondering,
how do you endure the pain, loneliness, and worry that go with superior returns? For value investors,
Fair markets are not as punishing.
Why is that?
It's because if you really thought that the intrinsic value of a stock was $50,
and it's dropped from $40 to $20, it's like, wow, this is so compelling, this stock will work,
dealing with the underperformance during a raging and somewhat speculative bullmark.
market was a contributing factor to my decision to retire.
Really?
It was very painful.
Yeah, it's very hard because I don't have any.
There were a small band of value investors' fidelity,
and I wish during that period that I had something that was both comforting and
productive to those people.
And I had nothing.
I had nothing to tell myself,
other than my stocks are selling for less than their fair value. And so I'm good with them. But of course,
it hurts if you're a competitive person that you are behind the benchmark. I remember Joe Greenblatt
once saying to me, what else am I going to do except buy stuff cheap? He's like, I believe that
it's going to work in the long run. And what else am I going to do? I don't have another approach.
And Jean-Marie Evriard said the same thing to me. He's like, what else could I do? I can only be a value
investor. It makes sense to buy stuff cheap, to buy it for less than it's worth. And it's tough, right?
I mean, you went through this crazy experience where even you had owned GameStop, I think,
before it became a meme stock and suddenly it went from under $20 to over $300. And you must just
be watching that and just thinking, how do I play this game in any sort of sensible, responsible way?
And so when I bought it, it was a combination of, I thought it was undervalued because it had been a consistent cash generator and a bit of reluctance to accept reality that indeed video game sales had changed and maybe their business was more impaired.
So when it lifted it off from single digits and got to 38, they sold some of the stock and blew out pretty much all of the rest when it was 63.
And from there, it went to like $350.
So did I do what I was meant to do thinking about my approach?
Yes.
Even with the help of the guy from Chui, Brian Cohen, who knew about internet retailing, the possibility of the growth opportunities were somewhat challenged.
And it was fairly valued to overvalued at 38 and 63.
And so I sold.
But if you were really unpleasant, you'd say, you blew away, you threw away.
a billion dollars worth of the fundholders money by selling at those prices and not waiting until
it hit 350. And my only defense is I was doing what I was supposed to do and annoyingly a matter
of public record, how many shares were sold and what prices. So when you announced, Joel,
that you were going to retire as a fund manager at the end of 2023, was it partly just a reaction to the
emotional and psychological drain and exhaustion of going through this long period where a less
rational approach to investing was doing better. And it just at a certain point, it becomes harder
and harder to be banging your head against the wall and swimming against the tide to mix metaphors.
Yeah. I think you, yeah, it is hard to tell. I think there's rarely been as much stuff that seemed
crazy to me that was going on in financial markets and the rest of the real world than over
the last two years. And it's hard to handicap it. But yeah, it was sort of emotionally exhausting.
But the other thing that was going on was my dad was getting to the end of his life. And I guess that
brings thoughts of mortality. And he did finally.
passed in December last year, but realizing that, yeah, telling all of that was sort of a
a complicating factor along with the emotional disappointment about disappointing certain
expectations of my chairholders. I think also that the market for funds has changed, and
Peter went where the opportunity is or was.
I try to go where the opportunity is, if I can understand it.
Well, Danoff goes to where a subset of the opportunity that you know is extremely well.
But modern funds are sort of annoyingly pushing towards making you look like an index fund,
which I think is not a favor to the fund holder,
because if you're going to hold a closet index fund,
you might as well just hold the index fund.
I remember Will telling me that years ago he got advice from Warren Buffett and said, look, I'm managing, I think it was $200 billion.
What advice do you have and Buffett saying concentrate more?
Like you can't concentrate that much, but at least make bigger bets when you have really high conviction.
And I think Will has absolutely followed that because I think today you will find in his
ginormous fund, some 7% bets. The SEC regulations limit the number of 5% and higher bets that
you can have. And so I think he has followed that advice. You've talked to me before about
your sense of mortality and it always weighed somewhat heavily on you this question. I remember
you talking about being in Japan going to investment conferences and the like in 2011 when
I think it was a 9.0 earthquake hit that triggered the tsunami that hit Fukushima.
And it seemed like that had a really powerful impact on your life.
And can you talk a bit about how that also has shaped your view of how you wanted to live
your life and what you wanted to contribute?
Yeah.
That was, and especially in, I was at a conference in Japan.
And there had been some tremors on Tuesday before the earthquake.
And one of them was very brief. It might have been half a minute. And I looked at the company
management and translator during that. And the translator said, oh, that was an earthquake or tremor.
And since they did not seem freaked out, I was not freaked out, since people's reality is
defined about what people around them think is real. Friday was different. We were
in a company meeting and the cups started to slide around and were threatening to fall off the
table and the company became increasingly worried and we walked down through the fire escape
to the bottom floor and in amazing Japanese lightness and kindness, they served us some free
coffee, which I appreciated.
But everybody went down to the bottom floor.
I tried to get the taxi to take me back to the hotel, but the taxi never arrived.
The phone, cell phones went dead and went back to the office.
So we walked back to the hotel, which was a pleasant walk rather than a horrific walk.
and the night was very difficult.
A reception got moved from the top floor to the bottom floor of the hotel.
And my hotel room was on the 23rd floor, and the building was swaying.
You could see it.
It was rocking.
And the aftershocks continued in the midnight.
But another member of her group went down to the front desk and started crying,
and she got transferred from like the 19th floor to the second floor because the spookier part was the rocking.
I had wanted to tell my dad what was going on, but when I did call, my uncle Howard had a stroke and he proceeded to die before I got home.
And so I didn't tell my dad about the earthquake, flights out, and even trains to the airport and flights were all canceled.
So I got delayed a day, did get out.
The airline made an extra profit on that.
But Fidelity thought that it was money well spent, and so did I, to escape.
Yeah, it was just a reminder that life can be short and unexpected.
And it seems like that was one of the reasons why you ended up writing your book was partly
that you were starting to think about what do I want my legacy to be.
Yeah, I think that was part of it and hope that I could write something as awesome as the
Peter Lynch books, but he's a more gifted storyteller and I guess I am too geeky and
produced a book that's probably more for professional investors.
really avid personal investors.
I think it's a good and valuable book that has good stories, good practical advice,
and it's authentic and it's hard-earned wisdom.
I think it's, I mean, I would definitely strongly encourage our listeners to read it.
I'm also curious, knowing that you've gone through a lot over your lifetime, you know,
loss of family members, struggles with work and with markets that aren't cooperating
with rational analysis and earthquakes and the like. I'm curious if there's anything that the rest of us
who would also face our own traumatic and painful situations and setbacks and challenges,
if there's anything that you found really helpful in dealing with adversity that has put
things in perspective in some way. Give me patience to accept the things that I can control
and accept the things that I can't. Just because it was a bad outcome, if you can't think of how you
would have done it better with the information that you had at the time, then there's no sense,
or if you can't control it, there's no sense in beating yourself up on things you can't control
things. We're saying, gosh, if I had held on to Amazon for more than briefly, would have been
different. But in fact, yeah, I want companies that are producing current earnings in cash flow. So it was
probably never meant to hold on to Amazon 20 years ago.
So in a way, it's to some degree being gentle with oneself and a little forgiving of oneself
is something that you're...
Yeah, absolutely.
If you can't control it and wouldn't have made a better decision, then be gentle.
And if you would have made a different decision with the information you had, then be darn
sure that you learn that and remember that. In my case, having 12 rumming cokes and some beer
is a really horrible idea. Be sure that you take away that and don't repeat it. But a couple
of monster beverages might be good. That would be some 45 years ago, but don't do it.
You're handing on the fund after, I think, 32 years. A little more, it'll be by the end of
23 when you retire as a fund manager and stay on as a senior advisor to the equity team.
You're handing it over to two people who I think have worked with you for the last 15 years,
a lady you mentioned before Morgan Peck and Sam Chammwitz, am I pronouncing that correctly?
Can you give us a sense of what it is you're trying to convey to them,
not just about how to pick stocks, but about a sense of commitment to shareholders,
which I think has been one of the defining characteristics, both for you and,
and Will Danoff this sense of actually really deeply caring about your shareholders.
What are you trying to convey to the next generation?
Because my sense is that you deeply care about this baby, Fidelity, low-price stock.
I mean, this is your creation that you're handing on.
Try to do the right thing.
Try to, the fund is less volatile than the market.
So it's somewhat easier to hang on to in down.
markets, although that doesn't mean that they're not as disappointed as I am. It's down,
and you can't avoid that. But I think it's less likely to make you sell at the wrong times.
Yeah. Try to choose when they're available. The best in class companies is what I'm trying to push
to Sam and Morgan. Beyond that, it's more like Howard Marks implied, which is a thousand little
things. What do you mean about a thousand little things? He had a book. The most important thing,
you know, and the conclusion is there's not a most important thing in investing. There's a thousand
little things. Yeah. But I think the really big thing is do what the shareholder would do for
themselves if they had the knowledge that you have, which since we spend all day on it, we should
have better knowledge, but do what they would do if they had the same knowledge.
I remember you once saying to me, Joel, that people had often said to you, why don't you
run a hedge fund where you'd get, you know, 2% annual fees and 20% of the profits?
And you had said to me, I'm not really interested in making people who are already rich,
much richer. And my sense with you with Fidelity, low price stock, I think you probably have about a
million shareholders, something like that, and you've been managing maybe 70 billion in assets.
My sense about you was that you really did, you know, one of the distinctive things about your
career is the degree to which you cared about whether you were doing a good job for those people.
Yeah. And I think Will cares about it a great deal. But finance is not a business.
that is raped with a lot of human meaning, but there are places where you want it to be of service
to someone.
When you look back on your career, having had this incredible run, what gives you a sense of
satisfaction about it?
Because you've come through this very painful period, in a sense, in the last few years,
albeit your long-term record is still great, but it's obviously been a frustrating
decade, in a sense. What do you look back on with satisfaction? I'm glad that the most fund holders
have gotten a satisfactory return. And I'm also glad that there are up-in-coming people like
Morgan and Sam at Fidelity who will continue to try to do that, looking at the attention to
shareholders. I can see people in the growth group who have been affected by Will's approach
And, yeah, I think producing satisfactory results were a lot of average people for a huge number of average people in developing talent in the next generation.
And when you look to the future, look, I'm 54, I look at you now, I think you're 64.
I think if you as a relatively young man, unlike the Beatles when they were saying, you know, when I'm 64 and it seemed incredibly old.
When you look to the future, what do you see yourself doing?
Well, in addition to obviously offering advice to people like Sam and Morgan,
how do you intend to spend the next 20, 30, 40, 50 years, I hope?
I sometimes wonder whether I want to rewrite and update the book
because there are new stories and there's some topics that I think
some might be left out, some might be added.
So I'm not sure if I'm going to do that.
And one of the things that I had talked about with my dad in the summer before he passed, he was not so keen on that.
I was asking him about a book that he had worked on but not published.
And he was sort of pushing me.
They had had some thoughts about international trade and how that affects economies and societies.
And he thought that was very interesting.
I might do that, although I think the likelihood is more that it will update the big money,
think small.
There is also a trustee at Wesleyan University and trying to work with them.
they do not, I'm on the Campus Affairs Committee, not the Investment Committee.
And so I'm pushing my thoughts where they're not really wanted.
But I think I'm looking for someone to help maybe in academia,
write about university spending rules because I think that there is a problem with what they
call the Tobin rule that really would be solved by looking more, look through income.
And you've mentioned your father a few times, and I was reading his obituary yesterday, and he's obviously a remarkable human being. And I wonder if I could just ask you it as a final question. If there's anything in particular that he taught you through the way he lived his life or through things he told you that you could pass on to us, really in some ways in honor of his memory.
Listen to everyone, observe everything, don't believe everything you think, keep exploring.
My dad was an exception like, kind man.
Yeah, keep learning.
That's what he did all his life.
It's a article in the Wall Street Journal about spiders and how they produced the web,
which was actually his specialty, and I so miss his descriptions and knowledge of apparently
there's some moisture in it that is required to produce it, but then it dries off. But keeping learning,
that's what he would have said. That's a good legacy. Joel, thank you so much. It's been such a
pleasure chatting with you. I really appreciate your generosity and sharing your ideas,
both in your book, my book, and in this conversation today. It's always a delight chatting with you.
Thank you. All right, folks, that's it for today's conversation with the great Joel Tillinghast.
If you'd like to learn more from Joel, you may want to glance at chapter 8 of my book, Richer Wiser, Happier, where I wrote a couple of pages about him.
Joel also wrote a very good book of his own that I would definitely recommend.
It's titled Big Money Think Small.
The subtitle is Bias, Blind Spots, and Smarter Investing.
It's full of really practical advice about how to invest more intelligently and equally important how to avoid dumb and costly mistakes.
I'll be back very soon with some more terrific guests, including a great investor named
John Spears, who has spent almost half a century at an iconic investment firm called Tweedy Brown.
In the meantime, please feel free to follow me on Twitter at William Green 72, and do let me know
how you're enjoying the podcast.
I'm always delighted to hear from you.
Until next time, take care and stay well.
Thank you for listening to TIP.
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