We Study Billionaires - The Investor’s Podcast Network - TIP495: The Changing Composition of Money w/ Alfonso Peccatiello
Episode Date: November 18, 2022IN THIS EPISODE, YOU'LL LEARN: 02:09 - Why Banks are at serious risk of losing deposits. 09:25 - Why the ECB is changing its tune on monetary policy. 17:01 - The recent Fed meeting. 39:46 - The un...derlying risk with pension funds using interest rate swaps. 58:44 - Expectations for the current yield curve inversion. And much, much more! Disclaimer: Slight discrepancies in the timestamps may occur due to podcast platform differences. BOOKS AND RESOURCES Join the exclusive TIP Mastermind Community to engage in meaningful stock investing discussions with Stig, Clay, and the other community members. The Macro Compass' Newsletter. Alf's Twitter. Trey Lockerbie's Twitter. Related Episode: European Fragmentation Policy & Mounting Global Pressures w/ Alf Pecca - BTC089. Related Episode: Understanding Quantitative Easing w/ Alfonso Peccatiello - MI232. SPONSORS Support our free podcast by supporting our sponsors: River Toyota Public Fundrise TastyTrade The Bitcoin Way Connect Invest American Express ReMarkable Toyota Onramp Facet SimpleMining Vanta Shopify Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm
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On today's episode, we welcome back Alfonso Pekitello.
Alf is the former head of a $20 billion investment portfolio and now the author of the
Macro Compass, which is an awesome free newsletter.
Alph and Preston discussed some major macro topics back in August on episode BTC 089, and Alph made some very accurate predictions, so we had to bring him back.
In this episode, we discuss why banks are at serious risk of losing deposits, why the ECB is changing their tune on their monetary policy, the recent Fed meeting, the underlying risk with pension funds using interest rate swaps, expectations for the current yield curve inversion, and much, much more.
I really enjoyed getting into the weeds on some of these very technical topics like interest rate swaps,
TLTRO loans, pricing and inflation and other tools and metrics that Althe uses.
I hope you enjoy it as well.
So without further ado, here's my conversation with Alfonso Pekatielo.
You are listening to The Investors Podcast, where we study the financial markets and read the books
that influence self-made billionaires the most.
We keep you informed and prepared for the unexpected.
Welcome to the Investors Podcast.
I'm your host, Trey Lockerbie.
And today we have back on the show Alfonso Pekitello, also known as Alf, especially on Twitter.
Alf, welcome back to the show.
Hey, Trey, a pleasure to be on this show, particularly in the list of shows you guys do are, is impressive, I would say.
It's very happy to be back.
I want to jump right in here and highlight something around banks that's been happening recently and get your opinion on it.
but banks are at a serious risk of losing deposits and reserves to higher paying yield products
like money market funds.
Today, households could make 4% just by investing in treasuries or money market funds backed
by treasuries.
But you highlight that if households decide to flow out of banks and into money market funds,
it could change the composition of money.
Can you walk us through how this works?
Yeah, Trey.
So let's start by defining what kind of money.
can a household actually use. For a household, money nowadays is mostly bank deposits. Ninety-seven percent
of the transactions that happen in the real economy is not cash anymore, but it's rather transferring
bank deposits from a bank to another. That's how we move money between households nowadays. So,
bank deposits are one form of money, but what are the other forms of money that we can own as households?
Well, there are a couple, especially in the US, you can decide to allocate to a money market fund,
which nowadays is a highly regulated relatively liquid instrument where you park short-term cash,
and these money market funds can only buy treasuries effectively,
which means you're parking money effectively in treasury investing vehicles that are highly regulated.
That's another way to park your money.
The third way would be directly to invest in treasuries.
Now, when you think of money tray as a household and you think of the safety of your money
and the liquid form of this money, you move along with two axes,
and you need to ask yourself every time
whose liability is your money.
Now, if you park money in a bank,
this is the liability of the government
up until the FDIC insurance, right?
Because effectively up until 100K, I think in the US,
or 250 is the level at which the government
basically would guarantee a potential default of the bank,
which means that inherently that money
is the liability of the US government.
Above that amount, above the FDIC threshold, the money you park in a bank, it's the liability
of a commercial bank.
It's an unsecured risk that you're taking that the bank doesn't go belly up above the FDIC insurance.
Now, alternatively, you can buy treasuries or invest in a money market fund who buys treasuries,
basically, and there you are directly having your money, your form of money that you own as the
liability of the U.S. government.
You might want to argue that the U.S. government is a better credit than an unsecured
a bank exposure, commercial bank exposure, which means as a household, of course, the bank deposit
is more liquid than a treasury, but it also comes with some additional risk, a layer of risk.
But obviously, if there is a return that you can generate there, you will also put that into
the equation when you decide how to allocate your money. And you are correct when saying that
today, if you're a household, a bank deposit exposes you to some risks, especially above the FDIC insurance,
and it does not reward you enough.
The alternatives are money market funds and treasuries
that basically are the liability of a government,
so a safer form of money, perhaps a tiny bit less liquid than a bank deposit,
but they're yielding much, much more today.
So money market funds is yielding roughly almost 4% in the treasury,
especially even at the short end, T-bill, six months,
one-year exposures will give you a 4% return against bank deposits
that will give you a 0.5, 0.6% return.
So one of my thesis is that quantitative tightening itself is already shrinking the amount of bank
reserves in the system by definition.
The Federal Reserve shrinks its asset side and with it it shrinks its liability side,
with bank reserves being one of the liability items that gets shrunk as well.
But those bank reserves will shrink even faster than in a normal QT process if households
decide to take away deposits from banks, which also shrinks the amount of reserves they own
and to allocate these deposits elsewhere, which can be buying a treasury bond or parking money
in a market fund.
Now, is the impact of that simply that the velocity of money slows way down and that,
loans are not generated as frequently in the economy just kind of tightens up that much faster?
So what we would be doing in that circumstance, if my thesis is correct, is that real economy
money will be destroyed alongside with financial.
financial money. So you need to think about money as two different tiers, two different channels,
two different buckets, right? So let's talk about real economy money. What I define as real
economy money is the money that tray of corporates, real economy actors actually use. And that money
is mostly bank deposits. But as we said, if we outsolds, actually withdraw our bank deposits from
banks and go and allocate and buy treasuries on exposure in money market funds, we are basically
eliminating a source of real economy money. Those deposits could be used to buy a car, to buy a house,
to boost nominal spending. And what we would be doing is we draw them from this real economy
money bucket and parking them in the financial sector, which means allocating to money market
funds or buying treasuries. So that will be a form of destruction of real economy money and transfer,
changing the composition of this money back into financial type of money, a type of money that cannot
be spent and used in the real economy. Now, remember trade that we also discussed about
quantitative tightening. And what quantitative tightening does is that it shrinks the amount of
financial economy money on top of the change of composition we just discussed. Why does it do
that? Because it removes the amount, it reduces the amount of bank reserves in the system.
And bank reserves are money for banks. They are a financial form of money that banks use to
exchange transactions between each other, settle them, repo against each other, buy securities
from each other, you need to think about it as the lubricant of the financial system.
Now, if households also withdraw deposits from bank and turn that real economy form of money,
they destroy that basically within this operation, you will be basically destroying both forms
of money. The Federal Reserve will take care of killing reserves, of draining these reserves from
the system of basically stop the lubrication of the financial sector and stop the flow of this
financial form of money.
And on top of that, households will be taking care of withdrawing real economy money from banks
to allocate the money market funds or treasuries and governments, which are the other producers
of real economy money.
They also stop the tap.
The last time that the US government sent Chebs-a-domer people has been April 2021.
It's been one and a half here since we have seen a fiscal stimulus that boosts the amount
of disposable money for us, which means the real economy is getting starved of dollars,
and the financial sector is getting starved of financial dollars, as I call them, which are
bank reserves.
And when these two happens at the same time, actually, you have to expect either liquidity
systemic events or economics lowdowns or both at the same time.
So speaking of bank deposits, the European Central Bank, the ECB, just hiked raised by 75 basis
points, which brought the deposit rate to 1.5%. And they're acknowledging that inflation might
stay higher for a lot longer, and that probably further interest rate hikes are underway.
Walk us through what happened, though, at the most recent ECB meeting and why you suggest that
central banks sound like they might have a change of heart related to their current monetary policy.
I think what we are getting here is a non-FED pivot, which means that all other central banks,
which are not the Fed, seem to be much more willing to be nuanced right now than the Federal Reserve
is nuanced about its monetary policy.
The European Central Bank was a point in case.
We have seen them coming, especially Lagarde, coming to the press conference and telling us
that, yes, of course, they are still serious about fighting inflation, but they also see a sharp
economic slowdown ahead. And therefore, that they are going to be more than once going forward.
We have heard that not only from the European Central Bank, but also from the Bank of Canada,
from the Reserve Bank of Australia. So what do all these jurisdictions have in common?
And the answer is inherent fragilities. Now, think about Europe. What would be European inherent
fragilities? It's its own architecture, its own infrastructure, which is built on 19 different
jurisdictions being under one umbrella when it comes to monetary.
policy, but not under one umbrella when it comes to fiscal policy, right? We all know that. That
creates inerrant fragilities within the system. Think about Canada or Australia. What are there
fragilities? It's very simple. It's the housing market. It's private debt. Just to give you statistics
about Canada, Canada private debt to GDP. So that's not the government, that's citizens, that's
corporates. Private debt to GDP in Canada is now higher than it was in Japan at the peak of the real
estate bubble of the 90s. Back then, private debt in Japan had grown so fast that the Imperial
Palace of Tokyo was worth more than California, the entire state of California. That's the level
of private debt injection that in Japan led to the real estate bubble. In Canada, today, we have a higher
private debt to GDP than in Japan at the peak of that bubble. Now, that makes raising interest rates
a very complicated exercise for the Bank of Canada. And we have seen therefore Bank of Canada,
Reserve Bank of Australia, European Central Bank, and all these policymakers in jurisdictions
that have in our fragility is being much more nuanced about their tightening path ahead
because they're now looking at financial risks, financial stability risks that are coming
and looming on the horizons and they go hand in and together with their mandate of fighting
inflation. When it comes to the Federal Reserve, the story is different for two reasons. The first is
the US economy is in general in a much better shape than anywhere else.
And that's basically the byproduct of a gigantic stimulus that the US true at its economy
in 2020, 2020, 2021, as a percentage of GDP that's unparalleled in any other jurisdiction.
And so the US is still basically living off that aggregate demand boost that we saw
in gigantic amounts being thrown at the economy in 2020, 2021.
The labor market is still relatively strong, balance sheets are still relatively healthy,
etc, et cetera, et cetera.
The second reason is that you need to think about our monetary system as a dollar-centric system.
So it's a pyramid, basically, and at the epicenter of the pyramid sits the dollar.
The dollar, despite being only 10% of GDP, the US being only 10% of GDP and dollar
representing roughly 15, 20% of world trades, the dollar basically takes a lion's share
between 60 and 80% of all FX transactions, cross-border payments, trade invoicing, so on,
and so forth, which basically means that the dollar sits at the epicenter of our system.
Now, when the system becomes shaky, the first impact, it's not at the epicenter of the pyramid,
but it's at the very top and at the fringes of the pyramid.
And the top at the fringes of the pyramid are all other jurisdiction that basically leave off
and benefit from this dollar-centric system we have created until there is a little bit of stress
being thrown into the system.
The US sits at the very center of it, which means it feels the stress,
late in the cycle, while the peripheral parts of the system actually tend to be stressed first,
including and especially the ones that have inherent fragilities like Europe or Canada
or certain emerging markets.
And that's why these central banks and not the Fed are the ones that are looking like ready
to pivot earlier than the Fed itself.
So interesting.
You know, back in August when you were talking to Preston, it was the Bitcoin episode 89,
you highlighted that 70% of the CPI components were running at over,
4%. Eurozone inflation recently soared to a new record. And prices have jumped by a record of 10.7%
in October and far exceeding the expectation of 10.3%. Core inflation also accelerated to a new
record of 5%. So I'm curious, how will this impact the current ECB policy? Yeah, so we are talking
about the soft pivot stance from peripheral central banks, which are not the Fed, and the European
Central Bank can be effectively qualified as one. Now, if the solution would be as simple as to say,
hey, instead of only focusing on our inflation mandate, we also want to take into account
financial stability risks that we see on the horizon. Therefore, we are going to be much more
gradual from now onwards when it comes to raising interest rate. Yes, you can do that,
tray, but the problem is that you will be sending a signal to markets that you are not overly
serious about inflation. And what happens then is that real interest rates start to drop
all over again. And as real interest rates drop, actually investors appetite come back and they
start buying houses, buying equities. Borrowers have an easy life again. They can borrow.
The economy starts to run hot again and we run the risk of basically feeding this inflationary
mechanism that we saw being very vicious in the 70s under the Volcker tenure and that led basically
Volcker to be overly aggressive later on to be able to actually bring inflation down once and
for all. So there is always a release valve in this process. When real rates drop very aggressively
as the central bank is not that committed about fighting inflation anymore, the currency can be one
release valve. We have seen that happening in the UK. We have seen the sterling actually drop. You've
in the euro drop against a dollar. So it's not that easy for a central bank during a period
where inflation runs way beyond their mandate to simply say, hey, all of a sudden, we also
want to take care of our financial stability risks, because bond vigilantes, effects
vigilantes, they will come back and actually haunt policymakers by going after the release
valves, be there the bond market, be there the effects market, or whatever other release valve
they find. So in this setup, I think, there is no easy policy.
that the central banker can implement, as Powell was very clear about, one very coherent monetary
policy take will be to just be very strong and committed in fighting inflation. But that means
that households will need to go through some pain. That means the housing market goes basically
to a halt. House prices have to go down. Stock prices need to go down. And households need,
unfortunately, to feel the pain for this monetary tightening exercise. There is this idea
of a soft lending, this idea of a nuance, this idea of a nuance, this idea.
of perfectly navigating a gradual interest rate increase in a world that runs at 400% that
the GDP summing up the private sector and the public sector. In a world that is highly leveraged,
it's really a complicated concept to unfold and to successfully land, I think.
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All right.
Back to the show.
We have another Fed meeting coming up this week.
I mean, this episode will probably drop a couple weeks after this, but tomorrow the Fed is meeting again.
And, you know, I'm hearing lots of different narratives or lots of speculation around whether they're going to ease up on their rate hikes now or if they're going to go ahead with 75 basis points and then kind of talk about maybe.
slowing down the rate hikes moving forward. I'm kind of in the camp of the ladder. So I'm kind of,
that's what I'm predicting. What are you predicting about this week's Fed meeting? I think they'll do 75 basis
point, tray. And of course, this episode will be released after the Fed meeting. So I'll make a fool of
myself by calling this wrong. We're honest man. But the most important part of the Federal Reserve meeting is
not necessarily 75 or 50 basis point at this meeting itself, but whether and how Powell responds
to the market demands for a Fed pivot.
The market is basically asking questions very loud
about when and if the Fed Reserve will slow down the pace of hikes,
where will the terminal rate be,
and what is the hurdle for Powell to stop tightening the screws that much?
And it needs to come up and answer to these questions during the press conference,
and I think that will be the most interesting part of the Fed meeting.
And I think those answers will be still pretty clear.
Powell's mandate is to bring inflation down. And because he's been so wrong about inflation for so long now for like maybe nine to ten months already, where the Federal Reserve was very late in hiking interest rates and tightening, he lost a fair amount of credibility.
Credibility tray is the strongest asset and basically almost the only one that the central bank has. And so as inflation is still running way beyond Powell's mandate and especially being very widespread, as I said to Preston a couple of months ago,
It's not only used car prices that are up, but it's now services inflation.
It's the stickiest component of the inflation basket that are pointing up, up and up.
There is no reason, no evidence in the data whatsoever that would allow Powell to coherently
and credibly slow down, let alone pivot.
So I think it will be very clear in his press conference that unless some serious progress
has been made on the inflation front, he can't validate any demand from market
participants to pivot towards a Mordovish stunts.
I agree with you there.
You know, instead of quantitative tightening, the ECB has been leaning towards what they
call targeted longer-term refinancing operations, otherwise known as TLTROs, and those are loans.
Please explain what TLTROs are and why it makes more sense for the ECB.
So, Trey, let's go back to the pandemic times in Europe.
So that will be early 2020 when we got the first wave of pandemic.
The European economy is very fragile.
It's an economy with a very bad demographics with poor productivity trends.
It's an economy that needs credit to try and grow at least at a decent level,
decent namely being roughly 1.5% or 2% real growth a year.
It needs credit.
It needs the flow of credit to be ample and available to economic actors
so that can leverage the balance sheet and grow more than the poor demographics
and productivity trends alone would allow.
Now, during the pandemic, you wouldn't expect banks to be very happy to lend money to the
private sector because they would expect major defaults, right?
So the European Central Bank came in and designed a program that effectively allowed banks in
to get an extremely cheap funding rate.
So banks could borrow directly from the European Central Bank through this TLTROs,
and these borrowing rates would be extremely cheap.
all the way up to minus 1%.
Now, think trade, you're getting paid as a bank
to borrow from the European Central Bank itself,
but the lower rates, negative 1% on the borrowing side,
would only become true if you, as a European bank,
would at least keep your loans book stable,
which means you would at least lend some money back
to the private sector without shrinking your lending book.
So there were some criteria.
It was a targeted long-term refinancing operation indeed,
and the target was to make sure that some flow of credit was directed to the private sector even
during the pandemic. Now, obviously, again, the central bank didn't ask banks to lend more. It asked
banks not to shrink their lending book. So the hard-old rate was very easy to achieve, if you ask me,
which meant that the conditions were extremely favorable. And European banks borrowed two trillion
euros from the European Central Bank and ended up keeping their loan book stable and simply
making an arbitrage by borrowing at minus 1% and parking back these reserves back at the
central bank and negative 50 basis point. So there was an easy arbitrage that banks could run.
Now, they did so for a while. Basically, the European Central Bank wrote a check to European
banks. You could think it this way as well. Now comes the post-pandemic period, the European Central
Bank with inflation at 10.7% in Europe does not want banks to lend aggressively to the private
sector and feed additional aggregate demand pickup.
So it wants European banks to actually pair back some of their lending activity.
And for sure, it doesn't want them to gain a free carry, a free arbitrage by continuing
to get these reserves at minus 1% and parking that back at positive interest rates at the
European Central Bank.
So they announced that the conditions would change.
And this changing conditions basically almost forces European banks to repay back the loans because
the borrowing conditions are not favorable anymore. So what you're doing from now onwards for the
next year, basically, is yes, you're rolling over this borrowing from the European Central Bank,
but not at favorable rates anymore. So where is the sense of that? Why would you lengthen
your balance sheet if conditions are not favorable anymore? Now, what the European Central Bank is
hoping there is that European Bank would repay back a good portion of this TFT euros to the
central bank. But what it does, Trey, is it shrinks the balance sheet of the European Central Bank. These
loans which were created against reserves which are created on the liability side will both shrink
as European banks repay these loans and the reserves are destroyed as well, which means the
balance sheet of the central bank will come down and reserves in the banking system will also
come down. And if you remember about what we discussed before, that means that money for banks
will be less ample, will be scarcer. The amount of reserves in the system will go down, which
means the lubricant of the financial system in Europe too and not only in the US will actually
become scarcer, which also means that banks will become less prone to engage in liquidity
providing activities, in repo activities, in transacting with each other, in facilitating liquidity
in markets, which, if you ask me, is an additional reason also in Europe to be very conservative
when it comes to taking risks and allocating assets in a risk-prone way going forward.
You know, you introduced me to a new ratio, actually, which is the one-year, one-year
inflation swaps minus the U.S. year-over-year CPI.
And what this, I guess, is telling us is a prediction of where the U.S. CPI or how much the U.S.
CPI may or may not drop or raise, right?
So right now it's predicting a drop by over 5%.
Now, do you use this metric or buy into it?
And if not, or if so, what are your expectations for future inflation prints?
So, Trey, the reason why I came up with this indicator on the macrocombus, the reason why I looked at that is the following.
I hear a lot of investors that are saying, hey, I think inflation will fall off a cliff and therefore I'm going to do X, Y and Z with my portfolio.
Now, if you have been a professional investor like me, you understand, Trey, that having an opinion is not a good enough reason to invest because the market as an opinion too.
So you need to basically weigh your own subjective assessment of probabilities and what will happen
against what the market is pricing in.
So this ratio that you just mentioned is my attempt at displaying to people what is the market
expecting when it comes to inflation going forward.
So what I did is I looked into the corners of the fixed income market, came up with forward
expectations from fixed income participants for inflation in 12 to 18 months from now against
where inflation is today.
Now, the market expects inflation to drop by five percentage points in 16 to 18 months from now,
from 8% all the way down to 3%.
It's already baked in in fixed income participants' expectations.
Now, we should dispel this theory under which the bond market is omniscient.
It can predict everything on point.
Well, that's not always the case, but knowing at least what's priced in,
what's expected by bond market participants, can inform you when,
taking risks. So if your thesis solely relies on inflation will come down, well, guess what?
The market is already pricing that into a large extent. Now, a lot has to do with the pace of
this lowdown and the extent of this lowdown trade. So there you can have a different opinion
from markets, basically. There are a lot of people that expect inflation never to drop to 3%
and to stabilize in the 4% to 5% camp. Am I in that camp? Well, not really, especially on the cycle.
So we shouldn't confuse long-term trends with cycles.
What I think we will be experiencing right now is as we had a very strong cycle of
inflation going up very rapidly, by the end of 2023, beginning of 2024, we're going
to have a very vicious cycle of inflation dropping very aggressively.
And my expectations is that it will also drop below this 3% implied by markets.
So why do I think inflation by 2024 will be back in the 2% area, if not even below,
is very simple. The amount of real economy money of credit being thrown to people in 2020,
2020, 2021 was gigantic. I built a series called the G5 Credit Impulse series that tries to measure
across the five largest economies, how much real economy money are we pumping? How much money
is it reaching the private sector pockets, the one that actually can be used to buy goods,
to boost nominal economic activity, basically? And that serious, Trey, in 2000,
late 2020, beginning of 2021, had the fastest increase on record on my series.
It was really gigantic the amount of money we threw at real economic actors, not financial
money, real economy money.
Now, if I look at that series, it leads inflation by roughly 18 months.
Why?
Because it needs time.
You need time.
You need people to get more money on their bank accounts, reassess their spending pattern.
Then you need people to spend, which will drive up earnings, economic growth.
and later on also inflation. Now, very punctually, inflation 12 to 18 months later actually started
to rise. But in order to understand what will happen in a year, 18 months from now, we need to
look at that series today. And where is that credit impulse series today, Trey? It's at the lowest
levels over the last 45 years. And why? Because we have stopped throwing money at the private sector.
We haven't had any fiscal stimulus in one and a half years. Actually, some jurisdiction are doing
fiscal tightening, they're taxing the private sector more than throwing money at the private
sector. Look at the tax season in the US in April. It was very, very good for the government,
which is bad for the private sector. It means we are paying more taxes. And yes, banks are trying
to lend more as normal in the late cycle, but you are not creating money anymore for the private
sector. You're actually draining some money from the real economy today, which basically means
that after every sugar rush, there is now a sugar cliff. And the sugarciful, and the sugarciful,
cliff inevitably in 18 months, 12 to 18 months, will also translate into lower inflation.
There is no good reason for which the big stimulus we have seen cyclical stimulus in 2020,
2021, which led to a sharp pickup in inflation and the subsequent gigantic withdrawal of real
economy money we're experiencing now shouldn't lead to the same extent, slowdown of
inflation into late 2023 beginning of 2024. That's a different story than discussing long-term
trends where people might say, yes, Alf, but we are de-globalizing. Yes, Alf, but the labor force is not
expanding anymore. Yes, but commodities. Yes, but all right. But these are long-term trends.
They take five, 10 years to unfold and be visible in inflation trajectories. In the meantime,
we will have cycles. And those cycles in growth, those cycles in inflation are dictated by
large swings in monitoring and fiscal supports. And as we have seen a large tailwind in 2020,
2021, we are seeing now a gigantic headwind in 2022, which will inevitably turn out to slow down
economic growth and inflation in late 2023 and 2024. So maybe there's a clarification here
around kind of timing. But earlier this year, you were more of a proponent of sitting on cash.
And it seems like lately you've been shifting into more of a proponent for going long treasuries and maybe
even shorting equities. So I'm kind of curious what has shifted for you, especially with the
expectation that inflation may be coming down over the next, let's call it a year.
So basically, the macrocompass asset allocation models in November, December, were signaling that
both forward economic growth would slow down and the policymakers will become more aggressive.
And the combination of the two is toxic for assets. And we have seen anything actually being
beaten up this year, apart from energy, anything that is.
Bitcoin, equities, bonds, anything you name has been beaten up, apart from the dollar and energy.
So back then, the Astellocation tilt was to effectively hoard a bunch of dollar cash, which isn't
a very attractive thing to say, but ultimately in cycles, in macro cycles, there are periods
to be long, periods to be short, and periods to go fishing, as my mentor would say, which means
just be defensive and not try to get sucked into very complicated situations. Now, that has played
that very well for the first seven to eight months of the year. Now, when you start, you start,
start having a lot of damage or potential damage being displayed into economic growth. Damage
that is caused by fiscal tightening and monetary tightening, there is a point at which there
is a dichotomy that happens. Earnings growth and economic growth will keep falling into
2023 because, well, we are trying basically to slow the economy down. So being long assets that
benefit from cyclical growth is a very bad idea. Now, what becomes a good idea or could become a
idea instead is to try and be long assets that benefit from a disinflationary trend. If you think
that this inflationary trend is coming while earnings growth and economic growth will still disappoint,
then historically one of the best assets that perform in this environment are bonds and gold to a certain
extent as well. Those are defensive assets that perform relatively well when real interest rates are
dropping and there are these inflationary trends. So I'm not saying it's time to pile up into a bond
allocation, but I'm suggesting, as you can read on the macro compass, that the times might be
ripe for a moment where, like in early 2001, bonds could start to do well while equities still
struggle. And let me elaborate for a second on this 2001 analogy. So I think, and this is one
of the pieces I release on the macro compass as well, that we are looking at a period, which is very
similar to late 2000, beginning of 2001. And now think with me, Trey, when it comes to the similarities. In
In 2000, we had the dot-com bubble, which was an expression of excessive risk-taking and animal
spirits in financial markets.
Does it remind you of anything in 2021?
We have seen unprofitable companies being validated 100 times earnings.
We have seen debatable alt coins being thrown to the roof in pump and pump schemes, etc.
So there have been a lot of animal spirits and irrational risk-taking experiences in 2021, which
pretty closely remind of the dot-com bubble in 2000.
Inflation in 1999 and in 2000 was at 4.5% for five quarters in a row.
Now, today is even higher, but you get the gist of what I'm going.
Where I'm going is that inflation was much higher than the Federal Reserve Target,
which limited the Fed ability in 2000, like in 2022,
to actually intervene and be dovish when the market was actually showing sadness stress
or the economy was already decelerating.
The Fed's hands were basically tied,
are still tied today. So that's another similarity. And then in late 2000, you start seeing a bit
of cracks appearing in earnings. Wow, we have seen some cracks appearing in this earning season.
Have you had a look at Amazon or meta? For example, very large cap companies that have
suffered an earnings disappointment compared to expectations. Now, let's say the similarities are
there. What happened in 2001, which would be us looking in the parallel and drawing into the next
three to six months. What happened then is that the labor market started to show in some cracks on non-farm
payrolls instead of being 300,000 addition of jobs a month became 50,000, 70,000. So the labor market
was still adding jobs, but visibly slowing down. I would expect the same to happen over the next
three to six months. We saw earnings continuing their deterioration on the way down, which is also
what I expect to happen over the next three to six months. Now, what happened to asset class's
performance in 2001? Instead of everything sell-off,
like we have seen in 2022, where bonds, gold, Bitcoin, equities, anything you can own went down,
actually some asset classes started delivering positive performance. Bonds being one of those.
And also why? Because the Federal Reserve at some point in 2001 saw that enough damage was starting
to be delivered to the labor market. Unemployment rate had gone up already significantly,
which allowed them at least to cut interest rates by a hundred, 150 basis point and bring interest rates down from
6 and 1⁄2% to 5%.
So not to 0%, but at least to 5% to start accommodating the process of an economic slowdown,
which helped bonds perform.
Now, do I expect this to happen immediately in three weeks?
Not necessarily, but I'm preparing investors to draw parallels with that period of early 2001
where a Fed pivot is not necessarily positive for equities and risk cussets because the Fed
will be pivoting when damage is done to the labor market and to earnings.
which is not a situation where you want to be bullish risk assets because the economy is
slowing down very aggressively.
We are in a recession in an environment.
There is an asset that can deliver positive returns.
And in that cycle, in that particular cycle, is bonds rather than equities.
And that's where I'm preparing to basically tilt my asset allocation going forward.
Let's talk about some other cracks in the system.
So I'm trying to better understand what exactly happened with the pensions in the UK as of late
because the global pension fund industry is worth $35 to $40 trillion.
I mean, this is just such a massive, massive part of our global economy.
And the UK pension funds were in hot water recently.
It seems like we got here by these funds using what's called interest rate swaps.
Can you please describe what an interest rate swap is and how it works?
Yeah, that's a good question, Trey.
And this is a relatively complex topic, but we'll try to make it simple.
That's why we're here for.
So bear with me for a second and let's think about how a pension fund works.
A pension fund balance sheet has a liability side and on the liabilities, it's basically
the pension fund promise to pay pensions to write re-ease in 30 to four years from now.
Those are the liabilities, the due items for a pension fund.
On the asset side, a pension fund will have investments to make sure it can generate
enough returns to meet these obligations.
So these investments will be a bunch of bonds, equities,
real estate investments, whatever they deemed necessary to achieve these returns. Now, what about
risks? A pension fund needs to pay these pension obligations in generally 20 to 30 years from now,
which means that rapid changes in interest rates can affect the market value of its balance sheet
because you need to think about this pension liabilities as very long-term duration liabilities.
So the price and value of these liabilities changes with interest rates changing up and down very
rapidly. In other words, the pension fund is exposed to interest rate risk. Now, not only on the
asset side they need to generate returns trade, they also need to hedge this interest rate risk somehow,
right? So the obvious candidate to generate fixed returns and hedge interest rate risk is a
government bond, a long-term government bond, which not only generates a certain return, which is
fixed if you own the bond until maturity, but it also hedges interest rate risk on the liability side.
And that's why pension funds are notoriously large investors in the government bond market.
I'm not saying anything new, but now let's introduce the concept of interest rate swaps.
Now, the problem with investing all your assets into government bonds trades that interest rates were dropping very fast for the last 30 years, which meant that if you look at the UK pension fund for the last 10 years, if they would only buy UK government bonds, they would lock in yields in the 2% area.
And 2% is not enough of a return to guarantee a decent pension stream to rate the risk 20 to 30 years from now.
So interest rate swaps became very convenient to use.
And why?
Because an interest rate swap is nothing else in an agreement where two counterparts exchange
floating interest rates over time against the fixed interest rate that we decide today.
So we're basically fixing today interest rates against promising to pay floating interest rate over time.
So it's an instrument to basically lock in interest rate today and try to hedge this interest rate risk over the time span.
But where is the trick?
Because you could do the same with government bonds.
The trick is that interest rate swaps do not require cash outflows, large cash outflows at the beginning.
When you buy a government bond, a hundred million of a government bond requires you to disburs a hundred million in cash.
Interest rate swaps are derivatives and they're centrally cleared, which means that the clearinghouse would only require you a small initial margin for,
you to enter into a trade that hedges a lot of interest rate risk. Now, do you see the convenience
of that? That's awesome because you save a lot of cash by doing this interest rate swap. You still hedge
interest rate risk, but you don't need to put all that cash up front. You don't need to anymore,
which means the cash you don't put up front can be instead invested in higher yielding assets.
You can buy more real estate exposure, more equities, more emerging markets, more credit
exposure and make sure that both your interest rate risk is edged and your perspective
return is much higher because now all of a sudden you're investing your cash in higher-yielding
us.
Wow, that looks amazing, right?
Well, there is a problem.
The problem is that as long as volatility remains very low, the clearinghouse will require
you to post only a little bit of variation margin.
You know, these interest rate derivatives go up and down every day, but as long as volatility
is contained, they will only call you to put a little bit of cash every day.
or to receive a little bit of cash if the position is going your way.
Now, let's walk back to a month ago,
where interest rate volatility in the UK went through the roof.
We saw as the combination of the fiscal package,
which was launched by Lids Trust,
and inflation in the UK being rampant,
we saw interest rate volatility going through the roof.
Interest rates increasing 20, 30, 40 basis point a date, right?
Which was nothing that any pension fund risk manager
had incorporated in their modes.
Now, what happens?
the clearinghouse is calling up this interest rate, these pension funds and saying,
guys, you need to post a large amount of collateral because your position is underwater.
Okay.
So the UK pension fund goes and look for cash and it has some cash on the side.
It posts it.
But the day after, the interest rate swaps keep going up, up and up in interest rates,
which calls them for more collateral.
There is no collateral anymore.
So what do you do is, no problem.
We'll give you some bonds, right?
We have a bond portfolio.
we will use that bond portfolio as collateral to meet the margin code.
The clearinghouses do not accept bonds as collateral.
They want cash.
Now, one way would be to try and post this bond somewhere else as collateral to receive cash,
maybe from a bank, for example, and use that cash to meet the collateral margin.
Banks refused to do these transactions because they understood that pension funds had
a liquidity problem.
They didn't want to lend money to an entity which is facing a liquidity crisis, right?
Pension funds also do not have access to the central bank.
They cannot go to the central bank and say, hey, here is my bond portfolio.
Please give me some cash.
They do not have a line with central bank, which means the only solution left is to sell
rapidly down your bond portfolio, your equity portfolio, anything you have in your book
in order to raise the cash necessary to meet the margin calls or otherwise you would default
on these contracts.
And that's exactly to what we saw happening, right?
a rapid fire sale that ended up compounding the problem of rising interest rates because
not only interest rates were rising pension funds were selling bonds on top of that to try and
raise the cash necessary to meet the margin course. And at some point, the Bank of England had to
intervene because otherwise a large systemic $40 trillion participant sector like the UK pension
fund would be underwater very rapidly. So these are systemic risks that tend to be hidden
until volatility picks up in some corner of this very leveraged system we have created actually shows signs of stress.
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All right.
Back to the show.
So you're calling in from the Netherlands today.
And just to give a reference point, the UK pension fund industry is sized about 119% of their GDP.
This is according to 2020 data.
And the Netherlands pension fund assets is a percentage of GDP over 200%.
Could the Dutch be facing a similar risk?
as the UK, just be given the size of this economy?
In principle, yes.
The Dutch pension fund industry is gigantic.
There is a butt to be said here.
So the first is the size of the pension fund industry as percentage of GDP is actually
one good indicator.
The other one is the size of the pension fund industry as percentage of the underlying bond
market.
If there is a vast, very liquid bond market pension funds can tap, it also limits basically
the risk that there will be collateral squeezes here and there because the collateral is
abundant, right? And it is not fair, really, to compare the Dutch pension fund industry to Dutch
GDP because the Netherlands is in Europe, uses the euro and therefore can access the euro bond
market, the euro repo market and also needs to be measured against the euro GDP. So if you
change the denominator from Netherlands to Europe, then all of a sudden the problem becomes a little bit
less acute. Nevertheless, it remains a very large, systematic industry. It's a bit better
regulated, if you ask me, than the UK one. But similar dynamics could unfold, Trey, because
so far we only talked about collateral squeezes on interest derivatives. The pension funds, insurance
companies, asset managers also use other derivatives for an exchange derivatives, commodity derivatives,
equity derivatives. And as volatility is picking up in every single corner of financial markets,
you always need to bear in mind that as we have built a very successful and fruitful and wealth-generating
system, we'd leverage when volatility is very low, when volatility picks up, such a leverage system
can become fragile, especially in places where you expected the least. And the Dutch pension fund
system could easily be a candidate for potential signs of stress. So I want to talk about some other
derivatives here. When you were talking to Preston a few months back, you were highlighting this risk of
a re-denomination in Italy from the euro to the Italian lira, and the credit default swaps
were climbing in price. How has that evolved since that discussion?
So, Italy is a new government, which has been recently elected. It's a right-wing government
with basically three main parties in its coalition. And so far, we haven't had any major
updates on the fiscal stunts and the European stunts of this government, but we are waiting news
over the next few days. The reason why I use those credit default swaps contract to grasp the risk
of a lira redenomination is that investors can hedge against Italian default risks in two ways,
using two sorts of credit default swap contracts, right? There is a 2003 contract and there is a
2004 and 2013 contracts. Now, why are they two credit default swap contracts in Europe? That's an
interesting story. In 2004-5, before the great financial crisis, nobody thought or foresaw the
possibility that one of the member countries of the euro would want to walk away from the eurozone.
There was basically this possibility never crossed anybody's mind, which meant that as an investor,
if you bought a credit default swap, what you really did is you basically protected yourself
against the default risk, the credit default risk of one of the sovereigns not being able to
pay back their sovereign debt. That's what you did. But if the sovereign decided to all of a sudden
redenominate that outstanding debt from euro to pesetas or French francs or Italian lira,
you wouldn't be protected. That redenomination wouldn't qualify as a default event where your
credit default swap contract would be triggered. Now comes the great financial crisis and the
Eurozone debt crisis of 2011, Tray, and all of a sudden, that possibility of a certain member
country wanting to redenominate their debt in domestic currency and walking away from the
Eurozone becomes a real and concrete possibility. So a new contract is born, a new contract, which
is a 2014 CDS contract law, which basically protects investors also against the risk of a certain
member country redenominating their debt in Italian lira, Spanish pesetas, et cetera, et cetera.
Right now, Trey, what that means is that there are two credit default swap contracts outstanding,
one that protects you against the risk of redenomination, one that doesn't.
So comparing these two contracts basically isolates in the best way possible the redenomination risk itself.
The only material difference between trading one of the contract or the other is the redenomination risk
protection or not.
So if you compare these two contracts, you can get an idea of how much investors are willing to overpay
by buying one credit default swap contract for the luxury to be also protected against redenomination.
And this spread against these two CDS contracts in Italy actually reached levels which were
relatively high in the run-up to the Italian elections and has remained relatively high,
which means investors are willing to pay up for protection against Italy redenominating their debt
in lira. Does it mean that Italy will or that the probability has gone up?
not really. It only means that investors are more nervous about the event. Now, I don't think
this government will be extremely friendly to Europe, if you ask me. It's a government which
wants to and understands that Italy has a large leverage within the Eurozone, being a very
large economy and especially in this geopolitical context, Europe cannot afford losing one of
his largest founding members. And so what that means that if you are negotiating as the Italian
government, you know you have some decent leverage that you might want to use. So,
I do expect some confrontation between this government and Europe, which might want to make
investors even more nervous going forward.
Now, are there other parts of the market where CDS spreads or prices are increasing that's causing
you concern?
Yes, there are a couple.
The Chinese CDS market has become very active.
China is undergoing a massive de-leverage tray.
It's a de-leveraging process that involves the single biggest asset class in the world.
which is the Chinese housing market.
Chinese real estate market at the end of 2021
was valued at $50 trillion,
which is much larger
than the U.S. equity market valuations,
a gigantic market which is undergoing
a massively leveraging
because Xijim being at the Chinese Communist Party
understood that the hyper-financialization of China
was not exactly the way they wanted to proceed forward.
They wanted rather common prosperity,
perhaps trying to contain some of the financial excessive,
that were ongoing in China and they clamp down on tech sector and also clamp down on the
housing market. Now, when you climb down on such a highly leveraged and such a systemically
big, asset class like the Chinese housing market, you generate a lot of pain through the Chinese
economy and that's visible together with the zero COVID policy through the Chinese CDS market.
So the credit default swaps in China pricing actually quite some pain, historically speaking,
in China. And the other sector that I'm looking at when it comes to credit default swaps is banks.
Banks obviously are in a much better shape than in 2007.
They need less to say, they're much more regulated, much more, and they have less leverage on the
balance sheet, but they do have significant exposure to the housing market, significant exposures
to emerging markets to a certain extent as well, which means that as the housing market slows down,
some of these might actually be reverberated through banks balance sheets, and therefore credit
default swaps are starting to reprise a meaningful possibility that some of these banks go
on the trouble. See Credit Suisse in Europe, for example, being one example of a bank that has
been targeted by investors as being in trouble. So those are the two areas, I would say, financials,
both in the US, in Europe across the world and China, where I am looking for signs of credit
stress. And speaking of spreads, another spread that you guys talked about a few months ago was
the 10-year, two-year treasury spread. At the time, it was about 0.27, if I'm remembering correctly,
and you predicted that it might go to 0.5.
And shortly thereafter, like weeks later, it was at 0.48.
It kind of peaked, if we can call it that, or the trough, I guess, has been at 0.51 on September 23rd.
So you nailed this prediction so far.
It's right around 0.41 today.
Because we kind of hit your target, where do you see it going from here?
So that will basically depend on whether the Federal Reserve caves in to financial risks
or financial stability pressures
or it decides to just march ahead
and tighten monetary policy.
Trey, curb inversions, which is something
I talked about for the first time in February
on the macro compass and people thought that was crazy.
But actually, they happen when the central bank is forced
because of their Monday to tighten the screws so much
that the bond market says,
okay, we get you to influence the short term of the bond market.
We have to prize you accordingly.
So we will raise yields
back at the front end. But we will reflect the pain and the nominal growth slowdown and the
potential recession you will generate by overtightening in the back end of the bond market, because
that reflects prospects for long-term growth and long-term inflation. And the tighter you are today,
the more likely you are to cause a recession that will lower growth over the long term, right? So that
gets reflected into lower yields, or at least a curve shape which becomes flat and even inverted.
Where are the Federal Reserve to continue tightening as the labor market slows down, as earnings
keeps slowing down, I would expect curves to invert further.
Now, we have reached levels which are pretty interesting, minus 50 basis point in the two
year, 10 years spread in the U.S. Treasury curve are levels seen in 2000s, levels seen 2007.
So we are seeing levels that are pretty inverted.
So from here, the risk reward in betting in further inversion, it's not as palatable as it was
at the beginning of the year or when I spoke even to Preston. Nevertheless, it's all up to the Fed.
And I think, to be honest, Powell doesn't have major alternatives for the time being, if not to
remain pretty committed and credible towards market in his inflation fight. So I don't expect a major
reversal in this flattening trend of the yield curve. But again, the entry point today is much less
palatable than it was at the beginning of the year.
Are there any positions around the normalization of rates, if you will, or just managing
the volatility of the bond market that you're considering?
I think I'm eyeing the exact good time.
It's very difficult to do, of course, of buying five-year or 10-year U.S. government bonds.
Because there will be a point, Trey, where the slowdown will become so visible
and will become so painful through the data, through the labor market data, through the
earnings releases.
And inflation will be slowing down because we are tightening the screws of the monetary
and fiscal policy accommodation that we have done in 2021.
It will become so visible that it's basically going to be almost impossible for the bond
market to ignore in this inflationary cycle ahead.
Now, the problem is that being early, as my Mender used to say, is also being wrong.
So you need to stay there very patiently and wait for the point where the forward-looking
indicators, which have already dropped, actually feed into real economy data that the Federal
Reserve is struck in very close.
And this is mostly the labor market.
The labor market and earnings are the next shoe to drop.
So you need to be very careful that I'll observe that process ongoing,
but there will be a point where five-year treasuries at 4%.
They will look like a fantastic investment with hindsight.
And I will be trying through the macro compass to direct my macro assessment
in a systematic data-driven way so that astallocation becomes more and better equipped
for what I expect to be a disinflationary period ahead.
where nominal economic growth will slow down very aggressively.
Earnings will slow down.
The labor market will also take a hit, and people, unfortunately, will get unemployed to a certain
extent.
The housing market will slow down, but at the same time, there will be some investment
opportunities finally for investors to be long something, because this year, whatever you
bought, whatever you were long, unless it was energy or the dollar, if you were a non-U.S.
investor was a big pain.
And the good news is that, from an investor perspective, I expect some opportunities for
a long investor to arise over the next six months.
Now, last question here, do you expect the other shoe to drop to kind of come from housing?
Because you've written that housing makes up 20% of US GDP in around 12 million jobs,
given its brokers and the construction and furniture shops, et cetera.
And if this needs to kind of grow by 90,000 jobs, if our labor force needs to grow by 90,000
jobs and this only grows by 10%, we might see a negative sign here as far as non-farm payrolls go.
Is that what you're keeping a close eye on at the moment?
moment. Yeah. So my expectation is that unemployment rate in the US will be at 6% by the end of next year.
And this is not your median expectation. The median expectation is for unemployment rate to rise to
4.5%. I expected to rise much faster to 6%. And the reason why is that I expect the housing market
to be much weaker than people expect. I wrote the first article in the housing market weakness in
March this year. And again, people told me I was crazy, but all I was doing was just looking at
mortgage rates and at potential housebuilding activity ahead and the affordability crisis that
people were basically staring into. And actually, that's what's been unfolding. And the housing
market is a vital sector of the economy. Housing ease the cycle because it's the most leverage,
most interest rate sensitive sector, one of the first sector to move actually. And it accounts for
so much of US employment and US GDP that the housing sector alone could be responsible for non-farm
payrolls to turn negative anywhere in Q1 next year. And as we don't add jobs, but we actually
reduce jobs on a national level, while we need to add jobs to around 100,000 monthly pays
to keep unemployment rate stable, if you do the mathematics, you end up understanding that
unemployment rate is likely to shoot up much higher than 4.5% by the end of next year, solely accounting
for a serious lowdown in the housing market, which is inevitable at this point, right? The bull case for
the housing market is a complete freeze. It's a situation where sellers have the luxury,
not to have to sell, and they can just basically pair back. And the market will become dry.
There will be no transaction and no new houses built. How many jobs will you lose in housing
and housing-related sectors at that point? Do you need brokers if there is no transaction?
Do you need construction workers if there is no appetite to buy any house anymore, right?
Now, this is the bull case.
A more base case, I would say, is that the labor market weakens and therefore some people
are forced to sell a house to tap into their equity because the housing market gains that
we have seen over the last five to ten years in the U.S. account for a lot of the so-called
balance-it strength in consumers.
It's people having their houses worth much more than what they paid for.
Now, if they lose their jobs, they might want to be forced to a certain extent at least to tap
into this home equity, which means selling their house or refine.
in their house or any way, extracting some equity from the housing market. Now, if that happens,
it starts a little bit of a cascade where I expect house prices to drop by 10% by the end of next year,
which, by the way, seems very scary, but it would only bring us back to early 2021 levels.
It's not the end of the world. And it's a likely path ahead that will also hit the labor market
to an extent where I think unemployment rate will be in the 6% area by the end of next year.
Wow. Well, Al, this was incredible. And you are putting out such amazing content. And I strongly encourage people to not only subscribe to your newsletter, but follow you on Twitter as well. You've got amazing threads you put up there almost daily. So before I let you go, I want to give you the opportunity to hand off to the audience where they can learn more about you and find all the resources you're providing.
Well, Trey, very kind words from your side. Thank you very much. If people want to find more about my work, the best place to do that is my free newsletter. It's called,
the macro compass. It has 110,000 readers by now. I'm very happy about the amount of people
reading it. It goes out weekly. And it's a newsletter whose mission is to give away financial
education, macroeconomic insights, and actionable investment ideas so that people can look at the
same things I, as a pro, I'm looking at when assessing macroeconomic conditions ahead and make up
their mind to be a much better informed macro investors and understand that there are risks
to be managed, cycles to be managed when it comes to portfolio allocation.
So my mission is to try and help people educate themselves, become smarter about macro,
about the bond market, which is in particular my specialty, and come up with actionable investment
ideas and portfolio locations that people can get ideas from when it comes to their own
financial situation and wealth preservation, basically.
That's one way.
It's called the macro compass.
You can just Google it or look for it on substack.
And the other way is via Twitter, as you said.
said, at Macro Alf is my endel. You'll find snippets much more frequent, let's say, in short,
but not as deep, of course, as the newsletter articles there. And occasionally some pictures
about homemade pizza and bread. You would pardon me for that, but I'm Italian after all.
I love it. Well, Al, this has been amazing. And I can't wait to follow up with you and check in
on some of these predictions we made today. So thanks again for your time. Thanks, it's been a pleasure.
All right, everybody. That's all we had for you this week. If you're loving the show,
don't forget to follow us on your favorite podcast app. And if you'd be so kind, please leave us a review.
It really helps the show. If you want to reach out directly, you can find me on Twitter at
Trey Lockerby. And don't forget to check out all of the amazing resources we've built for you at
the investors podcast.com. You can also simply Google TIP finance and it should pop right up.
And with that, we'll see you again next time.
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