We Study Billionaires - The Investor’s Podcast Network - TIP523: Financial Wisdom w/ Cullen Roche
Episode Date: February 12, 2023Stig Brodersen has invited back investment expert Cullen Roche to discuss how to optimize your portfolio for financial independence and sleeping well at night. IN THIS EPISODE YOU’LL LEARN: 00:00 -... Intro 01:05 - What the difference is between CPI and PCE. 08:31 - Whether central bankers should be elected? 14:46 - What the velocity of money is, and how it impacts inflation? 19:08 - What it means for inflation and the US dollar that the world is decoupling. 28:19 - What a balance sheet recession is and why it is important to understand investors. 34:15 - Whether the 60/40 portfolio is still working. 41:02 - Which longer cycle we are missing in the financial markets. 41:34 - Whether the next 40 years of stock market performance will look like the previous 40 years. 46:28 - Whether central banks fight global warming? 54:31 - Which portfolio to build for independence and sleeping well at night. 1:09:30 - Which bias does the new generation of investors have. Disclaimer: Slight discrepancies in the timestamps may occur due to podcast platform differences. BOOKS AND RESOURCES Join the exclusive TIP Mastermind Community to engage in meaningful stock investing discussions with Stig, Clay, and the other community members. Listen to Stig's interview with Cullen Roche about Macro Investing - TIP486 or watch the video. Related Episode: Listen to Inflation Masterclass Continued - TIP472 or watch the video. Related Episode: Listen to Inflation Update and the recent FOMC Meeting - TIP420 or watch the video. Cullen Roche's website, The Discipline Funds. Cullen Roche's website, Pragmatic Capitalism. Tweet directly to Cullen Roche. Email Cullen at cullenroche@orcamgroup.com. Cullen Roche's YouTube channel. Cullen Roche’s book, Pragmatic Capitalism – Read reviews here. Gavin Jackson’s book, Money in One Lesson - Read reviews here. NEW TO THE SHOW? Check out our We Study Billionaires Starter Packs. Browse through all our episodes (complete with transcripts) here. Try our tool for picking stock winners and managing our portfolios: TIP Finance Tool. Enjoy exclusive perks from our favorite Apps and Services. Stay up-to-date on financial markets and investing strategies through our daily newsletter, We Study Markets. Learn how to better start, manage, and grow your business with the best business podcasts. SPONSORS Support our free podcast by supporting our sponsors: River Toyota Range Rover Vacasa AT&T The Bitcoin Way USPS American Express Onramp Found SimpleMining Public Shopify HELP US OUT! Help us reach new listeners by leaving us a rating and review on Apple Podcasts! It takes less than 30 seconds, and really helps our show grow, which allows us to bring on even better guests for you all! Thank you – we really appreciate it! Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm
Transcript
Discussion (0)
You're listening to TIP.
In today's episode, I'm joined by Colin Roach.
As I'm sure avid listeners would know by now,
Colin is one of the most insightful thinkers on macro and building right portfolio.
In today's episode, we talk about whether central bankers should be elected,
how to optimize for independence and sleeping well at night,
and everything else in between.
Colin is such a wealth of knowledge,
and you just know that you'll be in good company
and get a more nuanced view of financial markets whenever you're around him.
So without further ado, here is our conversation.
You are listening to The Investors Podcast, where we study the financial markets and read the books that influence self-made billionaires the most.
We keep you informed and prepared for the unexpected.
Welcome to The Investors Podcast. I'm your host, Dick Broderson, and I'm here with Colin Rhodes.
Colin, how are you?
I'm doing great, Stig. It's always great to be back.
So, Colin, let's just jump right into it.
One of our favorite topics, and I'm sure the listener would know this,
giving that you've been a guest here so many times.
One of the favorite topics that we almost always talk about is inflation,
and this episode will be no different for the first part of the interview.
So I was going for a walk with my wife the other day,
and my wife told me about this rapper, famous rapper, called Cardi B.
This is my way of easing into a question.
I clearly know nothing about it.
But anyways, Cardi B is a rapper and she's rapping about lettuce costing up to $7, which just,
you know, it just sounds crazy.
And that led my wife and I to talk about the personal consumption expenditure price index,
also called PCE.
Now, my wife's an economist by trade, so that transition probably isn't as odd as it
might sound to you out there.
But anyways, CPI, on the other hand, it's often referred to as headline inflation.
That's what you read about in the newspapers.
That is re-weighted every two years, whereas PCE is re-weighted to reflect changing custom consumption patterns.
And you can argue that CPE is a more accurate snapshot on how people spend their money.
And really, to expand on Cardi B's point here, you would say that CPI is, that assumes that people continues to buy $7 letters, whereas PCE would then allow for people to substitute that with more
reasonable-priced vages.
Now, with all of that said, Colin, could you talk to us about PCE that we don't hear
as much about and what that tells us about the current purchasing power of the American
consumer?
Yeah, this is a good topic to go over because I think that a lot of people tend to discuss
inflation and just the headline CPI and not really dig down into the guts of why there
are all these different metrics and why we do things like strip out.
out, for instance, food and energy to create what is called the core indices for a lot of these
inflation measures. And I think that I think the best way to look at this and the reason why
there are all these different indicators and some of them are stripped out of like more volatile
instruments is that I think economists and especially the Federal Reserve, they're just trying to get
a better gauge of what is going on with trend inflation. And so, you know, having a lot of different
indices, I think provides a more useful data set to look at. It's not that, I don't like to think of
one as necessarily being better than the other or one being the true indicator versus one not
being a true indicator. I like to think of them all as sort of being, you know, complementary to
each other. And they all kind of give us a different bit of information about what's going on
with inflation. But the big kicker, like you said, with PCE versus CPI is that consumer price
index is really, it's a household survey, basically. So they're trying to get a survey of what is really
only urban consumers and what their price basket looks like on, it used to be a biennial basis that
I think they just moved it to January 2023. I think they just moved it to they're updating
it annually. So it's still, though, it's not necessarily the basket is sort of fixed at an annual
basket rather than the PCE actually updates the basket every month. And so like you were alluding
to you, what this does and the advantage of the PCE there with that is that this allows for what's
called substitution effects in the way that consumers actually perceive these things. So for instance,
like right now, eggs are crazy expensive because there's a, there's a shortage of eggs. And so
like this is actually a good real time example. My, I have a one year old and a two and a half
half year old and they love, love, love waffles. So I make waffles every Sunday for the whole week.
And in the last few weeks, weirdly, I have chickens that haven't been laying because it's the wintertime
here in San Diego and they lose all their feathers. So I won't get into all that nonsense about how
chickens work. But anyways, I know that the price of eggs is crazy high. And so, but rather than making the
waffles with eggs, I'm using bananas. So you can substitute bananas out for eggs. And so that's what I've been doing.
So literally there's this substitution effect in the way that I'm making waffles because I see the price of eggs and I'm just substituting something that is similarly delicious inside of this meal, but I'm actually buying something that is less expensive.
And so the PCE actually updates monthly and it actually accounts for that.
And so the difference that's actually much more substantial in the PCE versus the CPI is that the PCE is really a business-based index.
they're surveying businesses to get the cost of goods and services.
And the advantage of that is that you actually end up getting a broader price index
because there's a lot of things that businesses actually pay for on behalf of consumers.
And the biggie there is actually healthcare.
So businesses in the healthcare market tend to go out and actually they're bidding for,
you know, the cost of insurance on behalf of consumers.
So like if you have a, you know, a healthcare package through your employer,
your employer is actually the one that is paying for that.
And so you're getting a broader subset of all of these different things.
And one of the things that the PCE ends up doing as a result of this,
because it's such a broader index, you end up getting, I think, of a lesser effect
from a lot of the different items.
So, for instance, shelter in the CPI is like 35% of the index versus in the PCE,
shelter is only like 20% of the index. And so one of the ways that I like to think about all this
stuff is like think of it like from the stock market perspective. Like, why do we have the Dow Jones
index and the Standard Imports 500 index and the Wilshire 5,000 index and the NASDAQ 100 index?
Well, all of these indices provide us with a price of different but similar things. And so there
are different ways of viewing what are the price trends going on inside of
the stock market. And all of that information, it just provides us with a better idea of what is going
on with the broader stock market. And the same thing is true here with these consumer price
indices. We're looking at all these things and economists are just trying to get an idea of
what are all the different inflation trends that are going on with the underlying data.
And so PCE is a nice complement to CPI and economists will then, you know, strip out food and energy
from these two indices to get a better idea of, you know, for instance, is oil providing an outsized
impact on the overall index because if something silly like, you know, the Saudi Arabians just
decide to stop, you know, pumping oil or whatever. And all of a sudden, the price of oil
goes up crazily and creates this huge outlier impact on the overall inflation rate that doesn't
really reflect the underlying trends of consumers. And so all these things are kind of compliments
to each other. I wouldn't say one is necessarily better than the other, but they all kind of give us
an idea of what are potential future inflation trends based on just looking at a lot of different
types of indicators. And Colin, whenever we talk about inflation, we must also talk about central
banks. One argument you often hear is that it's a problem that central bankers are not elected.
And I read Gavin Jackson's new book Money in One Lesson, and he sees this differently.
His take is it's more of a trade-off.
So on the one hand, central bankers are independent governments.
So, for example, presidents are not supposed to tell them what to do beyond the dual
mandate that they have about controlling inflation and also stabilizing the economy.
And that insulates expert decision-making from political pressure.
At least in theory, I'm sure some people would not whenever I say that we've seen presidents
or presidential candidates wanting a low interest rate up to an election.
Because short term, that's good for unemployment and the economy, which is crucial in terms
of winning the election.
And I also think that if you ask most voters, would you like a low interest rate or a high
interest rate?
They want a low interest rate.
However, what Gavin Jackson, going back to his argument, what he's talking about is
that this is a trade-off because not having democratically elected central bankers comes
at a cost of accountability and democratic control.
So, with all of that being said, do you think that central bankers should be elected?
You know, this is an interesting question.
I, you could get into the weeds on all sorts of debates.
Like, is the Fed truly independent?
Or, you know, the Fed likes to describe itself as independent within government.
And obviously, there's lots of, with the Fed being directly in government and being
influenced by politicians, there would obviously be lots of conflicts of interest.
Like Trump for years was arguing that Jerome.
Powell was, you know, being too tight with, with monetary policy. And so, you know, whereas the Fed is
trying to look at things more objectively, more independently and saying, you know, like for
instance, right now is a great example of an economy where the Fed is being very aggressive,
really trying to cram down growth. They're trying to, they've literally said they're trying to
increase the unemployment rate, which obviously no president wants to see that happen. But if the
tradeoff here is that you have to beat inflation by causing some unemployment, well, from the
Fed's perspective, that's a battle they have to fight. And it's the, you know, you kind of have to
have some casualties along the way is sort of the way that the Fed would view it, which might
sound kind of crazy. But that's, that's the tradeoff there in the Fed's mind. And so, you know,
being independent, I mean, gosh, I, to be honest, I mean, I've always sort of said that the Fed
shouldn't be run by human beings in the first place, that there should be basically an administrative
staff that operates certain facets of the Fed, but that I've never loved the discretionary
monetary policy side of everything where you get even these independent, very objective thinkers,
you're obviously brilliant people, but people that are just as prone to mistakes as anybody
else. And so you can have the smartest guys in the room doing very stupid things or just doing
things that are, I think, you know, when it comes to setting interest rates, setting interest rates
and predicting inflation is just incredibly difficult to do. And so having a discretionary approach
to this to me has never really made a lot of sense. And I've always been more in favor of doing
something that was a little more systematic where the Fed was operating more like an algorithm
when it comes to interest rates. And then, you know, obviously there's some manual override that's
required in certain environments or certainly with certain facets of the Fed's operations. But me personally,
I mean, I wish that the Fed wasn't even manned by people. I wish there weren't, you know,
12 board members and a FOMC chief that were just talking about the economy and trying to predict
things that in the macroeconomy are just virtually impossible to predict. But in terms of
being elected versus not being elected, I think that the Fed is structured in a about,
as I think practical way as it could be in the present environment. Because what the Fed is really,
their primary role is to operate as the independent regulator for the banking system and as a
really as a payment processor. That's their primary role. A lot of the stuff they do tangentially
to that, like setting interest rates and quantitative easing, it gets a lot of press, but it's not
really their primary role. They really are operating as like an independent regulator over
the banking system for the most part. And they don't get enough credit for how good they are at that.
The Fed actually operates very seamlessly in meeting that objective. Where things get tricky
is when they start getting involved in these discretionary changes in terms of changing
their balance sheet and interest rates. And those are the sorts of things where I do think it's,
I don't want to say counterproductive, but not a very efficient way to set policy. So at least
the way it's structured now, though, they're able to be independent enough.
where, like, Powell has done a, he did a pretty good job in the last four years, you know,
looking at certain presidents and saying, you know, I know you're very loud and influential,
but I am going to stick to my guns here because I see the data and I'm trying to be objective.
And so it's a flawed institution in the way that it's set up inherently because I think that the
institution itself just isn't able to actually achieve a lot of the things that's demanded from it.
Like I've always said that the Fed, even when they're fighting policy, they have extraordinarily
blunt instruments. So even if these people, you know, if they were super objective, independent,
you know, non-elected officials running the Fed, even in that environment, given the tools that
they have, interest rates and things like balance sheet changes, they're very, very blunt
instruments. So very ineffective, lagging sort of policies that don't have an immediate impact
on the rate of inflation. And so it's very very effective.
very easy to look at this whole institution and be super critical because its structure is sort
of inherently inefficient in the way that it's designed. But I don't know. I try to be somewhat
forgiving of the people running it just because I know how hard it is to predict inflation and
try to manage it given the tools that they have. So, Colin, let's talk about the velocity of
bunny and how that's related to inflation. And let's set the scene and look at the three actors. So you
have money supply, production, and inflation. And let's say that money supply grows by 20%,
and production is only half of that, so 10%. What happens to inflation?
You know, I love this debate because you get into a really nuanced discussion about really
the key variable here is what is money. And money in the modern economy is a really messy
definition. So in a standard sort of textbook traditional sense, we would say that things that are
really super liquid inside the banking system are money, things like cash and coins and bank reserves
and bank deposits, really. Those are the things that were sort of traditionally thought of as money.
And I've always talked about how certain financial assets have varying degrees of moneyness.
And so even non-financial assets have a certain degree of moneyness like gold.
Gold is money.
But gold's moneyness is lower than that of a deposit in a modern monetary system in large
part just because gold is obviously very hard to transport.
You can't walk into Walmart and put a block of gold on the counter there and pay for anything.
And so the moneyness of gold, even though it is absolutely a form of money, you could argue
that the moniness of gold is lower than that of a bank deposit. But in terms of this debate,
you get into things like, well, are treasury bills money? Our treasury bonds money? I would argue,
even stocks are money in a certain sense, in the sense that a lot of people get paid in stock
options and corporations use their stock as cash in transactions and things like that.
So, there's a moneyness factor even in things like traditional financial assets that we typically
would never think of as money.
But when you get into things like the equation of exchange and the velocity of money, you
necessarily have to hammer down what is money.
And so, for instance, in 2008, when the Fed expanded their balance sheet in a big way, you
would argue that what the Fed was doing was they were taking treasury bonds out of the private
sector and they were flooding the private sector with bank reserves and bank deposits.
And so looking at the equation of exchange from that perspective, you would argue, well, this
has got to cause inflation.
But the problem is, is you instantly get into a debate about what is money there because
was the Treasury bonds moneyness more similar to deposits than a lot of people assume?
I always like to describe quantitative easing as being a situation where the Treasury bond is essentially
a savings account. And what the Fed does is the Fed creates a checking account as a bank deposit
and they remove a savings account from the private sector. And so from that perspective,
when you describe it that way and you ask yourself, well, does the consumer there that sold the
bond, do they have more money now or do they have less money? And so you see, you get into this sort
of semantic debate about moneyness and what is money. But the lesson coming out of the financial crisis for
sure is that, you know, adding more bank deposits, adding more reserves did not cause big inflation
because that would be the obvious impact that you would expect from this. But then you have
certain economists that will just look at the equation of exchange and say, well, no, inflation
stayed low and growth stayed low, which means that the velocity of money simply went down.
because as a matter of simple arithmetic, that's the only way that the equation can balance out
out the way that it would.
And whereas I would look at it and say, well, no, your definition of money never made any
sense in the first place.
And so even though you added what you're calling more money, well, you were really just
exchanging two very similar instruments in terms of their moniness.
And so you could take this in a million different directions, but you get into this
very interesting debate about what is money.
and moneyness and all these different things. And it's part of, this is part of what makes the
prediction of inflation so difficult is that you get into a lot of the nuance. And when you get into
the nuance of all this stuff, you start realizing, whoa, there's a lot more that goes into
predicting inflation than something like just saying, you know, hey, money, more money leads to
chasing, you know, fewer or the same amount of goods and services, which leads to inflation.
It's so much more complex than that.
So, speaking of complexity, Carlo, let me use that as a transition into my next question here.
So, central banker's most effective tool to control inflation is to raise interest rates.
But let's put a geopolitical filter over this.
There is a feedback loop between globalization and interest rates.
Could you please paint some color around that feedback loop and the implication of what we're seeing right now
with the US, Europe and China continuing to decouple?
It's interesting because even as the world is decoupling from the dollar increasingly,
but this is a very, very gradual exercise.
So, I mean, the dollar is still by a huge margin, the world's most important reserve
currency.
So there's lots of reserve currencies around the world.
And reserve currency basically just means, does a foreign government hold your currency
in reserve for some strategic purpose?
or do they end up inheriting lots of dollars for some strategic purpose or from a trade
relationship? In the case of the United States, the rest of the world ends up with lots of dollars
in large part because U.S. consumers just buy lots of stuff. And so foreigners are big sellers
of things into the United States. So China, for instance, they send us lots of paper plates,
but we send them lots of dollars. So when you look at the Chinese balance sheet, you know,
they necessarily end up holding lots of dollars in reserve just as a function of trade.
And so the interesting thing with what's going on with, you know, the current environment,
especially and dollars is that foreign countries don't just inherit lots of dollars.
They actually borrow lots of dollars in large part because, you know, the simplest example of
something like this is that let's say that a Saudi Arabian company wants to, you know, let's say
they've discovered some oil and they want to go in and drill this new.
oil. Well, in a lot of times, what they'll do there is they might hire a group of drill rig operators
from Texas because the Texans have the best oil rig technology and they'll be flown in.
They'll work as contractors for the Saudi Arabian government, let's say. And what'll happen a
lot of the times is those contractors will say, pay me in dollars. I don't want to be paid in the
Riyadh or whatever the local currency is. I want to be paid in my home currency. And in a lot of
of those cases, if the government or that entity doesn't have dollars on hand, they'll end up borrowing
dollars. And so, and this is a huge, huge market. The dollar borrowing market, you know, what's commonly
called the euro dollar market is a huge, huge market. There aren't exact figures on it, but it's
in the tens of trillions of dollars. And so this is a huge foreign market. And euro dollars for
listeners is just basically any dollar denominated bank deposit in a foreign country. So any country
that has a banking system where they basically are able to produce dollars denominated
outside of the United States.
So dollars in bank accounts held outside of the United States at foreign banks.
And so the euro dollar market, though, is hugely important in large part because not only
is it extremely large, but it requires the Federal Reserve and U.S. monetary policy to be
accommodative to whatever is going on, not just in the domestic U.S. economy, but whatever is going
on in the foreign markets. Because when the Federal Reserve starts making dollars harder to obtain
through interest rate policy and relative currency exchange rates, well, what happens there is that
this all filters into the foreign economy. So in an environment like today, where the Fed is increasing
rates, they're not just making dollars harder to get for domestic residents. They're tightening
global monetary policy because they're making it more expensive for foreigners to also get dollars.
And so there's this weird sort of knock on effect where when the Fed tightens the United States,
because they're the dominant reserve currency issuer, they're actually tightening,
really the whole world. They're tightening. They're really putting the clamps on a lot of
these foreign economies that rely on dollar funding markets. And so, you know, what is the knock on
effect there? Well, the knock on effect you would expect to be, you know, lower growth.
eventually and certainly the potential for a sort of like a credit event in foreign markets,
because as these, especially as these foreign economies rely on starting to roll over a lot of
this dollar-denominated debt, as the dollar becomes more expensive, it gets harder and harder
to do that.
And so there's a sort of unintended consequence of domestic interest rate policy because
it has such a big impact, not just on the domestic dollar funding market, but on the
global dollar funding market.
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
All right.
I want you guys to imagine spending three days in Oslo at the height of the summer.
You've got long days of daylight, incredible food, floating saunas on the Oslo Fjord,
and every conversation you have is with people who are actually shaping the future.
That's what the Oslo Freedom Forum is.
From June 1st through the 3rd, 2026, the Oslo Freedom Forum is entering its 18th year,
bringing together activists, technologists, journalists, investors, and builders from all over the
world, many of them operating on the front lines of history. This is where you hear firsthand stories
from people using Bitcoin to survive currency collapse, using AI to expose human rights abuses,
and building technology under censorship and authoritarian pressures. These aren't abstract ideas.
These are tools real people are using right now. You'll be in the room with about 2,000
extraordinary individuals, dissidents, founders, philanthropists, policymakers, the kind of people
you don't just listen to but end up having dinner with. Over three days, you'll experience
powerful mainstage talks, hands-on workshops on freedom tech, and financial sovereignty,
immersive art installations, and conversations that continue long after the sessions end.
And it's all happening in Oslo in June. If this sounds like your kind of room, well,
you're in luck because you can attend in person. Standard and Patriot.
Passes are available at Osloof Freedom Forum.com with patron passes offering deep access, private events,
and small group time with the speakers. The Oslo Freedom Forum isn't just a conference. It's a place
where ideas meet reality and where the future is being built by people living it.
If you run a business, you've probably had the same thought lately. How do we make AI useful
in the real world? Because the upside is huge, but guessing your way into it is a risky move.
With NetSuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.
NetSuite is the number one AI cloud ERP, trusted by over 43,000 businesses.
It pulls your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into one unified system.
And that connected data is what makes your AI smarter.
It can automate routine work, surface actionable insights, and help you cut costs while making
fast AI-powered decisions with confidence.
And now with the NetSuite AI connector,
You can use the AI of your choice to connect directly to your real business data.
This isn't some add-on.
It's AI built into the system that runs your business.
And whether your company does millions or even hundreds of millions,
NetSuite helps you stay ahead.
If your revenues are at least in the seven figures,
get their free business guide, demystifying AI at netsuite.com slash study.
The guide is free to you at netsuite.com slash study.
NetSuite.com slash study.
When I started my own side business, it suddenly felt like I had to become 10 different people
overnight wearing many different hats.
Starting something from scratch can feel exciting, but also incredibly overwhelming and lonely.
That's why having the right tools matters.
For millions of businesses, that tool is Shopify.
Shopify is the commerce platform behind millions of businesses around the world and 10%
of all e-commerce in the U.S., from brands just getting started to household names.
It gives you everything you need in one place, from inventory to payments to analytics.
So you're not juggling a bunch of different platforms.
You can build a beautiful online store with hundreds of ready-to-use templates,
and Shopify is packed with helpful AI tools that write product descriptions
and even enhance your product photography.
Plus, if you ever get stuck, they've got award-winning 24-7 customer support.
Start your business today with the industry's best business partner, Shopify, and start hearing
sign up for your $1 per month trial today at Shopify.com slash WSB.
Go to Shopify.com slash WSB.
That's Shopify.
com slash WSB.
All right, back to the show.
So, Colin, having discussed the future, let's discuss the past and the present.
After the housing bubble burst during the great financial crisis, consumers found themselves
saddled with too much debt, and one could argue that the U.S. economy was at the brink of a
balance sheet recession.
So perhaps our listeners haven't heard the expression before, balance sheet recession.
Could you please talk a bit about what is that and why is it relevant for us to understand
as consumers and also as investors?
So balance sheet recession is a term coined by Richard Koo.
And Koo's a macroeconomist who studied primarily the boom and bust that occurred in the
Japanese economy during the big real estate and asset price boom in the late 90s and
early 2000s.
And a balance sheet recession is when there's really a disequilibrium, not just in asset
prices, but in debt markets where primarily consumers or businesses or maybe both have leveraged
them up substantially and they've become so over levered relative to where asset prices are that
when asset prices come down, they necessarily end up with basically upside down balance sheets.
So they don't have the equity, for instance, to support the amount of debt that they've incurred.
And so what happens in that environment is that you get a forced de-leveraging.
And that forced de-leveraging forces balance sheets to contract.
And so that's why Koo calls it a balance sheet recession is that you get this sort of inherent
or natural process of balance sheet decline or shrinkage because consumers and households end up
having to repay a lot of their debt as a function of just being over levered in the past.
And so this typically coincides with big asset price booms. And it's always interesting to
understand. I mean, I think it's super interesting in the context of today's environment because
you've had this sort of extraordinary boom in real estate around the world again. And, you know,
And you could argue that it's not as levered as it was, for instance, during the financial crisis,
but it's still a really interesting and timely topic to look at in large part because
the real estate market especially, the thing that I think that is sort of interesting
and corollary to Japan in a lot of ways is that consumers have started using real estate more
more is a speculative instrument. And so the stock market has traditionally been the instrument that
people would have, you know, say, used some leverage on to get exposure to, you know, a certain
price trend. And then, you know, as things typically get out of control, consumers oftentimes
borrow more or household borrow more, corporations borrow more. And there's sort of this, you know,
debt effect in the stock market and in the corporate markets, obviously, where when you get a
disequilibrium and prices and the air comes out of that, you get a lot of volatility.
Real estate has traditionally been much more stable in large part because people haven't
treated that asset class as this sort of speculative instrument where they borrow against
it just to try to actually earn a return on investment necessarily. In the last, really the last
20, 30 years as the global economy has kind of grown, the real estate market has become a much
more speculative instrument. And so there's a huge leverage effect in real estate inherently. And the thing that
makes us all interesting in the current environment is that if real estate is becoming a more
volatile instrument, because people are using it as a more speculative type of instrument,
well, does that financialization in the economy create a lot more instability in the long run?
because do you have this very inherently fragile debt-based market that is tied to a much more
volatile asset class? And traditionally, real estate has been very, very stable. And that's the thing
that has made it such a good investment for a lot of people, but also made it a, it hasn't
created a lot of contagion risk in the economy traditionally because the asset price itself has been
so much more stable relative to the amount of debt that is used to leverage that instrument. Whereas
going forward, I think that the really sort of crazy thing is that you look at periods like
the COVID boom and you have a 40% price increase in real estate, well, it would take just a 25%
decline to go back to where we were just two years ago in the United States. That's a huge move
in the short term that in the long run does not look like a very big move. But what does that sort of
volatility due to the underlying leverage effects and the knock-on effects that real estate could
potentially have. And so, yeah, as this instrument becomes more volatile, does the discussion around
balance sheet recessions and the potential for sort of, you know, more of a force de-leveraging in
certain environments, does that become a more pertinent, more common outcome as we kind of move
forward. And my guess is yes, that, you know, I mean, I've kind of been of the view for a long
time that, well, Japan is very unique. Demographically and economically, it is, in a lot of
ways, it's almost like looking into the future, I think, for a lot of the global developed
economy. And I think that, you know, well, we may not be on the cusp of like a, you know,
a Japanese-style 1990s sort of de-leveraging and balance sheet recession, I think that the dynamics
of the balance sheet recession are much more important to understand today than they ever have
been in large part because the future of the borrowing markets, especially in the real estate
market, they look more and more Japanese as time goes on.
You know, one of the things that's also being debated these days is the 6040 portfolio,
so stocks and bonds allocation.
And now that we're recording here at the very end of January and a lot of economists are looking
back at what happened in 2020, and, you know, if you go to business school, you know,
you're taught that stocks and bonds are inversely correlated, which is why you need to have both
in your portfolio.
And so, for example, in a recession, whenever stocks,
dive, the Fed will lower the interest rate, thereby increasing the value of your bonds.
And if you look at last year in 2022, the 64 portfolio lost 16%. And just for this calculation,
I used the SP 500 and Bloomberg's U.S. aggregate bond index. You can choose your own metrics,
but it would more or less give you the same thing. Now, why did it happen and should we rewrite
or should we write off the 64D portfolio as no longer working? Well, first of all, why
did this happen last year? It happened in large part because of what the Fed did. I mean, the Fed's
very fast-acting move in interest rate policy resulted in when interest rates go up, bomb prices
go down in the short term. And this also caused a lot of, you know, consternation for the stock
market because people were worried increasingly that the Fed was going to move so aggressively that,
you know, this would put a lot of pressure on the economy and ultimately that would feed back to
corporate America and lower valuations. And so you had this sort of, you know, double whammy
inside of a very short time horizon where, you know, over the course of an 18 month period,
as the Fed moved very quickly, this had a huge outsized impact on both asset classes. But I don't
know, we talked about this a little bit in the last time we talked. I increasingly love to
think of asset classes as being instruments that exist across very specific time horizon. So,
So, for instance, if you were buying treasury bills last year, you really didn't care what the Fed
was doing.
I mean, you were losing money in real terms, but you were just clipping a coupon that was based
on a, let's say, a one-year instrument.
You weren't losing any principle over that one-year time horizon.
Whereas the aggregate bond market, something like AGG that you referenced, that thing is
closer to like a six-year instrument when you actually look at the underlying, especially
the duration, the interest rate sensitivity of the instrument.
And so, yeah, is that thing sensitive to price changes inside of a one-year period?
Sure, it is.
But in the six to seven, eight-year time horizon, the likelihood of that instrument losing money
is very, very low because the underlying will have all rolled over in that time horizon.
So the stock market is an even longer duration instrument.
I like to think of the stock market as being basically like an 18-year- or multi-decade type of
instrument. And so, you know, what is going to happen to that instrument inside of an 18-minute
or 18-month time horizon? Boy, I mean, who knows? But over the course of an 18-year time
horizon, the odds of you losing money on that instrument are very, very low because it's, you know,
the way that the underlying firms accrue their profits over that time horizon is very, very
stable, actually, when you look at it on a rolling sort of 18-year time horizon. So in the scope of
6040, you know, if you're looking for more short-term stability, then yes, the 6040 is absolutely
inappropriate for you because the stock market is, I mean, there's a lot of different things
going on in 6040 that people don't talk about. So, for instance, in a 6040, 85% of the volatility
comes from the 60% slice. And so right off the bat, you're buying something that isn't, you know,
Vanguard calls their 6040 a balanced index. It's not.
really a, when you look at it from in terms of where the risk is coming from, 6040 is not really
that balanced. It's really way overbalanced to the stock market. And so if you need something
that is going to dampen the volatility or reduce really the risk inside of that portfolio,
you need something other than the 60 or the 40. You need instruments to complement it, whether
that is treasury bills or something that is uncorrelated like commodities or,
gold or whatever it might be, you need a complement to that to dampen the volatility. So it totally
depends in the long run. If you've got time horizon, that is, I mean, when you look at a 6040,
if you blend the durations of all those instruments, you end up at something about 12 years.
So when you buy a 6040, I always tell people, you have to think of even that thing as though
it's at least a decade long type of instrument. And so looking at that thing and judging it
based on one year performance to me, it's the equivalent of like buying a CD that pays you a
one-time coupon at a 12-month period and complaining about how the price doesn't change inside
of a one-month period. It doesn't make any sense because the instrument is literally not designed
to do that. And a 60-40 is designed functionally as a multi-decade instrument because it's
underlying instruments are multi-decade instruments. So it depends. It depends totally on the investor. When
people say 60, 40 is dead, that to me is overreach because what they're really saying is that
the stock and bond markets are dead in the long run. And that, to me, just mathematically,
I mean, the bond market, for instance, unless you think every single instrument inside of a bond
aggregate is going to default, well, it's just sort of silly to say that the bond market is dead
because the bond market over the course of the next five or six years actually pays a very
predictable coupon. The Treasury bill market inside of something like that pays a very predictable
coupon over certain very specific periods. And so none of this stuff is dead, but it does
expose us to certain risks in the short term that people need to account for. And the bond
market, even though it is a much lower risk instrument than the stock market, it's not a zero risk
instrument. So to me, we talk a lot about asset price movements over certain periods. We don't talk
about time horizons enough. And to me, especially as I find myself getting older and whatnot,
time is really, it's the essential ingredient in all of this stuff that we discuss. And we like to
try to make the stock market operate as a short-term instrument. But the reality is that the stock
market isn't a short-term instrument. And there's nothing you can do that will change that underlying
operational fact. So, to me, it's all about time horizons. 6040 is good for a longer time horizon.
If you need more stability, it's probably, it probably is dead for you.
So I want to talk to you about the human mind and the biases that we have. And we have
this bias to extrapolate trends in financial markets. So if it's going up, it's always go up,
if it goes down, it will always go down.
And I remember how sound investing was equated to real estate before the great financial crisis.
I don't know if I was just like in the echo chamber at the time, but it seems like no one saw a problem about you're just putting your money into real estate.
And then after the great financial crisis, we slowly started to forget that real estate wasn't always a great investment.
And then we sort of like went back to the old narrative again up to the recent crash.
Billionaire Redalio argues that we have a problem separating the business cycle, which might
be, I don't know, five, eight years depending on how you wanted to find it.
We have a problem separating that from the longer cycles because we experience those long cycles
too rarely.
And I would say to my point before, even with the shorter cycles, we also tend to forget
what happened perhaps 10, 12 years ago.
And most people just don't study financial history.
Now, with all of that being said, which longer cycle should we pay attention to as investors
going into 2023?
In terms of, you know, history and looking at the markets going forward, you know, this is a really
actually important question because I think that, you know, like the other day I was talking
about on my website pragmatic capitalism, is the next 40 years of stock market performance
it's going to look like the past 40 years. And you can look at the last 40 years and there were a lot
of dynamics there that operated as tailwinds, especially in the United States, that are no longer
necessarily going to be there. The big one obviously was interest rates falling. Interest rates falling for
40 years created this, you know, the huge tailwind to the stock market that in the environment
we're in now, obviously interest rates just can't fall nearly as much as they did starting from
the 1980 period. And so the other biggie, I would argue in the United States,
was the development of the technology markets, especially the United States where, you know,
the sort of the big technology firms in the USA seemingly dominated a lot of the tech development.
And I think that that's going to mitigate or at least converge with a lot of especially
foreign technology companies as time goes on. And so these two tailwinds are increasingly becoming
sort of headwinds as we move through the next 40 years. But the other biggie, you know,
I was kind of alluding to this earlier, is that the debt markets have.
have completely changed. And so Dahlio would argue there's a long-term debt cycle and a short-term
debt cycle. And, you know, it's sort of weird to think of the economy in terms of cycles because
in the long run, you know, I think it's easy to look at things like they're, like the market
is sort of like a sine wave. And the market doesn't move exactly like a sine wave. The market,
really in the long run, if you look at things like even GDP growth, well, you won't find a lot
of variance in long-term GDP growth. It actually just kind of looks like a steady line from
bottom left, the top right, but in the short term, you have much clearer cyclicality,
especially in the short term. And the big driver of that is not just debt and borrowing and,
you know, these sort of things that are related to creating what Dahlia would call more of a
long-term debt cycle. But really, I would argue a lot of it is, most of it probably, is just
behavior. People who, I mean, God, look at the last two years where people are, you know,
bidding up crazy assets like, you know, Bitcoin going to 67,000 and AMC and GameStop and all
these stocks that seemingly had no underlying fundamental basis for what they were doing,
that, you know, in an efficient market hypothesis world, these things shouldn't move the way
they do. But they did, and a lot of them have stayed that way, I think in large part, because
the more behavioral aspects of a lot of these debates has become very, very clear that the
markets are not nearly as efficient as someone like Gene Fama would argue. And that, you know,
the sort of behavioralist, the Richard Thaler type views or the Robert Schiller type of views that
human emotions and animal spirits drive so much of this stuff that it can lead people to do
stupid things and actually result in stupid prices for much longer than people might expect. And so
in the short term, I think human behavior is hugely important to understand when we look
in terms of cyclicality.
I mean, yeah, in the long run markets will look very efficient, but in the short term,
the way you get to an efficient looking long term market is through lots of short term
behavioral mistakes in essence.
And so that's the primary driver of these boom and bus cycles.
And, you know, right now I think we're kind of in the middle of what is the, you know,
basically the decompression of like the irrational exuberance of the COVID boom.
and we're kind of digesting that big asset price boom that occurred in the last few years.
And that's all, this is all a behavioral exercise where, you know, we're all grappling with
what is the Fed doing in the short term and what are, you know, where our interest rates going to
end up be, where is inflation going to end up being in a couple of years.
And this is all an exercise in basically us making our best guesses and trying to grapple
with our emotions in the short term in the process of creating what looks like a relatively
efficient long-term pricing market.
So to me, you have to understand these big long-term sort of secular dynamics, like things like
demographics. And I think it's very useful to use sort of a multi-tiered approach where you're looking at,
you know, what is the baseline long-term sort of secular trend in certain things like
technology and globalization and demographics, these things that have huge, huge macroeconomic impacts,
but then also layer that in with something that is more short-term, like looking at human behavior
and the way that behavior drives markets to sort of gyrate more than maybe they should be based
on what a lot of the long-term demographic trends or technology trends might expect things to
look like. So it's difficult. You have to sort of, I think, understand the cyclicality of human
behavior inside of the short-term relative to the longer-term, more sort of secular trends
that are more long-term by nature.
So, Colin, shifting gears here, I can't help but tell a quick and funny story about the 19th century.
So this is about the Bank of England.
And the Bank of England installed a weather vein to track trade winds.
And why did they do that?
Well, whenever, they could tell whenever the wind allowed more ships to dock in London's ports.
Because that could, and would affect the number of goods for sale, or if they carry gold,
then the money supply.
And I just kind of feel like that's a funny story, because, because, because,
continue talking about central banks and making predictions and how to act.
Well, my next question is not about Weatherwains, but about central bank interventions
in general.
And Christine Lagarde, the president of the European Central Bank, Pleasant 2020, to use the
central bank's QE program to tackle global warming.
For example, one of the theories that were discussed was one could imagine excluding companies
that were not green from their bond-for-purchase programs.
So my question to you, and I'll try not to make it too value-based, even though that's,
I kind of feel like I've lost the battle already on that one.
But my question to you is, should the central bank, other than the dual mandate of maximizing
employment and stabilizing prices, we already talked about, should they also have the mandate
to fight global warming?
Oh, gosh.
You have to love a story where, I mean, what is more?
unpredictable than the weather. You know, there's a, you could joke that, you know, the only people
who are worse at their job than economists are weathermen. And that's not to knock on weather
people, but the being, predicting the weather is just hugely, hugely complex. You can, you know,
God, looking at like long-term cycles and stuff, like, you know, people for years have been saying
that, you know, California was going to run out of water. I'm watching California just get flooded
away this year. So it's, you know, all this stuff is so hard to predict, especially in the short term.
And you just, you have to die laughing, looking at a group of economists trying to use the weather
to then predict economic trends in the future. Like, talk about creating an indicator that is just
going to be complexly wrong in the long run endlessly. So, you know, in terms of the whole ESG debate,
the environmental sustainability governance debate, you know, should, how involved should governments be in this and how involved should especially central banks be? I mean, God, we talked about how blunt the central banks instruments are already. I mean, I think that using the balance sheet and interest rate policy and anything like that in a discretionary manner is already sort of misguided. So I think that adding a layer of sort of morality to it is,
even more misguided. Because, I mean, this is the interesting facet of this debate is that I always
tell people that within the realms of legality, how do you argue morality on top of that? I mean, is it,
you know, is a, is a company like Exxon Mobil immoral? Well, you know, think of it from Exxon
Mobile's perspective. Well, Exxon Mobile runs obviously big oil rigs that, you know, do damage to the climate
or whatever. But Exxon also is one of becoming one of the greenest companies in the world. They're one of the
biggest investors in green energies in the entire world. And so the natural transition for Exxon
Mobile, if you're thinking strategically over the course of the next 20 years, is for, I'm sure
Exxon wants to be a 100% green company. If that's where the world is going, if that's where
technology trends are taking them, well, then Exxon is, you know, if they're run by even remotely
competent people, that's obviously where they're trying to take this whole business. But at the same
time, the world doesn't move that fast. You can't just transition completely off of carbon
and petroleum-based products and jump into, you know, wind and solar automatically because
the technology just isn't there yet. We don't have everything in place to actually meet
the demands of the world running solely based on these environmentally friendly technologies
at this point. And so Exxon is necessarily making sort of a slow transition, but they are making
a transition. But if you looked at that company from an ESG perspective, well, it's very weird because
if you're building an ESG index, you might say, oh, well, Exxon doesn't qualify because they do too
much carbon. But from my perspective, it's actually the opposite. No, you actually should want
to own Exxon mobile in an ESG portfolio because Exxon is one of the biggest investors in the whole
environmentally friendly and climate change perspective because they're the ones that are pouring
tons of their cash coming in from the carbon business back into green energy-based businesses
trying to be proactive. They want to survive, obviously. They know that oil is probably the thing
of the past. And so they're trying to be proactive with this. And so to me, having the central
bank use very blunt instruments to try to predict the future trend of whether Exxon is going to
be an ESG-friendly company, to me, is just, I don't know, it seems like a recipe for disaster.
misguided in large part because you get into this very subjective debate about morality
that doesn't really make a lot of sense when you think about it. I mean, ExxonMobil, I don't think
can be objectively called an immoral company just because they operate a business that is,
you know, even though it's still very carbon-based, you know, they're investing so much money
into the climate change, you know, process going forward that I think you have to argue that
they're also somewhat ESG friendly. So where do you come down on this debate? I mean, it's very,
it just gets very subjective and messy. And I don't think that there's a real clean way to actually
decipher whether a company is ESG friendly or not. I mean, with the exception of obviously some
probably very sort of, you know, ugly companies that do exist. But on the whole, I think in the, in the
realm of legality, it's very hard to start getting into a morality debate. And so, you know, my bottom
line is that I, I don't mind governments nudging corporations in the right direction and, you know,
creating, say, laws that incentivize long-term changes in the way that we think about things so that we
don't just, you know, pollute the world in a sort of nonsensical way. But at the same time,
I really don't like the whole ESG debate in large part because I just think it comes.
down to so many subjective narratives and values that I think when you think of things in the aggregate
macroeconomic sense, you know, your vice is my value and vice versa. And you can't just say that,
you know, just because, you know, one person's vice is this thing, that that makes it immoral.
Well, is it legal? Yes, it's legal. So therefore, how can you just subjectively argue that, you know,
there's, it's immoral based on how you feel about the thing. I, I don't know. I've never really understood
the premise of ESG investing, to be honest. I've always sort of thought that it was more of a,
you know, subjective morality play than anything else. It's a really nice sounding narrative that I don't
think actually translates into necessarily positive change. And you see this actually in a lot of
Europe, you know, a lot of the energy policies have kind of come back to backfire in the last few years with
the way that, you know, Russia now kind of has dominance over the energy markets in large part
because we, you know, the Europeans failed to actually diversify across, you know, the existing
subset of technologies that make a lot of sense and transition more slowly into, you know,
more of these green, friendly sorts of technology. So the world moves at a slower pace than people
think and thinking in things in terms of, you know, this sort of cycles again.
We want the world to transition very quickly, and the reality is that the world just doesn't operate
that way. And so we can kind of nudge things in a certain direction, but I don't think you can
force it overnight. Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
No, it's not your imagination. Risk and regulation are ramping up, and customers now expect
proof of security just to do business. That's why VANTA is a game changer. Vanta automates
your compliance process and brings compliance, risk, and customer trust to
together on one AI-powered platform. So whether you're prepping for a stock two or running an
enterprise GRC program, VANTA keeps you secure and keeps your deals moving. Instead of chasing
spreadsheets and screenshots, VANTA gives you continuous automation across more than 35 security
and privacy frameworks. Companies like Ramp and Ryder spend 82% less time on audits with Vantta.
That's not just faster compliance, it's more time for growth. If I were running a startup or scaling,
a team today, this is exactly the type of platform I'd want in place. Get started at vanta.com
slash billionaires. That's vanta.com slash billionaires. Ever wanted to explore the world of
online trading, but haven't dared try? The futures market is more active now than ever before,
and plus 500 futures is the perfect place to start. Plus 500 gives you access to a wide range
of instruments, the S&P 500, NASDAQ, Bitcoin, gas, and much more.
Explore equity indices, energy, metals, 4X, crypto, and beyond.
With a simple and intuitive platform, you can trade from anywhere, right from your phone.
Deposit with a minimum of $100 and experience the fast, accessible futures trading
you've been waiting for.
See a trading opportunity, you'll be able to trade it in just two clicks once your account
is open.
Not sure if you're ready, not a problem.
Plus 500 gives you an unlimited risk-free demo account with charts and analytic tools for you to practice on.
With over 20 years of experience, Plus 500 is your gateway to the markets.
Visit Plus500.com to learn more.
Trading in futures involves risk of loss and is not suitable for everyone.
Not all applicants will qualify.
Plus 500, it's trading with a plus.
Billion dollar investors don't typically park their cash in high-yields.
savings accounts. Instead, they often use one of the premier passive income strategies for institutional
investors, private credit. Now, the same passive income strategy is available to investors of all sizes
thanks to the Fundrise income fund, which has more than $600 million invested in a 7.97% distribution
rate. With traditional savings yields falling, it's no wonder private credit has grown to be a
trillion dollar asset class in the last few years.
fundrise.com slash WSB to invest in the Fundrise income fund in just minutes. The fund's total return in
2025 was 8%, and the average annual total return since inception is 7.8%. Past performance does not
guarantee future results, current distribution rate as of 1231, 2025. Carefully consider the
investment material before investing, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses.
This and other information can be found in the income fund's prospectus at 3,000,
Fundrise.com slash income. This is a paid advertisement. All right, back to the show.
Well, Colin, thank you for your thoughts on that. And I wanted to transition into your recent
blog post where you quote Morgan Hausel and his quote on, risk is what you don't see.
And I found that quote profound, but it also makes me think of the former Secretary of Defense,
Donald Rumsfeld. And he has this wonderful and insightful quote about known unknowns and unknown
unknowns. And in Morgan Housell's book, The Psychology of Money, Morgan talks about how he
invests, including that he has no debt in his house. And he talks about how he acknowledges
that it's a terrible financial decision if you have the perspective of optimizing for investment
returns. Like that's absolutely terrible not to have a mortgage. But he claims that he basically
has two objectives. The first one is independence and the second is sleeping well at night. And
I love that. I love the approach that he has. Even though I should say for the record, I definitely
have a mortgage in my home. But I love it because as I get older and have a bit more money,
I also value my time differently. And I just find those two things, independence and sleeping in
night increasingly important. And also should say that independence to Morgan Howsel and what I would
like to bring into this conversation, it does not mean stop working. It doesn't mean like
going to the beach for the next 10 years and sipping a margarita or whatever. It means that you
only work on what you like to do with the people you like to do at times that you want to do
and for long as you want to do. And I can use this example here with you, Colin, as an example of
that. At least on, I won't speak for you, but at least here on my end. But knowing that
risk is what we don't see and we have unknown unknowns. How can we build a portfolio?
If I can see if I can type a bow around all of this, how can we build a portfolio with those two
objectives in mind? So a portfolio that secures us independence, but also sleeping well at night.
How can we even start to approach that? I know that's, I know it's covered a lot of ground for
that question. You know, I've started writing a lot about this. And I don't know if it's just the fact
that I'm getting old and, you know, worried about dying now. But I, I, I'm just endlessly obsessed
with time and optimizing for time. And, you know, I listen to this another, you know, pitching a podcast
on a podcast. But I listened to The Drive with Peter Adia and Bill Perkins the other day.
And they were, Perkins wrote the book, Die with Zero. And he talks a lot about all of the issues that
are kind of involved in this question and optimizing your life for time rather than, you know,
we seem to optimize our lives in lots of other ways rather than thinking about them as being
time optimized. And I love this concept inside of portfolio construction because I've spent
my entire career optimizing portfolios for asset returns. And everyone in the entire industry
does this. They basically, what we do is we look at a big subset of asset classes. And mostly
what we do is we run expected future return analysis or we run back tests and then we take,
let's say, five to ten instruments that create the optimized risk-adjusted return. And then you take
those five, let's just say five asset classes and you put them in your portfolio and that portfolio
is the optimal risk-adjusted return portfolio. Okay. What that portfolio does not do at all,
is it doesn't account for the concept of time. It does not optimize for time inside of that portfolio.
So this risk-adjusted portfolio that is optimized for returns, well, that thing might be filled
with, let's just say it's filled with super long duration style instruments. Let's say it's
filled with venture capital. It's filled with technology stocks. It's filled with long-term treasury
bonds. It's filled with gold. And you've got all these instruments that are inherently very long-term
instruments, all of those things, what they'll do across time is even if in the long term,
they give you the most risk optimized portfolio. So they're creating the most, the best
risk adjusted returns. They don't necessarily help with the sleep well at night aspect of all
of this. And so for me, I've increasingly become just a huge advocate of what I've started calling
all duration investing, where I actually go in and I'm looking at the time horizons over which
certain instruments exist. And so, you know, Morgan's a great example. I know Morgan fairly well,
and I know Morgan, Morgan like me, holds way more cash than he probably ever should. And he does that
because that's his sleep well bucket. And to me, you know, there's what you're really doing there is
when you hold cash, you hold what is an inherently short-term instrument. And the trade-off there is that
You have nominal principal stability inside of a cash deposit account or something like a treasury
bill, but you're giving up the potential for much more long-term principal growth, basically.
And so the stock market, you know, it's the exact opposite of cash in the sense that the stock
market will give you great real returns in the long term. But the sacrifice or the trade-off
there is that you're going to have a lot of overnight instability in that portfolio. And so to
me, when you're building a portfolio that's giving you not only independence and helping you sleep
all night, well, you have to really understand time and how it relates to the way that, not only the
way you think, but the way that you spend money most importantly. Because in terms of, you know,
this is basically the way that a lot of big pensions think about this too, because pensions naturally
pay out a lot of their investment returns over time. And so they have what's called an inherent
asset liability matching process over which they exist because they, they, they, they,
want to have very long-term asset growth, but they necessarily have short-term liabilities that
they have to pay out. I mean, they're almost like operating a, you know, a 4% withdrawal rate
every year or something like that, and they have to have a certain degree of liquidity.
The pension fund operates like a retiree to a large degree. And so you need liquidity inside
of that portfolio to complement your long-term growth. And so pensions end up inherently
having to think across very specific time horizons. And I think a lot of independent
retail investors don't do that. They think of what's the best way to generate the highest returns
in the most efficient way without a lot of downside volatility. And that process doesn't necessarily
involve thinking in terms of time horizons. And I think that when you come at it from the opposite
angle where you start attacking the equation from the liability side and especially from the time
horizon side, well, you accept a lot of the sort of tradeoffs that exist where you can't sleep well
and have a pure 100% stock market portfolio because the stock market won't help you sleep well at night
because the stock market's going to move 1%. So that's the big kicker for me within the context of
this debate. And the related topic to this with fire and the financial independence retire
early movement is similar in the sense that a lot of people will, especially in the fire movement,
I think end up creating very, very aggressive portfolies because they necessarily need to take more
risk in the long term because they're going to necessarily lose their source of primary income
because the whole goal is to retire early, of course. And so they almost end up necessarily
having to take more risk in the long run than they might otherwise because the real fixed income
asset that they own, their job is going to go away sooner than it will for the average person,
which in a weird way, it actually creates a lot more potential financial instability
because especially as you retire, you typically end up needing a portfolio that is actually
lower risk because you start having to meet these withdrawals.
And so you create your own sort of asset liability mismatch inside of that perspective that
I think creates a lot of risk.
It's one of the reasons why I'm not a huge fan of, I love all the principles of the fire
movement, you know, the idea of creating financial independence and saving a lot of your income,
trying to optimize your income to generate a high income, and then basically just plowing the money
into low-cost index funds. I think all of that is brilliant. Not necessarily a huge fan of the
retire early part, in large part, not just because I think you can create this portfolio
imbalance that I was just alluding to, but the whole retire early mentality to me sometimes,
it creates a lot of risk where I see people that retire, they oftentimes lose their sense of purpose.
And I think that's the bigger behavioral risk with the fire movement is that people who oftentimes
transition into retirement struggle with what is their purpose in life now because they've spent
30, 40 years where their purpose was their work to a large degree. And I don't know, I'm a bigger
fan of sort of easing into it or transitioning into a retirement of sorts where you're maybe
never fully retired or you still maintain a certain sense of purpose doing things for other people
that is providing value and still maintaining an income of some sort that, you know,
it doesn't leave you being a slave to a corporation, but helps you ease into a less rigorous
employment process where you're still technically retiring, but still maintaining a sense
of purpose to a large degree.
That's interesting.
And I wanted to continue along those lines about this.
new generation of investors, whether they're in fire movement or not.
You know, I read Redelio's book quite a few times, principles, and he talks about how he
lost all his money whenever he started his finance career, and he was 32 whenever he incorrectly
predicted a huge crash in 1982, and it got so bad that he had to borrow $4,000 from his
dad to support his growing family. And Delio says that looking back, it was the best thing that
could happen to him because it was just crucial in terms of what he learned about diversification
and as a building block to how he later grew his wealth to be one of the wealthiest people on the
planet. And I come from a place where different generations experience different things in the
financial markets and therefore have a financial and therefore have different realities.
And today you have a new generation of investors who might have read about the financial
crisis in 2008, but having experienced a prolonged.
painful recession. They might have experienced the COVID crisis, and that came with some
painful social costs. But from a financial market perspective, it really can't be compared
to what happened in 2008 or the ones before. You know, what happened? You know, you have a lot
of money printing and you had a bunch of fun stuff going on. You had a lot of subsidies.
It wasn't really like a recession like what you've seen in the past. Now, this new generation
of investors that might have experienced a recent recent.
isn't bear market last year and are perhaps staring into a recession, perhaps not, depending
on how you want to define it. But they really haven't really felt the pain that other generations
have. So I guess my question to you is, which blind spots would you think, would you say
that this new generation investors have? And perhaps using yourself as an example coming from another
generation, where do you think you have blind spots, which I know is paradox in itself for
for me to ask about.
Yeah, I mean, it's interesting because going back to the discussion about, you know,
behavioral biases and especially, you know, behavioral cycles in the way that human emotions
impact all of this.
Well, you know, this is always the variable that you can never eliminate.
So no matter how efficient the markets might become, there are always facets of all
of this that are inefficient because all of the percentage.
because all of the participants are inherently inefficient behaviorally.
And so even in the case of someone like me who, you know, I haven't been around forever,
but I've been, I've lived through now, you know, gosh, I mean, three, four pretty big bare
markets that shaped me in a lot of ways.
And I've seen, though, the way that a, you know, not just a persistent sort of grind like
the early 2000s can wear on you, but the, you know, that was for people.
listening. I mean, that was basically three years of the stock market just kind of ticking lower
every single month, basically. And that's, it was a grind. It just, it was only three years,
but it felt like 20 years just because it seemed to never end. And so that was very different,
though, from the financial crisis, where the financial crisis was really, I mean, it was half as
long, but it was twice as painful in large part because, I mean, God, in February, March of 2009,
it really felt like the wheels were coming off of the financial system.
And it was a really frightening environment in a way that was very, very different from the more
drawn out, prolonged sort of 2002 environment.
But then again, looking through history, you know, like I never lived through the 1970s.
The 70s were a totally different type of grind where I've read a lot of the economic history
of that.
Going back even further, you know, looking at like the post-war period there, the big boom
and bust that occurred in the, you know, across the war period. God, if you lived in Europe,
it was a, you know, in certain economies got totally decimated. Go back and look at a, you know,
a picture of the German stock market back in the 40s. It's unbelievable to see the way that
it sort of boomed when it looked like they were winning the war and then everything just, you know,
the rug got pulled out of them as soon as they started to lose the war. You can read about all
that stuff, but you can never actually experience it until, you know,
you really experience it and you never know how you're going to respond until you actually
are in the thick of it. And so, yeah, I mean, looking at even someone like me, I might be more
behaviorally robust to market gyrations than, say, someone who's 20 years old and fresh, you know,
on Wall Street or something, but we're both going to be challenged across environments in very
similar ways as we navigate all of this. And I still, I mean, even in, you know, periods like
gosh, March 2020 or April 2020. I mean, I remember all that stuff and remember seeing the stock market
down 35%. And when you're in that environment, even if you're like a seasoned professional,
you can find yourself in that environment and say, this feels different. You know, and it's actually
interesting, thinking of people like Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, they were basically saying that
at the time that, you know, Buffett for like the first time in, I think maybe forever was not just
gobbling up every company in the world back then. I think in large part because
the pandemic was so weird that you look at an environment like that and you say, this is different.
There's a real practical reason why the market is down 35 percent. And you need to ask yourself
in that environment, is it different this time? And I think that felt in a lot of ways like it was
different at the time, which is that's the thing that makes investing so behaviorally challenging
is that when you're into the throes of a bare market like that, it always feels different. There's
always a rationale for what's going on and it makes sense in the context of that. And then the future
changes and people get back to, you know, living their lives and producing things and stuff in the long
run. And, you know, everything kind of plays out, you know, more optimistically than I think we
typically tend to think in the short term. But that's the behavioral challenge of thinking in terms
of what are the blind spots. And risk is, you know, as Warren said before, risk is what we don't know. And
And so a risk is what you can't see.
And there are always going to be things in the future that we can't see or haven't seen.
And so, behaviorally, even being someone of a newer generation, I think you have to sort of,
you have to live through these things to sort of become, I guess, you know, Nassim Teleb would say
it's becoming anti-fragile to this sort of stuff, that you have to sort of live through
the tough periods to, you know, become.
tougher, I guess it is. And that's the only way to do that is to actually experience it and find
out, you know, how are you going to actually experience it? One of the great things about being young
and not having a lot of money is that, I mean, like, I lost percentage wise, I lost huge amounts
of money in the 2000 downturn. I had no idea what I was doing. And I was learning a lot about
myself behaviorally and what that, you know, the way that I would actually experience all
of that in the way that I would actually navigate it. And now I'm in a position where I'm much better
off financially. And interestingly, I don't have the time, though, to worry about all of this
stuff in the same way that I did back then, where I could lose a lot of money back then,
percentage-wise, and it didn't matter because I had time on my side. Whereas now it's kind of the opposite.
Now I've got the money, but now I don't have the time. And so it's a very different equation
where I'm naturally taking less risk, you know, even than I probably should be, because in large
part, because the future is so uncertain for me. And so I have more information, but because my time
horizon is compressed, it's a whole different risk dynamic. So, but yeah, for young people,
I mean, gosh, I don't know, a lot of them, I mean, they might have tougher skin than we do because
they think they live through, they're so involved in the crypto stuff that, you know, they've
live through all the gyrations of that in a way that a lot of the old sort of traditional finance
people shunned it off and, you know, didn't experience that in the same way. So they, I don't know,
I think the younger generations are going to be more resilient than maybe we think and, you know,
they'll evolve the same way that we all will through financial markets, ups and downs and booms
and bust. But in the long run, that's the equation that or the variable in the equation that
you can never remove is that humans are irrational and inefficient. And this cycle always continues
in large part because you always have fresh entrance into this dynamic system that necessarily
results in people behaving badly at times. You know, it's interesting that you said about,
you know, the young generation and how they might be more resilient because a lot of them
have invested in crypto. And, you know, you've seen the swings in crypto and you compare them
to the stock market. I was still in school whenever we had the great financial crisis. And I didn't
really experience it on, like, I saw the news and all. I, but you know, it's very different whenever
you have skin in the game and whenever you don't. You know, we have all these play money portfolios,
like, oh, build this and like, sure, I encourage people to do it if they want to, but they should just
know that if you lose $100,000 or $10,000, whatever a number is, it's just very different. If it's play
money or your own money, especially as you get older and might get more responsibilities. But I remember
whenever I was a student playing poker, and in that game, if you play no limit, hold them, like,
you're losing your shirt if you don't know what you're doing. So coming into the stock market
after a punk graduation, started to make a bit of money and put it into the stock market,
like whenever CNBC were talking about, you know, minus three percent, whatever, and it was just
crazy. It's like, yeah, but, you know, playing poker is like, you're losing. You're, you're
all your money or you're up like 300% or whatnot. And so I just wanted to paint some color around that.
I didn't think about it like that. I more thought about it as the young generation have mainly
seen things go up and they might be in for a shock because that's just not the way it is in the stock
market. I haven't considered the whole crypto piece of it. And who knows, whether it's good or
bad that they might be more resilient and are used to see things drop by, I don't know, 50% or
whatnot. I spend so much of my time thinking about what are the outlier risks that are going to,
you know, hurt portfolios and cause people to potentially overreact to certain things. And,
I mean, pandemic. Pandemic was not on my bingo card for my life. So, you know, you never know.
I think that's one of the big lessons about the pandemic is that you really don't know what's coming down
the pike here. And so you have to build a portfolio that is resilient to all of these potential
outcomes. It's why I mean, I've become such a big advocate of all weather investing and
what I call all duration investing because when you build these portfolios that account for all
these different time horizons and all these different potential weather impacts, you don't,
you don't really need to try to do, you know, what the Bank of England was doing with the
weather vein. You don't, you just sort of accept that the weather vein is going to
fail you at times. And that is part of good investing is that your portfolio should always have
components of it that are potentially failing at times. You know, like Brian Portnoy is famous for saying
that diversification is learning to hate part of your portfolio. And that's, that's the essence of it,
is that a good portfolio that is properly diversified, it should never move all in the same
direction, especially in the short term. It should have all these components that are
are moving in different directions. And that's part of what makes investing really hard is that
you look at things that are going down in value when lots of other things are doing well. And you say,
this part of my portfolio is driving me crazy. I don't know why I own this thing. And you sell that
and you buy. It's very easy for people to say, oh, let your winners run and sell your losers. And that's,
you know, the reality is that good diversification involves owning all of that. It's part of why,
I mean, index funds are beautiful in large part because that's what they do. They, and it really,
Diversified Index Fund like the S&P 500 works great because it's a systematic process by which
the underlying index basically it gets rid of its losers, but it owns losers for very,
very long periods. But the kicker is that it doesn't ride its losers to zero. They have a systematic
manner by which they kick things out and then they bring new entrance in. But in the process of
doing that, they ride losers down all through the whole process. But the kicker,
with that is that they're diversified enough that they don't have sort of an asymmetric exposure
to the losers. They have actually an asymmetric upside to the winners because they're constantly
replacing losers with winners in the long run, but they still have lots of exposure to the
losers in the short term. So, yeah, good portfolio management is about learning to hate big parts
of your portfolio across time. And that's part of the behavioral challenge of managing a good
portfolio.
What a wonderful way to end this episode.
Learning how to hate your portfolio.
But it makes a bunch of sense here.
Colin, before we'll let you go, where can the audience learn more about you and
pragmatic capitalism?
Yeah, so I'm the chief investment officer at Discipline Funds, and we manage these
all duration style portfolios for people, low cost, sort of financial planning-based
approaches to investment management. But most people can find my writing and work either at the
Discipline Funds website or Pragmatic Capitalism, which is pragcap.com, P-R-A-G-C-A-P. That's where we write
our blog. And we've recently started doing these three-minute macro videos where I'm trying to do
sort of, you know, speaking of time, trying to produce these very concise macroeconomic lessons of
sorts for people that help them rather than, you know, I know people don't like to read anymore.
So people prefer to listen to podcasts and watch videos.
So you can find us there or everything kind of through PradCap.
Yeah, and I highly recommend.
I think the name of the channel is three minute money.
Is that right?
Three minute macro.
I've checked out a few of the videos in there.
And you like take questions from your audience and that's pretty cool.
And of course, also it's a long time read of your blog on Pracab.com.
So also highly, I recommend that everyone checks that out.
Colin, thank you so much for your time. I hope we can bring you on again sometime. Absolutely. I love being here. Thanks, Stig.
Thank you for listening to TIP. Make sure to subscribe to Millennial Investing by the Investors Podcast Network
and learn how to achieve financial independence. To access our show notes, transcripts or courses,
go to theinvestorspodcast.com. This show is for entertainment purposes only. Before making any
decision consult a professional. This show is copyrighted by the
Investors Podcast Network.
Written permission must be granted before syndication or rebroadcasting.
