We Study Billionaires - The Investor’s Podcast Network - TIP782: The Search for Mispriced Stocks w/ Clay Finck
Episode Date: January 9, 2026In this episode, Clay reviews the book Hidden Investment Treasures by Daniel Gladiš and explores how the rise of passive investing has created growing inefficiencies in today’s market. IN THIS E...PISODE YOU’LL LEARN: 00:00:00 - Intro 00:02:37 - How the rise of passive investing has weakened the price discovery process 00:07:38 - Why price and value often diverge in overlooked parts of the market 00:15:37 - Why today’s market environment may be especially favorable for disciplined value investors 00:23:53 - Why paying the right price matters more than forecasting short-term market movements 00:29:43 - How capital allocation, balance sheet strength, and management quality reduce investment risk over time 00:59:33 - Key lessons from real-world case studies, including Markel, NVR, Japanese equities, and banks Disclaimer: Slight discrepancies in the timestamps may occur due to podcast platform differences. BOOKS AND RESOURCES Join the exclusive TIP Mastermind Community to engage in meaningful stock investing discussions with Stig, Clay, Kyle, and the other community members. Learn how to join us in Omaha for the Berkshire meeting here. Daniel Gladiš’s book: Hidden Investment Treasures. Learn more about Gladiš’s firm: The Vltava Fund. Check out the Made in Japan Substack. Related Episode TIP758: Current Market Conditions & Investment Opportunities w/ Derek Pilecki. Follow Clay on X and LinkedIn. Related books mentioned in the podcast. Ad-free episodes on our Premium Feed. NEW TO THE SHOW? Get smarter about valuing businesses in just a few minutes each week through our newsletter, The Intrinsic Value Newsletter. Check out our We Study Billionaires Starter Packs. Follow our official social media accounts: X (Twitter) | LinkedIn | Instagram | Facebook | TikTok. Browse through all our episodes (complete with transcripts) here. Try our tool for picking stock winners and managing our portfolios: TIP Finance Tool. Enjoy exclusive perks from our favorite Apps and Services. Learn how to better start, manage, and grow your business with the best business podcasts. SPONSORS Support our free podcast by supporting our sponsors: HardBlock Human Rights Foundation Masterworks Linkedin Talent Solutions Simple Mining Plus500 Shopify Fundrise Netsuite References to any third-party products, services, or advertisers do not constitute endorsements, and The Investors Podcast Network is not responsible for any claims made by them. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://theinvestorspodcastnetwork.supportingcast.fm
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You're listening to TIP.
Over the past decade, the investment world has fundamentally changed by the rising trend of
passive investing.
And as more and more capital pours into passive strategies, potentially a smaller and smaller subset
of the market is actively engaged in valuing individual businesses and allocating capital
based on fundamentals.
This trend, of course, has benefited many investors, but it can be argued that it's
created a growing number of distortions underneath the surface. In today's episode, I'll be covering
a book that digs into this subject. It's called Hidden Investment Treasures, How to Find Great
Stock Investments, as the investment world goes passive by Daniel Gladys. Gladys is the founder
and director of the Vitalva Fund, a long-term fundamentally driven investment firm based in Europe.
He's been an active stock investor since the early 90s and started the fund in 2004. The book
The book makes the case that today's market environment, dominated by indexing ETFs and momentum-driven
capital flows, may actually be one of the most favorable backdrops for disciplined and patient
value investors. Gladys argues that as fewer investors focus on the underlying fundamentals,
the gap between price and value has widened in many overlooked corners of the market.
Throughout the book, he shares a series of case studies of investments he has personally made
in the fund, ranging from companies that our audience is well familiar with, like Berkshire Hathaway
and Markell, to less obvious opportunities in Japan and banking. In this episode, I'll walk through
the core ideas of the book, discuss several of the most interesting case studies, and share
the takeaways I found to be most impactful in reading it. So with that, I hope you enjoy today's
episode on Hidden Investment Treasures by Daniel Gladys.
Since 2014 and through more than 180 million downloads, we've studied the financial
markets and read the books that influence self-made billionaires the most.
We keep you informed and prepared for the unexpected.
Now for your host, Playfink.
As I mentioned at the top, on today's episode, I'll be reviewing the book Hidden Investment
Treasers by Daniel Gladys, founder of the Vatalva Fund.
Vatalva benchmarks themselves against a world stock market benchmark. In over the 16 years,
leading up to year-end 2024, the fund delivered returns of 511% versus 333% for their global
benchmark. We'll be getting into this here shortly, but Gladys actually makes a case
for why the S&P 500 is no longer a helpful benchmark due to the increased use of passive
investing, which has bid up the prices of stocks in the S&P 500 relative to their
underlying fundamentals. So I found this book to be really interesting and thought-provoking as it
really made me question what I fundamentally believed about the markets. So in chapter one of the
book, he paints a picture of the market environment we're in today and sort of how we got here.
And in the remaining chapters, he covers several different investments for the reader to consider,
including Berkshire Hathaway, Markell, Alimentatio and Custard, Salantis, a basket of Japanese
stocks, and several others. From Daniel's perspective, he gets a lot of value in listening to investment
ideas from others because he's in the business of making investments himself and having a strong
thesis for why he's making the bets he is. He mentions that he's read countless investment
books. I can certainly resonate with that, but none of these really focus on sharing investment
ideas, which, you know, it makes sense because investments can come and go. And what might be a good
investment today might not be interesting to someone who's reading five years from now. So he not only
shares several investment ideas in the book, but he also goes into detail on why he selected these
stocks to include in the book, which is of course valuable because you can sort of get an understanding
of his thinking process that we can then apply and use some of those mental models to other
investment situations. He writes here, by examining those cases, I demonstrate that today one can find
in the markets a whole range of companies whose stock prices are significantly lower than their
intrinsic values, whose quality of business is very high, and whose associated risk is often
much lower than the risk of the market as a whole." The majority of the stocks outlined were purchased
in his fund and were still held at the time the book was published, which was later in 2024.
Gladys argues that today's market environment is better for value investors than it's ever been
over his investing lifetime, which is over 30 years. Many would say that with the rise of the internet
and new technologies to share all this information, it would become more and more difficult to find
mispricings because the market can react so quickly to new information. But Gladys believes that there are
fewer and fewer investors actually trying to identify the mispricings and act on them. Let's call
these types of investors, value investors. While many people would categorize value investors as investors who
buy stocks that have low PE ratios, low price to book ratios, which tend to be companies that
are not growing much and they tend to be more established and stable businesses. And a growth
investor would be in contrast to this, looking for younger companies with above average growth potential.
Value investing, as defined in the book, is not related to what earnings multiples an investor is
willing to pay or whether they prefer more established in stable companies versus companies
with rapid growth. A value investor simply looks to buy shares at prices that are lower than
their value. In the expected growth of a company, always plays an important role in estimating
that value. No stock can be accepted or rejected simply on the basis of whether it trades
at a low or high multiple of earnings or cash flows, or based upon whether the company is growing
fast or slow. The Vatolva Fund primarily holds what would be described as growth companies
that are increasing their intrinsic value by at least 10% per year, a rate above that of the
stock market as a whole. Now, buying something far less than its worth seems quite a logical
way to invest, so why are so few people actually trying to do this? In recent years, of course,
we've seen the rise of passive investing. Passive investors aren't really interested in how much
a stock is worth or how much they have to pay for it, because they put their money into
investment instruments that by their composition, replicate some index.
Ironically, passive investors who are not interested in individual stocks and are indifferent
to the prices they're paying for the underlying shares, rely on the actions of active investors
who by seeking out individual attractive investments maintain a process known as price discovery.
In theory, if most market participants were active investors, then you'd expect the price discovery
process to be relatively fast and efficient.
But research from 2019 suggests that more than 50% of the total amount of money managed
in the U.S. market is invested passively.
These investments are in a variety of index funds in ETFs, as well as in other retail, pension,
and institutional index-linked products.
And there are also funds that outwardly appear.
to be active, but behave more like these passive funds, otherwise known as closet indexers.
And then when you account for even more passive flows since 2019 and the fact that they're
major shareholders in the publicly traded companies, you know, such as the founder or the CEO,
Gladys estimates that around 20% of capital in the market can be regarded as actively managed
money. And that doesn't necessarily mean that that 20% of capital actually looks for
disparities between price and value. For example, it could be momentum strategies, algorithmic
trading, or technical analysis. For the past 15 years or so, passive investing has been a tailwind
for the S&P 500, helping lift the valuation multiples higher over time. But if the reverse situation
happens where these net inflows turn into net outflows, then we could see a considerable
decline in the broader market because there just wouldn't be enough capital to absorb that
big selling pressure. Now, much has been said about the increased levels of concentration of the
top companies in the S&P 500. As of the time of recording, the top 10 companies account for
around 40% of the S&P 500's value. When there are passive inflows, the companies with the highest
weighting will have the most money allocated to them. In those shares, they have to be sold
by somebody if they're being purchased. So, you know, of course, with every buyer, there's a seller.
Oftentimes, these sellers end up being active investors. But when that trend reverses and there
are passive outflows, it's the largest stocks that are being sold the most and experience the largest
declines because there just aren't enough active buyers to keep up with that large selling
pressure coming from the passive investors, who again make up most of the market's capital.
If we look back at 2022, for example, the Magnificent 7, which includes Alphabet, Amazon, Meta,
Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla, they collectively declined by 40%, but their earnings per share
only declined by around 8%. Their PE ratios contracted by 1 third from 38 times earnings
to 25 times earnings. So meanwhile, the S&P 500 during that year, it only declined by 19%.
And of course, we saw in 2023 and 24, markets rebounded and the valuation levels of these companies
soared back to new highs.
Now, this isn't meant to necessarily criticize passive investing, as it is a sound long-term investment
strategy for most people.
But Gladys outlines that everything, no matter how good the idea, has its negative consequences.
And the impacts can often run counter to the original intent.
The more extreme and original idea and its application, the more pronounced the side effects
can be.
Gladys believes that the prominence of passive investing is at unprecedented levels and there
has never been anything like it before.
And it's critical that investors understand its impact.
The situation with so much passive capital in the markets creates a situation where
most market participants are invested in the market, but they aren't necessarily concerned
with what exactly they're buying and at what price. If you're a value investor and you seek to buy
businesses at a discount to their underlying value, then it's a pretty good situation to be in
if the person selling the shares to you doesn't necessarily understand what they own and the
underlying value of what it is they're selling to you. So the point that Gladys is getting at
is that Jack Bogle, he popularized indexing and the idea was based on the premise that markets
were efficient, and passive investors would simply take whatever price the market would give them.
But since passive has overtaken the market, passive investors have gone from price takers to price
makers, creating a more inefficient market. Bogel himself even said near the end of his life
that if all investors utilize index investing, then chaos and catastrophe could be expected
and markets themselves would fail. Gladys writes here, an intelligent investor,
will not only get off this passive investing train, but will use the whole situation to their
advantage, provided that active investors come to grips with the new state of the markets,
understand how and in what ways market behavior has changed, and adjust their own investing.
They stand a good chance of having their portfolios provide returns higher than those of
broad markets while bearing much less risk than that of broad markets.
So with that as a backdrop, Gladys shares 15 case studies in the book, a few of
few of which I'll be getting into here. In his view, each case study represents a stock that
is priced significantly below their intrinsic value as of September 2024 when the book was published,
and it represents a high-quality business and often has associated risk that is much lower
than that of the overall market. The first chapter is on Berkshire Hathaway, which I know our audience
is well familiar with, and my co-host, Stig Browterson already does a deep dive on for the
Berkshire episode each year, where he brings on Chris Bloomstrand as a guest just prior to the Berkshire
meeting in May. I won't get into the specifics of Berkshire here for this episode, but Gladys
has Berkshire as a core holding in his fund, and he expects around a 10% annual growth in the
intrinsic value over the long term. So I wanted to turn to the chapter on a company often referred to
as Baby Berkshire, Markell Group. While having a similar business model, Markelle is just
1.40th the size of Berkshire Hathaway. Remarkably, Berkshire has still managed to generate
very similar returns to Markell over the past few decades, but I suspect that Berkshire's
investable universe is quickly shrinking with their ever-growing cash pile, so I think that's going
to make it pretty difficult for them to compound at such high rates going forward, which
makes Markell Group potentially more interesting for us as investors. Over the years, several
companies have tried to present themselves as the next Berkshire Hathaway, but few have succeeded.
Markelle Group may be one of the few that have been successful at emulating Berkshire's success
over long periods of time. Gladys writes, although it is far from being of Berkshire quality,
this is a business that is so interesting and promising that it makes sense to give it proper
attention."
Markle's obvious advantage over Berkshire is obviously its size, giving it less constraints
in terms of its future growth prospects.
Markelle was started in 1930 by Samuel Markell in the state of Virginia, and they first entered
the insurance business.
Today, Samuel's grandson, Stephen Markell, is the chairman of the board.
The company went public in 1986 with a market cap of just $15 million.
Tom Gaynor, the CEO of the company today, he joined Markell in 1990 as the company's equity
portfolio manager.
The stock traded for $20 when Gaynor joined the company, and today shares trade for around $2,100,
representing more than a 100x increase.
Gainer describes Markell as a company that is powered by three engines.
The first engine is insurance and reinsurance.
Markell is the world's leading specialist insurance company and the third largest U.S. provider
of excess and surplus insurance. Markelle's insurance business has grown steadily over the years
and has been consistently profitable. In a very Berkshire-like fashion, Markelle is conservative
when it comes to underwriting policies, setting aside reserves for future claims and not chasing
future growth just for the sake of growth. Insurance companies can get themselves into trouble
when they try to chase unprofitable business and are unrealistic and underwriting expected future claims.
When it comes to insurance, discipline is of utmost importance, which Markell has consistently showcased.
Markell's second engine is its investment portfolio.
Berkshire is well known for using its float as an interest-free source of capital to invest in stocks.
Markele takes a very similar approach and today has over $32 billion in float.
Now, not all of this is invested in the stock market. They need to ensure that they're able to
conservatively pay future claims, so a good portion of the float is invested in bonds that are
duration matched with expected future claims, while also generating interest income, and about
one-third is invested in equities. Tom Gaynor is a great investor, and his investment returns
over the past 20 years have exceeded the S&P 500 by 1% per annum. The remarkable part about this
is just how diversified he is. When I pull up his most recent 13F, his top 10 positions make up
just 43% of the portfolio, and he owns more than 100 stocks. It also includes several
well-known U.S. Blue Chips, and the top positions as of today include Berkshire Hathaway,
Alphabet, Brookfield Corp, Amazon, and Deer & Co. Gladys estimates that the average overall
return on their flow will be around 5%. Markell's third engine is the newest,
Markell Ventures, which management started building in 2005.
Markhill Ventures is their arm that invests in private, non-insurance businesses to add more
diversification to the conglomerate.
It primarily consists of older economy companies and tends to avoid technology and information
sectors.
Like Berkshire, Markeld purchases these companies with the intention of holding them indefinitely.
As of the time of writing, this segment produced annual revenues of $5 billion per year.
year. When Gladys totaled up the estimated annual profits from these three segments, he came to a
total estimate of $1.5 billion per year. And as of the time of writing, Markell traded at a market
cap of $20 billion, which he believed was undervalued for a company with the track record and
management team that they had. Over the 20 years leading up to the book being published, Markell
compounded operating income at 11% per year, gross premiums compounded at 9% per year, in the
investment portfolio also compounded at 9%. Investors like to judge the valuation of companies like
Berkshire and Markell based on the price-to-book ratio, but judging the valuation based on this
metric can be a bit tricky for Markelle because as Markele ventures continues to grow and
continue to play an increasingly important role in the conglomerate, book value becomes less
and less irrelevant since acquisitions are accounted for at cost. So it's probably better to judge
evaluation based on maybe the sum of the parts methodology. Let's take a quick break and hear from
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Gladys views Markell as a prime candidate to be a hidden investment treasure. Because of its
medium size, it doesn't have a large weighting in the indices, and since it belongs in the
financial sector and the property casualty insurance subsector, passive capital doesn't substantially
flow to this area of the market. Additionally, since it's a rather boring investment that
won't make investors rich overnight, it can continue to quietly compound without receiving
much attention from retail investors. I should also mention that each year, during the Berkshire
weekend in Omaha, I attend the Markell Brunch where Tom Gainer and other managers hosts the free
event for investors to socialize and ask some questions.
It's a really fun event, and if you happen to be in Omaha during the Berkshire weekend,
I would highly encourage you to attend the Markel brunch as well.
I also like that Markell has a very broad and loyal shareholder base.
At the Markele brunch, there are hundreds of people eagerly listening to management's responses
to questions, and the questions asked are rather sophisticated. So I think that management does a really
good job of communicating with shareholders in building out a strong base of well-informed
quality shareholders. I'd also like to mention that I put together a video that explains how
you can attend the Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders Meeting and how you can join us at the events
that TIP is hosting. I'll be sure to get that video linked in the show notes for those who are
interested. The second case study I'd like to highlight is Alimentation Couchard. Prior to getting
into the business, Gladys educates the reader extensively on capital allocation, share repurchases,
and dividends. He strongly favors companies that are good capital allocators and tends to favor
companies that are share cannibals as well. Share cannibals are companies that have repurchased a significant
number of their shares and have done so at attractive valuations. The reasoning tends to favor
wise share repurchases over dividends is that share repurchases can add value to existing shareholders
when they're done well below the intrinsic value of the company. In this case, value is transferred
from the seller to existing shareholders because of the advantageous price the shares are purchased
at, whereas with dividends, no value is created because the company is simply sending a check
to the shareholders. Share buybacks are essentially an investment by the company into itself
with a return on capital that is usually higher than that what is offered by available investment
opportunities and without the risk associated with such investments.
If management can maintain the discipline to buyback shares only at favorable prices,
and if this is not at the cost of excessively growing debt levels, then share buybacks
can have a highly positive impact on both share value and share price over the long term.
He then shares a word of caution with regard to actual.
acquisitions. Acquisitions for managers can be tempting as having your company in the headlines
for buying your largest competitor seems a lot more fun than a headline that states that you
bought back one-fifth of your shares. And acquisitions come with big risks for shareholders.
Gladys writes, our study of market events and our own investment experience lead us to conclude
that the greatest potential risk for value destruction is through acquisitions. This is because
overall, it is a form of capital allocation to which the largest volumes of money are directed, end
quote. Acquisitions can be troublesome if management's ego gets involved, and they get too far ahead
in themselves, not keeping shareholders in mind. In management's appetite for acquisitions,
is typically at its highest at the peak of a bull market. The worst acquisitions tend to be those
that are very large, are paid for with stock rather than cash, and are outside the buyer's existing
core business area. Furthermore, it's often the case, too, that the announcement of these acquisitions
is unexpected, and the market is caught off guard, causing an immediate negative reaction
for the stock price. Now, when you're partnered with a good management team, with a good track
record of looking out for shareholders, this potential risk for investors is largely
eliminated. With all that said, there are some companies that have a long track record
of growing through acquisition and have done very well.
These companies don't overpay.
They're able to integrate these businesses well,
and they're patient in waiting for the right opportunities.
They ensure that when acquisitions are made,
they are likely to be value accretive to shareholders.
Alimentation Couchard is an example of such a company,
which I'll refer to here as ATD, which is the ticker symbol.
ATD is one of Canada's most interesting and successful
business stories. The company was founded by Alan Bouchard in 1980 at the age of 31, and today
Bouchard is the company's chairman. In 1980, he decided to open his first convenience store near
Montreal, and his groundbreaking idea at the time was to keep the store open 24 hours a day.
Fast forward to today, the company owns 17,000 stores in Canada, the U.S., Northern Europe, and Asia.
Remarkably, of the stores they own today, 75% of them came through acquisitions.
Stores acquired by ATD tend to perform better in their hands than previously to the acquisition,
showcasing their operational excellence.
Debt is often used in making acquisitions, and then it's typically paid down rather quickly
to give the company flexibility to make further acquisitions in the future, or buyback
shares at favorable prices.
Over the past 20 years, ATD has made around 75 acquisitions and its stores span across 25 different
countries.
And since the convenience store industry remains highly fragmented, there is still a significant
opportunity to continue to grow through acquisitions.
In the U.S. alone, there are 150,000 convenience stores and gas stations of the type
that ATD operates, 7,000 of which are ATDs that's less than 5% of the total market.
As in many other industries, the expense structure favors the larger players over the smaller ones,
especially when it comes to things like purchasing fuel.
Since large players are able to have a lower cost structure, it makes sense for the industry
to continue to consolidate.
ATD is one of those companies that has steadily grinded out high returns over the years.
Since their IPO in 1999, the stock is compounded at an average rate of 21% per annum.
This has been driven by disciplined capital allocation and high returns on invested capital,
and as long as the company continues with this sound strategy, one should expect it to continue
to perform well from here.
Jumping to the third hidden investment treasure I wanted to discuss today, we have NVR.
I've long considered chatting about home builders here on the show, but I haven't come
around to pulling the trigger on it.
Several value investors and some members of our mastermind community have been interested
in home builders like D.R. Horton and Toll Brothers, so to tee up the discussion here on NVR,
Gladys ruminates on the best type of business one could own. The best businesses are those that
generate high returns on capital and are able to reinvest the capital earned over the long term
with similarly high returns. The magic of these is that the value of the business compounds
to extraordinary levels when given enough time. But these types of companies are quite rare. So maybe
the next best case might be a business that generates high returns on capital, can reinvest
only a relatively small portion of that capital at high rates, and then return the excess capital
to shareholders in the form of buybacks. Now, one wouldn't expect a home builder to be the prime
case study for a business with high returns on capital. So I think about where I live. I live
towards the edge of town here in Lincoln, Nebraska, and I can't help but notice how many of these new
neighborhoods on the edge of town, put up houses that are more or less, they look the same.
It seems like an industry that would be very capital-intensive and very commoditized.
Furthermore, housing is a cyclical industry, which can make it difficult to consistently
turn a profit if there are years where demand for housing is weak and home builders are left
holding several unsold homes. If we look back at the history of NVR, back in the 1980s, they were
a quintessential homebuilder and land developer. That is to say that they would buy land that
wasn't yet ready for homebuilding as it needed to go through phases of zone permitting,
planning, utilities, and infrastructure engineering into construction. Only after all of this
could a home be built. As one would expect, this process was costly, tying up a lot of capital,
and it took several years for the time and effort to bear fruit. The process also carried risk. In the
In early 1990s, there was an economic and construction recession, and NVR ended up declaring
for bankruptcy.
But when it emerged from bankruptcy in 1992, it had a business model that was completely different
from its previous one.
Gladys explains that the model is still in place today and uniquely positions NVR among
its competitors.
This business model led the stock to be one of the best performing stocks over the past 30 years.
NVR's business model is based on three fundamental pillars.
The first pillar is low capital of requirements.
The second is an efficient homebuilding process.
And the third is highly efficient allocation of capital.
Any company that builds houses needs to have an inventory of land upon which to build in the future.
And home builders tend to have several years of developments so that they're always able to fill demand for new houses.
But if you're a home builder, holding the land,
for several years is very capital-intensive, expensive, and inefficient.
And it tends to be financed with debt, meaning that you have these annual interest costs.
Additionally, you risk that the land will decrease in value while you hold it.
To avoid these risks, NVR almost completely avoids buying land that is not ready for development.
Instead, they focus on buying ready land, and not with cash, but through purchase options.
The option premium can typically be as high as 10% of the land price, and this alone comprises
the capital and risk involved for NVR. Should they decide to withdraw from the intended purchase,
in the worst case, it will only lose the option premium. Not only is this approach less risky
and less capital intensive, it also gives NVR much more flexibility and optionality relative
to just straight up buying the land that they think they need. To put some numbers around this,
In 2023, NVR built 20,000 homes, and at the end of the year, they controlled just over 141,000
lots, which would be enough for seven years of construction. It spent $584 million on them,
which is only about $4,000 per lot on average, making for a very low cost and efficient way of
acquiring inventory. The second pillar is the high efficiency of their development process. NVR is focused
on a few key markets and on building market leadership in those markets. Geographically,
it has four major segments in the U.S., which mostly look to be in the eastern part of the country
in states like Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Florida. In some of these markets,
NVR has a market share in excess of 20%. Second, NVR produces prefabricated building components
near its key markets, which significantly reduces its cost. Third, they use independent
subcontractors to build its houses working on fixed-priced contracts. This makes their margins
more stable. When the construction industry was in a crisis in the U.S. between 2006 and 2011,
the number of new homes built dropped significantly. And NVR was the only publicly traded
home builder that remained profitable and even performed well. Fourth, NVR overwhelmingly
builds homes only when they are pre-sold and when the down payment has been made. So,
they do not engage in speculative construction and there is very low risk in them being stuck
holding many unsold homes. In fifth, NVR offers mortgage financing to its home buyers
and sells the loans to banks, providing them with a high margin segment with low capital
requirements. The third pillar of NVR success is highly efficient capital allocation. Given NBR's
unique business model in the industry, it is not capital intensive. And given the
construction method itself, NVR considers itself more of an assembler putting the house together
than a builder, as it does not require much capital for machinery and equipment. NBR doesn't pursue
acquisitions and seeks to grow organically and gradually strengthen its position in existing markets
and grow into surrounding markets. Their low capital needs and high margins relative to its
industry results in high returns on invested capital and just as important,
high returns on incremental invested capital. NVR has a strong balance sheet with net cash
and the vast majority of the cash the business generates is deployed into share buybacks.
Here, as of the time of recording, when I look at the financials for the trailing 12 months,
I see $1.3 billion in free cash flow and nearly $1.9 billion deployed into share buybacks.
This is remarkably, their KAPX line is just $26 million.
That's just 2% of free cash flow.
Due to their approach to capital allocation over the past 30 years, the vast majority of
NVR shares have been retired.
At the end of 1995, the company had just over 15 million shares outstanding, and that
number today is $2.8 million.
So over the past 30 years, the shares outstanding have declined by over 80%, which is about
a 5.4% decline in the share count per year. Said another way, if you bought shares in NVR at the
end of 1995, your proportional ownership stake in the business increased by over five times
since then without you actually needing to purchase additional shares. What's also just as important
is that NVR's stock-based compensation looks to be rather modest, so they aren't like many
other companies that buyback shares simply to offset the dilution that is happening through
stock-based comp. To get a sense of how high the returns on capital are, Gladys walked
through the financial statements from 2023, which was a pretty average year, or perhaps,
let's say, a normal year for the industry, he calculates return on invested capital as simply
the net profit divided by the invested capital. With a net profit of $1.59 billion, an invested capital
of roughly $2 billion, ROIC is therefore almost 80%. When you have a company that generates so much
cash, has low capital intensity, and repurchases shares at a modest valuation, it's no wonder
that we've seen shares of NVR compound at high rates for three decades now. If we zoom out and
look at the industry more broadly, there is no doubt that they operate in a cyclical industry.
The primary factors that drive demand for new home construction in the short-term medium term
are employment, real income levels, availability, the cost of financing, and home prices.
Looking at new home builds over time, throughout the 1990s, we saw this figure rise as the economy
was booming.
There was a temporary decline in the early 2000s, and then at the peak of the GFC, new home
builds rose to $2.2 million and crashed all the way down to just $600,000.
around 2012. Now today, this figure has steadily increased back to 1.8 million new builds as the
industry recovered over the years. Looking back at the historical financials for NVR,
the cyclicality of the industry has certainly impacted this business. Revenues declined by more
than half during the GFC, and they also saw a revenue decline in 2023. However, they did remain
profitable the entire time, while other home builders did not fare as well. But even with the cyclical,
The long-term trend is a net positive for home builders here in the U.S., primarily due to population
growth.
The Joint Center's study estimate that around 1.5 new homes would need to be built annually
to meet demand, which is more than what has actually been built in many recent years.
To close out the chapter, Gladys covers the sources of competitive advantages for NBR and
potentially why the business model has not been replicated by others in the industry.
For any business that has increased by 100x over the past few decades, you should expect
others to want to join the party. Gladys's firm has been following the residential construction
industry for more than 20 years, and as of the time of writing, they believe that there are
no successful imitators among their competitors.
The theory for why that is is that it's simply not easy to apply the model.
So it may not be as straightforward in practice as it might appear to be on the surface.
Now, it's sort of an easy cop-out to just say what they do is just so difficult to do,
but it certainly could be the case.
Well, if any business is so good, why wouldn't the market just realize that and price
the shares accordingly?
As value investors, we must come to our own conclusion as to what we believe the business
to be worth.
In the past, the market has clearly gotten the pricing wrong for NBR, and that suggests
that the efficient market hypothesis just does not hold in this.
case. With a track record like NVR, you'd think that the market would come around to putting a
premium on this business. But in Gladys's view, the market views NVR as just another home builder
that operates in a highly cyclical industry. As of the time of recording, NVR's PE ratio is just
16, while the S&P 500 minus the Mag 7 trades at around 22 times earnings. That's nearly a 30% discount
to the broader market. And over the past decade, the PE ratio for NVR has been around in the mid-teens,
so it's priced at a similar level to its recent history. And the stock seems to really fly a bit
under the radar, given that management makes no effort to promote its own shares. They don't
hold quarterly conference calls, and its quarterly reports are brief. So Gladys expects the positive
trends of the past to continue and for the company to perform well over the long term.
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All right, back to the show.
For the fourth case study we'll be discussing today, we won't be talking about an individual
company, but the broader market of Japan.
Gladys titles this chapter, Japan Seeking Treasure in a country most investors ignore.
What I liked about this chapter is that it provides this broader perspective and some lessons
from history as well.
Many of the best investments tend to be in areas of the market where other investors just aren't looking.
If we take a step back in time, the Niki 225 index became one of the largest bubbles in financial history,
peaking out in 1989.
For those not familiar, the Niki 225 is a Japanese stock index that tracks the performance of 225
large publicly traded companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Gladys launched his fund in 2004, and at that point, the index was still down 30% from its peak
15 years earlier. As far as investors were concerned, Japan was a market that was falling
and just not worthy of anyone's attention. Meanwhile, China's economy was rapidly growing
in getting much more investor interest. In Gladys's words here, Japan was seen in many eyes
as a country with slow GDP growth, an old and declining population, large debt, and often struggling
with deflation.
It's no wonder that investors saw much more potential in a market like China.
To look at the positive side, Japan did have perhaps the longest life expectancy, a healthy
population, an absence of poverty and obesity, low levels of corruption and crime, the best
infrastructure of any major country in the world, and a sophisticated, homogeneous, and educated
population. Japan is also an advanced country technologically, and Japanese companies have invented
and or successfully commercialized a number of products that have since become almost
indispensable to consumers. A few examples include the microwave, a whole range of computer chips,
the digital watch, the transistor radio, 3G mobile telephones, among several others. If you look
at many products that we use every day, Japan is a part of several of them, a quarter to one-third,
of the content in an iPhone is from Japan, the most of any country. As of the time of recording,
the Japanese stock market is the third largest in the world after the U.S. in China. And to help
put things into perspective, there are around 4,700 publicly traded companies here in the U.S.
and nearly 4,000 in Japan. I think many investors would be surprised to discover how broad and
diverse the Japanese stock market really is. Now, just because there is innovation happening
in a country doesn't necessarily mean that it's necessarily investable. Our investment principles
should apply regardless of the market we're investing in. While investors deemed Japan uninteresting
and filled with companies that had low returns on capital, too much cash sitting on the balance sheet,
and a lack of shareholder value creation, some things started to happen underneath the surface
to get the market picking back up. In light of the great financial crisis, the Niki 225,
plunged by more than 50%, and it hardly recovered from 2009 to 2012. In 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party
pursued monetary easing, budgetary stimulus, and structural reforms that helped spark investor interest
and helped kick the market back into gear. And in 2014, further pressure was put on the efficiency
of companies, and for an increased focus on shareholder value creation, and even further pressure
was added in 2020 and 2023.
If management did not prioritize shareholders in their decision-making and did not present
a clear plan to improve ROE's or inefficient capital allocation, then they risked
being delisted.
One index required that companies maintain ROEs in excess of their cost of capital and
that their shares must trade above book value.
Gladys mentioned that he hadn't seen oversight like this anywhere else in the world.
And as a result, many companies have increased their dividends, increased the use of share
buybacks, and made other strategic decisions to add value to shareholders.
Now, the impact of these reforms aren't going to drastically impact the companies overnight,
but for investors in the Japanese market, it is necessary that management is shareholder-friendly
and understands the impact of their capital allocation decisions in order for value to be
recognized and appreciated by investors.
From the end of 2012 to the time of recording, the Niki has compounded at just shy of 13% per year.
However, the Japanese yen has weakened substantially over that time period.
At the start of the time frame, the yen to USD ratio was around 86, and today it's 157.
So holders of yen get substantially less dollars when making that conversion, which has
implications for investors like myself who are based in the US who invest in Japan.
When adjusting for the currency, the annual returns were closer to 8% per year.
Since Gladys' firm didn't have the capacity to cover the Japanese market extensively,
given their involvement in other markets, they decided to take more of a passive approach
to investing in Japan.
In his view, passive investing can be a good form of investing if it's based on analysis
and it makes sense both in relation to price and composition of the underlying asset.
The Niki 225 index meant both of those requirements for them.
However, they did have concerns about the currency risk.
And hedging such risks doesn't come too cheap.
So they settled on purchasing the Niki 225 index by means of futures contracts to largely
eliminate the currency risk.
He explains how it works in the book, so I won't bore you with all the details here.
As of the time of writing, the P.E. ratio of Japanese stocks was 17, while the P.E. ratio
here in the U.S. was 28, and the Japanese have generated higher earnings growth over the past decade,
have lower indebtedness, and changes are still being made by companies to try and unlock more
shareholder value. It also can't be ignored that Buffett invested in the five leading Japanese
trading companies in 2020. Buffett, of course, saw these companies as cheap, and I think investors
underestimate just how big of a home run this has been for Berkshire. Since the end of 2020,
all five of these stocks are up by more than 4x, which would equate with 30% plus compounded annual
growth rate. I've personally looked a bit into investing in Japan myself, and I do own
one SaaS business in Japan that is rather small. I'm in agreement with him that the currency
risk just cannot be ignored. I tried to overcome that in my investment by buying cheap
and ensuring that the future growth is strong. When you buy cheap and the thesis ends up even
moderately playing out, it's very hard to lose unless the currency significantly goes against you.
For those interested in checking out businesses in Japan, there's a substack called Made in Japan
that I follow that publishes differentiated ideas. The writer is an analyst who lives in Japan,
and I think they put out great work, so I'll get that blog linked in the show notes for those
that are interested. Their page also lists a bunch of other substacks that discuss Japan in depth
as well. Now, I'll be the very first to say that listeners should not take this as a recommendation
to invest in Japan. There's that saying that investors that send their money internationally
trade known risks for unknown risks due to things like cultural differences, potentially less
disclosures or transparency, or a language barrier that simply prevents you from understanding
the businesses as well. Gladys closes out the chapter by stating, I have seen several
situations in my lifetime where a country's entire stock market can be considered a hidden investment
treasure. It is almost certain that such opportunities will continue to occur in the future, end
quote. The fifth case study I'd like to touch on today is on banks, including J.P. Morgan Chase
and OSB group. This chapter reminded me of the two interviews I've had with Derek Pellecki,
who's an investor in the financial sector. He's compounded at 22% per year since 2008, one of the
best track records I've ever seen. One of the reasons that Pilecki has just done so well investing
in this sector is that a lot of investors just don't look at financials, they don't look at bank stocks,
and of course, that creates these big mispricings. I learned from my conversations with Derek
that the banking industry just has a lot of depth to it, and it offers good opportunities to
earn good returns with relatively low risk. But that doesn't come for free, as you need to have a
framework for analyzing and coming to understand banks. And it's easy to see why most investors would
shy away from banks. Gladys recommends studying and analyzing 50 banks of different sizes, markets,
and types in order to get an overview of the market globally and how things differ between
different banks. The first tip he shares with regards to analyzing banks is that free cash flow
should not be used to value banks because it's a metric that's difficult to estimate. Part of the
reason is that it can be difficult to parse out the growth versus maintenance capex. The main
variables he looks at for valuation purposes are based on the balance sheet, the amount of equity,
and the return on that equity. From a simplistic point of view, one can model out the starting
and ending price-to-book ratio, what the return on equity will be over time, and correspondingly,
how that will impact the book value over time. Since Gladys tends to use a discount rate of 10%
when valuing stocks, the intrinsic value of a bank that earns returns on equity of 10% is expected
to be around one-time's book value. So the price would be interesting in this case if it were
trading below book value. And if returns on equity are greater than 10%, then the intrinsic value
would be somewhere north of one-time's book value. It's important to look for businesses that
earn at least 10% returns on capital because then time is on your side as an investor. As of the
time of publication, Gladys' fund was long two banks, J.P. Morgan Chase and OSB Group.
They view J.P. Morgan as the strongest and most resilient global bank, which is the stock they
added to the fund during the market plunge in March of 2020. Today, J.P. Morgan has the number
one position for banks in terms of customer deposits with 11% market share. It's the number one
corporate and investment bank, the largest credit card issuer by spending and balances, the largest
mortgage issuer, the largest auto lender, and the largest payment processor. The company has been
led by Jamie Diamond for more than 20 years now. Since Diamond was CEO of Bank One in March of 2000,
which would eventually merge with JPMorgan four years later, he's delivered returns of 12.1%
for a year in 2023, while the S&P 500 returned just 6.9%. For a bank to perform well over the
long term, it must consistently earn high returns on equity and ensure that there are significant
losses during the temporary crises, such as the great financial crisis. J.P. Morgan satisfies
both of those conditions. During the GFC, many banks, of course, did not survive, and J.P. Morgan
was the only major U.S. bank that did not need government assistance and was profitable, and actually
mitigated the impact of the crisis on the entire financial sector by taking over the failing bear
earns in March 2008. J.P. Morgan's management prioritizes return on tangible equity, which has
been around 15% since the merger with Bank 1. This is the rate at which the bank's capital is
accumulating before dividend payments and share-by-backs. Jamie Diamond says that he expects
J.P. Morgan to be able to achieve an average return on tangible equity of around 17%. And over the
five years leading up to the book here, that figure was 19%. Gladys writes here, when one considers
that these five years have included a global pandemic, dramatic inflation, rapidly rising
interest rates, falling bond prices, and a U.S. banking crisis, this is a respectable result.
Other big banks can only dream of such returns, end quote. And just briefly here on OSB group,
this is a smaller, more specialized bank based in the UK. They provide mortgages to professional
Landlords. While J.P. Morgan is trading at a hefty premium to book value, this company
currently trades at around 1.1 times book value and earns returns on equity of around 15%.
Gladys' fund purchased shares of OSB in the summer of 2024 when the stock traded for
around 4.5 times earnings, paid a dividend yield of 8.5% and had a price-to-book ratio of just 0.7.
In his view, the stock was significantly undervalued. Some might question why a good business
would be valued so cheaply by the market.
In one potential reason, as we got into at the beginning here, is simply that this segment
of the market is largely ignored by most investors.
With OSB being a smaller bank, passive flows largely avoid this company, and many investors
mostly shun the banking sector too.
Lastly, the UK market has overtaken Japan as one of the least favored developed markets.
Despite how much investors ignore certain pockets of the banking sector, banks are important,
to the functioning of an economy and of companies, and they constitute an important part of capital
markets. So perhaps in the future, this sector will prove to be fertile ground in searching for
investment opportunities. I really enjoyed reading through the final chapter of the book to wrap
things up. Years ago, Gladys and his wife bought a piece of land where they planted flowers, shrubs,
and trees, and they named the land Berkshire Park. Watching the trees grow does not happen in a matter of
days or weeks. It happens in a matter of many years. From day to day, a person does not really
notice really any change. But if you look back after years, the differences can be astounding.
This is a close analogy to investing in stocks. Picking individual investments for your portfolio
is like planning trees. Most people like to watch the day-to-week price movements of stocks.
And I must admit, me included. But what really matters is understanding the underlying business,
business and the seeds they are planning that will bear fruit for the years to come.
Just like trees, when you look back over a period of years, the changes in value of businesses
can be enormous.
Now, not all stocks will grow and blossom as expected, but Gladys laid out many of the things
he likes to look for in the stocks he invests in.
As he illustrated at the beginning of the book, he believes that today's conditions are
quite ideal for selecting individual stocks because of how much less of the future.
efficient the market has become with the rise of passive investing. Gladys pulled in a quote from
Mark Leonard, founder and former president of Constellation Software. Leonard wrote in his 2018 letter to
shareholders, index investors buy our stock because we are part of whatever index they are emulating.
Their actions are formulaic. Despite the fact that they may be long-term holders, it is difficult
to find someone to speak with at these indexing institutions, and even if we do, they rarely know much
about our company."
Then Gladys writes, this sentence captures well what disturbs me about index investing.
Index investing makes the market even more inefficient by suppressing its price discovery
function and ultimately constraining the performance of the economy as a whole, end quote.
And then you also add in the impact to the internet and the easiness of making trades on our
phone with zero commission platforms.
It points to Buffett's line about how the market has become more and more to more.
casino-like. But with the potential fragility of the market here in the U.S., that isn't a good
reason alone to shun stocks. When an investor looks for hidden treasures, they can surely find
stocks with higher expected returns and lower corresponding risk. When people talk about investing in
stocks, they love to talk about the returns, but they rarely discuss the risk. One reason
is that returns are easy to measure in hindsight, but there's no objective measurement or
definition of risk. It's largely a subjective category. What might seem risky to one person
might seem just fine to another and vice versa. It's often argued that in order to earn higher
returns, one must take more risk. But the great value investors do not believe this. While academia
shares that risk is equal to volatility, Buffett and others share that risk is in fact the potential
for losing money. Gladys then breaks down further how we can minimize risk. He has three points here.
First is to have an awareness of our own abilities and skill set.
If he had to name one thing that causes investors to lose the most money, it's when they get
into things they do not understand.
This is true for all types of investments and investors, regardless of experience.
We need to have a good understanding of the boundaries of what we probably understand and
what we almost certainly understand and then concentrate our investments only in areas that
lie within this imaginary circle of competence.
The second pillar of risk management is to avoid the risk of permanent loss of capital.
We're said differently, minimize the probability of losing money.
A permanent loss of capital is a situation in which an investor loses part or even all
of invested capital on a particular investment without being able to recover it.
Now, this doesn't mean that we avoid volatility.
Share price fluctuations are normal.
But if you buy a business that is over-indebted and files for bankruptcy when a major crisis
hits, then that is a permanent loss of capital that cannot be recovered.
The most common causes of permanent loss of capital tend to be poor business quality, high levels
of debt, and poor management actions.
If we simply invert this, we should focus on high-quality companies we understand, with high
returns on capital and strong free cash flow, have minimal debt, and have management that
allocates capital effectively.
The final pillar of risk management is, of course, putting an emphasis on paying a fair price.
A stock presents different levels of risk depending on the price you pay.
The stock that's priced at $100 might be a low risk investment.
But if it's priced at $500, it might be a very high risk investment.
Of course, Buffett's share to only buy shares well below our estimate of intrinsic value.
But we must also have a relatively high confidence around that estimate of value.
Otherwise, we're speculating.
Furthermore, Gladys wants to use intrinsic value estimates that are conservative and realistic,
and the gap between price and value is wide to make room for a margin of safety.
And it's important not to overcomplicate things.
We don't want to build out an elaborate model to show that a stock is undervalued by 5% or 10%.
Based on his experience, the more sophisticated evaluation model, the poorer the investment outcome.
It's much better to wait for situations where a stock's cheapness is so blatant that no further
complex calculations are needed.
Although it can't be measured, the end result is that hopefully a portfolio of stocks
that put these practices of risk management to good use will have lower overall risk than
an investor who buys a broad market portfolio of hundreds or even thousands of stocks,
of which they know next to nothing about.
And the companies in your portfolio will be of higher quality, have less than a lot of
debt than the market average, making them more resilient. Based on these observations, I believe
it's possible to construct a portfolio with lower risk and higher perspective returns. So that wraps up
today's episode. I want to extend a special thank you to Daniel Gladys for this book. It's very
well written, and I would encourage the listeners to pick it up. And it looks like in his annual letters,
he also provides updates around changes to his portfolio and the top positions in his fund.
So I think we'll close out the episode on that note. Thanks a lot for tuning in to today's
episode and I hope to see you again next week. Thanks for listening to TIP.
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