Within Reason - #14 — William Lane Craig | The Kalam Cosmological Argument

Episode Date: June 21, 2020

William Lane Craig is an American philosopher and Christian theologian. He holds two PHDs in philosophy and theology, and is a professor of philosophy at both Houston Baptist University and Talbot School of Theology at Biola University. Dr. Craig is arguably the world's most famous Christian apologist, and often cited as its most effective public defender. He has taken part in high-profile debates with Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Anthony Flew, among others. Dr. Craig is the man who gave the kalam cosmological argument its name, and he speaks to Alex in this episode about that argument, and answers a number of objections to it. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Searchlight Pictures presents The Roses, only in theaters August 29th. From the director of Meet the Parents and the writer of Poor Things, comes The Roses, starring Academy Award winner Olivia Coleman, Academy Award nominee Benedict Cumberbatch, Andy Samburg, Kate McKinnon, and Allison Janney. A hilarious new comedy filled with drama, excitement, and a little bit of hatred, proving that marriage isn't always a bed of roses. See The Roses, only in theaters August 29th. Get tickets now. This episode of the Cosmic Skeptic podcast is brought to you by you. To support the podcast, please visit patreon.com forward slash cosmic skeptic. So welcome back, everybody, to the Cosmic Skeptic podcast. My name is Alex O'Connor, and I'm joined today by Dr. William Lane Craig, who is the professor of philosophy at both Houston and Biola Universities with two PhDs, has famously debated God and the existence of God with an expansive array of very high-profile atheists and always seeming to come out of those interactions unscathed.

He's also the author of more books than years I've Been Alive. So, Dr. Craig, thank you for taking the time. Thank you for being here on the podcast. Certainly, Alex. Good to be with you. That number of books in your age may be a reflection of your youth, I think. Maybe. I think how prolific you are is kind of the point that I was trying to get out there.

Sure. So, as I said, just before we got started, Dr. Craig, I'm sure that most of my audience will be familiar with you and some of the things you've said, but they'll be familiar with them through the lens of the atheist. because in my community, a lot of people have responded to your works. And so the people who are listening might feel as though they've heard everything you've had to say before. But it's unlikely that they've really given the time to listen from the horse's mouth, except in a debate scenario where they're probably going in with some biased kind of starting points. So today, I wanted to discuss the Kalam cosmological argument.

And one of the principal reasons for that is because not too long ago, I put out an article on my website about why I thought there was a particular version or justification for the Kalam cosmological argument that begs the question. And I got a wealth of response from it. And I also saw that you'd made a series of objections that you called something like objections so bad, I couldn't have made them up. And that was one of them. And I thought, whoa, maybe I'm standing something here. So I thought it would be good to sit down and talk to the man himself. So just as a bit of introduction, why is it that you're so well connected to the Kalam cosmological argument? Are you the person who gave it that name? I know you're incredibly

well known for having popularized it. So what's that connection? I did my doctoral work in philosophy at the University of Birmingham in England, and I did it on the cosmological argument for God's existence. And in studying the history of this argument, I discovered that although the argument goes all the way back to the fourth century after Christ, in medieval Islamic theology, this argument became highly developed. highly sophisticated. And so I tagged the argument, the Kalam cosmological argument, in honor of that medieval Muslim tradition. Kalam is simply the Arabic word for a point of doctrine and denotes medieval Islamic theology. Excellent. And so the form of the argument is quite impressively simple, and I'm sure that most people listening will have at least heard it in passing. Would it be a fair analysis to say, something of the following. The first premise is everything that begins to exist has a cause for its

existence. The second premise is that the universe began to exist, and the conclusion which logically follows is that the universe had a cause. Yes. And this is a deductive argument, which means that if both the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. So the only way to attack this argument, the only way to raise objections is raising objections with the premises. Right. I find that most people, when they try to raise objections, they jump to the second premise. Something like the universe beginning to exist is quite a difficult thing to prove, it seems. And yet you've got quite an expansive literature on different reasons why we can know this to be the case. So perhaps we can start there before talking about the first premise.

How can we know, let's say philosophically, because I know there are scientific ways and philosophical ways to look at this. Philosophically speaking, how can we make that assertion that the universe began to exist? I do think that the second premise is the most controversial premise in the argument and therefore the one to which I've devoted the most attention. Historically, the second premise that the universe began to exist was supported by philosophical arguments. It wasn't until the 20th century that there was any sort of empirical evidence for the beginning of the universe. And as I looked at the various arguments that were offered historically for the beginning of the universe, the finitude of the past, it seemed to me that two of them stood out. One would be the argument based

on the impossibility of an actually infinite number of things in reality. And then the other would be the impossibility of forming an actually infinite collection of things by successive addition. These arguments are independent of each other, even if one fails, the other could still be sound. And so together, I think they provide very persuasive philosophical grounds for affirming the finitude of the past, and hence the beginning of the universe. Sure. So let's think about this. The difference between an actual and a potential infinite, which is the crucial distinction to make, as far as I understand it, is that an actual infinite is kind of... of what it says on the tin. It's an actually existing infinite number of things, as it were,

that actually exist in reality, whereas a potential infinite is something that contend towards infinity, such as dividing the space between two points on a ruler. You can divide that infinitely, but that doesn't mean that there are actually an infinite number of things between each point. Is that a fair analysis? Oh, that's exactly right, Alex. And the concept of the potential infinite dominated Western mathematics and philosophy until the 19th century when Georg Kantar,

a German mathematician, discovered the concept of the actual infinite. So the notion of a potential infinite plays its role in calculus, where we think of infinity as a limit which a process approaches but never arrives at, whereas the notion of the actual infinite finds its application in infinite set theory where mathematicians talk about sets that have an

actually infinite number of members in them. And it is absolutely crucial to distinguish these because one is not denying that the potential infinite can exist. The denial is that there can be an actual infinite in the real world. Sure. So there are two objections that to me can be deriving, from this idea of the distinction between the potential and actual infinite. The first is this. There's an argument to be made that potential infinites in some way assume the existence of actual infinites. For example, people think that if a potential infinite is something like two spaces, the space between two objects being infinitely divisible, that there are somehow an infinite number of divisions between those two points. And so although it's like,

although when you do the divisions, it tends towards infinity, the number of actual divisions, the number of halfway points or something like that, is an actually infinite number of things. So that would imply that actual infinites do exist in between any two spaces. What's the problem with that? The problem with that is that it is guilty of a modal operator shift. It is true that possibly a line is divided here and here and here and here. ad infinitum. But it doesn't follow that there is a place here and here and here and here where the line is possibly divided. That's two different claims. And I would say that a line is not

a composition of points, that the line is logically prior to any points that you specify on it. And that therefore, the possibility of potentially infinite processes does not imply an actually infinite number of points. To assume that a line is a composition of points is to already beg the question in favor of the existence of an actually infinite number of things. Sure. So to flesh this out, let's think of a more concrete example. I'm thinking of the example of this paradox of the light bulb, which you've probably come across. This is how I'm kind of understanding the objection in its most strong form. You can imagine some kind of light bulb that is programmed to switch on and off at particular intervals. And it's programmed such that you

have a length of time, let's say, you know, 10 minutes, that once half the remaining time has elapsed, the switch gets hit, right? So it starts off. And halfway between the kind of of time elapsing, the light bulb gets turned on, and then halfway between the remaining time, it gets turned off, and halfway between the remaining time, then it gets turned off. And obviously, the on and off switch is increasing in speed in terms of how quickly it's going on and off. Now, the reason that this is an interesting point to raise is that by the time the actual time has elapsed, it seems that you actually have a substantiation, a thing that has actually happened, an infinite number of times. And we have to answer the question of whether

the light bulb would be on and off at the end of the question, but the kind of real question, the real interesting part is relevant to this discussion, is that if you had such a programmed light bulb, it would seem not just that you've kind of got a potentially divisible, potentially infinitely divisible space, but that an actual infinite number of things has happened in a finite amount of time. Yes, this is a paradox known as Thompson's lamp after the author who invented it. And the question that Thompson was raising is, at the end of the process, will the light be on or off? And there's no answer to that question, because there is no causally prior state immediately prior to the final state of the lamp after it's gone through

the process. And so my argument would be that Thompson's lamp is absurd, that it cannot exist because there will be a causal gap between the states of the lamp in the series of switchings and the state of the lamp after the switchings are complete. There is no immediate causally connected state prior to that last state, and therefore the state of the lamp at that last state would be literally uncaused, which I think is metaphysically absurd. Sure, so from this are we supposed to take that the lamp couldn't be programmed in such a way? I mean, it seems like it doesn't break any kind of, on the surface, I mean, any kind of logical or

metaphysical rule to say that you could have such a program, but you seem to be implying that because of the conclusion it leads to, we should kind of go back and then judge that actually that couldn't be programmed in such a way. Well, I would say that metaphysically it is impossible because of what I just said about this causal seizura, so to speak, between the states of the lamp in the switching series and the state of the lamp after the switching series is ended. But it's also scientifically impossible as well. Nobody has thought there could really be such a thing because once you get down to certain quantum distances, it's impossible to switch the lamp on and off anymore. The thing is

purely a thought experiment. It's not meant to be something that's physically real. And so this wouldn't have any impact upon contemporary science. Contemporary science has no use whatsoever for the actual infinite. Contemporary science operates purely on the basis of potential infinities. Sure. And perhaps it raises the question of whether or not there is such a thing as a minimal interval of time, which I know is an open question. Yes. Yes. We should press the reason this is important to the argument, I mean, to the kalam, is that essentially we're trying to address the idea that the universe could have been eternal, because this is one of the atheists escape groups many of the time. It's to just say, well, look, yes, maybe there needs to be some kind of explanation for the causes that caused everything, but what if that just goes back eternally and the universe is eternal?

And what you're trying to demonstrate here is that the universe can't be eternal because it leads to logical absurdities. Oh, not logical, Alex, I would say metaphysical. There's no logical contradiction in the notion of the actual infinite. Infinite set theory is a well-understood branch of mathematics. It's perfectly consistent and coherent, but I maintain that when you try to instantiate it in the world of the real, the thing that leads to these absurdities. And the Thompson-Lamp illustration is an example of that second argument that I mentioned

for the finitur to the past. the impossibility of forming an actually infinite collection by successive addition, like switchings on and off of a lamp. Sure. So this is why we can talk about the concept of infinity in mathematical literature, but that shouldn't give us reason to think that it can be substantiated in such a way that would affect the argument, right? Yes, that's right. In mathematics, there are just all sorts of entities.

For example, imaginary numbers and infinite dimensional spaces and so forth that cannot be physically instantiated, but they're perfectly consistent logically. Okay, so the second objection that this raises and why it's important is that you can ask the question if an actually infinite number of things or number of events or something like that is impossible to be real in the sense that we're using the term real. Does God not count as an actual infinite? Now, it's important to understand here, Alex, that this is not an objection to either premise. It would just show that the theist is going to have a problem too, but it doesn't do anything to refute the argument. Now, theists are typically, well, not

typically, universally held that God is not composed of parts. God is not an aggregate of definite and discrete elements that make up a collection. And therefore, the notion of God's infinity is not a mathematical notion. It's not a quantitative motion. It's a qualitative notion. It means things like God is perfectly holy, omniscient, omnipotent, timeless, timeless, spaceless, and so forth. All of those sort of qualitative attributes go to make up God's infinity, but the infinity of God is not a quantitative concept. Sure. The reason why I would have immediate trouble with this is thinking about, although the attributes of God that you mention are qualitatively infinite, there may be some room for applying quantitative infinites. For instance, if God is not dormant, right? If God is not just a kind of impersonal being that sits there doing nothing, we have an image of God that does things, that intervenes, that creates universes at particular times, but not at others, would imply that perhaps you could ascribe to God something.

like an infinite series of events in terms of an infinite number of actions that he's caused, unless there's some point beyond which God is dormant. I don't see why you can't apply the same reasoning to say that if God commits actions, then God has committed an actually infinite set of actions. What you're raising here, Alex, is the very interesting question of God's relationship to time. And as you explained so well, if there is a series of successive events in God's life, then the same arguments against the infinitude of the past would apply to God that apply to the universe. And therefore, the classic proponents of this argument, like Al-Hazali, argue that there is a beginning of time and that God existing beyond the universe, not before it,

not before time, but beyond time, is timeless. And unchanging. and perfect, and that therefore the arguments are inapplicable to God because God doesn't have a past. So anticipating this reply, I was thinking about the concept of the afterlife and how the reason why it's not problematic to say that the afterlife is infinite is because that seems to be a potential infinite, right? Because it starts at a certain point and tends towards infinity, but there isn't already an existing kind of infinite set of days or something in heaven. the afterlife. The problem I see is reconciling that with what you've just said, which is that God exists not kind of infinitely for an infinite amount of time, but outside of time itself. My understanding of the afterlife is somehow being with God, right? And so if the afterlife is being with God in an infinite kind of way, doesn't that mean that the afterlife is a kind of

actual infinite? Or is a kind of, rather than a potential infinite? I think what it implies, Alex, rather, is that God is in time. The view that I defend is a rather novel hybrid view, but I think it's the best view, and that is that when God creates time, he enters into time in virtue of his real causal relationship with temporal changing things,

and in virtue of his knowledge of tense, facts like what time it is now. So on the view I defend, God is timeless, saws creation, but in time from creation going forward on into the afterlife. Sure. And it's important that you say sans creation rather than before creation because that doesn't have much sense. It's like talking about before the Big Bang or something like that. Who was it that said that that's like asking what's north of the North Pole, right? It's just a contradictory notion. But does that imply that in order to accept all of the assumptions that you're making, or the arguments that you're making, I should say,

that although the afterlife is a kind of being with God, it's not being with God in his kind of timeless state. You are still confined to time in the afterlife in some way. So there's still, how would we understand it? Is there still like a part of God that's outside of the afterlife? No, no, I don't think so. I think God enters into time. He takes on a temporal mode of existence.

at the creation of the world. So that when God creates the first moment of time, he enters into time and thereafter has the temporal mode of existence. So I think God exists right now. I think that in the incarnation, God entered into human history in the person of Christ, and that in the afterlife, we will enjoy what the Bible calls, everlasting life with God and with his son, Jesus Christ.

Which implies potential infinity because everlasting is a kind of ongoing process. So does that mean that when we say God is timeless, as I've heard you say a number of times, we kind of mean that he was timeless, a part of him is timeless, but now is a temporal being, something like that? Well, here, it's so easy to be tricked by language. Right. And I think what we have to say is that God is timeless saun's creation and in time subsequent to creation.

And that is a non-contradictory way of stating it. Is that non-contradictory? Because the way I'm thinking of it is God sans creation is timeless. And so God kind of exists eternally as a timeless being. somehow in the same breath exists as a temporal being as well? So is temporal and non-temporal? No, because there is no time. Sans creation, this is a timeless, spaceless existence, and time and space come into being

at the moment of creation, which I would identify for the sake of simplicity with the Big Bang, with t equals zero, the first moment of time. Sure. So when we talk about, so it doesn't make sense to talk about God creating the universe at a point in time, right? Say again. It doesn't make sense to talk about God creating the universe at a point in time. Well, let me modify what I said. I shared with you my understanding, what I think is the best view. But there are certainly other theist philosophers who hold different views of God and time. For example, Richard Swinburne, Alan Padgett, John Lucas, hold to a view of God existing literally prior to creation, but in a sort of non-metric time

that is to say a time in which you cannot distinguish successive intervals of duration so that there is no point a million years prior to the moment of creation. There is no point one hour before creation. There is this kind of amorphous time that is pre-creation time, but it's not metric. It doesn't have a metric to it that enables you to distinguish intervals of varying duration. So there is that view out there. That's not my own view, but I want to say there are a number of options open to theists. It's not as though the Kalam argument commits you to a certain view of God in time.

Other theists would maintain that God is timeless, just simpliciter, that God never enters into time. I disagree with them, but there are the theists who would hold to that, and that would be consistent with the Kalam argument as well. Sure. The reason I think this is important is because I know it's not strictly the conclusion of the Kalama, or maybe you think it is, but I've heard you talk in the past about how once we identify that there's a cause to the universe, we can say that it's a personal cause, let's say, because of the fact, and I may be misunderstanding here, but my interpretation was that it has to kind of do something to create a universe, right? And if an infinite being creates a finite thing, that doesn't seem to make sense unless the, the being can change its nature in some sense. But how can we understand this outside of the idea of time, right? Because when I first heard that kind of line of thought, I was thinking, well, are we saying there's an infinitely existing being who, because at some point in time creates the universe, something must change and therefore it must be a kind of conscious

decision-making cause. Without time, I don't see how that jump can be made. I wouldn't express it exactly the way you did, but I think that you're in the ball. part. The problem here is how do you get a cause with the beginning, pardon me, how do you get an effect with the beginning from a cause which is permanent? Yes. If the cause is truly sufficient for its effect, then if the cause is there permanently, the effect ought to be there permanently. How in the world do you have a permanent cause, but in the fact that only begins to exist a finite time ago. And it seems to me that the best answer to that question is that the cause is a personal agent endowed with free will, because free will can initiate

new effects without antecedent determining conditions. And so what I would say is that this timelessly existing free agent freely wills to create the universe, And therefore, time comes into being at that moment and this being enters into time at that moment. So this is the problem I'm having is you say he wills the universe into being at that moment. But how can he make sense of a term like at that moment if this being is timeless? Because as you say, if it's an infinite being, the question is if that cause is sufficient and infinite, then the effect should also be infinite, implying that there was no sufficiency up to a certain point. But how can you talk about points with no time?

This is a great question. And the question here you're raising is, which one is explanatorily prior? God's decision to create the world is simultaneous with the origin of the world. They're at the same moment, the first moment of time. So which is explanatorily prior? Is it the moment of time? And it is at that moment that God chooses? or is it rather that God makes a free choice, and therefore that is the first moment of time?

And I would say it's the latter. God's free choice is explanatorily prior to the existence of the first moment of time, because in the absence of some sort of an event, there would be no time. It would just be timelessness. You need something to happen in order for time to exist. And what happens is that God freely chooses to create the universe. So it's all about explanatory priority here. So the insufficiency of the cause before, let's say, it's the wrong language, but before the universe exists,

the insufficiency of the cause, which means that it hasn't existed yet, is prior in explanation rather than prior in time? Well, what I'm trying to say is that what you call the insufficiency of the cause is due to the fact that the free will of this being has not chosen to create the universe. This being has not made such a decision, but the instant that such a decision is made, time comes into being. Indeed, the decision is explanatorily prior to the first instant of time. Yeah. When you say the free, it's because of the freedom of the being and the free being hasn't

made the decision, it feels like that it's begging for the word yet to be on the end of that. It hasn't made the decision yet, you know, but it's like we're carefully avoiding that language because of the complications of time, but it seems like the explanation that you're giving, it It feels to me like naturally it invokes a sense of time. I still don't quite see how it works without time. Well, you just have to be very careful if you're going to be philosophically precise to use tenseless verbs in your sentences and not use temporal particles like before or yet and things of that sort.

And I think that we can avoid those and make coherent statements. For example, I said, sans the universe. God exists timelessly. That's a tenseless verb. Songs the universe, God does not freely choose to create the universe. So I think that these statements can be correctly made if we just watch our tenses and our adverbs. Sure.

So I should say to the listeners, I'm going to leave resources and writing that Dr. Craig has has made on these points, because there's no way you can get to the bottom of them in a podcast like this. But the reason that I wanted to kind of talk about this for a little bit was because of the fact that one of the objections that has been made, and I think I've made it in the past, is this idea that, yeah, the Kalam cosmological argument gets you a cause of the universe, but it doesn't get you something resembling a god. But here, what we're doing is we're trying to show that in order, if we kind of admit that there is a cause of the universe that's

outside of the universe and is therefore timeless, eternal, infinite, whatever it may be, that it does in fact have to be personal. It does in fact have to have free will in some form of consciousness. And so the calam actually does imply a type of cause, not just a cause. I think that's, does that make sense? Well, it does to me. This is Al-Hazali's argument for the personhood, personhood of the cause of the universe. This isn't original with me. It's in Al-Hazali's work. And when I first read I thought this is absolutely brilliant. This is the only way that you can get a temporal effect with the beginning from a permanent cause.

It's if you've got an agent endowed with freedom of the will who can choose to do something without antecedent determining conditions. And since that time, Alex, I've enunciated two other arguments for the personhood of the creator, one from Richard Swinburne. based upon the distinction between personal explanations and scientific explanations, and then another based upon the causal power of the cause of the universe. An unembodied mind is the best candidate for a timeless, spaceless, immaterial cause of the universe. So I've got three arguments all leading to the same conclusion that the cause of the universe is a personal unembodied mind, which is very close to a theistic concept. Sure. So what we've kind of covered then, and those points, again, I'll leave resources down below people to explore.

I don't want to spend too much time on the same point or same objection. What we've shown here is that there's philosophical reasons. at least, to think that the universe began to exist. That's the second premise. And there's philosophical reason to think that if the, if the conclusion does hold, that the cause is a personal cause that's probably best described as God. So I want to discuss the first premise, because a lot of the time in the literature, as far as I can see, people think that this is the kind of, this is the kind of obvious one. It's the kind of, well, come on, of course, everything that begins to exist has a cause. Now, let's not say there is an argumentation behind it,

But it seems like people are just far more willing to accept it as intuitively true. Have you found the same thing? Well, actually, Alex, that's what I think. When I first enunciated the Kalam cosmological argument, to me, the first premise is a no-brainer. I thought anybody who is intellectually honest will agree to the first premise. And so I have been amazed, frankly, at the number of non-theists who are willing to admit that the universe began to exist. I think they're impressed with the scientific evidence for the beginning of the universe and therefore bite the bullet and say the universe came into being uncaused from nothing. And to me, that is just a compromise of intellectual integrity, to be honestly.

Yeah, I mean, to be clear, if a person accepts the second premise that the universe began to exist, and that includes, you know, a lot of people will want to say, well, the Big Bang wasn't the beginning of everything, but whatever was before the Big Bang would just be part of the universe as we're talking about it. Right, right. If we accept that premise, then the listener needs to bear in mind that the only way to deny the conclusion is to, as you say, bite the bullet and say that something at least that begins to exist doesn't have a cause. And this fact drove a lot of the resistance to Big Bang cosmology during the 20th century. People like Fred Hoyle, the proponent of the steady state model, was very explicit that it is metaphysically absurd what the Big Bang theory says, that the universe came into being without a cause at some point in the past. He said, this is impossible.

There's got to be something before it. And so he adopted or propounded his steady state theory. And we had oscillating theories, vacuum fluctuation theories, all sorts of alternatives to try to avoid that beginning. Because I think quite rightly, these theorists see that if the universe truly began to exist, it would be a metaphysical absurdity to say it just came into existence uncaused. An interesting piece of trivia. Fred Hoyle is, of course, the man who coined the Big Bang theory, but he did so majoratively. He was on a radio show, and he said, well, this big bang theory.

He was making fun of it, and that's where we get the name from. But let's talk about this. So on your website, Reasonable Faith, because I do do my research, I found you gave three justifications for this first premise, reminding the listeners, the first premise is everything that begins to exist has a cause. Now, the three justifications you give with a bit of explanation, but just the first line is, firstly, that something cannot come from nothing. Secondly, that if something can come from nothing, then it is inexplicable why just anything and everything doesn't come into existence from nothing, or come into being from nothing. And the third point is, and I quote, common experience and scientific evidence confirm the truth of premise one.

What kind of common experience are you talking about when you say that? Everyday experience, scientific experience, we always look for causes of events, that's the whole project of science, and we never come across things coming into being uncaused. Now, immediately people will think about quantum indeterminacy, that there seem to be events that on at least the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics are uncaused. But two things here need to be said. The argument is very carefully worded. It does not say every event has a cause. It says everything that begins to exist has a cause. So the argument is quite consistent with quantum indeterminacy and there being uncaused events.

What it says is that there can't be things, substances, that come. come into being without a cause. And then the second thing that I would say is that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum indeterminacy is by no means the only or the most plausible interpretation of quantum mechanics. There are at least 10 different physical interpretations of the equations of quantum mechanics, and some of these are as fully deterministic as non-quanty theory, so that it's not a proven counter example in any case. Yes, which is something, again, listeners should bear in mind. I do hear

a lot of people I want to reference quantum physics, which is famously not very well understood. So we've got to be careful when we try to do that kind of thing. Yeah, I have a friend who says that the quantum mechanics is sort of the trump card that a lot of people like to play. They don't understand it. But they just say, well, if quantum mechanics can be like that, then any absurdity can happen. Yeah. It's just, it just shows really a lack of understanding of the theory. Now, it's not to say that there aren't very well-thought-out arguments related to quantum physics

in kind of, in relation to the discussion we're having, but you are right that a lot of the time you do hear it from people who are, as you say, using it as a trump card. I've experienced that myself. But there's a kind of, there was an inconsistency that I found, which I was struggling with, or an apparent inconsistency when I was reading your points on the kalam. And it's on this point, right? Because on the one hand, you say, if things can come into existence without a cause, then why wouldn't it be happening all the time, right? Why wouldn't a horse or an Eskimo village, as you say, just pop into existence out of nothing, right? Why don't we observe that? Now, holding that in mind, in the Blackwell Companion to Natural theology, you are talking about this quantum idea that quantum mechanics, It gives us evidence of something coming from nothing, essentially.

And your response to that is to say this. You say popularizes touting such theories as getting something from nothing, that is quantum mechanics, apparently do not understand that the vacuum is not nothing, but a sea of fluctuating energy endowed with a rich structure and subject to physical laws. Such models do not, therefore, involve a true origination ex nihilo, okay? So, help me out here. But you say that quantum mechanics isn't an example of something coming from nothing, because it doesn't come from nothing. But then you say, well, if something could come from nothing, why wouldn't a horse pop into being?

Well, my thought is that if we did observe a horse popping into being in my living room, that similarly wouldn't be out of nothing, right? Because my living room isn't nothing. Oh, all right. Now, here we're talking about whether there's an efficient cause for that. Remember Aristotle distinguished between several different kinds of causes, efficient, material, formal, and so forth. And when I talk about whatever begins to exist as a cause, I'm thinking of efficient causes. There needs to be something that brings it into being. I don't think it has to have a material cause, but there does need to be at least an efficient cause that brings it into being.

Now, with respect to quantum mechanics, the point there is that certain popularizers of modern science, like Lawrence Krause, love to say that in quantum mechanics you have theories by which the universe comes into being out of nothing. And in fact, that's just not the case. You have a physical state of affairs, which is either a quantum vacuum, a field of fluctuating energy or these are quantum physical fields described by physical laws. And these physical states of affairs can reconfigure themselves so as to produce particles or the universe. And so there definitely are causes in this case for the universe or the particles coming into being.

Yeah, Lawrence Krause, his book, A Universe from Nothing, is a fantastic overview of cosmological science. But I hear this a lot of the time, too, people say, well, you know, you talk about something coming from nothing, but nothing isn't really nothing. And if that's the case, then we're not talking about the same thing here. I agree with you on that point. Have you read the review in the New York Review of Books of Krause's book, A Universe from Nothing? I'm sure did. David Albert. the philosopher of quantum physics, David Albert, wrote a review of Krause's book,

and it just is excoriating for the sloppiness of Krause's use of the term nothing. I have read that review. I think I read it in preparation to talk to Lawrence Krauss, who I know follows me on Twitter, so I'll be careful what I say about him here and how much I agree with you on the sloppiness of his work. But, yeah, it's worth bearing in mind that we're talking about two different things here. When a philosopher is talking about nothing, they mean, as Aristotle said, what rock stream of? They mean nothing, right?

And so if there's some kind of quantum soup or something, then that is not actually nothing. But here's how I like to put it, Alex. Nothing. The word nothing, even though it's a pronoun, it's not a referring term. Right. It's not a singular term. It's a universal quantifier. It's a negative quantifier.

It means not anything. So if I say I had nothing. for lunch, that is saying, I did not have anything for lunch. Because if you don't make that careful distinction and you think of nothing of something that can be spoken about, you can make arguments like in A.C. Grayling's history of philosophy, he puts forward the argument, nothing is brighter than the sun, a candle is brighter than nothing, therefore a candle is brighter than the sun, right? But clearly, the point being raised here is that when we talk about nothing, we have to be clear

that, as you say, we're talking about a kind of existential qualifier. We're saying no thing, not the existence of nothing. Universal qualifier, yes, that's right. Okay. Which shows again the importance of philosophy of language in dealing with even scientific issues. Yeah. But on that point of equivocating terms where perhaps they shouldn't be, I'm intrigued because a lot of the time people will say, now I'm not sure if this is an argument you would make, but this is what my article was on, my essay was on, about the, the begging the question of the kalam.

Now, some people have said, now, when you refer to common experience, I thought you might have meant something like, anytime we see something beginning to exist, it appears to have a course. That's a common experience that a lot of people will refer to. They say, look, you can never have something that begins to exist, me beginning to exist, a chair beginning to exist that doesn't have a course. But of course, the important point here for me was that the kind of beginning to exist we need to talk about in order for the calam to hold, in order to get our conclusion, is beginning to exist from nothing, surely. Whereas a chair doesn't begin to exist from nothing. A chair begins to

exist from pre-existing material. And yes, although it makes sense to say the chair exists now and didn't exist an hour ago, what we really mean is that the material that the chair is made out of has rearranged itself or being rearranged in such a way that we now arbitrarily give it the label of a chair, but nothing has actually begun to exist. Oh, oh, Alex, I think that's just a, well, as you say, that's included in my list of arguments so bad I couldn't. Just think of your own self. You began to exist. It is absurd to think that you existed before your father's sperm and mother's egg united in conception for you to begin to exist.

You didn't exist during the Jurassic period. You didn't exist during the era of galaxy formation. You began to exist about 18 years ago in this conception event. And so don't think that beginning to exist is something that is subverted by its having a material cause. I explicate what it means to begin to exist by saying x begins to exist at t if x exists at t and t is the first time at which x exists and that is fulfilled for the chair and yourself and other things that begin to exist and the point is that when we look at the things that begin to exist we have a tremendous inductive argument that everything that begins to exist so defined has a cause.

It's hard to think of an inductive generalization that could be more strongly supported than that. This is where we have to be careful about language to make sure the point gets across. As glad as I am that it's meaningful to say that I wasn't around to witness my parents' conception. I think that when we say it's kind of absurd, yes. that, you know, I existed in the Jurassic period or something. What I'm being careful to say here is that everything that I made of existed at that time.

Yeah, right, fair enough. And so when we talk about beginning to exist in the sense of the common experience in order to justify premise one, we're talking about beginning to exist conceptually, beginning to exist as an arrangement, something like this, right? We're not talking about actual matter becoming instantiated or something like that. Well, I don't think that it's necessarily just a matter of arrangement. I mean, take fundamental particles, for example, like electrons or quarks. They're not arrangements of anything, because they are fundamental particles.

You're raising an issue here as to whether or not there are composite objects, things that are arrangements of simples, that are themselves not arrangements of anything. And there are certainly these sorts of fundamental particles. But more to the point, Alex, would be that the definition I gave of begins to exist, namely X begins to exist at T. If X exists at T and T is the first time at which X exists, it's irrelevant whether or not X is a fundamental thing that is not an arrangement of prior materials or whether it is.

Either one of those fulfills that definition. Perhaps I can explain why I'm having trouble with this as pertains to something like a chair, which is that it seems to me that designating when that pointee is, is an arbitrary measure that we make subjectively, right? If you have a collection of wood and you kind of begin forming it into a chair, you could say, well, look, it's not a chair right now. Maybe if I bend this little bit like this and hammering that now, now it's a chair. It seems like to say this is the point tee at which the chair now exists

is an arbitrary subjective notion that we've kind of placed upon an object. It's not actually intrinsic to the object itself. Well, I do think that that's a good point. I would say an even better example would be a building, like a skyscraper. When does that actually begin to exist? But there are plenty of things that aren't like that, like yourself. I think it's very clear when you began to exist. And even with respect to the chair or the building, we don't need to specify time. T as an instant. Time T can be any interval of time. It could be 1970, for example. So this building began to exist in 1970, if the building existed in 1970, and 1970 was the first time at which

it existed. So don't think that the time at which something begins to exist needs to be to finally specify, because as you say, there's will be some vagueness as to when it actually begins. But at the same time... With regard to the universe, though, this is all academic, because there is a very precise time which the universe begins to exist. Well, I'm trying to move towards a distinction between the universe beginning to exist and things like chairs beginning to exist and in order to show why perhaps they don't

support each other. Let's say, you know, you have a skyscraper and you don't know particularly what time it begins to exist, but you could say that it's a period of time instead, still it seems that the notion of beginning to exist, as we're talking about it as pertains to chairs and skyscrapers, is not something, is not an attribute of the thing, but an attribute of us. It's an attribute of the people observing it and giving it a label. The fact that a piece of wood becomes a chair is not something so much true of the wood, but as it is true of us, because nothing about the actual material really changes.

in such a way that's meaningful, except as we decide that it's meaningful. Boy, I think that's a kind of anti-realist view of reality that I would have grave reservations about, that the chair is some kind of a mental construct that you make. That certainly wouldn't apply in any case to fundamental particles or things that we don't think about. I mean, for example, there was a time at which Tyrannosaurus wrecks began to exist. And if you go back far enough, there were no Tyrannosaurus rex prior to that.

And this has nothing to do with my conceiving of it. Well, I mean, so this is actually a quite helpful example, talking about species. So take the species of homo sapiens, right? I mean, it seems to me clearly that although it makes sense to say that, you know, there was a point at which human beings existed and a point, say, you know, 50,000 years before that where human beings didn't exist. Right. But clearly, Clearly, the coming into existence of this species homo sapiens is something that we have put upon it. Okay. Now, granted, when I said Tyrannosaurus Rex, I was thinking of a dinosaur, a flesh and blood

organism. I wasn't thinking of a species. And similarly with Homo sapiens, I agree with you. It isn't clear at all what is to be classed as Homo sapiens. They're all kind of hominids that it's very difficult to classify. But nevertheless, if you go back in time far enough, for example, one million BC, there weren't any human beings around at that point. Human beings began to exist sometime later, and that's an objective fact that has nothing to do with our conceptions. Well, allow me to try putting the same statement you just made in different words.

You said there's a human beings began to exist. What if I said something like, because we both agreed a moment ago that the matter that makes up human beings already existed, even if the human beings didn't. What if I said something like the matter which exists arranged itself in such a way that we would label homo sapiens, right? That seems to me the same thing as saying that the homo sapiens began to exist. Uh-huh. Well, if we would label it correctly, but there is an objective fact here, it doesn't begin to exist in virtue of our labeling it. The reason we label it as a homo sapiens or as a human being is because you have an organism that is recognizably human. It's not reptilian, it's not amphibian, this is a hominin that is endowed with certain kinds of mental and behavioral capacities that we would count as human.

And the beginning of existence of that thing is explored by paleontologists and paleoanthropologists just wholly independently of us. I think I've hit on our disagreement then, which seems to be that you would say that we call a homo sapien a new object that begins to exist, a new thing, because it begins to exist. Whereas I would say that conceptually it begins to exist because we've decided to call it a homo sapiens. It's kind of the reverse, right? I think that's the disagreement we're having. Yeah. Well, this gets into this question again that I mentioned whether or not you think there are really composite objects or not. And however you come down on that,

there are going to be certain entities that are not composite objects, like fundamental particles, like electrons and quarks and so forth. And I would say persons like yourself. And these provide clear-cut examples of things that exist that are not just arrangements of prior matter and therefore don't have any objective reality. Well, okay, so the reason why I wanted to make this argument is to try and get across the point that I feel that the only thing

that, if anything, has meaningfully begun to exist, the only thing that would fulfill that criterion would be the universe itself, because everything within the universe that begins to exist begins to exist in a conceptual sense only is the argument that I was trying to make, but clearly you disagree with that. Yes, right.

I suppose... And I think, I mean, I mean, you're talking here about a view that is, and I hate to get technically, it's called myriological nihilism. Yes. That is to say that there are no composite objects. Essentially, yes. But even myriological neilists recognize that there are fundamental particles that are

not composites. They're not aggregates of things. And some, like Peter Van Inwagon, would say that living things like horses and, you know, and humans and persons are also not just aggregates of material because they are alive and therefore have a kind of unity to their being that goes beyond being merely an aggregate of material things. So I think the person is going to take the line of myriological nealism, well, it's worse than myriological nealism.

I mean, he has to say that there are no fundamental objects. Well, I'm not sure that's the case. For instance, if we accept that fundamental particles exist, and what we mean by fundamental particles are simply things that can't be broken down any further. And so what we mean when we say beginning to exist is a rearrangement of fundamental particles in such a way that it gives rise to arbitrary labeling

as a new object, right? So that's the kind of view that I would take. Not that there aren't composite things, but that everything that begins to exist is just an arrangement of composite things. All right, that's not, you mean arrangement of fundamental things? Yes. If you break it down far enough, yes. Right. Yes, okay.

And that would be a consistent view. It's a very radical view. One that I wouldn't hold. I can't see any good reason to be a myriological nealist. But in any case, I don't. don't think that that would subvert the argument for the universe beginning to exist. Right. Because in that case, you can rephrase the argument, not such that the universe began

to exist, but you can say all fundamental particles began to exist. Sure. But then do you see how that just completely undermines the idea of the common sense experience of things beginning to exist? Because although it may make philosophical sense to talk about fundamental particles, beginning to exist, we wouldn't be able to say something like, we've observed it happening. Oh, no, I think that's not right, Alex. What it requires is a modification of the second premise, not the first.

The first premise that whatever begins to exist has a cause would remain intact. It's just that on the myriological nihilist view, very, very few things begin to exist, because they don't exist. There are no people. There are no horses. There are no skyscrapers. There are no chairs. But if you reformulate the second premise so that it states not, the universe began to exist,

but all the fundamental particles began to exist, you get the same conclusion. Okay. So perhaps I can explain why, because you say it's at least a consistent worldview. Let me try and explain why I thought this would beg the question when it came to the calam, was because if we accept the view that everything that begins to exist as we observe it in the world, let's say, is not actually beginning to exist in the meaningful sense. It's just a rearrangement of pre-existing matter. And ultimately, the furthest you can break it down as to fundamental particles, but those existed since the beginning of the universe, meaning that, in other words,

in the meaningful sense, the only thing that began to exist was the universe, right? Now, the reason this is a problem is because to beg the question is to accept the first premise only by virtue of already having granted the conclusion. Now, if the first premise is everything that begins to exist has a cause, but the only thing that truly begins to exist in the sense we want to talk about is the universe, then the first premise just becomes the universe has a cause, which is identical to the conclusion. No, it just means that the universe would be the only instance of that first premise.

I want your listeners to understand how radical the, view is that you're expressing here, it's not just that things don't begin to exist. It's rather that these things don't exist at all. There are no such things as chairs and planets and people and skyscrapers. None of these things actually exist, and that's why they don't begin to exist. The only thing that begins to exist would be these fundamental particles. And so, So this is a, I mean, you can take that line if you want, but it's really a radical view. Because I know that I exist. I think Descartes is quite right about that.

If there's one thing, I can't doubt it's that I exist. And I began to exist. So I think this is not, you know, this is sort of like an academic way to try to escape the argument, but it's not a plausible solution, the person who really is looking for truth. The two observations I'd make is potentially first to say that on the Cartesian view, yes, you can know you exist, but I'm not sure you could therefore know that you began to exist, but just on the Cartesian view. Fair enough. But, and secondly, and kind of important here is that you say that by denying that things begin to exist, I deny that things exist. I would rather frame it as saying something like the limits of an object and for people who are listening, what I mean by that are the boundaries of the thing, the thing that make it that thing as opposed to something.

else, right? The, the definitional boundary that you put around that thing is not a property of the thing, but a property of us in a way, right? So it does exist conceptually. So I can make sense of saying, here is a book, but what I'm saying is that my calling this a book and my saying that this has boundary such that this is a book and this other thing over here is not that book is a product of my mind, right? But it's like, it does. conceptually exist. However, the actual boundary itself is an arbitrary one. It's a mind-dependent reality. That's why I said this is a sort of anti-realism that I'm extremely implausible. You're saying that you construct reality by imagining these boundaries,

but these are not mind-independent realities. If there were no people, there would be no books and planets and galaxies and stars. Yeah, it's a strange line of thought. I would say that calling it something like anti-realism might be misleading because of the fact that I wouldn't say that nothing exists independent of the mind, right? I'm not saying that things existing or other, you know, existence is a product of the mind. What I'm saying is that categorizing that which exists into independent objects is a product of the mind, right?

Right, except for fundamental particles, which themselves began at the beginning of the universe. Those would be the only mind-independent realities on this myriological nihilist view that we just conceptually set boundaries to things, and so construct the world of objects around us. Yeah, I think one thing I've learned is how radical the view is that I hold, because I think you're probably writing the implications, and I hadn't considered that. to the fullest extent before, that if I'm going to say something like things only begin to exist as a rearrangement of pre-existing matter and the beginning to exist is an arbitrary metric we put on it, that the only thing that exists definitionally as an independent

object, mind independently, are fundamental particles. And everything else that exists as kind of individually discernible objects are mind-dependent, which is a really interesting radical implication of my view that I'll give some thought, and for my listeners, I'll try and write an explication on that view. So if you do take that view, this sort of ideological neelism, then you're right. We wouldn't have any inductive examples of things that begin to exist. The first premise would still be true that whatever begins to exist has a cause, but we wouldn't have any examples of things that begin to exist other than these fundamental

particles. We've still got all of those to deal with, and that's fine, but you wouldn't be able to, as you say, appeal to your common experience on this view. Yeah, so this is why... So that's a fair point. And this is why I thought it begged the question was because, and I guess the implications are more radical now that I think about it, but the reasoning I was thinking of was, well, if the only thing that ever really began to exist was the universe, then, as you say, that the first premise, although it doesn't become the conclusion, it means that the only kind of, the only thing which begins to exist is the universe. So when we say everything that begins to exist has a cause, the only example we can think of is the universe. And so by

saying the first premise, you're essentially believing that because you believe the universe has a course. Oh, no, no. Now there I think that's a mistake, Alex. I have actually reformulated the Kalam cosmological argument to make it more modest by rephrasing the first premise in the following way. If the universe began to exist, then the universe has a cause. Second premise, the universe began to exist, therefore the universe has a cause. So that statement of the argument would be fully in line with myriological nihilism. If the universe began to exist, the universe has a cause. Or if the fundamental particles began to exist, then they have a cause, et cetera, et cetera. So it would just mean that it's not begging the question. It would just

mean that you couldn't use this sort of inductive argument that I appealed to. Quite right. As you point out in your series about objections and about the objection of circularity in particular, you say, well, arguments don't beg the question people. beg the question, right? And so I would agree with you that if you reformulate the kalam, or even if you keep it in the original form but use a different justification, you're not begging the question. My essay was just trying to make the point that if you justify it in that inductive manner, it seems to me that you're begging the question. Well, I'll agree with you that the inductive argument wouldn't work if you have

this kind of myriological nihilism. And then I would fall back on the two, metaphysical arguments, which for me are the most important as opposed to the inductive argument. So the kind of other justification that you might give and the one that I found really interesting was saying if things can come into existence out of nothing, that is if you deny the first premise, then why doesn't it happen all the time, right? Why don't things begin to exist out of nothing all the time? Now, my first thought was to say, how do we know that that they don't, right? Because to come into being out of nothing, would surely imply coming into existence not within the universe, because everything in the universe is not nothing, as we've said.

And so to come into being out of nothing, it would have to somehow come into being outside of the universe, and therefore we wouldn't observe it. So maybe it is happening all the time, but we wouldn't be able to observe it by definition. Here, I think you're making the same mistake that we talked about earlier when you spoke of the horse coming into being in the living room. I'm thinking that therefore it's not out of nothing. And what I explained there was that I'm saying without an efficient cause, that's what I mean by out of nothing.

So if things could come into being without an efficient cause, it seems inexplicable why things aren't just popping into existence all around us, things of different sorts, because they don't need efficient causes to bring them in. into being. This was an argument that A.N. Pryor developed, and I found it just completely convincing. So, let me, how can I, how can I put this? A horse, how about an argument like this? Now, I've, I've heard what I think might be this kind of line of argumentation from you before, but I don't want to put words in your mouth. So if someone were to say something like,

And it seems absurd on the surface, but if they said something like, well, what if it's the case that universes are the only thing which can come into being out of nothing, right? A horse can't come into being out of nothing, but there's something about the universe. And we already know that the universe is a special kind of something compared to everything within the universe. It seems to kind of have the, we need to think about it in a different way. Could we not say something like, well, maybe things do come into being all the time, except the only thing that come into being out of nothing is a. universe, and therefore we wouldn't be able to observe it? As Anne Pryor said, prior to its existence, the universe doesn't exist so as to constrain what can come into being or not.

So you can't say that only things of a certain kind can come into being without efficient causes because without their causes, there just isn't anything to constrain it. So I don't think that you can say that only certain kinds of things can come into being without efficient causes. Yeah, now the argument that I didn't want to put it in your mouth was one that I've heard elsewhere of people would say the argument that the reason you can't say that only universe can come into being out of nothing is because nothing doesn't have any properties, and so therefore can't have a kind of preference for universes over other things.

My response to that was to say, what if the necessity of it being a universe is not a property of the nothing, but a property of the thing? And let me explain myself, if, for example, if we human beings create a circle, it has to be round, right? We can't create a square circle. But that's not due to a property of us. That's due to a property of the circle, right? So in the same way, although nothing has no properties and so can't prefer universes, what if it can only, what if only universes can come from nothing because of a property of the universe, not because of a property of nothing?

Right. That is exactly what you would have to say, because as you say, properties only in here in existing things. beings have properties, not non-being. So it actually, it's an inherent property of the universe that it can spring into existence without a cause. And I just don't make sense of that. Which sounds absurd. Something that doesn't exist come into existence without a cause because it has a property

after it comes into existence. Yeah, I mean, it sounds strange, but the thing. the reason why I think it's useful to think in those terms, or at least of the possibility of it happening, is because specifically the objection that why don't things pop into existence all the time? I suppose what I'm trying to do is make at least a far-fetched case. I'm trying to show at least a possibility that things could come into existence out of nothing, and yet, by definition, we'd be incapable of witnessing it. So maybe things do come into existence out of nothing all the time. But because these are only universes, we'll never be able to observe

it. We'll never be able to see it. Let me commend you for your method, Alex, because by pushing these questions, what you help the atheist to see is the intellectual price tag of his atheism. And I think that's very valuable. One of the goals of the Christian apologist will be to try to raise the intellectual price tag of non-belief. And if

non-belief or non-theism requires me to be a myriological neelist, to think that things have an intrinsic property that they can come into being that other things don't have, this is all raising

the intellectual price tag of non-belief. For me, at least, Alex, just way, way beyond what I'm willing to pay. And so that's helpful that you're doing this. That is a really, really interesting way of thinking about apologetics and the argument that we're having is kind of like, you know, what's the better deal here, right? Because both worldviews seem at least consistent, but you've got to ask yourself, you know,

how much you're willing to sacrifice of your intuitions, how much you're willing to sacrifice of the beliefs that you think are true in order to hold to those conclusions. and the key point is taking the justifications that we're giving and showing what they lead to, right? Because a lot of people consider, well, this argument may allow this to be the case, but they don't think that if you accept that justification, it can also lead over here, and you don't want that, right? And so I think this demonstrates, this discussion has demonstrated that every time you think of a justification for a point you're trying to raise, you have to consider the implications of that justification

and the other areas of philosophy it causes you to sacrifice. That's a really, really fascinating way of thinking about it. And I think it's a great place to end this conversation. Thank you so much for having me on today. This has been an unexpectedly rich and thought-provoking conversation. I really enjoyed it. That's really wonderful to hear because I remember kind of wanting to have you on. And I didn't tell anybody that this will be released without my followers knowing before it happened.

But if I did tell them, they'd probably be saying, go and, yeah, go and do. go and debate him, go and show him what's what. And it's like, I would never, I'd never dream of trying to do that with someone of your caliber, uh, of your caliber. So I just wanted to kind of ask questions. Um, so I'm, I'm glad to hear that it, that it, that it's kind of led to this kind of conversation, especially it's, it's gone in directions I didn't think it would go in. Um, but it has been fascinating. And I think that it's definitely going to lead for some follow up, um, points that I want to make. So anybody listening to this, there's a good chance. I'll do some kind of video or some kind of essay on

some of the points that we've covered, because there's, it's just so many things flowing out of, so many implications flowing out of what we've spoken about. But as I say, listeners, just, I hope that you found this to be useful. I hope that it's good to listen to a conversation about something like the calam that isn't in a debate format, because it may be the case that you've never done so before. And I hope this is of use. Do leave comments if you have any kind of reactions to the stuff we've been talking about it. It's always good to keep the conversation going. remind you that everything that I do on this channel is supported by you on patreon.com forward slash cosmic skeptic. So if you like this kind of conversation, please do consider

becoming a supporter. But Dr. Craig, thank you again for coming on. It's been a real pleasure to have you. My pleasure. Okay. So as always, I've been Alex O'Connor with the Cosmic Skeptic podcast. And today, I've been in conversation with Dr. William Lane Craig. You know,