WRFH/Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM - Paul Rahe: Sparta’s Third Attic War

Episode Date: November 26, 2024

When the great war pitting the Athenians against the Peloponnesians first erupted, Pericles told his compatriots that, if they kept up their navy, focused on the conflict at hand, and refrained from wasting their resources on ulterior objects, they would “win through”—and Thucydides believed him. After Pericles’ death, however, to the historian’s dismay, the Athenians pursued risky adventures tangential to their struggle with the Spartans and their allies; and, in Sicily, thanks in large part to domestic strife, they squandered not one, but two great armadas. Then, in the aftermath of that catastrophe, they found themselves bereft of triremes and short of manpower—as a coalition formed against them including their Lacedaemonians rivals, their longtime allies in the Aegean, and the Great King of Achaemenid Persia.In Sparta’s Third Attic War, Paul Rahe examines the armed conflict that followed, attending to the impact of the internal struggles at Athens, Sparta, and the court of the Great King on its outcome; describing the maneuvers of the wily, flexible, seductive Athenian turncoat Alcibiades, who dominated in turn the counsels of the Spartans, the Persians, and his fellow Athenians; and charting the eventual emergence at Lacedaemon of a commanding figure of helot ancestry named Lysander, who formed a close relationship with the younger son of the Great King and, in battle, outwitted the Athenians at every turn. This is a story of grit, determination, and brilliance on both sides. It examines the ambivalence of the Spartans, it relates the folly that brought the Athenians down, and it traces their ultimate defeat to defects in the policy and vision of Pericles.

This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. I'm Aaron Osborne, and with me today is Dr. Paul Ray. To start things off, I wanted to know how Sparta's third Attic War fits in with the rest of your series on Spartac military history. The whole series is an attempt to chart the grand strategy of classical Sparta, its origin, and then the challenges it faces and how it copes with those challenges. The first challenge is the arrival of the Persians on the scene, which they cope with, in part by putting together coalition, including the Athenians, who in the process become a great naval power. The second challenge is posed by those Athenians. Yesterday's friend is tomorrow's enemy. and there you have a rivalry between a land power and a sea power that lasts for 60 years

from 465 to 404 BC and in the course of those 60 years there are three direct confrontations between the Spartans and the Athenians I call them the first Attic War the second Attic War and the third Attic War and there is another war, which I call Sparta's Sicilian proxy war, in which the Athenians attempt to conquer Sicily. And at the beginning of this attempt, they try to knock out Syracusa, the greatest city in Sicily.

And Spartans send one man, and that one man makes the difference in the war. This is Radio Free Hillsdale, 101.7. 7 FM, I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. So what can we learn from Sparta and its interactions with Athens and Syracuse? The larger point of this is to look at grand strategy as such, and to do it by dint of three examples. Sparta, Persia, and Athens. I am juxtaposing what I call grand strategy against realism. Okay, realism is a political science doctrine aimed at achieving the scientific study of war and peace.

I think the scientific study of war and peace is impossible. Why do you think realism is impossible? I don't think that can be done with human beings. What do they do? In fact, they presuppose that all powers of any consequence have one end, maximization of power. And on that basis, they propose to predict how they will conduct themselves. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. I believe you have to pay attention to something that all polities have in common. not the desire for the maximization of power, but the desire for security.

That's an absolute. Then you have to pay, in addition, attention to all of these other things that are deliberately ignored by the realists. Can you give us a modern example? So the realists would tell you we can easily reach an accommodation with Iran because their material interests dovetail with ours. They abstract from and utterly ignore the religious character of the revolution that took place in Iran in the late 1970s

and the early 1980s. And the profound hostility of Shiite Islam in the form created by Khomeini to us. So in my view, any attention, to reach an accommodation with Iran, it's going to blow up in our faces. And it should be obvious to everyone. But as was explained to me at one point by someone who'd worked in the State Department,

there's no one in the State Department who takes religion seriously. Well, I'm sorry, there are people in Iran who take religion seriously. And it plays a very considerable role in driving them. So if we're going to have a sensible foreign policy, we must pay attention to that. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. So how does this relate back to Athens and Sparta? So in dealing with Sparta, Persia, and Athens, one of the things I want to show is that once you get past the question of security,

each of these polities is driven by other imperatives that are particular to it. And you simply cannot understand their conduct without attending to those imperatives. You behave in one way, they behave in another. And so you have a juxtaposition of these imperatives. So how does Thucydides play into all of this? You know, he says at one point, one of his characters says the Athenians, that polities are driven by fear, honor, and interest. What the realist leave out is honor. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM.

I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. So I was wondering how you kind of reconcile Thucydides' own motivations when trying to write a historical account of, say, Spartan Grand Strategy or something like that. Okay. Thucydides has a question that really bothers him. He's a witness to this war. He was in Athens when the war broke out. he almost certainly well we know he heard speeches by Pericles

he believed Pericles he believed Pericles was right Pericles said that if the Athenians were battling only against the Spartans meaning if the Persians didn't come into the war it's unspoken but that's

clearly the other power that could make a big difference in it if they avoided ulterior objects, meaning if they refrain from trying to expand the empire by going off and conquering other places, as they had done in the past in Egypt. And if they kept up their navy, they would win through. But Athens lost the war. They didn't win through. He praises Pericles foresight with regard to the war. But Pericles was wrong.

They lost the war. So for him, the question was, how if Pericles' analysis of Athens' power and of its capabilities was correct, how could they have lost the war? It would seem as if Pericles wasn't a natural genius, he was someone who learned from experience. And we can pretty easily guess at the experience, which has to do with the first Attic War of the Spartans,

and with Athens' involvement in Egypt where they lost something like 250 triremes and maybe up to 50,000 men, which was a catastrophe. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. So what does Pericles' experience tell us? Pericles has foresight, we're told, with regard to the war. So Thucydides' view is he's right about the geopolitical analysis, but he may be wrong about something else, which is Athens.

At the beginning of the war, Pericles is in his 60s. He's vulnerable. Not that many people live that long at that time. and given the state of medicine, if you got sick, they were more likely to kill you than to help you. So what he didn't think about hard enough is what happens if I die. And he is killed by the plague. And in the aftermath, what do the Athenians do?

They pursue ulterior objects. So the minute he's out of the way, They display the qualities identified by the Corinthians, which is restlessness, just an incapacity to be cautious, be careful, be prudent, and think long term. And they don't fully go off the rails until the second expedition to Sicily, which happens after they make peace with Sparta in 421. and they send a much larger force. When it gets into trouble, they send a second force almost equal to the first. And when a catastrophe happens in Sicily, they have almost no Navy left. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM.

I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. So what does this do to Grand Strategy? The Persians look at this situation. and they say, now is the time. They approached the Spartans with money, and the Spartans who had resisted think now is the time. They think now is the time

because a few years before, the Athenians had put together a coalition of polities within the Peloponnesus that provided them with enough hoplite soldiers to challenge Sparta. on land. So for the first time the Spartans feel vulnerable. Because if they had lost the Battle of Mantonea in 418, that might have done them in. That helps explain why they sent the one guy to Sicily. It very much helps explain why after the victory in Sicily, they accept the Persian offer.

So how does this relate to this book? The third Attic War stretches, from 413 to 404 BC, and it's the final battle. And it's a very interesting story in and of itself because it involves a land power trying to learn to swim, taking to the sea. And it involves a sea power that had profited from very great resources, money and so forth,

desperately trying to claw its way back, when its former allies are in rebellion against it. They see their opportunity to break free. However, there are two occasions when the Spartans sue for peace. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. What would have happened if the Athenians accepted peace? If the Athenians accepted peace, probably on either occasion, but certainly on the latter occasion,

they would have had the respite they needed in order to come back. They would have had years in which their population could expand, years in which they could collect tribute from what remained to their empire, years in which the Spartans returned to the norm, which was to be landlubbers, and not to try to be a great imperial power. And they threw away those opportunities because they couldn't accept anything but total victory. And that turns out to be fatal to them. because sooner or later the Spartans are going to win. All they have to do is win one big battle and it's over.

The Athenians can win battle after battle, and it's not over because the Persians will come up with more money. And the Persian resources are, in comparison with Athens, infinite. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. Is there any chance that the Sicilian expedition would have been a success? Well, it depends on one. what you mean by winning.

Could they have defeated Syracusa? Yes. They very nearly did so, and then this Spartian at Gallipus shows up and turns everything around. All it takes is leadership, and the Syracusans did not generate such a leadership. But had they won, could they have held it?

Okay. Jericho is 800 nautical miles from Athens. The main way that you travel is by rowing. Think about rowing 800 miles or thereabouts. Even in a tri-ream, not my favorite plan. No, no. And the thing about a trirem is you have to spend every night on shore and you have to stop frequently for water.

I mean, 170 rowers consume a lot of water, and you can't carry that much with you. So the extension is very large. You're going to have to garrison Syracuse. And controlling Syracuse doesn't mean you conquer the rest of Sicily because there are great many cities there. They're wealthy, they're populace, and they'll fight. So if you win, you may still lose.

In other words, the project is, in my opinion, beyond Athens' capacity. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray. What was Athens' biggest need? How big is the population of Athens at its height? 50,000? How many can you send abroad? And how many you just take to control an island the size of Sicily?

So I think the project was foolish from the get-go. Could they have one defeated Syracuse? Yes. But if they did so, do they have an asset or a liability? The responsibilities are very heavy. It looks to me to be a liability. What if they'd succeeded? If they conquer it, does it help them defeat?

defeat Sparta? I don't think so. I don't think it has any effect. I mean, yes, you can increase your resources in the sense of tribute, but it's not tribute that will enable you to defeat Sparta. Tribute enables you to build ships,

to man the ships with people who are willing to row for money. But tribute does not give you hoplight soldiers who are willing to die on the battlefield. and that's exactly what you need. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. I'm Aaron Osborne and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray.

Fear, honor, and interest always play a role. And fear would be tied up with the question of security, which is a universal. Interest varies from one country to another. The Athenians, because they're a democracy, because they have large numbers of poor people, have an interest in expanding their empire. The Spartans, because they're a community of gentlemen who lord it over a helot population seven times their size,

they're a saturated power. They have no interest in expansion. It will weaken them, not strengthen them. So, you know, it's really very different. similarly in our own world interest varies and also how you interpret interest varies what do we want well prosperity

how does that play into foreign policy it's very much in our interest that the seas be open for trade to achieve that, we need allies who are on the same page. We have them in Europe and in Japan. They want pretty much the same thing that we want, and they will cooperate with us. But those allies are dependent on imported oil.

It comes from the Middle East, so suddenly we have an interest in the Persian Gulf. The other thing is fear. The spread of nuclear weapons is a threat to our security. Then honor comes into play. And again, it comes into play in different ways for every polity. This is Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM. I'm Aaron Osborne, and I'm talking with Dr. Paul Ray.

So what does success with these factors look like? I believe that the greatest achievement in human history if you're talking about statesmanship is the Cold War. You have a war that lasts about 50 years. It involves two great powers and two massive coalitions. There are skirmishes. There's no major war. It ends with the collapse of one of the two sides

and the dismemberment of the great power without a major war. When has that ever happened? I would turn around and say American foreign policy since the Cold War is arguably the most disgraceful performance in human history.

It's built on the notion that we don't really have to think about war anymore that there will be world peace, that it will be built on commerce, that if the Russians and the Chinese become prosperous enough, they will be serious participants in a world economic order, but not a danger. To believe that, you have to believe an awful lot.

You have to subscribe to a species of idealism that resembles realism. Everything is reducible to economics. Countries that trade together won't go to war against one another. Prosperity will quiet countries, not make them more belligerent. There's nothing in human history to support that.

Our guest has been Dr. Paul Ray, and I'm Aaron Osborne on Radio Free Hillsdale 101.7 FM.