Yet Another Value Podcast - Avation Post-Mortem with Jeremy Raper $AVAP

Episode Date: January 23, 2026

Jeremy Raper returns for a deep-dive postmortem on his high-conviction investment in aviation leasing company AVAP. From sourcing the deal via Twitter, to acquiring a ~20% block at well below book value, to negotiating with key stakeholders and navigating operational hurdles, Jeremy recounts the challenges and victories of shareholder activism in a niche sector. This case study sheds light on the realities of unlocking value in the public markets and the grind behind executing a thesis, even when the setup looks ideal on paper._____________________________________________________________[00:00:00] Andrew introduces Jeremy and episode topic[00:02:11] Investment is a postmortem of AVAP[00:04:01] Jeremy's background in aviation leasing[00:09:41] Block purchase strategy and rationale[00:12:01] Purchase price details and thesis[00:13:45] Value from being largest shareholder[00:15:01] Behind-the-scenes work and learning[00:17:27] Complexity of executing activist strategies[00:23:46] Monetizing intangibles and aircraft rights[00:25:01] Shareholder base and interest after stake[00:28:24] Exiting AVAP and evaluating outcome[00:30:02] Final thoughts on learning from postmortemsLinks:Yet Another Value Blog - https://www.yetanothervalueblog.com See our legal disclaimer here: https://www.yetanothervalueblog.com/p/legal-and-disclaimerThis podcast was sponsored by https://www.youtube.com/@UClqFz8aiVfSV2PviLcQrIbA Production and editing by The Podcast Consultant - https://thepodcastconsultant.com/

All right, hello, and welcome to the yet another value podcast. I'm your host, Andrew Walker. Today we have kind of a special episode. My friend Jeremy Raper is back on the podcast. A few years ago, Jeremy got involved in aviation leasing. The ticker there is AVAP, and we're going to do a postmortem on the investment over in AVAP. So everyone should remember, this is a postmortem, a historical investment, but I think there's a lot of learnings there. I think people are going to be really interested in it.

I was really excited to get them on and go through this and talk. about it. So please see a full disclaimer for all the, you know, not investing in advice at the end of the podcast, but we're talking to post-mortem historical views. I think you're going to enjoy it. We're going to get there in one second. But first, a word from our sponsor. This podcast is sponsored by AlphaSense. One of the hardest parts of investing is seeing what's shifting before everyone else. For decades, only the largest hedge funds could afford extensive channel research programs to spot inflection points before earnings and stay ahead of consensus. Meanwhile, smaller funds had been forced to cobble together ad hoc channel intelligence or reliance their reports from sell-side shops.

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Raper, Jeremy, how's it going? Hey, Andrew, how are you? Thanks to having me again. Good to see you. We just recorded one episode, but I wanted to do this special episode because first a quick disclaimer, nothing on this podcast, investing device, see the full disclaimer at the end of the podcast. We're going across the pond again for this post-mortem, so extra risk, all that sort of stuff. Consult a financial advisor. I wanted to have you on the podcast because, you know, there are a lot of public filings. We were involved in aviation. The ticker there is A-V-A-P, it trades in London. Our trades are publicly available because of the way the London stock works. But as I've told other people, I thought it was the single, if not the singular, I don't want to be hyperbolic.

One of the best, you know, I get pitched all the time on, hey, I'm racing a vehicle, a fund of one. I thought it just was one of the best suggestivism, activism ideas I've ever seen. And I loved it. And I'm glad it worked out. So with the vehicle wrapping up, I wanted to do a post-mortem on it. So I'll pause there and just turn it over to you. Why don't we rewind the clock back to kind of the summer of 2023 and you can lay out the aviation story.

And I just want to post-mortem. And I'll pop in with some questions as it goes. Sure. Okay. So, firstly, if I could convince my wife to use such glowing terms that you just used about my SPV, I would be a happy man. So thank you very much. I'm not sure all that praise is entirely deserved for reasons we'll touch on. People will see. I get pitched SVVs all the time that is, hey, this company trades for 10 times price earnings and all the peers trade for 12. I want to buy this company. I'm like, hey, man, that's not a fund of one. That's not as that is, that is. Like, that belongs in a diversified portfolio. Like, you need something unique, and this just had such a unique structure to it. So that's why I praise you so much on it. Thanks, Matt.

Well, yeah, so high level going back to the summer of 2023. So I guess a little bit more context is needed than that. So for much of my, let's call it, two-decade investing experience career, I have been quite focused and interested on aircraft leasing. So aircraft leasing is a very interesting kind of sub-segment of the financial services portion of the stock market, where it's quite a large asset pool, but as public market investable companies go, for much of that last 20 years, there's really only been six or seven companies that you could invest in, at least within developed markets.

So right now today, there's actually fewer than that. There might only be three or four, but even going back, you know, 10, 15 years ago, you had air lease, you had air cap, obviously. You had ILFC was predecessor that then Deelisted and became just a dead issuer. where you had a couple of ones in Asia. And essentially, that was about it. Like, the investable subset for most investors in Western developed markets was maybe only a couple of companies.

So you had this weird oddity where even though some of these companies were relatively large, and by large, I mean, okay, not $100 billion or $50 billion, but multi-billion market caps with 30, 35 billion debt stacks outstanding and, you know, 10, 15 analysts covering the stock. So by no means undercovered or, you know, underfollowed. You had stocks that, for whatever reason, would trade it to my mind, crazy discounts to intrinsic value despite superior long-term track records of value creation. Look, for really interested deep, deep fans of Andrew or perhaps myself, there is a post I made on Vic maybe, I want to say four years ago, five years ago, when Air Cap had printed, you know, I was a big share of Air Cap at the time, and Air Cap had printed another stunning quarter and they'd beaten the number. and, you know, it was trading at spot six of book value

and generating a return on tangible assets of 15%. And all these other bank stocks are trading at three times book value and generating a 20% return on tangible assets. And I said, I don't understand. This is a set of financial assets with a sustainable balance sheet and a sustainable model. Finance theory says you should not trade at a discount to book value if your long term returns on that book value are wildly above your cost of equity capital. That's just finance theory 101.

And so for the longest, and I was kind of ranting and raving and how this was covered by 20 different analysts. And everyone said, oh, it's trading a spot six of a book. It's worth spot seven of book. And meanwhile, half these analysts also covered banks, and they're all trading it two times book and generating 10% ROs or whatever, in the US at least, not in Europe. But, you know, this is, again, this was an NYC listed stock.

So I was kind of lamenting, and here we are finally four or five years later, an air cap is re-rated. It's like one spot three times book. So, you know, we've been vindicated over the long run. But essentially, by way of background, I'd covered leasing for a long time. I felt like had a lot of specific industry knowledge or, you know, investor specific knowledge with regard that sector. And there was a company that had always been on my radar because even within the subset

of undercover companies, it was kind of an oddball. It's called Evasion, AVAP, as you mentioned, it was a much smaller company. They really only had 30, 33 planes. A lot of those planes were regional jets, which are different aircraft type and much less light, less covered, and let's be honest, a bit more junky than your typical narrow bodies or wide bodies that are in use by mainline fleets the world over. And they're subject to different supply demand dynamics, right? Perhaps there are a few more OEMs that make those planes.

Certainly the usage rates are a bit more volatile, less predictable than the long-term jet passenger usage rates, basically the demand picture that you see over the long term from mainline wide bodies and narrow bodies as to be very, very steady and very predictable. Regional jets was not that. So because of these factors, and it was a smaller company, It was a bit of an oddball based in Singapore, listed in London, only 100 million market cap.

Obviously, it traded at a massive discount. Not only that, you then looked at the register and you saw that the register had a massive shareholder there who, it became apparent to me in that summer of 2023, wanted to sell their close to 20% stake in the company. So you had a combination of deeply discounted security, a space I knew quite well, tangible assets backing that backing. that equity, meaning you were not not betting on some software code or some intangible licenses or biotech where something I had no experience with and was also intangible. No, no, literally aircraft valuations, which even in that space, the regional space, are pretty, pretty observable and, and, you know, somewhat liquid. I want to say super liquid, but somewhat liquid. And so you had a very clear thesis emerging that the assets are obviously undervalued. The equity, however, is

completely unloved and unknown or not followed. And hard assets that over a period of time could be, in my view, monetized or turned into cash to close the discount. So key to get this strategy off the ground, obviously, would be to acquire that 20% stake from the larger shelter because, you know, it had become clear through some rudimentary research that, you know, they were no longer enamored with the CEO of the company. there'd been some breakdown in communication. I think it's very simple, right?

You had a 20% owner and you interpreted and saw, hey, these guys, if they had an offer, like they know we have 20% of any liquid stock, it's not going to be easy to get out of it. They know if somebody comes an offer and they went out, you know, they have to consider selling it. Even if it's not, you know, if the last trade was 100, even if the offer isn't 100, they're going to have to considered if they went out. So tell me if I'm wrong or if that's too simple. No, no, that's right. And also, also, sorry, I forgot to mention that the chairman and founder of the company still own a substantial stake in the company. So this hedge fund was at 20%, but the founder and I said chairman, executive chairman. So essentially the top guy, the company owned 15% or 40%. Yeah, so he owned

some number that was less than 20%, but then nevertheless was still a substantial position and also was in most all his net worth essentially. So you had this natural conflict between, you know, a hedge fund that wanted to maximize value. I'm speculating, but within some shorter time frame, and the founder of the company who had built this company up over 20 years and wanted to do things his way and was also a substantial investor in company. Okay. So it became known to me that this hedge one was actually in the process of winding down. Some of their other assets were put up for sale. It was a relatively small fund. And once it became known, you know, you see there's, they have four or five positions they're selling two or three of them,

it makes sense that they would want to sell, you know, the most illiquid in that stage, one of the largest remaining assets on the book. So I literally, this is a win for technology. This is a win for Twitter. I literally put out on Twitter, does anyone know this hedge fund? I literally said,

does anyone know anyone at this hedge fund? If so, I'd love to chat with. And that's all, next thing you know, I think it was like 24 hours later. I get a call. I'm not sure how I got a call. I got a call. It's like, hi, I'm the manager of this fund.

They just called me up directly. And I was like, oh, wow, that was quick. That worked. It was kind of amazing. It was like sending out a bat signal. The hedge fund just came right back to me. So, you know, I was fortunate to have built up a network to the point where just a random tweet into the ether could generate that kind of an outcome.

So, look, I was always quite transparent in what I was trying to do. You know, they're a seller. I'm a buyer. You know, there's a commercial negotiation. I kind of mentioned that I would have to. the money to buy out that vehicle. Oh, sorry. Okay, okay.

I'm overstepping the There's a seller, you're a buyer. Why don't we talk about, you know, I believe this is publicly filed. It's late September, early October, 2012, 2023, and kind of, you know, we reach an agreement, right? So the publicly disclosed, but why don't you do

kind of the last trade and what the block goes for? Sure. So the stock of the time was trading around 100, maybe 105 pence first. share, we bought the block at, I want to say, 79 pence per share. I think it was about a 25% discount to the last trade. Now, keep in mind, tangible book value at the time was 140, 145. So the stock itself was already trading a big discounts of tangible book. There are also some intangibles that maybe we'll touch on later on. But nevertheless, tangible book was 14, 140-ish. And the stock was at 100,

and we bought it at 79. So we developed, obviously it was a price for liquidity, right? I mean, once you buy it, you know, that's a hotel California situation. So you have to have a plan to extract the value that goes beyond just sitting in the stock for, you know, another 10 years, which is what unfortunately that fund had gone through. But this is why I thought it was such a unique idea, right? Because, hey, I'm the only way that you can capture this discount is by going out, sourcing with the fund and negotiating the block.

block, right? Without that, you're just buying shares on the open market and you'll never buy this much. And the other way I thought it was great. I mean, obviously you mentioned the sector expertise, the valuation. You get the discount on the way in. And then because you now own 20%, I mean, yes, as we, as everyone knows, until you control 50.1% of the company, you can't like kind of make them do it. And even there, there are legal restrictions. But now that you're 20%, you do have a voice in the room and you can steer and you can talk and you try to negotiate. So that's just why, you know, you get the compound of the discount by buying the block. In a space you know, you get at the right valuation with or without the discount,

and then you can kind of try to make your own destiny. That's why I just thought it was such good idea. So a pause there. I want to talk about kind of what you learned in the about two years that you were by the scenes, but anything I miss, anything that kind of leading into, we should talk about?

Yes. The only other things I would mention are one, it was important to become the larger shareholder. Yes. Both from a kind of gravitas perspective and obviously a potential, you know, contested perspective, right? If you actually had to go down the more hostile route,

which thankfully you didn't, But if you did, then it obviously would need that position. Second thing that was important, I actually did know the chairman socially. Not well, but we did have a somewhat of a relationship just because I used to live in Singapore. I had coincidentally met him at an industry event. And look, we kind of swapped investment ideas for one of a better word over the years. So he wasn't anything more than a casual acquaintance, but we did have a, let's call it, a little bit of report. such that when I acceded to the 20% ownership position via this transaction,

it wasn't a cold call in to the exec chairman. So we already had something or relationship from which to go. And frankly, he already knew what my priorities were, what I was trying to do with the company. And it seemed to him a welcome development, right? Maybe not per se 100% aligned with him as it turned out, on every decision the company would therefore make. But, you know, he knew what he was dealing with straight, straightforward.

and I was in an unknown quantity. So this is the block trades late September, early October, 2012, 2023. I mean, me talking to you, I know for the next, again, public filing. So in mid to late 2025, the shares are exited. But from me talking to you, I know for the next 18 months, you are on and off, like, restricted behind the scenes, all this sort of stuff with the company.

So I'd love to just now talk about for the 18, let's just call it 18 months to make it easy, for the 18 months of this trade being on this investment. You're behind. What do you learn? What's going on behind the scenes? I want to know, ask this on both the company-specific level and just in general. This is a unique situation. I'd love to hear just in general your takeaways.

Look, there are a huge number of learnings on both. The first is a general one, and that is no matter what it says on the balance sheet or the Excel spreadsheet, when you actually get behind the curtain, it's so much more difficult than people imagine. So, you know, I was also somewhat naive, you know, not having done one of these so actively before, when you write a letter or when you just examine the balance sheet, do the analysis and say, yeah, it's trading at 40. Why don't you sell everything? It's worth 80. And then you actually get into the blocking of tackling. Okay, well, how do we actually sell that asset? You know,

is it incumbent? What's the encumbrance? What's the, you know, you just literally go line by line through the asset pool. You deal with people who's, you know, oftentimes, yeah, you're selling assets, but jobs are attached to those. And there are consequences that I'm not, I'm not speaking about balloon costs that were not in the numbers, although there is always some of that. I'm speaking the, the brain pain of blocking and tackling your way through an operating business versus simply doing the spreadsheet mass and working out that, you know, if we sell all the planes or we, you know, if we divest this business, we bring in a buyer, then we'll double our money. It's easy, you know, and, you know, dealing with all these competing personalities, even within a small

organization that was highly motivated to generate the best outcome for shareholders, given the chairman's large position in the company and others, insiders having large positions. It's really hard to communicate how much more difficult it is. I'm not saying I went into this thinking it would be easy. I went into this thinking very confident we had a huge marginal safety, right? And very confident we could generate. You mentioned about 150 in book value and you're getting for about half,

less than half that, right, or around half that. So you do also have to balance like, that's a huge margin of safety if you can just get them not to do really silly stuff with it. For sure, for sure. So I was never really, you know, I felt quite confident we would, we would not take a loss or we would, I was quite confident we would make a decent investment return on the investment. Having said that I was not at all prepared for the amount of interpersonal wrangling and corolling and back and forth and, you know, stuff that came out of the woodwork, which I think is not a unique comment by any stretch. I talk to other, you know, small cap activists or people who do activism. And even before you get inside the room, before you get behind the curtain, I don't think there's enough appreciation for the amount of time, effort, and costs involved in bringing some of these activist campaigns.

Right. So just before you even get on the board, right? Once you're on the board, it kicks up to two or three levels. And to be clear, I was never on the board, but I was essentially, I was restricted. So I was essentially an advisor to the company, let's say. So I was privy to all the things they were trying to do and the refinancings and, you know, advising them on asset sales, is that, the other. So, yeah, I mean, even just before you get to that stage with these campaigns, like people, I would love for them to hopefully understand that

there's a huge amount of behind the scenes work that is involved with multiple constituents, you know, huge amount of service providers. I mean, like, you look at some of these activist campaigns that don't even get to the boardroom. You might be dealing with, I know, we just did a podcast on Humb. I don't want to go back to it too much, but I have 10 different people on my commercial team for this. And we, I haven't got on the board yet, all right, 10 people. Right. So, so there's a huge amount of work. So getting

behind the curtain and kind of trying to help the company restructure and maximize the value of its assets, the actual doing of that was an order of magnitude more involved than I had anticipated. That was the main learning. Yeah. Good.

Oh, I was just going to say, and then, I was going to say specifically, in terms of the actual blocking and tackling of, say, quote unquote, extracting the value. I think we did that reasonably well, notwithstanding the fact that the overall goal at the outset of the venture was probably to shepherd a more holistic transaction. So my vision at the start was essentially my thesis was this entity is too small to be a public market security, right? It shouldn't really be a Singaporean company with 100 million market cap that's listed in London and 30 planes of which, you know, a bit of customer

concentration risk. You have, you know, most of the planes are out to like two or three airlines. It's really dinged them during COVID. One of the reasons why the stock was trading so cheaply is because they had a massive concentration to Virgin Australia. Over 20% of their assets were out with Virgin Australia. Virgin Australia goes not their fault necessarily, right? It was pretty capricious in COVID, which airlines survived, which didn't. So I'm not saying it was their fault. Completely agree. Very well. But look, look, it is what it is. And when you're a small company and when you're overly concentrated, you get buffeted by by the vicissitudes of chance more than a large company, right?

So it made a lot of industrial logic to merge this with a larger company and a bigger balance sheet, a bigger and better fund a balance sheet that had a lower cost of capital. Aircraft leasing is a cost of capital gain, right? That's always been that way it always will be. So my overarching goal was to probably shepherd this suite of assets into a structurally lower cost of capital, larger balance sheet. You can say, you wanted to sell it to a Japanese bank or Japanese finance company.

You can say it. Yeah, or a Korean insurance company. or a Chinese insurer that loves aviation. There's 20 different people who, 20 different companies who theoretically would be interested in that. But going back to my previous point, once you actually get behind the curtain and understand some of the intricacies,

like something that's not really apparent on the balance sheet, is like the tax treatment of individual asset sales as a listed PLC versus a holistic transaction where the parent company, or I guess the whole company is absorbed by another listed company, can be quite different. So we see this suite of assets. It's a Singaporean domicile company,

but it's actually a UK PLC, right? And there's all these intricate rules around how you'd even approach a UK company in order to buy it out versus, say, doing piecemeal transactions. And it's just quite complicated. And there's lots of different nuances that I did not understand

or I did not appreciate fully that I then began to understand. Now, I'm not saying that's not the reason why we ultimately didn't sell the whole business, but that was certainly a contributive factor. That was definitely a big part of the learning, which is why you need the discount on the way in when some of these things happen. So I guess, so there's a period just to continue the story. So we make the investment, we then build up our stake to 25%.

We make some of the operational changes that add value to the equity. So, for example, we start to monetize some of the intangible assets. They had a bunch of this particular company, had a bunch of purchase rights, which are essentially rights to buy aircraft in the future that have to be partially funded today. So I was making or have to be partially funded at a certain point in time. Oftentimes, you have to fully fund it 12 months before delivery, but even earlier than that, you might have to put down 10% of the purchase price, right? So if you have 20 purchase rights and each plane costs $20 million, you have to put up $2 million today, that's $40 million. Well, look, your $100 million market cap, but your 200 million

understandable assets, right? Just throwing numbers out there. So why would you put 40 million into purchase rights when your own equity is trading it 150 cents on the dollar? You'd be better off putting, my point is you'd be better of putting either some of that purchase rights money back into the equity, right, either via direct distributions or buying shares, buybacks, whatever it is, because the market is giving you no credit for those intangibles, zero credit, right? There's a similar argument I made to a lot of Japanese companies. The minute the market is giving you credit, for making new investments and for growth. Sure, throw 100% of your excess capital into growth.

I talk to these busted net cash biotechs all the time. I'm like, look, I know you guys think the science is great. I'm not a scientist. I can't tell you otherwise, but your stock's at five and you have $10 per share of cash. You have to solve that problem before you can put another dollar into R&D. And they'll be like, oh, well, don't you trust the science? I'm like, no. Like, you guys give yourself stock options at $5 per share with cash at 10.

Like, it's creating insanely perverse incentives. Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, that's the first and only thing you need to solve. And once you solve that, everything else becomes possible because that's the nature of capital markets, right? If the market is not rewarding you for making investments, actually, the market is directly punishing you for making a new investment because it's treating every new dollar

of equity capital is immediately discounted by 50%. Yep. There is literally zero reason to make new investments. You should be reducing your capital. That's the market telling you what to do. So, you know, getting that message across took a certain amount of time, but, you know, we did make some progress. We monetized some portion of the purchase rights to demonstrate value.

We did sell a few assets. We articulated a plan to transition into more eco-friendly next-generation regional assets. There was during that period, whilst we were fully restricted, some approaches to buy the whole company, which, as you can imagine, I was fully in favor of. Unfortunately, you know, they couldn't get to the finish line. Money could get to the finish line. So it's always a bit tricky, right? When you go, when the flip happens and you take over, you know, 20%, I'm sure, interested in

strategic, like it's not a big world, right? They see, they see, hey, there's a new majority show. Does that spur a little bit of inbound from people? I'm sure it didn't hurt. I'm sure it didn't hurt. I mean, look, I didn't speak publicly. I guess I made some limited public comment about my strategy at the company during the life of the vehicle, but it was pretty limited about, look, anyone who Googles me or, you know, Rangely and myself would quickly figure out, you know, what I, you know, what I'm attempting to accomplish. It's not rocket science, right? There's smart, sophisticated people out there. So I'm sure it didn't hurt. But to be fair, I think there was always that kind of noise

swirling around the company. And I think it will end in that direction simply because the logic is largely irrefutable. I mean, yes, it might not have happened yet. But again, right, there's a reason there's only two or three lists and less stores in the market, right? The, the market it simply has no time for smaller, perceived, junkier, oddball, listed, let alone ones at 150 million market cap in the UK. We all know the problem, structural problem in the UK is going through. So, you know, we made a few operational changes. We made some significant financing changes. That was probably the key early change we enacted, was to lower the costs of financing by refinancing a bunch of the debt. And we, you know, we started to do accretive things with the balance sheet and

with the excess cash. So we started buying back bonds in increasing size below par. We started buying back shares. I encourage them to continue to buy back shares. And ultimately, our exit was, I'll say suboptimal. I would say it's not as good as it could have been by the very fact that because we were unable to proceed towards a whole company transaction within the time frame I kind of envisaged, I took the view that, look, we've been in this investment for Nile in two years. We'd done most all of the active engagement. type operational stuff that we could do, not all of it, but most all of it, we'd experience some success, albeit not full success. And crucially, crucially, in that two-year period,

aircraft values had gone up a lot. So the gross increase in aircraft values of aircraft they operated probably went up 25% in those two years. That's a big move. And then they'd monetized a decent amount of that increase by a discrete asset sales. So they'd done, I want to say, six or seven out of 10 in terms of that's the score I would give them for kind of active operational kit rate. Obviously, they didn't end up deciding to sell the company or didn't go, have not yet decided to sell the company. And at that point, I thought, look, this is a very different investment than buying at 80 pence, you know, in the 140s, 150s.

And so, look, it wasn't all in one trench. The last tranche we sold the shares at 138 were back to the company. The average exit price is probably about 150 from memory. don't have the numbers in front of me. I think it was about 150. We sold some shares at 160, 1 at 140, 1, 1, 145. But essentially, we brokered a solution whereby, look, the biggest winner is probably the company. We ended up selling our shares back to the company. It's still a discounted tangible bulk. And nothing really has changed with regard my view of the underlying assets for the future of the company. It's still a very good company, and it's doing a lot better

now than it was a couple years ago. And hopefully, we were a small part of that. But from an investment horizon perspective and from a, you know, return on risk perspective, just the risk reward in the 140 to 150 range is quite different after a big rally in aircraft prices than it was at, you know, 80 pounds. And look, I'm just going to remind everyone, this is a UK listed company. There were there were filings, right? You can, in Jerry mentioned all these, you can track where the sales happens to everything. So we're not mentioning, we're not like breaking new ground. You can go see the last sale happens November 5th, 2025. That's where it's disclosed. No, I'm with you, you know? I just, Bill Ackman once said something in.

love him or hate him. He said something like, look, if you look at our historical returns, they do, they're the classic private equity in the public markets thing, right? And he said, look, if you look at our public returns, when we sell a stock over the next three years, the stock actually outperforms to S&P 500. And does it suck to sell a stock that outperforms? Absolutely. But like, if you get, when you're doing these big, big investments, not buying a little bit of a company in day trading, but when you're doing these big investments, if you get a reputation for it, we sell out the absolute top and everything. everything's been juice and there's nothing left, it's going to get harder and harder to exit.

And I mean, it's not like we've got their reputation or anything, but I do think there's something to, hey, you had a thesis, we bought a huge discount, a huge discount to tangible assets, help the company. And then, yeah, there's a little bit left on the buying for the next guy or something. But it's kind of someone else's bet now, though. So anyway, look, we don't have to make this long. This is around about 20 minutes. I got to go pick Sylvia up a little bit. But I really did want something because I just thought it was so great.

And I'm glad we could get a little bit of the learnings out there, a little bit of the learnings on the public market. Anything we didn't mention that you learned or anything we didn't hit into the aviation thing that we should have talked about? I think we covered most all the key points. I think we have a good, good account of how it went. And yeah, hopefully there'll be more in the future. We can do breakdowns of those in the coming years and have some new learnings and more P&L. Post-mortems, more learnings, you know, the, I just keep, I've said this a few times of the blog, but when I look at the investor I was 10 years ago, I'm like, God, that man was stupid. And, you know, when you and I have a few more gray hairs on our head.

I'm just kidding. Say again? I said, I said still is. Well, yeah, maybe. I was going to say when we've got a few more gray heads in our head and we do the next post-mortem three, five years from now, whatever it is on whatever it's on, hopefully we say, man, Jeremy and Andrew, like, they were celebrating Jeremy's success

and they just had no clue how to invest, how to think about anything because we're so much more than always continues. Highly possible, if not likely. That's lifelong learning is really important. So, yeah, that's all we can really hope to accomplish. continue to learn every day. Fingers crossed, man, fingers crossed. Well, Jeremy, really happy for the success here. Thank you for coming on. I'm going to wrap it up here. We're going to shoot this over to compliance and we're going to try and get a not too heavily edited podcast out because

I'm just so glad to get these learning on the podcast. We'll talk to you, buddy. Thanks for having me, bud. Speak soon, mate. A quick disclaimer, nothing on this podcast should be considered an investment advice. Guests or the hosts may have positions in any of the stocks mentioned during this podcast. please do your own work and consult a financial advisor. Thanks.