Yet Another Value Podcast - Jeremy Raper is going FAR

Episode Date: February 28, 2022

Jeremy Raper returns to the podcast to discuss his recent semi-activism at FAR Ltd. FAR recently received a bid that Jeremy thinks dramatically undervalues the company, so Jeremy is pressuring the company to cut costs and aggressively return capital to shareholders.My tweet thread on FAR: https://twitter.com/AndrewRangeley/status/1496863885122539520?s=20&t=UK4pHbZdyRecEFP_I46_UQChapters0:00 Intro1:50 FAR overview7:20 Recapping the valuation case13:10 Acquirer optionality at FAR16:45 FAR's historical mismanagement23:10 What put FAR in play31:00 Jeremy's proposal for FAR36:45 What if management goes scorched earth here?48:40 Closing FAR thoughts50:15 LastMinute (LMN) discussion

all right hello and welcome to yet another value podcast i'm your host andrew walker and with me today i'm excited to have the the original guest of the podcast the most frequent guest of the podcast my friend jeremy raper jeremy how's it going going great mate what's uh what episode am i up to now six seven you know i was wondering this afternoon i think it's six it could be seven i i need to keep track i'll start labeling the podcast like i keep track of what number podcasts we'll have everyone else podcast and then we'll have Jeremy Ray for podcast just to do you get any do you get any feedback saying that that random Australian guys being away too many times stop getting him back no no I you're one of the most popular guests I tweet out that you're coming on and the inbox fills up and they say hey

have him talk about every name in his book have him tell us what we should do with our life you're the popular guy good to hear good to hear well I'm what can I say I like to solve problems that's what I do let me start this podcast the way to every podcast first disclaimer remind every everyone, nothing on this podcast, investing advice. Probably particularly true today. I think Jeremy and I are going to talk about his latest activism play, but we also might talk some other stocks and Jeremy traffics in the E-liquid, the international, the unknown. So just please consult a financial advisor, do your own due diligence. Second way to start every podcast is a pitch for you, my guess, but we already did the pitch, six time on the podcast. If that doesn't speak to you,

I don't know what is. So let's just dive right into it. You're running another activist campaign. I think the last time we had you on, or maybe two times ago, was kind of your first activist campaign over at Hunter Douglas, which worked out absolutely swimmingly. I'll let you kind of recount the full story if you want to, but the contest you're running right now, not contest, but the pleasure of playing pressure is far limited. The ticker is FAR, FAR, it trades in Australia, and all that out the way, I'll toss it over to you. What's going on with FAR?

Sure, thanks very much. So, yeah, so, okay, so I'll try and keep it as. as brief and as succinct and up-to-date as possible because this has a long and interesting corporate history to its company, but I'm not sure all of it is entirely relevant to what's going on today. But in a nutshell, far is a, as you mentioned, Australian-listed small-cap oil and glass explorer. And when I say small-cap, it really is a small cap. I think the market cap today is about 65 million Aussie. Yep. They have about just over 100 million of net assets. They have, as I mentioned, a very interesting and torrid history of exploration, mostly in

West Africa, mostly with poor success. However, they did kind of strike a huge find in Senegal, a very long time ago, actually. Over a decade ago, they found the original oil field that would later become the San GOMAR, S-A-N-G-O-M-A-R, San G-M-R development project, which which is frankly one of the world's great oil discoveries in recent years and has been progressively advanced from discovery to, you know, development to probably first oil production in 2023, unfortunately now under different ownership. We'll talk about that. But essentially, I mean, just by way of context, this is a very small company. There are lots of companies like this in Australia. I mean, it's kind of like Canada. There is kind of a dime a dozen junior junkie small cap oil and gas or mining exploration plays with varying degrees of management quality and varying degrees. of exploration assets. What makes far interesting today is that unlike, say, nine out of ten of those other type playslists in Australia and probably most in Canada too, you actually have something real

and tangible on the balance sheet. And that is a whole bunch of cash and an extremely valuable deepen the money earn out from Woodside. Woodside being a very large Aussie operator with the largest oil and gas producer in Australia, $30 billion company, which bought the San Gomar assets from far and is the operator today and is essentially going to pay them an earn out if production comes online and oil prices stay at certain levels over the next few years. We'll talk about that. But just to frame the overall valuation case first was I think this is important. So basically net cash on the balance sheet today, net of all remaining obligations and basically with an accrual for costs in 2022 and probably longer than that, I think is about 45 to 50 cents

a share. Yep. Okay. Then the value of the, as we speak now, and we can talk how this share price got here, because it's interesting in its own rate. But as we speak, the stock is around 65, 66 cents Aussie. So when you say 45 to 50 cents, it's not the entire share price, but it is a lot of the share price just to give people that respect. The stock price today is 66 cents. Aussie, 45 cents-ish, 45 to 50 cents, depending on your burn down assumptions on what happens with the corporate overhead and other things like that, is a cap backed by cash. And then you have this woodside earn out. Now, the woodside earn out is, is up to $55 million U.S. dollars, it's a contingent payment, right?

So it's up to $55 million U.S. dollars total based upon Farr's share of run rate production once the Sangamar assets reach first production, which is slated to be in mid-20203. So call it a year from today, maybe slightly longer than a year from today. And essentially what that means is you look at Farr's original stake in the San Gomer assets before they sold to Woodside, which was 13.7%. then you look at what Woodside is saying phase one production will be, which they're saying up to 100,000 barrels of oil equivalent a day. Then you calculate the value that that 13.7% of let's say 100,000 barrels a day multiplied by the annual production, multiplied by the excess

value. I was told there wasn't going to be a lot of math here, Jeremy. Sorry, so I know. Let's just put it this way. It adds up to about 25, 26 million US dollars a year based on the metrics that Woodside has disclosed in U.S. dollars from first production. So, for example, if you think the field comes online in mid-2020, then from mid-2020 through mid-24, assuming they produced it around 100,000 barrels a day, far would be entitled to about $25 million in arrear. So from mid-2020, they'd be getting $25 million, and then the year after that, they'd be getting another 26, 27 million. So essentially, from two full years of production, they could get the full earn out if oil prices stay where they are. So the maximum

the oil price trigger is $70 Brent, $70 Brent per barrel, and right now the price of Brent is $100 a barrel. Importantly, this is very important. Importantly, the futures curve of Brent is north of $70 dollars a barrel for 2024, and last I checked, 2025. I need to check. So the oil futures curve is in backwardation, basically saying current prices are very high. They'll come down in the future as supply comes online or there's a shortage right now in the market. But my point is, oil futures curve is very liquid. You can easily hedge this out. If you wanted to actually actually make a bet on 2025 oil prices and quote unquote lock in those prices, you could do that today. So the earn out is risky in the sense that Woodside has to execute and ramp production,

but we're not talking about five years forward. We're literally talking as near term as it gets for a new potentially massive oil field. And that's evidenced by, I mean, the valuation of this thing before they were even thinking of selling it. So if you think about it, sorry, I should recap the valuation case before we talk about the event path because that frames everything else. So just take me at face value for now that the woodside, the woodside earn out is worth some NPV number of that 55 million. Yep. Because oil prices are deep in the money and because it's not too far production.

It's basically coming online in 12 to 15 months. And then you have a, you have quite a long window of observation. You have three years from first oil up until 2027 hard date. So assuming even there's some incremental delays, you still have a three-year period to get your money from whenever first oil starts. And if there's any periods of zero production or kind of hiccups, those don't count. So we can debate the NPV of that number. But if oil prices say as they are, maybe it takes two, three years, maybe it takes an extra year, you're probably going to get close to 55 million US. And how much is that for sure? Yeah. So 55 million US divided by, you know,

the exchange rate today is 71, 72. It's as much. as mid-70 cents per share gross gross now of course you have to npv that because you wouldn't be entitled to if you tried to cash it in today you got an npv so then you have this argument about discount rates i use a 10% discount rate um as i said there's no price risk at the moment there's very minimal price risk but there is execution risk you know 10% discount rate makes it worth about 55 cents a share slightly higher actually maybe i got like 57 cents or something like that At this point, go ahead, no, no, go ahead. I was just going to say, the company is fighting off a takeover bit at the moment.

And in their documentation, they said it was worth, I think, 55, 50, very similar number because their third party value came up with a very similar discount rate. It was 9.5 to, 9 to 10% discount rate they got to as well. And that's, look, that's a bit of fudge. I mean, not swag type math, but there's always an estimate, estimation in these things. But Woodside is, as I said, premium operator, no credit risk, completely, the best quality counterpart you could have, equivalent to BHP or whatever. Near-term production, they're the operator of the asset, they've made a huge financial

commitment to developing this asset. As I said, this is a, you know, this is a multi, multi-billion dollar project, right? Before this project was sold down by far, they were saying their NPV10 of their own 14% stake back in mid-2019 when they did the original financing for their. for the development of the field, you know, their 13% required funding cash call. They said the NPV 10 at the time was $540 million US dollars, okay, for 13%. And that was with crude Brent at $60, $65 a barrel. Yep.

So my point is this is not some $100 million project. This is, at today's oil prices, this is at least a $10 billion project. To Woodside, this is a huge, huge value creation opportunity. And the earn out to Woodside is totally and utterly immaterial. Like, there's no, there's no risk that they would slow play this project because they don't want to pay $5.50 million. I mean, this is. And people who've listened to the podcast for a long time will remember the Bristol Myers CVRs where they manage to slow play them. There's been some interest in court findings there.

But yeah, like, if it's a $9 billion liability, you slow play it. If it's a $55 million liability for a $10 billion asset, you're probably not going to slow play it. Especially, it's not like if they delay it by a month, they're going to get out of it, right? There's this huge window of time. So you might as well just get that thing producing. That's exactly. right. They couldn't really get out of it even if they slow-plated by a year. I mean, you may as well just try to maximize value. And again, we're only talking phase one, right? This is meant to be

part of a larger system and production should not stop at 100,000 barrels a day. It should continue to grow through investment from there. So for Woodside, totally, Dave, I mean, we can talk about what happened and how they even came to this asset, but essentially they are coming out well ahead. So we've got 45 cents per share in cash, NPV, 55 cents-ish of the, earn out here. I mean, right there, we're at a dollar per share of value. Anything else we need to consider when we're valuing this thing? Sure. So that's a dollar right there. I mean, my own numbers, I was slightly north of a dollar, more like a dollar, $1,6, $7, but whatever. Call it a dollar. That's what the company said. And then they have all their hodgepodge of

remaining oil drilling licenses. And so, look, I don't really accord much value currently to those, just because they did drill on some of the wells in the Gambia. The Gambia is basically right next to Senegal and West Africa. All their assets are in this West African pocket, Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea, Bissell. But anyway, they had a massive failure of one of their exploration wells. There was a complete disaster in their Gambier assets. They had spent 27, 28 million US dollars on. So think about that.

This company has a, you know, at that time, even a sub 100 million market cap, a sub 100 million market cap company spending 28, 30 million US dollars on one single exploration well, which was delivered over budget by 10 million eurosals. Anyway, that was basically a failure and didn't find any commercial moveable oil, although they did say they found hydrocarbons. Great. The point is, they have that. They're a 50% share of that. They're also the operator. The other 50% is owned by Petronus, which is Malaysia's state-owned oil company.

And then they have some other blocks of potential interest in Guinea-Bissau, which haven't been drilled in many years, where their partner is a small Norwegian company called Petronor that also doesn't have the money to drill those well. And then they have one tiny Australian asset that is essentially worthless. So look, I mean, let's put them all together. Just kind of bundle all those up. What do you think those are roughly where? In my model at the moment, nothing. Nothing. Okay. Yeah. So dollar per share of value, current share price is about 65 cents. And then there's probably some other optionality in there. Yeah, there's option. Yeah, there's optionality.

Right. I have nothing in it now, but there could be optionality that is very valuable to a large, long-term investing state oil champion like Petronus that, frankly, we do not. We as small shareholders in a company like Farr should not be valuing, but Petronus may well be interested in owning these huge potential results. So, for example, take the, let's forget about Guinea-Bissau. I frankly don't think that's worth very much either. It's in a much more difficult geography. Guinea-Bissau had a coup attempt earlier this year, had three or four coups in the last 12 years. And apparently an exploration well was meant to be drilled there as far back as 2015-16. They didn't drill anything. And they're also not operator. Fire is not operator air. So basically they've already stated they're trying to farm down their interest there. So that basically farm-down means except a lower interest in the upside from development in return for, I guess, not having to pay for the exploration well, right? So if we just focus on Vagambia, which before this recent disaster of a well, Farr was saying

contained hundreds of millions, potentially a billion barrels of oil in some of these discoveries, right? So huge, huge numbers and then they came up dry. Apparently there's a path forward if you listen to Farr. I'm quite skeptical and dubious, especially given their history. But if that is so, why shouldn't we talk to Petronus and potentially try to monetize our stake? Let them take the development risk and enjoy the upside and let us get out with some token amount to be determined, which would be de minimis for Petronus and essentially meaningless, but for far shareholders currently with a, as I said, 50 million, 45, 50 million US dollar market cap, a $20 million check, $10,20 million

is a huge, huge kind of upside optionality. So, I mean, that's one of the platforms of my approach, which I intend to pursue. We can talk about that. But to summarize a valuation case, 45 to 50 cents of net cash, unaffected, call it 55 cents of NPV in the woodside earn out and then maybe something worth another 20, 30 cents if things break our way. But the key point is this is unaffected value, unaffected meaning without financial engineering. And the point is the company is sitting on today 50 cents of cash with the stock trading at 65 cents. Okay. And the company says our

shares are worth at least a dollar a share. And the market, it's been very liquid. Stocks up a bit, you know, I think 20, 25% of the company has traded between 45 cents and 65 cents in the last month. Instead of spending this excess cash on further drilling adventures, a key part of my platform is to do something far more accretive for shareholders, and that is tended to retire a huge amount of stock, but something close to the current price because, yeah, it's a dollar per share if we leave things as is and just proceed to a wind down. But if we actually retire a bunch of the float, let's say 75, 80, 85 cents, you can add another 20, 25, 30% to your upside just through efficient capital management. So all of a sudden, you know, I'll let you speak in a

minute, but all of a sudden, instead of getting, you know, a dollar of value, we're getting a dollar 30 of value simply through efficient capital allocation, like no exploration risk, no, no, no aggressive kind of CAPEX, no kind of operational risk at all, simply through astute management. And so that's something that that is kind of the sine qua non of my investment thesis and my kind of activist platform is, what are we doing here? We should be doing a massive Dutch tender at as low as price as possible. This is like ripe for the picking. Anyway, you had a number question. No, look, I think you did a great job laying out the numbers there. But I, one of the things is you said this originally, like there are a lot of stocks, a lot of oil and gas explorers, a lot of biotech

companies that are trading below cash or something, right? You're trading way below hard asset value. The issue is, you know, the market is putting a chance that the, that the company is just never going to return that cash shareholders. They're just going to keep drilling, keep drilling, keep drilling until all the cash is gone. I want to talk about what attracted you to the situation and then talk about why I think you published in a, I can't remember if it was a news article or your letter, but you said, hey, I own about 1.5% of this company, and I'm pushing for change here. maybe we can start with the situation and then go you pretty much already laid out your platform buyback shares when they're undervalued and milk this thing but sure sure look as you said there are

lots of cheap stocks in the world i mean this is kind of analogous to what i'm used to in japan right you have very readily identifiable value right a bunch of cash a bunch of securities are very deep in the money earn out right and then a bunch of people sitting in control sitting you come to the gate you see behind the gate there's a bunch of treasure the problem is there's an ogre in front of the gate and the ogre is not going to roll over and get out of the way. And that's the problem. The problem is extracting the value. So what's really interesting in this case is that not only do I think it's possible to extract

the value, I think it's almost inevitable. So let's look at the sequence of events. Okay. So this company was on the cusp of catapulting itself from being an unknown junior to being truly a large, a mid-cap to larger oil company purely on the base of its 14% stake in Sangomar. As I said, on the books at NPV-10, 500 million plus back with oil at 65. If they had simply been able to maintain that stake and meet their funding calls, this would be a multi-billion dollar company today. So what happened?

I try to keep it as brief as possible, but essentially, like all oil discoveries, it's generally a club affair, right? It's a JV with various ownership stakes. Yep. Far had been and always was a small and junior player. And then they originally, the large ownership stake was owned by Conoco Phillips, and another ownership state was owned by Cairn Energy, the UK Energy Company. Konoko decided to sell out their interest. I think it was in 2016. At the time, I think they were 35, 40 percent, and they were also operator. They sold that interest to Woodside, as mentioned.

So Woodside went from zero and came into the project. They saw the potential. They came in as a significant owner, if not, they weren't the largest owner, but a significant owner and operator. At the time, FAR exercised, well, far, clansely. that move was against the JV agreement because they were not offered a preemption right on that sale. So in other words, it's pretty common in JVs that if you're an existing partner in the JV, if one of the JV partners wants to sell out, everyone else in the JV gets first right

to bid on it. Now, at the time, Farr was still a ring-heeding tiny quote-unquote shikko with no money. So they didn't have the money to even come close to bidding on the 35% stake in this field, you know, whatever Woodside paid, I'd have to look at up hundreds of millions of dollars. Yep. But nevertheless, the current managing director kicked up a huge fuss, tried to take Woodside to court, went to arbitration. Arbitration extended for a very long period of time. It extended so long in fact that even though Woodside eventually did close on the transaction and won their case in arbitration, it precluded far from being able to raise enough capital in an expeditious manner to fund their cash calls when the time came to make the payments because COVID happened. Okay. So, why, While COVID happened, they had not finalized all their funding arrangements, far that is. And as a result, they were kind of caught short shrift because they'd done an equity financing of north of 200 million Aussie, but that was going to be backed up with $350 million US dollars of senior debt and potentially a junior piece of debt as well, because their portion of the cash

calls to get Sangamara to first production were close to $500 million. dollars. Now, because of the ongoing arbitration, they had been unable to, this is what I think, they had been unable to raise that debt financing well in advance, right? So instead of raising that debt financing, say, 18 months in advance of needing to pay the money, all of a sudden they were trying to raise that debt financing six months in advance of needing to pay the money or less. And then COVID happened. Yes, COVID was a piece of bad luck, obviously. But that is what made, but that lack of, lack of astute management, that decision to enter an arbitration, the basis on which was questionable, and the financial consequences of which you had no

ability to finance anyway, was in effect the downfall of this company because it forced them then during COVID to sell to Woodside at cents on the dollar. That in itself is another story, but essentially that was the point. That's the key lesson or the key outcome here is, because they couldn't meet their cash calls to keep their stake in the project, they became a forced seller. Once they were a forced seller, you know, they're kind of, the wolves are at the door, but even then they made other mistakes. For example, they then engaged a third party, a further third party, an Indian oil company called ONG, and decided to sell their stake, theoretically worth $5.40 million US dollars at NPV-10 with $65 a barrel. They decided to sell it for $110 million.

dollars. Actually, it was $45 million plus reimbursement for some CAPEX, which ended up being 100, the total price ended up being 126, but the headline number was 111 at the time. In other words, an 80% discount to NPV10. To be fair, this was in late 2020, late 2020, basically, so oil prices had gone negative and then rebounded. So oil prices at the time were $45, $50 a barrel, so they weren't 65. So that so that NPV10 number is basically, I'm saying that needs to be discounted, fair. But again, why are you negotiating with a true third party who has no knowledge and no involvement in the JV? And when you know, and as has been proven, that Woodside has the right to come in and take any transaction you agree upon, which is essentially what they did.

So maybe you want to jump in here? Yeah, I actually think that was a good job. So I think at this point you've shown, hey, this company was mismanaged historically, you know, maybe ethically mismanaged, though obviously COVID-through wrenching, but they're trading for less than their pretty hard NPV firm assets. Trading for less than firm assets. It's been mismanaged historically. Let's fast forward to kind of the news article that happens a few weeks ago that attracts you, that spikes your interest in the company. Sure. Sure. So mismanagement historically, as you said, trading a big discount NPV, forced to sell their core asset at cents on the dollar through self-inflicted mistakes, let's say. And then, sorry, sorry, I need to include one first

the detail before the news article, but it's quite important. And so they raised a bunch of, as I mentioned, they raised a bunch of money from the equity markets in 2019 to fund their cash calls on Sangamara. In two different transactions, May 2019 and December 2019, they raised a total of 203 million Aussie. In both of those presentations, if you look at the investment decks, use of proceeds to get Sangamar to first production. Yeah, they had other corporate purposes, but essentially it's, this is infrastructure investment. This is not drilling. This is is not wildcatting. This is not exploration. This is to fund our share of infrastructure costs to get a proven oil discovery to first production. In other words, their share of the FPSO. FPSO is a

very expensive piece of basically the oil platform, essentially. That is extremely expensive. You need to build that. You need to build the oil pipeline that's going to tie into the FPSO from the actual discovery. These are all very expensive and they have to fund their share of that. That was the stated use of proceeds for over $200 million of investor capital. Then all of a sudden, they're forced to sell that one asset for which that money was intended to be spent. And instead of returning, said $200 million, they decide we're not going to return anything. And only after that, existing shareholders cause a huge fuss. Do they decide to return $80 million, $80 out of the 203? Complete another disregard for shareholders' rights, frankly, because the money was raised on the basis

of infrastructure investment. Now they're saying, no, we have a right. go and spend it as we see best fit on something completely different. I mean, it's essentially saying, imagine if you were a horse and buggy manufacturer and you say, we're going to expand our production of horse and buggies. And then a fire happens, the horse and buggy warehouse burns down. You take all that money and say, you know what, we're going to go invest in railroads. I mean, that's how different it is, oil exploration versus infrastructure. I mean, so that in itself was not just bad management. That was, I mean, that was almost dishonest, frankly. I'm happy to use that word. I'm just laughing because you know your preitions of the choir over.

here. I, I 100% agree with you. But at the same time, I mean, you've seen it 100 times, right? Management never wants to return the cash to shareholders once they've raised it. You do see it a lot, especially in the junior oil and gas company. But again, going back to your point, what drew my interest in a situation is this actually did promote some change. So after the last AGM, so June 2021, July 2021, the old board was basically turfed. They returned $80 million, a number of the legacy directors, but not the managing director, the Ms. Norman, who's been there for a decade. We'll talk about her shortly.

A number of the, the entire board got turfed. She remained. Two new directors came on board. So all the comments I've made, frankly, are not really related to those two new directors. They've only been there for seven months, let's say. They're regarding to legacy management of the company. I want to make that very clear.

But, so there was some board renewal. They did return $8 million, but nevertheless, they kept going with this well, we want to continue drilling the prospects we have, for example, the Gambia, the one that just failed that was drilled after the Sangamar asset sales. That's different. But what really drew me to the case was about a month ago, an Aussie investment fund called Samuel Terry asset management. We call it Stam, just as an abbreviation. They bought 5% of the company, 4.9% and launched a takeover bid at 45 cents. Stock at the time was about 40. I mean, it was almost a no premium bid. Maybe

maybe it was five cent premium. And so I had followed it peripherally on and off before then, but I wasn't really close to it. But, you know, that bid made it quite clear what was what they wanted to do, right? I mean, their cost basis was 40 cents, essentially, 35 to 40 cents. And these are pure financial buyers. These aren't oil guys. These aren't, you know, they're a deep value guys based in Australia. And, you know, they put in a bid for the whole company saying we want to get at least 50.1%,

which is important. They don't, meaning they want control. once you have 50.1% you have corporate and board control. You can essentially do whatever you want with the company because that meant essentially they're going to try and wind the thing down and basically buy it for 45 cents and get the dollar plus of value as I kind of outline. So they're at 4.9% they bid. That forces the company to come back and defend, you know, why that's an inadequate bid. And as I mentioned, the company's put out what's called a target statement where they say, look, we're worth at least a dollar a share. And we're taping this.

What's the day? Like, I can't even remember. We're taking this February 24th. I think the target statement came out yesterday, February 23rd. Came out either yesterday or the day before, a couple of days ago. But anyway, the Samuel Terry asset management bid seems quite unlikely to succeed, just given where the stock price is. But, I mean, in terms of platform, I think they're kind of analogous with what, and again, to be clear, I have no discussions with them and I am not a concept party of stamp, but their platform for the forward look at the company is very similar. I imagine to what I would look to do. And that is a same. essentially manages thing in an orderly wind-down scenario and or strategic alternative

scenario for the best value of all shareholders. And so what really interested to me was that because that led to a changing of the register. Right. So 45 cent bid, stock immediately trades 47.50 cents. Obviously that captures my interest. I buy all my shares in the 50s. But a huge amount of the float turned over, a huge amount, 20% plus. And every day the float continues to trade. and my point to the company is, look, you may have thought you had a mandate from shareholders for more drilling. Post this stand bid, that is patently not clear because at least a quarter of the company is now essentially a vote for capital return and maybe wind up. So your previous mandate has long been abrogated or relinquished, and a shareholder simply wants something new.

They want a new direction. And so I believe, and obviously I speak to a lot of shareholders, in my position, and I've acquired 1.5% of the company, I believe I've spoken in excess of 30% of the register, and I'm obviously going to try and speak with more, and I've had a lot of inbound since my letter went out as well, so maybe even 35% of the company would support, broadly support, the kind of agenda that I'm setting forth, and that is essentially an orderly wind-up of the company's affairs and return of all capital in the most expeditious form to shareholders. As I said, through a very large tender would accomplish that, but there are other avenues as well. negotiate with Woodside to crystallize the value of the earn out in advance. And again, there's

ways and mechanisms to do that. But essentially what I'm offering is some kind of return of total value well in excess of a dollar a share, which again is the company promulgated number. But the company promulgated number is kind of interesting because that's a static theoretical number where they say it's worth a dollar, including 50 cents of cash, but then they want to continue spending that cash on drilling. So it's kind of a habit both ways number. It's a have your cake and eat it too number. That's not really a dollar of value unless we can get the value in our in shareholders' pockets expeditiously, which is what I plan to do. So let's just summarize where we've got at this point. So the company has about a dollar per share, an asset value plus a little

bit of extra optionality. A couple months ago, Stam comes and lobs in it, you know, the stock's trading way under that value, probably because people think they're going to go drill a lot of dry Wells, but trading way underneath it. Stamlobs in a 45 cent bid, which, you know, is basically, hey, we'll pay you for the cash on the balance sheet and we'll take everything else and then we'll liquidate this and make a big profit ourselves. The company rejects that, but stock trades through the offer, you come in, buy up 1.5% and you're, correct me of my run, you are running a platform here.

You're going to activist. You're trying to replace board members and get shareholders to vote on, hey, let's get some board members who will, you know, follow this pretty easy plan, right? Stocks at 66, start tendering at 72, tender at 78, 10th at 82. Keep on tendering until you retire all the shares and then liquidate the proceeds to whoever remains. Essentially, yes, I should clarify, I have not put forth a board slate yet. So just to be completely clear on where I stand today, I am certainly, you know, that is certainly my go-forward plan is to engage more actively to take a potential board control of this company through some shape or form.

But again, just to kind of clarify the rule, so in Australia, you need to be a 5% shareholder to call an EGM, an extraordinary general meeting, at which meeting you could propose a variety of resolutions. For example, replacing directors. The directors are the ones who would actually replace the managing director. So it's actually a bit of a two-step process. The first thing to do would be to propose your own slate of directors to achieve board control, and then that board would essentially replace the managing director, assuming the current board doesn't come around and see things my way, which that's a TBD. Frankly, again, all my comments on the historical mismanagement of the company relate to the current managing director and the legacy board, not the two new board

members, who, as I said, are very, very new. And obviously, I'm very happy and willing to work with them to achieve the best outcome for everyone involved. The only thing is I just don't have anything concrete right now that I can disclose with regards to my own board slate. So I can't really say that I do. I shouldn't have said board state. But I guess what you're saying is, hey, I own 1.5% of this company. I have talked to. I haven't formed a group, but I've talked to another 30% of shareholders. The board, I mean, the board can go look at their stock price. It was 40 cents before the bid. It's at 65 cents now. The stock was saying, hey, you're going to light a lot of cash on fire before this. Now the stock market is saying, hey, we like that we might get

our cash back and they're putting odds. And you're just saying, look, I'm going to pressure. if the board wants to do what's right and return capital as a shareholder, great. I don't have to do anything. If not, like, I'm prepared to go to the next step is kind of where you're at right. That's totally right. I think that's a great way to put it. If the board is willing to play ball, we can have an amicable discussion. Of course, I welcome that first and foremost, but given their some of the language in their target statement, I think a prerequisite to that is definitely going to be a change in managing director. And so maybe it's worth highlighting at least some of the, and by the way, these are facts. These are not opinions. These are facts. But essentially,

the managing director was appointed in 2011 in relation to Farr Energy's merger with another small company called Flow Energy. Ms. Norman was previously the seat with the managing director of that company. Since that time, she's been being paid gross compensation of $7.5 million Australian dollars and delivered a negative 65% total shareholder return. And today, she owns a couple hundred thousand shares. So, and by the way, she did acquire a number of those shares. And by the way, she did acquire a number of those shares in the open market. So it wasn't entirely all through grants and what have you. But essentially my own holding at 1.5% is basically five times the entire board's holding today. So there's basically zero alignment between the board of the legacy managing director and

shareholders. And that's been the case for a very long time. And as I said, 7.5 million gross compensation. I mean, to kind of put that in context, you know, Ms. Norman was getting paid regularly close to a million dollars a year, you know, seven, eight, nine hundred thousand dollars a year when the CEO of Woodside Australia is basically at the time was 25% of the CEO of Woodside salary when the market cap is, you know, one, one, ten thousandth or whatever it is, right? And so there's a few other anecdotes that, you know, you've all heard it before, but it only speaks to make the point, you know, this company spends $500,000 a year on office rents in Collins Street. Collins Street, Melbourne, by the one, I'm from Sydney.

so I'm not taking a shot at Melbourne but Collin Street, Melbourne is kind of like Midtown Manhattan of Melbourne, white-collar bankers, lawyers, territory. I mean, this company has 85-90 employees. It has no operating business. I mean, it has some businesses in West Africa where they're drilling for oil, but it essentially has no operational revenue,

no operating assets beyond a couple of drilling rigs, which, by the way, they don't own. They lease in, right? So for them to spend $500,000 on an head office rent for a company this size is complete and utter, you know, it's a joke, frankly. In 2020, the last disclosed year last far, they spent a total of $2.7 million on board compensation. $2.7 million. Again, the board has shrunk since then, and again, those comments are to the previous board, not the current board, but the amount of corporate wastage and frittering of

shareholders' assets when the board owns zero shares has been, frankly, objectionable. Let me follow up on that because we can talk lots of risks and stuff, but this is a pretty simple story, right? There's an activist situation with hard, with hard assets for the most part, you know, you can quibble if the MPVs 10% or 9% or 11%. But active situation with the hard assets here, I think the biggest risk is, you know, I've looked at microcups for a long time. And there have been several times right by this is a microcap trading below cash.

Let's just like get the CEO on the phone, tell them to return capital. And it's never that simple, right? And you'll see, you've seen, I've seen microcaps literally burn the bridges, like just light the entire company on fire, trying to hold onto their jobs, trying to keep the activists. And sometimes it's like one of those peer victories where the activists come in and win, but they come in and win and the insiders have spent, you know, 50 million dollars on activist defense. And there's just kind of nothing left at the company anymore. So I guess the easiest pushback or the biggest risk here is, you know, obviously we can talk Hunter Douglas and you had great success there. the shareholder base here has turned over a lot, so you would think shareholders are probably supportive of getting more money over less, right? But what happens if managers decide, hey,

we're making a lot of money. We're in control of the company. We're going to burn all this money on fire trying to fight the activists off and keep the gravy train coming as long as we can. All right. So I guess that's a very valid concern. Let me try and defang it as best I can. firstly as I mentioned board renewal this is not the board from elder from the legacy company the two new board members essentially have no stake in maintaining the status quo right they've inherited a bad situation sure there's fees to be had but if you look at the backgrounds of at least one if not both of those gentlemen let's put it this way I believe they would be much more sympathetic to the argument I'm making than the legacy board so there's been some board

renewal already. There are only three directors with two new and have been there for seven, eight months. And as you can imagine, you need a majority of the board to make a change at the MD position. So you can imagine how minimal board change from here going forward could have a huge impact on the direction of the company. That's point one. Point two, if you actually read the target statement, they didn't come outright and say they agree with my agenda, of course, and there may be some elements within the board who want to maintain the gravy train. But if you look at what they've said about spending, they are doing a lot to kind of cut costs and basically wind down without saying it. So if you look at the two main exploration areas left, Guinea-Bissau and the

Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, they said, look, we're trying to farm down our interests along with the operator so that we don't actually have to bear the costs of drilling a well. Okay, that's point one. And then the Gambia, they said, yeah, there's still a lot of oil. There's a lot of we're really encouraged about the future prospects. Nevertheless, we are trying to farm down our interest. such that we get a free carry on a well to be drilled in late 2023 and some cash cocoan are back for costs that have already been budgeted for 2022. Not bad. And then point three, they said we're continuing to try and cut head office costs,

including moving to a new head office premises in the near term. In other words, they're getting out of that Collins Street building finally. So you have three different items. They're rapidly trying to cut costs. So if your thesis was correct and these guys intend to pull up the moat and just fight to the death, to get their, you know, five, six hundred grand a year for the next three, four years. Surely they'd be going the other way and saying, no, no, no, no, we're going to invest another 10 million drilling this well or that well. So it seems like they're maintaining some kind of

posture, but at the same time, they're retreating somewhat from aggressive spending. So to your point, I think the situation is obviously risky in the sense that it's a microcap, but I actually don't think it's all that risky if they only commit to spending the $6 million in 2022, which, by the way, I think that number comes down further because, as I said, cash on the balance sheet, 45 to 50 cents a share plus the woodside earn out is even at 50 cents on the dollar. You're more than covered. So this is still rape a capital special. You know, it's like, you know, look after the downside, the upside will take care of itself.

Yeah, I'm obviously trying to crystallize and catalyze that value return and get a huge excess return here. But, you know, worst case scenario, could I live with kind of a 75, 80 cents total return in six, nine months? sure. I mean, that wouldn't be a great, I wouldn't put that up as a win, but, you know, we could, you know, it's not going to keep me in diamonds and furs, but I wouldn't be out on the street dancing for Nichols either, you know? I, uh, I will disagree with part of your thing. I think you could afford plenty of diamonds and furs with that type of gross term. Let me ask more thing. I don't think this is central to the thesis, but I do think it's worth discussing. And I think it's where a lot of people's first thoughts are. The reason I, I don't

think it's too central anymore is I think this company's in play, right? As you said, about a third of the company's turned over. The stocks at 66, not 45 right now. But I'll go there anyway. Stam lobbed in their first bit at 45, right? And right now there's one bidder. The one bidder is Stan at 45. So I don't think they're going up to 60, 65 or something. I don't know what they're doing. So just can you talk to me for a second? You're not a group. I don't know if you talk to you or not, but I know you're not a group of Stan, but can you just talk to me for a second about what you think Stam's going to do

or thinking here? Sure. So as I said, Stam is a long short value-oriented investment fund in Sydney. As you said, 45 cent bid, it's almost impossible not to make a great return, right? They're no doubt very happy to take the whole thing down

or just control of the company at that level. They see what I see. It's simple. Having said all that, I think they must have been realistic and thought, well, we may not actually get control.

we may not be able to get, you know, the whole thing, but at least we're going to highlight the value and encourage other like-minded investors to look at this thing, which is essentially what happened. And this is essentially what they did in their last activist case. So they, I mean, you can look at this is all public information in Australia. They have a history of going around and bidding sometimes for control of deeply discounted securities and they're not ending up getting control, but nevertheless, either getting a few percent or getting the board to play ball, essentially. So there was a company called Kangaroo Island Timber that is now K-I-L on the Australian Stock Exchange. That was one of the last ones Stam did. You can look it up. They bid a dollar. I'm going from memory, so I don't know the exact numbers. But they bid at a somewhat of a premium to the extant stock price. I think it was a dollar, dollar five or something.

They already owned 20%. So they had a much larger shareholding and 25%. They bid at a dollar, dollar five, which is still a huge discount to asset. Again, a similar situation, mismanaged entity, huge hard asset value, blah, blah, blah. They beat $1, $1.5. They didn't get many acceptances, maybe a couple percent. They got up to 27, 28 percent. I'm not sure where.

But thereafter the board made their defense in a target statement, say it rejected, said we're worth $2 a share, whatever. And then the next thing that the board did is they bought back a quarter of the company in $1.35. And the stock today is like $1.40. So sure, they don't, they didn't get their playbook across in the sense they didn't get to buy the whole thing at a deep discount. but they nevertheless extracted a huge amount of value. Now, I don't know their current view. It has a stock come off since then. I was looking at it like a few, a couple weeks ago.

So maybe it's lower. The market's obviously being crushed. No, I was just saying that's beautiful stuff. It's wonderful to. Yeah, I mean, so they want to motivate and encourage through a visible campaign. I'm speculating what they want. I have no idea what they want. But it makes sense to, you know, to open the tent, to broaden the investment

intent for those who see the value because ultimately it's a, you know, it's a voting, it's a voting game, right? And, you know, so they have 5%. But if another 15, 20% join, then all of a sudden you're guaranteed to get at least one board seat by force or by voluntary measures. And at that point, at the very least, we can return a huge amount of that excess cash. So company just published their response to the bid yesterday, two days ago, something like that. where do we go from for where do we go from here so sure uh this this is a slightly more speculative uh basically the bid okay so i'll just give you the timeline so stams bid will expire on march 14th i assume it will be largely rejected given the stock price where it is so thereafter

you know those um those shareholders who have an interest in this will have to make a decision do you form a group do you not form a group do you you know get your board slate together. What do you do call an EGM? Or do you wait for the AGM? So the annual general meeting last year was in June. I assume it would be at similar timing today. There is one important detail I forgot to mention during the lead-up,

which is very important and peculiar to this case. In Australia, there's a rule called the two-strike rule, which is a very interesting rule. If the remuneration policy gets at least 25% votes against... Just for our domestic... Renumeration, that's a big word. That's the same. say-on-pay vote in Australia.

Say-on-pay vote. If you get at least 25% against, it's deemed a strike. So, for example, you have the say-on-pay vote once a year at the AGM. If you get 25% against one year, that's strike one. Then the next one rolls around. If you get another 25% against, that strike two. That automatically forces what's called a spill vote, where every director, not the MD, but every director is automatically put up for re-election at a new vote. so because

as far as management has been so historically bad they actually did get that first strike last year meaning at the AGM this year it's almost guaranteed they will get a similar strike meaning if we go to the AGM there will most likely be a spill vote now that means there'll be another vote sometime later

I think it's 60 or 90 days later where all the directors have to be put up for re-election again and to be honest you know that you need 50% right So they may get the 50%. But it's my view that once there is a spill vote, once that remuneration policy gets that second strike, that in itself is a huge catalyst for board renewal.

And obviously the new members on the board, even though we were elected last year, they're not up for renewal. But in a spill vote, they would be put up for renewal. So the managing director would not be at risk. I mistakenly thought the managing director would be up for renewal as well. It's not just the directors, but the two new directors would. and so if they don't get the necessary votes then of course at that time someone like me would

likely propose a new slate and those directors would obviously do what I suggested in my platform and so you have now that that's a bit more of an extended process I think than an EGM and any shareholder who owns 5% or group can call an EGM at which they can propose these resolutions to similar effect now you have to give 21 days notice and then directors have I believe it's 90 days to call an EGM. So if you think about the timeline, Stan's bit expires March 14th, thereafter I imagine I will have conversations with a wide variety of shareholders and the company. Thereafter, you may or may not see an EGM resolution or we may wait until June and go to the AGM. But basically within six months, I imagine this will be resolved one way

another, is how I would put it. This isn't a two or three year trade. Within six months, one way or another, we will either have the board we have or a new board and a new MD or we won't. And we will know what's going to happen. So in terms of cash burn at the company, short, 2022, you're going to continue to burn somewhere between, look, they said six million or six plus million dollars of cash out this year. I think it'll be lower than that. But yeah, you might have a multi-million dollar cash out this year. But 2023, short, there might be, I mean, the only other real liabilities on the balance sheet are least liabilities related to the office exit, which I believe are included largely in the six million. And then drilling licenses and

requirements, which were running at a million a quarter. But if you, essentially the thing about drilling licenses is if you are willing to bite the bullet and say we won't get anything back and just give up your rights to drill, you can walk away free and clear. Maybe you have to pay some of the contractors a bit, but if you give up your rights, you don't have to put any more money in. My point is we'd be much better off getting a guaranteed $1.25, $30 back through a creative capital usage than trying to drill for something that may or may not be there and we don't have the resources for. So my kind of base or upside case scenario, let's say, is not upside case, but I think the base case scenario is we're sitting here 12 months from today with a dollar 30 of value in our

pockets, largely derived from a huge tender at accretive levels, and Woodside cutting us a check early, which is in their best interest as well. I think we've covered a lot here. It's late my time. I'm going to get ready to go to bed in a second, but I want to ask two questions. First, far. I think we pretty much covered everything, but is there any point you wish we had hit or anything we should hit a little harder? I think. I think that's. That's basically it. I mean, yeah, I mean, I would only highlight it is definitely a small cap company and not the most. I mean, it's liquid now, but it's often not the most liquid security. But in terms of actual. It is not the most liquid. As someone who tried to buy a couple shares the other day, it took some work and I'd have to overnight to an Australian broker and something. It's not easy. Well, the thing is, it was trading very aggressively in a 50, 60 cents range. It was trading a few million dollars a day, but it's kind of dried up around 65 cents, which makes sense. Well, the 50-60-sense range is the range I wanted to pay, Jeremy. You snooze, you lose, mate.

I know, I know. But look, who knows, you might get another chance. But no, I think we covered everything. I think we should probably do an update at some point in the next, I don't know, three months, four months from today. We should have a good idea of where we stand. Well, my second question was, you know, I think every time I have you on, we say we're going to do just a rundown and just talk lots of event stocks and stuff.

But again, it's running late. So I don't know if we'll get to do that, but maybe we'll do the three months. month update and do that. But anything else on your radar you want to chat about in terms of event land? Dude, I mean, I've got another 10 minutes if you do, but if you want to, you know, it's getting late, right? So you want to call it a day. We'll try for 10 minutes. I'll try to my eyes over for 10 more minutes. All right. Well, look, I mean, I think there were a few questions on Twitter about last minute, the European travel stock. Oh, I know well, yep. I know it well because you're the one who told me to do it. Yeah. I've told you, go ahead, go ahead.

Yeah, no, I was just going to say, so this is really interesting. I mean, look, you have people fighting over themselves to pay mid-teens multiple of US OTAs, okay, where we're booking an Expedia trade. And like, in the last 12 months, you've seen a pretty aggressive local recovery in the US and everyone's bulled up on the leisure travel return trade post-COVID. But, you know, Europe is essentially 12 months, 15 months, maybe more, maybe not that look, 12 months behind where the US was, just given the slower vaccine rollout and the fragmentation of the market. And you have, look, last minute.com is a Swiss listed smallish cap security.

It's about a 500 million market cap. Trading it, I think, four and a half times even ebidba, post-COVID EBITDA. And they literally just came out in their 4Q report and said, okay, so just to give a few elements of context, we don't have time to go into all of it, but essentially they focus on packages, so not pure vanilla flights, but packages. So flight plus hotel bundled together, that's the core of their offering. So they're much more akin to a business like Thomas Cook that went defunct or TUI, TUI, a big German-listed operator or even something like On the Beach, which is a UK-focused travel provider, than they are to a pure OTA with has a much higher flight exposure like booking. Anyway, they came out and said, we're seeing massive demand in February.

Essentially, despite Omicron January was a very good month, February, huge demand running 20% above pre-COVID levels. Sorry, Jeremy. They is last minute or they is booking? They is last minute. They is last minute. When they say that? I didn't see them say that. Yeah, it was 19% above run. So to be clear, in February. So not in the reported numbers for 4Q, but in recent weeks, we're seeing 19% above run rate, you know, pre-COVID February, whatever it was, demand for packages. And so, I mean, there's a few threads to pull that here. I guess the threat I like to pull out is the most easy to quantify. And that is the cost out opportunity. Right. So basically during COVID, a lot of businesses did this. They went through

and deracinated the cost structure of their business. So, you know, if booking levels, GTV, so gross travel value, basically, bookings gets back to 2019 levels, essentially, I think instead of making 50, 60 million of EBITDA, I think they'd be making 80 to 90 million, maybe 90 million of EBITDA, right? Just there. Then you have this structural move away from single flight bookings to more, to more curated travel, right? So there's structural move towards packages.

People want to get everything buttoned up before they travel now. Is there a structural move to that? They've been talking about it. The numbers seem to, it's very early in Europe, but a lot of providers have been talking about. Tui mentioned it aggressively. Last minute mentioned it a lot. It seems like there's a bit more interest towards it.

And then the third angle is strategic interest. There's obviously special situations guy like me. This is where I really, you know, get out of bed, excited. Is booking.com bought another European travel player, E-traveli, for a huge multiple of what turned out to be a lot. making business. I thought it was actually a profitable business, but they paid it a billion plus for a business that is in a different vertical, essentially meta and flight oriented, but they basically wanted to integrate their offerings in Europe. And then booking on their recent

call said, look, we could have competed and built the technology ourselves, but in Europe, it's actually quite complex given all the different markets. And that's important because the correct me from hearing, but last minute does bookings. If you're on the booking website and you look for a package in Europe, last minute is actually the technology behind that. So the same rationale would play out. Yes. So that is true. It's slightly more nuanced in the booking does white label last minute.com's dynamic package offering, meaning a package that it's not like, you know, seven days from Sunday to Sunday, but customized by the user. So, okay, I want to leave on a Wednesday, come back on a Tuesday, you know, and I want to fly Ryanair. So a customizable package

called a dynamic package, that technology was developed and licensed by a last minute, not just to booking, but to a number of other hotel operators and sites in Europe as well. But yes, that's a good, strong validation for the technology and is essentially what booking was doing with e-traveli. They were a supplier to booking as well, and then they got rolled up for the synergies. And so, look, I think there's just multiple ways to win. Either Europe reopens, it's 100% leisure travel, basically. Leisure travel comes back roaring.

Everyone's talking about this thing trades on a very, very low multiple. Two, booking tries to roll it up because they need the technology. They don't want to build it themselves. The market access are 13 different markets that last minute is licensed in. All the local language support the last minute has spent many years developing. And three, the ownership structure of the business would encourage a sale because one of the founders recently sold down to essentially a private equity buyer. Private equity is increasingly dominating the float. I think they own about 30, maybe even 40% of the look through equity last minute.

They were trying to sell before COVID, if I remember correctly. aren't they? They almost sold the business pre-COVID at a level, quote, unquote, much higher than the extant stock price. And the stock at that time was in the mid-40s. So, yeah, I mean, I can't see how this trades at four, four and a half five EV EBITDA, even if it doesn't get taken out in 2020. The other thing that's interesting, I'm not involved here currently, but I did a decent bit of work on it when you first mentioned it to me. If you go through, I don't think they published the 2021 financials, but the 2000, either the 2020 financials or the 2021 semi-annual financials. I can't remember. If you look in the footnotes, they give you their goodwill and how they model like,

they basically give you the DCF for how they get to their goodwill, which is basically them giving you their internal projections for what the business is going to do. And hint, it's a lot higher than what the current stock price has implied, which, you know, internal projections, whatever, but I hadn't seen anyone we talked about them before. And my history has been when a company puts into a financial filing future projections that have been run by auditors, because again, that's in the footnotes. So the auditors have to bless that, it tends to be pretty interesting if it's hugely divergent from what the stock market has. Totally. That was a great catch. I should have mentioned that. And then the other thing that's more obvious to, you know,

a less observant person like myself is that the executive comp package is basically two-thirds of it is struck at 60 francs a share, the stocks at 40. None of these guys are getting paid unless the stock gets obviously meaningfully above 60 year. That's 50% of it. upside right there. I mean, look, I kind of targeted some lower multiple, but nevertheless, I think achievable multiple for a potential transaction with booking, you know, like a high single digit multiple of new run rate earnings. And that even that gets you a mid 70 stock price, 80, 80 euro, 80 francs stock price. So it's pretty juicy, I think. Anyway, it's late. So I want to let you get to bed, but that's that's one that's really high on my radar and it's one of my bigger

positions at the moment. Perfect. Well, hey, Jeremy, a couple months we'll have to do a catch up on far and we're going to have to do the long way to you and I just go through 10 different event names. And I think it's a really interesting time for events right now. I posted something the other day just like, not that I've never, but it is really interesting. You and I talked MoneyGram offline before, but I just use the MoneyGram example. Thank you. I wish I had been a lot bigger, but I just used the example. Like there was a Reuters reports bid at 1050 or whatever. Three bidders come in, bids at 10.5. And the stock was at $9 for. for three weeks. And I just kept looking at being like, what's going on? And then a deal came,

but we've seen several of those. Tegna the other day. You know, there was one bit at 23. There was one bit at 24. Stock closes last week at 2050. And they announced a deal this week at 24. And you know, I know these aren't like screaming grand slams. Jeremy Raper buys something for 40 cents and liquidates it for $1.20. But like those are really interesting. And I'm seeing a lot of those. And I know some of those fit into your real house. So we're going to have to do that. But Jeremy Raper, I'm going to include a link to his Twitter. So look, if you're an Australian shareholder afar and you're just looking to swap notes, looking to talk, looking to it smarter, please reach out to Jeremy.

I do not envy the sport if they try to stop you from doing what's rational here, because we saw it Hunter Douglas. You'll probably get what you want. But thanks for coming on, Jeremy. We'll chat soon. Thanks, man. Thanks for having me. I appreciate it.

Speak soon. Later, buddy.