Yet Another Value Podcast - November 2025 Random Ramblings

Episode Date: November 14, 2025

Host Andrew Walker delivers his November ramblings with four key themes. He kicks things off with a story about craps in Vegas to illustrate how early wins in investing can falsely reinforce flawed strategies. Andrew also explores the mental traps of buying stocks he initially passed on, offers cautious commentary on shorting the so-called "AI bubble," and reflects on why trusting management projections and NAV estimates often ends in disappointment. With a new baby on the way, Andrew signs off with personal updates and an open invitation for listeners to reach out and discuss these topics further._________________________________________________________[00:00:00] Podcast intro and disclaimer[00:02:05] Wins lure into false security[00:12:45] Passed stocks drop, then buy[00:20:00] Shorting AI bubble discussed[00:26:20] Trusting management and NAV[00:28:40] Final thoughts and baby updateLinks:Yet Another Value Blog - https://www.yetanothervalueblog.com See our legal disclaimer here: https://www.yetanothervalueblog.com/p/legal-and-disclaimer

You're about to listen to the yet another value podcast with your host, me, Andrew Walker. Look, if you like this podcast, it would mean so, so much to me. If you could rate, subscribe, review it wherever you're watching or listening to it. Rating, subscriptions, reviews help me get more viewers, which helps me get better guests, which helps the podcast fly. I will just keep spinning. But anyway, today we're going, I don't have to worry about guests today because my guest is me. It is time for my November monthly random rambling.

I'm going to ramble quite a bit today. I have four topics that I want to talk about. The four topics are Wednesday. that lure you into security, things that you pass on that drop that you then go on to buy and in my history of that not working out well for me, shorting the AI bubble, and I've got quotes around the AI bubble, and I'll say shorting is risky, see the full disclaimer at the end of the episode, but I've got thoughts on shorting the AI bubble and the risks parallels. People draw parallels to the dot-com bubble, but I think there might be another parallel to keep in mind.

No firm thoughts, but I just interesting thought-provoking experience to think about. I'll obviously explain that during the ramble. And finally, some thoughts. on trusting management NAV and numbers and how you can make that work for you, why it doesn't work, all sorts of stuff there. So I'm already starting to ramble. Let me go to our sponsors and then we'll dive into the monthly random members, a word from our sponsors coming up. Today's podcast is sponsored by Alpha Sense. Look, you know Alpha Sense as a long-time sponsor of this podcast. I love all their tools. They're Virgin AI tools. I love their expert networks. And I increasingly love their webinars. They are sponsored this podcast. The next webinar they have coming

up is P distributions is the drought finally over? They're going to be talking about, go on Twitter, go look. Everyone's talking about, hey, P, you know, the IRRs, are they real? Where's the cash? Where's all this sort of stuff? So they've got a great set of speakers who are coming on and talking about all those things. Hey, if they open up P and alternatives to investors, what is that, to retail investors, what does that look like? They've got a great set of speakers. It's sensitive from capital allocators and Zemir Smith, the director of E&I Research Alphsense, It's launching November 18th. There'll be a link to the sign up in the show notes and on the blog.

You can sign up there. And thank you to Alphsense for sponsoring this episode. All right. Hello and welcome to the yet another value podcast. I'm your host, Andrew Walker, here today for my monthly random ramblings. It is Sunday, November 9th, and I'm going to ramble about four things. I'll tell you what those four things are in a second. But first, quick disclaimer, remind everyone nothing on this podcast is investing in advice.

I don't think I'm talking about any specific stocks here. But, you know, if I do, I'm just rambling. for 30 minutes or so, so please see a full disclaimer at the end of the podcast. And remember, not on the best advice. Today, I want to talk about four different things. Normally it's five, but it's four today. Maybe I'm less thoughtful this month. But the four things are wins that lure you into security, a false sense of security,

and then kind of related thought on things that you pass on that drop and then maybe your bar is a little bit lower. Again, I'm going to explain all these. I realize I'm just kind of rambling and saying random words. Then I want to talk about people shorting the AI bubble, and then I want to wrap this up with something on trusting management, trusting management NAB, trusting management numbers. So let's up until all that. First thing I want to talk about, wins that lure you into security. And I'd love to explain things with metaphors and stories, you know, a little bit of storyteller.

I like to think, probably not a very good one. But let me give you a story. I don't gamble much. That's the honest truth. I'll do, you know, if I'm watching a basketball game, I'll slap $20 on a team or the over under just because it's more fun. You know, basketball game lasts two and a half hours, $20 is what you'd pay for a movie these days. And watching a game with $20 on a, it's better EV than going to the movies, right? So I'll do that. I don't really gamble up. But every year I do, or at least the past three years, I've gone to Planet MicroCap in Vegas. It's been a ton of fun.

I'd love to see you there if you're going, et cetera. But, you know, when I go to Planet MicroCap, it's a ton of fun. And I give myself a gambling budget, like $300 to go. So not crazy. That is money. But, you know, three days, $300, it's not much. If I lose it all in one drop, okay, I'm done gambling. If I can make a little bit and make it last, great, awesome.

So I'm not going crazy. I like to think I'm a investor. But I like craps. That's my game of choice. I will play some blackjack, but it's generally craps or blackjack. And craps is a really funny game. For those of you who don't know, craps is the game where you throw, you roll the dice.

And if you have never played craps and you hop onto a table and the table, it's called getting hot, where the table you're just throwing point after points and the whole table's winning at the same time. The table's hot, the shooter's on a heater, whatever you want to call it. If you bring somebody new to the craps table and the table is hot, they will think that you've given them access to a free ATM machine, right? They'll know that that's not how it works because, you know,

there aren't built on giving him. But I mean, you'll do it and be like, I can't believe, like, the house has an edge on this. This is insanity. And that does have a very small edge in craps. But the thing with craps is it's extremely high variance, right? If the table's hot, you can make 10 times your money in a second. And if the table is cold,

you can lose all your money in a second. So, oh, why do I mention that? Oh, so I bring a friend this year. He's never played crafts for. He comes to playing on MicroCamp. He comes with me. We go to the craps table. The table is hot.

And we were laughing about it. He was like, this is a free money hack. This is the infinite money hack. This is a free ATM, right? So you're laughing. He made, you know, 5X's money in night one. I think night two, he had a great night too, talking about how this is free money.

But, you know, the casinos, again, there's no free money at the casinos. The odds catch up to him. and night three, I mean, not literally lost his shirt, but all of the winnings were gone, right? And that's kind of the fun of it, right? As long as you don't have a gambling problem, that's kind of the fun. You go, you have a great time with your friends. We've got the stories of the big highs and the big lows.

So why do I mention all this? Well, first I mention it because, you know, he's my friend. I had two friends who were doing this. We'll see if they listen to the podcast, if they reach out and they're like, hey, you can tell my stories. We'll see. But the main reason I mention it is I think about it when it comes to themes and strategies, right? If you invest in a theme or strategy and there are five winners in a row, is it evidence

a skill or did you kind of go to the craft table and the craft table is hot and you roll it five times and now you're overconfident in yourself and you don't know how to edge it. And I'll give you an example with myself. I still look at a lot of legal special situations and I used to do a lot more of them. And I would say the first kind of seven years of me professionally investing to the except I am a professional, I had very few legal losers. I mean, it just felt like one after another running antitrust bets, winning on anti-trust bets, winning on M-A-E bets, winning on like every legal situation was a winner. And over the past three years, I feel like every legal situation I've looked at has been a loser. And that has me wondering, the first seven years

was that a hot streak? Was I, was that a hot street? Was I more selective in my diligence? Was it just Hot Tree, did I just get lucky? What was it? If I was just lucky, did I ever have skill or edge there again, was it luck? Is this an area I should be looking at the last three years where they've all been losers? Is it because did my diligence get work? Was it luck? So I was investing in an area where I had no skill? Was I riding a wave and maybe, again, my diligence dropped because I said, hey, I know legal situations. I can do this. I am good at these. I can assign odds better. I don't know, but it's something I'm really thinking about. And look, you know, I say legal situations.

And then you would say, hey, Andrew, I remember every Twitter podcast I did. And Twitter was obviously a big winner and one of the winners I referred to. Every Twitter podcast I did, I'd start to say, hey, guys, I am not a lawyer. So who am I to say, I have edge competing against lawyers, competing against people who are trained in this thing, just kind of jumping as in generalists? I don't know. And then, you know, I would say a lot of things. times I will talk to journalists about ideas and they'll hop into, and I'm the exact same way,

right? Hop into ideas in sectors that they're not specialized in and think they can make money. And is that the, is that the height of a, you know, generally, I hope all the people who are smart, is that the height of ego that you can say, hey, I'm not specialized in this sector, but I can kind of parachute in, learn everything and make money investing in this sector? The height of ego, are they on a winning streak? Is that crazy? I don't know, but it's something I've really been thinking about a lot. And, you know, I guess this evolves from wins luring you into security to what I thought as I've continued to rambling. It kind of dives into, hey, where is your edge? Where can you get edge? Where can you express edge? But let me bring wins that lure you

into security. Let me zoom out and go a little further. You know, I mentioned legal situations as my personal example. Another one I've really been thinking about. And if you've listened to this podcast, if you've read any of my writing to anything, you'll know. John Malone is someone I think about a lot. an unfortunate amount, I would say. And the past 10 years, in my opinion, I mean, look, the man's a billionaire. I'm about to say this. The past 10 years, in my opinion, have not been kind to John Malone. I'm sure, you know, again, he's a multi-billionaire. I'm sure they've been kind enough to him. But his empire has really crumbled over the past few years. Go pull up the stock of any of the Liberty trackers for the most part. I mean, Formula One's been great.

But aside from that, you know, Sirius hasn't worked. Charter was a big investment for him. That hasn't worked. Like, I think I do have a small investment in Charter that we can talk about. but it's not a big position anymore. But I was very wrong. And it ended up coming to play here. You know, Charter hasn't been great. Warner Brothers Discovery has been a disaster. All of these things like QBC on the verge of bankruptcy, Sirius XM, great 20 years ago.

Past 10 years have been a disaster. Like everything's been a disaster. And it's got me wondering. The famous John Malone model was a Loverd Buyback story, right? You got a growing business with basically a cable business, right, with subscription-based business, it grows, you know, you add a couple more subs, you get a little bit of pricing power, so it grows every year. You keep leverage constant on it, you know, four times EBDA or whatever. EBDA goes up every year. So because you're keeping that leverage

constant, you generate cash flow and you can add a boost up every year. You know, if EBDA grows by 10%, you can increase your debt by 10% because you keep your leverage constant. You can return increasing amounts of free cash flow to your shareholders. So that was the John Malone levered buyback model. And that's what made him rich, right? And I do wonder, John Malone practiced the levered buyback model from 1980 to 2010 is when it's just at its absolute best, right? And that is a period of declining interest rates, and it's the best period for media and history. So he's got that double tail win. And I wonder if, you know, all of us value investors, we get obsessed with the levered buyback stories. And I wonder if it's actually not as good a story. Point me to one that's worked over the

past 10 years, few and far between. And I wonder if it was not, hey, this is a great model, even though mathematically, intuitively, it does make sense to me. So I don't know. But I wonder if it wasn't as great of a model for a world that, you know, admittedly has thicker risk. I wonder if it was really benefiting from dual tailwinds of declining interest rates. That's the main one. Plus, the media companies from 80 to 2010 are kind of in the best of all worlds for them. And they've just been devastated over the past 10 years as their moots have come down. But I wonder if he was more a product of the tailwinds he was writing than his than his kind of strategy actually being great. And now, this is hard to say because A, I saw that

had a lot of respect for John Malone. And one thing I didn't say was John Moulon's son of Jesus because the man is off the change is bright. You know, like he's an electrical engineer, PhD, all this, like he is absolutely bright. I think the levered buyback model makes a lot of sense in the electrical engineering, the mathematical, the Excel spreadsheet model. But it was a big winner from 80 to 2010. And I wonder if that is just the tailwinds. And, you know, it has not worked over the past 10 years. Malone's empire has not crumbled because it's still together, but almost all the pieces of done disastrously. And they're all practicing this levered buyback model. And many of them, you know, they practice levered buyback model for the past 10 years. And over the past year or two,

they've had to really hit the brakes. And in many cases, reverse it, raise equity capital, or worse. They're on the verge of bankruptcy. So I don't know, but that's one thing I've really been thinking about. You know, Wins lowering you into security, and that applies both to individual investors and kind of different themes they like to invest in, different strategies they like to invest in, and honestly, it applies to management teams, companies overall pursuing different strategies. Related thought I have. Let's move to the second thought. Things that you pass on that drop. So, you know, every now and then, a few friends will pitch me an idea, you know, an idea will get hot among kind of the value

event investors I like to talk to. And they'll pitch me an idea. They'll be like, hey, this is a great growth company. This is awesome. This is the next big winner. You know, again, I respect my friends a lot. They're all smart. And three of them will come to me and say, hey, I'm along this company. Look at this diligence. Look at this. This is great. It's growing. It's cheap. All this sort of stuff. I love this. Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. And I'll research it. And for one reason or another, I'll pass. In one case, I'll give one anonymized example. A bunch of my friends are a long company, and they're long-it because they say, hey, the EBITA is really, it's really cheap on an EBITDA basis. EBITDA is growing, all this sort of stuff. And I look at it, and the

EBAA to me, the accounting was impenetrable to me. I thought the ad-backs were crazy. The cash flow and the EBITDA did not really match, et cetera, et cetera. So I saw, and I'm not accusing like anything on Twitter. I just, I didn't think the economics of the business were as good is what they were pitching. Okay? So I pass on it. And then fast forward six months. My friends are pitching at 50.

I identify, you know, I pass for the accounting. Maybe there's another risk or two I identify. I pass. The stock announces a terrible quarter and the stock goes from 50 to 30. And maybe they say, hey, our accounting, we had problems with it, whatever, right? There's a risk that I identified that played out. And actually, accounting might not have been a great example because I specifically am talking about times where you identify a risk and it plays out. You know, you say, hey, that soda company

you're talking about is great, but I'm really worried that Coca-Cola is going to enter that market. That dating app company you're talking about is great. I'm really worried that Facebook is going to enter that market. You identify that risk, you hold off, then that risk comes to pass and the stock gets hammered, right? So it goes from 50 to 30. I have found that that is a very difficult set up for me. I have multiple times it's gone from 50 to 30 and then I bought the stock and then the stocks gotten crushed. It's actually

been perhaps my worst performing investment. If I go back, I like to go back through what were my worst investments. What were our best investments? Perhaps my worst performing bucket is stocks that I initially passed on. I had a bunch of notes. It dropped. The risks

I came out to play. It dropped. I'd buy it and it's a disaster. And I Again, to the winners, learning you into security point, I have been wondering, is there something, look, this is a fault on me, right? Because obviously people can pass on things and buy them and have them be successful investments after they drop. I've been wondering if there's something mentally with me where, hey, do I think, oh, I correctly identified the risk that took it from 50 to 30? I know this company stone cold because I identified that one risk. Like, what is wrong

with me. What is in that scenario, in that setup, what is causing me to perform so poorly, right? Because the answer cannot be, hey, every company that I pass on that has risks, I just pass on for the rest of time once the risks have come to play. That can't be the right answer. But maybe it should be because I'm telling you, these are the worst investments I've ever had. So I've been thinking a lot about for me mentally what is happening there, how to readjust, how to reframe it. And I bring, again, I bring myself into it, but I'm pretty sure that I'm not the only one who can have this problem or the Winsler and you. It's a security problem because these do seem pretty applicable to most investors. So I've been thinking about that a lot.

How do you reframe, you know, if I'm constantly getting into these situations where I pass at 50, the risk hits, the stock drops are 30, I'm buying it, and then it's dropping again. How do I reframe it? What am I doing wrong? What diligence am I skipping or what step am I skipping? What is happening there where I think because it's gone from 50 to 30, I identified that risk, I am not doing enough diligence. Or I'm thinking I understand what's going on there. So that's the second thing I want to talk about. Let's go to the last thing. And these can be shorter.

I always forget to keep track of time when I'm doing these. I don't know if I've been rambling for 20 minutes or 20 hours. But shortly that AI bubble. And I'm putting AI bubble in quotes there. I think the past three months there's been a heavy, heavy drumbeat of people. claiming AI bubble. About a week ago, there was the now infamous Sam Altman basically hanging up on a podcast because someone asked, hey, you're a $10 billion company that's promising a trillion dollar of cap tax over the next 10 years. How are you going to fund that?

But, you know, for the past three months, six months, whatever it is, people have really been talking about shorting the AI bubble, right? And I think the most popular ones I would hear, and I think you'd have to be crazy to short either of these naked or anything. And shorting's extra risky. disclaimer, all that sort of stuff. But I'm just talking about the most positive ones I generally hear are Pallantir and Correve. But there are plenty of other. The reason I choose Pallantir and Correve is because they trade at nosebley valuations.

And both of them have, I would say, questionable economics, questionable TAM, questionable modes. It doesn't mean that they're not great companies. I'm just saying, like, I think there's questions could be raised, right? So especially value investors, I think, look at these and say, oh my God, the valuation is insane. Competition is looming. All the steps.

Correve, questionable economics, all the sort of stuff. and they short them. And I get it. And when these people short them, they say, hey, I am basically, they're drawing the parallel. They're drawing the pattern recognition to, I am shorting these companies at, you know, I'm shorting the top of the dot-com bubble. Was Cisco a great company? Yes.

But if you shorted it in late 1999, early 2000, and you could hold on because I think it did run up a little bit. But, you know, the stock got crushed. The valuation was insane. And Palance here, Corey, all these guys trade for even crazier valuations, I think, with either argument. So I totally get that. But I do wonder, you know, people also forget in kind of 2010 to 2015, there was a steady drumbeat of hedge fund managers who with really good track records, actually, who would make buzzes about shorting a lot of the tech companies.

And the ones I'm particularly thinking about are Tesla, Netflix, Amazon, Salesforce, a bunch of other ones, them. And they were short these. And the thesis was, there were lots of thesises, right? But the main thesis was accounting and valuation. I specifically remember Netflix, how they'd appreciated their movies and their owned IP. Got lots of questions from short sellers. Amazon never turned an economic profit, right? Salesforce, crazy valuation.

So those were the shorts. And the shorts would say, hey, these are great. Maybe they'd say they were great companies. Maybe they wouldn't, but they would say the valuation is sane. and this dot-com bubble, all of them got their faces ripped off, right? All of them got their faces ripped off. Go pull up the Netflix chart. Go pull up the Tesla chart.

Go pull up the Amazon chart. Faces ripped off. So I do wonder, like, with Palantir and Correve, yes, I get the questions on the long-term economics and everything. I get that. But people draw the parallels to, hey, I am shorting the dot-com bubble, and I hear it. But you could have made the exact same arguments for these great companies that became the magnificent seven.

you know, all this sort of stuff 10 years ago, and you were just dramatically wrong, right? Like, you got your face ripped off and many of them turned out to be the best businesses of all time. I'm not saying Palantiricor where you get there, but I think people talk a lot about the AI bubble side. They talk about the valuation. They talk about the AI bubble side. People say, oh, I'm going to short this.

Oh, you know, crazy inflated. I get that. And then I hear people, I hear people on the short side or I hear people who kind of fall into the kid that I actually admittedly in, where it's just like too hard. don't know where it's going. You can't short meme stops all those shows up. I don't want to touch it, right? So I hear those two camps, but I very rarely hear the third camp.

And maybe it's because I'm not talking to enough retail bulls. I don't know. But I very rarely hear the third camp of, hey, you would have said the same thing about Amazon, Netflix, Tesla, all these guys 10 to 15 years ago. You would have been decidedly wrong. What if we're not on the dot com bubble 2.0 path with these guys? What if we are on, hey, these are actually the companies of the future? Because if that's the case, there's still probably a lot more room to run.

Now, they traded such big valuations. They traded such big market. Maybe not. But I think it's an interesting other side of the coin. And just something to consider, think about, I want to put that out. Last thing. Last thing I wanted to talk about trusting management. Now, I've talked about trusting management on this podcast and on the blog a few times.

And I've generally meant that we're, I've gotten friendly with a management team. And they, to be honest, pulled my pants down, right? I thought, hey, these guys are good guys. They know what I want. They know what I expect. I respect them. I think they think about the world right. They say, hey, Andrew, we understand we're undervalued.

We would never issue equity in a deal. We get it. Like, we're working towards shareholder returns, all this sort of stuff. We see the same value in our shares that you do. We're working towards shareholder returns. We get it. And then six months later, they say, hey, I mean, look, we had the opportunity to do the deal of the century.

How could you have us turn down the deal of the century that had us issue, you know, 50% of our equity at these cheap prices? And by the way, I mean, management didn't do it. because we'd be running a bigger empire and we'll get paid a lot, but that type of stuff. So that's the trusting of management. Hey, I believe they're going to do the right thing for shareholders despite maybe their incentives not being aligned or everything. I think they get it because I'm friends with them and I've talked to them.

I've shook their hand. They've got a solid handshake. I always think about that. What I'm talking about here is management numbers and NAB. And the two in particular I would talk about is a lot of companies will do investor days and they will publish three-year targets. And famously, I don't have statistics or studies on this, but I'm pretty sure most companies miss their three-year targets when they put them out, and pretty dramatically. So, I mean, the SPAC bubble would be the fantastic one, right? The SPACs

in 2021. How many SPATs put out revenue projections that said they'd be earning $5 billion? This is late 2025 by this year, and like many of them still haven't generated any revenue. But even more than that, I mean, there are big companies that put out big long-term targets. A famous one might be IBM with Buffett in the early 2010s. They had their famous, hey, here's our long-term EPS target, and they missed it dramatically, right? But management love to put out numbers at investor days. And the other thing I find a lot of management teams like to do is they like to put out NAB slides, net asset value slides, right?

They like to put them out that says, hey, here's our different, here's the pieces, different pieces of our company, here's how much they're worth, here's what we think our stock is worth. And I will call myself out on this, but I think plenty of investor will agree with me. It's very easy for me, especially at the NAV slide, you know, management lays out the NAV and they say, hey, look, we own, you know, 5% of this company that's valued at a billion dollars, that's $50 million value there, 10% of this company, that's $100 million. They laid that all out, and then it comes out to a nice number that says, hey, we're worth a billion dollars, we have $100 million, a hundred million shares outstanding.

our shares are worth $10 per share on an AV basis. We trade for $6. We trade at a 40% discount. And look, you can, I will obviously go and check the assumptions under every piece of that NAV. But I will tell you, my history has been, even if I check the assumptions and I think the assumptions are good, my history investing in kind of management NAV stories has been not great, right?

It's not great. And even when the assumptions are fine. And I think there's a lot of reasons for that, but it's a lot of reasons. I mean, in particular, management NAVs never give discounts for corporate overhead, which I always do, but the corporate overhead a lot of times is running pretty big. And once you kind of like capitalize that, it takes a big trend of that NAB discount away. But even adjusting for that, you know, I just don't think I've had a lot of success when a management publishes an NAB number that says, you know, obviously it says the NAB is

higher than the stock price. I buy the stock. I don't think I've ever had much success. in that scenario. And I wonder why that is. It could be possible that the reason is, I talk all the time, hey, you need an edge that is not in the numbers, right? A hundred years ago, if you were buying stock in the 50s and the 60s and you were

calculating, hey, book value is 10, the stock trades at 5, this is a buy, that could work. Today, that's done by quantitative computers. And if you're trying to compete on that, you're going to get out competed 100 times out of 100, in my opinion. Maybe it's the same thing with management in NAV, right? Like if management's presenting the NAV, the market knows it and it's trading at a discount for a reason, doesn't mean it can't work, right? Because if you say, hey, I think management is much more incentivized to unlock this NAB

than the market believes, that's a thesis maybe. But just saying, hey, management's got NAB at 10, the stocks at 5, that's probably not a thesis. I will tell you it has not worked for me. And it's something I've been thinking about, you know, hey, A, how do I make myself more skeptical of some of these management teams in NAB? But B, why hasn't that worked? And how can you kind of tweak that?

Because I do, I am a value investor at heart. I do want to buy stuff for less than their worth. How do you tweak that? So, hey, I can, you know, buy stuff for less than the work. I can find these NAV discounts. I can have management kind of guide light, but I'm not constantly buying things at a discount to what management says it is and then never realizing value.

And, you know, I'll give one very fast example. Liberty, Sirius XM, serious XM. I like this example because anyone could do the math. the management, Greg Maffa, who was the Liberty CEO at the time, would do the math all the time, right? Serious XM traded for $4 per share that implied that Liberty Sirius's NAV, which was basically all serious XM stock, was, if I remember correctly, $40 per share, and Liberty Serious traded for $25 per share, right? And Greg Mousay would say all the time, hey, this is the discount, we know it's there, we're going to attack it, we're going to buy back stock, all this type of stuff. And the reason I like using this

because it's a great example, and also it plays the Malone stuff I talked about earlier. He'd say that all the time. But I think the interesting things that happened there was, A, he would always say we're going to buy back shares, but at multiple points when things got stressful, they would stop or they famously, infamously, I don't know, did a rights offering to save the rest of Malone's empire in kind of the COVID times. But B, you could do that math, but I think a lot of people would say,

hey, Sirius XM, kind of for a business that is challenged by Apple Music, Google Play, all this sort of stuff, trades for a pretty high multiple. Maybe the issue isn't that Liberty Series trades for a discount. Maybe the issue is SiriusXM stock is inflated because Liberty Series control so much and it's Stupco. And that actually is kind of what happened. When the two collapsed, it wasn't Liberty Serious XM stock going up to meet the serious XM stock price.

It was serious XM stock price that came down to meet the Liberty Series price as kind of the float normalized. Now, that is a silly example, but I've got plenty, playing more. of companies where they publish NAV numbers. And the Liberty Series was a simple NAB. But I've got plenty more where companies publish an NAV number and they say, hey, we've got a chemical code that's worth 10x. We've got a paper code that's worth 5x

if you're just using pure multiples. You put those together and our stock prices worth 20. We're trading at 8, huge buy. And it just never works. So did it work for them? No, but maybe it'll work for us. I don't know. But anyway, I'm going to wrap it up there.

Again, I don't know how long I've been rambling. One of the reasons I do these ramblings is people like to, I think some people, maybe I haven't been inflating myself, I think some people like them, but I love having discussions on these points. So if you listen to this ramble, and I don't expect every point I made to hit with you, but, you know, if you've got thoughts on things that you pass on that drop and you say, hey, Andrew, maybe this mental model would work for you or I've been thinking something similar. Reach out. I'd love to chat. I'd love to chat any time. You can always reach out. Please feel free. The only caveats that is, if you listen to the October rambling, you know, I'm expecting my second child. I thought that was going to be my last one. My wife has decided, her body's decided to keep the baby in for the full term. So that second child is coming real fast.

You will not be hearing for me for a couple weeks after the child comes up. Maybe I'll be doing December rambling. But you reach out around Thanksgiving time. There'll be a two-day-old baby. I won't be responding then. But my wife also, she's doing great. She's a trooper. She's got more energy than me.

She looks incredible. So I'm really excited for that. But I'm rambling. That's the point of rambling. I'm rambling. Thank you for listening. Again, reach out. We'd love to swap thoughts if you ever want to see the disclaimer at the end, all that sort of stuff. But I'm looking forward to talking to you on the other side of the baby. A quick disclaimer. Nothing on this podcast should be considered investment advice. Guests or the host may have positions in any of the stocks mentioned during this podcast.

Please do your own work and consult a financial advisor. Thanks.