Yet Another Value Podcast - Tim Weber is bullish $AMPY despite the oil spill

Episode Date: October 8, 2021

Tim Weber, a private investor, discusses the bull thesis for $AMPY. We're in a period of heightened uncertainty, as the company's Beta asset was responsible for an oil spill last weekend. However, Tim think the market has shot AMPY and priced in a worst case scenario without factoring in lots of other factors (the likelihood a ship is responsible for the spill, that this spill is much smaller than precedent spills and damages shoudl thus be significantly lower, etc.).AMPY is a microcap oil and gas company with high leverage and ongoing risk from the oil spill. Investors should remember the extremely high degree of risk here, that nothing on this podcast is investing advice, and that everyone is encouraged to do their own work!Tim's AMPY write up: https://twebs.substack.com/p/ampy Chapters0:00 Intro1:55 Extra Disclosures3:10 AMPY Overview6:25 Diving into the spill9:40 The Plains All American (PAA) Precdent15:20 Does AMPY's small size mean they don't have the resources to survive the spill?20:00 Is there a chance the net liability to AMPY is ultimately zero?22:00 Discussing the current regulatory / fine envrionment22:45 AMPY's solvency and liquidity28:45 Could AMPY file Beta without impacting the rest of the company?30:30 Will the spill push AMPY to sell assets?33:30 AMPY's SOTP and PV-1039:10 Could regulators pull the Beta lease?44:50 Recovery risk if a ship is found at fault46:40 Could AMPY's hedge book be an issue?50:15 Is the delay from AMPY alerting regulators hurt them?56:00 Tim's closing thoughts

All right. Hello, and welcome to the yet another value podcast. I'm your host, Andrew Walker. And with me today, I'm excited to have Tim Weber. Tim is a private investor. He's ex-by-side. He is the founder of Tim Webb Substack. The writer of Tim Webb Substack. There'll be a link to the show notes. I encourage everyone to go check that out. But Tim's really knowledgeable on the stock we're going to talk about today. I'm excited to him on. Tim, how's it going? It's good, Andrew. Thanks for having me. Long-time listener, first-time attendee. I like that. My wife is always asking me what I'm doing with the earbuds when I'm falling asleep. And it's always, it's always podcasts. And it's, anytime that you've got fresh material, it's your podcast. So, so I love your show and I appreciate you having me on. Hey, well, I really appreciate that. I'm going to get back to just returning the compliments in a second. But let me start this podcast the way I do every podcast. First, just to disclaimer to say everyone, nothing on this podcast is investing advice. That's going to be particularly true today. I'll let everyone know this is a microcap oil and gas company, heavily levered.

you know, I think as I'm looking at it, the debt is two times the market cap right now. And if that wasn't enough, they just caught, their pipeline was just responsible for an oil spill off the coast of California. So there could be fines, everything. This could be a zero tomorrow. So everyone should just remember, there is lots of risk here. Do your own work. Nothing on here investing advice. But all of that said, I'll disclose, I'll also disclose, I believe we both have a position in the stock.

So there's an extra disclosure. All of that said, let me turn to a pitch for you. You know, the pitch should speak for itself. YouTube listeners can see it is dark here. it's because this is an emergency podcast. Ampy is so interesting. I've talked to multiple people about it. And I will say the person who I was most impressed with talking to was you. So you know, you did a great write-up on this before the spill. I know you've done tons of due diligence post this bill. I've been super impressed. Listeners are going to be super impressed. So that out

the way, we'll turn to the stock we're going to talk about today. Amplify Energy, I believe, is the name, but I know it by the ticker AMPY. And all of that out the way, I'll turn it to view, what is AMPY and why are we so interested in it? Yeah, for sure. Thank you. But first, on top of your disclaimers, I have to give my own disclaimers. So number one, this is a hobby for me. I have a full-time job and young kids. So I'm jamming my research into the 5 a.m. to 7 a.m. window and weekends. So keep that in the back of your mind. Number two, I'm not an energy specialist. I covered consumer for most of my career on the by side. So keep that in the back of your mind.

And then if that wasn't enough, number three and four, I'm not illegal nor an insurance specialist. I'm doing what I can. I think there's reasonable presumptions you can make on all of these cases. But please just keep all of that due diligence in the back of your mind. Can I just jump in there for one of the things you said, I'm not an oil and gas specialist. I'm a generalist. And when you wrote up the ampie thing and I'd seen before the pipeline spill, I've seen the ampie thesis before. And my general thing was, you know what?

gets generalist investors heads ripped off. It is investing in the oil and gas space. So I had been avoiding it despite your excellent write-up until the pipeline thing, which I think changed everything, changed the risk reward, made this much more bent to get a little bit in my wheelhouse. But I just wanted to jump in there. I agree with you. This is how you get your head ripped off as a generalist. But let's go back to Ampe. Yeah. So look, I mean, here's at a 30,000 foot level, right? This is a stock that just went from a cash flow and capital return story that was relatively clean and debt pay down along the way and, you know, potentially really attractive share rate purchase given where the stock was trading. So it was a plain vanilla relatively easy

to analyze situation. And it turned into a special situation with the hook of an anchor, which is what I hope happened here. So it changed everything in one day, right? Now what gets super interesting, right? So now the situation, the special situation, just like this. Tim, let's back up, because you said the hook of an anchor, but can you just describe the hook of the anchor and the general story just because I know you and I know it. We'll put a link to it in the show notes, but just so everybody knows what we're talking about. Right. So over the weekend, their pipeline basically sprung a leak. And the initial presumption, of course, from everybody was, oh, this terrible oil and gas company.

They're the worst people in the world that shoot them and so on. And what we've learned in the intervening period is it's highly probable. Of course, we don't know for sure. But it's highly probable that this was caused by a ship at anchor, potentially a wayward anchor. And we, you know, the authorities have not identified exactly which ship yet, which is not ideal. But that seems to be the working theory of the Coast Guard,

just reading all the tea leaves of what's happening here. So basically, this story went from simple to a special situation, potentially through no fault of Ampe's, but we'll talk through all of these issues. And just so listeners can time sympathies, we're talking October 7th, Thursday, 815 p.m. As Tim said, it seems like this pipeline spring was caused by an anchor, ship anchor hitting the pipeline. But you know, there's no definitive yet, right?

We were going to record earlier, but we were kind of like, oh, let's see if there's one more day, brings news flow. So tomorrow, this whole story could change and I'll have to, you know, put a disclaimer in the show notes, hey, this whole podcast is worthless. But just so people know, we're really operating under the fog of war here. Absolutely. And on the anchor thesis, I posted, but you can throw in your show notes a 39-minute YouTube video from a marine expert, which really If you really want to go down a rabbit hole, you will know a lot more about why an anchor could cause this incident if you donate 39 minutes of your life. Cool. So right now we've got a special situation, sorry, right?

Ampie, the stock goes from approaching $6 per share last Friday before the pipeline sprung a leak over the weekend. So last Friday of approaching $6 for share as we're talking, the stock's at three, right? So literally $100 million of market value wiped off the stock. I think we'll, at the end, we'll probably start talking fundamentals, but it's obviously tough to talk about that with this special situation hanging over. So, you know, we've set this scene. Where do we want to go from here talking about what's happening with the pipeline spill? Yeah, I mean, I think let's just, let's just analyze what the special situation is now, right? So at a very high level, this, so if you strip this asset, if you strip the EBITDA out of this

company. I expected the company to go from about $100 million of EBITDA this year to $130 in 2023. If beta never operates again, they will lose about $30 million of EBITDA, but I think only about $10 million of free cash flow. And we'll talk about why later. Okay, perfect. But just to give you some backdrop, this is a company that I expected before the incident to do $200 million of free cash flow in 21, 22, and 23. They have about 210 of net debt outstanding. before this incident. So you either were taking a company which used to pricing a ton of bankruptcy risk because for solvency reasons and basically completely wiping away that, you know,

risk on the stock or what I wanted the company to do was basically use half for debt paydown and half for really attractive share repurchase. So anyways, that was the math, right? Now you need to analyze the situation as follows. There's a potential gross liability that the company may face. And I think that is what scares anybody away from even doing any talk like this. Because, oh, my God, BP was $60 to $80 billion. Wait a second.

And I'll probably mispronounce this. So somebody from California, correct me. But Refugio Beach, which was near Santa Barbara, it is a very, very comparable incident. The gross spillage amount was the same as the initial. gross spillage that was reported in the news over the weekend. As it turns out, it looks like this spill might be 5x smaller than we initially thought. But in any event, you know exactly what the gross liability was in 2015 off of Santa Barbara, which is just as beautiful, if not more than this area, right? And it's coastally, ecologically sensitive, you name it,

right? So that actually was a really good precedent. So you're not starting from, oh my I got, I could never estimate a liability whatsoever. So you've got to know your gross liability. That's first, right? And we'll talk numbers after I just give the framework. Yep. Okay, perfect, perfect. And then you have to know insurance proceeds.

So that incident that I just referenced was 74% covered by insurance. And the company was found negligent. This was essentially a corroded pipeline that burst. I mean, you literally couldn't think of. a worse storyboard in terms of liability. And I thought when I first analyzed it, and also in terms of how the insurance carriers would have treated you, yet it was 74% covered. So there's lots of more digging to do there. I'm obviously going off of 10Ks and that sort of thing. But there's an interesting story there about insurance coverage. So you, okay, gross liability, less insurance

pros. Can I pause you for just one second? You mentioned Rufizio, you went through the 10 case to see this. I've looked to. Plains All-American, I believe the ticker is PAA, but I could be mistaken there, but planes all-American. Yeah, Plains-All-American is the company that had this 2015 oil spell that Tim's been pointing to as the precedent. So any reader, again, go to your own due diligence. You can go through the 10-K. Tim's the one who told me to. Go Control F line 901 in the footnotes. You'll see how much they've reserved for it, how much insurance is covered so far, how much it's all of it's there. So just so everyone can go do their own due diligence. Yeah, and the rough math is it was a $450 million gross liability that was $330 million covered by insurance,

so a little under 75%. You know, so a net liability of $120 million in a spill that we think was five times larger, you know, in a spill that was five times larger, we'll see. And which happened, which was a little more, a little closer to land as opposed to water. So a lot of things going in Ampe's favor, but it is something that really helps you start to at least frame, you know, at least be in a ballpark somewhere. So you've got your gross liability, you've got your insurance proceeds. But what's interesting about Ampe is then you have your claims against potentially

the ship owner, potentially against the, there's actually a, I believe it's a public-private partnership that is meant to manage traffic outside of Long Beach. I want to say it's called marine traffic, but I might have messed up the name. But so you could potentially see liability against, you know, You know, you could potentially see claims springing down from Ampe to Ami's insurance carrier to, to, you know, not only the ship owner, but potentially marine traffic as well. But, you know, I'm heavily speculating there. So that's your math, right?

So the answer, by the way, to all three of those, it could be a real number. It could literally be zero. We don't know. Okay. But that's your frame on just the gross liability. Let's talk about business interruptions separately, right? because this is interesting. So Ampie carries, and they specifically reference it in their 10K,

and I've actually found other oil companies who reference not carrying this insurance, but Ampie covers and references the fact that they have, I believe they call it loss of, it's business interruption, but I think a more specific term to the oil and gas industry is loss of production income coverage. Okay. And they note in the last 210Ks that they have it, they note in their 2018 and their 2017 10K that it would cover up to 52, I believe it was either 52 or 54 million dollars of business interruption. So what I just told you is I think that EBITDA, and by the way, I saw some

presentations from the oil and gas industry where they define, okay, so what does that mean? because I was not sure, is it revenue? Is it EBITDA? I think it's EBITDA, right? So at a very high level, if that 52 to 54 is still true, they might have approaching two years of EBITDA covered. Now, of course, if they have to replace a pipeline, it's going to be more than two years. But we're going to do some math later on in the podcast about just removing beta entirely from this company. Tim, I just want to say, you know, I worry sometimes because sometimes I'll have substack authors on. Sometimes I'll have hedge fund managers on and sometimes I have private investors.

And I worry sometimes people, when I have a private investor like, oh, Andrew's just like, you know, he's dogging this episode. He just wanted to talk about a stuff. I'm just going to tell you that you, you know, I obviously Ampy isn't like my core focus, but I look through the 10K. You controlled after 10K, found the business interruption insurance and then you took it to 2017, 2018. This and a lot of the other reasons we're going to talk about it. I just wanted to commend you on the due diligence and thought process. Can we just take a second to plug BAM SEC, which has got to be the greatest website ever created? I mean, I just found out about it through Twitter. I think Mike Mitchell might have

talked about it or somebody, but it is mind-blowingly easy to that. A hundred percent agree. I should talk, like, I love it so much. I would be an evangelist for them. I should talk to them about being my sponsor or something, because I spent all day in that. Everything I posted highlighted is from there, but neither here nor there. Anyway, please It's funny because I control, I control F'd loss of production income as well, and that's how, and literally the only results were in this industry. And so that's what gave me a sense that it was a little bit more of a, it's a bit of a term that feels a little specific to oil and gas. So anyways, look, we're going to talk about just removing beta and what that does to price targets and that sort of thing. But this feels like a pretty good case where they might have a substantial amount of business interruption, potentially a to two years. And I was only going to caveat that with if they have to replace the pipeline, and please don't ask me where we are in that process. I have no clue whether this pipeline is salvageable or not. Plains All-American is just, so this incident that planes was responsible for was

2015, and their target completion date for the replacement is next year. So this, you know, There's, look, if you have to replace that pipeline, beta is going to be a call option in the stock. Let's be very clear. Yeah, yeah. Let me give. So I think we've done a nice job of laying out some of the historical precedents and everything. Let me give some pushback. So right now, you know, Ampie again, this was this was a $200 million market cap company on last Friday. As we're talking, it's a $100, $130 million market cap company, right? So we're talking about a loss of about $100 million. You said, hey, Plains All-American, their net liability for an incident that it seems like they might be more liable for, but it was about $100, $120 million, right? So my first take would be, hey, it seems like the market directionally has put it towards planes all-American. And, you know, it actually might be worse because planes had more resources than Ampy, right? So Ampy, if they get hit with $100 million liability, they're a going concern.

risk. Whereas something like BP, right, they could handle a $16 billion liability and not be a going concern risk. So I guess my first question is, has the market got it right? Like 100 million loss. You and I later will talk about why we thought the stock might have been undervalued before that, but $100 million loss directionally doesn't seem too crazy. I think the market would have been pretty close if the spill was the size that we initially thought it was. And by the way, what I'm referring to when I say that it's five times smaller is that A&B basically, I'm reading into the document, but here's my theory. I think they basically said, this was the size of the gash, gash. This was the pressure going through the line, and hence we can run calms on how much

on how much would have seeped out. And they're basically saying that's 600 barrels, as opposed to the maximum potential it could have been, which was 3,100. And of course, my favorite thing that the news rags do is that they give it to you in gallons, but now that one of them reported that it might be smaller, they then converted gallons to leaders, which is just brilliant. I mean, let's, it's such a good point because, you know, Monday or Sunday when I was first waking up to this, somebody ping me and I was like, 121,000 gallons at the ocean, these guys are dead. That's like BP levels, right? And then you or Matt Rosen or someone point out, no, it's, it gallons is not barrels, right? Like, calm down. And then it's been, you started hearing it Tuesday, but it seems

at this point almost definitely, you said, I think it's about 600. right. There's lots of reports coming out, which is fantastic for them, right? So this is a lot smaller of a spill, which should mean a lot smaller of cleanup costs. And Plains was negligent. I don't know if they were criminal. They did plead guilty to a criminal charge. So I think I can say they were negligent. But, you know, in this case, Ampie, it doesn't seem like they did anything wrong, except we'll talk timing later. But it seems like this was very much act of God or act of someone else that caused it. So the liability ultimately, it seems, should shift to someone else. It should. But let's just be very fair with that caveat that you just mentioned. The timing might be an issue. And when we say timing, we're referring to the response time by which they allegedly notified the authorities. When you read through the document, it's a little complicated. And I don't think we have all the facts, but it doesn't read very well.

And just, we can talk timing a little bit more, but Ampie, if I, if I'm correct, so one of the issues with planes was the pipeline had corroded, which made them much worse, right? That's negligence. With Ampe, I believe they were inspected two years ago. They were tested last year. They were due for another inspection this month, actually. Obviously, that didn't happen. But it seems most likely that this pipe was kind of up to date. You know, it'd been operating for 40 years, been inspected. Seems most likely we can eliminate that as a, a major chance of that being the risk. Yeah. And I mean, nothing eliminates it more than the Coast Guard you know, suspecting. And again, if you watch that YouTube video, you'll have a really good sense for what might have happened. But nothing makes me think it was a corroded pipeline less than that piece of information. So let's go back to the 100 million number. And I do have lots of other questions, but the $100 million number, we said directionally, this would be, if you assume the stock was fairly valued last Friday, which is still an open question, but directly, this would be right if we were talking about a plane's all-American case.

It doesn't seem like we are, right? It doesn't seem like they were negligent. It seemed like someone else calls it, and this is 5x smaller. So what do you think the ultimate kind of cost to Ampe is going to be here? For posterity state, let me say I have no idea, but I think the rate. is probably, the range of the incident itself is probably literally anywhere from, you know, I don't know, the low 20, 30 million to 200 to 300, let's say. The range of Ampe's exposure is some very small fraction of that, I would think.

Is there a scenario where between insurance coverage, whatever they're going to sue the ship owner who probably calls this and everything, is there a range, is there a chance where it's zero or even if the shipowner has to pay damages to the company where this ends up actually being net positive to the company? I had that thought as I was walking with my son a few hours ago and I just instantly erased it from my head because if you even say that, you're probably just, you know, you're probably so in love with the stock. Let's just pretend that the best case is zero. Let me ask for the question. In theory, yeah. This is the question I think that has been weighing on my mind the most, right? So Plains

is a great precedent. Bigger spill, similar location, negligence. Much more involvement from state authorities as well, which did not help. Because remember, planes was the pipeline, I believe, was running parallel to one of the highways, and it essentially seeped down a ravine and then into the water, if I'm understanding the facts correctly. So no question, it was certainly state land and I believe state water, whereas this incident happened in federal water, which almost certainly is better than if it happened in California jurisdiction. We're going to talk federal water in a second for sure. But let me ask the thing that has been lingering on my mind the most. And I don't have a great answer for it. But the regulatory

environment in 2015 and the political environment in 2015 was much different than it was today. I think environmental consciousness is a much bigger concern, you know, shut the pipelines down, that type of stuff is a bigger concern. And when planes got fined in 2017, the Trump administration was in charge, who I think probably was regulating oil and gas companies a little bit different than the Biden administration. So I guess my worry here is that, yes, this is much on the ampies smaller spill, much less negligent than planes, maybe not negligent on it. But my worry is the regulatory environment is so much worse that we're talking about fines, crackdowns, all the sort of stuff that have like kind of 10x since five years ago. So if this is five X, if they are five X smaller,

but the fines are 10x worse now, you know, it ends up being a bigger number to ANP. Does that make sense? Yeah, it's honestly, it's getting a little out of my area of expertise. Of the plane's liability, only 60 million was related to the, to the settlements with regulators. Okay, okay, perfect. It's fine, you know, fines and those sorts of things. I've got lots of other questions on the spill, but I'm going to pause here and say, what else should we be talking about the spill? What did you want to make sure the listeners kind of know in here? Well, I think, so I would go to bat, you know, all day saying that there's absolutely not a solvency crisis here. Okay. If you wanted to paint your bear case, you have to paint your bear case that

there could be a liquidity crisis. And it would be, in my mind, probably a socially constructed liquidity crisis. So they've got their entire debt staff. Let me pause just to make sure we're on the same page. Solvency crisis. You're saying, hey, the company, their debt, plus their asset retirement obligations, plus whatever liabilities come from this, is always going to be less than the value of the assets they own, right? So you're not worried that we're in an issue where they own a billion dollars a fine and this is just a structural zero. What you were worried about is liquidity crisis where all of their debt is a revolving is a revolver you know there's going to be fines coming the revolver's got covenants you're worried that breach covenants revolver pulled they have to file not because the assets

are worthless but because they just they don't have the funding yeah so it's it's reserve based lending it's a it's a bank facility there's don't quote me on the number but let's say there's 10 banks involved um the rbLs used to be a lot larger than that used to be you're You've had two banks in the last year that just totally went out of the business. You've had, I forget exactly who Ampey's administrative agent is, but it swapped in the last year. And then you had a really, I mean, if I were the CFO of Ampe, I would have been so annoyed. They have these, it's either quarterly or I think it's semi-annual redeterminations. And the last redetermination, which was, I don't know, three or four months ago,

and this is meant to, you're meant to lend as a percentage. of reserves, right? Hence reserve-based lending. And they redetermined the facility lower by $15 million, which is fine. You know, it was fine. It was well within a piece of control, and it was okay. And they have a little bit less drawn than the maximum amount right now, and they've got cash on the balance sheet against it. But that was not a good sign about the working relationship. That was, to me, a pretty big sign of a lack of, either a lack of trust or just the banks wanting to walk away from the business or the banks basically saying, and when I say lack of trust, I'm just saying they're essentially saying your capital allocation

is debt paid out. Do not do anything else. And that's the lever that they used. Well, that was not a good last interaction with the banks. So I guess what I'm trying to say is like somewhere out there and I'm going to have to do a better job of understanding the covenants. Obviously, it's impossible to talk to the company right now as it should be because they're managing through a crisis. But one of my first questions will be, you know, help me understand the covenant set up of that RBL. And is there anything we're going to trip and have to go and ask for relief on? I think we're going to be okay, but you never know, right? And so if the banks wanted to play hardball, now the game theory is terrible from their perspective, right?

Because why would you play hardball with a company that has, you know, for sure enough cash flow to service? absolutely to service the net amount of what I expect the exposure is, and they should be fine even on the potential gross exposure, even if you got like a working capital outflow as you wait for your insurance check, right? So the game theory is terrible, but I don't know, to your point, we're in a weird environment. Could somebody, you know, with some sort of social construct, rather than a financial construct, cause a problem here? Yes. It's an important, So it's an important consideration because I really think there are no solvency issues. But you have to be mindful of liquidity.

The banks are also going to have to think like if we throw this, if we pull the revolver and throw this into bankruptcy, we could actually be impairing our recovery, right? If they were really weird because a bankruptcy with this outstanding, with this outstanding liability, it's not going to be easy, right? That's a years-long bankruptcy process that's going to suck tens of millions from the estate because you can't, you know, a lot of companies could file and emerge 60, 90 days later, 120, something pretty short, but here you can't even define what the liability for, with the liability, what the cash fund flows. So it would just have to be a really long-term bankruptcy. So I don't think it would be in bank's interest to do that. But, you know, you never know. Banks get panicked. They say big oil spill lawsuit. Just BK the company will worry about it later. And Andrew, that's, that just reminded me. There's also, so there's a surety bond against beta specifically. Yeah. You know, think of that as their, as their ARO. I've been doing a lot of work on coal stocks lately, so A.O. I was in the back of my mind. But that would hypothetically be basically made current,

whereas right now. That was actually what I, that was on my technical questions to ask you later. So there's a 90 million ARO on their balance sheet. I look through their 10K. They've got the surety bond, but the surety bond's not on their balance sheet. So how was that getting accounted for? Well, I mean, you just pay, you know, they pay like the recurring annual charge against it. But, but yeah, like they released the cap. They used to, I think they used to have essentially almost the entire amount held up in collateral and essentially the collateral. So you do have that obligation out there that I assume would then be some, I don't know

where it would be like in the bankruptcy proceedings, but it's something to consider that you would essentially be pulling a problem forward. So the game, look, the game theory from the bank's perspective, if they think, like rational human beings is is definitely in the favor of not causing issues. But look, you just, you never know, right? And this, this conversation is why this is the 10,000 most popular finance podcast out there because we, we just went into the game theory for banks on a revolving line of credit. And we got into the technical accounting issues around asset retirement obligations and insurance bonds, man, I couldn't be prouder. I couldn't be prouder. So that actually

does bring me, so that brings me to a separate point, the beta asset, right? The liabilities are going to be at the beta asset. This is structured, surety bonds and stuff. Is there a chance that the beta asset is held at a, you know, kind of a remote hold co where, let's, you've seen, I've seen this before, an asset's got all of a sudden $300 million of unexpected liabilities. The asset's only worth $100 million. The company says, great, we're filing that asset, but, you know, there's $100 million of assets. The creditors can go try and get that, but you can't come up to the Holdco, right? That was a bankruptcy remote subsidiary, bankrupt it. The Holdco's fine. We have to write off that $100 million, but you can't come for the $200 million in excess.

Could beta be that? I mean, I do think there'd be questions of could you pierce the corporate veil if there was negligence or something. But is beta remote? Is there a limit to how much liability there could be to amplify? I told you I would address that and I didn't make it to that part of my to-do list. I mean, it is its own subsidiary, obviously, when you look at the corporate structure. I'm just, I'm presuming that you would pierce the corporate fail. I looked, you know, it is very difficult. These, all the times when people do these hold co-analysis, unless you have access to like all the legal documents and everything, I find it very difficult to do it. Often, you just have to trust the management team where they say this is

remote or something. My, my guess would be that it is not remote because it's part of the bank's lending. So I think it gets rolled up. But I, I definitely hear it. hear you. It's it's tough to hear. I think I think what you just mentioned about the banks is what makes me not even not even get hopeful on that topic. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. What else should we be talking about on the spill? Well, I don't know if this is spill related, but the game theory we just discussed on the bank side might potentially cause a different catalyst path. So if you if you read my substack, I said, hey, this is all great. And the stock is worth so much more than where it's currently trading. And by the way, I've got two catalysts, right? And my catalysts were capital returns

and side drilling they were doing in beta to increase production. So let's just say that my catalyst path is gone, right? But here's what's interesting. If you, if I'm the company right now, and I'm even the least bit worried about how the banks are going to behave, you actually might have changed the calculus of how this company recognizes its value. Let's call it the discount to PV10. Yep. And for listeners, but maybe, who is this for two seconds? It's on the question list, so go for it. Yeah. So PV10, you know, with oil and gas assets, is basically what are your reserves worth in a reasonable DCF model with a 10% discount rate, right? And by the way, who the hell uses a 10% discount rate now anyways? But that's neither here nor

there. You know, so anyways, Amby likes to highlight, and they've got this slide, and you can grab it from their last investor presentation, which, by the way, is amazing for a finance department that has, like, a staff of 10. 100% agree with you. It's really good. It's really good. And the slide you're referring to is slide five in their deck, I believe. Yeah, I mean, the CFO must work 100 hours a week because, like, the content that he puts out is incredible. But so basically, they have this slide that is, you know, what is our equity worth? Just that PV10. So there's, there's proved developing reserves. There's proved non-developing reserves. And then there's proved

undeveloped reserves. So let's just ignore those undeveloped reserves, right? But look, they've got all this math, which basically says like, hey, at that PV10, the stock could be worth anywhere between, you know, 10 to 17 or something like that. I'd forget the exact numbers. The point is that, you know, I did my whole substack piece just rolling a 3x EB to EBITDA multiple. And people in the energy industry think that you're a total moron if you do that because it's like, oh, you know, like that's too, that's too simple and blah, blah, blah. But as it turns out, just rolling a three to four times EBITDA multiple through gets you to the same answer that the company's highlighting with this PV10. Anyways, I apologize. That was long-winded.

The point is they, so the great, so you think that. You know, do you think that your stock is worth 17 at, you know, at PV 10 or something like that at current strip, let's say. It's like, by the way, the oil prices have ripped since they published that. Just to add it, so at PV10, I'm looking at the slide. So slide five is the one that shows all their different field. Slide, it's slide eight for people. They'll be a link to Tim Substack, which everyone should read. And they'll be a link to the investor deck in the show notes.

But so slide 10 shows at $65 oil and $3.25 gas. PV10 is just shy of $18 per share. And this, that was, they published this in early August. They were using July strip and stuff. Oil and that gas are higher than 65 and 325. Actually, the super out years aren't that much higher right now. It's mainly pull forward, but it is higher. So, you know, again, $3 stock, and we're talking to PV10 is $18.

You go ahead. I am going to have a question on PV10 in a second. Yeah, and I might have to look at my index card because I know your question is going to be what happens when you're removed beta. But so the, so that's what they're saying the stock could be worth, but it's potentially meaningless unless catalysts happen, right? That was kind of my theory, right?

But I was super excited that there were these catalysts. But if I'm the company now and I'm worried about my lenders, I actually might go and sell an asset immediately, right? So here's what there is, and you'll like the name, there's Chevron is marketing basically, probably as close to a carbon copy of assets as you can get in this business. They're calling it, I believe, the Rangley package that look exactly like the Rockies assets that Amby operates, right?

And so I've done a little bit of digging on that. And so this is enhanced oil recovery in the UCO2. So it's actually like really good from an ESG perspective. So apparently the bidding on these assets, are good. And maybe they won't get PV10, but maybe they'll get something close to it is kind of the scuttle butt out there. So in a weird way, you've basically, you took the stock from 575 to 3 and now we're at 340 because, well, the stock was up a lot today. But what in a very perverse way, and of course we've got to get through the crisis before this would happen.

But in a perverse way, if I were the company right now, I might seriously consider just selling the assets piecemeal if I'm worried about the bank, right? Because if the bank wants to put a gun to my head, right, then what are my left? What are my options, right? So then I would say, well, that's insane. I've got all this value, right? And so why don't I go and sell three assets and leave, you know, leave beta as Remain come? You know what I mean? And so if that happens, you would actually cataly the PV 10 or a 10% or 20% discount to it, which gets you a double-digit stock, but now you're not paying 575. Your entry price is three. So, and I'm going to get, so again, everyone should go look at the deck, do your own work, but like the Rockies assets that Tim is mentioning as of the July strip, their deck says, hey, the PV 10 of those Rocky assets is $210 million. So if they just sold the Rocky assets at close to the PV10, you basically wipe out all the deck and then you've still got, they say their overall PV 10 is $835 million. then you still have, you know, Net of the Rocks S, you sold 635 million of PV10 against

a $100 million market cap plus whatever liabilities you think are coming from beta. Beta is PV10 on here I'm looking is $200 million. So zero that out and you've got $410 million against $100 million market cap. Let me ask you a PVT, go ahead. You have an $11 stock at PV10. That was another question. But the question I actually was going to ask you is, look, I'm a generalist. You're a generalist.

I haven't. I have avoided oil and gas companies for a lot of reasons, but I haven't looked at them in a while. How many, you know, if I looked at the average oil and gas company, you know, all of them publish a PV10. They're part of the 10K. What's the average multiple versus PV10 that companies trade at? And obviously it's going to vary based on the companies, the resources and management team. But, you know, do most companies trade at probably not one X? Do most companies trade at 80% of PV10, 90%, 20%, you know, I actually don't know the answer to that question only because I started playing around with that a few months ago and you were so what you do then is that you look at PV 10s and 10ks on December 31st. Yeah. Yeah.

Like Ampe's PV10 is 3x what it was versus their 10k. So I would basically be looking at stale data and I didn't want to go through that whole exercise and have some false precision when it's like, oh, you did all this work, but you did it on PVs that were so stale, you know, because they were running $47 oil and $2 gas. Yeah. So that's the issue. Like Ampie is basically, think of Ampie updating their PV10 as almost a non-gap adjustment, right? Like the only time it's official is at 10K time.

Have you seen any deals or anything in the industry recently that are, that have a multiple PV10 or anything? So when I, so some of the scuttle butt around, oh, these assets could trade well and they could trade at 80-90. And it was like, oh, that's a good price. So presumably, like, they're not going for much better than 70, 80, let's say. Okay, okay. I think if you think of the multiples in the industry right now, it doesn't make, it's not

the craziest thing in the world, right? So, but you still, I mean, even if they got 50% of PV 10, you'd still be talking about a pretty, with this trip, you'd still be talking about a pretty, pretty good deal for the stock price, right? That we'd be getting into the approaching double digits at even just 50% of PV10. Yes, I mean, so there's a. a lot of cushion there of value if you catalyze any value at anything that's anywhere close to a 10 to 20 percent discount to maybe 10.

Let me ask another question on beta, right? So beta is held in federal waters. You know, I've seen lots of noise from the state regulators. This afternoon, I even saw some state regulators want a criminal investigation in here and everything. One of the questions that's come up frequently and that I've had in the back of my mind, you know, you operate, you operate a offshore oil and gas on a lease from the. federal government. Actually, if you Google the 10K, Ampy got royalty relief in exchange for

to drill more oil, actually. But you operate on a lease. If you're found negligent, if you don't operate on that lease, the federal government can pull your lease basically for nothing. Now, you can go to court, sue them and everything, but they can pull your lease. A lot of the questions have been, what if the federal government or California pressure somehow or something just pulls the lease and beta is a zero. Now, we have talked about there's a lot of other PV10 out there, but what are the odds beta, you know, just gets the least pulled, even if this wasn't Ampe's fault for any reason? I mean, Plainsville American was negligent and they were given the opportunity to rebuild

their pipeline. It's, it just, like, thankfully, thankfully the media doesn't control property rights in this country. And so while we all want to murder, amplify, because of the audacity that they have, to operate an oil pipeline, you know, we do have property rights in this country, which, which, you know, thank God that they still exist and it's still determined in the court of law. So, I mean, of course, anything can happen, but, you know, the shrub, the shrub posted something on your thread today, trust the shrub. And, you know, where essentially, okay, great, you want to go after the private prison industry, but, you know, they have property rights. And so federal basically

overruled the state. I mean, look, if California could act arbitrarily, there were these, none of these offshore drillers would still be there, right? So I mean, so what California has, like, they've basically been put into this box of like, okay, well, we can ban in state waters, which is, I think, three miles out the coast. But there's really not that much we can do in federal waters other than new drilling is impossible. But these grandfathered in assets, I'm not so sure. By the way, would it be the worst scenario in the world if they were not allowed to operate anymore, but given just compensation for that? That actually is a huge net positive for the stock of three. Yeah, I agree. That was the other thing I was going to say,

like the government, you know, they have to play a multi, like a multi process game where if they just went to amplify and said, hey, we're pulling your lease, you weren't, this was caused by a ship, but we hate you. We're pulling your lease. They would have to be thinking about we're going to get sued and we're probably going to lose. So there's that lawsuit, which maybe the government just doesn't care. They want to make a point. But they also have to think, hey, we lease thousands of other offshore things. And how are other offshore parties when we're negotiating, negotiating with them, how are they going to think about leases and all this type of stuff? When we just went to a company that through no fault of their own, if we assumed that a ship caused

this, had an accident and we just said, screw you, we're taking, we're taking this $200 million asset from you. It's going to be pretty tough to negotiate. And you're probably going to lose the lawsuit. It's going to be egg on everyone's face. So it is a question, though, because, look, bad headlines can make for really bad and crazy politics out of their. Yeah.

Andrew, just one point on that. hypothetically, the Coast Guard will be leading this investigation, and there's an interesting precedent that happened in Lake Michigan, Lake Michigan with Enbridge. I forget exactly what year, maybe five or six years ago, but a tugboat basically drug its anchor across the bottom of the lake and came this close to gouging the Nbridge line. They damaged it, but thank God it's, you know. And then they blew up a couple of transmission lines and that sort of thing. So if line five burst, I mean, that would have been like Exxon Valdez. You know, that would have been insane.

But so the NTSB led that investigation. And I'm not sure exactly, you know, jurisdictionally why that was the NTSP and this is the Coast Guard and that sort of thing. But those are generally honorable institutions looking for the truth in an investigation. And so the other uphill battle to climb, if you're just talking about like this wild, you know, like governmental or prosecutorial misconduct, which you could be worried about, is like they're then also going to have to, assuming the anchor incident is true. Like, oh, I know the Coast Guard said that this was almost certainly caused by an anchor because how else could you drag the pipe 150 feet? and by the way, here's the geo-coordinates of this ship and da-da-da-da-da. So you're also literally going to have to answer to that in court where it's like, wait, so that company was criminally negligent in a way that you want to rip their property rights away.

But your Coast Guard is saying that it most like, you know. So anyways, my point is, you know, we're really early here, but if it was an anchor, it's going to be a hell of an uphill battle to, you know, appropriate property rights. on the ship one of my initial questions was hey you know what if the ship owner is a small ship owner and can't cover it but at this point like and what if they don't have insurance and all this but at this point like it seems like there have been some early signs of who owned the ship and they're like a multi multi billion dollar ship but even if they didn't like ships can't operate in federal waters without insurance ships are worth tens of million dollars on their own like I'm pretty I feel pretty confident saying if a ship did cause this like there is going to be cash there to be recovered. Do you think that's an okay way to address that risk? Yeah, the only thing that I was a little disappointed by those is that, you know, I spoke to a maritime lawyer and it's one of the first things that he said is, hey, if you're interested in this company, make sure that they're filing emergency injunction

and arresting the ship, I believe it's a technical term, in their next port. And I think according to the headlines, yesterday the Coast Guard boarded this. ship yesterday in and um or was it somewhere north of los angeles wherever it's next yeah yeah yeah so they boarded the ship to investigate but then the next paragraph was and the ship is on its way to mexico so i was a little disappointed because angri forget about tens of millions i mean those vessels are hundreds of millions yeah yeah and so yeah i mean not to mention that the parents you know have have probably pp and e into the tens of billions um but look if well whether it was the one that's being alleged or one of the other five vessels who might have been on top of it,

you know, the ship itself is a multi-hundred million dollar asset. And then you can't build a multi-hundred million assets unless, you know, you're a pretty substantial company. Other, the other big worry that I initially had, but I think we've covered it. What if Ampe didn't have insurance? But again, you're not operating. I don't think you can operate a pipeline without insurance. you talked about the control, so I think you can drop that. Here's an interesting risk that I've thought about, I think I can dismiss it, but I'm not positive.

Ampy hedges a lot, right? I believe they hedged 80% of the remaining production, no, it's over 90% of the remaining production for this year and 80% of production, right? Yeah, they were 80 to 85 for next year, and beta is 34% of production. Perfect. So let's take beta out, right? So they were 80 to 85, beta is 35. So all of the sudden they are hedged, call it 110, 110, 115 of next year's production. Not the end of the world, but, you know, most of the hedges, if I remember correctly,

were done around 50, and oil is 70, 75, right? Could you, could you, you can correct me in a second in front of my, let me just finish this point. Could you get into a scenario where beta doesn't produce anything, they're over hedged, oil is ripping, and all of a sudden, they're massively underwater on these hedges, and the solvency issue actually comes from these hedges that they can't deliver on, right? Because if I've promised to sell you oil at 50, oils at 80, and I can't deliver you the oil, I have to make you hole in that contract.

So is there a risk with their hedge book here? No, I was super annoying when that really popular Twitter account posted that because it's just, it's not, it's just not factual. So first of all, they're, don't call me on the number, but I believe they're 30% hedged in 23. So this is absolutely not an issue other than in 22 and the fourth quarter of 21. Yeah. Their position in 22 is closer to the mid-50s. So it's a problem because, you know, but it's a $15 per barrel problem, right?

Not 70 or something. And of course, oil could keep ripping, right? But if oil keeps ripping, you know, there's a, if oil keeps ripping, like hypothetically, that PV-10 is still going higher. not all is lost, right? But so look, let's call it a little more than half. You're probably a little more than half exposed, right? Because you were 80 to 85% hedged. So you had a little bit of room, but the beta was about 34% of production. But again, it's a one-year issue. Further, you've got to think that that's, I mean, this business interruption, it's not just like,

hey, we need this much money, right? It's like a complicated financial model. And what? what was your exposure and, you know, hedging as a part of that. So I'm not so sure why that would be totally carved out of business insurance, business interruptions. So I don't know. I think that that was, that was like somebody thinking about it for four seconds and then just, you know,

posting. You know why I think it initially jumped out at me? Because everyone remembers when oil went negative. And oil went negative because a bunch of people couldn't accept the oil that was getting delivered, right? So I think in the back of my mind, I was kind of like, if your, if your hedges are off a little bit, you could be really disastrously, but in this case, their hedges are off where they promise to

deliver oil. You can just settle that by saying, hey, you know, we promise 50, oils at 80, we'll just give you $30 to settle it. They're not short in the way that kills you where, hey, we promise we take this oil and we can't accept delivery. So I think that might have been an issue. And you know, it's scary, but again, one year, a little bit too short oil, you can handle. Now, if it went from 80% hedge to 8,000% hedge, that's a different issue, but that's not the issue here. Yeah. Go ahead. Were you going to say something else? No, no, no. It's literally the bottom of my concern list. The last thing we mentioned earlier that I don't think we've addressed as I'm looking through my notes is it does seem like there was a delay in when the pipeline spill happened, when the company found out about it, when they kind of shut the pipeline down and when they alerted authorities. Again, we're operating in the fog of war. It's very difficult for me to think about that. But what potential risk could that present to the company?

me. We are in the fog of war. It's not entirely clear how that's written up. If you take the worst interpretation of it, it's not great. I mean, the lawyer that I spoke to yesterday was like, oh, God. He's like, it would have got a lot cleaner if that didn't happen. But again, if you read the timeline, the timeline is, I'm going to check my notes, so I don't mess this up. At 2.30 in the morning, they got a low pressure alarm. Okay. That's a low pressure alarm. That's not knowing that they had a spill, right? At six in the morning, they shut down the pipeline. Probably on suspicion that there was a problem, but not on knowing that there was a problem, right? And then, according to the report at 907, quote, beta offshore reported to the authorities,

you know, that there was an oil spill. Now, the CEO reporters, just because they're so disappointed, this is smaller than initially reported and because, you know, there's not like catastrophe, as they want to call it. We're just hammering the guy yesterday on this point. And he reiterated five times, I think, that we did not know about the oil spill until eight something. I forget exactly what the time is. Where I get a little bit confused, well, I'm confused on two points. One is like what happened at 2.30 in the morning was a low pressure alarm, which to me probably, like, I have obviously never met in that control room, but my guess is that that happens frequently, right? You know, I don't think it's like, you've got an oil spill and there's a sheen on the water, you know, freak out, right?

And that probably is something that happens frequently and you investigate, right? So, I mean, this timeline is relatively vague. The other thing I was a little confused by it is that the wording was beta offshore reported the incident to the authorities, but it was my understanding. that in the emergency response plan, you call a third party who was a crisis management firm, who then calls every single authority. And so I almost wonder if that bridges this gap between when the CEO is insisting they knew it was an oil spill, because there's still like, I don't know, a 40 or 50 minute gap, I think, at that point, and when the authorities were alerted, right?

And so, look, fog of war here, who knows, in a perfect world, we wouldn't be reading any of those three, right? Because it means that clearly there's something there. Now, if an anchor caused the spill, we're going to get into, you know, somewhat needy legal issue, which I forget the term, but it's some sort of, I said it to you yesterday, but I literally had to look it up. But you're going to get into this issue of kind of shared liability. But that's just liability. It doesn't mean 50-50. It could be 99.1. Where you go to the court and they say, hey, Tim ripped this open, but you didn't report it in time, so they have to decide was Tim 90% at fault and Andrew 10% at fault or whatever. I agree with you all on that. The other thing

I'd add to your, hey, this 2.30 in the morning alert they got, again, we haven't, we're just some Joe's. We haven't been inside the thing. But in order for Ampe to really get in trouble, they have to be found to be criminally negligent. And it would just be surprising to me. I don't know. Maybe getting an alert is like, you know, nuclear codes, all hands on deck, defecon one. But it would seem to me an alert at 2.30 in the morning. You've got like some foggy engineer who looks. He's like, we get one of these once every three months. This pipeline's been operating for 40 years. It's, you know, it's dozens and dozens of feet below the sea level. What could happen to this pipeline? Clearly, something's off. And it just doesn't seem like that's criminally negligent. Maybe fines. Maybe you slap the engineer on the risk. Maybe you slept the company on the risk. But there's a big difference between we haven't inspected or upgraded this pipe in 20 years. So now it's leaking into the water. And we got an alert at 2.30 for something that's like black, black swan type thing. And our engineer thought it was a mistake. And it took us a couple hours to report it.

Yeah. I mean, look, this, I agree with that. I agree with exactly how you just frame the issue. We don't know. I wish it wasn't there at all, you know, but, but it would be up to a court to decide hypothetically. I mean, does this mean that 600 barrels spilled instead of 500 or 600, instead of four. I can tell you it's not 600 instead of zero. I can tell you that if indeed it was an anchor because it was the anchor that was responsible for most of the perils. I would be interested

if it was because you delayed it was 600 instead of six, right? So 99% increase, but there wouldn't have been an issue if the crews hadn't dragged their anchor. So I would just be interested if somebody knew in that case, how do you sign the liability? that's just something that gets me curious. I don't even know. Tim, look, I think we've covered basically everything I want to hit. I mean, obviously, I'd love to talk about the other assets, but I think we've summed it up, right? Like, there's this huge gap between PV10 and where the company's trading. If you don't think that, you know, if you don't think that they're going to get hit with $300 million to the fine, insurance isn't going to cover it, the ship's not going to cover it. There's probably a lot

of upside here. Obviously, there's lots of risk. We're in the fog war. But I think we're we covered the upside. I think we really covered the spill well. I want to ask, do you think we covered everything well? Is there anything else that you'd like to make sure we get out there before we kind of wrap this up? Yeah. And I apologize because I rambled on and I realized we've been talking for a long time. But the only other thing I'd like to do for 30 seconds is just invert. So what do you have to believe to short the stock here? And I think you would have to be an insane person to short a $100 million $2x levered microcap oil and gas company just to throw that out there. Nothing on here's investing advice, but I think you'd have to be insane to want to short

something. Could you buy puts? Maybe, but please, you know, just like I tell everyone all the time. Just don't short. Just don't short. But please continue. If you want to short this stock, you are shorting a small equity stub of a much larger EV on a company that is incredibly cash generative. I still have, you know, $140 million of free cash in 22 and 23 with no data whatsoever. I don't think there's a, you know, a level of liability here that's going to be particularly scary, particularly post, you know, insurance and claims against hypothetically shipowner. So if you're going to short this stop, you have to have your thesis better be that I know something about a liquidity crisis that forget about when the facility matures

in November of 23, which is 750 days from now, okay, I know something that is actually going to pull this facility forward and cause a liquidity crisis. That better be your short thesis. I just remember last year, this guy, Texas Henge posted this amazing threat about shorting equity stubs of oil companies and how crazy you have to be in, you know, he used all the option Greeks to basically walk you through the kind of bet you're taking on an equity stop that actually has duration. And, you know, his point is like, if there's duration, you are psychopath for shorting stock. So anyways, when you invert, I don't know. I mean, you better have like an amazing liquidity thesis right now to get this stock from three to hypothetically zero. You know, one of the things

I've been trying to do in my investing is invest in things with more right-tail risk, where if something goes right, you know, it's not going from 10 to 12. It's going from 10 to 25 to 30, whatever. And the inverse of that is don't invest in things that have a lot of left-tail risk, where, you know, you buy something at 10 and if it works, it goes to 12, but if it doesn't work, it goes to zero. And the more I do that, the more I get away from shorting things, right? Because shorting is the definition of you get a little bit of right-tail where the best that short can do is make 100% and you get a whole lot of left tail where go ask, you know, the people who are short and game stop about the left tail if you get when, if and when you get a short wrong.

Hey, last bonus thing I want to ask, we talked about it a little bit, but I don't think we talked about it. There is this weird, like, what if Ampie gets fined $450 million, right? And eventually they recover it from insurance, they recover it from the ship owner, but there could be some really weird timing on that liability mismatch, right? So I don't even know how to think about it. Like, is the timing you pay 450, insurance covers 450 and then insurance collects from the shipowner? Is the timing you pay 450?

You get 450 from the insurance company a year later. Like, how do you think about that timing of the liability and just the timing of everything going forward? I'm sure I'll butcher every legal or insurance terminology in trying to play this game of telephone. But what the lawyer said to me is if you can prove that to the court, you know, like let's say you're in litigation with your insurance carrier, the immediacy of what you're describing matters. Perfect. Okay. So you can prove that to the court.

So the immediacy matters. So they'll expedite the hearing. They'll get you in there. Maybe they'll have the insurance covered and put it into some type of trust box or something so that they're not bankrupting a company while. Yeah. Okay. That makes total sense.

Cool. Tim, last thoughts. Anything else you want to talk about here? Yeah. Yeah, you know, I grew up in Pittsburgh and, you know, there's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, a town where there's kind of a sense of spirit, uh, and togetherness. And, you know, the people who get up every day and actually make the world work, uh, are the most respected in Pittsburgh. And everything that I've seen in, in analyzing the energy industry in the last year is the opposite. And it drives me absolutely crazy. So I just think, look, In general, at least my interaction, it's generally been through the CFO, fundamentally decent person. I've heard the same about the CEO. And I'm sure the workers who get up every day, you know, to actually do their jobs and make the world work, are generally pretty decent people.

So the vilification of an entire industry just drives me absolutely bananas, and it's gut stuff. Well, you know, I thought we were going to say the most highly respected people were podcast hosts who are hosting emergency podcasts on. microcap oil and gas stocks, but I agree with most of the rest of the sentiment. Hey, well, Tim, look, again, everyone should, I'm going to have a link to his substack in the show notes. I'll put a link to his Twitter in the show notes so you guys can follow up with him when our fog of work clears up a little bit and we get some more information on AMP. I'm going to give everyone more disclosure. This is a risky microcap stock. Please be very careful. Do your own due diligence. We've got positions in it. But Tim, your work here has been incredible. I've learned so much. I took a position after talking to you offline. And I'm just glad we could get this due diligence out and do this online. So, So really enjoyed it and looking forward to having you on the next time some wild black swan oil spill happens. It'll be a consumer staple. Thanks so much, Andrew. I appreciate it. Thanks, Tim.