Bulwark Takes - Iran War Consequences: Will Epic Fury be an Epic Failure?

Episode Date: March 15, 2026

Robert Kagan (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution) joins Bill to discuss the likely consequences of Trump's war in Iran.

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BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with Eye Gaming Ontario. Hi, Bill Crystal here. Welcome to Bullwork on Sunday. Very pleased to be joined today at noon Sunday, March 15th. You have to specify the date because God knows things could change, you know, within an hour or something. With, joined by Bob Kagan, foreign policy, historian and analyst, and not just foreign policy. The most recent book is also about American domestic history. Author a very important article in the Atlantic of six weeks ago, America versus the world, scholar at the Brookings Institution. You discussed America versus the world with Tim Miller, a very good podcast about five, six weeks ago, which I recommend to people. It hasn't been overtaken by events, though. This was, of course, before the war in Iran, right? But it stands up, right?

I mean, sure, because it's mostly, you know, it's mostly about the breakdown of the world order, which is being accelerated by the war in Iran. So, yeah. So let's talk about that. I mean, we're six weeks, six weeks. I mean, we're, what are we, two weeks, 16 days in to the war, I guess. Is that right? My math's so good. It feels longer, but yeah, I think that's.

Yeah, two weeks in. And, I mean, there's people like, many of us have probably been a little too preoccupied, actually, whether, you know, what's in Trump's mind? What's he going to do? Which is important, obviously. We can get back to that. But give me your sort of, you know, what difference, what has happened? I mean, where do we stand in the war and what are its geopolitical?

implications so far and that we can talk about going forward. Yeah, I think that, you know, obviously the outcome of the war is in doubt. We don't, we don't, we can't really foresee what's going to happen, partly because we can't, we don't know what, Don Trump has a really huge choice to make, basically, which is either go all in, as some are urging like the Wall Street Journal and, and just really deal with this problem once and for all, which, which also, by the way, implies a huge, long-term American military commitment, you can't just go in and do that and then run out, or to try to find some way to bug out and declare victory as other people are saying he has the choice to make.

But until he makes that choice, I don't think how we're going to know how this war is going to turn out. But I think what you can, even before knowing how the war turns out, we can certainly see what some of the repercussions have been in terms of the rest of the world. Because, of course, the United States is the most important country in the world. and when it undertakes a significant military action like this, it inevitably affects the decision-making, the well-being, the security, the economic security of many other nations around the world,

and that's clearly already happened. And I would say the sort of top-line big picture of all that is that one undoubted effect of the Iran war has been to drive a deeper wedge between the United States and pretty much all of its allies, it's all of its traditional allies, both in Europe and in Asia. And I would say potentially, even in the Middle East, but we can sort of build it. Let's go through those, maybe in that order, actually, it took about the implications. Because people are, as I think the geopolitics,

strategic side of this has been slightly under analyzed, understandably, you know, in a way compared to the kind of day-to-day stuff and what's in Trump and excess mind and all that. So, you want to begin with Europe? Yeah, let's talk about Europe because, of course, you know, The Europeans, they face an existential threat from Russian aggression right now. If you ask the Europeans, what's the biggest, by far the biggest strategic challenge they face? It's not Iran, and certainly not a depleted and impoverished Iran, which was what existed before the war. But it is very much Russia, which is committing aggression. And Europe is now gearing itself pretty much almost entirely to trying to make sure that Ukraine doesn't lose that war,

because they see it as sort of the first step toward further Russian aggression, which Americans, including Republicans, used to believe too. Mike Johnson made a whole point about how Putin is not finished when he gets done with Ukraine, he's going to keep going. And the Europeans definitely believe that. And so from their point of view, the war has been a real strategic disaster because there have been two major consequences of the war. One is obviously the skyrocketing oil prices, which are only,

which even before Trump took the action of lifting sanctions against Russia was going to increase Russian income. But then when Trump, by the way, over the unanimous objection of the other G7 leaders, which they had a phone call, he overruled them and lifted sanctions on Russia, which is now going to provide Putin, depending on how long the war lasts, with tens of billions of dollars for his war chest. And so, you know, whatever else is true, this is buying significant amount of time at a time when Russia was really suffering economically, running huge budget deficit. So this is a real lifeline to Putin. And meanwhile, on the other side, the American forces are, I would say, somewhat unexpectedly, perhaps burning through major stocks of weaponry,

and particularly Patriot and other forms of interceptors, on which Ukraine depends heavily, because those are the interceptors that defend their major cities from constant Russian attack. So on both ends, both in terms of helping Russia and hurting Ukraine, this has been a major setback for Europeans. And it's also clear in the way the Trump administration has handled this, that the Trump administration neither before the war nor now could not care less about the effect

on Europe. They didn't consult with the Europeans before the war. In fact, even Trump's best buddy out, best non-authoritarian buddy, I would say, out there, Georgia Maloney, the Prime Minister of Italy, you know, she was also not giving a heads up and she's quite, she was quite unhappy about that an embarrassed or humiliated in Italy. She's supposed to be Trump's buddy and he didn't tell her. So for the Europeans, this is unquestionably a strategic setback. I think in the unilateralism of it, I mean, is maybe less important in terms of going to war. The conduct of the war, maybe less important than the actual substantive results you've just outlined very well. But it is striking. I mean, we were, we remember the Iraq War.

We were accused of acting unilaterally. But at fact, we tried very hard to get Europeans on board. We failed with Schroeder and Germany and I guess Iraq and France. And that was, you know, we went to the Security Council. I mean, there was a big. Twice. Twice. And we did get other Europeans on board and sadly. But anyway, I think it's one thing.

Don't you think if you're an ally to have, okay, we disagree on this particular action and choice. And we're just going to not participate. That was kind of their position. That's very different from just thinking you can go to war, a big war, not too far from Europe and not even talk to them. I mean, it is kind of stunning. Well, it just means that he doesn't think of the U.S. as leader of an alliance. He thinks of the U.S. is a...

And that's the conclusion that Europeans have sensibly reached. You now see many, many more Europeans. You know, there's a really smart European scholar named Yvon Krosdib who's written this, but many others are written that it's very clear, and this is the bottom line. It's very clear that the Trump administration no longer regards the trans-acran relationship as anything of importance, longer regards Europe as an important security interest of the United States. You know, they've told, the Europeans that they have to be able to defend themselves by 2027. I think that's what

Secretary Hedgeseth told them last year. And so they've really cut the Europeans loose. And the thing about this war is it really drives home the degree to which the United States no longer cares about fundamental European security. And then, of course, the same, you know, we can move on and go oil to Asia, yeah. You know, very few countries in the world are more dependent on Middle East oil, and including the oil that comes directly through the Strait of Hormuz than Japan. Japan, I think, depends for something like 90% of its oil supplies come from the Middle East, and 70% of that runs through the Strait of Hormuz.

So once again, the Japanese were not consulted. In fact, as late as late as late, late, last week, they were still complaining, and no one had talked to them about any. Diplomats have not been contacted. It's clear that the new prime minister, who is a conservative, you know, is supposed to be sort of Trumpy, although I don't think that's really what she is. But nevertheless, she's very upset. She's talked about how this crisis has severely impacted Japanese interests.

And so the huge oil prices are really damaging our allies. on top of which the Japanese will notice that the United States has sent significant forces that are dedicated both to the defense of Japan and are sort of critical to any response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Those forces are now being sent. Some of them are already there and some are being sent to the Middle East, particularly people who are writing these days about this 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and what's known as the Tripoli amphibious ready group, both of which are sort of critical parts

of defending against the Chinese attack in the region. Those have been sent now to the Middle East. So once again, we see Americans having to sort of strip the West Pacific theater of significant capability in order to deal with this. This is something, by the way, that Elbridge Colby used to be very concerned about. It used to talk a lot about how we were degrading our capabilities,

in the Western Pacific because of all our activity in the Middle East, but apparently now that's a good thing. So the Asian allies have been very badly hurt by this, and will continue to be badly hurt. And then finally, there's a question, I mean, we can get to Israel in a second. What about China? I mean, China itself, are they being hurt at all or intimidated? Well, I mean, this is funny.

I mean, I read in some articles in the Wall Street Journal about how, how the Chinese, you know, this is going to be a great deterrent to the Chinese, but I don't really see how they view it that way. I mean, first of all, on the oil, yes, they are very dependent on Middle Eastern oil, but they've built up huge stocks. I think they have something like a billion barrels of oil in their reserves so that they can kind of make it for months. But also, Iran is shipping oil to China right now. I mean, the ships that are allowed through the Straits, through the Hulamu Strait, are ships that are, our ships that are, oil bound for China. So they're not even particularly, they're not even particularly suffering. But from a military point in view also, it's interesting, what are the lessons that the Chinese

should learn from this? Now, obviously, they're going to be very impressed with some of the performance of our fifth generation aircraft and, you know, American capability of hitting targets is obviously, you know, unparalleled. On the other hand, if in a contingency with China is the United States going to send the Israeli air force in to take out all the air defenses before the Americans have to start risking their craft? It's not exactly clear how the Iran operation is replicable in the case of China, again, partly because of the Israeli role, which was very important. I don't think the United States would have gone into take out those air defenses from Iran by itself if the Israelis hadn't done it for them. But also, you know,

the Americans have shown that they're afraid, understandably, I don't mean, I'm in the critical of it, but I mean, they are clearly unwilling to send their, Americans are unwilling to send their naval vessels into the strait for fear, as Pete Hegseth has pointed out, that the Iranians will shoot at them. Well, I think in most Taiwan scenarios, there will be people shooting at American ships and probably with greater capability, not probably, but definitely with much greater capability. So I don't know whether the Chinese are given pause by this or whether they're encouraged by it, quite honestly. Yeah, if you can't beat Iran very quickly, you have everything on your side and Israel and it's against Iran, which is, as you say, sort of been impoverished and depleted by 12 days of war last summer and other things,

are we really going to, how successful will we be in deterring or defeating China? or something if they try something with Taiwan. I mean, it just seems like it's infantly harder for us to do. Right. And, you know, a lot of these questions are not only about capability. America has extraordinary capability, but it's a willingness to take risks. It's a willingness to use them in dangerous situations. And certainly in this situation, the United States, has been very cautious.

So I don't know what that, I don't know what, I don't know what, what signaled that sense of the Chinese. And then finally, of course, the Chinese can also see that in order to conduct this war against a much less or power, the United States has had to strip, you know, the Western Pacific of significant forces, which are supposed to be dedicated to dealing with a potential China threat. So, you know, I don't see why the Chinese should be any more worried about the United States before this than they were before the war. Yeah, I think that sounds right to me. And in the region, in the Middle East itself? Well, I mean, I just wonder whether the Gulf states in particular are wondering whether they've joined the right team here, because they're, they're

have, by the way, been very on background, very vocal in saying that they were against the war. They didn't, they did not favor it. They thought they had a pretty good deal going with the Iranians, that kind of an agreement that they would get to, they would leave each other alone for the most part. So they were not really in favor of the war. They were overruled. And then it turns out the United States can't really protect them. I mean, they have suffered the worst in some respects because it's not only that they've been targets and that they're shipping, you know, they've lost. money on oil. But, you know, they, with the tremendous cooperation of the Trump, and I would say in this case, the Trump family and social circle, have been very deeply involved in the United States

making investments in AI and other things, but particularly AI. They're hosting data centers for all kinds of companies. And in general, they've been trying to make themselves an attractive place for investment and also tourism. And that's a big, that's basically their whole game right now. And this is devastating for that. It's funny, you watch the UAE is basically arresting people for taking pictures of damage that may have been done by Iranian drone strikes and other things on things in Dubai, for instance. I think they've arrested foreigners who took pictures of these things. Why? Because they don't want people to see that it's risky to be in Dubai because then people won't invest and they won't come. And so it's kind of a disaster for them. So again,

the bottom line for the Gulfies is that the United States undertook this war and then was not able actually to protect them. So and here now Trump is calling for the Chinese maybe to help keep the straight open. I don't think it's hard to persuade certain Gulf states like the U.S. and others, that maybe China is also a pretty good partner, or at least as much of a reliable partner as the United States has turned out to be. So I don't really see how the United States has gained a great advantage in its relationship with those, with those allies. Some people have written, they're very big on the U.S. Israel cooperation, which has been very close, I gather, and I guess militarily effective. That's a model for, of, what is it

the model four. I mean, I... Well, that's the thing. I mean, it's very sui generis. You know, America doesn't have Israel with it in every region of the world. It only has it with its year. And I must say I find it a little bit, it's kind of a syllogism when people talk about what a great ally Israel is. It is a great ally in defense of Israel, you know, I mean... Which is fine. I mean, they're entitled to put that first, you know? No, no, no, right. That's their great concern. I mean, let's face it, at the end of the day, Iran is a much greater threat to Israel

than it is to the United States. So when they say that people, and when people say that Israel's a great ally in the fight against Iran, it's kind of like saying that South Vietnam was a great ally in the fight against North Vietnam, you know? I mean, it was, but weren't we there to defend Saudi Vietnam, you know? So, but I think Israel also has got, I don't know what, I don't, I can't speak for what's in B. Nadi Netanyahu's head. But if I were the Israelis, I would also be worried about the reliability of the American commitment over the long term. I mean, Israel has used its power

with the United States now to really create a kind of hegemonic dominance in the region. Let's say that they do get rid of this Iranian regime and therefore is sort of involved in Iran to make sure that it doesn't come back. It is involved in Lebanon, is involved in Gaza, et cetera, et cetera. Can Israel sustain that without the United States? So that's why we get back to this decision that Trump has to make. I mean, if the United States is now going to sort of establish itself as a major long-term military presence, and by the way, Netanyo has talked about this, something he's talked about when he spoke to Congress in 2024. He talked about turning the Abraham Accords into the Abraham Alliance,

which would be a kind of NATO-like long-term American with the Arabs and the Israelis interoperability and intelligence, et cetera, et cetera. Is the United States really ready to make that kind of long-term commitment to a larger military presence in the Middle East? And if it's not, as I said, can Israel sustain this position? Yeah, it seems like Israel was in good position after the June, you know, 12-day war. And the U.S. had come in to help finish, more or less finish the job with Iran's nuclear program. So there was, you know, good allies. The alliance structure was working.

But on the other hand, Israel didn't ask the U.S. to run many risks or do too much. And Iran was weakened and Hezbollah, thanks to Australia, actually, before it, but very much weakened. Yeah, and now they've sort of, I don't know, overextended. They've extended the effort so far that they're now in a position if they don't replace this Iranian regime. And if they don't, if the U.S. doesn't succeed in opening the straight, how does that work? How does that look? I mean, is that, yeah, some of the deterrent effect is less, not greater, I would say, after all. Now, maybe they just feel they sort of so weakened and decimated Iranian, the military capabilities and the IRGC and so forth,

that it's kind of worth it for a couple, two or three years. And that would be, I guess, you know, they could make that argument. But if we're not reliable, yeah, go ahead. I wouldn't think we're reliable because, I mean, first of all, I don't think that Donald Trump is a reliable ally to anyone, including people who think that they're his, you know, buddies. But also because I'm not sure the American public is really that pro-Israel right now, honestly. And depending on how the war goes, they might be even less pro-Israel by the time, by the time we're done.

You know, that's an important point, if I can just interrupt as someone who's been involved in the Israel stuff a little bit over the years. I mean, one of the key talking points for Israel always was. And it wasn't a, it was a true talking point, an important one. It was very much like Ukraine. I mean, it was, we've, Israel depends on, God knows, a lot of U.S. military aid and high quality, you know, keeping a qualitative edge and et cetera. But they've never asked the U.S. to fight for Israel. they did ask the U.S. help in defending themselves against missiles, obviously. That was, I guess, the Biden administration.

We wouldn't go all the way back, obviously, to the first Gulf War and so forth. But that was pretty much it. I mean, and that was a big advantage for Israel, I think, you know, in sort of making the case in the U.S., that, look, the military aid, the diplomatic relationship, the price you pay for this sometimes in the Arab world and so forth and in other places is worth it because it's, you know, a good ally that isn't asking you to send, it's not Vietnam, if you want to use your early, right? You're not asking you to send troops here to fight and die. And suddenly we are in the middle of it. And I'm very dubious

that that's good for Israel. You know, and, I mean, at the largest level with Israel and with the Gulf and with everybody else, I mean, wherever we get to, let's say we have a decent outcome here. But whatever decent outcome we get, however you want to define it, it will be because the United States brought its enormous power to bear. And what we've learned through history is that it's not enough to bring the enormous power to bear to get the victory. You also need to keep the power there to sustain the victory. The United States won a big victory in World War I,

totally transformed the balance of power in Europe in a way that was favorable to peace, and then pulled out. And then the European, because then the balance of power was, was refashioned that it wasn't sustaining a piece anymore. And we got that and then we wound up in World War II. I mean, a similar thing would happen in the Middle East if the United States brings great power to bear to create a certain kind of situation, but then is not willing to keep its power there to sustain that situation. And then you go back to, and I think that's the real risk now. And that's why, again, I get back to Trump is at a kind of fork in the road. Now most

explain the fork, the choice. That really weird. Well, again, the choice is, We have now expended a tremendous amount of power to sort of restructure the region. That's the, put simply, that's the goal, right? Restructure the region so that there is no longer an Iranian threat. But there's going to be instability in Iran no matter what happens. Let's say you get a friendly government in place, okay? Let's say you get some even member of the IRG, the Iranian Guard, you know, the current regime in a sense. You get the kind of outcome you had in Venezuela.

Does that mean everybody in Iran is going to be going along with this? Does that mean that there's not going to be any kind of, you know, rebellion somewhere in Iran? I think that's quite likely. Or that Iran simply falls apart, you know, and then spreads chaos in the region, which is exactly what the Gulf states have always been worried about. At that point, has the United States sort of said, well, that's not my problem, our problem anymore because that will also create terrorism and brutality and closing the strength. I mean, who knows? It's not like the region will all of a sudden just become permanently stable.

The United States would still have to play a role, but it has kicked this hornet's nest. It has upset one balance. So is it going to sustain the other? So it seems to me the one choice that Trump faces is to, as I say, really establish a long-term, large American military presence in the region. to sustain whatever gains have been made by this war, or to pull back and to pull out and then let things take whatever course they're going to take. I find both of those courses are highly unlikely, but he's going to have to choose between them or do something in the middle. But in the middle won't solve the problem.

Either you're there being dominant enough to suppress these forces or you're not. And so this is that, you know, I have to say, fairness to the Bush administration, and this is something that people are now making this, the analogies between the Iraq War in 2003 and this. But here's a big difference. Whatever else is true, Bush did feel responsible for leaving behind an outcome in Iraq that could be sustained. And if you look at Iraq since the American invasion in 2003, there have been six elections, parliamentary elections. There's been a change in of government. There have been seven prime ministers. Iraq has been stable. It hasn't committed war

against anybody. He hasn't committed atrocities against its own people. I mean, we would dream of an outcome like that in Iran. And I just don't get the sense that Trump feels that kind of responsibility. In fact, Colin Powell famously said, you know, he had the pottery barn rule about these kinds of conflicts that if you break it, you own it. I think Bush took serious. the idea that he owned Iraq, even if he did break it, and even if they were incompetent in the conduct of the war, which I don't think, which was certainly true, he did ultimately feel responsibility. The other day, Lindsey Graham, who's pretty much the Trump whisperer on this war, I mean, he seems to be a play, he's certainly boasting about his role in getting Trump to do this.

Lindsay Graham specifically said, I don't believe that if you break it, you own it. Which means that, yeah, we can break it and just walk away. And I think, by the way, that is what much of the world is likely to think that we're going to do. Yeah, I mean, one thing it strikes me, I want to come back to those two choices that, as you say, neither is attractive.

But I guess he has to make one or take one or the other or try to muddle through somehow. But what strikes me is that if we had had this conversation the day the war began, we would have said, I mean, the maximalist, if you want to call it that, the, in it for real, you know, a choice, and for a diamond, for a dollar choice would be to insist on regime change, basically. It may be not full regime change to some kind of democracy, but to at least to Venezuela level of, you know, of someone who clearly is willing to work with us, however, you know, for at least a while and have at least some

modicum of stability for a while, I guess, or not. And if not, that it's just about the weapons and further degrading their nuclear and missile capabilities and stuff. It's funny, it was interesting to be that we're sort of beyond that in the sense that now the more deventious goal is just to reopen the straight. I mean, when you think about that for a minute, that's itself very telling, right? Literally, I mean, this is, we're going to require all this effort two weeks in to reopen a straight that's been open for forever basically, right? I mean, with two exceptions, basically for, you know, 40 years or something like that. And that's a pretty, including during the Iraq war, by the way.

So that's a kind of, I mean, now, I don't know which way that pushes someone like pushes Trump exactly. I guess you could reopen the stray or try to, but even that does seem to be require a pretty big, well, as we can see by the movement of troops and by HECS as saying, well, by the fact we don't seem able to keep it open by bombing alone. And then you are talking ground troops. And so that's even leaving aside the regime question, right, which is so it's a pretty astonishing.

I think people haven't quite focused enough on how that's not good, you know, that we're in for over two weeks. And this, our goal now is literally to reopen something that was open 16 days ago, you know. Right. I mean, it's pretty funny to watch supporters of the Trump administration say, well, this is only demonstrated what a threat that Iran posed. that they have closed the strait, but of course they were like deliberately not closing the straits for all these years, precisely because we did not confront them with the prospect of complete annihilation.

You know, for the Iranians, it's always been a last resort to try to wreak this kind of damage both closing the strait and on the Gulf states. that was not ever their number, that was not their first move in a conflict. And in fact, they took a fearful bombing in June without doing this. It was only when both the Israelis and the United States made it clear that their goal was the annihilation of regime assassinated the entire leadership with a bombing strike, that they then did this. So we are now having to solve a problem that we clearly provoke. you know, that we created this problem by conducting this in the way that we've conducted it. So, but but as you say, more importantly, I mean, I'm not an expert on this, but every expert that I read says the only way to guarantee keeping the straight open is by controlling the coastline of Iran from where a lot of these, where a lot of the attacks would be coming from.

And you can only control the coastline with ground forces. And I imagine that that has something to do with why they're sending the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit to the region, possibly, because one of the things that that unit is expert at is amphibious landings. And it could be that that's what the plan is. And I guess if you had to ask me right now, I would say Trump is going to send ground troops. He is going to use ground troops. and we're going to be engaged in this war now for months, if at least. Yeah, that's striking. Did you have that?

I mean, did you have that few two weeks ago? Or did you, or are you just judging? No, because like everybody else, like everybody else, I thought Trump would declare victory and bug out. But now things have gotten to the point where I think, I don't even think he thinks he can do that. You know, he could have bugged out on the Sunday after they killed the entire leadership of the Iranian government.

And honestly, what I would have expected. So like a lot of people, I expected the Trump taco. But I think that he's, I'm not sure that that is an available option. Honestly, I'm not sure that is now an available option. Because if this war, if the United States, first of all, the war is not going to stop. But if the United States stops, he's going to have left in power the son of the Ayatollah. That's not what I would say would be the ideal outcome. But also more importantly, the fact that the straits now are in a way much more vulnerable to Iran than they were before. I'm not sure you can accept that that is an acceptable outcome,

even for someone who feels no sense of responsibility. Yeah, I've assumed that he would talk oh, and I wrote this, I guess, 10 days ago, so a week into the war. And I guess I've still inclined to that. I have been inclined to that future, just was it does seem like the one lesson Trump learned from watching American politics but one of the key lessons over 50 years was do not get involved in a ground war in the Middle East. I mean, you know, it's a, and frankly, just if you're judging politics, it's a good lesson to learn.

Those who tend to be difficult. They've hurt presidents, obviously George W. Bush. And getting successfully, executing one successfully, George H.W. Bush, didn't help him either. So you don't gain from it and you just lose from it. So I've always assumed he would, you know, and he doesn't care about the pottery bar and stuff. you can still imagine, I guess I could still imagine him. He needs to be given some fig leaf, you know, some could seize fire with the straight being stabilized. But he stops the military action.

He doesn't care about what happens in the ground. He assumes that, hopes that things don't fall apart too dramatically so as to make it hugely embarrassing to the U.S. that we did this. He hopes the Gulf states kind of help clean up some of the mess, some of the pottery barn mess, you know, in the region. And people don't pay too close attention. And he could at least claim it's Venezuela like, and who knows what's going to happen in Venezuela. That could be a total mess, of course, in three months, too. But, you know, and kind of move on.

But I think maybe you're right. Just the rhetoric certainly haggs that. And Trump goes so back and forth, but, you know, I could end it as quickly as I want. But I don't know. It's an interesting question of which. I mean, he has to not only stop himself, but he has to get the Israelis to stop too. Because the Iranians will keep firing if the Israelis are still firing. So that means that they'll keep hitting the Gulf.

close in the straight, et cetera. So he has to get the Israelis to stop, too. Which he did in June. But that was after, you know, they had, that was a much more limited goals in Israel and Zerahoo and Trump could both say they'd accomplish the goals of very badly setting back, even though maybe not what a Trump say, eliminate or something, eradicate the Iranian nuclear program. But, you know, there was clearly real damage done. I mean, yeah, they have gotten themselves in it. You think, when do we think we, I guess he's got some, I've, I've, I don't know, he's time. He can, of course, keep doing what he's doing for a while, I guess.

I mean, but the other difference with the June, of course, is there are real, because of the Gulf, because of the straight, there are real-world, real-time consequences, I guess. They were not, right? It's not like a, well, he's got two weeks, four weeks, six weeks, he can decide, because, which would be true, incidentally, in other conflicts and other circumstances, you and I were great advocates, defenders of the, of the U.S. military effort in the Balkans twice in the late 90s, and the second time. And we thought they should be ground troops, worried that the bombing wouldn't be enough. I think the threat of ground troops finally brought Milosevic down and took a long time, right, 75 days, 80 days. I can't remember. It was a long, 90. It was a long time, yeah.

But there was no, I want to say no, but, I mean, in a way, 40 days, 80 days, it wasn't affecting the rest of the world that much. It was affecting us at home. And here, that's not really the case, right? So you can't just kind of play out the clock and hope for something lucky to happen. and maybe this second, this, how many son turns up dead, and then you have an excuse to say, see, we really did decimate the regime. Again, go ahead. No, I mean, these are rather, like, contrasts with the Iraq war. The price of oil, both before and after the invasion of in 2003, was $20 to $30 a barrel.

I mean, there was not an oil spike as a result of this. So living indefinitely at $100 a barrel oil, and some people say you go up to 150, and other people say it go up to 200, but let's just say it's at 100. That will obviously have, you know, severe economic repercussions at home. And also, again, you know, help American adversaries and harm American allies. You know, by the way, we could also be on the cusp of a really sort of, I don't know, virulent European anti-American sentiment on the conflict. You know, I mean, obviously during the Iraq War and during the Vietnam War,

millions went into the streets of Europe to oppose that action. But the government's kind of held firm because the United States are still guaranteeing their security. You know, it was still a reliable ally. These wars, when the United States fought the Iraq War in 2003, Russia was not a threat. At that time, Putin was still trying to make nice with everybody. The Chinese were in there, Hujentau, Wen Zhao, Mao, moderate, sort of accommodating phase. There was no impact on sort of the global sort of balance of power as a result of this war. But in this case, we're in a very different strategic situation.

Russia has already committed an act of aggression. Europe is an ongoing war in Europe. China is clearly in a more aggressive and more powerful mode than it was in 23 years ago, so that now an action like this really can and is having implications for the strategic balance, including in an actual war that's occurring in Europe. So the downside consequences of this conflict are much greater than the downside consequences of a failed war in Iraq was. that's such an interesting point and a good point I guess an important point really worth thinking about even more I guess from Trump's point of view from his whatever his America his version of America first

America alone America the bully I don't know how in order to define it yeah maybe that doesn't matter so he doesn't take the alliances seriously but even so just from a practical as you say economic well-being of America and Americans involved in a difficult conflict you think yeah he's got to be well I'm sorry I mean let me let me let me complete the thought about Europeanism. We've already had a case in this situation where Spain didn't want to let the United States use its base. You know, the United States, despite what John may or may not realize, is heavily reliant on bases in Europe, not for the defense of Europe, but for, you know, being able to use it in Central Asia, being able to use it in the Middle

East, et cetera. Who's to say that we will always have access to these bases? if we have driven such a wedge between ourselves and our allies. And by the way, when it comes to our allies, I did leave out one other point. When Bush invaded Iraq in 2003, the allies did not have to wonder whether this use of force and this sort of American boldness might not be used against them.

But now the allies do have to worry about that because a Trump that is bold enough to do Venezuela, that is twice as bold enough to do Iran. Is it inconceivable that he's bold enough to take Greenland when he decides to do it? The costs and risks of taking Greenland are infinitesimal compared to the cost and risks of going to war with Iran. And he's already challenged the Europeans on that issue. So if you're Denmark today, is the war in Iran making you feel more or less secure against an American move against Greenland? I would say the answer is likely to be less.

So now we have a situation where the war may actually be frightening to some of our allies. And again, this gets back to context and what is the purpose here? No one had the doubt when Bush went to war in Iraq, the first Bush in the Gulf, in the first Gulf War, the second Bush, that they were still heavily committed to defense of their allies, heavily committed to supporting this liberal world, order. I think we have reason to believe now that Trump is not committed to any of that. Therefore, this Iran operation is occurring in a situation that is not about defending the liberal world order, is not about defending allies, which is why I think from an allied point of view, this is not an encouraging action by the United States. Yeah, the allies looking in 91 or in

2003, but also see that the Congress had approved these wars. The Democrats had voted in considerable numbers to do that. And therefore they probably, even if you didn't participate or agree with the judgment, as Schroeder didn't and Shroeder didn't, you sort of thought, okay, but look, that's what America has decided and we'll have to just, you know, we'll live with it. We won't be part of it. We won't either, as you say, they quietly didn't encourage, I wouldn't say, demonstrations in the streets and so forth.

They didn't blackball those allies in Tony Blair and Spain and other countries that were much more with us in that effort, right? They didn't sort of have repercussions within the EU or NATO and so forth. You're looking at America now, and he's taken American war. The Democrats are going to be against the war, and certainly are against the war, and are going to be really against it. I think they should be, too, in terms of ground troops and so forth. You look at this country, you think, is this, even if Trump somehow, you know,

disappears from the scene or is succeeded, I mean, what, are we looking at a country that's at all, you know, they can't count on anyone, honestly. I mean, if I were, you know, I'd be, I mean, not that I think the Democrats have behaved responsibly so far. They, you know, I'm not criticizing them. I just think analytically, a country like that's got a president who's acting entirely on his own and then forcing it away an opposition party to be in total opposition to this war without getting any buy in. How reliable, yes you say, you know, how reliable is this going forward? And without any clarity about whether he's, as you say, you and I are sitting here.

We follow this pretty closely two weeks in. We don't know. He could pull the plug tomorrow or he could double down. Right, right. No, it's just the whole thing is being carried out in a way that evinces no sense of broader responsibility. I guess that, you know, to allies, to anybody, you know. So I think that's unnerving. By the way, there's one thing we haven't mentioned, and it is, I don't know, a little bit concerning,

which is what is the domestic ramifications. Yes, I say a word about that. And one of the reasons I a little bit worry that Trump is willing to have the war go on now for months, including into the election, is that it is a potential weapon in his holster against domestic opposition. Now, and to make the most obvious point, Brendan Carr just warned, threatened, I think it was today or yesterday, that he's going to start looking into the licenses of the news organizations that are running news reports that the Trump administration is not happy with. I mean, Heggseth is up there complaining about news criticism that is like so, like even mentioning that something got American, some American thing

got blown up is somehow, you know, unpatriotic. And making the completely obvious point that we weren't really ready for Iran's response is now regarded as, fake news and an effort to undermine the president. And so, you know, I think that they could use this as a way to try to silence the media more than they've already done, which is plenty, or that they could convince the corporate chiefs to reign in their news gathering organizations so they don't report news that's unhelpful to the Trump administration. And that doesn't even get into the question of national security sort of dispensations to the federal government, whether it's during elections or some other time because we're at war and we're facing a risk.

And, you know, now we're down to, now we have to find out whether can we trust the FBI when it tells us that there's a threat here or a threat there. Their credibility is not particularly high right now under Cash Patel. So, but it wouldn't take much for the FBI to say, hey, we were facing a lot of threats out there. we're going to have to crack down on X, Y, and Z. What if we start having anti-war protests? Do they become domestic terrorists because they're protesting against this great patriotic war

that we're fighting? So I do worry that, I've always worried that Stephen Miller was particularly pro the Venezuela action, not because he cared about who was ruling in Venezuela, but because of the opportunities it might give him to wield particular kinds of, of authorities in the United States. And I worry that the Iran war, as it continues, could open that opportunity as well. Yikes. No, but I think that's right. I think just in terms of the choice,

it's something to at least think about. It's probably in Trump's mind, but also in others who were very close to Trump's in the minds of others who are very close to Trump, including Stephen Miller, but not only Miller, that there's, usually you would say being involved in a ongoing war that's hiking oil prices and causing turmoil and mayhem and not going so great, it's not a good thing for a U.S. President, which therefore gives him a political incentive to cut his losses or pull back or try to stop it. But if on the other hand, you wanted excuses to do a whole lot of things at home in terms of the 26 elections and beyond, that maybe changes that calculus. Yeah, I mean, Trump would not be the first leader in history to feel that a foreign war was

useful for domestic purposes of the domestic consolidation. Yikes. But this has been a good, this is a very helpful discussion on the geopolitical side and ending a little on the U.S. side, but that's appropriate. That's part of the, they're connected. Bob, thanks for joining me today. People should keep reading. Bob Kagan, as he writes about this war and listen to you, and maybe we'll get back together in two, three, four weeks and see where we think things stand. If Trump has really picked one of the, picked, you know, picked one of the forks in the, one of the forks in the road, picked the road from which.

Came to the fork and he took it. I think is. Yeah, I know, what is that joke? Yeah, Yogi Berers. Yeah. Anyway, thanks Bob for joining me today. And thank you all for joining us on Boil Work on Sunday.