Bulwark Takes - Nobody Believed Orbán Could Lose. Then It Happened. (w/ H. David Baer)

Episode Date: May 3, 2026

H. David Baer joins Bill Kristol for Bulwark on Sunday to discuss the lessons of Hungary.Read Baer's article in The BulwarkTickets for our Bulwark Live shows in San Diego and Los Angeles in May

Hi, Bill Crystal here. Welcome to Bullwork on Sunday. I'm very pleased to be joined today by David Baer, a professor of theology and philosophy at Texas Lutheran University. I think it's been there for a quarter century. I think it's amazing. You're so young, but you must be gun when you were 12 years old. Yeah, yeah, yeah, you must be gunned when you were 12 years old or something. And David teaches on many topics of theology and philosophy. He's written a very good book on just war theory, a topic that's kind of come back into the news recently with the Pope and the Trump administration and so forth. forth. But for us, has written, for the bulwark, has written many times on Hungary, where you've visited and lived and know the language and spent the election season there the last, you know, about a month ago. And David, you were, was ahead of the curve and seeing that Orban might lose and noticing how interesting alternative Magyar, Peter Maggiara presented. So I thought we'd talk about the meaning of everything that happened three weeks ago. I guess it's three weeks ago today, right, in Hungary. and maybe begin, though, with an update of where we are now, since, like most Americans, I've kind of lost track of things

after those first few days of excitement and so forth. But also I just want to recommend David had an excellent article this week, I think Thursday at the bulwark, how Peter Magyar toppled Victor Orban's illiberal regime by reviving Hungary's liberal traditions. And people should go look at that. I think we'll put it in the showdust. Anyway, David, thank you for joining me today.

Well, thanks for having me. I know it's the end of the term and you're busy grading papers and exams and doing all kinds of things. I'm always having to take a break from grading. Okay. Well, the one thing I do not miss about being a professor, I've got to say, you know. Okay, so let's just begin. It's three weeks since the election. I'm curious what Peter Maggiard has been doing.

Are you surprised by what he's doing? And maybe more, and then that's more broadly, does anything look different to you that it did sort of the day after the election in terms of its significant and meaning of what happened or about its defeat. Well, so this, so the next government, the new parliament is going to be sworn in on Saturday. So next week, okay? So Maggiard has been pretty, pretty, I think he's done a pretty good job very quickly sort of putting together as his cabinet or his ministers. They, he's basically selecting competent people or people who appear to be competent, who have training in the various portfolios. he's creating a, it looks like he wants a more decentralized kind of government.

So Orban had a pretty centralized. You know, the ministers were all sort of under him or under an office. And so there's going to be more ministries and they're going to be populated by people who are supposed to be, have training or qualified in the portfolios. They're all new people. They're not people who have really a political track record because that was part of what Maguire was doing. He wanted a system changed.

And so he, you know, basically these are all new people. The one, so that's basically, there's three women, I think. There's one blind person who's going to be, has in one of the portfolios. So it's a different feel. There is one kind of controversy, though, is that he has appointed his brother-in-law to be the minister of justice. So that's gotten a little bit of, it's a little odd. Or anyway, it's a question. You know, I guess you can go back to Robert Kennedy or something.

But so there's this, there's been some discussion of that. But other than that, I mean, it looks, it's been impressive. Basically, he still hasn't really stopped. He's been going and he set up his government. And it seems like he campaigned, as you put it on system change, I guess that's the way you put it. And it feels like just from my very limited seeing his couple reports of his speeches and interviews that he is very much following through on system change. He's not like backing off or anything like that. No, no, no.

he's following, I mean, he, yeah, he made some announcements right away. I mean, so one thing that happened is a number of these oligarchs, or at least according to reports, are moving their money, you know, out of the country, at least the, you know, for sure, I think that the son of the, what used to be the head of the central bank, you know, was now taking up residence in Dubai and so forth. So he, you know, Orban's son-in-law, his daughter and live in America. I mean, his son-in-law is one of the most richest and corrupt people in hungry. So there are some people fleeing and they're worried about the money, you know, leaving the country. So Magga made a statement, you know, this should stop and, you know, there's going to be accountability.

So he has definitely focused on, I mean, he wants system change. This is going to, he's demanded. So the system change will require to happen sort of, he wants to remove all these old people. He's called, or the people that Orban put in in the various positions. He's called for the president to resign and so forth. So, you know, as I guess there's a little bit of an issue there, he's trying to want all these office holders to resign. He can probably get them out because he's got a two-thirds.

So he's got that. And then there's a lot of talk about accountability and holding people accountable. So a big chance. So in that respect, those of us who thought looking very much from afar that it's a big moment and that he's, and then over the last two weeks that he seems to be wanting to follow through on it being a big moment, it does seem like that's, we'll see what happens. God knows it's hard to govern and all kinds of things. We'll all kinds of zigs and zags ahead, I'm sure.

But at least at the start, he thinks this is a real change, of course, and not, I mean, not just, I mean, I think with Biden, to use the obvious American comparison, Biden v. Trump in 2020, Trump and President four years, Maguire has been, you know, power 16 years, so quite different, obviously. But Biden's rhetoric was, you know, basically restoring normalcy, and that's what he did, it tried to do. But that's not, Maguire is different, right? I mean, this is a definition. No, no, it's definitely, it's definitely going to be a something big. And I think the real question is, um, uh, what will happen is big coalition. How will these ministers prove competent? Will he be able to hold together all these, uh, I mean, you know, it's just a basically a broad spectrum of political views. So, I mean, there'll be a lot of challenges. And then there'll be sort of, you know, challenges with

the economy. But he, he has, he has said, repeat, said on the election night that, you know, the president needs to resign. He listed all these other people from the Supreme Court, constitutional court and support. They need to resign. And they push back. And he said, well, you have until May 31st. And if you don't step down, we will remove you. So, I mean, right now he's focusing on the president. So the president is not, I mean, this is Orban system. The parliament with the two-thirds majority can pretty much do whatever it wants. I mean, there's some control. So if the parliament passes a law, and the president has a, is concerned about the constitutionality of it.

He can send it to the constitutional court and the constitution court can kind of review it and so forth. So, but if they decide to change the constitution, then that's basically it. So if the president who is, or Maudiore for his first room as a puppet, which I think is a totally accurate. He's an unqualified puppet and a weak, kind of a weak, just a weak character, a weak person. so if he doesn't resign, the parliament can impeach him. But the decision about impeachment goes to the Constitutional

Court, so it's unlikely that the Constitutional Court would, you know, agree. But then he could, Magdard could just change the Constitution so that he doesn't have to go to the Constitutional Court. So I think the first thing that'll be interesting to see is how, what happens with the all of the various office holders? I think some of them will

you know, certainly go. I would be, I personally think the president will go because I just don't think he's got the stomach. This is my sizing up, I don't think he has a stomach for fighting a losing battle. But, you know, the rhetoric is pretty tough from the, from the Orban people,

and so we'll have to see. The other, yeah, go ahead. Go ahead. Well, so the head of the constitutional court, I mean, this is, you know, the head of the constitutional court right now was the former general prosecutor for Orban. He's never been a judge.

He's got a legal training. He's never been a judge. And when he was a prosecutor, of course, he didn't prosecute anybody. So he was protecting all of Warbond's people. And now he's been moved over to the head of the Constitutional Court. So that's a guy they want to get rid of. I mean, you could probably, you can challenge the whole legitimacy of him because he wasn't doing his job. But, you know, it's a little harder to take down the Constitution Court. And there are concerns. I mean, now all the legal scholars are talking about, well, can you, you know, if you just remove everybody, I mean, you've kind of got a precedent where you're acting kind of unconstitutionally or you're undermining constitutionalism by, you know, trying to create a new constitution. So there's, you know, there are some, I don't know what we call them philosophical questions or kind of legal philosophical questions about how to proceed in a way that will actually create a stable new system. So I think we'll have to just see what happens. Yeah, for me that means that I haven't really thought about it this way before. We really need to follow what Magyar does and what he succeeds in and what he doesn't succeed

in, I suppose over the next two and a half years because a lot of these are the challenges that will face if Trump would or if Trump's designee were to lose in 2028 or Trumpism were to be, would a lose, let's just say. Yeah, the challenges of how do you fix a system, how do you do systemic change in a way that restores or maybe, let's say, creates a new constitutional government and rule of law and so forth and a functioning free government, but requires pretty dramatic changes and you can't just, I mean,

so some of it's going to require things that would look radical or look slightly, you know, I don't know, not quite to the taste of people who want it all to be done in a very moderate and temperate way, I suppose. So I suppose he has the same,

he faces that dilemma as well. Right, I think so. I mean, he can do kind of what, pretty much whatever he wants, but then he would just be ruling like Orban, right? Right. So he has to try to do, I don't know. I think he's going to, well, I shouldn't make a prediction, but just based on how he's acting, I think he's pretty much going to go after them. And then that will raise some questions about was this legitimate. I mean, they're talking about it is the case that in Hungary, this was actually one of Warbonds points that, you know, Hungary, I guess, had two constitutions since the fall of communism. And the first one was just negotiated by elites. basically, I don't know, in 1989. And they kept the, they literally kept the old constitution, but they just did a bunch of amendments so that it was like a, it's the same law, but it's the same title of the law, but it was, you know, the new constitution.

But it wasn't done with any, it's just done by elites over the head of the people. There wasn't any buy-in. And then, and then basically Orban did the same thing. I mean, when he came in in power in 2010, he didn't tell people who was going to change the constitution. He ran on other things. And then when he got in, boof, you just changed the constitution. and there wasn't any, you know, it wasn't any societal involvement. So I think that, at least is what people are saying, I think that Madhya,

and of course, Mardia has been traveling around the country. He knows, he's got this sort of, it's kind of populist. I think he would try to, they call it, like create a constitutional moment and get a lot of feed in, you know, get a lot of contributions from people and a lot of buy-in. And then hopefully you create a new constitution. settlement, a new constitutional settlement that has a kind of legitimacy that the last two did not. No, that's very interesting. I mean, I'm in our internal debates in the U.S., I mean, these are all wildly premature since this middle of 2006, but I'm sort of on the side of you need to think about it as

a constitutional moment in 2029, if that happens, not simply as a restoration of something from before. I mean, it's not quite 1787, obviously, but it's not like we don't have experience with having to end 1865, I have, in 1932 even, we have some experience with the kind of rethinking of the Constitution. For the purpose, though, of creating constitutional government, right? I mean, I think that's very much where Maguire is interesting in the sense that, and how much can you do and where do you maybe risk crossing some lines and seeming, you know, Lincoln faced this challenge, right, seeming like you're almost doing something unconstitutional for the sake of saving the Constitution or anyway, it'll be interesting to follow him.

And that, I mean, I'm actually not so qualified as you guys have talked about American politics. But I mean, I do think that, I mean, I kind of agree that there are lots of problems at kind of constitutional level or fundamental level even in the United States that would, I guess, ideally require, you know, constitutional amendments, which everybody, you know, is pretty hard to do, right? So, so, but you do it through, and it's not impossible because we've done it, you know, you know. Well, also, yeah. Yeah, go ahead. through the law. Well, I mean, you can expand, just making up. The spanking the courts, and then you can, that you could, that. Totally. And a lot of the things you can do. And what you do is, I don't know, of handling a

justice department, let's just say this by 2029, I'm making this up, it is 70%, you know, kind of Trump appointees, 90% of course, has top ranks, 100%. And, you know, there are legal ways to replace people, some of which are the predicate for which is been laid by Trump, actually, in the Trump administration. Now, it's also, it's not exactly, the, you know, it's a pretty tough path to go, you might say. It's, you know, radical reconstruction as opposed to, let's, let's have everyone get along, right? So, I mean, it just, these are genuine dilemmas. And I don't know that there's one answer.

There certainly isn't one answer for every part of government and other parts you might want to be much more gradualist about and so forth. But I just, I think following my Jarwich, I'm sure you will do over the next three, two and a half, three years will be very important, you know, important, actually. But there will be lessons not, as they were from the campaign, some of which we discuss again. Right. Getting people involved, right? basically. And then he, he has kind of a mandate, right,

in a way that... He has a clear mandate, and he's, and he, I mean, because he ran on, he ran on regime change. I mean,

that's what he said. It wasn't a secret. And then he got, he really did create a social movement because he's not like, because he traveled all around the country, but, you know, he created these things called the TISA circles,

which were like little local activist groups. They weren't really under his control. It wasn't like, I mean, Orban had done the same thing, actually. I mean, Marjard had no problem.

on copying Orban, but, you know, things that Orban did that were successful. And Orban had made these, I forget what he called them, but he had his little groups too. But they were, you know, disciplined Fides groups that were, you know, there to give Orban a base and they worked. And I think these TISA circles that, that, Magiard created or Mata being the name of his party. This is party. So they call them, they call them Tisa circles. And, but they're like everybody's just involved. I know people who are involved.

And it's much more of a really organic grassroots local participation in politics that doesn't represent, you know, where people are just giving their input. And he basically created a social movement. I mean, because these, you know, when you saw these demonstrations or his rallies or whatever, I mean, it was just, it's just unbelievable. And it's the whole country. So there's a lot of, there's a lot of democratic participation right now. A lot of people are engaged, which is something new. And it's at a grassroots level. but it's not totally, and of course they're following him, but it's not really, I don't think it's totally under his control because it's an authentic grassroots thing.

And so, you know, they will see how he works that if he really gets to the point of trying to change the Constitution, which I hope, I would think he will, we'll see how he gets participation, you know, popular participation. That will be very interesting. And that that is the kind of thing that at some level at a practical level, there's a kind of people could copy that, right? the amount of work he did, engaging people, traveling around talking to people, understanding them. You know, that's something that others, anyone could copy, basically. It takes a lot of work, but you could do it. Yeah, I don't agree.

Smaller country, obviously. Yeah, but you could do it in a state. I mean, you could do it in a state. No, that's a good point, actually, you know, and then even in the natural level. I mean, it sounds as you're talking, just thinking out loud, it's as if almost, I tell me if this analogy is crazy, but it's almost as if the no-kings movement for reduced a leader, you know, with 8 million people rallying and so forth, reduced a leader sort of outside of the official Democratic Party,

though I mean friendly to it, or at least, you know, in sync with it mostly. And that no king's organizers became kind of crucial to this whole movement. And it's sort of not simply, you know, Hakeem Jeffries and Chuck Schumer and the local Democratic, you know, senators and members of Congress and so forth. I guess what I guess it's a challenge here. that you have a massive big party that has half the country almost. I've said this formulaically, but I haven't really thought it through. I mean, that somehow the Democratic Party, capital D, Democratic Party,

has to also become, it has to be both a normal political party and a bigger party, you know, and a No King's Party, if you want to think of it that way. And, I mean, it was sort of amazing how that happened in Hungary, with Magyar coming out of nowhere and not being an elected official prior before that. I guess he was a, I guess he was. He was in, I mean, no one knew he was. He was in the European Parliament, right? Yeah, that's true.

He was for a while, yeah. Yeah, but no one knew who he was, yeah. Right. I don't know with you that. Yeah. Well, there's an, here's a point. I think there's some analogy there. I think that this is sort of a, I guess, a global observation or something.

We basically are in a period, I mean, whatever, everywhere of sort of upheaval and transition. I mean, there are some historical periods or moments where things are kind of solid, right? And there are other times when things are in upheaval. And when things are solid, I think the political alignments are clear and how people are like. And then the elites, or maybe they know what the people want and people are more willing to trust the elites. Okay. If you're in a period of upheaval, the elites, we don't know, I mean, like the sort of conservative, liberal, these categories don't quite, they don't quite work. I mean, everything is in flux.

And so the elites are out of touch because they don't, we're in kind of a point of realignment or reconfiguration. And they don't know what the people want and the people maybe don't quite know what they, you know, they haven't quite figured out their general orientation. So in this period of flux, it's harder for elites to represent the people, I think. And then the way you do that, and this is what I think is suggested by Maguire, is you have to actually, like, interact with them. And you have to, you have to let something encourage things coming up from, coming from the ground up. So my, I mean, again, I don't, I'm not such an expert on American policy, but I do think the Democrat was a bunch of elites, right? And they, I mean, they're all irritating or most of them are. And, and they, you know, they don't feel like they're really, you know, they're not really listening. Or I mean, and even, I mean, you know, I mean, well, just, you know, Trump talks. I mean, of course, it's a demagogory, but you compare Trump and Biden. I mean, no one ever saw Biden, right? He was just an elite.

And the whole Hillary Clinton, how she got to select? I mean, it's just like they've been deciding everything. And so that's probably something the Democrats need to do is like figure out what people want and represent and talk to people and get something flowing in from the bottom. And then it probably won't be exactly, whatever that produces won't be exactly like our old, you know, Republican, conservative liberal divide. It'll be something different or at least somewhat different. now that's so interesting and I think

yeah that way that all happened in one election cycle the change or the transformation but it can happen over a couple of cycles certainly right right right right right right you and I were texting a bit about a couple of issues that I want to I think you have very interesting thoughts on one is Orban's conceding so quickly and apparently easily and not I guess some people who have made well they may they've destroyed some papers and they're moving money out of the country

and so forth But there's not a Trump 2020-like attempt to resist the election results. So that's sort of striking. And I guess it's related to the point you've made about the character of Orban's authoritarian. I'll just use that grab-back term regime and how it's not the Trump people appeal to it. So obviously there's as an example as a model. So obviously there's something in common. But it's not entirely in common and the way in which he used the law.

Talk a little bit about either one of those things. I guess the related, the concession and the kind of using the law to establish something like an authoritarian regime that's not quite, doesn't quite fit into the models we know about. So I think it's true that, I mean, everyone noticed, Orban conceded right away. It was really surprising. I mean, and I remember there it was like 915 and it came up on the TV that Orban has conceded and what is going on. that was really striking because everybody was worried that he wouldn't do that. And, I mean, there were, it was plenty of evidence of this sort of, there was, there was a false flag operation. There was some hokey, like, a threat on one of the pipelines coming from, you know, from Serbia that supposedly on Easter.

And he's, you know, so that was a totally fake thing. And a bunch of reporters went down there and said, well, did you see any, did you see any, you know, police or anything? You see helicopters. There was some guy who's been interviewed. And the guy said, yeah, I did see a helicopter on TV. So, I mean, there was nothing. It was a, so anyway, this is, that's a tangent. But the, I mean, Orban was, was not following democratic procedures.

He was not exhibiting respect for democratic norms or, or the democratic process at all running up, running into the election. And it's a total mistake to think that this is just a, it was just a democratic system. It would be, it would be, and it's easy to demonstrate that if you just look at the details. But, but, but so why did Orban, why did Orban resign so. quickly. I mean, there people speculate it. And my speculation is that basically, kind of, Ormond had a better sense of reality than the most people in this party. He saw that it was, he was through, because it was a landslide. There was no way given that

situation for him to, to fight it. He, there would have been, it would have been a civil war. The people, this whole country would have been full of people. And so he said, well, he sized up the situation and he said, okay, this is my interpretation, obviously. And he said, well, I want to come back. He's thinking about how to make a comeback. And if he protested and fought it, he would be damaging himself as much better to just give up because it was a losing battle and plan has come back. That's what I think he's doing. In fact, I was when I was there in Hungary for the election, I went to this Orban rally,

like two days before the election in Sakeeshwadva, which is a city. I mean, it went in a lot of people there. And Orban, I mean, it was just such a joke of a rally. for this guy. I mean, anyway, it's like there was a bunch of old people and they were like waving the flags and it was Harley, could Harley fill up the all of his, whatever. So, but his speech, Orban's speech, he kept talking about

he could relate to the crowd because they were old, it was a lot of nostalgia, but he kept talking about 2002. That was when he lost. And he had before, and he kept, he talks, he mentioned it several times and what did he learn from 2002? And, you know, you have to hold together, he stick together, you come back

and I said, this guy knows he's going to lose. He's thinking about what's going to happen. He's making the comparison to 2002. And I thought at that point that the conclusion I drew, of course, his intuitive thing was that he's not going to resist this. I mean, I thought that from that rally from his speech. So he made a quick judgment and he decided he could come back, which is quite different from Trump. Okay, because if you, Trump, you know, apparently you can totally deny an election result. you can start a little revolt or instigated insurrection,

and it doesn't destroy you politically. I mean, Orban knew that if he tried to do that, he has no hope. He doesn't really have hope of coming back anyway, I don't think, but he knew he would have no hope. So in some sort of, like, bizarre way, it almost suggests that Hungary's political culture is healthier. And then in America, or, I mean, maybe that's, yeah, I mean, I might say that. Of course, it was a blowout.

So, I mean, it was impossible to dispute it, right? If it had been close, if it had been close, then I think he would have disputed it, but it was clear. And he is trying to come back and all of his little propaganda outlets, which will probably be shut down pretty soon because they're all funded illegally by the Hungarian government, but they're still there on Twitter and this and that. And he's totally trying to make a comeback. It'll be kind of interesting to see what happens. I don't think he can do it, but you never know. No, you're right. I mean, it's a very interesting point about the political culture.

ironically of Hungary, supposed to us, so that we've tolerated and ended up rewarding or at least not punishing January 6th, 2021, kind of amazingly. But there's also the difference, though,

going forward, obviously Trump's 80 years old and... Yeah. Orban has 60 or something like that. 63, 63. Yeah. And Orban,

so he thinks he can either make a comeback or people close to him can or whatever. He has maybe a future, at least in the country. With Trump, both because he's 80

and also just because of his character, I would say. which has gotten more that way over the last couple of years, it seems, you know, the narcissism and the megalomania and so forth. Orban sort of is a very sober kind of, reasonably sober kind of authoritarian. I mean, he knows what he's doing. Yeah, I think so. He wants to become super rich and make all of his friends rich

and control the levels of state power. He doesn't seem to have gone to his head exactly in the way he trumps. Well, he's not a nut case. He's not, he's not building arches or he's not building wallrooms particularly, right? He's stealing a lot of money. He's stealing money. He doesn't need the public narcissistic quite thing. Anyway, all of that makes Trump in some ways, yeah, I think much more of a risk in terms of really trying to use, you know, forces against the public and against preventing a fair election or not recognizing election results probably compared to Orban.

It's an irony, right? Hungary is the place that had Orban for 16 years. But Trump, after two terms of four years each, interrupted, might be more of a threat to our democracy, actually. And there was never the kind of Orban didn't engage in the kind of political violence that, I mean, he was trying to consolidate an authoritarian regime, but he was trying to do it by basically eliminating the opportunities or possibilities for opposition to emerge, right? So he got surprised by Maudiard. I mean, everybody was surprised. So they were behind the game because within a couple months, Maudiard was a major force. But Orban's strategy was, you know, was not to like openly, you know, throw people out of it.

windows and came. He wasn't this, he was trying to just sort of reduce the possibilities and space for any kind of, a possibility for any sort of opposition to emerge. Okay. And there was never anything at Hungary where like somebody came by in a car, you know, people, people were nabbed off the street and thrown into cars and driven away and disappeared and nobody was shot in the street, you know, for demonstrating. I mean, it was nothing like that in Hungary. It would have been very shocking, I think. And we have that in America because, I mean, let's just, be frank, we're probably more tolerant. We're more tolerant of violence, obviously, in America than probably in Europe and Hungary.

So he put up with that, but there's, Trump is more willing to use sort of what I would call transparently naked force to try to give his hold on power, get his hold on power than Orban. Orban was much subtler than that, than Trump. And these guys, I think they do, I think there are definitely people in Trump's circle who, you know, They admire Orban. They want to repeat this organization thing. I think that Orbán is kind of a model. And Orban had this saying, well, you've only got to win one election, but you've got to win it big.

And then you can do whatever you want. And you just act quickly. And so you just win and you act quickly. To me, a little bit, it seems like that was kind of a philosophy that the Trump people were trying to do where they didn't really win so big. They thought they did. And you just got to act really quick. But to do it quickly in America, it requires a lot more. force, naked force.

And, yeah, so it's different. And federalism, and it's a much bigger country. And the Democratic Party wasn't blown out. I mean, whatever one thinks of the Democratic leaders. They did have 47 senators and 212 House members and governors and so forth. And whatever one thinks of the behavior of a lot of the private sector being, you know, capitulating to Trump's threats or promises or bribes or whatever, there still is much more robust and dependent. You know, Trump wasn't able to close things down the way.

or behind us trying to use the level of state power to do so. That's an interesting. Makes one think, though, going forward how important it is to keep those levers, to minimize his ability to use those levers of state power to shut things down, right? I think liberals are very big on, my liberal friends are very big on persuasion, you know, which is good and important. But I think sometimes they need to be a little more focused on power, you know, very important to deny a wannabe authoritarian.

in as many levers of power or as powerful levers of power as possible. And there are a lot of them in America and some of them, he doesn't control and he's trying to, incidentally,

with the prosecution's intimidating people. But anyway, I feel like the power side. You got to play hardball. That's what they got to get. Yeah. You got to play hardball and the guy's going to throw,

you know, like in baseball, if they hit your batter, you're going to hit their batter. I mean, whatever. So you can't quite do that. Executive branch is a big advantage. I mean, it'll control.

Yeah, yeah. I worked in the government. I mean, controlling that gives him a lopsided edge, but not everything, I think. You stressed in your pieces, Majar's message of liberal patriotism, killing to the liberal sides of Hungarian history in 1848. So say a little bit about that and about what it would, what these sort of analogy would be here. Because Maggard 1 have to be more conventional liberal pro-democratic types, who were incidentally people, someone like me probably would have admired and who were fighting the good fight against, against Urban.

But after they lost in 2018 and 2020, 22, right? So this last thing I wrote for the bulwark, I didn't realize I was so emotionally invested in it. I don't know. I mean, I write a lot of stuff, but this one I was really, I didn't realize it's made because it's been such a big event for us too here. I mean, I have a lot of connections with Hungary. And, I mean, this euphoria at the fall of Orban is just, it's even. even it's greater than 1989 for, I think, because, well, for whatever. So. Say a word about why is it greater than an 89.

Because in 89, it just happened. I mean, I wasn't actually. And it had been happening gradually, right? Yeah, yeah. It wasn't more liberal communist regime than most. No, no, no, no, right. And so, I mean, I wasn't there in 1989. So my connection to Hungary-goorly goes begins in 1992.

But, but there was a, it was, well, Hungarians were very proud of themselves at the time they were more advanced than the, you know, the rest of the, the countries and they were more liberal. They had this guy, you know, Yosef Antal was the prime minister who was like kind of a, seemed like a statesman. He died because he had a cancer died. So they were very proud of themselves,

but it was a very elite thing. And they played an important role, if I'm not mistaken. I mean, just in the actual practical sequence of events that collapsed the Warsaw. Yeah, they opened the gate. They did open the border, right? That was so important. Yeah, the East Germans, well, there's a kind of

interesting thing there. The East Germans, were coming through Hungary and they couldn't get into Austria and then the Hungarian said, okay, we're going to open the border. And it's with the guy, there's this folk family.

I don't know what he was. Someone wasn't maybe the prime minister for his name is Jewel Horn and he's cutting the fence with I don't know who else is there and the Hungarians go. Of course, this is just okay, this is just kind of the interesting things about Hungary. So this guy, Julio Horn later became prime ministry. He was a reformed communist and he

played an important role in bringing down communism actually hungry. But he had in 1956, he had been a, what is a term, he'd been kind of, he'd been fighting, he were not just a guy, but he had, he had kind of a position where he was basically fighting to put down the 1956 revolution. He was like a traitor. And so there's this, and he was such a controversial figure. And I don't know how you judge a person who, when 56 is a traitor and 89 is a hero. And this is the, you know, how do you, how do you sort through that. So this was a problem. Okay. We're off. I don't even remember what the original question. We've gone off on a

tangent, but the, this was a problem. You're saying this is a bigger moment in some ways that it is. Oh, it's a bigger moment. Yeah. So the, yeah. So the, yeah. So it just sort of happened. I got it. I got it. I got it. I got it. I was there. It was just everybody feels this euphoria. The Budapest was insane. After the, the whole, I was in the press area, and I, but then the internet didn't work. So I had, I had written my piece and I sent it off. I couldn't send it. Because I couldn't send it. because I couldn't get on the internet and say, oh, crap, I wanted to go out and celebrate,

but I got to get back to home so I can say, well, I couldn't get through the city. I mean, you couldn't walk. It was just packed, at least, you know, and getting on the, you know, people, of course, everyone's honking, you're on the metros. That way as you bundle in, like, all these drunken people are singing this Tava Siseo with this song that Magillard made the spring wind. I mean, anyway, it was great, but I was just, like, stressed out. How am I going to get home?

So I can send out the email. It took me an hour and a half to get home. So there was a lot of euphoria, and people just feel it. They feel it. Of course, maybe not the people who voted for it, but it's a different kind of experience, I think. I mean, that's what people say. I wasn't there in 89. Then it's really very euphoric.

Yeah, so I don't know. So the liberal patriotism. Oh, the liberal patriotism. Close with a couple of minutes. Yeah, yeah. Okay. So the, as you said, how emotionally invested you were in the piece you just wrote.

Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah, I was emotionally invested in the, well, I got a lot of feedback. I've heard from a lot of Hungarians, they really like it, at least the ones that sent talk to me. They thought there's something there. I mean, to me, it seems kind of obvious, but no one had said it, and there's something there. So he, he, I don't know what my point is right now. He definitely appealed to liberal traditions in a classic sense, but he did it in a very patriotic way. And one person wrote me in a letter, you know, his kids who were like embarrassed by the Hungarian National Anthem or children were now like, you know, out there proud to be Hungarian.

So he changed the way people think about Hungary. He made people proud to be Hungarians. It's not in competition with being a European. He's, you know, a member of the European Union. But he was willing to make people proud. He spoke to them in a language of patriotism. That's a problem for, and that's why he was essential to his success. That is a problem for liberals, and that's, you know, the normal.

sense. They're all embarrassed. You're embarrassed. You know, you can't really like love your country or you can't you know, they are really, we have all these horrible things in our past and so forth and so we shouldn't be. Now, they don't know how to talk to people. People want to feel something. And of course, there's a lot. There's a lot of the Hungarian tradition that made it possible for them to say we reject warbunism. And there's lots of things in America's heritage true, right? It's a liberal country, a liberal democratic country. So, yeah, I think learning how to, how to, you know, make people speak to people in a way that connects to their, you know, whatever patriotism is to be a very good thing for,

for people on the left to learn how to do. I mean, Trump does it in a kind of a, in a parody way, but, but, I mean, that's important. I think that's something they need to learn how to do. Yeah, Trump appeals to the illiberal aspects, you might say, of the American tradition, which are real, obviously. Yeah, that's right, yeah.

And then it's sort of, but there is a liberal tradition. Yeah, and I think you make that point that Orban, there were, God knows, illiberal aspects of Hungarian tradition. Right, absolutely. Oh, yeah. But there were liberal ones, which were maybe a little covered over and the Orban. I mean, he freed himself consciously that's closer to this. But he freed himself consciously brought them back, right?

Did 1848? It's a totally self-com. Yeah. Well, I mean, yeah, he, he, look, this is I, the March 15th holiday, which is the one that celebrates 1848 is always the one I like best because I'm an American, okay? But it's the most American like, but it's always sort of like, it didn't make any sense. I mean, this is my feeling that they didn't, Hungary's didn't quite know what to do with it, at least in the time, because it, you know, it's a democratic, liberal democratic revolution.

And all these great... Which failed, basically, or at least sort of. Which failed, yeah. So it's like celebrating something that didn't, yeah, that didn't hold. That's true. But all the greatest Hungarians are from that period. One after the other. And so he came out from the very beginning.

He had the, you know, the top of Maggi, he had this poem and from Petruvi or Shandok Petruvi that everybody knows. And he's always, everyone can receive. My family, everyone can recite this poem. And he appealed to that. He appealed in countless ways that you just, I mean, these Hungarian folk songs that go from 1848, the whole idea of freedom, you know,

he just deliberately appealed to it, and he was able to use it to explain the choice between what Orban was offering and what he offered. So it wasn't just, he said system change, but he explained system change, he talked about corruption, all that stuff is true, But he explained the system change using language symbols and traditions that Hungarians understood because they came from Hungarian history because everybody learns about it when they're in school.

I mean, everybody knows who these poet, who Petuvia is, and everybody knows who these figures are. And everyone can sing these songs that he was singing that commemorate the 1848. So it wasn't just that he explained to them in a rational way, oh, you know, this corrupt system is, you know, it's all connected. to, you know, all this corruption and all your misery is related to this, you know, mafia state, which he did use that term. He explained it using language and symbols that totally appealed

of the emotions of people. And which are true. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, that's really interesting and important. Let's, I'll let you go, but you've got to go. Great, great exams and stuff. Well, I think I'll give myself a break if I was like. Give yourself a break after this. It's got enough. This is really

interesting and really helpful. And you'll keep a close eye on it and continue to write for us on this and other topics. And we'll have another conversation as things develop. But this is really helpful both for understanding what's happened over there and its significance, but also I think some lessons, not directly applicable in some cases, but certainly can inform us over here. So, David, thanks for taking the time. Thanks for having me. And thanks to all of you for joining us on BOWERC on Sunday.