Bulwark Takes - Trump Rejects All Oversight on Venezuela War. What's Next? (w/ Ryan Goodman)

Episode Date: November 2, 2025

Bill Kristol talks with legal scholar Ryan Goodman about how the Trump administration has rejected all congressional oversight over planned military strikes in Venezuela.

Hi, Bill Crystal here, editor at large for the bulwark. Very pleased to be joined again by Ryan Goodman, Professor of Law at NYU, co-editor of the indispensable, just security website, expert on work to DOD as a council of DOD for a year and expert on matters of the laws of war and peace, and more broadly, just the war in peace, I would say, Congress, the executive branch and stuff. So, Ryan, thanks for joining me again.

Thanks, looking forward to the conversation. And I guess we spoke just a month ago, right, to try to, and I think people found it very helpful. Somebody told me that explaining the situation with what was happening with the fishing boats or the drug boats in the Caribbean. And we've progressed quite a bit, though, just in that month, right? And the War Powers Act, the 60-day window expires tomorrow. But you explain the situation. And where do we stand on that? Sure.

So we are about to cross the 60-day mark of the War Powers' War-Wars. resolution on Monday. And that means at that point, according to the statute, the president must terminate military operations because he has failed to obtain an affirmative authorization from Congress. That's one way of thinking of it. And another way of saying that same thing, but differently, is as of Monday, the military operations against the drug cartels will be Congressually prohibited because the War Crimes Resolution, War Crimes Act, prohibits... War Powers, War Powers Act. Sorry, did I, sorry.

War Crimes. No, it's not our mind, too. Right, right. That, too. We shouldn't be laughing, I suppose. That was day one. So, yeah, the War Powers Resolution, War Powers Act, prohibits it. And we now are learning, you know, what my...

might be the Trump administration's best legal arguments against that, because I think there basically are none, as reflected by bipartisan consensus and majorities in the past. So that's where we're at. So it's going to enter a new frontier with respect to illegal presidential actions and major separation of hours concerns. And I think for many people on the Hill as well, deep concerns about the precedent, it also sets for other potential uses of military force by presidents in the future. Now, it's striking that the president did obey the dictates of the War Powers Act, after the first strike against one of the boats, right? He sent the letter you're supposed to send to Congress within 48 hours. People didn't like the letter for various

reasons. Didn't have a lot of detail and specifics, but it was in a core. I mean, it said, didn't it on its face that it was in accord with what the war powers resolution requires. So he has sort of said, you might say, that this resolution is applicable. So what is he now going to say? Yeah, so the first strike was in September 2nd. The obligation is for the president to report within 48 hours, and he did. And he submitted a war powers report. Now, I think what they would say on that is, look, what he did is what other presidents in the past have done, which is he submitted the report consistent with the war powers resolution, not because he said that the war, was acknowledging that the war powers resolution was necessarily constitutional or

attached. Now, that's a, you know, playing a bit of a legal game with it, but now we hear or from the Washington Post or no from the Washington Post that their president is not claiming that the war powers resolution is unconstitutional. The argument is instead something very different, which is to say it doesn't apply to these kinds of military operations, even though that's the oddity. But, you know, September 4th, you, you know, you, the Trump administration submitted your report, according to the war powers resolutions. That sounded like you thought of what was applicable then. And why doesn't it apply to these military actions? Okay. According to the administration, according to what I think is not uncontroverted Washington Post.

reporting, which I think the administration pretty much confirms on the record. Yes, and with quotes from the post as well. The administration's argument is that this is not an introduction of U.S. armed forces into hostilities. That's the key word, hostilities, in the war powers resolution, because they, U.S. military armed forces are not at risk of being shot or killed or anything like. because they're relying primarily on drones and there's no real risk that the drug cartels are going to fire back at them. And I suppose they also have to assume that the Maduro regime doesn't do anything either.

That's the argument. Now, they've got some deep, deep problems with the argument. And the deepest problem is that might be to some degree executive branch Office of Legal Council view that there's some. arguments as to why it has been raised in the past, but even when it was raised in the past, it was not raised by the OLC with respect to Libya. That's the big case in the past with under the Obama administration. That is not the view of Congress. That's not the view of the legislative history. That's not the view of Congress in 2019 under the Trump administration

1.0 when they passed a legislation in both the Senate and the House on U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. It was a very broad definition of hostilities. It was, in fact, in that instance, for U.S. support for aerial refueling of Saudi airplanes, there was no chance that the Houthis were going to shoot down U.S. airplanes. And it is the view of Congress at the time, legislation that was bipartisan, that hostilities was broader. Let's put another way of running at that same question. According to the Trump administration today, The United States is engaged in a armed conflict with the drug cartels, a non-international armed conflict, an armed conflict with the drug cartels, but it's not hostilities.

That's the absurdity of their point. That's the absurdity of their point. And the legislative history of the board powers resolution is that Congress specifically decided to use the word hostilities because they thought it was broader than the word armed conflict. So that's where we're at. So that's why the administration really doesn't have. a legal footing to stand on because of the way in which the resolution has been understood,

especially by Congress, regardless of what executive branch lawyers might want to say it means. And what strikes me just reading about it is, I mean, there's some semi-plausible notion that if our troops aren't at risk, really, though, we don't know. They could be at risk, obviously, as you say, other MZero could do things and others could intervene, but it's not really hostilities, but that would sort of imply that, I mean, to correct me if I'm wrong, that if we dropped massive bombs on some place that couldn't respond or did it from 30,000 feet, or did it by drone or by missiles, obviously, which presumably don't put American pilots at risk, at risk, there's just no congressional say. I mean,

I honestly, this sounds hysterical to say it this way, but if we dropped a nuclear weapon somewhere, you know, sent by an ICBM, no American would be at risk in the way they're defining it of, you know, a kind of tit-for-tat combat with, you know, ground troops or air power being, you know, being shot at by by surface air missiles and so forth. So it seems a little bit crazy that the Congress has nothing to say if we just attack people as long as it's from over their horizon and by, you know, where the opponent can't really get back on us right away. Yes. And when the Obama administration tried the argument for the Libya intervention in 2011, it had multiple elements to their argument. But on this particular element of, oh, U.S. forces are not at risk, speaker Boehner of the House said that it was preposterous.

Republican senators sent a letter to Obama saying this is obviously in violation of the war powers resolution. the Republican senators who sent that letter that are still in Congress include Senator Mike Lee, Senator John Cornyn, Senator Ron Johnson, and Senator Rand Paul, and some other Republican senators as well, but they're not currently serving. So it was pretty clear. And I should also mention Charlie Savage had the absolute best reporting, both in the New York Times and in his book Power Wars, in which he showed that internal to the Obama administration,

the senior lawyers at the Pentagon and the OLC, obviously legal counsel at the Justice Department, completely rejected the idea that this theory of, oh, well, if U.S. forces aren't at risk from the bombing, that then doesn't, the war powers resolution doesn't apply. Because it would lead to the examples you provide. Those hypotheticals fit within that framework. And it just shows the preposterous nature of the theory.

And just on the Libya thing, for one second because people are using that as kind of well. Obama did it too. He maybe should have obeyed, listened to his own lawyers and the Justice Department and elsewhere and followed the more power's resolution, followed it more, well, more carefully and dutifully. But it also was a multinational mission. It was, there was an actual civil war going on. I mean, we were intervening in it and helping the rebels against Gaddafi. But that's a little different from feels to be that then, I mean, probably still Congress. I'd probably still approve it, but it feels like that's a little different from us unilaterally

blowing boats out of the water. I mean, that's just us acting militarily, period, right? I mean, there's no ongoing, well, I guess they would say there's an ongoing attack on us by these drug boats, I suppose. Right, but it is funny. I mean, in their framework, I've thought about this, which is if they think that the drugboats are engaged in hostilities and attacks, which is what they've also been saying, then it is not the case.

This is very hard to figure out because they're making mincemeat of regular words. But if those drug cartels are engaged in hostilities and attacks against the United States, then indeed bombing them can produce hostilities and attacks from them against the United States. If the drug cartels are really this organized armed group, then it's not just even putting American soldiers at risk. It's putting Americans at risk according to their definitions. But obviously they're not here for coherence. They're just trying to bootstrap arguments.

And I think that according to the post-reporting and other reporting, New York Times, CNN, there is pushback, bipartisan pushback on the hill because these legal theories are obviously riddled with problems. Unfortunately, a lot of that pushback from the Republican side is behind closed doors. So we're getting more inklings of it, and we'll see soon because there's going to be, it looks like, legislation from Rand Paul and Tim Cain around the corner, maybe as early as this coming week. But that's where things stand. And I suppose Trump takes the administration takes the position it takes.

Congress, what could Congress, how can Congress act? I mean, I guess there are a variety of legislative and appropriations mechanisms if they wish to try to get accountability for this, or is the administration just going to be very hard to force to do anything? So there could be appropriations. I mean, one of the final ways with the power of the purse is that Congress could cut off funding. But, and they could cut up funding in potentially with like the NDAA annual legislation

so that they don't fund. something, and that way can avoid the veto override problem. But they rely on Congress and the committees in multiple ways. And that's something I experienced when I worked at the Defense Department such that DOD needs to be, in some ways, in the good graces of the Armed Services Committee if they want things. And if they want to reshuffle around funding, things like that. And it is notable that Senator Worker, the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, does seem to some degree animated on this issue so that it was recently revealed by him and Senator Reid, the ranking member, that they had sent letters to the DOD demanding the legal justifications,

including this secret office of legal counsel. I should even put quotation a lot. Secret. They won't release it to the public. Secret office of legal counsel. counsel opinion that provides some kind of legal justification that's hard to imagine. So there could be various forms of congressional action and congressional leverage, you might say, over the Defense Department. I've struck one of the pieces, I think, benefits of the piece you published, just secured a member of recent, I think it was, yeah, the recent one you had, which you should say a word about how people can find that in that earlier piece, too, earlier this week.

But the, someone said in passing almost, I think the author said in passing that you know, Congress may have gotten used to also depending on the fact that within any administration, within the Defense Department and prior administrations, there were legal, there was an office of general counsel obviously, there were Jags, there were people in the White House, there were some internal mechanisms that didn't perfectly keep things in line, obviously. We saw in 2011, Obama chose one set of advisors over another, but they gave some reassurance, I think, to the committees that we weren't just dealing with people just deciding they wanted to blow up a lot of people and thought they could do it with zero congressional oversight, zero congressional accountability,

no direct appropriations for this. Again, it's not the Iraq War, which was authorized, obviously, by Congress, which, and then the Democrats turned against it, obviously, in 0506, and sought pretty consistently that to cut off appropriations for it, which was totally legitimate. I mean, that's what people try to do in Vietnam, too. And Bush opposed that, and they managed to beat it. back in 2007, 2008.

But, I mean, that is the Bush administration never said the Democratic Congress can't do this or they can't do it because they want to authorize this war. If the war's going badly and it's now a mistake, they don't want Americans, you know, American soldiers to be fighting there. So the degree to which Congress is being just cut out strikes me. And the degree to which there's no internal check on the Trump administration just strikes me as kind of extraordinary. Yes.

So, yeah, I agree. two pieces that are fairly, very recent and just, fairly and fairly, uh, very recent and just security that I would highlight. I think you're touching on. So the one that's fairly recent, um, was by Sarah Harrison and Mark Nevitt. Sarah was a lawyer in the Department of Defense. And Mark was a Navy JAG. So their piece is titled the Caribbean strikes and the collapse of legal oversight in U.S. military operations. They detail what the normal process is for internal to the executive branch lawyering approving military operations like this

and why there's lots of evidence that that's what's going on and so that the internal checks are, or they refer to them as the guardrails, are severely damaged if not being destroyed internally. So for Congress to defer to the executive in this situation or for courts to defer to the executive if these issues can make it to court because of problems with standing and the like,

that's a real serious concern that we don't have the normal internal executive branch checks that would work with part of the checks and balances across the separation of powers to the other branches, but internal. And then the second piece... It's just on that, if I'm not mistaken,

says he was in the first drop, I mean, he was a Navy Jag. I think we had the top Navy Jags already in the first Trump term. And he talks about right. a, you know, a war powers notification to Congress. I can't remember. But, I mean, it's not as if Trump didn't comply with, even Trump, under pressure, presumably,

from lawyers within the administration and maybe Secretary Mattis or Secretary Esper and others sort of complied with this, not in every respect in the first term, but at least in a couple of important ways, right? Yeah. So that's also Brian Funnuchin, who was in the Trump administration in one point out all the way through it, yeah, and who's in charge of the war powers. Okay, so it was him. I'm sorry. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, they're all

great. Exactly. And I don't, my understanding is also that the Obama era 2011 legal justification is almost traded as a negative precedent. It was so repudiated, both internal to the

Obama administration, and by Congress in very strong bipartisan ways, that The idea that Trump 2.0 would rely on that is quite something. And then another piece that we published most recently is by Beck Engber and Jessica Thibodeau, which they both served as lawyers inside the State Department, and Jess in particular, handled Warpower's resolution reporting. And they also detailed the other check that you described, which is how Congress can indeed get in the game.

make it much more difficult for the president to get away with unilateral or illegal or unauthorized military operations. And getting in the game includes simple things like open public hearings with executive branch witnesses, especially because the legal justifications here. And we can get into the policy justifications, like what on earth is the policy objective of all of this, I think that would be an enormous public service just to do that, but also would place a significant amount of pressure. And administrations in the past have caved under that kind of pressure because sunlight as the disinfectant can expose all the problems. I'll just like reference one of them, which we haven't discussed here. But as far as I can tell, two things about the

drug boat targeting. One, it's cocaine. It's not fentanyl. So I think there's the American public and political leaders are rightfully concerned about fentanyl deaths in the United States. Targeting TDA has nothing to do with that. The Trump administration's DEA has already said that fentanyl is not coming from Venezuela. It's coming from Mexico and China and Canada. That's one. If it's cocaine, the DEA says that. 90% of cocaine coming into the United States comes from Colombia over the Mexican border. So are we really murdering or killing these people on the basis of less than 10% of cocaine coming to the United States? That's one piece. I'd love to see that in a congressional

hearing discussed with an executive branch witness under that kind of scrutiny. A second one is who's getting killed? Who's getting killed? I've now started to look at all of the instances in which Secretary Hegseth and the administration have made official statements about the strikes. Time and again, they do not say that the people killed are members of the drug cartels. They do not say that. They say they're affiliated with or the boats are affiliated with. And there's reason to believe that the people on board those boats are not even drug cartel members. They might be the equivalent of a thought about putting it this way, Uber drivers, so just individuals who are grunts that are paid money to take the boat from

one place to another. And remember, the first boat that was struck that had 11 people on board that a lot of people and experts said, that's way too many to suggest that it's drug smugglers. They may have actually killed people who are being smuggled. So it was human smuggling and human trafficking. That, you know, you would think that a significant bipartisan concern over that. And I would imagine that the president and the White House would not look forward to those kinds of hearings, which is a good thing for the country. It is striking. Just as you talk about the hearings, I was thinking back to the Iraq War, actually. And I was somewhat close to the people, sort of a close in a complicated way to some of the people in the Bush administration who are engaged in that.

And I remember Dave Petraeus and Chet Crocker, who was Dave Petraeus being in 2007 was in charge of the multinational force in Iraq. And Crocker was our ambassador to Baghdad. And they came back for those very high-profile hearings in September, as I recall, in 2007, and the Democrats insisted on. And no one, I mean, I think the most people weren't happy about that this was happening, but it was, they didn't question Congress's right to do it. And Petraeus and Crocker testified at great length, as I recall, considerable length. And, you know, candidly, I think, they wanted to defend the surge. And people on the hills, the Democrats, some of them were skeptical, and others, Republicans mostly defended it. Yeah, the degree of just, it's for two months now.

I mean, leave aside almost the details of the War Powers Act for a second. Isn't it kind of astounding that we've just had nothing, have way before Congress? I don't think we've had either the Secretary of Defense or serious, or uniformed officials. Petraeus was the combatant commander. We've had the combatant commander, the equivalent of Petraeus, sort of the equivalent of Petraeus. I don't remember if he was then in charge of said comp or just of maybe just the Iraq theater. But anyway, the combatant commander in Socom, for this for Latin America. basically, Southern Atlantic and South America, has resigned.

And isn't that kind of a big deal? You know, we'll look at one year into his tour. And again, we've had no visibility into that. So the degree to which we are not, we are operating without congressional oversight is really astonishing. Yeah. And on an issue in which Congress really does have significant expertise on these committees and is supposed to be representing their constituents, and we're talking about massive military operations

and a massive military buildup in the Caribbean and not a single hearing on it. It's an astounding. And as you say, with the admiral resigning, there are, you know, the canary, there are a lot of dead canaries, let's put it that way. So what happens do you think? And, I mean, how does this both legally

and kind of more broadly, politically, not partisan politics, but sort of in terms of the political system? How does this play out? And what do you make, incidentally, since you know quite a lot about defense policy and foreign policy, what do you make of the repeated attacks on these boats, maybe, I think, accelerating, you could almost say. And then the big buildup near Venezuela. Yeah.

So they accelerate. I do think that they're accelerated. It would be good to maybe do a graph of how they've increased over time. And Hankseth has almost promised it almost that it would be on a daily basis, essentially. but a very constant drumbeat. Now into the Pacific, so it says the last time we spoke, it was just Caribbean strikes. And I do think part of what's happening

is they're potentially trying to normalize it. So the more it happens, then it's not as scandalous and spectacular so that maybe the American public becomes, in some ways, accustomed to it. I think that's one of the effects, if not one of the intense behind it. And then it's very difficult to figure out

what's going on with the massive, buildup and an enormous aircraft carrier coming into the area because it looks like they are preparing for bombing operations inside Venezuela. It certainly has the capacity for that and the overcapacity for it in some ways. But it's difficult to know because I think one way in which it might all be playing out and some experts are talking about it in these terms is that it's actually just trying to scare the bejesus out of Maduro so that he maybe steps down without a a gunshot fired. So in other words, he is so fearful that this is what's coming that he decides to try to

flee the country. And, you know, based on their legal theory, one cannot exclude the possibility that they would attend something like an assassination because they don't think these things are murder. They think that they're killing, they might, or as let's put it this way, as J.D. Vance put it after the first strikes, he doesn't give a shit whether or not it's lawful. So I think that might be what it's about because there are some real blowback concerns to the administration if they were to start anything like an open war against Venezuela, including some of the public

opinion survey data, which does show unusual support for the boat strikes, I think, in part because most Americans don't know what's going on exactly with them and who's actually being killed and they probably think it's all about fentanyl, which is false. But there's definitely public opinion data that shows that if they were to start striking inside Venezuela, that would turn against the administration. And I could say that independence and Democrats, it's more mixed for them on the boat strikes, but even with Republicans, things start to shift dramatically against the administration, were they to do something like that against Venezuela. So I don't know if it's theater on the part of the administration or if it's something real.

But the administration has given no hint. I don't quite know what the legal theory behind this would be, but it would sound plausible, I think, to people that, well, in the high seas, these boats, fentanyl, cocaine, whatever, we're allowed to blow them up. But obviously, if we started actually bombing a country with whom we've had no previous war, we've had, it's not like, you know, Clinton with Iraq, where there'd been the 1991 war, you know, there are other, these things were more complicated in some ways, the Balkans. We're just going to start bombing a country whose regime we don't like, maybe with some good

reason, I think with good reason, and that may be involved in drug swuggling. I don't know, I do feel like that would be, that would seem like a pretty big step, you know. Absolutely, absolutely. And as a matter of law and then as a matter of policy and just any lay person can see the difference between those. But as a matter of law, one thing I've said in the past as well, which is if it is a U.S. military lethal operation on the high seas, the administration has a good argument that that is not in violation of the U.N. charter. Were they to bomb inside the sovereign territory of another country, it's completely different. Completely different. I think it would be a diplomatic outcry

at the UN. I think many members of Congress would be deeply concerned about that in a different way. And there's already a shift going towards greater and greater, I think, congressional opposition against the boat strikes. So were there to go in that direction of striking inside Venezuela? Just in terms of the precedent that even sets for what can be done by any president in the future is dramatically different. I think it's already, we're in a horrific situation right now, especially because the strikes are against civilians and the United States government is killing civilians, but to take it to that next level

would shift things, I think, even more dramatically. And God knows what other countries in Latin America would think would bring back very bad memories for them. And worst memories really was whatever we did in the past, being behind certain coups and defeating a little bit in the Dominican Republic and 65 and stuff, bombing, as you said, a sovereign country that's we've had no declaration of any war

or anything like that would be quite yeah i can't believe they would we do need the cooperation of some of those countries in all kinds of ways including in fighting drugs presumably but exactly that's i was going to say as well right exactly yeah what about we discussed this we'll maybe close on this the last time we discussed the relationship of this foreign policy exertion of executive uh claim of executive power and what's happening at home with with the deployment of the national guard and just generally the big claims of presidential authority here. I mean, how are these just parallel, sort of, or they come from one understanding of the executive,

or are they more linked than that? So I think they're more linked than that. And I think that they're linked both in rhetorical framing. I have to assume that Stephen Miller loves what's going on in the Caribbean and the Pacific because it is part of the anti-immigration, militarization, this is a national security threat, we're under attack kind of framework

that justifies the same kind of logic of use of paramilitary units and the U.S. military domestically. So I think that the framing of that, and then I also think that it dovetails with the law as well. I think it's one more, and I think it'd be better if especially members of the Hill

understood it as what... I believe the truth of the matter is they, the White House is trying to make it as one war. And that means that there should be even greater concern for what's happening in the Caribbean and the Pacific because it is about the home front as well. And I think that's what President Trump himself said at Quantico to the 800 plus most senior U.S. military. He said foreign and domestic and the war is also within and you all have a role to play within. and the people he was speaking to, they excluded the National Guard from that meeting. He was speaking to the active military leaders, and that is their framework. And I think that, you know, even to the point that lawyers are wondering,

are the boat strikes in some ways trying to help the administration in its litigation on things like the Alien Enemies Act, etc., because they are so linked? So I think people need to really understand how concerning this is. And just one other piece on how concerning it is, in the executive branch notification to Congress about the boat strikes, the Trump administration's position is that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with the drug cartels who are members, who are unlawful combatants. If that's true, then I'm sure Stephen Miller also would say that there are unlawful combatants inside the United States. who, according to their international legal framework, can be targeted lethally, et cetera. And so these things are so deeply connected. And they're, I bet you, based on what was some of the white papers that were being prepared for the administration before they went in,

I bet you that they're also relying on, for example, John used most outlandish theories about the use of the military domestically when you're dealing with counterterrorism operations. These things are all deeply connected, and it's going in a direction that I'm certain that the American public does not want based on all the public opinion data on that. And just finally, I mean, it does seem like the talk about Antifa, the labeling of foreign terrorist organizations, then the invention of the domestic terrorist organization as a category, Antifa links them together somehow, the drug smuggling, narco-terrorists, that we're adding terrorists to narco-classes. criminals, you know, links them together. It does seem like an awfully slippery slope to basically, I don't know, you know, treating people within the United States, including perhaps U.S. citizens, I guess why not, really, as enemies. I mean, and as enemies in a war where we don't really acknowledge much limitation and how we have to treat enemies, right?

I mean, absolutely. And that those are the, I think there's the explicit terms of the President of the United states at Quantico. When he said the enemy from within, he was referring to protesters and the like. He's referring to American citizens. The Antifa executive order, that's American citizens. And the one piece that we haven't mentioned here, but is in terms of extraordinary executive power, I think another piece that's probably going on that there has not been as much reporting on is national security surveillance. When you move this into the category of national security and notions of, even fabricated notions of terrorism, then it also kicks in

significant surveillance authorities. And this administration has decimated one of the internal executive branch checks, which was the Privacy Board, that was an oversight board, a P-Clab, that I was supposed to review that kind of surveillance. So I'd worry about that, and I would hope, though I'm not naive, that Senator Mike Lee and others who have been very strong, very strong on privacy rights and surveillance and on being against unilateral exercises of military operations, as he was in the Trump 1.0 administration would be like Rand Paul and stand up against that stuff. And we'll see in the coming week. I do think that there's some hope that Senator Young will move in that direction. He made a statement that he did not favor the past resolution,

on the War Powers Resolution against the drugboats, but because it had a peculiar problem with it, that that believes Rand and Paul is now fixing in the new legislation that will be introduced. So we'll see where this goes, but I think some of that is at least trending in the right direction in terms of bipartisan pushback from the Hill representing Americans' interests

with respect to military operations, and one would, I think, need to put into that ledger surveillance authorities. It's really amazing how much things have moved though, you know, when we had our conversation a month ago, maybe it was three weeks ago, four weeks ago, I thought, well, we'll do this again in three, four, five months and see where we're saying it. It really is striking and in a bad way, obviously, I'd say that, you know,

that the thing has all, the accelerationism of the effort, both in terms of actually people getting killed on these boats and the deploying of the aircraft carrier and the rhetoric, but also, and the legal justifications, I mean, at home and abroad, is really, I don't know, even to be somewhat startling. Yeah, absolutely. And the at least authorization of CIA COVID operations inside Venezuela, though it's not clear as to where those things stand,

but just adding that to the mix as well, that's all happened in the last couple months. Yeah, the president, I guess, chose to mention that, yeah. So, well, we'll have to do this, I guess, unfortunately, more often. It's very important, though, And I really appreciate you're taking the time and being so clear and explaining this, but I don't think it's a little complicated and it's a little hard to follow the ins and outs and war power's resolution in 60 days and all this stuff.

But it really, the degree, we are at a, we've been at many inflection points, I've got to say, over the first nine months of this administration, but I do feel like we're hitting one, a pretty big one, a set of ones here, don't you think? And then the tying together, I think, of the foreign and domestic wars is really an important point that people haven't quite maybe come to grips with. Yeah, I completely agree. And Monday is one of those important markers because after Monday we're in a new territory

with respect to at least the foreign part of this. And it's also accelerating at the domestic level too. So I'm deeply concerned about it. And unfortunately, I agree with you totally that we'll have to reconvene sooner than later. Well, we will do that. And thank you, Ryan, for taking the time and really being so clear and compelling

and explaining what's happening out there. So I appreciate you joining me today. Thank you. I really appreciate the conversation with you. And thank you all for joining us on Bullwark on Sunday.