Classic Audiobook Collection - Laches by Plato ~ Full Audiobook [philosophy]

Episode Date: June 14, 2024

Laches by Plato audiobook. Genre: philosophy Plato's Laches is a vivid philosophical drama that drops you into an Athenian courtyard where fathers worry about their sons' education and the meaning of virtue. When the question arises whether a young man should be trained in armed combat, two respected generals, Laches and Nicias, are asked to advise. Their disagreement draws in Socrates, whose relentless, good-humored questioning turns a practical debate about schooling into a searching inquiry: what is courage? As the conversation unfolds, definitions are offered, tested, and revised, revealing how easy it is to praise bravery in war yet how hard it is to explain courage as a stable quality of the soul. With Socrates guiding the group through examples, counterexamples, and uncomfortable admissions of uncertainty, the dialogue becomes a portrait of intellectual integrity and moral seriousness. Laches explores the tension between reputation and real wisdom, the responsibilities of parents and leaders, and the challenge of educating character rather than merely teaching skills. By the end, the characters confront not only the limits of their knowledge, but also the urgent need to keep examining how to live well. For ad-free listening try our premium subscription Chapters (Approximate) (00:00:00) Chapter 01 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

LACUS, or Courage, by Plato, translated by Benjamin Joet. Persons of the dialogue. Lycemicus, son of Aristides. Melesius, son of Thucydides. Their sons. Nisius. Lachus. Socrates.

Lysimachus. You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armor, Nisius and Lackus, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melisius and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess this, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was that we were intending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and, when they are asked, will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according to him. is, and not according to their own opinion. But, as we know that you are good judges,

and will say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our councils. And, the matter about which I am making all this preface is just this. Melisius and I have two sons. That is his son, and he is named Susidides after his grandfather, and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather Aristides. Now we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way with the young, when they are no longer children, but to begin at once and do the utmost that we can for them. And, knowing that you have sons of your own, we thought that you were most likely to have attended to their training and improvement. And, if you have not, we may remind you that you ought to have attended to them.

and would invite you to assist us in the fulfillment of a common duty. I will tell you, Nisius and Lachus, even at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this. Melisius and I live together, and our two sons live with us, and now, as I was saying at first, we are going to confess to you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds, which our fathers did in war and peace, in the management of the allies, and also of the affairs of the city,

but neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. Now, we are somewhat ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied with the concerns of others, and, this we point out to the lads, and tell them that they will not grow up to honor if they are rebellious and take no pains about themselves, but that if they take pains they may perhaps become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on their part, promised to comply with our wishes,

and our care is to discover what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Someone told us of this art of using weapons, which, he said, was an excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn, and he praised the man whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. and we determined to go and to get you to accompany us, and if you did not object, we thought that we would take counsel with you about the education of our sons. That is the matter about which we wanted to talk with you, and we hope that you will give us

your opinion about this, and about any other studies or pursuits which may, or may not be desirable for a young man to learn. Please to see whether you object to our proposal. Nisius, as far as I am concerned, concerned Lycemicus and Melisius, I applaud your purpose, and will gladly assist you, and I believe that to you, Lackus, will be equally glad. Lackus. Certainly, Niscius, and I quite approve of the remark which Lysimachus made about his own father,

and the father of Melisius, and which is applicable not only to them, but to us, and to everyone who is occupied with public affairs. As he says, they are too apt to be negligent. and careless of their own children and their private concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lycemicus, but why do you not consult our friend Socrates instead of consulting us about the education of the youth? He is of the same deem with you,

and is always passing his time in places in which the youth have any noble study or pursuit, such as you are inquiring after. Lycemicus, why Lackus, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort? Lachus, certainly Lysimachus. Nisius, that I have the means of knowing as well as Lackus, for, quite lately, he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons, Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way,

as well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their age. Lysimachus. Those who have reached my age, Socrates, and Nisius and Lyshius, and Lysius, and Lysmachus, Lackus, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are generally detained at home by old age. But I hope that you, oh, son of Saffranescos, will let your fellow deemsman have the benefit of any advice which you are able to give them. And I have a claim upon you as an old friend of your father, for I and he were always companions and friends, and, to the hour of his death, there never was a difference between us. And now it comes back to me,

at the mention of your name that I have heard these lads talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates in terms of the highest praise, but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of Sophroniscos was the person whom they meant. Tell me, my boy, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken. Son, certainly, father, this is he. Lysimachus, I am delighted to hear Socrates that you maintain the name of your father, who was a most excellent man, and I further rejoice at the prospect of our family ties being renewed. Lackas.

Indeed, Nicomachus, you ought not to give him up, for I can assure you that I have seen him maintaining not only his father's, but also his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honor of our country would have been maintained, and the great defeat would never have occurred. Lysimachus. That is very high praise which is given you Socrates by faithful witnesses, and for desserts like these. And let me tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame, and I hope that you will regard me as one of your best friends. Indeed, you ought to have visited us long ago, and reckoned us among your friends. But now, from this day

forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I say, come and make acquaintance with me and with these young men that i may continue your friend as i was your father's i shall expect you to do this and shall venture to remind you but what say you of the matter of which i was speaking the art of fighting and armour Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed? Socrates, I will endeavor to advise you Lycemicus as far as I can in this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes. But, as I am younger and not so experienced, I think, that I ought to hear what my elders have to say first, and to learn of them, and if I have anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as to you.

suppose Nisius that one of you speaks first. Nisius. I have no objection, Socrates, and my opinion is that the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. There is an advantage in their being employed during their leisure hours in a way which tends to improve their bodily constitution, and not in the way in which young men are too apt to be employed. No sort of gymnastics could be harder exercise, and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a free man, for they only who are thus trained in the use of implements of war are trained in the conflict which is set before us, or in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover, in actual battle, this sort of acquirement will be of some use when you have to fight

in a line with a number of others, and will be of the greatest use when the ranks are broken, and you have to fight singly, either in pursuit when you are attacking someone who is defending himself, or in flight when you have to defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly, he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several, and in any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of skill inclines a man to other noble lessons, for every man who has learned how to fight in arms will desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson, and when he has learned not,

this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts will be useful and valuable to a man, and this lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me add a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one, that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant and self-possessed in the field, and I will not disdain to mention what to some may appear to be a small matter, that he will make a better appearance at the right time, that is to say, at the time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies. My opinion, then, Lycemicus is, as I say, that the youths should be instructed in this art,

and for the reasons which I have given, but I shall be very glad to hear Lackas if he has another view. Lackus, I should not like to say, Nisius, that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned. for all knowledge appears to be a good, and if, as Nisius and as the teachers of it affirm, this art of fence is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned. But if not, and if those who profess it are deceivers only, or if it be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use of learning it? I say this, because I think that if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding out in practicing the arts, which gives them an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered this one.

And, even if they had not, still, these professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover that, of all the Helenes, the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters, and that a master of the art who was honored among them would have been sure to have made his fortune among other nations, just as a tragic poet would, who is honored among ourselves, which is the reason why, he who fancies that he can write a tragedy, does not go on a peregrination into the neighboring states, but rushes hither straight, and exhibits at Athens, and this is natural, whereas I perceive that these fighters in armor regard Lacedaemon as a sacred, inviolable territory, which they do not touch with the point of their foot, but they

make a circuit of the neighboring states, and would rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans, and particularly to those who would themselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the arts of war. Further, like Symmachus, I have encountered a good many of these gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I can give you at once, for none of these masters of fence has ever been distinguished in war. There has been a sort of fatality about this, Whereas in all other arts, the men of note have been always those who have practiced the art, but these appear to be a most unfortunate exception. For example, this very Stesilus, whom you and I, have just witnessed exhibiting in all that

crowd, and making such great professions of his powers, I have seen, at another time, making, in sober truth, an involuntary exhibition of himself, which was a far better spectacle. He was a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel and was armed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe, the singularity of which was worthy of the singularity of the man. To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention of the scythe spear. He was fighting in the scythe end, caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast, and he tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another.

He first ran along his own ship, holding on to the spear. But as the other ship passed by and drew him after, as he was holding on, he let the spear slip through his hand, until he retained only the end of the handle. The people in the transport clapped their hands and laughed at his ridiculous figure, and, when someone threw a stone, which fell on the deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe spear, the crew of his own tri-rearer, also burst out laughing. They could not refrain when they beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport. Now, I do not deny that there may be something in such an art,

as Nisius asserts, but I tell you my experience, and, as I said at first, my opinion is, that whether this be an art which is of some slight advantage, or not an art at all, but only an imposition, in either case there is no use in such an inquirement. For my opinion is that if the professor of this art be a coward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be only more notorious. Or, if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men will be on the watch, and he will be greatly introduced, for there is a jealousy of such pretenders, and unless a man be preeminent in valor, he cannot help being ridiculous if he says that he has this skill in weapons.

Such is my judgment, Lycemicus, of the desirableness of this art. But, as I said at first, asked Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the matter. Lysimachus, I am going to ask this favor of you, Socrates, as is the more necessary because the two doctors disagree, and someone is needed to decide between them. Had they agreed, this might not have been required, but, as Lachis has voted one way, and Nisius another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree. Socrates. What, Lycemicus, are you for going by the opinion of the majority?

Lysimachus? Why, yes, Socrates, what other way is there? Socrates. And, would you agree in that, Melisius? If you were deliberating about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and exercised under a skillful master.

Melisius, I should take the advice of the latter, Socrates, as would be reasonable. Socrates, his one vote, would be worth more than the vote of all us for? Melisius, certainly, Socrates, and for this reason, as I imagine, because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers? Melisius, to be sure. Socrates, must we not, then, first of all, as, whether there is any one of us who has knowledge in that about which we are deliberating. If there is, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the others.

If there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight matter about which you and Lycemicus are deliberating? Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches, and upon their turning out well or ill, will depend the whole order of their father's house. Melisius, that is true. Socrates, great care then is required in the matter?

Melisius, certainly. Socrates, suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or wanted to consider, who was the best trainer, should we not decide in his favor who knew and had practiced the art, and had the best teachers? Melisius, I think that we should.

Socrates. But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art, of which we want to find the masters? Melisius. I did not understand. Socrates, let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think that we have, as yet, decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we ask which of us is skilled in that, and which of us has or has not had a teacher of the art. Nishius. Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought, or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armor? Socrates. Yes, Nishias, but there is also a prior question which I may illustrate in this way. When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes?

Nishius. About the eyes. Socrates. And when he considers if he shepherds, if he shepherds, if he shepherds, set a bridle on a horse, he thinks of the horse and not of the bridle? Nisius. True. Socrates. And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the and not of the means? Nisius. Certainly. Socrates. And when you call in an advisor, you should see whether he is skillful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view as well as of the means.

Nishius. Most true. Socrates. And at present we have in view some kind of knowledge, the end of which is the soul of use? Nishius. Yes. Socrates. The question is, which of us is skillful or successful in the treatment of the soul? And which of us has had good teachers? Lackus. Well, but Socrates, did you never observe that some persons who have had no teachers are more skillful than those who have had, have in some things. Socrates, yes, Lackus, I have observed that, but you would not be very willing to trust them if they only profess to be masters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their skill, or excellence in one or more works. Lackus, that is true, Socrates, and therefore Lachus, and Nisius, as Lysimachus and Melisius, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them.

we too should inform them who our teachers were, if we say that we have any, and prove them to be men of merit, and experience trainers of the minds of youth, and really are teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has works to show of his own, then he should point out to them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have improved. but if he can show neither teachers nor works, then they should ask him to look out for others, and not to run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, which is the most formidable accusation that can be brought against anyone by his near and dear relations.

As for myself Lysimachus and Melisius, I am the first to confess that I have never had a teacher, although I have always, from my earliest youth, desired to have one, but I am too poor to give money to the sophists who are the only professors of moral improvement, and to this day I have never been able to discover the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicius or Lackus may have learned or discovered it, for they are far wealthier than I am, and may therefore have learned of others, and they are older too, so that they have had more time to make the discovery, and I really believe that they are able to educate a man, for unless they

had been confident in their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly of their pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose confidence in both of them, but I do not understand why they differ from one another, and therefore Lycemicus, as Lackus suggests, that you should detain me, and not let me go until I have answered, I, in turn, earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Lachus, Initius, and question them. I would have you say to them, Socrates says that he has no knowledge of the matter, and that he is unable to decide which of you speaks truly.

Neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind. But you, Lachus, Initius, should either of you tell us who is the most skillful educator whom you have ever known, and whether you invented the art yourselves or learned of another, and if you learned, who were your respective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art? And then, if you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of all our families, in order that they may not grow up inferior and disgrace their

ancestors. But if you are yourself's original discoverers in that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they, who, having been inferior persons, have become, under your care, good and noble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying the experiment, not on the Wille Corpus of Akarian slave, but on your own sons, or the sons of your friend. And, as the proverb says, break the large. large vessel in learning to make pots. Tell us then what qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tell you this Lycemicus, and do not let them off. Lycemicus, I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends, but you, Nisius and Lackus,

must determine whether you will be questioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, I, and Melisius would be greatly pleased to hear you answer the questions which Socrates asks, if you will, for I began by saying that we took you into our councils because we thought you would be likely to have attended to the subject, especially as you have children who, like our own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Suppose, then, if you have no objection, that you take Socrates into partnership, and do you and he ask and answer one another's questions? For, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns. I hope that you will see fit to comply with our request. Nisius. I see very clearly Lysimachus that you have only known Socrates's father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself. At least, you can only have known him when he was a child,

and may have met him among his fellow tribesmen, in company with his father, at a sacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you have never known him since he arrived at manhood. Lycemicus. Why do you say that, Nisius? Nisius. You don't seem to be aware that anyone to whom Socrates has an intellectual affinity is liable to be drawn into an argument with him, and whatever subject may be started by him, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds that he has to give an account both of his present and past life, and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now, I am used to his ways, and I know that he will certainly do this,

and also I know that I myself will be the sufferer, for I am fond of his company Lycemicus. Neither do I think that there is any harm in being reminded of the evil which we are, or have been doing. He, who does not fly from reproof, will be sure to take more heed of his afterlife. He will wish and desire to learn as long as he lives, as Solan says, and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant. Indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass

from our sons to ourselves, and therefore, as I say, as far as far as I am concerned, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner, but you had better ask our friend Lackus what his feeling may be. Lackus, I have but one feeling, Nishius, or shall I say, two feelings about discussions, and to some I may seem to be a lover, and to others a hater of discourse, for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure, and I compare the man and his words, and note the harmony in correspondence of them, and such an one I deem to be the true musician,

having in himself a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music. For truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic, mode, which is the Dorian and no other. Such a one makes me marry with the sound of his voice, and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse, so eager am I in drinking in his words. But when I hear a man of opposite character, I am annoyed, and the better he speaks, the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a heater of discourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem, I have had experience of his deeds,

and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments may be expected from him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him. For I agree with Solon that I would fain grow old, learning many things. But I must be allowed to add, of the good only, Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil, but that the teacher is younger, or not as yet in repute, anything of that sort is of no account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which I know. Such is the opinion which I have had of you ever since

that day, on which you were my companion in danger, and gave an unmistakable proof of your valor. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages. Socrates, I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take counsel and advise with me, Lysimachus, but that is our business in which I regard you, is having a common interest, for I reckon you is one of us. Please, then, to take my place, and find out from Nisius and Lackas, what we want to know, for the sake of the youths, and talk and advise with them, for I am old, and my memory is bad, and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to them,

and, if there is any interruption, I am quite lost. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by yourselves, and I will listen, and Melisius and I will act upon your conclusions. Socrates, let us, Nisius and Lachus, comply with the request of Lycemicus and Melisius. There would be no harm in asking ourselves the question which was first proposed to us, who have been our own instructors in this sort of training, and whom we have made better. But the other mode of carrying on the inquiry will bring us to the same point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles.

For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must know how that, about which we are advising, may be best and most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then, let me make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we know that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift,

and also were able to impart sight to the eyes. Then, clearly, we should know the nature of sight. When asked how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained, for if we knew neither what sight is nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisors about the eyes or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight adhering to them. Lackus. That is true, Socrates.

Socrates, and are not our two friends, Lackus, at this very moment inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the improvement of their minds. Lackus. Very true. Socrates. Then, must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how, if we are wholly ignorant of this, can we advise anyone about the best mode of attaining it? Lackus, I do not think that we can, Socrates.

Socrates. Then, Lackus, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue? Lackus, yes, Socrates, and that which we know, you must surely be able to tell. Lackus, certainly, Socrates, I would not have us begin, my friend, with inquiring about the whole virtue, for that may be too much for us. Let us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part, that will probably be an easier mode of proceeding. Lackus, let us do as you say, Socrates. Socrates, then, which of the parts of virtue shall we select?

Must we not select that to which the use of arms is supposed to conduce? And is not that generally supposed to be courage? Lackus, yes, certainly. Socrates. Then, Lackus, suppose that we first set about determining the nature of courage, and, in the second place, proceed to inquire how the young men may attain this quality of courage, as far as this is to be affected by the help of studies and pursuits. Try and see whether you can tell me what is courage. Lackus. Indeed, Socrates, that is soon

answered. He is a man of courage, who remains at his post, and does not run away, but fights against the enemy. Of that, you may be very certain. Socrates, that is good, Lacus, and yet I fear that I did not express myself clearly, and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended to ask, but another. Lackus, what do you mean, Socrates? Socrates, I will endeavor to explain. You would call a man courageous who remains at his post and fights with the enemy? Lackus, certainly I should. Socrates. And so should I, but what would you say of another man who fights flying instead of remaining? Lackus. How flying? Socrates, why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as pursuing. And,

as Homer says in praise of the horses of Innius, that they knew how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither, and he passes an encomium on Ineus himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him an author of fear or flight. Lackus, yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right, for he was speaking of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that way of fighting, but the heavy armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his rank. Socrates, and yet Lackus, you must accept Lacedaemonians at Plata, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled. But when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like cavalry,

and won the battle. Lackas, that is true, Socrates, that was my meaning when I said that I was to in having put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering badly, for I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry, and every other style of soldier, and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or poverty, or again in politics, are courageous, and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of courage, is there not?

Lackas, certainly Socrates, Socrates, and all these are courageous, but some have courage in pleasures, and some in pains, some in desires, and some in fears, and some are cowards under the same conditions as I should imagine. Lackus. Very true. Socrates. Now, I was asking about courage and cowardice in general, and I will begin with courage and once more ask,

what is that common quality which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do you understand now what I mean? Lackas, not over well. Socrates, I mean this. As I might ask, what is that quality which is called quickness, and which is found in running playing the liar speaking learning and in many other similar actions or rather which we possess in nearly every action that can be mentioned of arms or legs mouth voice mind would you not apply the term quickness to all of them lackus quite true socrates and suppose i were to be asked by some one what is that common quality socrates which in all these uses of the word you call quickness

quickness. I should say, that which accomplishes much in a little time. That I call quickness in running, speaking, and every other sort of action. Lackus, you would be quite correct, Socrates, and now Lackus, do you try and tell me, what is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases which I was just now mentioning? Lackus, I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all. Socrates, but that is what we must do if we are to answer the question, and yet I cannot say

that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Here my reason. I am sure, Lackus, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality. Lackus, most noble, certainly, Socrates, and you would say, that a wise endurance is also good and noble, Lackus, very noble, Socrates, but what would you say of a foolish endurance, is not that, on the other hand,

to be regarded as evil and hurtful? Lackus. True, Socrates, and is anything noble which is evil and hurtful? Lackus, I ought not to say that, Socrates. Socrates, then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage, for, that is not noble, but courage is not. noble. Lackas, you are right. Socrates, then according to you, only the wise endurance is courage.

Lackas, true. Socrates, but as to the epithet, wise, wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man endures in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous? Lackas, assuredly not. Socrates, Or, for example, if a man is a physician and his son, or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other refuses, is that courage? Lackes. No, that is not courage at all, any more than the last. Socrates, again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing to fight,

and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and that there will be fewer, and inferior men against him than there are with him, and suppose that he has also advantages of position. Would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army, who is in the opposite circumstances to these, and yet endures, and remains at his post, is the braver? Lackus. I should say the latter Socrates was the braver. Socrates, but surely this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other. Lackus, that is true, Socrates, and you would say that he, who in an engagement of cavalry,

endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he who endures, having no knowledge of horsemanship? Lackes. That is my view, Socrates, and he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, or the bow, or any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, not having such a knowledge? Lackas. True, Socrates. And he who descends into a well and dives and holds out in this, or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge? Lackus. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say? Socrates. Nothing, if that is what he thinks. Lackus, but that is what I do think, Socrates. And yet, man. who thus run risks and endure are but foolish, Lackus, in comparison of those who do the same

things, having the skill to do them? Lackus. That is true, Socrates. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and hurtful to us. Lackus. Quite true, Socrates, whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality. Lackus, true, Socrates, and now, on the contrary, we are saying that the foolish endurance which was before held in dishonor is courage.

Lackus. Very true, Socrates. And are we right in saying that? Lackus. Indeed, Socrates, I am sure, that we are not right. Socrates, then, according to your statement, you and I, Lackas, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds, for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Anyone would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not

I imagine he who heard us talking about courage just now. Lackus, that is most true, Socrates, and is this condition of our satisfactory? Lackus, quite the reverse. Socrates, suppose, however, that we admit our principle to a certain extent. Lackus, what principle, and what are we to admit, Socrates, the principle of endurance. Let us to endure and persevere in the inquiry, and then courage. will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage, which, after all may, very likely, be endurance. Lackus, I am ready to go on, Socrates, and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said, and I am really

grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning, for I fancy that I do not know the nature of courage, but somehow or other she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature. Socrates. But my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track and not be lazy? Lackus, certainly he should, Socrates, and shall we invite Nishas to join us? He may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say, Lackas, I should like that.

Socrates, come then Nisius and do what you can to help your friends who are tossing on the waves of argument and at the last gasp. You see our extremity and may save us, and also settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think about courage. Nishius, I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Lachas are not defining courage in the right way, for you have forgotten an excellent saying, which I have heard from your own lips. Socrates, what is that, Nisius? Nishius, I have often heard you say that.

every man is good in that in which he is wise and bad in that in which he is unwise. Socrates. That is certainly true, Nisius. Nisius, and therefore, if the brave man is good, he is also wise. Socrates, do you hear him, Lackus? Lackus. Yes, I hear him, but I don't quite understand him, Socrates. I think that I understand him, and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

Lackus. What sort of wisdom, Socrates? Socrates. That is a question which you must ask of Nisius. Lackus. Yes. Socrates. Tell him then, Nishius, what do you mean by this wisdom, for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays on the flute. Nishius. Certainly not, Socrates, nor the wisdom which plays the liar. Nishius. No. Socrates. But what is this knowledge then? And of what? Lackas. I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates, and I would like him to say, what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom? Nisius. I mean to say, Lackus, that courage is the

knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything. Lackus, how strangely he is talking Socrates. Socrates, what makes you say that, Lackus? What makes me say that? Why, surely courage is one thing and wisdom another. Socrates. That is just what Nis denies. Flacus. Yes, that is what he denies in his foolishness, Socrates. Shall we enlighten him instead of abusing him? Nisius. Lackus does not want to enlighten me, Socrates. But having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been doing the same. Flacchus. Very true Nis. And you are talking nonsense as I shall endeavor to show. Let me ask you a question. Do not physicians know the dangers of disease, or do the courageous, or are the physicians the same as the courageous?

Nisius. Not at all. Lackus. No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or other masters of crafts, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with fear or confidence in their own crafts. And yet, they are not courageous a whit the more for that. Socrates, What is Lackus saying, Nisius? He appears to be saying something. Nisius. Yes, he's saying something, but something which is not true. Socrates. How is that? Nishius. Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only extends to the nature of health and disease. He can tell the sick man that and nothing more. Do you imagine Lackas, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man?

had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed. I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two? Lackus. Yes, I certainly think that. Nisius. And do you think that the same things are terrible to those to whom to die is better and to those to whom to live is better?

Lackas, certainly not. Nisius, and do you suppose that the physician, or any other artist knows this, or anyone indeed except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear and hope, and him I call the courageous. Socrates, do you understand his meaning, Lackus? Lackus. Yes, I suppose that in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are courageous, for who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better.

And yet, Nisius, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, Or, are you neither soothsayer nor courageous? Nishius. What, do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear? Lackus. Indeed I do. Who, but he? Nishius.

Much rather, I should say, he of whom I speak. For the soothsayer ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat in war, or in any sort of contest, but to whom the suffering or not suffering of these things will be for the best can no more be decided by the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer. Lackus, I cannot understand what Nisius would be at Socrates, for he represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer nor a physician, nor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a God. My opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he

shuffles up and down in order to conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might have practiced a similar shuffle just now if we had only wanted to avoid the appearance of contradiction, and if we had been arguing in a court of law, there might have been reason in this, but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this? Socrates, I quite agree with you, Lackas, that he should not, but perhaps, Nishius is serious, and not really talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side, we will agree with him. If not, we will instruct him. Lackas, do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him. I think that I have asked enough. Socrates, I don't see why I should not,

and my question will do for both of us. Lachus. Very good. Socrates. Then tell me, Nisius, or rather, tell us, for Lackas and I are partners in the argument. Do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear? Nisius. I do. Socrates, and that is a very special knowledge which is not possessed by the physician or prophet, who will not be courageous unless they superad this particular knowledge.

knowledge. That is what you were saying? Nishius. I was. Socrates. Then courage is not a thing which every pig would have any more than he would have knowledge, as the proverb says. Nishius. I think not. Socrates, clearly not Nisius, not even such a big pig as the Cromoonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say, not as a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope cannot allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion or a leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has a degree of wisdom which but a few human beings,

and these only with difficulty, attain. He, who takes your view of courage, must affirm that a lion and a snag and a bull and a monkey have equally little pretensions to courage. Lackus, capital Socrates, by the gods, that is truly good, and I hope, Nishius, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind, or whether you will have the boldness in the face of universal opinion to deny their courage. Nishius. Why, Lackus, I don't call animals or any other things courageous, which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, but fearless and senseless only. Do you think that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? There is a difference, as I should imagine, between fearlessness and courage. Now, I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but that rationalness, and boldness and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children, many animals, and you, and men in general, call by the term

courageous actions, which I call rash, and my courageous actions are wise actions. Lackas. Behold Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honor of courage, those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous. Nisius. Be of good cheer, Lackas, for I am quite willing to say of you, and also of Lamacos, and of many other Athenians, that you are courageous and therefore wise. Lackas, I could answer that, but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty

Ixonian. Socrates, I would not have you answer him, for I feel. fancy, Lackas, that you have not discovered whence his wisdom comes. He has got all this for my friend Damon, and Damon is always with prodigos, who, of all the sophists, is considered to be the best taker to pieces of words of this sort. Lackas, yes, Socrates, and the examination of such niceties is a much more suitable employment for a sophist, then for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her. Socrates.

But still, my sweet friend, a great statesman, is just the man to have a great mind. And I think that the view, which is implied Initius's definition of courage, is worthy of examination. Lackas. Then examine for yourself, Socrates. Socrates. That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Don't, however, suppose that I shall let you out of the partnership,

for I shall expect you to apply your mind, and join with me. in the consideration of the question. Lackas. I did not object if you think that I ought. Socrates. Yes, I do. And I must beg of you, Nisius, to begin again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue? Nisius. Very true. Socrates. And you yourself said that this was a part, and that there were many other parts, all of which together are called virtue? "'Nishius, certainly. Socrates, do you agree with me about the parts, for I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue, as well as courage? Would you not say the same? Nisius, certainly, Socrates. Well then, about that we are agreed, and now, let us proceed

a step, and see whether we are equally agreed about the fearful and the hopeful. Let me tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong, you shall set me right. My opinion is that the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not create fear, and that fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Lackas? Lackus. Yes, Socrates, entirely. Socrates, that is my view, Nicias. The terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future, and the hopeful are the good or not evil things which are future. Do you, or do you not agree in this? Nisius, I agree. Socrates, and the knowledge of these things you call courage? Nisius. Precisely, Socrates. And now, let me see whether you agree with Lackas and myself in a third point.

Nishius, what is that? Socrates, I will tell you, he and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third, of what will be, and will be best in the future, but that of all three there is one science only. For example, there is one science of medicine, which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and future, and of husbandry in like manner which is concerned with the productions of the earth, and, as to the general's art, you yourself will be my witnesses that the general has to think of the future as well as the present, and he considers that he is not to be the servant of the soothsayer,

but his master, because he knows better what is happening, or is likely to happen in war, and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the sooths. Am I not correct, Lackas? Quite correct. Socrates, and Deunitius also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the,

the same things, whether future, present or past? Nisius. Yes, indeed, Socrates, that is my opinion. Socrates, and courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful. Nisius, yes, Socrates, and the fearful and the hopeful are admitted to be future goods and future evils. Nisius, true, Socrates, and the same science has to do with the same things in the the future or at any time? Nishius. That is true. Socrates.

Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only, and courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present and past, and of any time? Nishius. That, as I suppose, is true. Socrates. Then the answer which you have given, Nisius, includes only a third part of courage, but our question extended to the whole nature of courage, and, according to your view,

that is, according to your present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement? Nisius. I agree to that, Socrates. Socrates, but then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how they are and have been and will be produced, would he not be perfect and wanting in no virtue, whether justice or temperance or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers, and which were not, and guard against them, whether they were supernatural or natural, and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal with gods or men.

Nishius. I think Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say. Socrates, but then, Nisius, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue? Nishius. I suppose that is true, Socrates, but we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue? Nishius. Yes, that was what we were saying, Socrates, and that is in contradiction with our present view? Nisius. That appears to be the case. Socrates. Then, Nisius, we have not discovered

what courage is. Nisius. We have not. Lackas. And yet, for Nisius, I imagined, that you would have made the discovery, as you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by the wisdom of Damon. Nishius. I perceive, Lackas, that you think nothing of having displayed your ignorance. of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have not made a similar display, and if we are both equally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know, that I suppose will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbour and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said

on the subject of discussion, and if anything has been imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to deride, although you have never seen him, and, with the help of others, and, when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge. Lackas, you are a philosopher, Nisius, of that I am aware. Nevertheless, I would recommend Lycemicus, and Melisius, not to take you and me as advisors about the education of their children, but, as a little bit of their children, but, as as I said at first, they should ask Socrates, and if my sons were old enough, I would have asked him myself.

Nisius. To that, I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under his charge. I should not wish for anyone else to be the tutor of Nekirotos, but I observe that when I mention the matter to him, he recommends to me some other tutor, and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus. Lysimachus. He ought, Nisius, for certainly I would do things for him, which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates? Will you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths? Socrates, indeed Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to

aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nisius and Lachos have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me, to perform this duty. But, as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should, and, under these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice, and this need not go further than ourselves. I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything, but I cannot advise that we remain as we are, and if anyone laughs at us for going to school at our age,

I would quote to them the authority of Homer who says that modesty is not good for a needy man. Let us, regardless of the remarks which are made upon us, make the education of the youths our own education. Lysimachus, I like your proposal, Socrates, and, as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favor of you. come to my house tomorrow at dawn, and we will advise about these matters.

For the present, let us make an end of the conversation. Socrates, I will come to you to Moral Isimachus, as you propose, God willing. And of Lackas by Plato, translated by Benjamin Joet.