Classic Audiobook Collection - On Lying by Saint Augustine of Hippo ~ Full Audiobook [philosophy]

Episode Date: February 1, 2024

On Lying by Saint Augustine of Hippo audiobook. Genre: philosophy In On Lying, Saint Augustine of Hippo tackles a question as practical as it is unsettling: can a lie ever be justified? Writing as a pastor, teacher, and philosopher, Augustine examines the everyday ways people bend the truth and the serious spiritual and social consequences that follow. With a careful, step-by-step method, he defines what counts as a lie, explores the role of intention and speech, and tests common excuses: protecting someone from harm, avoiding shame, helping a friend, or defending the faith. Along the way, he presents vivid scenarios drawn from family life, civic affairs, and religious controversy, asking listeners to weigh mercy against integrity and short-term outcomes against the formation of character. More than a list of rules, this concise treatise is a disciplined inquiry into conscience, responsibility, and the meaning of truthful communication. Augustine challenges the listener to consider how truth shapes trust, how habits of deception distort the self, and what it means to live with a steady heart when the cost of honesty feels too high. For ad-free listening try our premium subscription Chapters (Approximate) (00:00:00) Chapter 01 (00:53:13) Chapter 02 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On lying by St. Augustine of Hippo, translated by Henry Brown. There is a great question about lying, which often arises in the midst of our everyday business and gives us much trouble, that we may not either rashly call that a lie, which is not such, or decide that it is sometimes right to tell a lie, that is a kind of honest, well-meant, charitable lie. This question we will painfully discuss by seeking with them that seek, whether to any good purpose, we need not take upon ourselves to affirm, for the attentive reader will sufficiently gather from the course of the discussion. It is indeed very full of dark corners and hath many cavern-like windings whereby it oft alludes the eagerness of the seeker,

so that at one moment what was found seems to slip out of one's hands and anon comes to light again, and then is once more lost to sight. At last, however, the chase will bear down more surely and will overtake our sentence. Wherein, if the there is any error, yet as truth is that which seteth free from all error, and falsehood, that which entangleth in all error, one never errs more safely, methinks, than when one oars by too much loving the truth and too much rejecting of falsehood. For they who find great fault say it is too much, whereas peradventure truth would say, after all, it is not yet enough. But whoso readest thou wilt do well to find no fault until thou have read the whole, so wilt thou

have less fault to find. Eloquence, thou must not look for, we have been intent upon things, and dispatch in putting out of hand a matter which nearly concerns our everyday life, and therefore have had small pains or almost none to bestow upon words. Setting aside, therefore, jokes, which have never been accounted lies, seeing they bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the very mood of the joker, a most evident indication that he means no deceit, although the thing he utters be not true. touching which kind of discourse, whether it be meat to be used by perfect minds is another question,

which we have not at this time taken in hand to clear. But setting jokes apart, the first point to be attended to is that a person should not be thought to lie who lieth not, for which purpose we must see what a lie is. For not everyone who says a false thing lies, if he believes or opines that to be true, which he says. Now between believing and opining there is this difference that sometimes he who believes feels that he does not know that which he believes, although he may know himself to be ignorant of a thing, and yet have no doubt at all concerning it, if he most firmly believes it, whereas he who opines thinks he knows that which he does not know. Now, whoever utters that which he holds in his mind either as belief or as opinion,

even though it be false, he lies not, for this he owes to the faith of his utterance, that he thereby produce that which he holds in his mind and has in that way in which he produces it. Not that he is without fault, although he lie not, if either he believes what he ought not to believe, or thinks he knows what he knows not, even though it should be true, for he accounts an unknown thing for a known. Wherefore, that man lies, who has one thing in his mind, and utters another in words, or by signs of whatever kind. Whence also the heart of him who lies is said to be double, that is, there is a double thought, the one of that thing which he either knows or thinks to be true and does not produce, the other of that thing which he produces instead thereof, knowing or thinking it to be false.

Whence it comes to pass that he may say a false thing and yet not lie, if he thinks it to be so as he says, although it be not so, and that he may say a true thing and yet lie if he thinks it to be false and utters it for true, although in reality it be so as he utters, for from the sense of his own mind, not from the verity or falsity of the things themselves, is he to be judged to lie or not to lie. Therefore, he who utters a false thing for a true, which, however, he opines to be true, may be called euring and rash, but he is not rightly said to lie, because he has not a double heart when he utters it, neither does he wish to deceive but is deceived.

But the fault of him who lies is the desire of deceiving in the uttering of his mind, whether he do deceive, in that he is believed when uttering the false thing, or whether he do not deceive, either in that he is not believed, or that he utters a thing with will to deceive, which he does not think to be true, wherein being believed he does not deceive, though it was his will to deceive, except that he deceives insofar as he is thought to know or think as he utters. But it may be a very nice question whether in the absence of all will to deceive, lying is altogether absent. Thus put the case that a person shall speak a false thing, which he esteems to be false, on the ground that he thinks he is not believed to the intent that in that way

falsifying his faith he may deter the person to whom he speaks, which person he perceives does not choose to believe him. For here is a person who tells a lie with studied purpose of not deceiving, if to tell a lie is to utter anything otherwise than you know or think it to be. But if it be no lie unless when something is uttered with wish to deceive, that person lies not, who says a false thing, knowing or thinking it to be false, but says it on purpose that the person to whom he speaks by not believing him may not be deceived, because the speaker either knows or thinks the other will not believe him. Whence, if it appears to be possible that a person should say a false thing on purpose that he to whom it is said may not be deceived, on the other hand, there is this opposite

case, the case of a person saying the truth on purpose that he may deceive. For if a man determines to say a true thing because he perceives he is not believed, that man speaks truth on purpose that he may deceive, for he knows or thinks that what is said may be accounted false just because it is spoken by him. Wherefore, in saying a true thing on purpose that it may be thought false, he says a true thing on purpose to deceive, so that it may be inquired which rather lies, he who says a false thing that he may not deceive, or he who says a true thing that he may deceive, the one knowing and thinking that he says a false thing, and the other knowing or thinking that he says a true thing. For we have already said that the person who does not know the thing

to be false which he utters does not lie if he thinks it to be true, and that that person rather lies who utters even a true thing when he thinks it false, because it is by the sense of their mind that they are to be judged. Concerning these persons, therefore, whom we have set forth, there is no small question, the one who knows or thinks he says a false thing and says it on purpose that he may not deceive, as if he knows a certain road to be beset by robbers and fearing less some person for whose safety he is anxious should go by that road. which person he knows does not trust him, should tell him that that road has no robbers on purpose that he may not go by it, as he will think there are robbers there precisely because the other has told him there are none,

and he has resolved not to believe him, accounting him, a liar. The other, who knowing or thinking that to be true which he says, says it on purpose that he may deceive. For instance, if he tells a person who does not believe him, that there are robbers on that road, where he really knows them to be that he to whom he tells it may the rather go by that road and so fall among robbers, because he thinks that to be false, which the other told him. Which then of these lies? The one who has chosen to say a false thing that he may not deceive, or the other who has chosen to say a true thing that he may deceive. That one, who, in saying a false thing, aimed that he to whom he spake should follow the truth, or this one who in saying a truthing aimed that he to whom he spake should follow a falsehood

or happily have both lied, the one because he wished to say a false thing, the other because he wished to deceive, or rather has neither lied, not the one because he had the will not to deceive, not the other because he had the will to speak the truth. For the question is not now which of them sinned, but which of them lied, as indeed it is presently seen that the latter sinned, because by speaking a truth he brought it about that a person should fall among robbers, and that the former has not sinned, or even has done good, by speaking a false thing, he has been the means of a person's avoiding destruction, but then these instances may be turned the other way, so that the one should be supposed to wish some more grievous suffering to the person whom he wishes not to be deceived,

for there are many cases of persons who, through knowing certain things to be true, have brought destruction upon themselves if the things were such as ought to have continued unknown to them, and the other may be supposed to wish some convenience to result to the person whom he wishes to be deceived, for there have been instances of persons who would have destroyed themselves, had they known some evil that had really befallen those who were dear to them, and through deeming it false, have spared themselves. And so to be deceived has been a benefit to them, as to others it has been a hurt to know the truth. The question, therefore, is not, with what purpose of doing a kindness or a hurt,

either the one said a false thing that he might not deceive, or the other a true thing that he might deceive, but setting apart the convenience or inconvenience of the person spoken to, insofar as relates to the very truth and falsehood, the question is whether both of them or neither has lied. For if a lie is an utterance with will of uttering a false thing, That man has rather lied who willed to say a false thing and said what he willed, albeit he said it of set purpose not to deceive.

But if a lie is any utterance whatever with will to deceive, then not the former has lied but the latter, who even in speaking truth, willed to deceive. And if a lie is an utterance with will of any falsity, both have lied, because both the former willed his utterance to be false, and the latter willed a false thing to be believed concerning his utterance, which was true. Further, if a lie is an utterance of a person wishing to utter a false thing that he may deceive,

neither has lied, because both the former in saying a false thing had the will to make a truth thing believed, and the latter to say a truth thing in order that he might make a false thing believed. We shall be clear, then, of all rashness and all lying, if what we know to be true or right to be believed, we utter when need is, and wish to make that thing believed. which we utter. If, however, either thinking that to be true which is false or accounting as known, that which is to us unknown, or believing what we ought not to believe, or uttering it when need is not, we yet have no other aim than to make that believed which we utter. We do not

stand clear indeed of the error of temerity, but we do stand clear of all lying. For there is no need to be afraid of any of these definitions when the mind has a good conscience, that it utters that which to be true it either knows or opines or believes, and that it has no wish to make anything believed but that which it utters. But whether a lie be at sometimes useful is a much greater and more concerning question. Whether, as above, it be a lie, whether a person has no will to deceive, or even make it his business that the person to whom he says a thing shall not be deceived, although he wished the thing itself which he uttered to be false, although he did wish the thing itself which he uttered to be false. But this on purpose that he might cause a truth

to be believed, whether again it be a lie when a person willingly utters even a truth for the purpose of deceiving, this may be doubted. But none doubts that it is a lie when a person willingly utters a falsehood for the purpose of deceiving, wherefore a false utterance put forth with will to deceive is manifestly a lie. But whether this alone be a lie is another question. Meanwhile, taking this kind of lie in which all agree, let us inquire whether it be sometimes useful to utter a falsehood with will to deceive. They who think it is advanced testimonies to their opinion, by alleging the case of Sarah, who, when she had laughed, denied to the angels that she laughed, of Jacob questioned by his father and answering that he was the elder son Esau, likewise that of the

Egyptian midwives, who, to save the Hebrew infants from being slain at their birth, told a lie, and that with God's approbation and reward, and many such-like instances they pick out of lies told by persons whom you would not dare to blame, and so must own that it may sometimes be not only not blameworthy, but even praiseworthy, to tell a lie. They add also a case with which to urge not only those who are devoted to the divine books, but all men and common sense, saying, Suppose a man should take refuge with thee, who by thy lie might be saved from death. Wouldst thou not tell it? If a sick man should ask a question, which it is not expedient that he should know,

and might be more grievously afflicted, even by thy returning him no answer, will thou venture either to tell the truth to the destruction of the man's life, or rather to hold thy peace, than by a virtuous and merciful lie to be serviceable to his weak health. By these and such-like arguments, they think they most plentifully prove that if occasion of doing good require, we may sometimes tell a lie. On the other hand, those who say that we must never lie plead much more strongly, using first the divine authority, because in the very decalogue it is written, thou shalt not bear false witness, under which general term it comprises all lying, for whoso utters anything bears witness to his own mind. But lest any should contend that not every lie is to be called false witness, what will he say to that which is written, The mouth that lieth slayeth the soul?

And lest any should suppose that this may be understood with the exception of some liars, Let him read in another place, thou wilt destroy all that speak leasing. Whence, with his own lips the Lord saith, Let your communication be yea, yea, nay, for whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil. Hence the apostle also in giving precept for putting off of the old man, under which name all sins are understood, says straightway, wherefore, putting away lying, speaky truth. Neither do they confess that they are awed by those citations from the Old Testament, which are alleged as examples of lies. For there, every incident may possibly be taken figuratively, although it really did take place, and when a thing is either done or said figuratively, it is no lie. for every utterance is to be referred to that which it utters.

But when anything is either done or said figuratively, it utters that which it signifies to those for whose understanding it was put forth. Whence we may believe in regard of those persons of the prophetical times who are set forth as authoritative, that in all that is written of them they acted and spoke prophetically, and no less that there is a prophetical meaning in all those incidents of their lives, which by the same prophetic spirit have been accounted worthy of being recorded in writing.

As to the midwives, indeed, they cannot say that these women did, through the prophetic spirit, with purpose of signifying a future truth, tell Pharaoh one thing instead of another, albeit that spirit did signify something without their knowing what was doing in their persons. But they say that these women were, according to their degree, approved and rewarded of God. For if a person who is used to tell lies, for harm's sake, comes to tell them for the sake of doing good, that person has made great progress. But it is one thing that is set forth as laudable in itself, another that in comparison with a worse is preferred. It is one sort of gratulation that we express when a man is in sound health, another when a sick man is getting

better. In the scripture, even Sodom is said to be justified in comparison with the crimes of the people Israel. And to this rule they apply all the instances of lying which are produced from the old books, and are found not reprehended, or cannot be reprehended. Either they are approved on the score of a progress towards improvement and hope of better things, or in virtue of some hidden signification, they are not altogether lies. For this reason, from the books of the New Testament, except the figurative presignifications used by our Lord, if thou consider the life and manners of the saints, their actions and sayings, nothing of the kind can be produced which should provoke to imitation of lying. For the simulation of Peter and Barnabas is not only recorded but also

reproved and corrected. For it was not, as some suppose, out of the same simulation that even Paul the Apostle either circumcised Timothy or himself celebrated certain ceremonies according to the Jewish right, but he did so out of that liberty of his mind whereby he preached that neither are the Gentiles the better for circumcision nor the Jews the worse, wherefore he judged that neither the former should be tied to the custom of the Jews, nor the Jews deterred from the custom of their fathers. Whence are those words of his, is any man called being circumcised, let him not become uncircumcised? Is any called in uncircumcision, let him not be circumcised? Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God.

Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called. How can a man become uncircumcised after circumcision? but let him not do so, saith he. Let him not so live as if he had become uncircumcised, that is, as if he had covered again with flesh the part that was bared and ceased to be a Jew, as in another place he saith, thy circumcision is become uncircumcision. And this the Apostle said, not as though he would compel either those to remain in uncircumcision or the Jews in the custom of their fathers,

but that neither these nor those should be forced to the other custom, and each should have power of abiding in his own custom, not necessity of so doing, and each should have power of abiding in his own custom, not necessity of so doing. For neither if the Jew should wish, where it would disturb no man, to recede from Jewish observances, would he be prohibited by the apostle, since the object of his counselling to abide therein was that Jews might not by being troubled about superfluous things be hindered from coming to those things which are necessary to salvation. Neither would it be prohibited by him if any of the Gentiles should wish to be circumcised

for the purpose of showing that he does not detest the same as noxious, but holds it indifferently as a seal, the usefulness of which had already passed away with time, for it did not follow that, if there were now no salvation to be had from it, there was destruction to be dreaded therefrom. And for this reason Timothy, having been called in uncircumcision, yet because his mother was a Jewess and was bound in order to gain his kindred to show them that he had not learnt in the Christian discipline to abominate the sacraments of the old law, was circumcised by the apostle, that in this way they might prove to the Jews that the reason why the Gentiles do not receive

them is not that they are evil and were perniciously observed by the fathers, but because they are no longer necessary to salvation after the advent of that so great sacrament, which through so long times the whole of that ancient scripture in its prophetical prefigurations did travail in birth with all. For he would circumcise Titus also, when the Jews urged this, but that false brethren privily brought in wished it to be done to the intent they might have it to disseminate concerning Paul himself as a token that he had given place to the truth of their preaching, who said that the hope of gospel salvation is in circumcision of the flesh and observances of that kind, and that without these Christ profiteth

no man, whereas, on the contrary, Christ would nothing profit them, who should be circumcised because they thought that in it was salvation. Whence that saying, Behold I, Paul, say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. Out of this liberty, therefore, did Paul keep the observances of his fathers, but with this one precaution and express declaration that people should not suppose that without these was no Christian salvation. Peter, however, by his making as though salvation consisted in Judaism, was compelling the Gentiles to Judeaise, as is shown by Paul's words, where he says, why compelest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews? For they would be under no compulsion unless they saw that he observed them in such a manner

as if beside them could be no salvation. Peter's simulation, therefore, is not to be compared with Paul's liberty. And while we ought to love Peter, for that he willingly received correction, we must not bolster up lying even by the authority of Paul, who both recalled Peter to the right path in the presence of them all, lest the Gentiles, through him, should be compelled to Judeaize, and bear witness to his own preaching, that whereas he was accounted hostile to the traditions of the fathers, in that he would not impose them on the Gentiles, he did not despised to celebrate them himself, according to the custom of his fathers, and therein sufficiently showed that this has remained in them at the coming of Christ, that neither to the Jews they are

pernicious, nor to the Gentiles necessary, nor henceforth to any of mankind means of salvation. But if no authority for lying can be alleged, either from the ancient books, be it because that is not a lie which is received to have been done or said in a figurative sense, or be it because good men are not challenged to imitate that which in bad men beginning to amend is praised in comparison with the worst, nor yet from the books of the New Testament, because Peter's correction rather than his simulation, even as his tears rather than his denial, is what we must imitate. Then, as to those examples which are fetched from common life, they assert much more confidently that there is no trust to be given to these. For first they teach that a lie is iniquity,

by many proofs of holy writ, especially by that which is written, thou lord hateest all workers of iniquity, thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing. For either, as the scripture is wont, in the following clause, it expounds the former, so that as iniquity is a term of wider meaning, leasing is named as the particular sort of iniquity intended. Or if they think there is any difference between the two, leasing is by so much worse than iniquity as thou will destroy is heavier than thou, hateest. For it may be that God hates a person to that degree more mildly as not to destroy him, but whom he destroys he hates the more exceedingly by how much he punisheth more severely. Now he hateth all who work iniquity, but all who speak leasing he also destroyeth.

Which thing being fixed, who of them which assert this, will be moved by those examples when it is said suppose a man should seek shelter from thee who by thy lie may be saved from death. For that death which men are foolishly afraid of, who are not afraid to sin, kills not the soul but the body, as the Lord teacheth in the gospel, whence he charges us not to fear that death, but the mouth which lies kills not the body but the soul, for in these words it is most plainly written, the mouth that lieth slayeth the soul. How then can it be said without the greatest perverseness, that to the end one man may have life of the body, it is another man's duty to incur death of the soul. the love of our neighbour hath its bounds in each man's love of himself.

Thou shalt love, saith he, thy neighbour as thyself. How can a man be said to love as himself, that man, for whom that he may secure a temporal life, himself looseth life eternal? Since if for his temporal life he lose but his own temporal life, that is not to love as himself, but more than himself, which exceeds the rule of sound doctrine. much less then is he by telling a lie to lose his own eternal for another's temporal life. His own temporal life, of course, for his neighbour's eternal life, a Christian man will not hesitate to lose.

For this example has gone before, that the Lord died for us. To this point, he also saith, this is my commandment that ye love one another as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. for none is so foolish as to say that the Lord did other than consult for the eternal salvation of men, whether in doing what he hath charged us to do, or in charging us to do what himself hath done. Since then by lying, eternal life is lost, never for any man's temporal life must a lie be told. And as to those who take it ill and are indignant, that one should refuse to tell

a lie, and therefore slay his own soul in order that another may grow old in the flesh, What if by our committing theft? What if by committing adultery a person might be delivered from death? Are we therefore to steal, to commit hoarddom? They cannot prevail with themselves in a case of this kind, namely if a person should bring a halter and demand that one should yield to his carnal lust, declaring that he will hang himself unless his request be granted. They cannot prevail with themselves to comply for the sake of, as they say, saving a life. If this is absurd and wicked, why should a man corrupt his own soul with a lie in order that another may live in the body when, if he were to give his body to be corrupted with such an object, he would, in the judgment of all men,

be held guilty of nefarious turpitude. Therefore, the only point to be attended to in this question is whether a lie be iniquity. And since this is asserted by the texts above rehearsed, we must see that to ask whether a man ought to tell a lie for the safety of another is just the same as asking whether for another safety a man ought to commit iniquity. But if the salvation of the soul rejects this, seeing it cannot be secured but by equity, and would have us prefer it not only to another's, but even to our own temporal safety, what remains, say they, that should make us doubt that a lie ought not to be told under any circumstances whatever. For it cannot be said that there is ought among temporal goods greater or dearer than the safety and life of the body. Wherefore, if

not even that is to be preferred to truth. What can be put in our way for the sake of which they who think it is sometimes right to lie can urge that a lie ought to be told. As concerning purity of body, here indeed a very honourable regard seems to come in the way and to demand a lie in its behalf, to which that if the assault of the ravisher may be escaped by means of a lie, it is indubitably right to tell it. But to this, it may be easily answered that there is no purity of body, except as it depends on integrity of mind. This being broken, the other must needs fall, even though it seem intact. And for this reason, it is not to be reckoned among temporal things as a thing that might be taken away from people against their will. By no means, therefore,

must the mind corrupt itself by a lie for the sake of its body, which it knows remaineth incorrupt, if from the mind itself incorruptness depart not. For that which by violence, with no lust for going, the body suffereth, is rather to be called deforcement than corruption. Or if all deforcement is corruption, then not every corruption hath turpitude, but only that which lust hath procured, or to which lust hath consented. Now, by how much the mind is more excellent than the body, so much the more heinous is the wickedness, if that be corrupted. There then, purity can be preserved because there none but a voluntary corruption can have place. For assuredly if the ravisher assault the body, and there is no escaping him either by contrary force

or by any contrivance or lie, we must needs allow that purity cannot be violated by another's lust. Wherefore, since no man doubts that the mind is better than the body, to integrity of body, we ought to prefer integrity of mind, which can be preserved forever. Now, who will say that the mind of him who tells a lie hath its integrity? Indeed, lust itself is rightly defined, an appetite of the mind by which to eternal goods, any temporal goods whatever are preferred. Therefore, no man can prove that it is at any time right to tell a lie, unless he be able to show that any eternal good can be obtained by a lie.

But since each man departs from eternity just insofar as he departs from truth, it is most absurd to say that by departing therefrom it is possible for any man to attain to any good, else if there be any eternal good which truth comprises not, it will not be a true good, therefore neither will it be good because it will be false. But as the mind to the body, so must also truth be preferred to the mind itself, so that the mind should desire it not only more than the body, but even more than its own self. So will the mind be more entire and chaste when it shall enjoy the immutability of truth rather than its own mutability? Now if Lot, being so righteous a man that he was meet to entertain even angels,

offered his daughters to the lust of the sodomites, to the intent that the bodies of women rather than of men might be corrupted by them, how much more diligently and constantly ought the mind's chasteness in the truth to be preserved, seeing it is more truly preferable to its body than the body of a man to the body of a woman. But if any man supposes that the reason why it is right for a person to tell a lie for another is that he may live the while or not be offended in those things which he much loveth. To the end he may attain unto eternal truth by being taught. That man doth not understand in the first place that there is no flagitious thing

which he may not upon the same ground be compelled to commit as has been above demonstrated, and in the next place that the authority of the doctrine itself is cut off and altogether undone if those whom we are say to bring thereunto are by our lie made to think that it is some while's right to lie. for seeing the doctrine which bringeth salvation consisteth partly in things to be believed, partly in things to be understood, and there is no attaining unto those things which are to be understood unless first those things are believed, which are to be believed. How can there be any believing one who thinks it is sometimes right to lie, lest happily he lie at the moment when he teaches us to believe?

For how can it be known whether he have at that moment some cause, as he thinks, for a well-meant lie, deeming that by a false, story a man might be frightened and kept from lust, and in this way account that by telling a lie he is doing good even in spiritual things. Which kind of lie once admitted and approved, all discipline of faith is subverted altogether, and this being subverted, neither is there any attaining to understanding, for the receiving of which that discipline nurtureth the babes. And so all the doctrine of truth is done away, giving place to most licentious falsehood. If a lie, even well meant, may from any quarter have place opened for it to enter in. For either whoso tells a lie prefers

temporal advantages, his own or another's, to truth, than which what can be more perverse? Or when, by aid of a lie, he wishes to make a person fit for gaining the truth, he bars the approach to truth, for by wishing when he lies to be accommodating, it comes to pass that when he speaks the truth he cannot be depended upon. Wherefore, either we must not believe good men, or we must believe those whom we think obliged sometimes to tell a lie, or we must not believe that good men sometimes tell lies. Of these three, the first is pernicious, the second foolish. It remains, therefore, that good men should never tell lies. Thus has the question been on both sides considered and treated, and still it is not easy to pass sentence, but we must further lend diligent hearing to those who

say that no deed is so evil, but that in avoidance of a worse it ought to be done. Moreover, that the deeds of men include not only what they do, but whatever they consent to be done unto them. Wherefore, if cause have arisen that a Christian man should choose to burn incense to idols, that he might not consent to bodily defilement which the persecutor threatened him withal, unless he should do so, they think they have a right to ask why he should not also tell a lie to escape so foul a disgrace. For the consent itself to endure a violation of the person rather than to burn incense to idols, This, they say, is not a passive thing, but a deed, which rather than do, he chose to burn incense. How much more readily, then, would he have chosen a lie if by a lie he might ward off from a holy body, so shocking a disgrace?

In which proposition these points may well deserve to be questioned, whether such consent is to be accounted as a deed, or whether that is to be called consent which hath not approbation, or whether it be approbation when it is said it is expedient to suffer this, rather than to do that, when it is said it is expedient to suffer this than do that, and whether the person spoken of did right to burn incense rather than suffer violation of his body, and whether it would be right rather to tell a lie if that was the alternative proposed than to burn incense. But if such consent is to be accounted as a deed, then are they murderers who have chosen rather to be put to death than bear false witness, yea, what is worse, they are murderers of themselves? For why, at this rate,

should it not be said that they have slain themselves because they chose that this should be done to them, that they might not do what they were urged to do? Or, if it be accounted a worse thing to slay another than himself, what if these terms were offered to a martyr that upon his refusing to bear false witness of Christ and to sacrifice to demons, then, before his eyes not some other man, but his own father should be put to death, his father entreating him, that he would not, by his persevering, permit that to be done. Is it not manifest that upon his remaining steadfast in his purpose of most faithful testimony, they alone would be the murderers who should slay his father, and not he a parasite into the bargain?

As therefore, in this case, the man would be no party to this so heinous deed for choosing, rather than violate his faith by false testimony, that his own father should be put to death by others, yea, though that father were a sacrilegious person whose soul would be snatched away to punishment, so the like consent in the former case would not make him a party to that so foul disgrace if he refused to do evil himself, let others do what they might in consequence of his not doing it. For what do such persecutors say but do evil that we may not? If the case was so that our doing evil would make them not to have done it, even then

it would not be our duty by doing wickedness ourselves to vote them harmless, but as in fact they are already doing it when they say nothing of the kind, why are they to have us to keep them company in wickedness rather than be vile and noisome by themselves? For that is not to be called consent, seeing that we do not approve what they do, always wishing that they would not, and as much as in us lies hindering them that they should not do it, and when it is done, not only not committing it with them, but with all possible detestation condemning the same. How, says thou, is it not his doing as well as theirs, when they would not do this if he would do that? Why, at this rate, we go housebreaking with housebreakers, because if we did not

shut the door, they would not break it open, and we go and murder with highwaymen, if it chance we know that they are going to do it, because if we killed them out of hand, they would not kill others. Or, if a person confessed to us that he is going to commit a parasite, we commit it along with him. If being able, we do not slay him before he can do the deed when we cannot in some other way prevent or thwart him. For it may be said word for word as before, thou hast done it as he, for he had not done this, hadst thou done that. With my good will, neither ill should be done, but only the one was in my power, and I could take care that this should not be done. The other rested with another, and when, by my good advice, I could not quench the purpose, I was

not bound by my evil deed to thwart the doing. It is therefore no approving of a sinner that one refuses to sin for him, and neither the one nor the other is liked by him who would that neither were done. But in that which pertains to him, he hath the power to do it or not, and with that he perpetrateth it not. In that which pertains to another, he hath only the will to wish it or not, and with that he condemneth. And therefore, on their offering those terms and saying, if thou burn not incense, this shall thou suffer, if he should answer, for me I choose neither,

I detest both, I consent unto you in none of these things, in uttering these and the like words, which certainly because they would be true, would afford them no consent, no approbation of his, let him suffer at their hands what he might, to his account would be set down the receipt of wrongs, to theirs the commission of sins. ought he then, it may be asked, to suffer his person to be violated rather than burn incense.

If the question be what he ought, he ought to do neither. For should I say that he ought to do any of these things, I shall approve this or that, whereas I reprobate both. But if the question be, which of these he ought in preference to avoid, not being able to avoid both, but able to avoid one or other, I will answer his own sin rather than another's, and rather a lighter sin being his own than a heavier being another. others. For reserving the point for more diligent inquiry and granting in the meanwhile that

violation of the person is worse than burning incense, yet the latter is his own, the former another's deed, although he had done it to him. Now who's the deed, here's the sin. For though murder is a greater sin than stealing, yet it is worse to steal than to suffer murder. Therefore, if it were proposed to any man that if he would not steal he should be killed, that is murder should be committed upon him, being he could not avoid both, he would prefer to avoid that which would be his own sin rather than that which would be another's. Nor would the latter become his act for being committed upon him, and because he might avoid it if he would commit a sin of his own. The whole stress then of this question comes to this, whether it be true universally that

no sin of another committed upon thee is to be imputed to thee. If being able to avoid it by a lighter sin of thine own, thou do it not, or whether there be an exception of all bodily defilement. No man says that a person is defiled by being murdered, or cast into prison, or bound in chains, or scourged, or afflicted with other tortures and pains, or prescribed, and made to suffer most grievous losses, even to utter nakedness, or stripped of honours, and subjected to great disgrace by reproaches of whatsoever kind. Whatever of all these a man may have unjustly suffered, no man is so senseless as to say that he is thereby defiled. But if he have filth poured all over him, or poured into his mouth, or crammed into him,

or if he be kindly used like a woman, then almost all men regard him with a feeling of horror, and they call him defiled and unclean. One must conclude, then, that the sins of others, be they what they may, those always exempted which defile him on whom they are committed, a man must not seek to avoid by sin of his own, either for himself or for any other, but rather he must put up with them and suffer bravely. And if by no sins of his own he ought to avoid them, therefore not by a lie. But those which by being committed upon a man do make him unclean,

these we are bound to avoid even by sinning ourselves, and for this reason those things are not to be called sins which are done for the purpose of avoiding that uncleanness. for whatever is done in consideration that the not doing it were just cause of blame, that thing is not sin. Upon the same principle, neither is that to be called uncleanness, when there is no way of avoiding it. For even in that extremity, he who suffers it has what he may do a right,

namely patiently bear what he cannot avoid. Now no man, while acting a right, can be defiled by any corporal contagion. for the unclean in the sight of God is everyone who is unrighteous, clean therefore is everyone who is righteous, if not in the sight of men yet in the sight of God, who judges without error. Nay, even in the act of suffering that defilement with power given of avoiding it, it is not by the mere contact that the man is defiled, but by the sin of refusing to avoid it when he might. For that would be no sin, whatever might be done for the avoiding of it.

whoever therefore for the avoiding of it shall tell a lie sinneth not or are some lies also to be accepted so that it were better to suffer this than to commit those if so then not everything that is done in order to the avoiding of that defilement ceases to be sin seeing there are some lies to commit which is worse than to suffer that foul violence for suppose quest be making after a person that his body may be defluxed and that it be possible to screen him by a lie. Who dares to say that even in such a case a lie ought not to be told? But if the lie by which he may be concealed be one which may hurt the fair fame of another by bringing upon him a false accusation of that very uncleanness to suffer which the other is sought after? As, if it should be said to the inquirer, go to such an one, naming some chaste man who is a

stranger to vices of this kind, and he will procure for you one who, whom you will find a more willing subject for he knows and loves such, and thereby the person might be diverted from him whom he sought. I know not whether one man's fair fame ought to be violated by a lie in order that another's body may not be violated by lust to which he is a stranger. And in general it is never right to tell a lie for any man, such as may hurt another, even if the hurt be slighter than would be the hurt to him unless such a lie were told. because neither must another man's bread be taken from him against his will, though he be in good health, and it is to feed one who is weak,

nor must an innocent man against his will be beaten with rods, that another may not be killed. Of course, if they are willing let it be done, because they are not hurt, if they be willing that so it should be. But whether, even with his own consent, a man's fair fame ought to be hurt, with a false charge of foul lusts, in order that lust may be averted from another's body,

is a great question, and I know not whether it be easy to find in what way it can be just that a fair man's fame, even with his consent, should be stained with a false charge of lust, any more than a man's body should be polluted by the lust itself against his will. But yet, if the option were proposed to the man who chose to burn incense to idols rather than yield his body to abominable lust, that if he wished to avoid that, he should violate the fame of Christ by some lie, he would be most mad to do it. I say more that he would be mad if to avoid another man's lust, and not to have that done upon his person which he would suffer with no lust of his own. He should falsify Christ's gospel with false praises of Christ, more assuing that another man should corrupt his body than

himself to corrupt the doctrine of sanctification of souls and bodies. Wherefore, from the doctrine of religion and from those utterances universally, which are uttered on behalf of the doctrine of religion, in the teaching and learning of the same, all lies must be utterly kept aloof. Nor can any cause whatever be found, one should think, why a lie should be told in matters of this kind, when in this doctrine it is not right to tell a lie for the very purpose of bringing a person to it the more easily. For one's break, or but slightly diminish the authority of truth, and all things will remain doubtful, which, unless they be believed true, cannot be held as certain. It is lawful then either to him that discourses, disputes or preaches of things eternal,

or to him that narrates or speaks of things temporal pertaining to edification of religion and piety, to conceal at fitting time whatever seems fit to be concealed, but to tell a lie is never lawful, therefore neither to conceal by telling a lie. This being from the very first and most firmly established, touching other lies the question proceeds more securely. But by consequence, we must also see that all lies must be kept aloof which hurt any man unjustly, because no man is to have a wrong, albeit a lighter one is done to him, that another may have a heavier kept for him. Nor are those lies to be allowed, which, though they hurt not another, yet do nobody any good and are hurtful to the persons themselves

who gratuitously tell them. Indeed, these are the persons who are properly to be called liable, for there is a difference between lying and being a liar. A man may tell a lie unwillingly, but a liar loves to lie, and inhabits in his mind in the delight of lying. Next to such are those to be placed who, by a lie, wish to please men, not that they may do wrong or bring reproach upon any man, for we have already before put away that kind, but that they may be pleasant in conversation.

These differ from the class in which we have placed liars in this respect, that liars delight in lying, rejoice in deceit for its own sake, but these lust to please by agreeable talk, and yet would rather please by saying things that were true. But when they do not easily find true things to say that are pleasant to the hearers, they choose rather to tell lies than to hold their tongues. Yet it is difficult for these sometimes to undertake a story, which is the whole of it false, but most commonly they interweave falsehood with truth, where they are at a loss for something sweet. Now, these two sorts of lies do no harm to those who believe them because they are not deceived concerning any matter of religion and truth, or concerning any

profit or advantage of their own. It suffices them to judge the thing possible which is told, and to have faith in a man of whom they ought not rashly to think that he is telling a lie. For where is the harm of believing that such an one's father or grandfather was a good man when he was not, or that he has served with the army even in Persia, though he never set foot out of Rome. But to the persons who tell these lies, they do much harm, to the former sort because they so desert truth as to rejoice in deceit, to the latter because they want to please people better than the truth. These sorts of lies, having been without any hesitation condemned, the next sort follows, as it were by steps rising to something better, which is commonly attributed

to well-meaning and good people when the person who lies not only does no harm to another but even benefits somebody. Now it is on this sort of lies that the whole dispute turns whether that person does harm to himself, who benefits another in such sort as to act contrary to the truth, or if that alone may be called truth, which illustrators the very minds of men with an intimate and incommutable light. At least he acts contrary to some true thing because although the bodily senses are deceived, yet he acts contrary to a true thing, who says that a thing is so or not so, whereof neither his mind nor senses nor his opinion or belief giveth him any report. Whether, therefore, he does not hurt himself in so profiting another, or in that compensation,

not hurt himself in which he profiteth the other, is a great question. If it be so, it should follow that he ought to profit himself by a lie which damages no man, But these things hang together, and if you concede that point, it necessarily draws in its train some very embarrassing consequences. For should it be asked what harm it does to a person rolling in superfluous wealth, if from countless thousands of bushels of wheat he lose one bushel, which bushel may be profitable as necessary food to the person stealing it, it will follow that theft also may be committed without blame, and false witness born without sin.

than which what can be mentioned more perverse, or truly if another had stolen the bushel and thou sawest it done, and were it questioned, wouldst thou tell a lie with honesty for the poor man, and if thou do it for thine own poverty, wilt thou be blamed? As if it were thy duty to love another more than thyself, both then are disgraceful and must be avoided. But happily some may think that there is an exception to be added, that there be some honest lies which not only hurt no man, but profit some man accepting those by which crimes are screened and defended, so that the reason why the aforesaid lie is disgraceful is that although it hurt no man and profit the poor, it screens a theft. But if it should, in such sort, hurt nobody and profit somebody as not to screen and defend any sin, it would not be morally wrong. As put the case, that someone should, in thy sight, hide his money, that he might not lose it by theft or violence, and thereupon be questioned, thou shouldst tell a lot.

thou wouldst hurt no man and would serve him who had need that his money were hidden and would not have covered a sin by telling a lie. For it is no sin if a man hide his property which he fears to lose. But if we therefore sin not in telling a lie, for that while covering no man's sin we hurt nobody and do good to somebody, what are we about as concerning the sin itself of a lie? For where it is laid down, thou shalt not steal. There is also this, thou shalt not bear false witness. Since then, each is severally prohibited. Why is false witness culpable if it cover a theft or any other sin? But if without any screening of sin, it be done by itself, then not culpable, whereas stealing is culpable in and by itself, and so other sins? Or is it so that to hide

a sin is not lawful, to do it lawful? If this be absurd, what shall we say? Is it so that there is no false witness, but when one tells a lie either to invent a crime against some man or to hide some man's crime or in any way to oppress any man in judgment. For a witness seems to be necessary to the judge for cognizance of the case. But the scripture named a witness only as far as that goes. The apostle would not say, yea, and we are found false witnesses of God because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ whom he raised not up. For so he shows that it is false witness to tell a lie, yea, in falsely praising a person. Or peradventure doth the person who lies then utter false witness,

when he either invents or hides any man's sin, or hurts any man in whatever way. For if a lie spoken against a man's temporal life is detestable, how much more one against eternal life, as is every lie if it take place in doctrine of religion. And it is for this reason that the apostle calls it false witness, if a man tell a lie about Christ, yea, one which may seem to pertain to his praise. Now, if it be a lie that neither inventeth or hideeth any man's sin, nor is answered to a question of the judge, and hurteth no man, and profit some man, are we to say that it is neither false witness nor a reprehensible lie?

End of Section 1 Section 2 of On Lying by St. Augustine of Hippo, translated by Henry Brown. This Librovox recording is in the public domain. What then, if a homicide seek refuge with a Christian, or if he see where the homicide have taken refuge and be questioned of this matter by him who seeks in order to bring to punishment, a man, the slayer of man? Is he to tell a lie? For how does he not hide a sin by lying? when he for whom he lies has been guilty of a heinous sin? Or is it because he is not questioned concerning his sin, but about the place where he is concealed?

So then, to lie in order to hide a person's sin is evil, but to lie in order to hide the sinner is not evil? Yea, surely, says someone, for a man's sins not in avoiding punishment, but in doing something worthy of punishment. Moreover, it pertaineth to Christian discipline, neither to despair of any man's amendment, nor to bar against any man the way of repentance? What if thou be led to the judge, and then question concerning the very place where the other is hiding?

Art thou prepared to say either, he is not there, when thou knowest him to be there, or, I know not and have not seen, what thou knowest and hast seen? Art thou then prepared to bear false witness, and to slay thy soul that a manslayer may not be slain? Or up to the presence of the judge wilt thou lie, but when the judge questions thee, then speak truth that thou be not a false witness. So then thou art going to slay a man thyself by betraying him. Surely the betrayer too is one whom the divine scripture detesteth.

Or happily is he no betrayer, who in answer to the judge's interrogation gives true information, but would be a betrayer if unasked he should delete a man to his destruction. Put the case with respect to a just and innocent man, that thou know where he is in hiding and be questioned by the judge, which man, however, has been ordered to be taken to execution by a higher power, so that he who interrogates is charged with the execution of the law, not the author of the sentence. Will it be no false witness that thou shalt lie for an innocent man because the interrogator is not a judge but only charged with the execution?

What if the author of the law interrogate thee, or any unjust judge, making quest of an innocent man to bring him to punishment? What will thou do? Will thou be false witness or betrayer? Or will he be a betrayer, who to a just judge shall altroniously delight a lurking homicide, and he not so, who to an unjust judge interrogating him of the hiding place of an innocent man whom he seeks to slay, shall inform against the person who has thrown himself upon his honour? Or between the crime of false witness and that of betrayal, wilt thou remain doubtful and unable to make up thy mind? Or, by holding thy peace and professing that thou wilt not tell, wilt thou make up thy mind to avoid both? Then, why not do this before thou come to the judge, that thou mayst shun the lie also? For having kept clear of a lie,

thou wilt escape all false witness, whether every lie be false witness or not every, but by keeping clear of all false witness, in thy sense of the word, will thou not escape all lying? How much braver then, how much more excellent to say, I will neither betray nor lie. This did a former bishop of the Church of Agusta, firmest by name, and even more firm in will, for when he was asked by command of the emperor, through officers sent by him for a man who is taking refuge with him and whom he kept in hiding with all possible care, he made answer to their questions that he could neither tell a

lie nor betray a man, and when he had suffered so many torments of body, for as yet emperors were not Christian, he stood firm in his purpose. Thereupon being brought before the emperor, his conduct appeared so admirable that he, without any difficulty, obtained a pardon for the man whom he was trying to save. What conduct could be more brave and constant? But peradventure, some more timid person may say, I can be prepared to bear any torments, or even to submit to death, that I may not sin, but since it is no sin to tell a lie such that you neither hurt any man nor bear false witness and benefit some man, it is foolish and a great sin voluntarily and to no purpose to submit to torments, and when one's health and life may happily be useful to fling them away for nothing to people

in a rage. Of whom I ask, why he fears that which is written, thou shalt not bear false witness, and fears not that which is said unto God, thou will destroy all them that speak leasing. Says he, it is not written every lie, but I understand it as if it were written, thou wilt destroy all that speak false witness. But neither there is it said or false witness. Yes, but it is set there, saith he, where the other things are set down, which are in every sort evil. What is this the case with what is set down there, thou shalt not kill? If this be in every sort evil, how shall one clear of this crime, even just men who upon a law given have killed many. But it is rejoined, that man doth not himself kill, who is the minister of

some just command. These men's fears, then, I do not accept, that I still think that laudable man, who would neither lie nor betray a man, did both better understand that which is written, and what he understood did bravely put in practice. But one sometimes comes to a case of this kind that we are not interrogated where the person is who is sought, nor forced to betray him if he is hidden in such manner that he cannot easily be found and less betrayed, but we are asked whether he be in such a place or not. If we know him to be there by holding our peace we betray him, or even by saying that we will in no wise tell whether he be there or not, for from this the questioner gathers that he is there, as if you were not, nothing else would be answered by him who would not lie

nor betray a man, but only that he is not there. So, by our either holding our peace or saying such words, a man is betrayed, and he who seeks him hath but to enter in, if he have the power and find him, whereas he might have been turned aside from finding him by our telling a lie. Wherefore, if thou know not where he is, there is no cause for hiding the truth, but thou must confess that thou knowest not. But if thou know where he is, whether he be in the place which is name, in the question or elsewhere, thou must not say, when it is asked whether he be there or not,

I will not tell thee what thou askest, but thou must say, I know where he is, but I will never show. For if, touching one place in particular, thou answer not and profess that thou wilt not betray, it is just as if thou shouldst point to that same place with thy finger, for a sure suspicion is thereby excited. But if at the first thou confess that thou know where he is, but will not tell, happily the inquisitor may be diverted from that place and begin now to ply thee that the place where he is may be betrayed. For which good faith and humanity, whatever thou shalt bravely bear, is judged to be not only not culpable, but even laudable, save only these things which, if a man suffer, he is said to suffer not bravely but immodestly and foully. For this is the last

description of lie concerning which we must treat more diligently. For first to be eschewed is that capital lie and far to be fled from, which is done in doctrine of religion, to which lie a man ought by no consideration to be induced. The second, that he should hurt some man unjustly, which is such that it profits no man and hurts some man. The third, which so profits one as to hurt another, but not incorporeal defilement. The fourth, that which is done through only lust of lying and deceiving,

which is an unmixed lie. The fifth, what is done with desire of pleasing by agreeableness in talk. All these, being utterly eschewed and rejected, there follows a sixth sort which at once hurts nobody and helps somebody, as when if a man's money is to be unjustly taken

from him, one who knows where the money is should say that he does not know by whomesoever the question be put. The seventh, which hurts none, and profit some except of a judge interrogate, as when not wishing to betray a man who is sought for to be put to death, one should lie, not only a just and innocent, but also a culprit, because it belongs to Christian discipline, neither to despair of any man's amendment, nor to bar the way of repentance against any, of which two sorts, which are wont to be attended with great

controversy we have sufficiently treated, and have shown what was our judgment, that by taking the consequences, which are honourably and bravely and brave, these kinds also should be assured by brave and faithful and truthful men and women. The eighth sort of lie is that which hurts no man and does good in the preserving somebody from corporal defilement, at least that defilement which we have mentioned above. For even to eat with unwashed hands, the Jews thought defilement, or if a person think this also a defilement, yet not such that a lie ought to be told to avoid it. But if the lie be such as to do an injury to any man, even though it screen a man from that

uncleanness which all men are poor and detest, whether a lie of this kind may be told, provided the injury done by the lie, be such as consists not in that sort of uncleanness with which we are now concerned, is another question. For here the question is no longer about lying, but it is asked whether an injury ought to be done to any man, even otherwise than by a lie, that the said defilement may be warded off from another, which I should by no means think, though the case proposed be the slightest wrongs, as that which I mentioned above, about a single measure of wheat, and though it be very embarrassing whether it be our duty not to do even such an injury to any man, if thereby another may be defended or screened from a lustful outrage upon his

person. But as I said, this is another question. At present let us go on. with what we have taken in hand, whether a lie ought to be told, if even the inevitable condition be proposed, that we either do this, or suffer the deed of lust, or some execrable pollution, even though by lying we do no man harm. Touching which matter, there will be some place open for consideration if first the divine authorities which forbid a lie be diligently discussed, for if these give no place, we vainly seek a loophole, for we are bound to keep in every way the command of and the will of God in all that through keeping his command we may suffer, it is our duty with an even mind to follow. But if by some relaxation any outlet be allowed, in such a case,

we are not to decline a lie. The reason why the divine scriptures contain not only God's commands, but the life and character of the just, is this, that if happily it be hidden, in what way we are to take that which is enjoined by the actions of the just it may be understood. With the exception, therefore, of those actions which one may refer to an allegorical significance, although none doubts that they really took place, as is the case with almost all the occurrences in the books of the Old Testament. For who can venture to affirm of anything there that it does not pertain to a figurative foretelling, seeing the Apostle speaking of the sons of Abraham, of whom, of course, it is most easily said that they were born and did live in the natural order of

propagating the people, for not monsters and prodigies were born to lead the mind to some pre-signification. Nevertheless, asserteth that they signify the two testaments, and saith of that that marvellous benefit which God bestowed upon his people Israel to rescue them out of the bondage in which they in Egypt were oppressed, and of the punishment which avenged their sin on their journey, that these things befell them in a figure. What actions wilt thou find from which thou mayest set aside that rule and take upon thee to affirm that they are not to be reduced to some figure. Accepting therefore these, the things which in the New Testament are done by the saints, where there is most evident commending of manners to our imitation may avail as examples for the

understanding of the scriptures which things are digested in the commands. As when we read in the gospel, thou hast received a blow in the face make ready the other cheek. Now, as an example of patience, can none be found than that of the Lord himself more potent and excellent. But he, when smitten on the cheek, said not, behold, here is the other cheek, but he said, if I have spoken ill, bear witness of the evil, but if well, why smitest thou me? Where he shows that the preparation of the other cheek is to be done in the heart. Which also the apostle Paul knew, for he too, when he was smitten on the face before the high priest, did not say smite the other cheek, but God, saith he, shall smite thee, thou whited wall, and sittest thou to judge me according to the law, and contrary to law

commandest me to be smitten. With most deep insight, beholding that the priesthood of the Jews was already become such that in name it outwardly was clean and fair, but within was foul with muddy lusts, which priesthood he saw in spirit to be ready to pass away through vengeance of the Lord when he spake those words, but yet he had in his heart ready not only to receive other blows on the cheek, but also to suffer for the truth any torments whatever with love of them from whom he should suffer the same. It is also written, but I say unto you, swear not at all. But the apostle himself has used oaths in his epistles. And so he shows how that is to be taken, which is said, I say unto you swear not at all. That is, lest by swearing one come to a facility and swearing,

from facility to a custom, and so from a custom there be a downfall into perjury. And therefore he is not found to have sworn except in writing where there is more wary forethought and no precipitate tongue with all. And this indeed came of evil, as it is said, whatever is more than these is of evil, not however from evil of his own, but from the evil of infirmity, which was in them in whom he even in this way endeavoured to work faith. For that he used an oath in speaking, while not writing, I know not that any scripture has related concerning him. And yet the Lord says, not at all, for he hath not granted license thereof to persons'r writing. Howbeit, because to pronounce Paul guilty of violating the commandment, especially in epistles written and sent forth for the

spiritual life and salvation of the nations, were an impiety, we must understand that word which is set down at all, to be set down for this purpose, that as much as in thee lies, thou affect not, love not, nor as though it were for a good thing with any delight, desire, an oath. As that, take no thought for the morrow, and take therefore no thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or what ye shall put on. Now, when we see that the Lord himself had a bag in which was put what was given, that it might be kept for necessary use as the time should require, and that the apostles themselves made much provision for the indigence of the brethren, not only for the morrow, but even for the more protracted time of impending death, as we read

in the acts of the apostles, it is sufficiently clear that these precepts are so to be understood that we are to do nothing of our work as a matter of necessity through love of obtaining temporal goods or fear of want. Moreover, it was said to the apostles that they should take nothing with them for their journey, but should live by the gospel. And in a certain place too, the Lord himself signified why he said this when he added, the labourer is worthy of his hire, where he sufficiently shows that this is permitted, not ordered, lest happily he should do this, namely, that in this work of preaching the word, he should take order for the uses of this life, from them to whom he preached, should think he was doing anything unlawful. And yet that it

may more laudably not be done is sufficiently proved in the apostle Paul, who, while he said, let him that is taught in the word communicate unto him that teacheth in all things, and showed in many places that this is wholesomely done by them to whom he preached the word. Nevertheless, saith he, I have not used this power. The Lord, therefore, when he spake those words, gave power, not bound men by a command. So in general, what in words we are not able to understand, and the actions of the saints we gather how it is meet to be taken, which would easily be drawn to the other side unless it were recalled by an example.

Thus then what is written, the mouth that lieth slayeth the soul, of what mouth it speaketh is the question. For in general, when the scripture speaks of the mouth, it signifies the very seat of our conception in the heart, where it is approved and decreed whatever also by the voice, when we speak the truth, is uttered, so that he lieth with the heart who approveth a lie. Yet that man may possibly not lie with the heart who uttereth other than is in his mind, in such sort that he knows it to be for the sake of avoiding a greater evil that he admitteth an evil, disapproving with all both the one and the other.

And they who assert this say that thus also is to be understood that which is written, he that speaketh the truth in his heart. Because always in the heart truth must be spoken, but not always in the mouth of the body. If any cause of avoiding a greater evil require that other

than is in the mind be uttered with the voice. And that there is indeed a mouth of the heart may be understood even from this, that where there is speech, there a mouth is with no absurdity understood, nor would it be right to say, who speaketh in his heart, unless it were right to understand that there is also a mouth in the heart. Though in that very place where it is written, the mouth that lieth slayeth the soul, if the context of the lesson be considered, it may, peradventure, be taken for no other than the

mouth of the heart, for there is an obscure response there, where it is hidden from men, to whom the mouth of the heart, unless the mouth of the body sound therewith, is not audible. But that mouth, the scripture in that place saith, doth reach to the hearing of the spirit of the Lord, who hath filled the whole earth, at the same time mentioning lips and voice and tongue in that place, yet all these the sense permiteth not to be taken, but concerning the heart, because it saith of the Lord that what is spoken is not hidden from him. Now that which is spoken with that sound which reacheth to our ears is not hidden from men either. Thus, namely, is it written, the spirit of wisdom is loving, and will not acquit an evil speaker of his lips, for of his reigns God is witness, and of his

heart a true searcher, and of his tongue a hearer, for the spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole earth, and that which containeth all things hath knowledge of the voice. Therefore he that speaketh unrighteous things cannot be kid, but neither shall a judgment when it punisheth pass by him. for in the thoughts of the ungodly shall there be interrogation, and the hearing of his words shall come from the Lord to the punishment of his iniquities. For the ear of jealousy heareth all things and the tumult of murmurings will not be hid. Therefore keep yourselves from murmuring, which profiteth nothing, and from backbiting refrain your tongue, because an obscure response will not go into the void.

But the mouth that lieth slayeth the soul. It seems then to threaten them who think that to be obscure and see, secret, which they agitate and turn over in their heart. And this, it would show, is so clear to the ears of God that it even calls it tumult. Manifestly, also in the gospel, we find the mouth of the heart, so that in one place the Lord is found to have mentioned the mouth both of the body and of the heart, where he saith, are ye also yet without understanding? Do ye not yet understand, that whatsoever entereth in at the mouth goeth into the belly and is cast out into the draft. But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart and they defile the man.

For out of the heart precede evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies. These are the things which defile a man. Here, if thou understand but one mouth, that of the body, how wilt thou understand those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart, since spitting also and vomiting proceed out of the mouth unless peradventure a man is but then defiled when he eateth aught unclean but is defiled when he vomits it up but if this be most absurd it remains that we understand the mouth of the heart to have been expounded by the lord when he saith the things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart For being that theft also can be, and often is, perpetrated with silence of the bodily voice and mouth, one must be out of his mind, so to understand it, as then to account a person to be contaminated by the sin of theft, when he confesses or makes it known, but when he commits it and holds his peace,

then to think him undefiled. But, in truth, if we refer what is said to the mouth of the heart, no sin whatever can be committed tacitly, for it is not committed unless it proceed from that mouth which is within. But, like, as it is asked of what mouth the scripture saith, the mouth that lieth slayeth the soul, so it may be asked of what lie. For it seems to speak of that lie in particular which consists in detraction. It says keep yourselves from murmuring which profiteth nothing and from detraction refrain your tongue. Now this detraction takes place through malevolence, when any man not only with mouth and voice of the body doth utter what he forgeth against any, but even without speaking wisheth him to be thought such, which is,

in truth, to detract with the mouth of the heart, which thing it saith cannot be obscure and hidden from God. For what is written in another place, wish not to use every lie, they say is not of force for this that a person is not to use any lie. Therefore, when one man shall say that according to this testimony of Scripture, we must, to that degree hold every sort and kind of lie in detestation, that even if a man wish to lie, yea, though he lie not, the very wish is to be condemned. And to this sense interpreteth, that it is not said, do not use every lie, but do not wish to use every lie, that one must not dare not only to tell,

but not even to wish to tell any lie whatever. Sayeth another man, nay, in that it saith, do not wish to use every lie, it willeth that from the mouth of the heart we exterminate and a strange lying, so that while from some lies we must abstain with the mouth of the body, as are those chiefly which pertain to doctrine of religion, from some we are not to abstain with the mouth of the body if reason of avoiding a greater evil require, but with the mouth of the heart we must abstain utterly from every lie. Where it behoveth to be understood, what is said, do not wish, namely, the will itself is taken, as it were, the mouth of the heart, so that it concerneth not the mouth of the heart

when in shunning a greater evil we lie unwillingly. There is also a third sense in which thou mayest so take this word, not every, that except some lies it giveth thee leave to lie. Like, as if he should say, wish not to believe every man. He would not mean to advise that none should be believed, but that not all, some, however, should be believed. And that which follows, for, for, assiduity thereof will not profit for good. Sounds as if not lying but assiduous lying, that is the custom and love of lying, should seem to be that which he would prohibit, to which that person will assuredly slide down, who either shall think that every lie may be boldly used, for so he will shun not that even which is committed in the doctrine of piety and religion, than which

what more abominably wicked thing canst thou easily find, not amongst all lies, but amongst all sins. Or to some lie, no matter how easy, how harmless, shall accommodate the inclination of the will, so as to lie not unwillingly for the sake of escaping a greater evil, but willingly and with liking. So seeing there be three things which may be understood in this sentence, either every lie not only tell thou not, but do not even wish to tell, or do not wish but even unwillingly tell a lie when aught worse is to be avoided, or not every to wit that except some lies, the rest are admitted.

One of these is found to make for those who hold that one is never to lie, two, for those who think that sometimes one may tell a lie, but yet what follows, for assiduity thereof, will not profit to good, I know not whether it can countenance the first sentence of these three, except happily so that while it is a precept for the perfect, not only not to lie, but not even to wish, assiduity of lying is not permitted even to beginners.

As if, namely, on laying down the rule at no time whatever, not merely to lie, but so much as to have a wish to lie, and this being gainsaid by examples in regard that there are some lies which have been even approved by great authority. It should be rejoined that those indeed are lies of beginners which have, in regard of this life, some kind of duty of mercy, and yet to that degree is every lie evil, and by perfect and spiritual minds in every way to be eschewed, that not even beginners are permitted to have assiduous custom thereof. For we have already spoken concerning the Egyptian midwives, that it is in respect of the promise of growth and proficiency to better things,

that they, while lying, are spoken off with approval, because it is some step towards loving the true and eternal saving of the soul when a person doth mercifully for the saving of any man's, albeit mortal life, even tell a lie. Moreover, what is written, Thou wilt destroy all that speak leasing. One saith that no lie is here accepted, but all are condemned. Another saith, yea verily, but they who speak leasing from the heart as we disputed above, for that man speaketh truth in his heart who hateth the necessity of lying, which he understands as a penalty of the mortal life. Another saith, all indeed will God destroy

who speak leasing, but not all leasing, for there is some leasing which the prophet was at that time insinuating, in which none is spared, that is, if refusing to confess each one his sins, he defend them rather, and will not do penance, so that, not content to work iniquity, he must needs wish to be thought just, and succumb not to the medicine of confession, as the very distinction of the words may seem to intimate no other, thou hateest all that work iniquity, but will not destroy them, if upon repenting they speak the truth in confession, that by doing that truth they may come to the light, as is said in the gospel according to John, but he that doth truth cometh unto the light. Thou wilt destroy all who not only work

what thou hateest, but also speak leasing, in holding out before them false righteousness and not confessing their sins in penitence. For concerning false witness, which is set down in the ten commands of the law, it can indeed in no wise be contented that love of truth may at heart be preserved, and false witness brought forth to him unto whom the witness is born. For, when it is said to God only, then it is only in the heart that the truth is to be embraced. But when it is said to man, then must we, with the mouth also of the body, bring forth truth, because man is not an inspector of the heart. But then, touching the witness itself, it is not unreasonably asked, to whom one is a witness. For not to whomsoever we speak unto, are we witnesses, but to them to whom

it is expedient and due, that they by our means should come to know or believe the truth, as is a judge. that he may not err in judging, or he who is taught in doctrine of religion that he may not err in faith, or, by very authority of the teacher, waver in doubt. But when the person who interrogates thee or wishes to know aught from thee speaks that which concerneth him not, or which is not expedient for him to know, he craveth not a witness but a betrayer. Therefore, if to him thou tell a lie from false witness peradventure, thou wilt be clear, but from a lie assuredly not. So then, with this salvo, that to bear false witness is never lawful. The question is whether it be lawful sometimes to tell a lie, or if it be false witness to

lie at all, it is to be seen whether it admit of compensation to wit that it be said for the sake of avoiding a greater sin, as that which is written on a father and mother, under stress of a preferable duty is disregarded, whence the paying of the last honours of sepulture to a father is forbidden to that man who by the the Lord himself is called to preach the kingdom of God. Likewise, touching that which is written, a son which receiveth the word shall be far from destruction, but receiving he receiveth it for himself, and no falsehood proceedeth out of his mouth.

Someone may say that what is here set down, a son which receiveth the word is to be taken for no other than the word of God, which is truth. Therefore a son receiving the truth shall be far from destruction refers to that which is written, thou will destroy all that speak leasing. But when it follows, receiving, he receiveth for himself. What other doth this insinuate than what the apostle saith? But let every man prove his own work, and then he shall have glorying in himself and not in another. For he that receiveth the word, that is truth, not for himself, but for men pleasing, keepeth it not when he sees they can be pleased by a lie. But whoso receiveth it for himself, no falsehood proceedeth

out of his mouth, because even when the way to please men is to lie, that man lieth not, who receiving the truth, not thereby to please them but to please God, hath received it for himself. Therefore there is no reason why it should be said here, he will destroy all who speak leasing, but not all leasing, because all lies universally are cut off in this saying, and no falsehood proceedeth out of his mouth. But another saith, it is to be so taken as the apostle Paul took our Lord saying, but I say unto you swear not at all. For here also all swearing is cut off, but from the mouth of the heart, that it should never be done with approbation of the will, but through necessity of the weakness of another, that is, from the evil of another, when it shows that he cannot

otherwise be got to believe what is said unless faith be wrought by an oath, or from that evil of our own, that while as yet involved in the skins of this mortality, we are not able to show our heart, which thing were we able to do of swearing there were no need? Though, moreover, in this whole sentence, if the saying, a son receiving the word shall be far from destruction be said of none other than the truth by whom all things were made, which remaineth ever incommutable, then, because the doctrine of religion strives to bring men to the contemplation of this truth, it may seem that the saying, and no falsehood proceedeth out of his mouth, is said to this purpose that he speaketh no falsehood that pertaineth.

to doctrine. Which sort of lie is upon no compensation whatever to be gone into, and is utterly and before all to be eschewed? Or if the saying no falsehood is absurdly taken, if it be not referred to every lie, the saying from his mouth should, as was argued above, be taken to mean the mouth of the heart, in the opinion of him who accounts that sometimes one may tell a lie? certain it is, albeit all this disputation go from side to side, some asserting that it is never right to lie, and to this effect reciting divine testimonies, others gainsaying, and even in the midst of the very words of the divine testimonies, seeking place for a lie. Yet no man can say that he finds this either in example or in word of the scriptures that any lie should seem a thing

to be loved, or not had in hatred. Howbeit sometimes by telling a lie, thou must do that thou hatest, that what is more greatly to be detested may be avoided. But then here it is that people err, they put the precious beneath the vile. For when thou hast granted that some evil is to be admitted, that another and more grievous may not be admitted, not by the rule of truth, but by his own cupidity and custom, doth each measure the evil, accounting that to be the more grievous which himself more greatly dreads, not which is in reality more greatly to be fled from. All this fault is engendered by perversity of loving. For being there are two lives of ours, the one eternal, which is promised of God, the other temporal, in which we now are. When a man shall have begun to

love this temporal more than the eternal, for the sake of this which he loveth, he thinks all things right to be done. And there are not any, in his estimation, more grievous sins than those which do injury to this life, and either take away from it any commodity unjustly and unlawfully, or by inflicting of death, take it utterly away. And so Thee, and so Thee, robbers and ruffians and torturers and slayers are more hated of them than lascivious drunken luxurious men, if these molest no man. For they do not understand, or at all care, that these do wrong to God. Not indeed to any inconvenience of him, but to their own pernicious hurt, seeing they corrupt his gifts bestowed upon them, even his temporal gifts, and by their very corruptions turn away from eternal gifts.

above all, if they have already begun to be the temple of God, which to all Christians the apostle saith thus, know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you. Whoso shall corrupt God's temple, God will corrupt Him, for the temple of God is holy, which temple are ye? And all these sins truly, whether such whereby an injury is done to men in the comforts of this life, or whereby men corrupt themselves and hurt none against his will, all these sins then, even though they seem to mean well by this temporal life, to the procuring of any delight or profit, for no man commits any of these things with any other purpose and end. Yet in regard to that life which is forever and ever, they do entangle and in always hinder. But there are some of these that hinder the doers only, others likewise those on whom they are done. For as to the things which people keep safe for the sake of utility to this life, when these are taken away by injurious persons, they alone sin and are hindered from eternal life who do this, not they to whom they do it. Therefore, even if a person consent to the taking of them from him, either that he may not do some

evil, or that he may not in these very things suffer some greater inconvenience, not only does he not sin, but in the one case he acts bravely and laudably, in the other, usefully and unblameably. But as to those things which are kept for the sake of sanctity and religion, when injurious persons wish to violate these, it is right if the condition be proposed and the means given to redeem them even by sins of lesser moment, yet not by wrongs to other men. And then to these things thenceforth cease to be sins which are undertaken in order to the avoidance of greater sins. For as in things useful, for instance in pecuniary or any other corporeal commodity, that is not to be called a loss which is parted with in order to a greater gain. So in things holy, that is not called sin

which is admitted lest a worse be admitted. Or, if that is called loss, which one foregoes, that he may not forego more. Let this also be called sin, while, however, the necessity of undertaking it in order to the assuing of a greater is no more to be doubted than that in order to avoid a greater loss, it is right to suffer a smaller one. Now the things which are to be kept safe for sanctity's sake are these. Pudicity of body and chastity of soul and verity of doctrine. Pudicity of body without consent and permission of the soul doth no man violate. For whatever against our will and without our empowering the same is by greater force done upon our body is no lewdness.

Albeit of permitting there may be some reason, but of consenting none. For we consent when we approve and wish, but we permit even not willing because of some greater turpitude to be eschewed. Consent truly to corporal lewdness violates also chastity of mind. for the mind's chastity consists in a good will and sincere love which is not corrupted, unless when we love and desire that which truth teaches ought not to be loved and desired. We have therefore to guard the sincerity of love towards God and our neighbour, for in this is chastity of mind sanctified,

and we must endeavour with all the strength in our power, and with pious supplication, that when the pudicity of our body is sought to be violated, not even that outermost sense of the soul, which is entangled with the flesh may be touched with any delight, but if it cannot this, at least the mind and thought in not consenting may have its chastity preserved entire. Now, what we have to guard in chastity of mind is, as pertaining to the love of our neighbor, innocence and benevolence, as pertaining to the love of God, piety.

Innocence is that we hurt no man, benevolence, that we also do good to whom we can, piety that we worship God. But as for verity of doctrine of religion and piety, that is not violated unless by a lie, whereas the highest and inmost verity itself, whose that doctrine is, can in no wise be violated, which truth to attain unto, and in it on every wise to remain, and to it thoroughly to cleave, will not be permitted, but when this corruptible shall have put on in corruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality. But because all piety in this life is practice by which we tend to that life, which practice hath a guidance afforded unto it from that doctrine, which in human words and signs of corporal sacraments doth insinuate and intimate truth herself, for this cause, this also, which by lying is possible to be corrupted, is most of all to be kept incorrupt, that so, if aught in that chastity of mind be violated, it may have that wherefrom it may be repaired. For once corrupt or thoroughness,

of doctrine, and there can be none either course or recourse to chastity of mind. There resulteth then from all these this sentence, that a lie which doth not violate the doctrine of piety, nor piety itself, nor innocence, nor benevolence, may on behalf of pudicity of the body be admitted. And yet if any man should propose to himself so to love truth, not only that which consists in contemplation, but also in uttering the true thing, which each in its own kind of things is true, and no otherwise to bring forth with the mouth of the body his thought than in the mind it is conceived and beheld, so that he should prize the beauty of truth-telling honesty, not only above gold and silver and jewels and pleasant lands, but above

this temporal life itself altogether, and every good thing of the body. I know not whether any could wisely say that that man urs, and if he should prefer this and prize it more than all that himself hath of such things, rightly also would he prefer it to the temporal things of other men, whom by his innocence and benevolence he was bound to keep and to help. For he would love perfect faith, not only of believing a right those things, which by an excellent authority and worthy of faith should to himself be spoken, but also, or faithfully uttering what himself should judge right to be spoken and should speak. For faith hath its name in the Latin tongue, from that the thing is done, which is

said, and thus it is manifest that one doth not exhibit when telling a lie. And even if this faith be less violated when one lies in such sort that he is believed to no inconvenience and no pernicious hurt, with added intention, moreover, of guarding either one's life or corporal purity, yet violated it is, and a thing is violated which ought to be kept safe in chastity and sanctity of mind. Whence we are constrained, not by opinion of men, which for the most part is in error, but by truth itself. Truth which is eminent above all, and alone is most invincible, to prefer even to purity of body, perfect faith. For chastity of mind is love well-ordered, which does not place the greater below the smaller. Now, it is less, whatever in the body than

whatever in the mind can be violated. For assuredly, when for corporal chasteness a man tells a lie, he sees indeed that his body is threatened with corruption, not from his own but from another's lust, is cautious less by permitting at least he be a party. That permission, however, where is it but in the mind? So then even corporal chasteness cannot be corrupted but in the mind, which not consenting nor permitting, it can by no means be rightly said that the corporal chasteness is violated, whatever in the body be perpetrated by another's lust. Whence it is gathered that much more must the chastity of the mind be preserved in the mind, in which is the guardianship of the pudicity of the body. wherefore what Enus lies both the one and the other must by holy manners and conversation be walled and hedged round, lest from another quarter it be violated. But when both cannot be, which is to be slighted in comparison of which, who doth not see, when he seeth which to which is to be preferred, the mind to the body or the body to the mind, and which is more to be shunned among sins, the permitting of another's deed or the committing of the deed thyself. It clearly appears then, all being discussed,

that those testimonies of scripture have none other meaning than that we must never at all tell a lie, seeing that not any examples of lies worthy of imitation are found in the manners and actions of the saints as regards those scriptures which are referred to no figurative signification, such as is the history of the acts of the apostles. For all those sayings of our Lord in the Gospel, which to more ignorant minds seem lies, are figurative significations. And as to what the apostle says, I am made all things to all men that I might gain all. The right understanding is that he did this not by lying, but by sympathy, so that he dealt with them in liberating them with so great charity, as if he were himself in that evil from which he wished to make them whole.

There must therefore be no lying in the doctrine of piety. It is a heinous wickedness, and the first sort of detestable lie. There must be no lying of the second sort because no man must have a wrong done to him. There must be no lying of the third. third sort because we are not to consult any man's good to the injury of another. There must be no lying of the fourth sword, that is, for the lust of lying, which of itself is vicious. There must be no lying of the fifth sort, because not even the truth itself is to be uttered with the aim of men pleasing, how much less a lie, which of itself as a lie is a foul thing. There must be no lying of the sixth sort, for it is not right that even the truth of

testimony be corrupted for any man's temporal convenience and safety. But unto eternal salvation none is to be led by aid of a lie. For not by the ill manners of them that convert him is he to be converted to good manners, because if it is meat to be done towards him, himself also ought when converted to do it towards others. And so is he converted not to good but to ill manners, seeing that is held out to be imitated by him when converted, which was done unto him in converting him.

Neither in the seventh sort must there be any lying, for it is meat that not any man's commodity or temporal welfare be preferred to the perfecting of faith. Not even if any man is so ill moved by our right deeds as to become worse in his mind, and far more remote from piety are right deeds therefore to be foregone. Since what we are chiefly to hold is that whereunto we ought to call and invite them, whom as our own selves we love, and with most courageous mind we must drink in that apostolic sentence. To some we are a savor of life unto life, to others, savor of death unto death, and who is sufficient for these things. Nor in the eighth sort

must there be lying, because both among good things chastity of mind is greater than pudicity of body, and among evil things, that which ourselves do, than that which we suffer to be done. In these eight kinds, however, a man sins less when he tells a lie in proportion as he emerges to the eighth, more in proportion as he diverges to the first. But whoso shall think there is any sort of lie that is no sin, will deceive himself fouly when he deems himself honest as a deceiver of other men. So great blindness, moreover, hath occupied men's minds, that to them it is too little if we pronounce some lies not to be sins, but they must need pronounce it to be sin in some things

if we refuse to lie, and to such a pass have they been brought by defending lying, that even that first kind, which is of all the most abominably wicked, they pronounce to have been used by the Apostle Paul. For in the epistle to the Galatians, written as it was like the rest for the doctrine of religion and piety, they say that he has told a lie in the passage where he says concerning Peter and Barnabas, when I saw that they walked not uprightly according to the truth of the gospel. For while they wished to defend Peter from error and from that pravity of way into which he had fallen, the very way of religion in which is salvation for all men, they, by breaking and mincing the authority of the scriptures, do endeavour themselves to overthrow.

in which they do not see that it is not only lying but perjury that they lay at the charge of the apostle in the very doctrine of piety that is in an epistle in which he preaches the gospel seeing that he there saith before he relates that matter what i write unto you behold before god i lie not But it is time that we set bounds to this disputation in the consideration and treatment whereof altogether there is nothing more meat to be before all else born in mind and made our prayer than that which the same apostles saith. God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able to bear, but will with the temptation make also a way to escape that ye may be able to bear it. End of Section 2 End of Online by St Augustine of Hippo

Translated by Henry Brown