Classic Audiobook Collection - Tactical Studies on the Battles around Plevna by Thilo Lebrecht Ernst Michael von Trotha ~ Full Audiobook [history]

Episode Date: May 12, 2025

Tactical Studies on the Battles around Plevna by Thilo Lebrecht Ernst Michael von Trotha audiobook. Genre: history In Tactical Studies on the Battles around Plevna (also published in German as Der Kampf um Plewna), Thilo Lebrecht Ernst Michael von Trotha turns one of the Russo-Turkish War's most grueling episodes into a clear-eyed case study in modern combat. Focusing on the 1877 fighting around the fortified town of Plevna (today Pleven, Bulgaria) during the Danube Campaign, von Trotha reconstructs the sequence of attacks, countermeasures, and battlefield adaptations that turned a rapid advance into a costly struggle for ground measured in trenches, redoubts, and ravines. He follows the pressures on commanders and staffs as reconnaissance, artillery preparation, infantry formations, and logistics collide with hard terrain and an enemy determined to hold. Rather than offering simple heroics, the book asks why plans failed, what tactical choices proved decisive, and how improvisation, engineering, and coordination changed the character of operations as the campaign intensified. Written with a candid, late-19th-century German professional soldier's perspective and translated into English, it is both a narrative of action and a disciplined guide to extracting lessons from battle for anyone interested in strategy, leadership under uncertainty, and the evolution of siege warfare. For ad-free listening try our premium subscription Chapters (Approximate) (00:00:00) Chapter 01 (00:21:54) Chapter 02 (00:42:28) Chapter 03 (00:53:47) Chapter 04 (01:09:02) Chapter 05 (01:38:19) Chapter 06 (01:50:03) Chapter 07 (02:03:06) Chapter 08 (02:15:57) Chapter 09 (02:38:10) Chapter 10 (03:00:55) Chapter 11 (03:28:38) Chapter 12 (03:47:33) Chapter 13 (04:11:33) Chapter 14 (04:39:52) Chapter 15 (05:07:15) Chapter 16 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevner by Thilo von Trotha, translated by Karl Reichman. Editor's Preface and Part 1 Introductory Review of the Danube Campaign. Editor's Preface Among the many books on the Turco-Russian War of 1877 through 8, two works stand out prominently, namely Greens' Russian campaigns in Turkey, which is universally recognized as a military classic,

and von Trotha's Abel work, which, though long and favourably known in Germany, is here presented in English for the first time. Of the latter work, it is perhaps sufficient to say that, in its full and careful consideration of tactical matters, it forms a worthy supplement to the former, and as such it will doubtless prove welcome to American and English readers. US Infantry and Cavalry School,

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1, 1896. Part 1, Introductory Review of the Danube Campaign The Army Designated to Operate Against European Turkey, and Called the Army of the South, was commanded by Grand Duke Nicholas, and consisted of the 8th, 9th, 11th and 12th Corps of two infantry and one cavalry division each. Of the 4th Rifle Brigade, a combined Cossack Division, and a number of separate Cossack regiments attached to the core and divisions. On April 24th, the army began to cross the Romanian frontier

and completed its strategic deployment along the Danube during the ensuing month, mostly by marching and, to a smaller extent, by the use of the railroad, which was largely occupied by the transport of the heavy artillery, the pontoon parks, and other stores of munitions and provisions. While the greater part of the cavalry held the line of the Danube from the mouth of the Aluta downward, the main body of the army stood, toward the end of May, in the vicinity of Bucharest, the right wing at Slatina on the Aluta, the left wing at Altenica on the Danube. On the lower Danube was one division of the 11th Corps, strengthened by detachment of the

7th Corps, which latter, together with the 10th Corps, constituted the Coast Army for the protection of the northern shores of the Black Sea. Of the three other corps also mobilised and assigned to the Field Army, the 14th Corps was directed to advance to the lower Danube and relieved there the division of the 11th Corps, which was to rejoin the main army, while the 4th and 13th Cors were to join the main army directly. Political reasons prevented the Romanian army

from active participation in the campaign. This force consisted of four divisions, posted in lesser Wallachia and in a certain sense constituted the right flank guard of the Russian deployment in Greater Wallachia. On account of the complete absence of any fixed organisation of the Turkish army and on account of the unsettled state of the Turkish Empire, the strength, distribution and special formation of the Turkish troops cannot be given with complete accuracy, although the following round figures may be approximately correct. At the time of the Russian passage of the Danube, there were

1. In the quadrilateral, Shumla, Vana, Silistria, Ruschuk, the main East Army under Kerempasha, 100,000 strong, of which about 60,000 men may be considered available for field operations. 2. In the Dubrugia, about 10,000 to 15,000 men.

3. In Nicopolis, Sistova and turnover, about 10,000 men. 4. At Widen, the Western Army under Osman Pasha, 50,000 strong, of which about 40,000 men probably marched towards Plyvna at the end of June. 5. At Sophia, about 20,000 men, a sort of reserve army, for the most part also marching to Plevna to join Osmond Pasha. 6. South of the Balkans, on the line Philippa Pollyce to Adrian Ople, some 10,000 to 15,000 men under Rene Pasha, who did not assume actual command until after the first passage of the

Balkans by the Russians. 7. About 30,000 men under Salaman Pasha, which had been put in motion toward Romalia from the theatre of war in Montenegro. 8. The reinforcements of regular troops from Constantinople, from distant provinces, and from new organizations, which had been formed with considerable zeal and skill, are estimated at not less than 40,000 men. Most of these were sent to Solomon Pasha's army. The Tahrquess's,

an irregular but excellent-like cavalry, numbering about 20,000 men, are included in the above data. The Musterhafiz, or National Guard, are not included, as their military value is doubtful, and has not yet been tested in actual conflict with Russian troops. On the side of the Russians, the infantry divisions may be put down at 10,000 men. The cavalry division, and the cavalry division. divisions at 2,500 horses, the Cossack regiments at 500 horses. The entire field army of seven cores is therefore to be estimated at about 150,000 infantry, 25,000 cavalry, 20,000 special troops and 800 field guns. In addition, there was a siege park of 350 heavy and medium guns. The Romanian army, so far as fit for the field, may be estimated at 40,000 men.

Active operations suffered a further postponement of four weeks through the unusually high and long-continued rise of the Danube, the delay in the arrival of large masses of bridging material required, due to defective organisation of the Romanian railways, and the necessity of rendering the Turkish monitor flotilla on the Danube, harmless by the use of batteries and torpedoes. On the 21st of June, General Zimmerman crossed the Danube at Galatz with the head of his 14th Corps, and established himself on the opposite bank after a brisk engagement. The remainder of his corps followed during the next few days, and was subsequently joined by a part of the 7th Corps. The whole constituted the so-called column of the lower Danube,

which advanced through the Dubrugia, meeting insignificant resistance on the part of the enemy. and reached Kustengi and Trajan's Wall about the middle of July. None but small reconnoitering parties crossed this line. Unfavourable sanitary conditions, difficulties of supply, and the duty of guarding the shoreline caused larger portion of the column of 30,000 men to remain in the Dubrugia, and to exercise no influence whatever on the operations in Bulgaria beyond. The opposing Turkish troops appear to have been greatly inferior.

We now turn to the main army. On the 27th of June, the 8th Corps crossed the Danube at Zimnitsa, under a sharp engagement where the Turkish brigade posted at Sistova. By the 5th July, the 9th and 13th Corps, the 4th Rifle Brigade, the Bulgarian Legion, and the Combined Cossack Division had also completed their passage at this point. Anticipating somewhat, we note here that by the middle of July, the 11th, 12th and 4th cause were also brought to the right bank.

The Yantra bridge at Biela, having fallen into the hands of the Russians on the 3rd of July, General Gorko occupied Tienova on the 8th of July, with a mixed advance guard, crossed the Balkans from here by the trail to the east of the Ship Kapas, reached the village of Hankiyoi at the southern foot of the mountains on the 14th, and turned westward, took Kazanlik on July 17th, where he found himself in the rear of Shipka Pass, which was unsuccessfully attacked on the same day by a detachment of the 8th Corps,

coming from Gavrova. The appearance of Gorko in the rear of their position caused the weak Turkish garrison to evacuate the pass on the 19th without resistance, and to retreat by side paths. One of the principal Balkan passers was thus in Russian hands. Grand headquarters was moved from Sistova to Biela on the 8th of July, and thence to Tenova on the 17th.

The passage of the Balkans divided the Russian army of operation in Bulgaria into three separate groups. The centre, consisting of the 8th Corps and Gorko's mixed advance guard, operated in the Balkans and for some time also to the south of them. The left wing, consisting of the 12th and 13th corps, charged with the investment and siege of Ruschuk, and placed under the orders of the Sarovic, extended along the Lom from the Danube to the Osmond Bazaar, with headquarters at Kedikyoi. The right wing, consisting of the 9th Corps under General Crudner,

was charged in the first place with taking Nicopolis, guarding the line Nicopolis, Plevna, Lovcher, and establishing communications from the latter place with the centre in the Balkans. The fourth and 11th corps were at this time in the act of crossing the Danube. Meanwhile, General Kruyner with the 9th Corps had moved on to Nicopolis. On the 15th of July, the commanding and strongly fortified positions in front of the place were taken by assault, and on the 16th of the garrison capitulated. Osman Pasha, who marched from Widen with his corps, about the end of June, had, in the meantime, reached Plevna, without being discovered by the Russians. A weak detachment of the 9th Corps, dispatched against this place on the 20th of July, was repulsed with Kovna. considerable loss.

The unexpected appearance of this strong Turkish army in the space between the Vid and the Osma caused a complete change in the situation. Kridna, with the 9th Corps reinforced by a brigade of the 11th and a division of the 4th Corps, attacked Plevna on the 30th of July and suffered a heavy defeat. Osmond Pasha was prevented, probably by the deficient character of his army, from acting on the offensive and reaping the fruit. of his victory, and the Russian communications, by way of Sistova, seriously menaced at first, remained undisturbed. Nevertheless, the Russian offensive had not only been checked for the present,

but the Russians were obliged to make retrograde movements in the centre and on both flanks. On the left the Sarovic, whose forces had been augmented by a part of the 11th Corps, raised the investment of Ruschuk, and took a defensive position along the Black Lom, against the Turkish army assembling in his front. After his successful passage of the Balkans, Gorko extended his troops into the Tunja Valley, called the Bulgarians to arms, spread terror and confusion as far as Philip Apollos and Adrian Ople.

He was defeated at Eskizagra on the 31st of July and compelled to retreat to Kaysenlich by Salaman Pasha, who had bought his corps, heretofore employed against Montenegro, by water from Antivar, to Derdig at the mouth of the Maritza, thence by rail to Adrianople, and had advanced from the latter place northward by forced marches. The Eighth Corps, originally designated to follow

Gorko across the Balkans, could no longer be employed in the latter's support on account of the unfavourable situation north of the Balkans. He therefore evacuated Kaysenlich on the 6th of August, and withdrew into the Balkan passers where he entrenched himself. Grand headquarters was moved back from Tienova to Beeler. The unfavorable situation had demonstrated to the Russian leaders that the forces employed were unequal to the task, and the attempt was made to remedy this evil in two ways. First, reinforcements of ten infantry divisions,

five-line, three guard, two grenadier, and two cavalry divisions, guard, were ordered from Russia. Second, a treaty heretofore refused by Russia, was concluded with Romania, which made the Romanian army available for use in active operations. The West Army, consisting of the 4th and 9th Corps, was augmented by the entire Romanian army, and the guards and grenadiers which arrived later, and the command was conferred on Prince Charles of Romania. The remaining three Russian infantry divisions were assigned to the East Army under the Sarovic,

as also those parts of the 11th Corps not heretofore so assigned. General Radetsky, with part of the former advance guard and the 8th Corps, formed the centre in the Balkans and connected the two flank armies, which were posted with their backs toward each other. For the present, the West Army left one Romanian division and the East Army left several Russian bodies on the north bank of the Danube, opposite the Turkish fortresses. The reinforcements ordered had not arrived when, at the beginning of August, the three Turkish armies,

the West Army under Osman Pasha at Plevna, the South Army under Salaman Pasha at Kaisnlich, the East Army under Mohamed Ali Pasha on the line Razgrad-Ozman Bazaar, were in readiness to advance to a concentric attack. The Russian army, which was posted between the Osmar, the Lom and the... the Balkans in the triangle Nicopolis Gabrova Ruschuk was shaken by its reverses and in an undoubted critical position having to rely for weeks until the arrival of considerable reinforcements on its own strength which had been recognized as insufficient even the splendid bravery manifested by the Russian troops on every occasion would hardly have saved the army from heavy reverses

had not a certain unwieldiness of the Turkish army in offensive movements, as well as lack of harmony and even open enmity between the Turkish leaders acted in favour of the Russians. Instead of utilising the open passes to the east of Shipka and advancing with the main body of his army, consisting of battle-tried elite battalions against the line Osmond Bazaar turn over in cooperation with the East Army, Salaman Pasha wasted his strength for six days in heroic but useless attacks against the position

in the ship Kepas, which was defended by an opponent equally heroic, though much inferior in strength. His heavy losses, more than 15,000 men, according to Turkish statements, rendered Salaman's army unfit for active operations, at least for the present. It was not until September 17th, and after complete reorganization of his troops and considerable accessions of reinforcements that he undertook another unexpected attack on the ship could pass which though successful at first was repulsed in the end during this time mehemet ali advanced from razzgrad against the russian positions on the kara loam after several small engagements a detachment of the russian center was defeated at kara hasankyoi on the right bank of the kara

Lom on the 31st of August. Another was beaten at Kuzeljuo on the 5th of September and pushed over the Lom, whose right bank was completely in the hands of the Turks on September 7th. To defend the line of the Jantra, the Russian East Army took position on the right bank of the stream, on the plateau between Jantra and the Banishka Lom, left branch of the Karolom. On the 13th of September, Mohamed Ali crossed the left bank of the Karolam, defeated a Russian detachment, and the Russian detachment at Sinan Kyoi on the 14th, and on September 21st made an unsuccessful attempt to force a passage over the Benizkalam at Shakana, repulsed with considerable loss. Mohamed Ali recrossed the Karolam, whose passages from Kuzeljuo downward as far as Pygos

were reoccupied by the Russians by the middle of October. Osmond Pash's inactivity throughout is surprising. By his unexpected approach from Winnin and his tactical skill in the defensive actions during July, he had made his appearance on the field of war in splendid manner, and decisive action might have been expected on his part. An insignificant advance from Plevner, westward on the 14th of August, and another feeble, unsuccessful attack from Lovcha against Selvey on the 21st and 22nd of August, and not to be taken for seriously contemplated aggressive movement.

Still, the coincidence in time of the latter attack with the beginning of the great attack on the ship Kapas by Salaman Pasha, as well as with the advance of Mahemad Ali against the upper Lom, is worth noting. More seriously contemplated and more vigorously carried out was Osmond Pasha's attack against the Russian positions at Zagalvitsa and Pellashat on the 31st of August. But this attack was likewise undertaken with but half of the available forces, and is not to be considered as a last struggle for final decision. Coincident again with Osman's attack was Mohamed Ali's advance against the middle loam, while Sleiman was still engaged in reorganising his army, which was shattered and unable to cooperate with the aggressive movements of the two flank armies.

While the Russians were restricting themselves in the Balkans and on the Lom, to the defence of their partly maintained and reoccupied positions, the West army reinforced by two Russian infantry, divisions and the Romanians, proceeded to the serious attack on Plevna. After the capture of Lovcha on the 3rd of September, the great artillery attack against Plevner opened on the 7th and continued for some time after the Great Assault on the 11th of September, which, though in part successful, must be accounted a failure. The attempt to deprive the army of Plevner of its communications with Widen and Safia

by posting a strong cavalry corps on the left bank of the Vid was without result for a time. Reinforcements with considerable supplies of provisions and munitions repeatedly broke through the weak line of investment on the left bank and succeeded in getting into Plevna. The investment of Plevna did not become effective and make itself felt until after General Gorko assumed command of the Corps of Investment on the left bank of the Vid with troops of the guard and had established himself on the line of communication and retreat of the army of Plevna.

After the capture by assault of the fortified station of Gorney Dubnick, provisions and ammunition ran short in Plevna. Russian detachments, which were pushed into the mountains along the Iska and Vid, cut off Mohamed Ali's reserve army assembling at Sofia and compelled it to be more solicitous of its own defence than of the relief of Plevna. deprived of hope of assistance from without and pressed by the daily increasing difficulties of his position Osmond Pasha attempted to break through the Russian line of investment westward on the 10th of December

the attempt failed and Osmond Pasha and his entire army surrendered as prisoners of war it remains to cast a brief glance at the coincident events on the Lom where the Russian East Army after reoccupying the line of the Karolom, remained strictly on the defensive. Salaman Pasha, who had assumed command of the Turkish East Army, about the middle of October, in place of Mohamed Ali Pasha, attempted to draw the attention of the Russians to their own left flank by attacking the lower Lom on the 19th and 26th of November, and seriously and unexpectedly attacked the extreme right of the Russian position in the mountains at Maran and Alina. on the 4th of December with 30,000 men.

The feeble Russian detachment was driven back with severe loss in men and guns. But in the rear of Alina, the Turkish advance came to a stop, and on receipt of the news of the surrender of Plevna, the Turkish corps withdrew towards Ahmedli on the 14th of December. On December 12th, the Turks suffered a bloody repulse at Metschka on the lower Lom, where they made a vigorous attack. With the fall of Plevenor, almost coincident with the end of the year, the campaign on the Danube terminated. All subsequent events on the various portions of the theatre of war pertain to a new period, the campaign of Adrianople.

End of Section 1. Section 2 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. By Thalo von Trother. This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 2. Review of the Operations Around Plevna. The operations of the 9th Corps, which constituted the nucleus of the subsequently formed West Army, began July 15th, with the assault on the Heights commanding Nicopolis and the surrender of the fortress on the 16th.

During the struggle at Nicopolis, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade was pushed into the space between the Osma and the Vid to cover the 9th Corps against any hostile enterprises from Rohova and Plevna. According to the statements of prisoners, the garrison of Nicopolis did in fact expect relief from the West. During the night of the 15th-16th, the Cossack Brigade had an action with a detachment of Turkish infantry which seemed to belong to the garrison of Nicopolis and to have escaped from the impending capitulation. No hostile bodies made their appearance from the West in these days. But on the 17th, one of the Rehospelsersersers, one of the Recapital Noitering parties, dispatched to the south, encountered at Selvey, a detachment of about 1,000 men, consisting of Terkesses and Bashi Bashe with some infantry, which retired

on Lovcha. On the evening of the same day, reports arrived at Grand Headquarters from the Cossack Patrol scouting along the vid, of the approach of strong hostile detachments from the west, marching in the direction of Plevner. It seems that the commander-in-chief placed little importance on these reports, and certainly did not believe the presence of strong masses of the enemy in that direction. The only measure taken in this respect was in order to the commander of the 9th Corps to occupy Plevna with a detachment and to clear the vicinity of such bodies of the enemy

as might be there. The fact that headquarters rested in such false security as regards the danger of threatening from West Bulgaria does not throw favourable light on the organisation and direction of the service of information. An entire army was assembled at Plevenor by this time. The date when Osman Pasha started from Widen with the main body of the West Bulgarian army cannot be accurately ascertained. Supposing the movement from Widen to have begun when the passage of the Danube by the Russians became known, Osman Pasha's army would have consumed about 20 days in traversing the distance of about 125 miles from Widen to Plevna.

The heads of these columns were the troops whose presence on the Vid was reported on the 17th of July by the Cossacks scouting there. In addition, a part of the reserve army at Sofia was ordered to join Osman, and it is probable this corps took the Great Road through Orcanny, and thence either the road leading from Telas to Plevina or from Jabal and Iza along the northern foot of the Balkans to Plevina. In the former case, the troops with whom the Russians came in touch at Selvi on the 17th may be considered the right flank guard, and in the latter case, as the advance guard of the Corps approaching from Sofia. Nothing is known with certainty of the plan on which Osmond's march

was originally based. Had he arrived on the banks of the Vida a few days earlier, the capture of Nicopolis by the Russian 9th Corps would hardly have been possible. We now again turn to the operations of the Russian army. Pursuant to the instructions from headquarters, General Crudena on the 18th of July ordered the commander of the 5th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Shilder Shuldner, to move with the 1st Brigade of his division, four batteries, and the 9th Don Cossack Regiment from Nicopolis to Plevna, and to occupy the place. The troops already beyond the Osmar and along the High Road from Bolgerene to Plevna, the Kostroma Regiment of the 5th Division with a battery, and the Caucasian Cusac Brigade were ordered to cooperate in the

enterprise and placed under the orders of Lieutenant General Shillushuldner. The latter permitted two detachments to advance separately from the north and east against Plevner, where meanwhile a large part of Osman's army, probably not less than 20,000 to 25,000 men, had arrived and he suffered a bloody defeat on the 20th of July, the three infantry regiments losing 3,000 men, one-third of their proper strength. The vigorous sign of life given by the hitherto two-neglected army of Osman made a very unpleasant impression at headquarters, occupied at this moment by Gorko's surprisingly successful passage of the Balkans, and probably engaged in

plans of an immediate advance on Adrianople. The unfavourable impression produced by the defeated Plevna was to be wiped out as quickly as possible by overpowering the troublesome opponent. General Crudner received considerable reinforcements from the Corps recently brought to the right bank of the Danube and was enjoined to attack Plevna vigorously. General Krudner had meanwhile been concentrating on his 9th Corps at Brazil Janiza, but one regiment was left at Nicarpol's, which place received a Romanian garrison in addition. Up to July 26, Krudner received the following reinforcements, the 1st Brigade of the 32nd Infantry Division, and the 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division, both of the 11th Corps, and under the personal command

of Prince Sharkovskoi, the Corps commander, also the 30th Infantry Division of the 4th Corps. Lovcha, temporarily occupied by a Russian detachment, was recovered by the Turks on July 26th, who at this point were distant 50 miles from the headquarters at Tenova, and 37 from Grobova, at the northern issue of the Shipkipa Pass. Kridna's total strength, including the reinforcements and deducting losses, amounted to about 30,000 men with 176 guns. He had some hesitation in attacking the enemy at Plevna, believing his own forces insufficient in view of the enemy's strong position and large force, or by the end of July, Osmond Pasha must have had more than 40,000 men with about 80 guns

at Plevner. Reiterated orders from headquarters prompted him finally to proceed to the attack on the 30th of July. The battle was contested on both sides with great bravery, but terminated in a heavy defeat of the Russians, who lost 7,500 men in killed and wounded, which was one-fourth of their effectives. Strange to say, there was no pursuit on the part of the Turks, thereby the Russian troops, which were much demoralized immediately after the unsuccessful termination of the struggle, gained time to make front in good condition on the line Trestenik-Poridim, barely 13 miles from the battlefield.

A pause now ensued in front of Blevner. Prevented by some cause, probably by the defective character of his army, from turning his victory to full account by a vigorous attack on the Russian communications, Osmond Pasha occupied himself with strengthening his position by means of fortifications and converted it into a spacious, extremely strong, entrenched camp, to which it seems a number of heavy guns of position were en route from Widen. The only signs of life given by the Turkish army at Plevna was a feeble reconnaissance westward on the 14th of August, which was driven back by the fire of Russian guns, and a movement from Lovtshire to Selvi,

which was undertaken on the 21st and 22nd of August, with small forces without energy, and therefore without result. With Russians passed the entire month of August in a waiting attitude, the arrival of reinforcements ordered was awaited with impatience, and it was a matter of gratification that the Turks did not proceed from Plevenor to the attack of the line of the Jantera. The portion of the 11th Corps, which had been present before Plevna, since the end of July, was detached from the West Army and employed farther to the east. In its place, the entire Fourth Corps and the Fourth Romanian Division were assigned to this army,

now commanded by General Zotov, the commander of the 4th Corps, and Senior General Present. The 4th Romanian Division, which rested on the vid at Riben, formed the right wing. The 9th Corps, north of the High Road to Bulgareni, formed the centre, and the 4th Corps, south of the High Road, formed the left wing of the position. After the completion of the diplomatic formalities and military agreements, the main body of the Romanian army, i.e. the 2nd and 3rd divisions, crossed the Danube at Carabia, 22 miles above Nicopolis, during the last days of August. The first division remained opposite Widen.

The selection of the point of crossing raises the presumption that the Romanians were to operate on the left bank of the vid and to invest Plevna from the west. But after a few days, the two Romanian divisions were brought to the right bank of the vid. The Romanian army of three divisions now constituted the right wing of the West army, over which Prince Charles of Romania assumed command, the previous commander General Zotov, becoming his chief of staff. On the 31st of August, previous to the arrival of the Romanian army on the right bank of the Vid, Osman Pasha made a vigorous attack south of the Bulgarini Road, with some 25,000 men,

against the left of the Russian positions at Zagailvitzer and Pellashad. He was repulsed after a long and doubtful struggle, with a loss of several thousand killed and wounded. The Russians lost 1,000 men. The period from the beginning of August to the beginning of September, which, aside from the action of Pellashat, was broken by no noteworthy event, was utilised by the Russians for various preparations for the great attack

contemplated upon the arrival of reinforcements. The first of these measures was a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, which was very much broken and well covered by, the fire of the Turks, but an accurate survey on the scale of three inches to the mile was nevertheless made and the resulting map was manifolded and distributed among the troops. Hussians, gabbians and ceiling ladders were also prepared, and the troops practiced in escalade. Approaches to the enemy's position as well as lateral communications were built. Many large and small bridges were repaired or newly constructed. The existing wells were cleaned and a number

of new ones sunk, particularly at such points as were designed to serve as future dressing stations. Lastly, a number of siege guns were brought up, partly in order to employ heavy calibers against the Turkish position, partly to give a moral support to the troops, which had lost confidence in the field artillery in the action against the Turkish works. At the beginning of September the long-expected reinforcements arrived. They consisted of the main body of the Romanian army, which was posted on the right, part of the cavalry of Gorko's former advanced guard, two dragoon regiments, one Hussar regiment, and two Don Cossack regiments, the siege artillery of 20, 24-pounders.

Lastly, on the 5th of September, General Prince Emeritinsky, with the second infantry division and the third rifle division, arrived from Lovcha, which he had taken by assault on September 3rd, after an obstinate and bloody struggle, which severed the community. communications of Plevenna to the southeast. His detachment for the present took position in the rear of the left of the 4th Corps. The Russian army before Plevenor now numbered five infantry divisions and one rifle brigade. A total of 64 battalions, but it may be safely assumed that the battalions cross the Danube with not more than 800 effectives, and it is not probable that the ranks could have been filled with recruits by the beginning of September. The losses of the 15th, 20th and 30th.

of July and the 31st of August, and at Lovtshire, amounted to some 12,000 men, while the loss from sickness during July and August must, at a moderate calculation, be placed at several thousand men, so that the number of effectives of the Russian infantry before Plevner could hardly have been more than 35,000, and certainly not more than 40,000. If we had the artillery, cavalry, and engineer troops, the total of the Russian West Army was at most 50,000 effectives, to which some 25,000 Romanians should be added. The number of effectives of the Turkish army assembled at Plevna was probably about 50,000 men, after making allowance for the losses suffered in July and August, and counting reinforcements.

During the night of the 6th to the 7th of September, the Russian troops approached in deep silence, within gunshot, of the Turkish works, and threw up in the night of the warps. and threw up entrenchments for their artillery and cover for part of the infantry. On the morning of the 7th, fire was opened on the Turkish positions and continued until noon of the 11th, almost without any effect whatever, as we'll be seen later on. On the left, General Skobolev began his assault on the Green Hills on the 8th, and made himself master of the southern portion of that important point in a bloody struggle of three days.

At 3pm, on the 11th of September, a general assault was made, on the right by the Romanians and the 9th Corps against the Gravica Works, in the centre by the 4th Corps against the Radashevo Works, on the left by Skobolev's combined core against the Crinchen works. The attack in the centre was repulsed. On the right, the most advanced Gravitzer readout, On the left, the northern portion of the Green Hills, and two redouts of the Kringen works, fell into the hands of the Russians.

The Gravitsa readout was the only one, however, that remained in Russian hands. After a furious struggle, and under great losses on both sides, the Turks made a counter-stroke in force, regained the redouts on the left, and also drove the Russians from the Green Hills. As it soon became clear that the captured redoubt, which had been considered the key point of the hostile position was completely overlooked by the works lying farther to the rear. The assault which cost the Russians about 12,500

and the Romanians about 3,000 men may be considered a total failure. Upon the unsuccessful and costly issue of this assault, the Russians abandoned the idea of taking Plevner by assault and decided upon the conquest of Osman Pasha's army by means of investment and starvation. The centre of gravity of the events was thus shifted from the right to the left bank of the Vid. On the 8th of September, General Oshkarev crossed to the left bank with eight regiments of Russian and Romanian cavalry,

and made several scouting expeditions. On the 19th, General Krylov took command of all cavalry corps on the left bank, but was unable to effectually check the march of Turkish trains and reinforcements from Sofia on the road Orkani, Telas, Gorni Dubnick. and the whole attempt to invest Plevena from the West is to be accounted a complete failure. In this quarter, the investment did not become effective until the arrival of the guards and grenadiers, which for the greater part were assigned to operations on the West side. On the 24th of October, General Gorka, with greatly superior forces, assaulted and took Gorney Dubnick, a strongly fortified point on the line of communications,

which was bravely defended by a few thousand men. Tellus fell into the hands of the Russians on October 28th, after a slight engagement, and Dolny Dubnick on November 1st, without resistance. The line of investment on the west of Plevenor was then completed by the building of a series of strong entrenchments. All communications of the army in Plevenor were now severed. Moreover, to deprive it of any hope of relief by Mohamed Ali's army, which was assembling at Sophia and whose advance guard had reached Orcanny, strong Russian detachments

were pushed to the west and south. Toward the west, Vrata was taken on the 9th of November, Rohova on the 22nd and Lompulankar on the 30th. On December 1st, flying detachments advanced toward the direct line of communications with the Servians. Toward the south, Tettivin, on the upper vid, was occupied on the 2nd, and the Rosalita Pass on the Upper Osmer on the 17th of November.

On the 23rd, strong detachments took Prawez between Orkani and Etropole, and on the 24th, the latter place itself, whereupon the Turkish advance guide at Orkani, fell back to the main body at Sophia. Reverting now to events on the east front of Plevenor, we have stated above that no decisive importance attaches to them after the middle of September. The question here for the Russians was partly one of holding their positions, partly of gradually advancing the line of an investment, so as to shorten it somewhat. On the 17th of September, an end of the time of the attempt on the part of the Turks to retake the first Gravica readout was repulsed. On the following day,

an attempt on the part of the Romanians to take the so-called second Gravica readout also failed, whereupon trenches were resorted to for the approach on the Turkish positions. The artillery, meanwhile, maintaining a slow fire, which failed to elicit any reply from the Turks. After pushing their trenches to within 30 yards of the enemy's readout, the Romanians made a dash at it on the 19th of October, but were flung back with great loss. On the left, General Skobolev occupied the village of Brestovets, on the night of November 4th-the- 5th, seized the first knoll of the Green Hills on November 9th, and maintained himself in the rapidly entrenched position against two hostile assaults launched against it by the Turks on the 12th and 15th

of November. The complete investment of Plevna, meanwhile, made itself felt. munitions and provisions began to fail, and disease made great ravages among the troops, which were poorly fed, clothed and housed. The hope of relief from without diminished more and more, and Osman Pasha was at last compelled to relinquish his stout and protracted resistance. The attempt undertaken, with great bravery on December 10th, of breaking through the Russian line of investment on the West, where it was held by two Grenadier divisions, seemed to be without hope of success, and merely for the sake of saving the honour of the Turkish arms. On the failure of the attack, and after the loss of the partly abandoned and weakly held

works on the east, Osman Pasha surrendered unconditionally with his entire army, whose effectives may still have numbered some 40,000 men, not counting some 20,000 sick and wounded. For nearly five months, Osmond Pasha and his army maintained themselves against a constantly increasing opponent, and under the apparently overwhelming, fire of a formidable artillery. The entire situation was altered by this obstinate resistance and the decision of the campaign which at one time seemed to become ripe during the year of 1877 was staved off until 1878. The results gained by Osman Pasha and his army may therefore be justly regarded as surpassing their own expectations.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the repeated reverses suffered at Plevna helped toward the Russian final success. Timely attention was called to the defective character of the whole Russian plan of operation, and much greater forces than originally contemplated were brought to the theatre of war, which rendered a subsequent successful and decisive conduct of the war possible.

Had the Russian army succeeded in reaching Adrian Opel in August 1877, without the interlude of Plevna, peace might have been made under stipulations much more acceptable to Turkey than those now to be expected. End of Section 2. Section 3 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. This Librovox recording is in the public domain.

Read by Alistair. Part 3, Plevna. Subsection 1. Geographical Conditions Plevna is situated in the centre of a great agricultural district, on the great road from Sophia to Ruschuk, in the Vald. of the Tuchinitzabrook, a right branch of the vid. From here radiate important roads to Nicopolis in the north, Widen in the west, to Orcani and Sofia in the southwest, to Lovcha and Trojan in the south, to Selvia and Tienova in the southeast, and lastly, as previously stated,

to Biela and Rostchuk in the east. Appreciating the importance of Plevna as an industrial and commercial centre, Mid Hatpasha, the former Governor-General of the Danube province, Tuna Velliet, decided to connect the town with the Danube by railway. Nicopolis was at first intended to be the terminus of the road, but closer examinations showed this place unsuited for a commercial depot, and the wreck was at harbour construction, and Midhat Pasha decided to establish a new commercial centre to be named Port Sultanei at the mouth of the Osmar west of Nicopolis.

From this latter place, the road was to ascend the valley of the Osmar for some distance and reach Plevna by the way of Mechka, Kodoloza and Gravitzer. For the construction of the roadbed, which consisted for the most part of fillings, Midhat Pasha collected some 20,000 Bulgarian labourers. The requisite timber was taken from the forests at the foot of the Balkans. Soon afterward, Midhat was recalled from his position. The enterprise was allowed to lapse, and few vestiges of the work remain. We will now examine the communications radiating from me.

Plevna. A. From Plevna to Nicopolis, 25 miles, by way of Calais Savat and Brezaljaniza. B. From Plevena to Widen. The road from Plevenor to Rohova is 35 miles across the deep valleys of the Iska and its branches. Rojova is a Bulgarian commercial town, situated in a narrow, level valley between receding mountains. The Turks had constructed some redoubts on the surrounding heights in order to make it serve as a post on the communications between Plevna and Whedon. The distance from Rojova to Lompa Lanka on the Danube is 35 miles, and from there is Widen is also 35 miles. A good road leads southward from Rohova to Verra, 40 miles.

From Vrata there is a direct road to Plevna, 60 miles, which crosses to the left bank of the Iska, and follows that stream in its further course. All the roads named except the High Road Rojova Vrata are country roads, which crossed the deep-cut valleys of the Ogost, Iska and Skit at various points. C. The Great Road from Plevena to Orkani and Sophia was built during Midhat Pasha's governorship

and surpasses most of the Turkish roads in being well-paved and wide enough to permit two four-horse wagons to pass each other at any point. A telegraph line follows the road throughout its length. From Plevenna, the road runs westward, crosses the Vid, three miles, runs southwesterly across undulating ground to Dolny lower Dubdick 6 miles and Telos 10 miles southward to Lukovica 9 miles and Jablonitsa 12 miles westward to Olcani 12 miles then southward to the Balkan Pass of Baba Konak

12 miles from here westward to Sofia 30 miles D from plevenna to lovcha and Trojan From plevina to lovcha elevation 600 feet 20 miles from here up straight along the left bank of the Osma to Trojan, elevation 1,100 feet, also 20 miles. Trojan is situated at the junction of the Balabanka with the Osmar, and numbers 600 houses, with 3,500 inhabitants, in a district almost exclusively inhabited by Bulgarians.

South of Trojan is the wealthy Bulgarian monastery, which was the centre of the Bulgarian insurrection of 1867. From Trojan, the road leads to the pass of Trojan, which has an elevation of 5,000 feet. E. From Plevna to Lovcha and Tienova. A high road runs the entire distance. From Plevna to Lovcha on the Osmar, 20 miles. From there to Selvi on the Rositsa, left branch of the Jantra, 20 miles.

Thence to Tienova, on the Jantra, 25 miles. From Selvey, a road leads southward to Rosaleta Pass, which has an elevation of 1,400 feet, and is distant from Selvi 30 miles, and 6 miles north of Califa. the Rosalita Pass is 25 miles to the west of the Shipka Pass. F. From Plevna to Rooschuk. From Plevna, the Great Road, prolongation of the Sofia Road, leads to Bolgereni on the Osmar, 25 miles, then to Biela on the Jantra, 30 miles, and lastly to Roschuk, 25 miles.

Subsection 2. Topographical Conditions Plevner was a well-built town of 17,000 inhabitants, one half of whom were Mohammedans, with 3,100 houses, 18 mosques and two Christian churches. It is situated on the Tuchinitzer Brook, three miles above its junction with the River Vid. Higher up on the brook lies the village of Tuchinitsa, from which the brook derives its name. Just below Plevna, the Tuchinitzer Brook is joined by the Gravitzer Brook,

which comes from the east, and is so called from the village of Gravitzer on its upper course. The entire country surrounding Plevna on the east may be divided into three sections, the section north of the Gravitzabrook, the middle section between Gravica and Tuchinitzhrubrooks, the section between Tuchinitzabrook and the Vid River. The heights skirting the right bank of the Vid, closely approached the river at Bivola and Oppenets in the northern,

and at Ulchugs in the southern section. Above Plevna, the valley of Tuchinica is a steep, narrow ravine, but expands below the town and forms a broad plain, enclosed by mountains on the north and south. In the northern section, the Great Road, Plevna, Bulgarini, Biela, follows the northern bank of the Gravica. The heights which form the northern edge of the Gravica and Tuchina brooks, and whose southern slopes are very abrupt, are divided by the ravine of Bukova into a western and eastern portion, the former lying between the ravine named and the Vid River, the latter between the ravine of Bukova and another ravine,

extending northward from Gravitzer. The plateau forming the section between the Gravica and Tatsunitsa brooks is furrowed by three smaller ravines. From Gravitsa southward, extends the Southern Gravica ravine, from the Tachinica Valley eastward, the Radashivo ravine, and between the two, from Plevna, south eastward, the middle ravine. The eastern edge of the southern Gravica ravine and the northern edge of the Radashivo ravine were covered with brush and groups of trees. The slopes of the steep and deep Tachenica ravine were covered for the most part with vineyards.

The southern portion of the southern section has become known as the green hills and was thickly covered with trees, vines and high cornfields. To the east it forms three sharply separated knolls, which are designated from south to north as first, second and third knoll. The two depressions intervening between the noles open into the Tachinica ravine. The Lovcha Road follows the western edge of the latter ravine and crosses the green hills. The northern part of this section, between Plevna and the Vid River,

and separated from the green hills by a depression running east and west, seems to overtop the entire country around Plevna. From Plevna, the Great Road to Sofia follows the left bank of the Tachinica to the Vid, and crosses that river on a well-constructed wooden bridge which is 140 paces in length, and rests on stone piers. Subsection 3. Fortifications

At the beginning of July, Plevna was without any fortification whatever. About the middle of July, at the time of the first attack, probably but few points of the town itself were prepared for defence, as the monastery at the east and exit of the town. Toward the end of July, the construction of works on the surrounding heights was taken in hand with great energy. At the time of the great attack on July 30th, most of the commanding points in the vicinity were entrenched and subsequently the whole position was thoroughly fortified,

partly by the erection of new works, partly by completing and strengthening those already in existence. To the west of the Bikova ravine was the Bikova redoubt. A. East of the Bokova ravine, the so-called second Grevitsa redoubt, B, close in front of Grevisa, the first Grevitsa redoubt, also called Abdul Karim Tabia. C. To the southwest of the last was the eastern Radishishie. Redisivor Redis Abia, also called Central Redis Abia. D. Further to the west on the edge of the Tachinica ravine, the Western Radishiva readout or Tachinitsa readout.

E. Lastly, north of the Green Hills, the Christian readout, F. All of these works were very large, a very strong profile, and provided in the interior with large hollow traverses prepared for artillery defense. In front and on the sides of the redouts were several lines of rifle trenches, which, partly by the use of natural slopes and partly by artificial construction, rendered a defence by tiers of rifle fire, possible on a large scale. In second line were a number of smaller works to guard communication between those works and with the town.

Between the Christian redoubt and the town, two redouts were subsequently built, which were taken and again lost by Skobolev on the 11th and 12th of September. In the rear of the Christian redoubt was the camp of the Turkish reserves, protected by a number of works. On the west bank of the vid, a sort of bridgehead was constructed in front of the bridge. The space from there, northward to the mouth of the Netropoli brook, was covered by two additional works. Lastly, let us quote here a brief description of the external aspect of the Turkish works

as given by an eyewitness at the beginning of September. As viewed from the Russian batteries, the surroundings of Plevna appeared as a hilly plateau about five miles in width. bounded on the right and left by continuous ridges. The Gravica Heights and the Green Hills. In the background, hidden in the depression, was Plevna. On first sight, the entire plateau offered nothing unusual to the eye. On closer observation, however, a series of entrenchments might be seen,

which looked like yellowish bands on the general green ground. Even with the aid of the field glass, details could not be distinguished. most conspicuous were the three foremost readouts on the right the Gravica readout on the left the Radashivo works and farther in rear and entrenched camp end of section three section four of tactical studies on the battles around plevna by thilo von trotha this librovoc's recording is in the public domain read by alistair part four the action at plevina on julevon on July 20th. Subsection 1. Advance on Plevna on July 19th. On July 18th, Lieutenant General Shilderner,

commander of the 5th Infantry Division, received orders from General Crudina to advance with two regiments, Arkangelsk No. 17 and Wollogda No. 18, of his division, four batteries, and the 9th Don Cossacks, from Nicopolis on Plevna, and to take possession of that place. Additional troops from beyond the Osma were also placed under his orders. At Bulgarini, 25 miles from Nicopolis, 10 sotniers of the Caucasian Cossack brigade, with a battery.

Also one battalion of the Costroma Regiment, number 19. At Poradim, 12 miles near a plevna, the remainder of the 19th regiment, a battery and two sotniers of Cossacks. General Shilder Shulder gave directions to the Costroma Regiment to assemble at Poradim, and then to march to Zagail Vitsa, arrived. arriving at 2pm July 19th. The Cossack Brigade was ordered to march to Tuchnitzer. During the night of July 18th-19th, Lieutenant General Shulder Shuldner

Biverwacked with the infantry brigade and artillery at the mouth of the Osmar and arrived on the afternoon of the 19th before Plevner, 21 miles. Finding the place occupied by the Turks, he opened fire from his guns and continued the cannonade until dark and then went into Bivowack in front of the town.

The ninth Don Cossacks had started towards Plevner separately from the infantry, bivouacked at Ribbon on the night of the 18th-19th, and seemed to have remained there during the forenoon of the 19th. While they were cooking, the sound of guns was heard from Plevna 10 miles, about 3pm. The camp kettles were emptied at once, and the regiment marched to within 2.5 miles of Plevna, where a small Turkish infantry detachment was encountered. Half a Sotnia dismounted and began a fight, which lasted until dark,

covered by a chain of outposts consisting of two Sotnias, the regiment bivouacked in view of Plevna. The Kostroma regiment, with the battery, and the two attached Sotniers, reached Zagalvitsa at the designated hour, and sent both Sotniers forward to reconnoiter toward Plevna. In the rear of the village of Gravica, a hostile camp was discovered, from which about 300 men, one infantry battalion and two guns, started to meet the Cossacks, who fell back on their infantry. On the evening of the 19th, the troops of Shulah Shulner were posted in four separate groups as follows.

The 9th Don Cossacks, six Sotnirs, on the extreme right, north of Plevna. The first brigade of the 5th Division, six battalions, 32 guns, to the northeast of Plevna. The Gostroma Regiment, three battalions, two Sotniers, eight guns, southeast of Plevna at Zagalvica. The Cossack Brigade, 10 Sotnir 6 guns, south of Plevna at Tuchinitzer. The whole detachment, which did not number more than 9,000 men, was in a crescent-shaped position, 10 miles and extent, facing a concentrated enemy at least twice its strength.

Late in the evening, Shilda Shulda Shulner issued orders for the attack at 5 o'clock on the next morning. The Kostroma Regiment received the order at 2 a.m. Subsection 2. The attack on Plevna on July 20th. At 4 a.m., Turkish troops advanced from Plevner against the 9th Cossacks and opened fire with artillery. The outposts of the Cossacks were assembled, dismounted and occupied the edge of a wood on the extreme right. As the Turkish infantry and artillery advanced against this position, a report of the situation was dispatched to General Shulda Shulderner, who sent two infantry companies and a battery to support the regiment.

The shrapnel fire of this battery soon caused the Turks to seek cover. Without further engagement, both sides remained facing each other until noon, when the Cossack Regiment was ordered to cover the withdrawal of the infantry. The regiment, which had for the most part dismounted to fight on foot, mounted and moved to the left to interpose itself between the withdrawing infantry and the enemy. A Turkish cavalry detachment advancing in pursuit was driven back. At 6pm, the regiment was at Brysalam. The main body posted along the road from Nicopolis to Plevner,

brought three batteries into action at 4.45am, against two Turkish batteries. Soon afterward, the brigade deployed on the west of the road in the following order. To the left of the batteries, one battalion of the Arkangelsk regiment, to the right two battalions of the Arkangelsk, and two battalions of the Wollogda regiment, all five battalions in two lines of company columns. The rifle company, fifth company of each battalion, was deployed in front as skirmishes. One Wollogda battalion with a battery formed the reserve. from which the battery in two companies were soon afterward dispatched to the extreme right to support the Cossacks. In front of the Russian position was a ravine which opened into the Vid Valley at Ribbon.

The further edge of the ravine was covered with bushes and held by hostile riflemen. In the rear of the ravine were heights on which the second so-called Gravitsa readout and the Bukova redouts were subsequently built. At 5.30 a.m., the Russians advanced the attack all along the line. The Arkangelsk regiment on the left encountered obstinate resistance and did not make much headway. The Wallogda Regiment on the right and the nearest companies of the Arkangelsk Regiment drove the hostile skirmishes back and reached the town itself where furious street fighting began. The Turks brought forward reinforcement after reinforcement, and the losses of the Russians increased at an alarming rate.

The brigade commander was wounded, the commander of the Wollogdo Regiment was killed, and the commander of the 5th Artillery Brigade, as the senior officer present assumed command. The position was held for the present. Up to 9.30am, General Schilder Shuldner was without any information of the doings of the Kostroma Regiment. At the time he received a report that the commander of the Kostroma Regiment had been killed and that the attack of the regiment was not making headway.

Receiving reports from several sides of total exhaustion and great losses of the troops, and having no reserves at hand, he ordered the infantry to retire at 1130am, the 9th Cossack Regiment to cover the withdrawal of the infantry. Upon the withdrawal of the Arkangelsk and Wollogda Regiments, 17 ammunition carts fell into the hands of the Turks, partly because they were shot to pieces, partly because the teams were killed. The retreating brigade was relieved by the Gallets Regiment of same division, which was coming up from Nicopolis and in the evening both bivouacked at Bryslan. At 5 a.m., after a brief preparation by artillery fire, the Kostroma Regiment advanced to the attack,

along the high road from Plevna to Bulgarini, against the height on which, subsequently, the first Kravitzaridza readout, Abdul Khrim Tabia, was built. The regiment deployed the second and third battalions in two lines of company columns, the two rifle companies in front as skirmishes, the first battalion in reserve, the two Sotniers were on the right flank. Three lines of rifle trenches were taken by the regiment, one after the other, and finally also the entrenchments on the height of the subsequent Abdul Karim Tabia. The assailants here captured a gun which had been dismounted by the fire of Russian artillery.

Thrown back to the town, the Turks offered furious resistance from behind hedges and walls. The losses of the Kostroma Regiment increased from minute to minute. The regimental commander, three field officers, most of the other officers, and a large part of the men were dead or wounded. The ammunition of the infantry and the artillery, which had followed the assaulting infantry to with an effective infantry fire, began to run short. For these reasons, the regiment fell back at 9am,

when the Turks were bringing forward fresh reserves to the counter-attack. In order to approach the main body, the retreat was made in a different direction from that of the attack, and the men's packs, which had been taken off before the assault, fell into the enemy's hands. As the action began, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade moved from Tuchinica to Radishivo. Since the ground impeded the movements of the cavalry, and as the mountain battery attached to the brigade could produce no effect on the hostile position, owing to its small calibre, the brigade moved

more to the right to connect with the Kostroma regiment. At 10 a.m., when the brigade reached Gravica, the Kostroma regiment was in retreat, in which the Cossack Brigade joined. The Turkish pursuit did not extend beyond the original foremost Turkish positions. Subsection 3. Losses The First Brigade of the 5th Division lost one general, 51 field and company officers, and 1,878 men. It is to be noted here that in the Assault on Nikopolis a few days before, the Archangelisk Regiment lost 12 men, The Wallogda Regiment, six officers and 256 men.

The loss of the brigade, whose effective strength can hardly have been more than 5,000 men, therefore, amounts to almost 2,000 men for the two days of the 15th and 20th of July. On July 20th, the Kostroma Regiment, which suffered no losses at Nicopolis, lost at Plevna, seven officers and 359 men, killed, and 15 officers, and 534 men. wounded. The losses of the Cossacks and of the artillery are not stated, but they cannot have amounted to much. The Turks claim to have captured a Russian gun on that day. Nothing reliable is known about it. It may have been a gun of the fifth battery of the 31st Brigade, since this battery accompanied the assaulting Costroma Regiment to within range of infantry fire.

Comments Comment 1. That the Supreme Command attached so little importance to the reports which reached Tienova on the 17th of July about hostile columns approaching the vid from the west, and that it treated the occupation of Plevna as of inferior importance, are matters which can be commented on, only with a full knowledge of the idea, entertained, of the whole situation at that time. Why was not a strong body of cavalry, a division, or at least a brigade, dispatched to Plevna in the middle of July during the struggle around Nicopolis,

being an important junction point of roads, 25 miles from Nicopolis, and barely 43, from the point of passage at Sistova, Plevner was well worth that much attention. Comment two, the advance of General Shielder-Schilder's weak detachment in two widely separated columns against an enemy of unknown strength was imprudent.

Although in view of the actual positions of the troops, a separation could not be avoided, an attempt should have been made to unite the two detachments before proceeding to the attack. The march of the Nicopolis column under General Shiloshudner, when considered by itself,

invites unfavourable criticism. Instead of sending his Cossack regiment forward at once to cover his march, the general led his infantry directly on Plevna, without caring for the whereabouts of his cavalry, and without having given its specific instructions. On arrival before the town, on the afternoon of the 19th, he had no cavalry to reconnoit of the ground in front or to establish communication with the other column. He was unable, on one hand, to learn anything of the matters in and around Plevner, and on the other hand, he seems to have been uncertain of the whereabouts of the other detachments. The cannonade opened on Plevna, appears to have been a cover behind which he hid his painful perplexity, but it had the good effect of informing the other detachments of the whereabouts of the main column. Some time after the beginning of the Canaanade, the 9th Cossack Regiment made its appearance. Not only had it not preceded the infantry on the march to Plevner,

but it remained far in the rear. On the night of July 18th and 19th, the bivouac of the Cossack Regiment at Ribbon was but 10 miles from Plevna, while the bivouac of the infantry on the same night was 22 miles from that place. By proper management, the Cossacks would have had plenty of time to thoroughly reconnoiter the Vizzi of Plevna before the arrival of the infantry. But at the moment when the infantry arrived and the artillery opened, the Cossacks were still quietly resting at Ribbon and in the act of cooking. This can be explained in no other way, except that the commander of the Cossack Regiment was not properly informed of the contemplative movement, and the fact that this infantry, marching at random toward the enemy, did not suffer

a heavy defeat on the 19th, is probably due to the incredible clumsiness of Turkish troops in offensive movements. Turning to the march of the other column, we find the infantry provided with two Sotnirs of Cossacks, which were properly employed in reconnaissance. However, the employment of the Cossack Brigade, which was also attached to this column, cannot be considered proper. The brigade marched 25 miles from Bulgarani to Tuchinica, while the infantry column, which marched from Bulgarini to Zagailvitzer, covered almost an equal distance. It is true that small patrols were sent out from Tuchinica,

but complete information of the situation was not gained. According to recent ideas on the employment of advanced bodies of cavalry in the Russian army, one would expect the Cossack Brigade to move rapidly on Plevner, reach there about noon, make a feint against the town from the south, under cooperation of the horse-itlery, an endeavour to advance with several Sotniers between the town and the river against the bridge over the vid, whether Plevner was occupied feebly or not at all. In any event, sufficient information would have been gathered without exposing the brigade to great risk. Comment 3. The attack of the two regiments of Arkangelsk and Wallogda on the morning of July 20th

was made without sufficient reconnaissance of the enemy's position and without any preparation by the fire of skirmishes. The preparation of the attack by artillery did not last more than half an hour. From the very beginning, five of the six available battalions were led to the attack against the wholly unknown position of the enemy. The only battalion kept in reserve was very soon called upon to detach two companies to the right to support the Cossacks, so that there was no real reserve at the disposal of the leader for use in emergencies or after clearer knowledge of the situation. The same may be stated of the attack of the Costroma Regiment,

Although one-third of the troops was nominally set aside as a reserve, it was almost as soon engaged in the conflict as the other two battalions. Comment four, the expenditure of ammunition in the six hours of this action seems to have been very great, since almost all of the ammunition carts were bought up and emptied. The Russian infantry carried 60 rounds in the pouches, and in addition each company was provided with a three-horse ammunition cart. More than one half of the ammunition carts of the first brigade fell into the hands of the Turks. End of Section 4. Section 5 of tactical studies on the battles around Plevna by Thylavon

Trotha. This Librovox recording is in the public domain, read by Alistair. Part 5, the Battle of Plevna on July 30th. Subsection 1, position of the troops on the evening of July 29th. Briceland, 9th Lancers, 9th Don Cossacks, 2nd Don Cossack. battery, 10 squadrons and 6 guns. At Koyulotsky, 31st Infantry Division, less the Warranesh 124 Regiment and one battery at Sistova, 9 battalions and 40 guns. At Tristanick, 5th Infantry Division, Les Kostroma Regiment, number 19, and one battery at Nicopolis, nine battalions and 40 guns. At Karagach, 2nd Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division with three batteries, six battalions and 24 guns.

At Poradim, First Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade of the 32nd Infantry Division, 6 foot batteries, 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division and 1 horse battery, 12 battalions, 8 squadrons, 54 guns. At Bogot, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade

with the 8th Don Cossacks and the Mountain Horse Battery, 12 Sotnios and 12 guns. Total 36 battalions, 30 squadrons and 176 guns, among which were 89-pounders, 72-4-pounders, 18 horse, and six mountain guns. The line Brizland-Poridim Bogot was about 25 miles long and formed an arc of a circle, whose radius was about 12 miles and whose centre was at Plevna.

The left at Borgot was 12 miles from Lovcher, which was held by the Turks. The right at Brizland was the same distance from Nicopolis. The distance from the centre of the position at Poradim to the Osmar Bridge in the rear at Bulgarini was also 12 miles. Subsection 2. Dispositions for the Battle A. Right flank cavalry detachment under General Loshker F. To start at 6am from Brysalan covered the right flank and observed as far as the vid. B. Right wing under Lieutenant General Wilhelmoff, 31st and 5th Infantry Divisions,

to attack the enemy's position north of the High Road, the 5th Infantry Division in reserve. C. Left Wing, under Lieutenant General Prince Shikofskoi, First Brigade of the 30th Division and First Brigade of the 32nd Division, to march at 5am from Porodim and attack the position between Gravica and Radashivo. D. Left flank cavalry detachment under Major General Skobolev, to march at 5 a.m. from Bogot, take position on the Lovtra Road and watch the country, particularly in the direction of Lovcha. The detachment was reinforced from Prince Chikovskoi's command by the 3rd Battalion of the Kursk Regiment, number 125, and 4 guns.

Both cavalry detachments had orders in case of the enemy's retreat to cross to the left bank of the Vid and bar the enemy's road to Sofia if possible. E. General Reserve, under personal command of Lieutenant General Krudner, second brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, two squadrons each of the 11th dragoons and 11th lancers, one horse battery, total six battalions, four squadrons and 30 guns, was posted with the infantry at Poradim and the cavalry at Pelashat. Subsection 3. Deployment for Battle and the artillery combat up to 2.30pm.

The right wing completed its deployment by 7am. The first line consisting of the 1st Brigade of the 31st Division with 6 battalions and 24 guns, in the 2nd line the Kozlov Regiment, number 123, with 3 battalions and 16 guns. About 10 o'clock, the 5th Infantry Division consisting of 9 battalions and 24 guns. was posted in third line. At 8.15 a.m., the first gun was fired by the Turks. The 24 Russian guns in the first line directed their fire on the flashes of the enemy's guns, the fog being so dense that the enemy's position could not be seen. All that could be observed in front was a wide ravine densely covered with brush and hostile skirmishes, and two guns at its further edge.

By 9 a.m., the fog had settled so far that the large Gravitzeridout became visible, against which the Russian guns, reinforced by the batteries in the second line, now directed their fire. The ground did not permit placing more than 40 guns in battery. The artillery combat thus opened was continued until 240pm. The left wing occupied the village of Rattashifo by 9am without firing a shot. The first brigade, numbering five battalions and 28 guns after reinforcing Skobolev, of the 32nd Division, deployed on the heights to the east and north of the village.

The first brigade of the 30th Division was kept in reserve. and posted it first on the road from Pelashat to Radashivo, subsequently nearer to Radishivo. At 10am, the Turks opened the artillery combat, which was taken up by the Russians and continued until 2.30pm, the infantry, meanwhile, not firing a shot. In the course of the cannonade, two Turkish batteries cease firing.

The redoubt north of Radashivo, Hafiz Be Tabia, had suffered severely. Three Russian guns were rendered unserviceable, and the battery had to be relieved from the reserve. Section 4. Attack of the Russian Right Wing. At 2.40pm, Lieutenant General Krznynir ordered Lieutenant General Wilhelminov to proceed to the attack of the Gravica readout in two columns, one from the north and one from the east.

The north column consisted of the Penza Regiment and the second and third battalions of the Kozlov Regiment, on the east, General Wilhelminov himself, with the Tamboff Regiment and the first battalion of the Kozlov Regiment. The right column was followed by a reserve of six battalions, Arkangelsk and Wologdo regiments, the left by three battalions, Gallets Regiment. The first Panzer Battalion, which led the right column, took the first line of trenches on the near side of the ravine, but was brought to a halt by the murderous fire from a second line just behind it. The second Panzer Battalion, advanced on the left of the first, carried the

second line of rifle trenches, crossed the ravine with the retreating Turks, and approached the readout. The third line of trenches in front of the readout was also taken. The Assailants and sconces, themselves in it, and a part of them rushed for the redoubt. After the commander of the 2nd Battalion, who had placed himself at the head of the assailants, was killed on the parapet, the attack was repulsed, and the efforts of the rest of the regiment to take the redoubt were equally fruitless. After losing 29 officers and a thousand men by the murderous infantry fire from the redoubt and flanking rifle trenches, the pens of regiment retreated in considerable disorder. The two Kozlov battalions of this column then advanced the attack. Penetrated to the

readout, and apart reached the ditch, where the regimental commander fell, pierced by three bullets. The assailants did not succeed in taking the breastwork, but maintained themselves in the ditch, both sides keeping up a murderous fire at short range. At this time, Lieutenant-General Shildershulder Shuldner brought up from the right the last reserves of the column, consisting of the Arkangelsk and Wollogda regiments. He crossed the ravine and took the trenches on the side from whence up to this time the Kozlov regiment had received flanking fire, but the attack of these six fresh battalions on the redoubt itself also failed. The left column of four battalions under Lieutenant General Wilhelminoff, which moved from the east and more in the direction of the

high road, came under such severe fire that the attack was stopped without reaching the redoubt, the men opening what seemed to be a very ineffective rapid fire. The Galitz Regiment, which had formed the reserve of this column, having also been brought up, the attack was renewed and again repulsed. At 6pm, after the infantry attack had lasted, over three hours, the situation on the right wing was as follows. The three battalions of the Penza Regiment, almost destroyed by its losses, seemed to have withdrawn from the fighting line altogether. The remnants of 15 battalions shot to pieces and badly intermixed, maintained themselves in the space between the Redoubt and the ravine, partly to the east, partly to the north of the former. As early as 4pm, the whole Coloma

regiment had been drawn from the General Reserve to support the left wing. At 6pm, one battalion of the Serpukov regiment, with some cavalry and artillery, was dispatched to the extreme right to check the retrograde movement beginning there, leaving but two fresh battalions, two squadrons and some artillery as a general reserve. Towards sundown, General Crudner ordered a renewed attack, to support which he sent forward three companies of the reserve, followed subsequently by three more companies. Three successive assaults were repulsed. the last, the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 30th Division, was wounded within 100 paces of the redoubt. Darkness had meanwhile settled down, but in the vicinity of the readout, a wild and

disorderly conflict was continued, with uninterrupted firing and cheering. Under these circumstances, Crudner abandoned all hope of a favourable turn of the struggle, and gave the order to retreat. The last Sapukov Battalion of the Reserve, the Gallet Regiment of the left column, which had suffered least, and the Warranesh Regiment, which had just arrived on the field from Sistova, were ordered to cover the retreat. These troops took up the action under the cover of which the wounded were collected by means of the available transportation. The conflicts raged around the redoubt during the whole night. At daybreak, the last detachments retreated, and it was not until 11 a.m. on July 31st that the troops of the right wing were assembled at

Tristanick and Carragatch. No pursuit took place. Subsection 5. Attack of the Russian left wing At 2.30pm, Prince Chakofskyi sent forward the Kursk and Rilsk regiments, five battalions, on the two redouts between the High Road Slavchir and Bulgarini. In front of the redouts, three and four lines of trenches had been constructed. The trenches were taken after a furious struggle, and the Turks thrown back on the redouts, whereupon the Rilsk regiment moved on the eastern, the Kersk regiment on the western redoubt. Two guns fell into the hands of the assailants, the Turks, succeeding in removing ten other guns from the fortification in good time.

The assault on the Western redout presented greater difficulties. On advancing against this redoubt, the Kursk regiment was taken in the left flank by the fire of a battery, and skirmishes in action on the edge of the Tuchunitsa ravine. While in front on both sides of the redoubt, dense lines of closed infantry appeared to receive the assailants with a murderous fire at a range of 200 to 300 paces. To support the attack, some companies of the Rilsk Regiment advanced at this critical moment from the captured Eastern Redoubt, and the first Sousa Battalion from the Reserve came up on the left, while the artillery of the left wing reinforced by fresh batteries from the reserve

advanced at the same time. The attack was successful, and the Western Redoubt was also taken, but the losses were very heavy. The commander of the Rilsk Regiment, although wounded, retained command of his regiment. The commander of the Shusier Regiment, leading his first battalion in person, fell mortally wounded. but ordered the soldiers who wanted to carry him off, to leave him and encourage his men to advance. Matters had reached this stage by 5pm. Prince Chikovskoi received from General Krudner the information that the Coloma Regiment and a battery from the General Reserve

had been dispatched in the support of the left wing. In fact, however, the regiment did not reach its destination, but became embroiled in the general conflict on the extreme right of the left wing without producing a visible effect on the course of the action. As the Turks were proceeding to the counterattack with fresh forces, Shikovskoi, in hope of using the Coloma Regiment as reserve, bought the second and third Sousia battalions from his own reserve to the support of his right, which left him but three fresh battalions of the Jaroslov regiment in reserve. Two batteries were brought forward from the right of the artillery position

and posted to the right of the Eastern Redout. Soon afterward, the first Jarosloff division was ordered forward to support the left. With the beginning of darkness, the Turks made a new counter-attack, this time with considerable bodies of cavalry on both flanks, endeavouring to turn the Russian position. To support the hard press left, another Jaroslav battalion came forward from the reserve, while a battery advanced boldly into action

almost on the flank of the Turkish attack, and took it under effective fire. Schakovskoi decided to retreat, although the Turkish attack was repulsed. Ten of his 11 battalions were in action and reduced by severe losses. All the troops were completely exhausted and no reinforcements were at hand

or in prospect to oppose the frequently renewed attacks of the Turks. The retreat was begun in good order, the two captured guns having to be left behind. The troops at first took up position on the heights, close in front of Radishiva, which they had in the morning, and passed the night there. Next morning they withdrew to Porridim unmolested. Subsection 6. Attack of the left flank detachment. Meanwhile, General Skobolev was making his last attack, presently to be described, thereby rendering the position of Shukovsky's left less difficult. Under cover of the dense fog, Scobolef had moved from Bogot, unmolested to Krishin, where he halted his main body and advanced in person with two Sotnyers and four guns

to within 650 yards of the edge of the western suburb of Plevner. From this point, he observed some 20,000 infantry and close reserve formation between the heights of the Gravitz-Zaridout and the town, while cavalry was seen in rear toward the vid. At 10 a.m., Shakovskoi's guns were heard, and Skobolef ordered his four guns to open fire, which was at once replied to by six Turkish guns. Shortly afterward, quite a number of Turkish guns took up the fire, and infantry columns with skirmishes in front and cavalry on the flanks

moved to the attack of Skobolev. Before this overwhelming attack, Skobolev withdrew to his main position at Krishin and made the following dispositions. 1. Colonel Tutolman with three Sotnirs and 12 horse guns remained on the height of Krishen, fron towards Lovcha, with strong Cossack posts pushed out beyond. 2. 1 Sotnia sent to the left toward the vid in observation, and 20 volunteers under an officer were charged with discovering a Ford for use in case the detachment should have to cross to the left

bank to move on the enemy's communications. The detachment of volunteers accomplished its object to Skobolev's complete satisfaction. Three, one Sotny was detached to the right, with orders to keep up communication with Shikovskoy, from whose position Skobolef was separated by the steep and rocky touched in its a ravine. Throughout the day it reported all that took place on Shikovskoy's side. Skobolev advanced with four remaining Sotniers, the third Kursk battalion, and the four-foot guns toward Plevner to reoccupy the position he had held before and from which the Turks might direct an effective fire against the flank of Shikovskoi's troops. Skobolef at first moved to the attack with one and a half companies, two Sotniers and the

four guns, keeping the rest of his detachment in reserve in case he should be attacked from the direction of Lovcha. This small detachment occupied the commanding height close in front of Plevna and maintained itself there from 10am to 4pm, against eight Turkish batteries supported by artillery, which made repeated attacks against the Russian position. By 4pm, Skobolev had become convinced that no danger was impending from Lovcha, and he was informed that Chikovskoi was making a decisive attack. On receipt of this information, he left but a half company in reserve, and led three companies forward to support his hard-pressed detachment, when within a few paces of the guns, the Turks were driven back as far as the edge of town by a sudden bayonet charge.

Supported by the four guns, the Kursk Battalion withstood for two hours the repeated attacks of the Turks. It was only at dusk that Skobolev ordered the retreat. To cover the withdrawal of the infantry and guns and the removal of the wounded, the Cossacks advanced repeatedly to the attack, mounted and dismounted. Upon the arrival of the detachment at Christian at 10pm, Skobloff received Shikovsky's order to withdraw to Bogot and Pelashat. Subsection 7, losses. The Russian losses in killed, wounded and missing are given as 169 officers and 7,136 men. Some details of the official tables of losses are interesting.

The regiments of the 30th Division lost in killed and wounded, Jaroslov, number 117, 238 men, Shusia, number 118, 118 men, Coloma, number 119, 85 men, Sapukov number 120, 214 men. Details of the losses of the regiments of the 5th and 31st divisions, 9th Corps, cannot be ascertained, since the losses at Nicopolis and in the two battles of Klefner

are not separately given. The losses of the two regiments of the 11th Corps on the left of the first line, which captured the two readouts north of Radishivo, were quite severe. Kursk Regiment, number 1. Part of the regiment that was in action under Skobolev, 336 men killed. Rielsk regiment, number 126, 725 men killed.

Subsection 8. The panic at Sistova. The following events, although very slightly connected with the Battle of Plevna, are here stated as forming an interesting contribution to the history of confusion created by a false alarm. At noon on July 31st, the first wounded from the warren from the warren. Battle of Plevna reached Sistova from Bulgarini, saying that the battle was lost and that it was rumoured that a transport of wounded, while en route, had been attacked by Turkish cavalry and cut down. The statement created consternation among the inhabitants of Sistova and among the men of the

new Bulgarian Drushinas, which were being formed there. A large portion of these men started for the pontoon bridge below the town with the cry, the Turkzak humming! Here a large number of empty provision wagons were halting on the Bulgarian bank, their destination being Zimnitsa. A drunken Cossack on an unsaddled horse, preceding the swarm of fugitives, galloped toward the bridge, crying, The Turks are in Sistova! Whereupon a terrible confusion ensued in the train,

all the wagons trying to gain the bridge, the swarm of fugitives from Sistova also rushed upon the bridge. The commander of the bridge, General Richter of the engineers, who happened to be, on the North Bank at the time, ordered the small detachments at his disposal to close the bridge by force of arms if necessary. Through his energetic intervention, he succeeded in restoring order. Meanwhile, word came from the commander of Sistova that the report was false and that there were no Turks inside at all.

To allay the uneasiness of the inhabitants, the Russian detachment stationed at the town had meanwhile taken a defensive position in front of the town. The bridge being closed, swarms of fugitives crossed the Danube by boat, in which operation several persons were drowned. They soon spread the false alarm in Zimnitzer. The Turks have taken the bridge. The Turks are marching on Zimnitsa. The Turks are crossing from the right to the left bank on four steamers.

The entire population and a large part of the wounded in the hospitals began to fly. After much trouble, Cossack patrols succeeded in bringing the fugitives back to town. The confusion was increased by the fact that at the time of the arrival of the first alarming news, a detachment of Turks captured in former engagements happened to be conducted through Zimnitsa. Comments. comment one general crudner although nominally commander-in-chief seems to have occupied himself chiefly with his own ninth corps which formed the right wing and to have left the conduct of the left wing without reservation to prince schakovskoi commander of the eleventh corps this fact became evident in the dispositions made by crudena for the position and attack of the ninth corps although that corps had an acting commander in the person of general wilhelminov while he left the details on the other wing to general shukovsky Moreover, Krudner ordered the right wing with which he remained exclusively to attack at 2.40 p.m. after Schakofskoi had begun the attack of the left wing at 2.30pm on his own responsibility.

In uniform conduct of the battle by a common superior, General Krudner is therefore out of the question. Comment 2. A striking point in the disposition is the weakness of the General Reserve, consisting of one-sixth of the available battalions. The disruption of the unity of the 30th Infidri Division is also surprised. One of its brigades was combined with a brigade of another division to form the left wing, while the other brigade of the former division was held in reserve. The reason may have been a desire of placing under Prince Chikovsky's orders, the only infantry brigade of his core present, first of the 32nd division.

The brigades and divisions being posted in lines in rear of each other, instead of abreast, caused a complete disruption of the larger tactical units in the course of the battle. This was particularly noticeable in the 9th Corps, where it would have been far more appropriate to have formed each of the first of, the great wing columns of an entire division. Comment three, General Crudner is said to have reconnoited the enemy's position in person on the day preceding the battle. The same was done by Colonel Biskupski, Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Corps, in the portion

south of the High Road, Bulgarini Plevna, which was assigned to the left wing as its field of attack. Both reconnaisances seemed to have been conducted in a very general way. For several days, the Russians had been in comparatively close proximity to the enemy, yet a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position does not seem to have taken place. Sufficient information had not been gained about the details of terrain in front, or about the fortifications of the Turks. Had this been done?

The dense fog which covered the field during the first hours of the artillery combat, and which was not favourable to the efficiency of the Russian artillery fire, might have been turned to good account by the Russians in masking the advance of strong skirmish lines against the Turkish position. It would have been possible, for instance, to keep a good account. capture the Great Ravine in front of the Gravica Redout without much difficulty and with comparatively small loss, thus securing

from the beginning an intermediate position favourable to subsequent attack on the readout. Scobolev's bold and skillful mode of proceeding on the extreme left demonstrates that the fog could be taken advantage of for reconnaissance and attack of the enemy's position. Comment 4. Nowhere was the Russian attack ushered in by the fire

of skirmishes. After the cannonade, whose effect seems to have been small, the Russian infantry, which up to this time had not fired a shot, moved in dense masses to the attack, which was frontal throughout and unaccompanied by any attempt to turn the enemy's flank. The chief strength of the Turkish position did not lie in the redoubts, which have attracted the most attention, but in the tiers of rifle trenches in front and the flank of the redouts.

In order to capture a position entrenched in this manner, it is evidently not so important to penetrate into the redoubts as to carry the trenches on the flanks, in which case the readout would have been isolated and unable to hold out for any length of time. But the method of the right wing in its attack is not based on such an idea. The nine battalions in the first line were formed in two columns and moved from north and east against the great redoubt in the rear of the village of Gravica. The entire second line was attached to these two columns from the beginning

and moved off with them so that, properly speaking, all of the 18 battalions of the right wing were out of the hands of the leaders from the very beginning of the attack. If we examine the details of the action, we find two columns advancing against the redout on a narrow front and under effective fire from some rifle trenches at the side. Of the right column, five battalions advanced successively

on the readout. Each battalion reached the enemy when the preceding battalion had been used up. Each battalion lost large part of its men under the fire from the rifle trenches which swept the approaches to the readout. Of each battalion, only fragments got into the ditch of the readout, where they maintained a hopeless and desperate struggle, in which a large part of the officers and the bravest of the men found their death. Further tactical availability of these five battalions was out of the question.

The six battalions of the Arkangelsk and Wologda regiments brought up from the reserve to support the attack. At last turned on the rifle trenches, the gauntlet of whose murderous fire the preceding assailants of the Redat had run. These rifle trenches were taken after a furious struggle, but now these six battalions were also expended, for it should be borne in mind that these battalions whose strength at the beginning of July was probably less than 5,000 men, had lost more than 2,000 men and the greater part of their officers in the bloody actions of the 15th and 20th of July.

Attempts made by fractions of the battalions to take the readout failed and added to the losses, and henceforth these battalions were likewise no longer to be regarded as tactical bodies. But as a disorganized mass of more or less brave men, on which the higher leaders could no longer exert any influence, since most of the officers were dead or wounded. The conditions with the left, east column, were similar. Here also the battalions of the second line became early involved in the action. All frontal attacks against the redout were repulsed with great loss, chiefly by the fire from the rifle trenches,

which on this part of the field were not captured at all. All available troops of the right wing, 18 battalions were expended and out of hand before the Turkish reserves moved to counterattack. On the whole, the attack of the Russian left wing was conducted more correctly and therefore with more success. The five battalions of the first line made their attack without preparation by fire, but simultaneously on a broad front and supported by one battalion from the reserve and the fire

of several batteries also advancing upon the enemy's position. The battalions of the first line succeeded in capturing both readouts and the rifle trenches in front and on the flank, while five fresh battalions of the second line remained available. The Turkish counterattack, effectively supported by artillery and swarms of skirmishes, in a flanking position along the Tchinoza ravine, was repulsed with the aid of three battalions gradually brought forward from the second line. At dusk, the Turks began the second counterattack with fresh forces. It was repulsed, it is true, with the assistance of another battalion from the second line,

but having a single fresh battalion left to him, and having learned of the complete failure of the attack on the right, Shakovsky did not wait for the third. counter-attack of the Turks, and began a well-ordered retreat covered by his last fresh battalion. The course of action was thus very different on the two wings. On the right, Crudner's 18 battalions failed to gain possession of the enemy's position, and in this wing, the Turks were not obliged to use their reserves at all, in consequence of which, almost all of them were sent against Shukovsky. And in order to cover the retreat of the battalions engaged, the last troops of the senselessly squandered general reserve had to be brought forward.

On the left, Shukovsky's first line succeeded, almost single-handed, in capturing the enemy's position, and the second line was only used to repulse two strong counter-attacks of the Turkish reserves. And at the termination of this furious and costly struggle, the troops possessed a certain outward cohesion, which rendered tactical action and leading possible. It cannot be denied that the left wing accomplished much more with far inferior means than the right. In casting a parting glance at the employment of the General Reserve, we find that surely after the beginning of the infantry attack, it was diverted from its proper purpose by direct orders of General Krudna, and distributed, among both wings as a kind of special reserve.

At 4pm, the Coloma Regiment was detached to the left wing, where it became engaged in the general action, without plan or effect, and the Supukov Regiment was retained in support of the right wing. From the moment of this division, the all-too-week reserve was no longer able to exert a decisive influence on the general conflict. How the Sopperkov Regiment was subsequently squandered has been stated above. Had the right wing gained the same results as the left, compelling the Turks to expend part of their reserves against it, then a general advance about dusk by the reserve, held in hand until the moment,

either in the centre along the Great High Road, or on either flank might, and probably would, have produced a decisive result of this bloody day in favour of the Russian arms. Comment 5 It becomes evident from the above description that we can hardly speak of a cooperation of the three arms in the course of the battle. The preparation of the attack was left exclusively to the artillery. The attack of the infantry received little assistance from the artillery on the left, and none at all on the right. The Russian cavalry took no active part in the conflict of the main bodies.

The possibility of the cooperation of the three arms in unfavourable terrain is demonstrated by the small left-flanked attachment under General Skobilef. The conduct of the action by this general shows a rare combination of prudence and rashness. his personal and thorough reconnaissance of the ground, his careful arrangements for guarding the rear of his detachment, and for maintaining communications with the main army. The bold advance of his small detachment close to the enemy's position, attracting disproportionately large forces of the enemy

and rendering the attack of the main army correspondingly easier. His stout defensive action, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry, both mounted and dismounted, supported one another with great skill. Lastly, upon learning of the beginning of the main attack on the part of Chikoskoy's troops, his energetic offensive, for which he employed his heretofore carefully husbanded small infantry reserve, and the skillful and successful retreat under difficult circumstances are certainly worthy of great consideration and thorough study. End of Section 5

Section 6 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna, by Thilo von Trother. This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. part six sortie battle of zagail vitsa and pelashat on the thirty first of august subsection one position of the west army on the morning of the thirty first of august the right of the army was formed by the fourth romanian division which was posted between the vid and the high road nicopolis the ninth corps formed the centre between the nicopolis and bulgarini roads the fourth corps formed the left between the bulgarine and lovchre roads The Fourth Corps was commanded by General Krylov, in the absence of General Zotov, who was acting as Commander-in-Chief of the West Army. The following positions were occupied on the morning of the 31st of August.

The outposts stood on the line Bogot Tachanitsa Radishivo Gravica, 10 miles, and were furnished on the left by two squadrons of the fourth lances, on the right by two squadrons of the fourth Hassars. The Corps was posted as follows. On the left at Pellishat, the regiment's Sustal No. 62, Uglitz number 63, two squadrons of the fourth lancers, and probably four batteries. About 2,000 yards in front of the position there was a lunette occupied by two companies and two guns. At Zgal Vitsa on the right, there were entrenched two Shusia battalions, two squadrons of the fourth hussars, two foot batteries, eighth horse battery of the fourth core, the Galitzar regiment, number 20, with a battery of the 9th core, also a sapyculon.

company. The regiment's Jaroslov, number 117, Coloma, number 119, Sepukov number 120, and two batteries were in reserve. The following troops of the 4th Corps were absent. The 4th dragoons observed the Valley of Osma at Kara-Hassan. The Vladimir Regiment, number 61, was on the way from Zimnitsa to join its core, and had reached Karagach, eight miles west of Bulgarini, on the Great Road. The Kazan Regiment number 64, one Sousja Battalion, number 118, and a battery were with the core of Prince Emeritinsky operating against Lovcher. The position of the fourth Cossack Regiment, and three batteries at this time cannot be ascertained. Subsection 2. Turkish attack 8.30 a.m. until 1 p.m. At 6.m., the Russian outposts reported that strong Turkish bodies were marching out of the entrenchments south of the

the high road and advancing on Pelashat and Zagalvitsa, with a thick line of cavalry in front. General Zotov was at first inclined to consider the reported movement a faint to screen a serious attack against either the Ninth Corps or the Romanians. No changes in the position of troops were made for the present. The two squadrons of lancers at Pelashat, the two Hussar squadrons, and the horse battery at Zagail Vitsa advanced to the support of the hard-pressed outposts. In view of the strength of the Turkish cavalry, which numbered 2,500 horses, the lancers gradually fell back on Pellashat and the Hussar Regiment on Zagalvitzer. At 8am, the Turkish cavalry withdrew to the flank,

disclosing a strong line of infantry, which moved the attack on Pellashat. The Lynette was taken after a brief but fierce struggle. Its garrison fell back on Pellashat, where it was relieved by five companies of the Sustal Regiment. After three batteries had cannonaded the Turks for some time, attachments of the Sustal regiment advanced to the attack and recaptured the lunette. Toward 9am, the Turks brought up considerable reinforcements. Their right extended more and more, and turned the left of the Russian position. Swarms of bashy-pozooks penetrated into Pellashat and set fire to the village.

A new attack on the lunette was repulsed. Opposite the position of Sagael Witsa, batteries came into action and a cannonade began on both sides. At 10 a.m., no reports of any hostile movements having been received from the outposts of the 9th Corps and the Romanian Division, General Zotov, became convinced that the main attack was against his left wing, 4th Corps, and issued the following orders.

A, one brigade of the 9th Corps to advance at once on the high road and attacked the enemy's left flank. B, the reserves of the 9th Corps, three regiments of the 30th Infantry Division, to take position north of Porodim and hold themselves at the disposal of the commander-in-chief. C. The Vladimir Regiment No. 61, which had reached Karagatch, to leave train and knapsacks, and to march as quickly as possible to Poradim to join the General Reserve.

D. The 4th Romanian Division to assemble at once at Kalysovat. Opposite the entire Russian position from Pelashat to Zagalvitzer, the Turks deployed a long line of inventory, about noon. In front of the infantry, some 40 or 50 guns, fired on the Russian position and were applied to by the Russian batteries. Subsection 3, repulse of the Turkish attack, 1 to 5pm. Toward 1pm the Turkish infantry advanced to a general attack, which was made in three principal directions,

against the position of the Lynette, against the left flank, and against the centre of the Zagailvica position. A, the attack against Pellashat and the Linet in front was repulsed in front by the fire of four batteries. The commander of the 4th Corps, General Krilov, advanced against the extreme right of the assailing Turks with four squadrons of lancers, two squadrons of hussars, and a horse battery. The Turks retired slowly and threw their right well back when it was threatened by the Russian cavalry. B. The attack on the left of the Zagalvitzer position struck one Galitz Battalion, number 20, and four guns. This portion of the position was reinforced from the reserve at Parodim by two battalions, Sir Pukov number 120,

and a battery. The attack of the Turks was repulsed. C. The attack directed against the centre of the Zagalvitzar position was carried out with great energy and reached the Russian rifle trenches, but was repulsed by the counterattack of the Russian infantry posted there. Two Galitzar Battalions, number 20, and two Shusia battalions, number 118. 24 guns covered the Turks with a murderous fire during their advance, as well as during their retreat. During the great infantry attack, the cavalry of the Turkish army.

left attempted to turn the right of the Zagalovits opposition. The movement was discovered by the two Hussar squadrons posted there and frustrated without difficulty by artillery fire. Notwithstanding their previous failure and great loss, the Turks undertook a second attack at 3pm, well prepared by artillery and infantry fire. The attack was not made with the same energy as the first, and failed also. On this occasion, the regiment's Sustal and Uglitz of the left, and two battalions each of the regiment's Gellits and Shuzha of the right wing made an attempt to take the offensive but were checked by a Turkish counterattack undertaken partly by fresh troops and supported by severe fire of heavy artillery whereupon the Russian battalions fell back to their original positions. At 4.30pm

the Turks began their retreat to Plevner under the cover of a heavy artillery fire. Subsection 4. In effectual pursuit. General Krylov ordered the 10 battalions in first line and the available eight squadrons of lancers and hussars to pursue, which, however, yielded no result. The two cavalry regiments had been on outpost without interruption for two months, and they had not been able to either feed or unsettle throughout this day. The Dragoon regiment posted on the Osmar did not reach the core until after the termination of the action. The infantry pursued for three miles, and returned without having affected anything particular. The result might have been better.

if the brigade which had been ordered forward to Gravitzer by the High Road had been able to take the Turks in the flank. Although directed to advance with the utmost speed in the direction indicated, the brigade did not leave its knapsacks behind, but started with them. This circumstance, in connection with the Great Heat, so delayed the movement that the brigade was too late to act against the enemy's flank. Subsection 5. Losses The losses of the Russians were killed, three officers,

171 men. Wounded, 27 officers, 708 men, missing, 66 men. Total, 30 officers, 945 men. Comments Comment 1. The outer line of the Russian line of investment, or, better, their line of observation east of Plevna, began on the left at the road to Lovcha, and described from there an arc of a circle, with Plevna as the centre, to the vid above Ribbon. The line had an extent of about 20 miles, with a radius of about six miles. The position of the Russian reserves at Poradim was 12 miles to the east of Plevna, and six miles in the rear of the centre of the Russian front. It may not be out of place here, to cast a glance at the strength of the armies opposing each other at

Plevna. At the beginning of August, the West Army in front of Plevna, consisted of the four infantry divisions of the 4th and 9th Corps, which, at the time of the passage of the Danube, may have numbered about 40,000 effectives. Deducting 10,000 men for the losses suffered by these divisions in the actions of July, there remain 30,000 infantry, without counting loss from disease. To these may be added about 10,000 cavalry, artillery, and special troops, and as many Romanians, 4th Division, giving a total of some 50,000 men, deducting losses from disease during the months of July and August, and taking also into account the absence of several bodies included

in the above calculation, which were attached to the core operating against Lovshire. The maximum available strength did not probably exceed 45,000 men present before Plevina toward the end of August. In calculating the strength of the Turkish army, it is perhaps best to figure backwards from the number of men comprised in the surrender. At that time, there were in Plevna some 57,000 men, inclusive of 20,000. sick and wounded. It can be proved that reinforcements to the amount of some 12,000 men entered Plevner during the month of September, which leaves 45,000 men. Estimating the loss from battle or disease for September to December, at 5,000 men, probably much too low, we find that

toward the end of August, the Turkish army at Plevner numbered at least 50,000 effectives, and was at least equal and probably superior to the investing army, which, moreover, was scattered over a line 20 miles long. Comment 2. The failure of the pursuit after the repulse of the Turkish attack renders it proper to ask whether such an attempt was right under the circumstances. It would probably be so only in the case it were the intention to enter the entrenchments of the retreating enemy, or in case it seemed practicable to drive a portion of the enemy

from the line of retreat before reaching the shelter of the entrenchments. If neither is the case, pursuit understead. similar circumstances had better be admitted, as it will invariably result in the retreat of the pursuing troops from the works, thus raising the morale of the previously defeated enemy. End of Section 6. Section 7 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevner by Thilo von Trotha. This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistar. Part 7. The Capture of Lovcher on the 3rd of September. Subsection 1. Advance on Lovcher

Early in August, General Scobileft was posted at Kakrina on the road from Selvie to Lovcher with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade and a mixed detachment from the 4th Corps, Kazan Regiment, No. 64, 1 Sousja Battalion and one battery. A portion of these new reinforcements had by this time rich Selvey, consisting of the 2nd Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division with its artillery, the third rifle brigade, and a heavy battery made up of four guns captured at Nicopolis. On the 31st of August, Prince of Meritinsky, commander-in-chief of the forces at Selvey, received orders to attack Lovcher.

On the 1st of September, Skobilef was accordingly pushed forward from Kakarina to Fontana, about 3,000 yards east of Lovchur, with orders to occupy the heights dominating the approaches to the position of Lovchur, to reconnoit the terrain with a view to artillery positions, and to construct rifle trenches and gun emplacements. The Caucasian Cossack Brigade was to cross the Osmar at Igloor, seven miles below Lovture, and to reconnoit of the road to Plevenor by which reinforcements might reach Lovture, or by which its garrison might withdraw. Two sotniers of the 30th Don Cossacks were to observe the roads from Trojan to Selvey.

A single poor road was available for the march of the main body from Selvey to Lovchre, 33 miles, so that it was started in echelons, the second brigade of the 2nd Division on the afternoon of September 1st, the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division at 11pm, the 1st Brigade of the 2nd at 2nd the 2nd 1st, and at 4 a.m. September 2nd, the 3rd Rifle Brigade. Subsection 2. Preparatory arrangements on the 1st and 2nd of September. General Scobble have reached Fontana at 2pm, September 1st, reconnoited the country and ordered the 1st Kazan Battalion to occupy the height,

A, on the left of the road, and the remaining troops of his detachment to take position in rear of that height, Throughout the night the men were at work constructing rifle trenches and emplacements for 24 guns, and one battery was dragged by the infantry to the steep rocky height, B, north of the road, where it opened fire at 5am September 2nd, sweeping more particularly the ground in front of the height A. During the night of the 2nd to the 3rd, the infantry dragged five batteries to the height B, so that, on both sides of the road, 48 guns were in position. Major General Dobrovolski, who was to form the right wing of the position, with the third rifle brigade, arrived at Presyika, three miles northeast of Lovshire, on the evening

of September 2nd, and entrenched himself on the height in front during the night and the following morning. A field battery, and the heavy battery heretofore mentioned, were placed in position at this point early on the morning of September 3rd. For the execution of the general attack contemplated for the 3rd, Prince Amaritinsky directed that, after proper preparation by artillery fire, the left wing under Skobolef, attack the Red Hill, situated close to Lovcha and forming the key to the enemy's position, that Dobrovolski, with the right wing, attacked the heights on the right bank of the Osama. The second infantry division and parts of the third division present were to follow in reserve. Subsection 3, action on the right bank of the

Osmar. At 5.30am, September 3rd, the artillery opened along the whole Russian line, with 16-4-pounders, 49-pounders, and the four heavy guns. On the left, the fire was continued without interruption until 2 p.m. According to Russian accounts, the Turkish artillery, the number of whose guns cannot be ascertained, but which certainly was much inferior to the Russian, offered a most obstinate and successful resistance. At 6.15am, the Turks opened a brisk infantry fire from the trenches on the heights of the right bank of the Osmar against Dobrovolski's rifle battalions in front of Praseyaka. The latter must have been in a faulty position. No other explanation can be given for the loss of eight officers and 150 men in the 11th Rifle Battalion

before the Russian infantry in this wing had fired a shot. According to the plan, Dobrovolski was not to advance until Skobilef's attack on the Red Hill had succeeded. In view of the great losses which his troops had suffered, and which seemed likely to increase with further delay, General Dobrovolski at 8am moved against the opposite heights on the right bank, which were defended by two rifle trenches, one halfway up, the other at the crest.

The rifle brigade, reinforced by a combined company of the headquarters guard of the commander-in-chief, captured the heights after an action lasting from eight to, 11 a.m. The Turkish left wing fell back behind the Osmar. The Ravall Regiment was brought forward from the reserve to support General Dobrovolski. It turned to the left, where meanwhile, the attack on the Red Hill, the chief point of the hostile position, had been preparing. After the Great Russian Battery on both sides of the road had continued its fire against the Turkish position until 2pm, the Kazan Regiment advanced, with band playing, to the attack

on the Red Hill, and captured it. Two batteries from the reserve were at once dragged to the top of the Hill, whence they opened fire against the line of redouts on the left bank of the Osmar, whose central stronghold was a formidable redoubt. On the right of the Kazan Regiment, north of the road, the regiments of Kaluga and Lebao crossed the marshy bottom intervening between the Russian and Turkish positions, and captured the heights north of the Red Hill, leaving the whole right bank in the hands of the Russians. Subsection 4.

Action on the left bank of the Osmar Upon the capture of the Red Hill, the first Kazan Battalion took post there, while the remaining two battalions of the regiment crossed the river, penetrated into the town, and captured its farther edge after a brief action. In addition to the two batteries posted on the Red Hill itself, two more were posted on the high road farther to the north, so that 32 guns brought their fire to bear on the entrenchments of the left bank.

The regiment's Pocoff No. 11, Esland number 8, revel number 7, and the first Shusia battalion crossed the river, so that, inclusive of the two Kazan battalions already there, 12 battalions stood in readiness for attack. Eight battalions of these troops advanced at 5.30pm against the right of the enemy's position, while the Kaluga Regiment No. 5, together with attachments of the Leibau Regiment number 6, and the rifles, crossed the river lower down and attacked the left of the Turkish position. The latter was taken after a furious hand-to-hand conflict.

The retreating Turks were pursued by the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, which advanced from the right wing across the Osmar. Two Turkish battalions were cut off and destroyed by the Cossacks after brave resistance. The fire of the Cossack horse battery, which had accompanied the Cossacks, made great havoc among the fleeing Turks. Subsection 5. Losses The losses of the Russians were killed.

Six officers, 313 men. Missing, 52 men. Wounded, 33 officers, 1, 112 men. Total, 39 officers, 1,477 men. On the part of the Turks, neither the number of troops nor the losses can be ascertained. According to Russian accounts, 2,200 Turks were buried within the captured entrenchments, not counting those killed by the Cossacks during the pursuit. It seems very probable, under the circumstances described, that the latter number was very great.

The statement of Prince Meritinsky at the conclusion of his report, that 3,000 Turks, the number occurs more than once, and is therefore not a misprint, were cut down in their flight, bears too much the stamp of inordinate exaggeration, to be of any value whatever. The more when it is considered that the pursuing Cossacks could barely have numbered more than a thousand horses. Section 6. Events on the 4th and 5th of September. Late on the evening of September 3rd, reports were received from the headquarters of the 4th Corps that strong bodies of the enemy had marched from Plevna in the direction of Lovcher.

Soon afterward, patrols reported the appearance of strong hostile detachments. On the morning of September 4th, this column moved on the position of Lovtcher and tried to gain the Russian left flank by continued maneuvering to the right. The conflict, however, was limited to wholly ineffective artillery combat, and toward noon the Turks withdrew in the direction of Micran, 12 miles to the south-west of Lovture. On the 5th of September, Prince Amaritinski left the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division at Lovchur, and marched to rejoin the main body of the West Army, whose left wing he reached in the evening at Bogot, about 12 miles.

Comments Comment 1. A surprising feature of the Order of the March, of the Corps, from Selvi to Lovcher, is that the rifle brigade, although intended to form the right of the attack, marched at the rear of the column and that the troops intended for the reserves marched in front. It is also surprising that the unity of the second division was broken up on the march by sandwiching a brigade of the third division between the two brigades of the second. Comment two. As the Corps had 76 guns, there must have been present a number of field officers of artillery, and certainly one, probably two, brigade commanders. Yet it was not an

artillery officer, but Captain Kuropatkin of the general staff, who was charged with posting the artillery on the heights on both sides of the high road. The same Captain Kuropatkin traced the lines for the rifle trenches to be constructed on the left, and the execution of these pioneer works, including the construction for the emplacements of 48 guns, was directed by an infantry lieutenant of the Kazan Regiment. On the right of General Dobrovolski's position, the construction of the rifle trenches and gun emplacements was superintended by an ensign of the Saper battalion of the Guard, who, with his small detachment of Sappers, belonged to the Combined Guards Company,

which formed the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters guard. This corps, therefore, although consisting of 26 battalions, seems to have been practically without special troops. Editor's footnote by Arthur L. Wagner In view of the fact that Currapatkin, although only a captain was Scobolef's chief of staff, the author's comments seem somewhat severe. Kuropatkin afterwards became a lieutenant general and the governor of the Trans-Caucasian provinces. He is a soldier of distinguished ability and is regarded by many as Scobolef's natural successor. A. L. W. Footnote end.

Comment 3. The attack on the Turkish position of Lovtshire was purely frontal, and its preparation and inception was left to the artillery, which, to be sure, was very much superior to that of the enemy. Not a musket seems to have been discharged on the Russian left before the infantry advanced to the decisive attack on the Red Hill, in doing which it had to traverse a distance of not less than a thousand yards from its shelter's position to that of the enemy. Comment four, it would appear from our description that the unsuitable position of the rifle brigade on the right made it almost helpless against the enemy's infantry entrenched on the right

bank of the Osmer. Instead of opposing the troublesome and destructive infantry fire of the Turks with musketry, the Russian right wing was unable to help itself except by an attack, which was contrary to the program and insufficiently prepared, but which succeeded through the bravery of the troops and their superior numbers. Comment 5. The vigorous advance of the Cossack Brigade against the defeated enemy's line of retreat resulted in considerable losses for the latter. The question seems not inappropriate here whether in view of the great and undoubted numerical superiority of the Russians in this action, a turning movement below the position by a strong infantry detachment, say a brigade,

might not have been decisive and entailed less loss. It appears from the description that the Osmer could have been crossed with little trouble and without using the bridge. Comment 6. The headquarters of the 4th Corps, which formed the left of the Russian army before Plevna, discovered in the course of the afternoon that a strong Turkish column was marching from Plevna against Lovchre, where it was known that Prince Amaritinsky was engaged in battle. A report was accordingly sent to him. It does not appear, however, that the 4th Corps made any movement of troops in indirect support of the Corps engaged at Lovtcher. An advance of the cavalry and horse artillery posted on the Russian left against the flank of the hostile column, would certainly have seriously delayed or stopped that movement.

Comment 7. The constant maneuvering to the right by the Turkish column which appeared before Lovcha on the morning of September 4th is explained by the Russians as an attempt threatened but not carried out of turning their left. The movement is, however, susceptible to a different explanation. The Turkish column from Flevna, whose approximate strength is not known, reached the vicinity of Lovcha at a time when the garrison of that place was in full flight, probably toward Mikron in the opposite direction, on account of the turning movement of the Cossacks in the north. Under the circumstances, it is not improbable that the Turkish column had good reason to consider the direct road to Plevna, leading as it would pass the left of the Russian main position,

too dangerous for its retreat, and therefore executed a sort of flank march, passed the Russian position under the cover of a rather harmless cannonade, with a view of gaining the road to the upper vid by way of Mikran. Nor should it be overlooked that the movement was best calculated to cover the road to the Tidawan and Jabal and Sirpasses, which were now endangered by the capture of Lovcha by the Russians. End of Section 7. Section 8 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna. By Thilo von Trother.

This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 8. Artillery attack on Plevner from September 7th to 11th. Subsection 1. Dispositions for the night of September 6 to the 7th. At 6pm on the 6th, the troops left their encampments and took up the following positions against the south front of the Turkish entrenchments. A. General Krudina with the 9th Corps between the Bulgarani and the Pellashat roads, where emplacements were constructed for the artillery and trenches for the infantry.

Three infantry regiments and the six batteries were placed in the first line. Three infantry regiments with four batteries formed the core reserve. One regiment and one battery formed part of the main reserve. One regiment with one battery was at Nicopolis. In addition, 20 siege guns in two batteries were established in the front line of the Corps. B, General Krylov, with the 4th Corps, was on the left of the 9th, on the so-called Heights of Radishivo, and here also, emplacements and trenches were constructed. The Corps had three regiments of the 16th Division, and five batteries in the first line.

The first brigade of the 30th Division, with four batteries formed the Corps Reserve. The second brigade of the 30th Division, with two batteries, was assigned to the main reserve, one regiment, Kazan, and one battery, were as yet with Prince Emeritus. C. General Prince of Maratinski, with his detachment of the 2nd Infantry Division, and its artillery, the 3rd rifle brigade, 3rd Artillery Brigade, and 4 siege guns, was posted at Tchunitsa, in the rear of the left of the 4th Corps. The detachments from the 4th Corps rejoined their own core. D. The 4th Romanian Division was posted north of the High Road, abreast of the 9th Corps. Three regiments of the irregular Romanian cavalry guarded the space between the right of the division

and the Vid. E. General Loshker F, with the 8th and 9th dragoons, the 9th lancers, and the 9th Cossacks, with two horse batteries, was posted on the high road in the rear of the Romanians and the 9th Corps. F. General Yontief, with the 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, and a horse battery, covered the left of the 4th Corps, and maintained communication with the two Cossack Brigades of the Donne and Caucasus, which were observing the Lovture Road. G, the General Reserve consisted of the 2nd Brigade of the 30th Division, the Glitcher Regiment No. 20 of the 5th Division, 3 batteries, the Hasa Regiment's Mariupel No. 4 and Kiev number 9, and a horse battery. It was posted west of Pellishat at the junction of the Gravitzer, Tatsch, and Pellashat Plevner roads. H.

Three Sotnies of the 34th Don Cossacks formed the headquarters guard of the commander of the West Army, who took post with the main reserve. I. Packs were left behind in the camps. Each man carried two pounds of cooked meat and four pounds of hard bread. Each regiment formed a detachment of convalescence to guard the packs and train. K. The light baggage followed the troops, the flying park of the 9th Corps at Zagalvitzer, of the 4th Corps between Tuchinitz and Bogot, the Reserve Park of the 9th Corps at Bulgarini, of the 4th Corps at Lichan,

baggage of the 9th Corps in the rear of Karagach, of the 4th Corps in the rear of Poradim. L, the dressing station of the 9th Corps, at the 3 wells, two miles in the rear of the 4th Corps on the Tachinitzer Brook. As many country carts as possible were collected at the dressing stations. Subsection 2, erection of batteries during the night of September 6 and 7th. Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, the whole movement was carried out with rapidity, order and silence. The leaders having previously familiarised themselves with the positions to be taken and roads to be followed. The troops carried gabbians, facines and entrenching tools, and constructed emplacements for field and siege guns

2,000 to 2,500 yards from the enemy's works. One company of the 3rd Sapper Battalion was assigned to each corps, and a detachment of 40 sappers to the Romanian division. Two Saba companies were charged with the establishment of the siege artillery, one for the 12, the other for the 824-pounders. Four infantry battalions furnished the working parties, and the other four infantry battalions brought up gabbians, facines and other material. The entrenching tools had been issued to the troops from the Field Engineer Park.

The earthworks were completed by 6am and armed with the 9-pounder field batteries and the 20 siege guns. In each of the two great batteries, an observatory 95 feet high was constructed of ladders. Subsection 3. The 7th of September At 6am, the battery of 12 siege guns fired a salvo as a signal, where upon all the batteries, numbering altogether 20-24-pounders and 88-9-pounders, open fire, which was briskly answered by the Turks. The Russian infantry lines, posted under cover, were in complete readiness for battle. Wherever water was near, the infantry cooked a meal at noon.

The cannonade was continued throughout the day. Subsection 4. Dispositions for September 8th In the course of the night, the artillery was moved closer to the enemy's works, and brought into action some four-pounder batteries, which heretofore had not taken part, on account of the long range. The third Romanian division crossed the vid at Ribend at daybreak, closed up on the the right of the 4th Division and brought its artillery into action. The Romanian Reserve Division moved to Verbizza and formed the special reserve of the Romanians.

General Oshkarev, with his full Russian cavalry regiments, reinforced by four Romanian cavalry regiments, crossed to the left bank of the Vied at Ribenne and moved to Lower Dubnick on the Sophia Road. His task was to cut the enemy's communications and to fall upon him in the case of his retreat from Plevner. General Prince Amaritinsky moved during the night from Tuchinica to Lovcha Road, to gain the wooded ridge south of Plevna. Subsection 5, the artillery combat on the 8th, 9th and 10th of September. The dispositions for the 8th of September were carried out with precision. The batteries were advanced during the night to within 1,600 yards of the enemy's works.

In addition to those previously engaged, five Russian and five Romanian batteries took part. The fire was chiefly directed against the Gravica readout and the Radashevo redout. At first the Turks answered briskly, but toward 2pm their fire diminished, and ceased towards evening altogether. In order to disturb the Turks in repairing their works, the Russian artillery maintained a slow fire throughout the night. Eight of the siege guns, which on the 8th had confined their fire to the Gravitsa readout, were shifted during the night to the position of the 4th Corps to bring their fire to bear on the middle group of readouts. The cannonade was maintained along the whole front on the 9th. The artillery conflict of the past few days had cost the Russians about 300 men. On the 10th of September, the bombardment of the Turkish position was at first continued as heretofore,

but it soon became evident that it could not continue much longer, for lack of ammunition. Prompt replenishment could not be hoped for, as the fine weather suddenly changed on the evening of the 10th, and the ensuing rain quickly rendered all roads impracticable. The uninterrupted fire of several days had also damaged several carriages of the siege guns, and quite a number of those of the field guns. Under these circumstances, it seemed unwise to continue the artillery combat, and the assault which was to be prepared by cannonade had to be abandoned or made it once. The latter alternative was decided upon.

Subsection 6. Preparatory actions of the left wing on the 8th, 9th and 10th of September. During the artillery combat on the 8th of September, Prince Amaritinsky moved his call from Tachinica to the Lovturod, and took position on both sides of the road. General Skobolev commanded the advance guard, consisting of the regiment Caluga No. 5 and Esland No. 8, two rifle battalions, three sotnyers of Cossacks, four batteries, and the four heavy guns.

He occupied Brestovets with the third Eastland Battalion, placed two nine-pounder batteries in the four heavy guns in action on the height in the rear of the town, and opened fire on the Christian readout. After the artillery fire had been continued until 3pm, the Kaluga Regiment was ordered to take the so-called second knoll of the Green Hills. The regiment advanced to the attack, with two battalions in the first line. The third battalion, following as a reserve, were the distance of 500 yards.

Nine companies of the Esland Regiment were told off as the general reserve for this attack, and six companies occupied Brestovets. The Kaluga Regiment captured the second knoll, carried on by its side eight, continued the attack, took the third knoll and penetrated to the rifle trenches between that knoll and the Christian readout. Here the regiment was assailed by Turkish reserves and driven back to the second knoll, where it was supported by the previously mentioned nine Estlan companies. The pursuing enemy was then himself driven back. The three sotnyers attached to the advance guard had taken an active and skillful part in the infantry action

and proved very useful in seeking out and removing the wounded. The Russian losses in the action amounted to 900 men, 700 of which fell on the Kaluga Regiment. For the present, the second knoll was held by the Russians. But when informed during the night, that the general assault, which he expected for the following day, would not take place until some later day. General Scoboleff considered his advanced position as too risky, and withdrew his right from the captured second knoll to the first knoll, which was strengthened by a double line of rifle trenches.

An attack on the first knoll, attempted by several Turkish battalions at 5am, was repulsed chiefly by the fire of the artillery. At 8 a.m., the attack was renewed with increased numbers. This time the Turks penetrated within 60 paces of the rifle trenches. but were again repulsed. Anticipating a renewal of the attack, which, however, did not take place, Skobolev remained in his position with the Essela and Lebao regiments, the latter from the reserve having relieved the Kaluga Regiment and three rifle battalions.

His right was on the first knoll. His centre was formed by the village of Brestovets, and the height in the rear with 28 guns. He's left by a series of rifle trenches to the west of the village of Brestovets. In the rear of the position stood Prince of Meritinsky, with the Kaluga and Ravel regiments, a rifle brigade, and three four-pounder and one-nine-pounder batteries as General Reserve. In the course of the night of the 9th to the 10th, Prince Amaritinsky received orders from General Zotov,

chief of staff of the West Army, to gain possession of the third knoll of the Green Hills next morning. He was reinforced for that purpose by the first brigade of the 16th Division of the 4th Corps, which crossed the Tachinica ravine at daybreak and took post on the right of the Corps. Prince Amaritinsky entrusted General Scobolev with the direction of the attack and placed at his disposal the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division, the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions and 4 9-pounder batteries. As additional support, the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division was placed in readiness. The remaining troops of the Corps, the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division, the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, 3-4-pounder batteries, were posted to the rear of Bresdevettes

as General Reserve under General Dobrovolski. At daybreak September 2, 7th,000, the 10th, the Eslin Regiment captured the second knoll almost without resistance, and Skobolev had it fortified at once. In the construction of the rifle trenches, the lack of entrenching tools was sensibly felt, and part of the men used the lids of their cooking pots and their bare hands. To ensure the best possible feel of fire to the front, the vines of the vineyards were pulled up. Scobolev had the first brigade of the 16th Division brought up at once, and took post with the troops under his command on the second knoll, between the road and the Chuchinitzre Révi. 169 pounds were placed in battery in the centre.

The Sustdal Regiment was posted in the rear of the first NOL as reserve. Not deeming it advisable to attempt the capture of the third Null, Skobolef postponed it till the general attack ordered for the morrow. To support the contemplated attack, two companies of the Sustdell Regiment escorted 12-9-pounders and the four siege guns to the east side of the Tuchinza ravine, where they were posted so as to sweep the slopes of the third Nol, as well as the third Nol itself with their fire.

Comment 1. The fact that the carriages of all the Russian guns were damaged by the fire of several days duration was also met within the siege of cars. There it was attributed to the excessive elevation given to the guns on account of the great range. Comment 2. The number of technical troops employed before Plevner was altogether insufficient. There was but one Sapper battalion with five infantry divisions, not counting the Romanians, but 35 sappers were at the disposal of Prince America. Rotinsky's core, consisting of two divisions. Moreover, no entrenching tools were issued to that core, while the fourth and ninth core, as well as the Romanians, received at least a few hundred tools each from the Field Engineer Park. End of Section 8. Section 9 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna, by Thilo von Trother. This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 9A. The assault on Plevner on the 11th and 12th.

of September. Subsection 1. Dispositions for the Assault The hour for the assault was selected at 3pm of September 11th instead of at daybreak for two reasons. First, to spare the troops a half day of battle, second to allow the artillery to use the forenoon in preparing the assault by its fire. In order to keep the Turks as much as possible in the dark as to the time of the assault, to exhaust their attention and to keep up their suspense, it was ordered that the artillery should open up the heaviest possible fire at daybreak, paused all along the line at 9am, to resume its fire at 11, and again suspend

suddenly and simultaneously at 1 o'clock. The fire was to be resumed at 2.30pm and continued until further orders, those batteries alone, whose fire should be masked by Russian troops, suspending their fire for the time. The attack was to be directed on three points. The Gravitzer works, the Radishiva works, and against the Christian work. The Christian work. works. The Gravitsa readout was to be attacked from the northeast by the Romanians, and on the south by the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division with 2-4-pounder batteries. Against the central readout, the 1st 3rd Brigade of the 30th Division and the 2nd Brigade of the 16th Division were told off. The Christian Redoubt was to be attacked by the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division, the 3rd

rifle brigade, the entire 2nd Division, and 9 batteries. The 1st Brigade of the 31st Division was charged with the protection of the entire line of artillery from Gravitz's. to Radashivo, the second brigade of the same division and two batteries, formed the special reserve for the first brigade, and was posted on the right edge of the Radashivo ravine. The main reserve was posted in the rear of the centre, and consisted of the second brigade of the 30th division, and one regiment of the 2nd Brigade of the 5th Division, three batteries, and the 4th hussars were the horse battery. The 1st Brigade of the 4th Cadillary Division, with two Cossack Brigades and two horse

batteries, all under command of General Leontiof, had orders to cross the Vid if possible and gain the Sphia Road, as well as to establish communication with Loshkarev's cavalry. The 9th Haasas were posted on the Bulgarini Road between the 9th Corps and the Romanians. A brigade of the Romanian cavalry covered the right of the Romanians as far as the Vid. General Loshkarev, who already had four Russian and four Romanian cavalry regiments on the left bank of the Vid, in the vicinity of Lower Dubnick, sought to establish communication. with Leontyev's cavalry. The rain, which began to fall on the evening of the 10th, continued without interruption until September 12th. On the early morning of the 11th of September,

a dense fog covered the entire field. The ground was thoroughly soaked, and everywhere men and horses moved with difficulty. Still, any further postponement of the assault was not advisable. Section 2. Attack of the right wing on the Gravitzer works. The double attack on the Gravitsa readout, from the north by the Romanians, from the south by the Russians, was carried out without any tactical combination whatever. The final meeting of the Russians and Romanians in the captured readout appears in the descriptions of both parties, more like an accidental meeting than the result of a bloody struggle carried out according to a common plan. According to the Romanian accounts, parts of the third and fourth divisions advanced to the attack from the north at 3pm as ordered,

and were three times repulsed. At 6pm there was a lull in the fight, and at 7.30pm, the 2nd Rifle Battalion, and the 16th Dorobanza's militia regiment, renewed the attack and captured the readout, assisted by the Russian Archangelsk Regiment. The losses of the Romanians, 56 officers and 2,500 men, dead and wounded,

give clear proof of the bravery and contempt of death, with which that young army had here undergone its baptism of fire. The tactical decision of the attack, however, was probably brought about by the advance of the Russian brigade from the south. The first brigade of the 5th Division, under Major General Rodionoff, the Arkangelsk Regiment, the Wollogda Regiment and two batteries crossed the Gravitsa Brook, passed through the village and formed for attack to the west of the latter. Both batteries were in the centre.

On the right the Arkangelsk Regiment, on the left the Wollogda Regiment. Each regiment deployed a rival company as skirmishes in front and formed three battalions in rear in three lines. The first two in company columns, the rear, one in battalion column. Immediately upon crossing the brook, the brigade received severe artillery fire from the works of the left bank of the Gravitzer Brook. Slightly to the left of the direction of attack, a caisson of the sixth battery was blown up. The brigade now advanced to the attack. The Arcan Gelsk Regiment, straight on the readout, the Wollogd Regiment, advancing slightly its left

shoulder, past the redout and against an entrenched camp, 500 yards farther in the rear, and connected with the redout by trenches. Twice during the advance, General Rodionov halted the troops in sheltered depressions to restore order in the battalions. On approaching the redoubt, the interval between the regiments, through which the two batteries had kept firing, was closed. The Arcan Gelsk Regiment threw itself on the redoubt from the front, past the deep, steep ditch, and climbed the breastwork, which was ten feet high and slippery from the rain. At the same time, a portion of the Wologdo Regiment, which had overlapped the redout on the left, entered the work from the gorge. The rest of the regiment advanced past the redoubt against the camp, engaged the troops posted there and prevented them from coming to the support of the garrison of the redoubt,

which was cut down after a furious resistance. From the north, Romanian troops, particularly the second rifle battalion, also penetrated into the redoubt. Five guns were captured, the Colonel of the Arkangelsk regiment, and the commander of the Romanian brigade were killed near the works. At 7.30, the Russian brigade was assembled at the redoubt. Colonel Rakatschev relinquished his attack on the West Camp, assumed command in place of General Rodionoff, who had been wounded, reformed the disordered battalions, and posted them partly in the redoubt, partly in the adjoining trenches. During the night, the Turks made three attacks to recover the redoubt, but were repulsed by fire and bayonet. The loss of the brigade was 22 officers and 1,300 men, killed and wounded. A Sapa Company, an improvised Sapper Company, formed of men of both regiments, and on the extreme right, as out of flank guard, the sixth Sotnyer of the 34th Don Cossacks had a part in the action.

Subsection 3. The attack of the centre on the Radashivo Works The troops in the centre between the Bulgarian and Lovture roads may be divided into four groups according to their tasks. A. To attack the Radishivo Works. The regiment's Uglitz No. 63. Azan, number 64, Jaroslav number 117, Shuzha number 118, all under the command of Major General Schnitnikov, commander of the 30th Division. B, to protect the batteries, the regiment's Penza number 121 and Tamboff number 222. C, special reserve of the centre, the regiment's Kozlov, number 123, and Warnesh, number 124. D, main reserve, the regiment's Gallitz number 20, Coloma, No. 119, and Sapukov, number 120.

An unfortunate accident disarranged the combination from the beginning. The dense fog, brisk infantry fire on the extreme left, Skobolev, and an insignificant movement in the Turkish trenches, caused one battalion of the Uglitz Regiment to attack prematurely at 11am, drawing after it the rest of its regiment, and also the Yaroslav Regiment. After a severe action, the two regiments captured the rifle trenches of the enemy, in front of the redoubt, but were compelled to re-relipped. retire on the arrival of Turkish reinforcements after losing half of their men and nearly all of

their officers. Though deprived by this accident of half of his troops, General Shittnikov deemed it advisable to adhere to the original disposition and advanced at the appropriate time with the Kazan and Shusia regiments. On the march he met the retreating Uglitz and Jarrislav battalions, which carried disorder into his ranks. It was in vain that the Kozlov and Warnesh regiments and the Gallitz Regiment of the Main Reserve were brought forward in support of the attack. The attack was finally repulsed with enormous loss. The seven regiments engaged, lost altogether, 110 officers, and 5,200 men killed and wounded. The greater part of the losses falling on the Uglitz and Jarraslav regiments.

Subsection 4. Attack by the Left Wing on the Christian Works The task set General Scobolev was to capture the so-called third knoll of the Green Hills, and the line of readouts in the rear of Christian, which formed the direct protection of the camp of the Turkish reserves. To enable him to accomplish this task, the following troops were placed at his disposal. The regiments of Vladimir No. 61, Sustal, number 62, Ravel number 7, the 3rd rifle brigade, 3-9-pounder batteries,

1-4-pounder battery and 4-Sage guns. Skobelff resolved on the immediate capture of the 3rd knoll and to attack the redoubts in the rear simultaneously with the general attack at 3pm. After the 16 guns, previously posted at the east of the Tuchnitsa Ravine, had taken the northern slopes of the Green Hills, for some time under fire, Scobble left at 10 a.m. advanced and occupied the third Nol, with the following troops. In the centre, two Vladimir battalions in two lines of company columns. On their right, the 10th Rifle Battalion. On the left, three S-land companies. In the rear as special reserve, the third Vladimir battalion and three batteries. The third Nol was deserted by the enemy, but he was annoyed by fire from the Turkish infantry in the trench. between this knoll and the readouts. The 3rd Vladimir Battalion, having been brought to the front to reinforce the fighting line, its place's special reserve was taken by the Sustdal Regiment,

formed in battalion columns in the rear of the fighting line, under the best cover obtainable. About 2pm, strong lines of Turkish skirmishes advanced up the slopes of the Green Hills, against the troops on the top. The fire of the Turkish infantry increased more and more in strength and inflicted sensible losses not only on the troops in the firing line, line, but also on the first echelon of the reserves posted a thousand yards in the rear.

In view of these circumstances and of the fact that the general attack was soon to begin, General Skobolev ordered the Sustal regiment to drive back the Turkish skirmish lines. This was done. The Turks did not withstand the attack and fell back on their redouts. From there and from the adjoining rifle trenches, they maintained a brisk and galling fire against the Russian troops. About 2.30pm, Scobilef's troops had approximately the following position. On the 3rd Nol, in the firing line next the enemy, the Vladimir and Sustal regiments, and the 9th and 10th rifle battalions. In the depression between the 3rd and 2nd Nol, the Raval regiment.

In the entrenched position on the 2nd Noll, 2nd 1st and 2nd Battalions, with 3 batteries. In the depression between the 1st and 2ndndndnd, the Libal Regiment, and the 11th and 12th Rifleans. One Kaluga Battalion held the village of Brestovets. At 2.30pm, the batteries on the second knoll opened over the heads of the troops on the third knoll. At 3pm, Skobilef gave the order to attack. The troops in the first line descended from the third knoll, crossed the deep depression between the knoll and the height beyond, and began to ascend the steep height on whose crest lay the three strong readouts,

the western one of which was known as the readout of Christian. The redouts were connected by trenches, and on the slopes in front were a series of rifle trenches. The attack which was directed at first against the eastern and middle redoubts was received by murderous musketry fire from the rifle trenches and redouts, and also by artillery fire from the redoubts. The attack of the 4th Corps on the entrenchment north of Radashiva, having meanwhile failed, the artillery of the western portion of these fortifications then directed its fire across the Tuchinica ravine against the troops of Skobolev, which were attacking the Turkish right.

The efficacy of this severe fire and the ensuing losses brought the air. attack to a stop. Part of the attacking troops halted in the depression and those which had begun to ascend the further slope tried to find cover, and opened a rather ineffective fire against the well-covered adversary. Skobilef now ordered the Ravall Regiment to advance to the support of the troops engaged, and the La Balle Regiment and the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, posted as reserves between the first and second Nol, to take the place of the Ravall Regiment, in the depression between the second and third Nol. The Ravale Regiment advanced for the war. with firm order, crossed the brook, ascended the bare slope beyond, and carried forward with

its parts of the troops engaged there. But the attack of this regiment was also stopped halfway up, and the remnants of the Vladimir and Sustal regiments and the 9th and 10th rifle battalions began to fall back, singly at first, then in crowds. Scobilip now had to decide whether to throw in his last reserves for a decisive attack, or, in view of the failure of the attack of the 4th Corps, to order the retreat of his troops engaged, under the cover, part of his reserves. He decided for the former, the La Bauer Regiment, leaving three companies in rear, and the 11th and 12th rifle battalions, were ordered forward, and were joined by those remnants of the Vladimir Sustal and Ravel regiments and the 9th and 10th rifle battalions, which were

still in the firing line. The whole line advanced with a cheer in the direction of the middle redoubt, and captured the rifle trenches in front, the Turks withdrawing within the line of redoubts. Encouraged by their first success, the Russian battalions continued the attack with great determination, though in disordered crowds. The nearer they approached the enemy's position, the less effective became the enemy's fire. The Turkish line wavered and the foremost Russian detachments penetrated into the trenches between the eastern and middle redouts. At 4.25pm, the middle redoubt was in the hands of the assailants, who seized almost the entire line of trench up to the eastern redoubt. One gun was abandoned in the redoubt.

Several thousand men of various organisations soon filled the interior of the captured redoubt and trenches. Those arriving later found no shelter from the fire from the other positions of the Turks. The captured middle redoubt was, moreover, open to the rear and its interior exposed to fire from the western Christian redoubt, which was making great havoc among the Russians crowded together in the interior. At the same time, strong Turkish reserves advanced to the counter-attack from the entrenched camp in the rear of the line of redouts, partly against the left, partly against the front of the Russians. Caption Kuropatkin, of the general staff gathered some 300 men from those inside the readout, and moving 200 paces to the left,

led them against the enemy. This nucleus was joined by other crowds of assailants arriving at this time, and about 5.15pm, the counter-attack against the Russian left was repulsed, though not without great loss. At 5.30pm, when the Turkish fire slackened somewhat, the Russians began to entrench the captured position on the side toward the enemy. The almost total absence of entrenching tools was painfully felt. The rapid retreat of the Turks who had advanced from the Christian redoubt against the Russian left had been influenced to a certain extent by the appearance of General L'Ontief's cavalry in the vicinity. A horse battery opened fire on the readout and a attachment of dismounted Cossacks occupied the village of Christian, thereby making the Turks uneasy for their

own right flank and preventing an energetic execution of the counterattack against the Russian left. Meanwhile, a brisk fire was maintained from the eastern against the captured middle redoubt, and part of the connecting trench was still in the hands of the Turks. An officer collected a detachment of about 100 volunteers to drive them out, seized the trench, and carried away by success, advanced against the East Redoubt, where most of the men fell under the murderous fire of the Turks. Meanwhile, Colonel Shestakov of the General Staff, acting under orders from Prince Meritinsky, was busy in the rear of the front,

collecting the scattered men and forming them into detachments. Thanks to his efforts, the following detachments formed of scattered men arrived in the line of battle at 5pm, in addition to the three LIBau companies, which had been held back at first, two Sustale companies, half a Ravall company, two and a half Vladimir companies,

and one company of the 12th Rifle Battalion. The detachments belonging to the Vladimir and Ravall regiments, and the 12th Rifle Battalion, reinforced the defenders of the middle readout, over which Major General Dobavalski, commander of the rifle brigade, and, after he was mortally wounded, Major General Tebjinnik, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division, assumed command. The five Lebow and Sustal companies were led forward against the East Readout,

supported by mixed attachments from the Middle Redoubt. At 5.30pm, the East Redoubt fell into the hands of the Russians. Lieutenant Colonel Muzeroy of the Sustal Regiment assumed command there. With the approach of darkness, the Turkish fire sliddle. lacquened somewhat, but never died out completely throughout the night. Subsection 5. The night of September 11th and 12th. As darkness settled down, the troops of the Russian left wing occupied the following positions. Fractions of the Vladimir, Sustel, Raval and Le Baudiments, and of the four rifle battalions

held the two captured redouts and the trenches between them. Opposite their front was the entrenched camp of the Turks, between the town and river, On their left, the Christian redoubt was still in the hands of the Turks. On their right, beyond the Tuchinica Ravine, were the western works of the Radashivo entrenchments. In the rear of the line of battle, the third knoll was not occupied. On the second knoll, two Eslam battalions and two very weak Kaluga battalions cover the great artillery position of 24 guns. One Kaluga Battalion held the village of Brestovets.

To guard the intermediate space of almost 20,000 yards between the captured redoubt and the artillery position on the 2nd NOL. General Skobolev personally took position at dark, with two weak battalions in the middle of the space, at the northern foot of the third knoll, and deployed two companies to cover his right and left, one fronting east, the other fronting west. The remaining three companies halted with Skobolef and faced north.

Scattered men, singly and in groups, moved about everywhere. Some of them returning from the redouts, where they could no longer find cover, and some coming from the rear and endeavouring to find their organisations in the line of battle. Scobolev had as many of them as possible collected by members of his staff and formed into a battalion without regard to the organisations to which they belonged. After some hours the battalion had reached strength of more than 1,000 men, when a new subdivision was made, the men of the several regiments and of the rifle brigade, being each formed into a separate company.

The two companies mentioned had hardly deployed on the flanks when Turkish detachments advanced on the left from the direction of Christian, but were repulsed by the company deployed on that flank. Soon afterward, volleys were fired against the Russian position from the right, and the bullets fell near the reserves. The darkness prevented the firing troops from being recognised, but the patrols reported them to be Russians. Deeming it possible that detachments of the 4th Corps may have crossed the Tuchinica ravine to make a night attack, Skobolev forbade his men to fire. Patrols were sent out and made a positive report that the firing troops were Turks, some hundred paces in front of the Russian skirmish line.

Fire was opened on both sides, but, on account of the darkness, nothing but the flash of the guns could be seen. To get his main body out of the line of Turkish slanking fire, Skobolov led it about 1,000 paces to the rear, in the utmost silence, and prolonged his skirmish lines, which had remained in place, by adding a deployed company to each. The fatigue of his men had become such that they would fall asleep as soon as halted. To be prepared for an emergency,

Skobelov had them waked up from time to time, and formed. By accident, a sotnyer of Caucasian and half a sottenia of Donkoss arrived at Skobilef's position at midnight, whereupon he immediately sent patrols to the right and left beyond the skirmish lines. Sixty of the Cossacks he retained, resolved to oppose them to any sudden attack by the enemy. Upon report that the firing line was getting short of ammunition, Scobolev had ordered up ammunition carts. Two of them reached his position, and he sent the ammunition to the firing line by special detachments. The difference in the armament caused some difficulty. The infantry was armed with the Krenker, the rifles with the burden,

rifle, and the latter were therefore unable to use the infantry ammunition, which alone was contained in the two carts. A Cossack non-commissioned officer, who with 20 Cossacks was sent after burden cartridges, finally bought a small supply in nosebags of his detachment, thus relieving the want to some extent. While the events just described were taking place in the rear of the line of the battle proper, the utmost activity was maintained in the ladder throughout the night. The open gorges of the two captured readouts had to be closed. The enemy's rifle trenches had to be arranged for cover from the opposite side, and some new trenches had to be made to cover the left against the Christian readout,

the lines having been marked out during daylight by Captain Kuropatkin of the General Star. The execution of the work was extremely difficult, owing to the almost total absence of entrenching tools. The Russian soldiers well understood the importance of the task, in view of the murderous character of the enemy's fire, and worked for dear life with bayonets, sidearms, camp kettleids and bare hands. With the beginning of darkness, the Turkish fire had considerably slackened, but toward 10pm, strong Turkish bodies rushed on the Russian position, with much yelling and severe fire.

But in this, as well as in several subsequent attempts, they were repulsed by the fire of the Russians. In one of these attempts, the retreating assailants were mistaken for Russians by fresh Turkish reserves, which were coming up and subjected to a severe musketry fire. End of Section 9. Section 10 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trother. This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair.

Part 9B. The assault on Plevna on the 11th and 12th of September. Subsection 6, the 12th of September. Towards 6am, the Turks opened a severe artillery fire from the Christian Redoubt, the entrenched camp, and the works beyond the Tuchinitsa ravine, and caused at once considerable losses to the Russians. To engage the Christian Redoubt, Scobolev ordered four nine-pounders to be bought inside the middle redoubt, and to open fire, which served to encourage the troops in the redoubt.

Soon afterward, large bodies of Turks, preceded by dense swarms of skirmishes, advanced against the Russian left and penetrated within 300 yards. of the Russian position, despite the severe fire with which they were greeted. There the attack was checked, and soon converted into a retreat. At 900 yards from the Russian position, the Turks halted and opened a severe fire. At 8am, a second Turkish attack began, which was chiefly directed against the left flank of the Russian first line. Scobule, who was on the third knoll, dispatched from there, a skirmish line which opened fire at 900 yards, against the right flank of the attacking Turks.

A battery was brought up to the third knoll to fire against their right. Notwithstanding the effective crossfire of 12 guns, 8 on the 3rd Nol, 4 in the middle redoubt. The Turks approached the Russian rifle trenches, within 500 yards, came to a halt, maintained a brisk fire for some time, and then fell back with great loss. Meanwhile, the defenders of the East redoubt had been engaged since early morning, with the enemy's detachments posted on the outskirts of Pleistair.

and attempting to turn the Russian right. Convinced of the importance of the advantages gained by General Skobolev, Osmond Pasha utilised the inactivity of the Russians opposite his left and centre to send all troops that could possibly be spared to reinforce his threatened right. Leaving a thick skirmish line which maintained a severe fire, in a well-covered position opposite the two redouts in the hands of the Russians,

the Turks assembled their main force near the Christian reading to advance from there against the Russian left. The reinforcements, withdrawn from the east, moved partly through Plevna against the right line of the captured redouts, partly in the Tuchinitz Ravine, against the position of the Russians on the third knoll. At 10.30 a.m., the third attack began, at first from the front and left, against the middle redoubt. After two Turkish batteries had caused great havoc among the defenders crowded together inside,

these men, after an uninterrupted exposure to severe fire for 30 hours, began to waver and to leave the redoubt, singly at first, afterward in crowds. The defenders of the East readout followed the infectious example, but when Scobolev came galloping up from the third knoll, and spoke words of admonition and cheer, all turned about and reoccupied the redouts before the Turks were able to take possession of them. isolated Turkish detachments which succeeded in penetrating into the redouts were cut down on returning to his position on the third knoll scobilef sent forward some companies formed of dispersed men to support the troops engaged at the redouts meanwhile Turkish troops were forming partly in the tachinista ravine itself partly on its eastern edge north of the the radashiva ravine for the purpose of attacking the third knoll A company formed of dispersed riflemen was deployed for the defence of the western edge

while two guns attempted to enfilade the ravine. The Turks nevertheless succeeded in ascending the western edge of the ravine and driving back the Russian riflemen, and it was only when assisted by two Libour companies which had been detached yesterday and had very insignificant losses. And a Caucasian Cossack-Sotnia that the Turks were driven back into the ravine, the Turkish reserves in the ravine at the sudden exit of Plevna fell back into the town. scobilev had become convinced on the eleventh that the capture of the entrenched height between the town and river would decide the victory and on the other hand that he was too weak to gain that result

having asked for reinforcements on the eleventh general scobolef expressed to colonel orloff who arrived from grand headquarters to inform himself of the state of affairs his opinion that without reinforcements he would be unable to maintain his position Early on the morning of the 12th, Scobolev received a copy of the following order addressed to General Prince Emeritinsky. By direction of the Commander-in-Chief, I order you and General Scobolev to entrench and maintain yourselves, in the positions captured the day. We cannot send reinforcements because we have none. Signed, Zotov, Lieutenant General. Notwithstanding this discouraging order, Scobolef,

hoped for a favourable turn, since the entire Fourth Corps stood east of the Tuchinica ravine, apparently in readiness for battle, but inactive. At 10.30 a.m. as the third Turkish attack began, Colonel Ollor delivered to General Skobolev, the following order. By order of the Commander-in-Chief, if you cannot hold the captured positions, you are to fall back, if possible, not before evening. In the direction of Tuchnizze, covered by the cavalry of General Leontye. Communicate this order, which is to be kept secret otherwise, to General Prince Emeritinsky. The Gravizzeridout is in our hands, but the attack is not to be continued,

and we are to fall back slowly. 8.30 a.m., signed, Zotov, Lieutenant General. Even after the receipt of this order, Skobloff did not give up hope of a general turn for the better. He hoped at any moment to see the fourth quarter. advanced to the attack, to the east of the Tchitchnitsa ravine. The situation of the defenders in the redout was becoming more and more critical, receiving fire not only from the Christian redoubt in front, but from the Radashevo works in rear. At 1pm, two of the four guns in the middle redoubt had become useless,

and the other two were almost without men and teams. Skobolev ordered these guns to be relieved by three guns of the fifth battery of the third brigade, processed in rear of the third knoll. The movement having attracted the attention of the Turks, they increased their fire, causing considerable loss to the newly arrived guns in the redoubt, but the latter now opened up on the Christian readout. The one ammunition wagon brought along was posted between the breastwork and traverse, the only comparatively safe place in the readout. It was nevertheless blown up by a hostile shell, killing and wounding many men in the narrow space of the redoubt. Among the wounded

was Major General Tebjianic, who had assumed command in the redoubt after the wounding of General Jobovolski and Captain Kurapakkin of the General Staff. At 2pm, the last available troops sent by General Prince Emeritinsky arrived. Two exceedingly small Kaluga battalions, here to four retained as protection for the artillery position, and a detachment made up of 200 dispersed riflemen were disposed as follows. Four Kaluga companies proceeded to the redouts. Three companies covered the right, on the third knoll, against the Tachinza ravine. Three companies took post in the rear of the left.

The combined rifle detachment was at first posted in the rear of the second knoll as a last general reserve, but was soon ordered forward to the left, where Scoboleff also ordered four guns to proceed and to take up a covered position. Soon afterward, the fourth attack began from the Christian readout. This time, Scobolef allowed the Turks to approach within 500 yards, and then greeted them with rapid musketry fire from his infantry, and canister from his four concealed guns. The Turks halted and replied to the fire. but their fresh reserves were not able to carry the attack forward.

After three quarters of an hour of very costly fire action, the Turks fell back. At 2.30pm, when Skobolev arrived at the redoubt to examine personally how matters stood in his first line, the fortifications presented a ghastly spectacle. The interior of both redouts and the trench connecting them were filled with corpses. The gorge of the east redoubt, opened toward Plevna, was closed by a, breastwork made of corpses. The three guns of the third brigade, in the middle readout, were dismounted, the cannoneers killed or wounded. The two dismounted guns of the second brigade were removed, and the abandoned Turkish gun was rendered unserviceable by the removal of the breach block.

The movements of the Turkish troops were plainly visible as they assembled from all directions at Plevner against Skobolef's right. Those Turkish troops, which had heretofore, made several attacks from the Christian redoubt against the Russian left departed for the same point. Upon his return from the redouts to the Green Hills, Skobleff was informed that the Shuzha regiment, numbering 1,300 men, had come from the centre to support him. He retained the regiment in reserve and sent several hundred dispersed men to reinforce the defenders of the redouts. At 4.30pm, the Turks advanced in several lines to make the fifth attack simultaneously on boast redouts. The severe flight of the war.

which greeted them, did not check them. Though the leading columns resolved themselves into disordered swarms, still they continued to advance with the termination, and they were followed in the rear by fresh troops. Before this overwhelming attack, the defenders of the middle redoubt began to give way, and abandoned the redoubt in swarms. The small body of brave men, which faced the attack, fell after a furious hand-to-hand struggle, among them Major Gortilov, who had greatly distinguished himself on this bloody day. Despite the loss of the middle redoubt, Lieutenant Colonel Muzawoy held out in the East redoubt against the attack which was now directed against him from the front and both flanks.

To prevent the useless sacrifice of the brave garrison of this redoubt, Skobolev ordered Mozawoy to fall back, and in order to make the withdrawal possible, he advanced in person with the Shuzha Regiment and a battery, covering the retreat of all the troops engaged in front, An attempt at pursuit on the part of the Turks was frustrated by a splendid charge of two sootnies of Cossacks. A battery of 24 guns on the second knoll, guarded by some detachments formed of dispersed men of the Vladimir, Sustal and Raval regiments, covered the further retreat, the troops carrying their wound along as best they could. On the 13th of September, Skobelph remained almost the entire day on the first knoll, and at 7pm fell back by order to begot.

The total losses The total losses sustained by the Russians in the attacks on Plevna from the 7th to the 12th of September is stated in round numbers at 300 officers and 12,500 men, including 60 officers and 3,000 men killed. According to the special lists of losses, the two regiments of the right wing, which captured the Gravitsa readout,

lost 22 officers and 1,305 men. The seven regiments which vainly attacked the Rediscivo works in the centre lost 110 officers and 5,249 men, adding about 300 for the losses sustained during the artillery attack on the first day of the attack. We have, for the troops of the left wing under Skobolev, six regiments and four rifle battalions, a loss of 160 officers and 5,600 men.

individual losses cannot be accurately ascertained from the available data. Still, some figures may be given as accurate. The Uglitz and Jarraslav regiments, which attacked prematurely in the centre, lost respectively 3,700 and 300 killed. Of Skobilef's troops, the Vladimir Regiment lost 200, the Sustal 150 killed, the former regiment lost 36 officers killed and wounded, the latter 15 officers. The third rifle brigade, consisting of four battalions, which had entered upon the theatre of war barely 3,000 strong, and had lost at Lovcha, one officer and 132 men killed, and 172 men wounded, lost here its commander, Major General Dobravalski, three officers and 177 men killed, and 20 officers and 666 men wounded. Of the superior leaders, Major General Dobrovolski, of the Rifle Brigade, was among the killed.

as already stated, Major General Rodionov, commanding the First Brigade of the Fifth Division, and Major General Tebjinnik, commander of the First Brigade of the 16th Division, were wounded. The loss of the Romanians, 56 officers and 2,500 men, has been previously stated. The losses of the Turks are not accurately known. Opposite General Skobolev, they must have been very heavy. Comments Comment 1 The above description of the attack on the Russian Gravitzer readout

is based on the official Russian report. Other accounts state that two attacks were repulsed and that the third succeeded. The difference may be explained by the two halts made by the assailing troops, which practically did interrupt the advance, though it does not imply that the attack was repulsed. There was no preparation by infantry fire.

The tactical form of the attack was about the same as that of the unsuccessful assault on the same works on July 30th, but in this instance the real result was gained by the advance of portions of the well-longed, regiment passed the flank of the redoubt for it seems that the entrance of portions of the regiment through the gorge of the redoubt and the engagement of the Turkish reserves in Ria by other detachments brought the attack to a successful

issue it is not quite clear whether in forming for the attack the first and second line of each regiment consisted of one battalion each or whether two battalions were formed abreast each in two lines of company columns in view of the formation used on other occasions where they are clearly described the latter seems more probable. Since the first two lines are expressly stated to have been formed in company columns, it may be assumed that in the third line the battalions were formed in mass. It would seem, however, that all three lines started at the same time with comparatively short distances. The two halts seemed to have diminished the distances between the lines.

The whole, in the further course of the attack, formed a single mass of unequal depth. Special tactical employment of the lines and reserve was out of the question. reach the enemy about the same time. Although the faulty cooperation of the two columns who are attacking the same work may be attributed to several causes, it nevertheless remains reprehensible from the professional point of view, proper combination and cooperation of the double attack would no doubt have accomplished its object more quickly and with less loss. Comment 2.

The details of the failure of the attack of the centre are still enshrouded in obscurity. No tactical details are known, and the whole. thing seems to have been a wild chaos from the beginning. The fact that an unfortunate accident caused the premature advance of the Uglitz and Jarrislavre Sliaments does not provoke criticism, but it may well be asked whether the procedure after that event might not have been better contrived. Abaying the letter of his orders, General Shittnikov held back the two regiments still in hand until 3pm. For three hours he allowed the regiments who had advanced prematurely to fight single-handed. It might have been assumed as certain that these two regiments alone

would not be able to take the enemy's works. On the other hand, it could not be presumed that these regiments would be really effective after fighting single-handed for three hours against great odds. Hence, after the advance of the Uglitz and Jarraslav regiments, General Shitnikov should have either pushed the Kazan and Shudra regiments also forward at once, or the Kozlov and Warranesh regiments should have been brought up in order to undertake the attack with sufficient strength from the very beginning, for, as above stated, the Uglitz and Jaroslav regiments could, under the circumstances, not be counted upon at three o'clock. Under the circumstances, there was no good reason for postponing the attack until three o'clock,

pursuant to the disposition, for not only had the advance of those two regiments compelled a large part of the Russian artillery to cease firing, but the Turks had been long alarmed and prepared for the assault, hence the contemplated surprise could, under no circumstances, be realized. Did the commander-in-chief, posted in the rear of the centre, receive any information whatever of the premature attack? If yes, when? Did he express no opinion whatever to General Shittnikov as to what he should do? In what formation was the attack made? When and in what direction did the regiments from the reserve advance? These are questions which cannot as yet be answered, but which are indispensable for any real criticism of the bloody events in the centre.

Comment 3. In turning now to the events on the Russian left, the peculiarly a mode of command obtaining here attracts our attention. Prince Amaritinsky was the senior general, but he played an entirely subordinate role by the side of the younger Scobolev, and was pushed altogether into the background by the latter. During the initiatory actions on the 8th, 9th and 10th of September, the Meritinsky officially had command over all the troops of the left wing. Scobolev was subordinated to him, but acted independently as commander of an advance. Guard, which was increased to a strength equal to two-thirds of the whole corps, since a very small part of the troops under Emeritinsky's command was not engaged on the 10th. His initial

subsidence is less striking, but on the 11th of September, matters were different. On this day, Scoboleff was charged direct from the headquarters of the West Army with the conduct of the attack on the south front of the enemy's position, and was reinforced by part of Ameritinsky's troops. The latter was left in command of the remaining troops, and ordered to support Scobolelleges, if necessary. In the course of the action, Prince of Marotinsky gradually sent all his troops to General Scobolef's assistance, so that in the end he had not a company under his command, and was a mere spectator on the battlefield, and was even favourably mentioned in the junior's direct report to the commander-in-chief for making himself useful in collecting the dispersed men

and looking after the sanitary service. These are conditions for which our conception lacks understanding and expression. Comment four, Scobolef's method of conducting the action exhibits the traits discussed in connection with the events of July 30th on a larger scale. Careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position. General preparation of the attack by concentrated artillery fire. Careful formation of the infantry and fighting line. Special reserves in the rear of the flanks and a general reserve in two lines. Special preparation of the attack by brisk fire of strong, well-covered skirmish lines, increased wherever possible by that of some batteries, or at least some guns brought into the front line. Advance of the internet. Advance of the

infantry by stages, occupation of the new line reached and renewed preparation by infantry and artillery fire from that point. Great care for the safety of the flanks. Why is husbanding of the reserves, wherever practicable, new reserves were formed from troops heretofore engaged? Notwithstanding the unfavourable condition of the ground for cavalry, the latter was at the right place at the decisive moment was properly employed and took a decisive part in the action. Lastly, the indefatigable efforts in collecting scattered men, which alone made it possible again and again to lead formed and half-fresh detachments into the action. To be sure, mistakes may have been made in the details of tactical employment, of the individual bodies of troops, but the conduct of the battle as a whole

presents a brilliant picture, interesting and fascinating in its smallest details. Comment 5. It was only by their utmost efforts that the Turks succeeded on the 12th of September in recapturing the redoubts lost on the preceding day, when the complete inactivity of the Russians opposite the Turkish left and centre left the latter free to use most of their available troops for the support of their right. Had the Turks failed to drive Skobolev from the position he had captured, and there can be little doubt that this would have been the case, had the Russian right and centre shown any activity whatever,

had the Russians permanently ensconced themselves on the heights south of Plevna and posted their numerous artillery there, the remaining portions of the Turkish position would, it is presumed, have become untenable. That the Supreme Command failed to appreciate the importance of the advantages gained by Skobolev, or to do anything for their completion, preservation or attention, is probably due to the fact that the Supreme Command, posted in the rear of the centre, near Radishivo, was so struck and influenced by the defeat inflicted under its own eyes as to be unable to divert its mind to any other thought.

the complete inaction of the russian centre on the twelfth at a time when but a short distance away the furious action on the green hills was fought out does not admit of explanation by the theory of exhaustion and losses on the previous day there can be no doubt that the defeat witnessed on the preceding day had deprived the supreme command of confidence in a happy result and that the only thought was to find some honourable way out of the battle at the time when scoblus request for reinforcements was denied four entirely fresh regiments were available in the centre, not to mention the In German Land Regiment of the 3rd Division, which was not mentioned in the disposition, and seems to have been the special escort of headquarters. The Shusia Regiment, which came to Skobloff's assistance at noon on the 12th, and covered the retreat of the other troops by an offensive movement,

was one of the seven regiments which on the preceding day had suffered defeat in the centre. It may therefore be presumed that the other regiments, excepting perhaps the Uglitz and Jaroslav regiments, were again fit for action. At any rate, they would have been capable to undertake the protection of the artillery positions, thus setting those four fresh regiments free. It should be stated, however, that the Shudja Regiment were sent to Skobblef's assistance not by the Supreme Command, which was opposed to any continuation of the battle, but by the commander of the Fourth Corps, from courtesy, as it were.

End of Section 10 Section 11 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trother. This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair Part 10 Work of the Cavalry on the Left Bank of the Vid Subsection 1 General Loshkareff from the 7th to the 19th of September

On September 7th, General Loshkaref, commander of the 9th Cavalry Division was posted on the high road east of Gravica, between the 9th Corps and the Romanians, with the Astrakhan Dragoons, number 8, Kazan Dragoons, number 9, Buglanza Regiment, number 9, Don Cossacks, number 9, and the 16th horse, and the second Don Cossack battery. He was ordered to move to Rabin, past the night there, to draw himself both regular remaining cavalry regiments, the 5th and 6 irregular cavalry regiments, and 1 Romanian horse battery, to cross the vid on the next day, with the United Cavalry Corps,

to make an energetic advance towards Dubnick, and to threaten the communications of Osman Pasha's army by taking suitable position on the left bank. Pursuant to this order, the eight regiments of cavalry and three batteries were assembled by 9pm, September 7th, at Reben, on the right bank of the brook which there emptied into the vid. At 6am, September 8th, the vid was crossed, and at 11.30am, Smaret Tresnik was reached,

8 miles west of Ribbon, and about the same distance to the north-west, of the bridge over the vid at Plevna. Wheeling to the left, the cavalry corps took front toward the southeast against Plevna. Thence the Rossiori regular brigade, with the battery, moved to Dolny, Lower, Netropoli, with instructions to observe Plevna and the road leading thence to Rohova. The main body of the corps marched through Gorney, Upper Netropoli, to Dolny Dubnick, where it went into Bivouac at 1.45pm.

On the march, the Cossacks of the Advanced Guard captured a small herd of cattle, whose armed escort fled to Plevna. Nothing further was seen of the enemy. The line of outposts of the Romanians at lower Netropoli extended from the Vid opposite Bivalar to the Sofia Road, facing the west front of the Plevner position. At the Sophia Road began the Russian outpost line, formed of two Lancers' squadrons and a sopnea of Cossacks,

which extended at first southward along the heights between the Vid and the High Road, turned off to the west halfway between lower and upper Dubnick, crossed the road and fronted toward upper Dubnick. The length of the entire line was about 13 miles. A separate detachment was posted in the rear of the whole position in observation of the road from Lower Dubnick to Rohover. The distance between Lower Dubnick and Lower Netropoli is about six miles. The former place is four miles from the bridge over the vid at Plevner,

the latter about two and a half miles. At 4pm reports were received from the outposts that from 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry, followed by three battalions of infantry, were approaching Lower Dubnick from Plevna. At the same time, the Romanians reported that about four battalions of infantry, with some cavalry, were approaching Lower Netropoli, and that the works of the west front of the Plevna position had opened an artillery fire. The Romanians were ordered to maintain themselves at Lower Netropoli,

as best they could. The balance of the Ninth Lancers, First and Second squadrons, Assopnia of Cossacks, and four Cossack guns were dispatched to support the Russian outposts. The main body was posted in readiness at Lower Dubnick. The Turkish infantry halted within the range of protection afforded by the works. The 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry advanced against the Russian line of outposts, which fell slowly back on its supports. Of the latter, one half of the first squadron, supported by the formed attachments of the outpost squadron, third and fourth, advanced against the Turks from the front.

The other half of the first squadron took them on the left flank, a platoon of the second squadron on the right flank. After a brief hand-to-hand conflict, the Turks fell back on their infantry, and the pursuing lances were received with infantry fire and retired. The Turkish cavalry left 70 dead on the ground. The Turkish detachments, which had been advancing against the Romanians, retired to the works after a brief artillery fire, without having made a real attack. After the outposts had taken their former positions and the four Cossack guns had been posted under cover to one side of the high road, the Turks again advanced to the attack at 6pm with infantry.

At 1,500 yards the Turks were greeted with shrapnel fire from the heretofore concealed guns and retired at once. The total Russian losses on this day were three men and nine horses killed, nine men and 22 horses wounded, the Romanian suffered no loss. Early on the 9th of September, patrols were sent out westward toward the Isker, south-eastward along the high road, and southward up the Vid.

Upon report of the appearance of Tahrke-S's west of Upper Dubnick, two Sotniers of the 9th Cossacks were dispatched in that direction at 2pm. At 3.30pm, the outposts reported the approach of strong hostile bodies against the position of the Rossioree at lower Netropoli, and that bodies of hostile troops were assembling at the bridge over the Vid opposite. the Russian position. Upon receipt of this report, the whole corps was placed in readiness. At 4.30pm, bodies of hostile troops appeared on the heights on the left bank of the vid, and farther to the south, dense skirmish lines, cavalry on the flanks, closed infantry and artillery

in rear, amounting to about six battalions, one cavalry regiment and four guns. The attack was supported by artillery fire from the works of Oppenetz, and was made with great determination. The regular brigade retired from Lower Netropoli. With a view of utilizing the favorable situation for a successful attack, General Loshkarev ordered the Romanians to fall back to the heights of Upper Netropoli in order to entice the Turks as far as possible from their works. As soon as the main body took the enemy in the flank, the Romanians were to attack in front. The 8th Dragoon Regiment, on outpost south of Lower Netropoli, was to push two dismounted squadrons under cover of the High Corn and a depression of the ground against the left flank of the Turks

advancing on the Romanians. The attack was to be supported on the left by two mounted squadrons of the 9th dragoons with two guns of the 16th horse battery. Two lancers squadrons and the remaining four guns of the horse battery were posted on the right as protection against any Turks who might advance from the bridge over the vid. Two sotniers of Cossacks having been dispatched to Upper Dubnick and two squadrons of the 8th dragoons and probably also a Sotnia of Cossacks, having been deployed on the extensive outpost line. There remained in general reserve, four squadrons of dragoons and lancers, three Sotnia's of Cossacks, the Cossack Battery, and probably two Kalarashi irregular

regiments, of whose special employment nothing is known. The attack directed simultaneously against their front and flank, caused the Turks to fall back to their works, about 6pm, whereupon the troops at the bridge also withdrew. While this engagement was in progress, the detachment of Cossack. Cossacks dispatched to Upper Dubnick reported that it had encountered to Herkesas, and that an infantry camp of some 10,000 men had been observed in the rear of the wood west of Upper Dubnick. Loshcaref now ordered his outposts into their original positions and moved with his main body to Lower Netropoli.

The 9th Cossacks remained at Lower Dubnick with instructions to light a large number of campfires with a view of deceiving the enemy at Upper Dubnick as to the strength of the troops at Lower Dubnick, and at the same time, with the Turks in Plevna to believe that the reinforcements from Reben had arrived at Lower Netropoli in the evening. The aggregate loss of the Russians and Romanians on the 9th of September was, one man and 11 horses killed, one man missing, and 25 men and 31 horses wounded. Early on September 10th, the Corps took up the following position. The regular brigade between Upper and Lower Netropoli, facing Plevner,

all four Russian regiments, with both batteries and the fifth militia regiment at lower Dubnick, their right resting on the high road, their front facing south covered by the Dubnik Brook, a branch of the Vid, the sixth militia regiment, south of Upper Netropoli, connecting the two bodies. The Turks could be plainly observed increasing and strengthening the works of their west front. A number of guns were placed in battery. The Turks were evidently expecting the beginning of a serious attack from this direction. Besides several small patrols which reconnoited the ground on both sides of the high road between the Vid and the Iska, as well as the ground beyond the Isker,

two strong patrols were dispatched with instructions to seek communication with the cavalry of the left wing of the West Army and to cross to the right bank of the Vid above Plevner, if necessary for the accomplishment of their object. The fourth squadron of the Ninth Lancers crossed to the right bank of the Vid at Medavan, six miles above the bridge, and scattered in an easterly direction as far as far as the first. Keble, two miles southeast of Medavan, without meeting either Turks or Russians. A sultania of Cossacks which attempted to cross at Desoitsa, three miles above the bridge, found the village held by Turkish infantry and cavalry, and fell back. The reports of all the patrols agreed that small bodies of Turkesses were roaming between the

Vid and Iska, and the beyond the Iska, they were in greater force. On September 11th, a squadron of regular Romanian cavalry was ordered to cross the Iska at Magaleda. west of Lower Dubnick, and send patrols as far as possible in the direction of Rojova-Wydden. For the purpose of establishing communication with the left flank of the West Army, a second squadron of the Ninth Lancers was sent out with orders to find the Russian troops under all circumstances, and, if possible, to communicate directly with the commander-in-chief. The squadron accomplished its object and returned the next day by the same route, capturing a Turkish officer on the road.

Moreover, a squadron of the fourth dragoons, dispatched by General Iontief, commanding the cavalry of the left wing of the West Army, arrived during the day. During the night of the 11th to 12th, skirmishing took place along the entire line of outposts, with small bodies of Tahrquesses and Bashi Basi bassooks, who endeavoured to steal through to the west and south, and lost some killed and prisoners in the attempt. At the same time, many Bulgarians, with empty wagons, were leaving Plevna. On the 12th of September, the Turks began construction of a new battery along the high road to sweep the approaches of the bridge.

At Oppenetz also, a four-gun battery was built against the Romanian battery at Lower Netropoli. On September 13th, the Romanian squadron dispatched to Magaleta reported that the patrols on the previous day found the neighbouring villages full of Teherkesses and Bashi Bashezzukes. The total losses of the Romanians in this reconnaissance consisted of one man wounded. A detachment of two squadrons of lancers which advanced on the high road toward Tellis and dispatched small patrols to the right toward the Iska, and on the left to Rakita and Radamurza, found in all the villages plundering to Herkesses and Basie Bassooks, who retired on the appearance of the lancers.

Patrol sent out on the 14th and 15th of September, rendered similar reports. On the latter day, seven sotnias of the Don Cossack Brigade of General Shernovsabov, with the 15th Don Cossack battery, arrived at Lower Dubnick and bought an order for the 9th Cossacks to move to Bogot, south of Plevenor on the road to Lovshire. The patrol sent out on the 16th everywhere,

had skirmishes with the Herkesses and armed inhabitants. The Romanians at Magaleda lost one man and one horse killed. During the night, an attack was made from Plevna against the 5th Irregular Regiment, which was on outpost along the vid. The attack was repulsed without lost to the row. Romanians. The patrols sent out southward on the 17th and 18th of September, no longer met with hostile detachments. In the evening, an attack on the outposts north of the high road

was repulsed with the loss of one man wounded. The Turks had two men killed. The first brigade of the 4th Cavalry division, having arrived on the evening of the 18th of September, General Loshkarev Sutherbergat at 10 o'clock next morning. With the rest of his division, the 9th lances, the dragoons, and the 9th Cossacks preceding him there. The 9th hussars had throughout this period been at the east of Plevna. General Loshkreff, then with his 9th Cavalry Division, guarded the left of the West Army. Subsection 2, General Krilov, from September 19th to October 7th. General Krilov, the newly appointed commander of the combined cavalry corps on the left bank of the Vid, arrived at Lower Dubnick on the 19th of September. Reinforcements, consisting of a Don

Cossack brigade, a Caucasian Cossack brigade, and part of the 4th Cavalry Division. which had heretofore been posted on the left of the West Army near Bogot and toward Lovcha, arrived at Lower Dubnick partly before, partly at the same time with Krylov. The task of the Corps was to cut off all supplies from the Turkish army at Plevna, to save the troops as much as possible, to prevent entirely any cooperation of the troops in Plevna with operations on the left bank of the Vid, or to entice the troops from Plevna to such a distance as to temporarily weaken the garrison. About the time of the arrival of Krilov and the main body of his core at Lower Dubnick,

reports came in of the approach of hostile columns from Magaleta. These reports proved erroneous, but still Krilov bestowed special attention to the country of Magaleta and west of the Iska. On September 20th, Colonel Stackleberg, with two squadrons of Assars, two squadrons of irregulars, and two guns, scattered toward Telas in order to reconnoit of the country between the Iska and the High Road, as far as Rakita. Near Tellis, he encountered strong hostile attachments and fell back after a brief engagement. In order to more accurately ascertain the strength and position of the enemy,

Colonel Tutolman, with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, two squadrons of regular cavalry, and the 8th Don Battery, was again dispatched toward Tellis. His vigorous attack developed about ten Turkish battalions in sconesed in rifle trenches, and about two regiments of cavalry. Three guns were covered by entrenchments, and several others were in the open. While the action was taking place, a general staff officer made a sketch of the enemy's position. The enemy's strength was estimated at 10,000 or 12,000 men. On the 22nd of September, the outposts reported that considerable hostile forces were approaching Lower Dubnick from Upper Dubnick,

and that the strong Russian patrols were falling back fighting to Lower Dubnick. General Krilov at first decided to make a stand at Lower Dubnick, But on receipt of information from Loshkaref on the right bank that he was marching on TELUS, Kralov decided to attack the enemy in front, while Loshkreff, as he supposed, was attacking in Ria. After Krilov had opened the action by a brisk artillery fire, the sound of the guns of Loshkref's detachment was heard at 3 o'clock, not, however, in the enemy's rear, but in prolongation of the Russian left.

At the same time, reports came in from the outposts at Lower Dubnick that strong bodies of hostile inventory were advancing from the bridgehead against the Russian position. In view of these circumstances, Krilov led his court as Maret Ristnich, leaving a strong advance guard, the Don Cossack Brigade, and the irregular brigade, at Netropoli. The infantry advancing from the bridgehead retired within the works toward evening. On the morning of the 23rd of September, the advance guard at Netropoli reported that the hostile forces at Upper Dubnick had marched into Plevner during the night under the fire of the 15th battery attached to the Don Cossack Brigade. On the 24th, Krilov was ordered to cover the right of the army

by taking position a breast of Brestovets, midway between the Lower Vid and the Lower Iska, and to fall back in case of necessity, to Ribenne. At the same time, reports arrived from the west of the presence of bodies of Turkesses, collecting provisions for the Turkish army. On the 25th of September, Krilov marched to Rojova with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade. the Romanian regular brigade, the first brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, the 8th dragoons, and three batteries. A flanked attachment marched to Bielos Latina. Bodies of Turkcesses were driven from several of the villages of that vicinity.

The telegraph line between Witten and Plevena was cut. On the 26th of September, the three redouts covering Rojova were bombarded, and one Turkish gun dismounted. Krilov made no attempt to capture Rojova, since he would not have been able to hold it. Nor did he desire to set it on fire by shells, as the village was chiefly inhabited by Bulgarians. On the 28th, Kralov retired to Riemann, to replenish his provisions and ammunition, and on the 30th, the corps again stood at Smaret Trestenik. During the absence of the main body, the detachment at Netropoli captured two wagon trains of 20 and 100 wagons, loaded with flour and barley, respectively,

and on another occasion relieved a Turkish foraging party of a part of the hay collected, On the 30th of September, Colonel Levis advanced with four sotonyers of the Vladi Caucasian regiment, two squadrons of Charkov Lancers, two squadrons of Mariupol Hassars, and the eighth horse battery, on Tellus and Radamurza. He reported on October 1st that he'd encountered bashi bashoques and pursued them to Lukovica, that his detachment had captured one thousand head of beef cattle, 80 horses, and a wagon train loaded with salt and quinine, and that the bridge at Radamurza and the Telegraph line had again been destroyed as far as Lukovica. On the 1st of October, General Chermatt, commander-in-chief of the Romanian army,

appeared and informed General Krilov that he had arranged for a reconnaissance in force on the next day by a body of Romanian troops against the position of Opponets and requested support. In compliance with the request, General Krilov ordered the detachment at Netropoli to advance on October 2 against Opponets. learning of the advance of a strong Turkish corps of all arms from the bridgehead against Lower Netropoli he sent forward all the troops at Smarach-Trestenik. On reaching the detachment, General Krylov found the 15th Don Battery engaged with Turkish infantry and artillery, which had advanced to Lower Netropoli.

The Romanian and 8th Don Batteries came at once into action on the right of the engaged battery and took part in the conflict. One of the enemy's guns was dismounted, an ammunition cart blown up, and Netropoli was set on fire by shells. The 15th Don Battery being seriously molested by the fire of Turkish skirmishes ensconced in the outskirts of the village, two squadrons of the fourth dragoons dismounted and drove them away. The retreat of the Turkish infantry was covered by an attack of a body of Turkesses and to cover the dismounted dragoons, two sotnyers of the Cuban regiment advanced and threw the Turkesses back on their infantry. At 1.30pm, the Romanian Colonel Cherkus

reported that the reconnaissance against Oppenetz could not take place. And as it would have had no purpose under these circumstances to continue the action, General Krilov withdrew to his right about 3pm. An attempt of the Turks to take the Russian detachment in left flank was frustrated by a counter-attack of the Cuban regiment. Meanwhile, the detachment of Colonel Levis had advanced southward and its patrols had established communication with General Loshkareff's cavalry, scouting on the right bank of the vid. Having burned the bridge at Schovennybreg on October 2, while en route from Radomirza to Sumer-Korkev, Knoel Levis moved from Sumercova on October 3rd and assembled at Lukovica in the evening, having skirmished with Terkesas on the way. The bridge at Lukovica was demolished.

Sir Mail was captured and sent to Krylov, and by him, to the commander of the West Army. On the 4th and 5th of October, Levis remained at Radamurza with the main body, and sent patrols in all directions. On the 6th of October, he was attacked by some 4,000 or 5,000 infantry and Turgesses from Lukovica. Up to 2pm he repulsed the attacks on his front, but at this hour an equally strong body, which left Plevner in the morning, appeared in his rear. Covered by the fire of his artillery and dragoons, Levis withdrew, crossed the Iska, and moved to Somovo.

On the 7th of October, Levis moved to Magaleta, from which point, a detachment sent against Tellus reported Upper and Lower Dubnick occupied by the Turks. By entrenching Lukovica, Tellus, and Upper and Lower Dubnick, the Turks'clock protected their line of communication from Orkani to Plevna so effectively that the Russian cavalry was compelled to abandon for the present all attempts to cut the line. The investment at the west of Plevna, which for a time seemed successfully established, was completely broken. Comments The task of the Russian-Romanian cavalry was to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching Plevna. The task might have been accomplished by defensive means. It est the cavalry might

bar the road to an approaching relief corps in some favourable position, or it might go to meet the relieving troops and try to overthrow them by a vigorous and unexpected attack. The latter method is more in keeping with the tactical ideas of cavalry than a pure defensive in which the inherent strength of the arm, modern armament and training notwithstanding, cannot be fully developed. In the period described above, the Russian cavalry made no attempt whatever to solve the problem by offensive action, and the very weak defensive attempt failed completely. The work of the Russo-Romanian cavalry may be divided into two portions, the period of the attempted investment up to the successful movement of the Turkish Relief

Corps, September 23rd, and the period of simple observation subsequent to that day. Within the latter period fall the movement on Rojova from September 25th to 28th, and the expedition of Colonel Levis to Lukovica from September 30th to October 7th. 8th of September, the day when Loshkarev was dispatched to the left bank of the vid, the artillery preload to the great attack on Plevna was beginning. At this moment, it was not so much Loshkareff's task to cut Plevna from a leave without, as to facilitate the attack on the east by demonstrations on the west, and, in the case of the capture of Plevna, to cut off the retreat of the fleeing Turks on the left bank, it is evident that the appearance of the strong body of cavalry

opposite the west side of their position attracted the attention of the Turks in no small degree, but we fail to note any sensible effect on the events of the East Front. On the receipt by Loshkreff on September 9th of information that a hostile core of some 10,000 men was in the vicinity of Upper Dubnick, it was to be expected that a strong advance would be made at once in that direction to verify the correctness of this important information. Loshkoref, however, contented himself with taking up a defensive position so close to Plevner as to expose himself to the danger of being attacked simultaneously by the relief-coeur. Corps and by the garrison of Plevner itself.

Upon the abandonment of the idea of a capture of Plevner by assault, after the failure of the attack on September 11th, the investment, particularly on the West, became the important feature. Loshkaref, with part of the cavalry, was withdrawn from the left bank to the right bank, where he covered the left of the army. In his place, Krylov made his appearance with considerable reinforcements, so that the total strength of the Cavalry Corps operating on the left bank must be put down at not less than 6,000 or 7,000 effectives.

Krylov had very pertinent instructions from the commander-in-chief to meet any relief corps at as greater distance as possible from Plevna. Yet when the approach of a strong hostile corps from Telas became known, Krylov remained close to Plevna, and, upon the appearance of the enemy, fell back without offering any serious resistance, so that the Turks had no difficulty in getting their large train of provisions and ammunition into the town.

The task demanded of General Krylov and his cavalry was the cavalry task of the most common sort. He failed completely and made no attempt to solve the problem by force of arms. The passage in Kralov's orders, to save his troops as much as possible in the solution of his dusk, may perhaps be admitted as an explanation, though by no means an extenuation of his feeble action. That phrase was not well chosen and served no clear purpose,

that a general should save its troops, as much as possible, is so elementary a rule that it would be trivial and unnecessary to call attention to it. If it is used, it is apt to lead a careful and prudent man into such exaggerated caution as to render any success impossible, because real success against an active enemy will rarely be gained without bloody sacrifices. If Krylov had been compelled to leave the road open to the Turks, after losing a few hundred of his horsemen in a fruitless defensive action, or in a vigorous, though, hopeless charge, the Russians might have consoled themselves with the idea that the fortune of war is variable. But it is hardly to be assumed that the Russian commander-in-chief was satisfied when the Turks were able to accomplish their object,

almost without any shedding of blood, in the face of 6,000 to 7,000 eager horsemen. It is interesting to note how Kralov in his report seeks to vindicate, not to say excuse, his action. In the first place, he claimed credit for delaying the arrival of the Relief Corps in Plevner, by 48 hours. Since no decisive events were taking place in Plevenor at the time, it was a matter of indifference whether the Turkish corps arrived 48 hours sooner or later. He justified his retreat from Lower Dubnick to Samarit Tresnik on September 22nd by stating

that the point was but a little farther from the high road than Lower Dubnick and much closer to the line of the retreat of the corps, Reben, and that the posting of the detachment at Netropoli furnished the means for observing everything that passed in and out of Plevna. To watch the Turks from a distance carrying provisions into Plevena did not, we should say, require the presence of a body of 7,000 cavalry. If the entire affair could be repeated with the difference of having Skobolev or Gorko at the head of the Cavalry Corps, a comparison between the action and that of Krylov would be

as interesting as it would be instructive. The very interesting events during the first week of October could, unfortunately, not be described in full, owing to the lack of reliable information. The expedition of Colonel Levis was the first attempt, though undertaken with insufficient force, to accomplish the investment of Plevna by offensive movements, and the idea of opposing an attempt at relief at Lukovica rather than at Dubnick was certainly correct. But there is a certain obscurity in the accounts before us, as to what the main body of some 40 squadron was doing while Levis was advancing southward with 12 squadrons and eight guns, and how a comparatively small Turkish force should find it possible under his very eyes to advance against Levis's rear.

The numerous tactical details, which it was possible to interweave in the description, are of interest in judging the tactics of the Russian cavalry. It is much to be regretted that information as to the tactical details and losses in the two most important actions, at Netropoli on the 2nd and at Lukovica on the 6th of October, are scant in the case of the former and lacking altogether in the case of the latter. End of Section 11 Section 12 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trother.

This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 11A. Investment of Plevna from the West Subsection 1. The Communications of Plevena to the rear As early as the beginning of hostilities, an army of newly formed reserves was assembled at Sofia. About the time of the Russian passage of the Danube, part of it was put in motion and affected its junction at Plevenor with Osman Pash's army from Widen. When, after their repeated failure to capture Plevner by force, the Russians threatened

to cut the communications of the army posted there, it became the... the duty of the force at Sophia to keep the communications with Plevna open and to look to the safety of the trains of provisions and ammunition destined for that place. Crossing the Balkans with part of the army assembled at Sophia, Shethket Pasha moved to Orkani and thence with about 10,000 men to tell us, and, after slight engagements with reconnoitering Russian cavalry, succeeded, on September 22nd in driving back General Krylov and getting his large convoy of provisions and ammunition into Plevna, where the Great Abunders, where the Great part of his troops remained. He himself, however, returning to Orkani. At the beginning of October,

Sheffquette again started out with a large convoy and 5,000 men, a corps of equal strength marching from Plevner to meet him. Colonel Levis, who blocked the road at Radamurzer, was driven back on the 6th of October, and the convoy of 2,000 wagons succeeded in reaching the left bank of the vid opposite Plevner on October 8th, the lighter vehicles crossing it at once by a fort above the bridge, while the heavy wagons waited for the damaged bridge to be repaired. In order to protect the march of further convoys against Russian scouting parties, the Turks fortified three stations on the northernmost part of the road between Plevna and Orkani, Dolny Dubnick, Gorni Dubnick and Telos.

These stations were garrisoned by a division consisting of 20 battalions and 15 guns, according to other accounts, 18 battalions and 24 guns, and a number of Turkesses, under Chifsy Pasha, who established his headquarters at Gorney Dubnick. Other bodies of troops stood echelonde on the section from Lukovica to Orkani. Very considerable supplies were collected at Sofia and Orkani for Osman Pasha, between whom and Sheffkat Pasha there was an agreement that every two weeks, a convoy with provisions for a month should be dispatched.

Subsection 2, General Gorko's task and disposition for the 24th of October. The arrival of the Guard, having considerably increased the number of available troops, it was decided to adopt the plans of General Todd Leban, now appointed assistant to the commander-in-chief, and to undertake the investment of Plevna from the West in a manner that would ensure success. General Gorko, heretofore commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Guard, was entrusted with the task and given the greater part of the guard, in addition to the masses of cavalry on the left bank of the vid. At this time, about the middle of October, the following troops under General Arnaldi,

karloff having been relieved, were on the left bank of the vid, northwest of Plevna, in the vicinity of Trestenic and Reben. The fourth cavalry division, numbering 18 squadrons and Sotniers, with 12 guns. A Don Cossack brigade of 12 Sotnors and six guns. Footnote, this is the organic strength. On their arrival on the left bank of the vid, the account mentions but seven Sotniers. Footnote end. Lastly, four Romanian cavalry regiments, the two regular, and the fifth and sixth militia regiments,

of 16 squadrons and six guns. Total, 62 squadrons and Sotniers with 30 guns. At the south of Plevna, on the right bank of the vid, was Loshkaref, with the 9th Cavalry Division, 18 squadrons and 12 guns, scouting southward on both banks. In addition to these bodies of cavalry, the following troops of the Guard were placed at the disposal of General Gorko to enable him to accomplish his purpose. The first and second infantry divisions with 32 battalions, the rifle brigade with four battalions,

the battalion of Sappers, the second cavalry division with 24 squadrons, the personal escort of the Emperor with four squadrons, 12 batteries with 96 guns, and three horse batteries with 18 guns. All these troops were south of Plyfner, between the Vid and the High Road to, to Lovcher. In addition, General Arnaldi's cavalry was reinforced by seven battalions of Romanian infantry and a Romanian footbattery, while the fourth Don Cossacks, though belonging to the 4th Cavalry Division, were attached to the Guard Corps to serve as guides, on account of their knowledge of the terrain gained from their protracted presence in the locality. On the 22nd of October,

each of the six cavalry regiments of the Guard sent a platoon to the left bank of the Vid to reconnoiter. At the same time, General Gorko was reconnoitering in the direction of Telet, and accompanied by the superior officers of cavalry of the guard and escorted by two squadrons of the Emperor's escort and one Sotnir of the fourth Cossacks. From that point he rode forward on the Hiro toward Gawney Dubnick, accompanied by a few officers and reconnoitred the enemy's position under a brisk fire. As a first step in the accomplishment of his task, Gorko decided upon the seizure of the fortified position of Gorney Dubnick. While the main attack was to be directed against that

point, the enemy's forces at Tellis and Dolny Dubnick were to be kept busy, and a sortie from Plevner, as well as the approach of reinforcements from Orkani, had also to be provided against. The disposition drawn up to this effect by General Gorko for the 24th of October divided his forces into five groups. Group A, the following troops were to make the direct attack on Gorney Dubnick, the second infantry division of the Guard, with 15 battalions, the Rifle Brigade of the Guard, with four battalions, the Sapper battalion of the Guard, two squadrons of the Imperial escort, four Sotnyers of the Fourth Don Cossacks, and six-foot batteries of the Guard, with 48 guns. In addition, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, 12 sotnies with six guns, was to advance

from Abyskoy and take post-West of Gorney Dubnick to prevent any retreat westward. One battalion of the 2nd infantry division of the Guard, and a foot battery of the guard, were to remain at the Ford of Medivand to cover the passage there. Group B. The following troops were detailed to make a demonstration against Telas and repulse any troops of the enemy that might be advancing from Orkani. The Chasseur regiment of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard, with four battalions, the 1st and 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Guard, with 16 squadrons, one sopnea of the 4th Cossacks, and 1 foot and 2 horse batteries of the Guard, with 20 guns. In addition, 4 Max Militia Brigade, 8 squadrons,

was moved from Magaleta, partly on the right bank of the Iska to Chauvenibreg, partly on the left bank to Sumercova, forming, as it were, the western flank guard of the detachment operating against TELUS. Group C, the following troops under General Arnaldi, were told off for the demonstration against Dolny Dominic. The 4th Cavalry Division, without the 4th Cossacks and another squadron detached with two guns, with 11 squadrons, and 10 guns, and the militia brigade with 8 squadrons, 6 guns, and two battalions of Romanian infantry.

In addition, a detachment was to be dispatched by the 9th Cavalry Division from Medavan against Darnie Dubnick to establish communication with General Alnaldi. Group D, to meet any sortie from Plevna, General Shonosob was to occupy the position of Netropoli with seven sotniers of his brigade, five battalions of Romanian infantry,

and six Russian horse, and six Romanian footguns. Group E. The General Reserve was posted between upper and lower Dubnick, and consisted of, the first infantry division of the Guard, with 12 battalions, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Guard, with 8 squadrons, two squadrons of the Imperial Escort, one sot near the 4th Cossacks, and 4 foot and 6 horse batteries of the Guard, with 44 guns. Subsection 3. Capture of Gorney Dubnick on October 24th.

Gorney Dubnick is situated on the Dubnick Brook, about 1,000 yards west of the High Road. At the highest point west of the road and south of the village, a spacious redoubt was built, with a cavalier in the interior. A smaller redoubt lay east of the Great Redoubt. Both redouts were surrounded by rifle trenches. On the north, the level and open ground sloped almost insensibly towards Dolny Dubnick. Toward the east, the slopes were gentle and covered. were gentle and covered with a young and very dense growth of timber. The distance of the smaller redoubt from the edge of this wood was about 400 yards. To the south and west, the ground sloped steeply into a depression about 200 yards wide.

About 1,800 yards south of the small redoubt, there was a clearing in the wood which the Turks had begun to fortify. The troops detailed for the direct attack on Gorney Dubnick crossed the vid during the night, near, Chirokova by three fords with knee-deep water and were divided into three columns as follows. Right column under Major General Ellis, four rifle battalions, two batteries, two squadrons and one Sotnia, on the road from Chirikova to Khrushavica, 2,000 yards from the former place. Middle column under Major General Baron Zedler, First Brigade of the Second Infantry Division of the Guard, with seven battalions, the Sapper Battalion of the Guard, two batteries and one Sotnia. on the road from Chirokova to Sumercovica Vitsa, 500 yards from the former place.

Left column under Major General Rosenbach, second brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division of the Guard, with eight battalions and two batteries, was the last to cross the vid, and took position 3,500 yards west of the river in the ravine of Swinard. Two sotniers of Cossacks cannot be accounted for. The two flank columns which were to advance from the north and south, against the enemy's position were to start at 6.15 a.m. The middle column, which was to attack from

the east, and had the shortest route, was to start at 6.45 a.m. The latter column entered the action at 8.30, the two flank columns at 9 a.m., their movements having been somewhat delayed. The artillery of the middle column was posted about the centre of the position of that column. On the left of the artillery was the Bodyguard Grenadier Regiment, with its fourth battalion in first line, the second and third battalions in second line. To the right of the batteries was the Bodyguard Moscow Regiment in the same formation. The first battalion of the Grenadiers and the Sapper Battalion formed the reserve. At 8.30am both batteries came into action in the clearing above referred to

and opened fire at a range of 1,600 yards. The Grenadier Regiment, advancing through dense undergrowth, lost direction, went too far to the left, and touched the left column, whereupon General Ziedler moved the regiment some distance to the rear, and then to the right oblique to approach the batteries. The gap caused by the oblique movement had meanwhile been filled from the reserve by the first battalion of the regiment. On renewing the advance, the Grenadier Regiment reached the western edge of the wood, and was about abreast of the Moscow Regiment on the right of the artillery. At this time, 9 o'clock, the two flank columns appeared before the enemy's position and opened fire from their artillery.

At 9.30 o'clock, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade appeared west of Gorney Dubneck, and also opened fire from its battery, so that the Turkish position where there were but four guns was receiving a concentric fire from 54 guns. Shortly after 10 o'clock, the Grenadier Regiment attacked the East Redoubt, which was captured in spite of the murderous fire from this, as well as from the main readout. The garrison of the East Redoubt fell back on the main readout. An attempt of the Grenadiers to enter the main readout at the same time with the retreating enemy was frustrated by a severe fire, whereupon the Grenadiers ensconced themselves in the captured

readout. While the attack of the Grenadiers was in progress, Major General Zedler ordered the batteries and the Moscow Regiment to go forward. The first battery approached under a severe infantry fire to within 800 yards of the main readout, but, being unable to maintain itself, fell back to its original position after firing a few rounds. The Moscow Regiment advanced until abreast of the Grenadiers and ensconced itself in the rifle trenches to the right, north, of the captured redout, Meanwhile, the right column had gained the high road leading from Dolny to Gorney Dubnick and advanced against the Turkish position from the north. The two Cuban squadrons of the Imperial Escort, marching at the head, drove bands of Turkesses

before them and cut the telegraph line, which ran by the side of the road. Leaving one battalion opposite Dolny Dubnick, General Ayles formed his remaining three battalions for the attack, one battalion on each side of the road, the two batteries in the centre, one battalion in reserve. At 1,700 yards from the main redoubt, the artillery opened fire, the rifle battalions continuing the advance. In consequence of the loss of the east redoubt, the Turks also abandoned the northern line of advanced trenches.

The rifles of the guard took cover in them and opened fire at a range of from 600 to 700 yards. As the rifles were directly in front of the artillery and masking their fire, both batteries, notwithstanding the severe fire of the enemy, came up almost to the position of the rifles and again opened fire at 800 yards. The first division of the Guard, having meanwhile arrived between Gorney and Dolny Dubnick, and having deployed with front toward the latter place, the rifle battalion heretofore opposite Dolny Dubnick, was ordered to join its brigade. Gorko had ridden to the foremost line of the rifles of the guard to reconnoiter the Great Readout, and there, about noon, received report of the failure of the attack.

of the left column. The left column started about 6.15 o'clock from the ravine of Swinard, and was considerably delayed in crossing a narrow but deep watercourse. It advanced on the road leading from Tellis to Gorney Dubnick, and did not arrive before the enemy's position until 9 o'clock. Two batteries placed in the centre opened fire at a range of 1,800 yards, but soon closed to 1,500 yards, and were reinforced by the 5th horse battery. of the Guard.

The Finland Regiment advanced on the left, west of the road, against Gorney Dubnick, through dense Underwood, the Poloff Regiment on the right, east of the road, on open ground. After crossing the ravine in front, both regiments moved to the attack on the main redoubt, but were repulsed by a severe fire and rallied in several places where the terrain afforded cover in rear. The rifle battalions, meanwhile, utilizing the depression over the depression over, opening into the valley of the Dubnik Brook, or a bleaking more and more to the right, so as almost to face the west front of the Turkish position.

Gorka ordered forward two battalions of the Ismailov regiment, to fill the gap between the rifles and the artillery on the road, which belonged to the right column. At the same time, he reinforced the middle and left column, each by one battalion of the same regiment. Having made these arrangements, Gorker repaired in person to the batteries of the middle column, at about 2pm. Having learned that the Chaucer regiment of the Guard had been repulsed at TELUS and was retreating, Gorko feared the arrival of Turkish reinforcements from that direction,

and decided to bring the affair before Gorney Dubnick to a conclusion by a simultaneous assault from all sides. The middle column received verbal instructions to that effect. A written order was dispatched to the right flank column. The following arrangement was made to ensure a simultaneous attack, As soon as the left column had completed its arrangements and stood ready to attack, its artillery, was to fire three salvos. The same was to be done by the middle column when everything was in readiness there. And lastly by the right column.

As soon as the artillery of the right column fired the last salvo, the assault was to begin from all directions. The space to be crossed by the assaulting troops differed at the various points, from 100 to 400 paces. Having himself seen to the arrangements of the middle column, Gorko went to the left column to personally see to what was needful. But, before this was accomplished, the salvos of the right column resounded and its troops advanced to the assault, which misunderstanding rendered a simultaneous attack impossible. In order to support the assaulting troops of the right column as much as possible, Gorko dispatched orderlies in all directions, with orders for every detachment to advance to the attack without waiting for the signal, with the natural result of provoking a series of individual attacks,

which were anything but simultaneous. Received by a murderous infantry fire, none of the detachment was able to reach the redoubt, and the assailants ensconced themselves at various distances from the redoubt, where they found shelter. The Finland regiment, finding no shelter at all, fell back to its original position on the rear slope of the hill. The attack came to a standstill about four o'clock. Gorko decided to leave his troops in their positions for the time being, and to renew the attack at dusk. The artillery was compelled to suspend its fire everywhere

in order not to fire on its own troops. As Darkness set in, two battalions of the Ismailov regiment advanced, creeping, to within 50 paces of the redoubt, and threw themselves on it, simultaneously from all sides. After a brief struggle, the redoubt was taken. The Turkish commander, Ahmed Chifhti Pasha,

surrendered with his whole garrison, which still numbered 53 officers, and 2235 unwarranted men. Four crupped guns and large quantities of cartridges were also captured. The main body of the General Reserve did not become engaged. End of Section 12. Section 13 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. This Librevox recording is in the public domain.

Read by Alistair. Part 11B. Investment of Plevna from the west. Subsection 4. Events at Telus on October the 24th. To the troops detailed to operate against Telas and which crossed the Vid at Shirakova toward morning. The tasks were assigned as follows. The first cavalry brigade of the Guard to block communication between Tellis and Gorney Dubnick, the second brigade, the Cheser Regiment of the

Guard, and a battery to move to the direct attack of Tellus. The latter detachment started at 6.15 a.m. from the ravine near Swinar, where it had remained for some time after crossing the vid. At its head, the Dragoon Regiment, with two horse guns, moved to the height of Rakita to cover the left and rear of the troops on their march to Tellis. The Hussar regiment with four horse guns moved to the left in order to advance against Tellis from the south, and the chasseurs, with the foot battery, advanced from the east. The works of Tellus consisted of a large readout built across the high road, a smaller redoubt more to the west, and a series of rifle trenches in front. The detachment arrived before Tellus at 9.30 a.m.

And the 8-foot and 4 horse guns opened fire at a range of 1,000 yards. The Chaucer Regiment, having been drawn up in two lines of two battalions, the first line advanced across the perfectly level and open ground to attack the foremost rifle trenches. The latter were captured with the bayonet about 10 a.m., but, unfortunately, they offered no shelter whatever from the fire from the enemy's main position in rear. so that the chasseurs suffered great losses in the captured position.

In order not to expose themselves idly and uselessly to this murderous fire, the two battalions of the first line tried to attack the main redoubt, and were followed, without orders, by the two battalions of the second line not heretofore engaged. But the attack did not approach the redoubt closer than within 100 paces, where the assailants sought such cover as they could find. A sortie of the Turks was repulsed by a brisk fire, But as the capture of the readout proved impracticable, and as report was received from the dragoons at Rakita,

that bodies of hostile infantry and artillery were approaching Telos from the South, the order to retreat was given. During the unsuccessful attack of the Chisurs, the hussars advanced on Telos from the South. Some of their detachments galloped into the foremost rifle trenches, and drove out the Turks. An attack made by a strong body of infantry from the Turkish main position was repulsed by the fire of the horse artillery and the dismounted fire of some of the Hassars.

The retreat of the Chisers was covered by the Hassars. The Dragoon regiment dispatched to Rakita was skirmishing with swarms of Turkesses. Bodies of infantry and artillery appeared near Admerza, but did not advance further. Subsequently, the regiment joined the retreat of the troops that had been engaged at Telas. part of the regiment, in conjunction with the squadron of hussars, assisted in the removal of the wounded. At dusk, the second cavalry brigade of the guard halted in touch with the enemy. The first brigade of the guard started from the vid about 7 o'clock and reached the high road between Telas and Gorney Dubnick at 10 o'clock.

Communication was established with the column moving on Telas and with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, which had arrived west of Gorney Dubnick. The second horse battery of the guard, which belonged to the brigade, was dispatched in support of the left column moving on Gordie Dubnick, and took part in the fire against the Turkish position. On learning about noon of the failure of the attack on Tellus, the regiment of Mounted Grenadiers was dispatched to meet and support the retreating troops, but no assistance was required, as the enemy failed to pursue. During the night, the brigade remained in its position between Tellis and Gorney Dubnick. Subsection 5, events at Dolny Dubnick on October 24th. Leaving Tresnik early on October 24th with his detachment, consisting of 19 squadrons, two battalions, and 16 horse guns. General Arnaldi reached 3,000 yards north of Dolny Dubnick about 7 a.m., being greeted with artillery fire from two redouts in front of the place.

Arnoldi moved to the southwest, turning Dolny Dubnick, and continued. continued the march under the cover of the fourth dragoons, whom he left opposite the town. When the detachment had almost reached the high road, a third redout was encountered. Covered by the fourth Hassars and two militia regiments, the Romanian and first Russian battery came into action against this readout, and opened fire. Meanwhile, the fourth lancers with four horse guns advanced at a trot on the high road between Gorney Dubnick, where the rifle brigade on the right column arrived about the same time. A hill which commanded the redoubt was captured by some dismounted dragoons and occupied at once by the Russian artillery.

A daring charge of the Russian cavalry against Dolny Dubnick was repulsed by infantry fire. The two Romanian batteries arrived and threw up entrenchments on the left of the artillery position. The cannonade was kept up by both sides until late in the evening without visible result. The Turks in Dolny Dubnick numbered six battalions and four guns. guns. While the action of General Arnaldi's detachment against Dolny Dubnick was in progress, General Loshkarev ordered six of his squadrons and a horse battery from Medavan to cross to the left bank, dashing against Gorney Dubnick without result. The action of the detachment was thereafter limited to maintaining communication between the troops of General Arnaldi, the General

Reserve and the troops on the right bank of the vid. Subsection 6. Capture of Telus on October 28. After the capture of Gorney Dubnik, the first division fronted toward Dolny-Dumnik, covering the second division and the Sapper Battalion, while they entrenched the captured position of Gorney Dubnick on the side toward Plevna. Meanwhile, Arnaldi's cavalry was watching Dolny Dubnick and the bridgehead of Plevner. The cavalry division of the Guard was south of Gorney Dubnick toward TELUS. Dolny Dubnick and TELUS were each occupied by six or seven battalions of infantry,

a few hundred turkesses and four guns. The guardhouse on the high road, three miles south of Tellis, was also entrenched, surrounded by rifle trenches, and occupied by infantry. At Radamurza, there were strong bodies of infantry and cavalry under Shefketpasha, who was approaching from Orkani, with 20 battalions, ten guns, and several thousand horsemen, to succour the Atapen posts who had halted and faced about on learning of the capture of Gorney Dubnick. From the 25th to the 28th of October, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of the Guard was stationed at Rikita, with outposts towards Radamurza, the Guard House, and the south side of Telas.

The outpost service was very exacting, and skirmishes with the enemy were incessant. The horses of the 2nd Brigade remained saddled for almost three times 24 hours. The first cavalry brigade of the Guard was in the ravine of Swainer, with outposts toward the east side of Telest. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade of the Guard at Gorney Dubnick, with outposts toward the north side of Telos. The Caucasian Cossack Brigade was farther to the west on the Iska, and observed Telos from the west. On October 28, Gorko advanced to the attack on Telos. While the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigade were observing toward the south, Telas was surrounded on all sides by 16 battalions of infantry and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade,

and subjected to a concentric fire from six foot and two horse batteries between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. Gorko then sent some Turks, captured at Gorney Dubnick, into Telos, with a demand for immediate surrender, and the threat that he would destroy everything with his artillery if the surrender did not take place within half an hour. Ismail Haki Pasha now surrendered with his garrison of seven battalions, still numbering 100 officers and 3,000 men. Four guns and very large quantities of cartridges fell into the hands of the Russians, whose entire loss consisted of one man killed and a few wounded, while on the other hand many dead Turks lay about in the badly damaged works. We now turn to the events of the First and Second Cavalry Brigades of the Guard,

which during this time were posted at Rakita to check the approach of reinforcements from that direction and to cut off the retreat of the garrison of Tellus to the south. The Dragoon Regiment was at Rakita, fronting south. On its right, the 5th Horse Battery, escorted by a squadron of mounted Grenadiers, came into action against the Guard House. The second horse battery, escorted by two squadrons of lancers, was firing against the south front of Tellus. The rest of the two brigades,

edessed three squadrons of grenadiers, two of lancers, and four of hussars, were posted in reserve in rear of the dragoons. The fifth horse battery opened fire about 10 a.m. And soon compelled the Turks to leave the rifle trenches in front of the guardhouse. At the same time, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade advanced from the west against Rannemurza under a brisk engagement with Turkish infantry and cavalry, and was joined by two squadrons of lancers sent toward them from the reserve. The brigade was, however, ultimately forced to fall back, followed by the lancers,

who thus became separated from the main body of the cavalry. of the Guard. Having repulsed the attack on their left, the Turks advanced against the enemy opposite their right. Turkish infantry began to advance from the guardhouse through the brush against the fifth horse battery, and dense swarms of mounted Turkessers threatened the second horse battery, which was firing on Telas. The two squadrons of lancers, which formed the escort of this battery, and were posted with front toward Telas, changed front against the turkesses, and seven squadrons posted in reserve at Rakita also advanced against the them in the space between the batteries.

The lancers charged before the arrival of these reinforcements. The third squadron followed in second line at a trot. The fourth squadron charged at full speed against the Turkessers, who received the charge with a brisk fire from their magazine rifles, and suddenly wheeling to the right and left, unmasked a line of infantry, which had been posted under cover and now greeted the lances with a severe fire. The lancers galloped around the flank of the infantry and charged from the flank. and cut down the greater part.

On proceeding further, in the direction of the guardhouse, the lances received fire from the infantry posted in the dense brush, and turning about regained their original position at a short trot. Meanwhile, the main body of the cavalry reached the high road between Tellis and the guardhouse, when the news of the capture of Tellus arrived. Small detachments of the garrison, attempting to escape to the south, were overtaken and cut down by the cavalry. The second horse battery now also directed its fire on the guardhouse, which was soon after

abandoned by the Turks. All Turkish troops that had come under observation so far were withdrawing southward. The third cavalry brigade of the Guard, arriving from Tellis, relieved the outposts towards Radamurza and Ligua. The first and second brigades were assembled at Rakita. The Turkish brigade at Dolny Dubnick evacuated the place on October 31st and withdrew without further action into Plevna. Dolny Dubnick was occupied on November 1st by the Russians, who advanced their lines 2,000 yards beyond the village toward Plevna, and at once entrenched their position. Plevna was now completely invested on the west side, and deprived of all communication, with the army posted at Orkani and Sophia.

Subsection 7. Losses The accounts of the losses of the guards and the actions on the left bank of the vid, toward the end of October, A. Capture of Gawney Dubnick, October 24th. Killed. 18 officers, 811 men. Wounded, three generals, 95 officers, 2384 men. Total loss, 116 officers and 3,195 men. B, action of tellus on October 24th. Chasseur Regiment of the Guard, 26 officers and 907 men killed.

and wounded. Second cavalry brigade of the guard. One officer, one man and two horses killed. One officer, 15 men and 18 horses wounded. C. Action of Telos on October 28th. Infantry. One man killed and 15 men wounded. Lancers of the guard. Five men and 14 horses killed. Four officers, 11 men and 31 horses wounded. No special data are given for the losses of the 4th Cavalry Division, the Cossacks and the Romanians during this period, particularly in the action of Dolny Dubnick on October 24th. The losses, however, were very slight. Nothing accurate is known of the losses of the Turks in killed and wounded in these actions. The garrisons of Gorney Dubnick and Tellus contain 13 battalions of infantry and about two regiments of cavalry,

or 8,000 men at the most, since not less than 5,500. 100 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the Russians and a few hundred men seemed to have escaped from Tellis, the losses of the Turks in killed and wounded in the two actions of the 24th and 28th of October were probably not much in excess of 2,000 men. The losses of the Turks engaged at Radomirsa on the 28th cannot have been heavy. Comments The actions described above are, in more than one respect, worthy of attention. Comment 1. In the first place, they were the result of a correct strategic idea after repeated previous mistakes. Then, as regards tactics, they were planned with great prudence and skill, and executed with much awkwardness.

Lastly, the Russian guards appeared for the first time, which apparently very indifferent fact, is of importance for an understanding of many features. The strategic importance of the operations described we will not discuss here as considerations of this character will find a place later. We turn to the conception of the operations directed by Gorko up to the investment of Plevner on the left bank of the vid. The enemy's troops encountered here numbered 12,000 men at the most, about equally distributed among the three fortified Atappan stations, Dolny Dubnick, Gorni Dubnick, and Telas. Under certain circumstances, they might hope for assistance from Plevna or Orcanny.

The insufficient supply of artillery with these troops deserve special mention. There seemed to have been but four guns in each of the fortified places. To overcome these three points, General Gorko was given considerable forces. 36 battalions of the Russian Guard, seven battalions of Romanian infantry, about 80 squadrons and sotnias of the Russian and Romanian cavalry, and 150 guns, a total of not less than 32,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry. Leaving out a few small detachments, we find about one half of the cavalry, seven Romanian battalions and 30 guns employed to observe Dolny Dubnick and Plevna.

One quarter of the cavalry, 20 battalions and 60 guns, were detailed to attack Gorney Dubnick. One quarter of the cavalry, four battalions and 20 guns observed Tellis. Lastly, 12 battalions and 32 guns stood as a general reserve between upper and lower Dubnick. The force detailed against Gorney Dubnick was so large in comparison with the garrison of that place that the defeat of the latter, as long as it had to depend on itself, could not be doubtful. The general reserve may therefore, from the beginning, be considered as intended for use against Dolny Dubnick and Plevner. Any attack from Plevner in the direction of Dolny Dubnick would therefore encounter not less than 4,000 cavalry, 19 battalions and 62 guns. The enterprise against Gorney Dubnick

may therefore be considered as well covered on the side of Plevenor. To be sure, considerably smaller forces were posted toward Tellis, but in the first place, the appearance at this point of superior forces of the enemy was much less probable. In the second place, the approach of such a force would have been discovered at quite a distance, so that the proper countermeasures might have been taken. The enterprise against Gorney Dubnick may therefore be considered sufficiently covered toward the south also. When we consider that according to the disposition, Dolny Dubnick and Telas were to be merely observed and not attacked, it is safe to say that the plan was bound to succeed, and that there was no reason to fear a check. The large number of troops available for these operations might have

been a source of temptation to make a decisive attack against all three points at the same time, and the relative strength of the opponents would justify the Russians in expecting certain success in that case also, Gorko restricted himself to the attack on one point in order to make it with an overwhelming force, and this extreme prudence, which approaches timidity, may be explained in several ways. In the first place, the confidence of the Russians in their own strength was undoubtedly weakened after the many failures suffered before Plevner, and in the second place it was his intention to prevent any failure of the Russian guards in their first action, and to preserve their unshaken self-confidence.

Comment 2. Gorko's plan bore with it all the conditions for certain, quick and easy success, and it is solely due to the awkward tactical execution that the success, though ultimately attained, was gained only after a protracted, variable, and bloody action. A field entrenchment held by 4,000. men and four guns was surrounded by 20,000 men subjected for half a day to concentric fire from 60 guns and, after repeated failures, ultimately captured, with a loss to the assailant almost equaling the total strength of the defenders. This cannot be explained by the

single assumption of extreme bravery and skill on the part of the defender, and anyone is warranted in saying that great tactical mistakes were undoubtedly made by the assailant. In turning to the details of the attack on Gourney Dubnick, we miss uniformity of instructions as to the method of execution of the attack by three infantry columns advancing separately against the Turkish position. Each of the three attachments moved to the attack without regard to the other two. Moreover, the attack was fairly executed only on the part of the right column. The confirmation of the ground was here utilized and the advanced made by rushes, and an attempt was made, though without much success, to prepare.

Prepare the attack by infantry fire. The attack of the middle and left column makes the impression of having developed itself not in accordance with some well-defined plan, but under the influence of a precipitate advance from the beginning and of an irrepressible ardour on the part of the troops. At any rate, all the troops were almost simultaneously engaged, and there was practically no preparation of the attack by infantry fire.

The attack itself was made without a formation of several lines, and without utilising the terrain, the dense masses through themselves, with their bravery which despised death, from a great distance, a thousand paces, against the murderous frontal fire, and, of course, suffered terrible losses. It is surprising that the middle column

failed to utilise the small eastern redoubt, which was captured at the beginning, as an intermediate position from which to prepare the further attack by artillery and infantry fire. It is stated, in extenuation, as it were, that the captured position afforded no shelter from the fire from the main position in Ria. To be sure, this is a notable proof of the skill of the Turks in planning and locating the fortifications,

which also becomes manifest at Telos, but would not the entire Sapper Battalion, which accompanied this column, and was undoubtedly equipped with entrenching tools, have supplied the means for converting the captured position into good cover? The employment of the Sapper Battalion, which seems to have been held as a closed reserve to the last, like ordinary infantry must certainly be set down as unusual. In view of the noise and excitement of battle, it is not surprising that Gorko's attempt to secure combination in the renewed attack by a seemingly well-divised,

though complicated signal, failed in execution. It might have been better to fix a certain hour, not too near the time of the order. In the attack of the Chaucers of the Guard on Telos, we miss plan and direction even more than in the attack on Gorney Dubnick. not only was the attack of the first line made without due reflection and contrary to the general disposition, but the second line, the last available body of infantry, ran away from the superior leader, and threw itself into the action without orders.

The detachment was sufficiently strong, but the attack was contrary to program and premature, and its severe loss diminished the defensive strength of the detachment, to such an extent that a vigorous counterattack of the Turks from Telas might have exercised a bad effect on the entire enterprise against Gorney Dubnick. Nearly all the defects in the Russian attack may be somewhat extenuated by the fact that the troops were on that day under fire for the first time, and that they felt that, being a specially privileged corps,

they were expected to do something quite extraordinary. The Russian guards may certainly point with pride to the fact that they failed in no enterprise, and that, upon their appearance, the war took a brilliant turn. Nevertheless, a little more steadiness and coolness on the day of their baptism of fire, would certainly not have diminished the success, while, on the other hand, it would have greatly reduced the losses. Comment 3. The behaviour of the Turkish garrisons in Gorney Dubnick on the 24th,

and in TELUS on the 28th, shows a striking contrast. On the 24th, Gorney Dubnick was cannonaded for half a day by 60 guns, yet the garrison repulsed several furious assaults of a greatly superior enemy, and did not succumb until after a protracted struggle. On the 28th, the garrison of Telas surrendered, though its tactical situation was exactly the same as that of their brethren Gorney Dubnick, after being cannonaded for two hours, and without waiting for an assault. On the part of the Russians, the reason is a sign that the garrison of Telas was so disheartened by the fall of Gorney Dubnick as to lose all heart for resistance. But that fact alone is not sufficient to explain the striking contrast. If on the 24th Gorko had demanded the surrender of the

garrison of Gorney Dubnick after a cannonade of five or six hours without moving his infantry to the attack, I believe that very probably the garrison would have surrendered. On the other hand, if on the 28th Gorko had sent his infantry to the attack instead of opening negotiations, I believe it very probable that the garrison of Tellus would have offered an obstinate resistance. Section 14 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trother. This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair Part 12 The Fall of Plevna

Subsection 1 General Measures for the Investment It having been determined by the Russians to avoid any attack entailing useless loss and to overcome Osmond Pasha's army by a close investment, all requisite steps were taken with great care under the direction of General Todd Lieben. The line of investment was strengthened by a series of rifle trenches and artillery emplacements. The most important points were secured by lunettes or redoubts. Between the positions of the investing troops, commodious communications were constructed and their use facilitated by signposts. Lastly, the line was connected throughout by a line of telegraph.

The line of investment, which measured 44 miles, was divided into six separate and to a certain degree independent sectors. The first sector extended from Bivalar on the vid to the Gravitzer Redoubt, Commander General Shumat, troops, the main body of the Romanian army, exclusive of the 4th Division. The second sector extended from the Gravitzer Redout to the Galitz Redisie Wadiqo,

commander General Crudne, troops, 31st Infantry Division with the 31st Artillery Brigade and the 2nd Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with four batteries of the 5th Artillery Brigade, total 18 battalions and 10 batteries. The third sector extended from the Galitz Redoubt to the ravine of Tuchinica, commander General Zotov, troops,

second infantry division, 12th Rifleififif, battalion and 30th artillery brigade, total 13 battalions, six batteries. The fourth sector extended from the ravine of Tuchinica to that of Kattushovan, commander General Skobolev, troops, 16th and 30th infantry division, 9th, 10th and 11th rifle battalions, and the 16th and second artillery brigades, total 27 battalions, 12 batteries, and a Cossack regiment. The fifth sector extended from the Cartusheven Ravine to the right bank of the vid at TNN, commander General Kitali, troops, third infantry division of the Guard, two squadrons of Cossacks of the Guard,

third foot artillery brigade of the Guard, and 10th Don Horse Battery. Total, 16 battalions, two squadrons, and seven batteries. The sixth sector extended from the left bank opposite TNN to opposite Byvalak, Commander General Gernetsky. Troops. Second and third Grenadier divisions with the second and third Grenadier Artillery Brigade. First Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with two batteries of the 5th Artillery Brigade, 4th Romanian Division with its artillery. 9th dragoons, 9th lancers, 9th hussars, and 4th Cossacks, 7th Horse Battery, 2nd Don Horse Battery, and a regiment of Irregulars. Total. 30 battalions, 18 squadrons, 16 batteries besides the Romanians.

The commanders of sectors had exact instructions in the various possible cases of an attempt on the part of the Turks to break through. Some days before the sortie of the Turks took place, the marches prescribed were carried out under Todd Lieben's direction in the 5th and 6th sectors, in order to ascertain the amount of time requisite to carry out these concentrations. The remainder of the troops heretofore belonging to the West Army, 1st and 2nd Infantry Division of the Guard, the Rifle Brigade of the Guard, cavalry of the Guard, part of the 4th Cavalry Division, several Cossack regiments, and some Romanian detachments, were united under Gorko's orders, pushed to the south and west, and engaged in seizing several passes over the Balkans,

and opening communication towards Serbia. Subsection 2 Signs of the impending attempt to break through Russian dispositions for December 10th. From the reports received on December 9th, from all parts of the line of investment, and from the statements of numerous deserters, it appeared that Osman Pasha was preparing for a decisive attempt to break through. The fire from the Turkish works had been quite weak on the 8th,

and almost completely silent on the 9th. Deserters stated that shoes in a supply of hard bread, as well as 150 rounds of ammunition per a man had been issued, and that rifles had been inspected. Much movement was discernible on and along the high road between town and river. Large bodies bivouacked there, and large trains were parked. Since all these statements and signs pointed to an attack against the sixth sector, General Todd Lieben, in concert with the Prince of Romania,

made the following dispositions on the evening of December 9th. disposition one at daybreak on the tenth of december general scobileff to cross the vid with one brigade of the sixteenth division and three of its batteries and one brigade of the third division of the guard the brigade of the sixteenth division with the artillery to move to dolny dubnick and remain in readiness to support genetsky's troops until the situation should be cleared up the brigade of the guard to remain close to the river on the left bank so as to be available for reinforcing either in the fifth or 6th sector. Disposition 2. The 5th sector to remain occupied by a brigade of the 3rd Division of the Guard, the 4th by a brigade of the 16th Division and the whole of the 30th division. General Shintnikov to assume command in Skobolev's place. Disposition 3. No changes in the troops holding the 3rd sector. Disposition 4. The three rifle battalions belonging to the garrison of the 4th sector to move to the village of Gravitzer to help reinforce

the second sector. Disposition 5. The main body of the Romanian army to occupy the first sector. Early in the morning, four battalions and three batteries to cross to the left bank and moved to Merakoi to support the troops of the sixth sector. Four battalions and two batteries to remain in readiness to follow. Subsection 3. The events on the left bank of the vid.

On the morning of December 10th, the following was the situation of the left bank of the vid. The line of Russian entrenchments began near Tienn-en and extended east of Dolny Dubnick and Gorney Netropoli to the ground opposite Bivalar. In addition to a number of connected rifle trenches it seems there were two redouts east of Dolny Dubnick, three east of Gorney Netropoli, and a sixth readout north of Gorney Netropoli. The entrenchments of the right wing of this position, including the first and second redouts, were held on the morning of December 10th by the Grenadier Regiment Kiev, and the three nine-pounder batteries of the second Grenadier artillery brigade. In their rear was the Grenadier Regiment Taurus as First Reserve.

The second reserve posted at Dolny Dubnick consisted of the second Brigade of the Second Grenadier Division, the Samagittia and Moscow Regiments, and the three four-pounder batteries of the Second Grenadier Artillery Brigade. The entrenchments of the centre, including the readouts, were held by the Grenadier Regiment Siberia and three nine pound of batteries, in rear stood the Russia Minor Regiment as reserve. The Fanagoria and Astrakhan Regiments and the three four pounder batteries were posted at Gorney Netropoli as second reserve. The left wing of the entrenchments north of Gorney Netropoli was held by the Archangelisk

Regiment and two Romanian divisions. In their rear were the Wollogda Regiment and two Russian batteries as first reserve. to their rear, near Demirikoi, the 4th Romanian Division was posted as second reserve. One brigade of the 16th and another of the 3rd Guard Division were expected to arrive in the rear of the right of the entire position. The reserves in rear of the left were to be reinforced by four Romanian battalions from the right bank. During the night, cavalry patrols reported the concentration of Turkish forces on the banks of the Vid. Under the cover of a dense fog the Turkish masses crossed to the left bank at daybreak over

the main bridge a newly constructed bridge near Oppanets and several fords the Turkish troops deployed in a large fold of the terrain the artillery took position on the high ground and opened fire and at 7.30 a.m. the attack began in the direction of Gawney Netropoli. A dense skirmish line was closely followed by small closed bodies. The main body followed at a greater distance. The artillery, keeping up its fire, advanced abreast of the infantry, the guns halting to fire one round, and then galloping forward again. On the part of the Russians, a nine-pounder battery posted in readout number three, opened fire. General Danilov, commander of the third Grenadier division, ordered the Russian Minor Regiment closer up to the line

of entrenchments, and also directed the brigades at Gorney Netropoli to advance. Meanwhile, the Turkish masses projecting a terrible hail of bullets to their front reached the Russian position about 8.15 a.m. The losses of the six companies of the Siberia Regiment, which held redoubt number three, and the rifle trenches in the vicinity, were very great. The trenches on either side of the redoubt were lost first. The battery in the redoubt had lost nearly all of its men and horses, and when the redoubt had to be abandoned, but two guns could be removed, the remaining six falling into the hands of the Turks. At this time, about 8.30 a.m., the Turkish attack was directed against Redoubt No. 4,

which was held by the rest of the Siberia regiment. The 9-pounder battery posted in the redoubt continued to fire for some time, but when the Turks, after the capture of Redoubt 3, turned the right of the position and at the same time attacked in front, the remnants of the Siberia Regiment fell back, and Redoubt number four with the adjoining rifle trenches was lost with two guns, which could not be removed because the teams had been killed. At this hour, the Russia Minor Regiment reached the battlefield, formed in two lines of company columns. It advanced in the interval between the readouts number three and four, and checked the attack of the Turks, but not without great losses.

Within a few minutes all three battalion commanders and more than half of the company commanders were killed or wounded. The situation of the two Grenadier regiments, which, though almost annihilated, were alone opposed to the vigorous attack of the hostile masses, was very critical. About 10.30 a.m., the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Grenadier Division arrived from Gorney Netropoli in support of its first brigade, and the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division posted in reserve at Dolny Dubnick approached the battlefield. The 1st Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division still held the entrenchments on the right, east of Dolny Dubnick. The debris of the Siberia and Russia Minor Regiments joined in the advance of the Fanagoria and Astrakhan Resiments.

The attack of the division was successful and the two redouts and adjoining rifle trenches were recaptured, as well as the lost guns. The Astrakhan Regiment, moreover, captured seven Turkish guns and a stand of colours. During this successful attack, two were-logged battalions arrived from the left and attacked the Turkish right. At the same time, the Samagittia Regiment of the 2nd Grenadier Division appeared from the right and took part in the recapture of the lost entrenchments, taking three Turkish guns. Having recovered all the lost positions, the Russian battalions halted and reformed. It was about noon when the Turks finally gave up on the attack and fell back toward the

bank of the vid. All the batteries of the 3rd Grenadier Artillery Brigade were now placed in the front line with the infantry and covered the retreating Turks with a brisk fire. The lost and recaptured guns were being served by men from the infantry. General Danilov now advanced to the attack with the entire 3rd Grenadier division, followed on the left by the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division and on the right by the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division. The 1st Brigade of the latter division, heretofore holding the entrenchments of the right, was also brought forward and took the Turks in left flank.

One battalion each of the Turidia and Kiev regiments of this brigade forwarded the Vid, the warder reaching to their waist belts and seized the height of Blasivats. The garrison of the Turkish readouts at this point surrendered without firing a shot. Upon request of General Ganeski, the six battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division of the Guard, under General Kulov, having crossed to the left bank by a pontoon bridge, started at 10 a.m. for Dolny Dubnick. Arriving there, the brigade received orders to advance against the left of the Turks. General Skobolef, however, who arrived at this moment,

ordered the brigade to delay its advance until the arrival of the brigade of the 16th division. Having given the order, General Scobalev repaired elsewhere. Neither the brigade of the 16th nor further orders having arrived by 2pm, call off on his own responsibility advanced along the high road. When the brigade reached the bridge over the vid, the battle was already at an end. Subsection 4. The events on the right bank of the vid. In the course of the night of the 9th to the 10th of December, General Scoboliffe was informed by outposts

that the Christian works had been abandoned by the Turks. A party of volunteers was dispatched at once to investigate and found the redoubts and trenches in rear of Christian empty. They were at once occupied by the troops of the 30th Infantry Division. Simultaneously with the report of the occupation of the Christian works, information was received at headquarters at 9 a.m. That the so-called second Gravitzer readout had been abandoned by the Turks

and occupied by the Romanians. General Todd Lieben immediately ordered all the troops on the east front of Plevna to move to the attack on the Turkish works. The brigade of the 16th Division, which was still on the right bank in the fourth sector, as well as the three rifle battalions which had been ordered to the village of Gravitzer

but had not yet reached their destination, were directed to cross to the left bank as quickly as possible. and to place themselves under Skobloff's orders, who, we know, had been sent with two brigades to support Ganeski. Advancing on Plevna from all directions, the troops found a large portion of the works evacuated by the Turks. Others were held weakly to deceive the enemy, and were easily taken. The Romanians, approaching from the north, found the works of Oppenetz still occupied. After a brief engagement, the Turkish garrison of two thousand men surrendered, three guns were captured in these works.

On perceiving the withdrawal of the Turks toward the river, General Kattali, commander of the fifth sector, led those battalions of his division of the Guard, which were still on the right bank, against the Turkish entrenchments to the west of Christian. By 1pm, all the works of the entrenched camp between Plevina and the river were in his hands. One pasha, 120 officers, 3,600 men,

and four guns were captured here by the Russians, whose losses did not exceed three killed and 15 wounded. Subsection 5, the surrender. Crowded together from all sides against the banks of the vid and helplessly exposed to the fire of the Russian guns, the Turks had to give up. Not only the idea of renewing the attack, but of prolonging the resistance.

Osman Pasha dispatched officers in all directions to seek the Russian commander-in-chief and inform him of the cessation of the cessation of, resistance on the part of the Turks. General Ganeski riding toward the bridge over the vid met Osman's chief of staff and demanded the unconditional surrender of the whole army. Osman who was wounded having acceded to the demand the Turkish troops everywhere laid down their arms. Exclusive of 20,000 sick and wounded, the army surrendering here to Russian captivity still numbered 40,000 effectives. Among them, 10 pashes, 100,000.5%. One of 10 pashers, 100

128 field officers and 2,000 officers of lower grade, 77 guns, 70,000 rifles, and a great quantity of cartridges fell into the hands of the Russians. A number, about 30, of heavy guns, which were buried by the Turks before the beginning of their attempt to break through, were not discovered until later. Subsection 6. Losses The losses of the two Russian Grenadier divisions were as follows. killed, two field officers, seven company officers, 409 men. Wounded, one general, three field officers, 47 company officers and 1263 men. By far the greater part of these losses fell on the Siberia

and Russia Minor Regiments. The next greater loss was suffered by the Astrakhan Regiment, one officer and 72 men killed, 12 officers and 346 men wounded. The first brigade of the 5th Division lost one officer and 47 men wounded. The third division of the Guard lost three men killed and 15 wounded. The losses of the two batteries posted in the readouts which were for some time in the hands of the Turks must have been heavy but cannot be ascertained. The loss of the Romanians was trifling. The Turks lost about 6,000 men, killed and wounded. Comments Comment 1

The troops available for the investment of Plevon during the last six weeks numbered eight Russian infantry divisions. Third division of the Guard, second and third of the Grenadier Corps, second, fifth, sixteenth, thirtieth and 31st infantry divisions. And the first rifle brigade and some cavalry and Cossack regiments, and 48 foot and three horse batteries, total, about 75,000 men with 400 field guns, to which should be added 25,000 Romanians. The total strength of the investing army was therefore 100,000 men,

with about 500 guns, while the effectives of the Turkish army during the last few weeks may be put down at 50,000 men, with little more than 100 field and position guns. The Russian line of investment measured 45 miles, the Turkish line of defence, about 25 miles. A brief comparison of the investment of Plevna with the successful investment of cars by the Russians under Moraviev in 1855 is not without interest. The Russian army of investment numbered 30,000 men, the invested Turkish army, 20,000 to 25,000 men. The length of the Turkish line of defence was about 13 miles, that of the Russian line of investment, 50 miles. The methods of investment pursued in these two sieges differ materially.

General Moraviev posts his entire infantry with some cavalry south of cars on the line of communication with Ursum, and the investment proper was maintained by five strong detachments of cavalry, consisting each of one or two cavalry regiments with some artillery, which were posted in a circle around cars, and kept up communication with each other. After an investment of several weeks, the Turkish army surrendered on account of lack of provisions, without making an attempt to cut its way out.

The investment of Plevna was of nearly equal strength at all points. The greatest importance attaches to the fourth and sixth sectors, which were traversed by the Great Roads which might be used by Osman on his retreat. In comparing the extent of the line of investment of Plevna, with the two great investments of the Franco-Prussian War, we find the German line of investment of Metz had an extent of 25 miles, that of Paris 53 miles. The circumference of the Anzance of Paris measured 19 miles,

the line connecting the fort about 35 miles. Comment 2. The sixth sector of the line of investment of Plevenven. embracing the left bank of the vid, was geographically the most important portion of the line, and had, from Tiennen to Dolny Dubnick and from Gorney Netropoli to opposite Biavlar, a length of 12 miles. This portion of the line was held by two Grenadier divisions, which had not yet been engaged, one brigade of the 5th division which had suffered considerably, and several thousand Romanians, total 25 to 30,000 infantry, giving about five men for every three yards of front.

As a matter of comparison, we state here the following. About the middle of November 1870, when the Great Sortie from Paris was expected, the investment was so arranged that the Third Army guided the left bank of the Seine, extending 15 miles with 100,000 infantry, and the Muse Army guided the right bank, which measured 37 miles, with 80,000 infantry, giving the Third Army about 13 men for three yards of front, to the Meuse Army, about four men for the same front. Comment 3. The two points of Dolly Dubnick and Gorney Netropoli, where the main reserves of the sector were posted, were distant six and four miles respectively from the bridge over the vid.

The line of investment, consisting of redouts and rifle trenches, seems to have been 2,000 or 3,000 yards farther to the front. The beginning of the Turkish attack was discovered by the Russians about 7.30 a.m., whereupon, it seems, General Danilov at once issued orders for the two rear echelons of his division to move up to the line of the line of the army. defense held by the Siberia Regiment. As the Russia Minor Regiment did not reach the fighting before 9 a.m. and the second brigade coming from Gorney Netropoli not before 1030 a.m., there must have been delays whose nature cannot be ascertained with the lights before us. The distance was not such as to prevent those troops from arriving much earlier. Peculiar ill luck also seems to have attached to the movements of the troops dispatched under Skobolev to the left bank in support of Ganeski. Since both brigades were on the further

bank of the Vid by 7am, there is no reason why they should not have arrived in good time at the assailed front, either in direct support, or, still better, have advanced against the left flank of the Turkish attack. But it seems that, owing to some misunderstanding, the Brigade of the 16th Division never reached Donny Dubnick, and that Kowloff's Brigade of the Guard was held at Dolny Dubnick by contradictory orders during the decisive hours. Scobilef's ordered Kowloff to wait for the arrival of the 16th Division is due to a justifiable desire to undertake the decisive attack of the day, not with an isolated brigade, but with all his

available troops. On the other hand, Ganeski's order to that brigade to advance along the high road was perfectly proper, for he was in position to know that the attack of even a comparatively small detachment in the direction indicated would no longer encounter serious resistance. Comment 4. The number of affectives of the Turkish army on the morning of December 10th must be set down at 45,000 men, and the strength of the corps led to the attack on the left bank of the vid at 30,000 to 35,000 men with 60 guns. The passage of the vid was affected before dawn with surprising rapidity by means of two bridges and a few forwards. The deployment on the further bank was also affected with great rapidity so that the attack made in

dense closed formation could be begun at 7.30 a.m. The passage as well as the deployment for the attack challenged an interesting comparison with similar events during the investment of Mets. During the night of the 25th to 26th of August, Marshal Bazenne issued the necessary orders for a sortie to be undertaken next day on the right bank of the Mosul against Santebabe, with a view of marching thence along the river to Tionnville. The troops encamped on the left bank of the Mosul were put in motion at 5 a.m. in broad daylight. Although four bridges were available for the passage of the Mosul, crossing was not completed until 3pm. At the time, at At that hour, when everybody was waiting for the beginning of the attack, Marshal

Bazzene assembled his generals in council, and it was decided, after protracted consultation, to defer the attack, whereupon the troops returned to their camping grounds. The events of the 31st of August, preceding the Battle of Noasevid, were of similar nature. Early on the morning of the 31st, Bazane ordered the army to deploy in front of the forts Kulu and Sante Giuliani, the arrangements differing but little from those of the 26th. but although an additional bridge was thrown that day near fort kulu it was two p m before the deployment on the left bank was completed again bazania assembled his lieutenants this time to communicate to them his orders of the attack and it was at four p m when the attack began even making allowance for the fact that the number of french troops crossing the mosul was three times that of the turks crossing navid still a comparison between the two leaders and the two armies with reference to the point under discussion is decidedly in favour of the turks comment five the turks attacked the russian position with a bravery that despised death and at first with surprising success considering that the russians must have been more or less prepared for the attack as soon however as the first check was suffered and the attack brought to a halt

the heretofore convulsive tension gave way to a total relaxation the turks ceased all resistance before the capitulation was officially concluded The feeble action of the garrisons on the right bank of the vid is hard to understand, and must in part be called shameful. Though not strong enough to permanently hold their works, they might undoubtedly have checked the Russians for hours and inflicted on them very sensible losses. If those 30 guns, instead of being buried, had remained in the works on the right bank, they would certainly have paid for their ultimate loss many times over. Comment 6. Lastly, a negative answer must be given to the question, did the Turkish sortie have any prospect of success? The garrison of a small place of a few thousand men,

if led with determination and prudence, may cut its way through an investing enemy by piercing the line of investment by a sudden attack and escaping through the gap. Menin, 1795, Almedia, 1811. This method of escape, however, without assistance from without, is out of the question for an invested army. A merely temporary piercing of the line of investment will probably, in most cases, be followed by a defeat in the open field. Escape is only possible

if the investing army is beaten. On that eventuality, the Turks could under no circumstances count, for, even if it had been possible to overthrow the Russian troops on the left bank, the Turks would, beyond a doubt, have been surrounded and crushed within 24, or at most 48 hours. In this particular, similarity between the conditions at Metz and Plevna. As long as a so-called relief army stood at Orkani, Osmond's retreat, if difficult, was possible. But the fate of the army of Plevna was sealed as soon as Gorko's bold operations in the passes of the Balkans compelled the Turkish army at Orkani to fall back to Sofia.

End of Section 14 Section 15 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trother. This Libravox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 13A. Comments Subsection 1. The Operations

By what plan of operations The Russian Commander-in-Chief was originally guided will probably never be known with exactness, at any rate, not until after a long time. It may be assumed that the program of the campaign was carried out, up to the passage of the Danube. The forcing of the passage of the Danube, with comparatively small difficulty, and still more, Gorko's unexpected passage of the Balkans undertaken with a bold appreciation of the situation,

impressed upon the here-to-fore prudent and methodical leadership, a new and somewhat hazardous character. It appears as if political considerations had previously exercised a greater influence upon the conduct of the war, than purely military considerations. The low estimation placed upon the opponent led to a precipitate advance and exacted a severe penalty. Successes easily gained, and existing more in appearance than in reality, produced a complete intoxication, which made the most difficult objectives seem to be within easy reach. It is interesting to draw a rough outline of the development things might have taken with a high degree of probability if the incident of Plevenor had not happened.

The first possibility was that the sudden appearance of the Russians south of the Balkans would have created such consternation in Constantinople as to cause further resistance to be abandoned and the road of negotiations, attended by inevitable sacrifices on the part of the Turks, to be entered upon. Should Turkey have made far-reaching concessions and placed the execution of the promised reforms in the hands of a European commission, Russia would, to a certain degree, have been disarmed. The object for which Russia had drawn the sword,

would, in appearance at least, have been accomplished, and the rivers of Russian blood would not have washed out the peaceful protestations of unselfish and humane sentiments. Perhaps it might still have been possible to allay the justifiable impulses of Russian self-confidence with formal concessions. In one word, the solution of the Oriental question

that bugbear of the peace of Europe might again have been postponed for a shorter or longer period. But the events connected with the name of Plevna removed that possibility and rendered the long-impending Oriental catastrophe unavoidable. Therein lies the great political importance of the conflict, which for five months raged around Plevna.

A second possibility is out of the war continuing after the Russians had passed the Balkans, when they might have been so carried away by the intoxication of easily gained successes at the beginning, as to transfer the centre of their operations beyond the Balkans with their totally inadequate forces. In that case, the reverse might have come at Sophia or Adrianople, instead of Plevna,

and would have been quite unavoidable, in view of the wholly inadequate Russian forces, and the Turkish power of resistance which surpassed all expectations. This result would have come independently of the numerous mistakes in the conduct of the war on the part of the Russians, which were counterbalanced by the equally heavy areas on the part of the Turks. The new preparations to surmount this crisis, which entailed on the Russians such unusual difficulties and enormous sacrifices of treasure and blood before Plevner, would of course have been

more difficult on account of the greater length of the communications, and the obstacle presented by the Balkans. And it seems quite possible that the campaign of 1877 might have ended with a failure for the Russian arms. The great strategic importance of the conflicts around Plevna lies in the fact that they opened the eyes of the Russians to the impending danger, cause them in good time to make a suitable change in their entire plan and force them against their will

to employ the amount of force indispensable for decisive success. The question then would be whether the Turks made a mistake in fighting at Plevna, since that campaign, notwithstanding its primary disadvantage, did certainly confer very considerable advantages upon the Russian cause. This is a point worthy of reflection. Upon the appearance of Osman Pasha on the right flank of the Russians, the strategic situation of the latter was decidedly unfavourable,

and it became highly dangerous by Krudner's defeat at Plevner on July 30th. Had Osman Pasha been able to follow up his victory with an immediate and vigorous pursuit, and to drive Crudeness morally and materially weakened troops across the Osmer, all conditions would have been favourable, in case of fairly proper and combined action on the part of the East and West armies, to involve the Russian army in a defeat which was bound to be decisive for the campaign of that year. In that case, the detention of the West Army at Widen, and its subsequent skillful advance on the decisive point at the right moment

would justly stand as a brilliant and successful example, of strategic calculation, and old Abdul Kerempash's secret plan, often derided and maligned to the extent of having its existence denied, would have been vindicated. Yet these claims to consider the advance of the West Bulgarian army from Witten on Plevna, as the efflux of a brilliant strategic reflection, are seriously weakened, not by the ultimate failure, but by another factor. The above-described decisive role could not be played by Osmond's army except by way of the most vigorous offensive. Osman's inactivity after his second victory at Plevner on July 30th proves that his army, however stout on the defensive, must have lacked every trace of offensive force. A general as able as Osmond Pasha would not have allowed the favourable situation as it existed the beginning of August to slip by without turning it to account.

If Osman Pasha considered his army capable of carrying the offensive to the point of seeking a decisive battle, his advance from Widen to Plevner was a well-planned operation. If he did not credit his army with this offensive capacity, his advance must be accounted an error. In spite of all the defensive successes attributable in part to the lack of skill of the Russian leading, the mere stay of his army at Plevner was not only useless, but an advantage voluntarily considered to the Russians. that they failed to turn the advantage to account until very late, and after many mistakes and sacrifices,

and that the tenacity with which the Turks held out at Plyfner came near giving the whole campaign a turn unfavourable to the Russians was due to circumstances which were beyond Osman Pash's control. Subsection 2. Combat Fire of masses and rifle trenches The Great Wars of the 17th and 18th centuries bear to a certain degree a peculiarly a character in which the personality of one or several leaders is strongly impressed. To be sure, a long series of improvements has been made in the course of time,

partly in armament and equipment, partly in tactical arrangement and employment of troops. Still, grand innovations which influence the character of the whole method of fighting do not appear, and the technique of fighting has remained essentially unchanged for a long time. The period of the Napoleonic Wars forms the transition from the period just mentioned to that of modern wars. It is true the introduction of the dispersed order of battle brought about a complete modification of the entire fighting technique, but the armament and equipment of Napoleon's infantry, cavalry and artillery differed in nothing from the armament and equipment of his opponents, and, leaving out some trifling matters, it was not different from the armament of the times of Frederick, Eugene and Turin. An entirely different picture is presented by the Great Wars of the Quarter of a Century just passed.

Compared with former times, the individuality of the leaders, though still decisive of the final result of the war, is placed in the background. On the other hand, each of the Great Wars of Recent Times is characterized by improvements which mark an epoch in the character of weapons and a resulting transformation of the methods of fighting. The Oriental War produced the rifled musket, the Italian War, the Rifle War, the Italian War, the Russian War, rifled gun, the American War, the Armoured Ship and Monitor, the Austro-Prussian War, the breech-loader with moderate rapidity and range, the Franco-Prussian War, the Chassepo, a far superior rival of the old breech-loader. Lastly, the Turco-Russian War produced the new systems of rifles of surpassing rapidity of fire and range, up to the repeater and, as a result,

field entrenchments on a grand scale, which are now not the exception, but the rule. Editor's Footnote by Arthur L. Wagner It is surprising that a military writer of von Trotha's attainments should speak of field entrenchments on a grand scale as an outgrowth of the Dirko-Russian War. Had he given even the most superficial study to the War of Secession, he would have known that the great armies engaged in that contest made a more extended use of field entrenchments than was made by the Turks, more than 12 years later. The battles at Kennesaw Mountain had, indeed, the entire campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

The battles of the wilderness in Spotsylvania and the long struggle at Petersburg might be studied with profit by von Trother Cleary and other European critics who labour under. and the delusion that field entrenchments on a grand scale were practically unknown until the Turks brought them to the attention of the military world. Moreover, the American War produced a breech-loader which was superior in range, accuracy and rapidity of fire to the Prussian needle-gun of 1866, and which was largely used by the Union troops. especially the cavalry in the last year of the war. A.L. W. Footnote end. The waste of ammunition, predicted by the opponents of the breech-loader on its first introduction, was happily prevented by the fire discipline of the Prussian troops.

The surprisingly small consumption of ammunition, two millions, in the campaign of 1866, proved conclusively that the capacity of the new arm, as regards rapidity of fire, needed to be fully utilised only in exceptional circumstances, and then, for very brief periods, as a rule, the fire delivered was aimed fire at short range and of moderate rapidity. Quite different was the use made in 1870 by the French army,

after a brief peace training of the rapid-firing long-range arm. Fire was opened at enormous ranges, in part before the opponent came in full view. The latter sometimes suffered, considerable losses at very long ranges, but a real success was never gained by this kind of fire. It is not our intention to discuss here the much mooted question of the long-range fire of masses, but we feel safe in stating that the procedure of the French in this particular was ill-adapted, and not based on clear reflection and calculation, but chiefly on lack of fire discipline,

and obscure conceptions of the real value of the new arm. After the Franco-Prussian War, the long-range fire of masses became the frequent topic of theoretical disquisitions and practical experiments in the great armies of Europe. But while the contending parties were still deeply engaged in their controversies, and no final settlement of the necessary transformation of fire tactics had been reached, the question had been very simply settled in Turkey, without much previous inquiry, and the most extreme conclusions had been drawn from the armament with long-range rapid-firing arms. At the beginning of the war, the Turkish army developed a system of fire tactics, complete in its simplicity.

As soon as the enemy was known to be within reach of the rifle, the space supposed to be occupied, or about to be traversed by him, was covered without regard to distance and probability of hitting, or consumption of ammunition, with a fire whose severity and duration were without example. Intimately connected with this system of fire tactics is the use of field entrenchments, which were probably never heretofore employed to this extent or in this manner. The Turkish method of fighting in this war rests therefore on two, to a certain extent, new, factors, and although many objections may be raised or improvements suggested as to the application of the system in detail, still the soundness of these new factors and their influence on any change of fighting tactics cannot be denied. In turning now to the active factor of the Turkish tactics, we find that experience has silenced those objections, which were formerly frequently raised against the practicability of such rapid fire.

The new and complicated systems of small arms have proven efficient in the hands of untrained men, nor was there any difficulty encountered in the handling of magazine rifles, formerly condemned as a weapon in war. The supply of ammunition, which was consumed in incredible quantities, was affected on the part of the Turks without difficulty. To be sure, as regards to the latter point, the Turks were greatly favoured by the fact of being almost everywhere on the tactical defensive, but even in the rare cases where the Turkish infantry made great attacks, the thorough organisation of the ammunition supply can be traced up to

the very firing line. In nearly all the Turkish positions which the Russians captured, enormous supplies of cartridges were found, frequently spread out in shallow boxes for convenient use between the prostrate skirmishers. It was not at all rare to find 200 to 300 empty cartridge shells by the side of a dead Turk. Instances occurred where individuals were individuals Turkish expended as many as 500 rounds in a single action. Even in those cases where the Turks moved to the attack on the Russian positions, it has been proved that some Turkish skirmishers covering themselves in front of the Russian line fired away 120 to 150 rounds in a comparatively short time. We may supplement this by the assertion of the Russians that in the course of the war

they took altogether in the captured positions and in several surrenders 500 millions of cartridges. It may be interesting to state here that the total supply of a German army corps, inclusive of the ammunition columns, amounts in round figures, to four and a half millions of cartridges. Nor should the fact be overlooked that the distances in front of the Turkish positions were frequently measured by pacing and marked. We now turn to the passive factor of the Turkish tactics, the employment of field entrenchments.

Here we have to do two things, which, though intimately connected, must be separately considered, construction of the entrenchments proper, and the shelter afforded by the rapidly constructed rifle trenches. Wherever the Turkish infantry took up a tactical position, it sought cover for deployed lines, utilising to the fullest extent any advantages offered by the ground. Where it became necessary, a shallow rifle trench was constructed, wherever the ground permitted, tiers of fire were arranged for several lines. of infantry covering themselves at short distances one above the other on more or less steep slopes.

The Turkish infantry seems to have possessed great skill in the construction of these trenches. The first hasty construction was accomplished with great rapidity and technical troops were not employed in this work. Where there was ample time, the shallow trench was deepened and the breastwork strengthened. If the position was to be occupied for several days, traverses against infallating fire were added, and shelter for part of the men constructed by digging a blitz. leekly down under the counter-scarp, thus obtaining better shelter whenever the garrison of the trench was not engaged. As a very good arrangement, we commend the placing of numerous vessels filled with water in the trenches, the latter in some cases being also fully supplied with provisions,

so that neither hunger nor thirst would compel the men to leave the trench even temporarily. The latter case happened several times on the Russian side, causing in some instances tactical disadvantages, and in every case, useless losses. When preparing to hold a position for some time, the lines just described were strengthened by redouts constructed at the highest points of the position, and armed with guns. They served particularly to sweep the front of the trenches. In preparing the line of entrenchments, great care was taken that the advanced line,

when carried by the enemy, gave him no protection from the line still held in rear. Having endeavored to give a brief outline of the two new factors of modern fighting, fire of masses and field entrenchments, we will subject the tactical employment of the several arms to a brief consideration. Subsection 3. The Infantry The Russian Infantry on the European Theatre of War is organised into regiments of three battalions of five companies each. The fifth company of each battalion is styled rifle company, and is intended for skirmishing, although differing neither in armament nor equipment from the

remaining companies. The regiments of the Guard have four battalions of four companies each. The rifle battalion has four companies. When preparing for battle, the battalion usually forms four company columns in two lines with short distances, the fifth rifle company being deployed in front. A regiment formed for battle usually has two battalions abreast in the formation as described, and the third battalion is held closed in mass as reserve in rear. From the description of the several actions, it is plain that there was no preparation of the attack by the fire of skirmishes, and that all preparation was left to the artillery. The attack was mostly undertaken from a great distance, a thousand paces and over,

and carried out in such a manner that the skirmish line, the two lines of company columns, and frequently the reserve, started almost at the same time, and with very small distances, and became intermixed in the advance, so that the attack, in a favourable case, approached the enemy in the shape of a more or less disordered swarm. If the first advance failed to bring the troops to the enemy's position, they found shelter on the ground and opened a lively but for the most part ineffective fire. The tactical arrangement was greatly loosened and the tactical leading rendered difficult, frequently impossible.

Fresh reserves were required to get the halted lines again in motion. The attacks on the enemy's positions were almost invariably frontal and attempts to turn one or both of the enemy's flanks rare. When on the defensive, the Russian infantry frequently advanced to the counterattack too soon without having fully utilised the destructive effect of rapid fire at short range. The pursuit of the defeated enemy was also sometimes made with the bayonet, though pursuit by fire would have been far more effective. The tactics of the Turkish infantry on the defensive has been noticed

in connection with the discussion of the Turkish fire tactics. In addition, we note on the defensive a persistent holding back and usually a skillful employment of the reserves. On the offensive, a dense skirmish line was followed by small closed attachments, which in turn were followed by larger bodies at greater distances. They opened a terrible fire and endeavored to utilize the terrain in delivering the decisive blow against the enemy. In most cases, the flanks of the advancing infantry were covered by more or less cavalry.

A few words more on the armament of the opposing infantry. The Russian guards and rifles were armed with the Burden rifle, the remaining infantry on the European theatre with the Krenk rifle, and the Turks with the Peabody Martini, and partly with the Snyder. The following table gives a comparison of the different arms. Weight of the rifle and bayonet, Berdan, 10.27 pounds. Crank, 10.84 pounds, Pibody Martini, 14.30 pounds. Snyder, 11 pounds.

Weight of the rifle without bayonet. Burdan, 9.37 pounds. Crank, 9.9.9 pounds. Pibody Martini, 9.5 pounds. Snyder, 9.9 pounds. Calibur. Burdan, 0.42 inch. crank 0.60 inch, P-body-martini, 0.44 inch, Snyder, 0.57 inch. Weight of cartridge, Burdan, 6808 grains, crank, 841 grains, P-body-martini, 636 grains, Snyder, 708 grains. Initial velocity, Burdán, 1,450 feet per second, crank, 1882 feet per second, crank, 1882 feet,

per second. Peabody Martini, 1,349 feet per second. Snyder, 1,163 feet per second. Dangerous spaces for infantry. At 600 paces, Burdahn, 170 paces. Crank, 75 paces. Pibody Marty 5 paces. Snyder, 100 paces. At 1,200 paces, Burdahn, 46 paces. Crank, 28 paces. P-body-martini, 45 paces, Snyder, 36 paces, at 1,600 paces, bernardin, 25 paces, crank, disappears, P-body-martini, 20 paces, Snyder, disappears. End of table. In connection with the field entrenchments which we have discussed above, and which have gained greatly in importance, and more particularly in connection with entrenchments thrown up in the course

of the action, the entrenching tool comes to the fore as a point-tebranching. in the infantry equipment. In the actions here described, one becomes painfully aware of the frequent lack of entrenching tools on the part of the Russians. It is partially explained by the fact that in many cases the Russian foot soldier threw away his entrenching tool has a troublesome burden. But, leaving this out of consideration, the equipment of the Russian army with entrenching tools seems to have been too small to satisfy the requirements of modern combat.

Editor's Footnote by Arthur L. Wagner. After the bitter lessons of Plyvna, the throwing away of entrenching tools by the Russian soldiers seems to have ceased. Referring to the march of Skobel F's division from Plevna to Constantinople, Green says, Overyman carried an implement of some kind, about 85% being spades or shovels, 10% picks, the rest axes, etc.

His division marched with these on their back, from Plevna to Constantinople. They were slung over the back, the handle projecting above the left shoulder, and the spade below the right hip, and were attached to the shoulder with a piece of string, strap, or a piece of old tent, or anything else that was available. They were heavy, weighing over five pounds. They were uncomfortable. They were in every way inconvenient, but each man had learned by hard experience to feel that his individual life depended upon his musket, and his spade, and he took good care to lose neither one nor the other. ALW. End of footnote. Several means are available for having the requisite entrenching tools on hand at the decisive moment, by an addition of special troops, by carrying the tools on wagons and issuing them to the troops as required,

and lastly, by making the entrenching tool a permanent part of the infantry equipment. The detail of special troops for the construction of such works would seem to be inadequate on account of the great extent to which hasty entrenchments have been and will be employed in modern war, and on account of the intimate connection of these works with the tactical action of infantry. Someone in the Russian army has proposed to equip a company of each regiment with entrenching tools and to compensate the company for the extra weight by reduction in another direction, In other words, to give each regiment a pioneer company and to enormously increase the special troops. Aside from many disadvantages entailed, this plan would still fall short of its aim.

It is wholly impracticable to carry the tools on wagons, issue them to the infantry before the action, and have them turned in afterward, so that nothing remains but to permanently equip the infantry with such a supply of entrenching tools as to enable it to meet any demands of battle. A supply of entrenching tools would of course have to be carried on the wagons as a reserve and for the construction of extensive works. The infantry should be wholly independent of the assistance of special troops in the execution of all purely tactical trench work, and the Turkish infantry, in spite of its defective training,

has shown that this is feasible. Some voices in the Russian army oppose the permanent equipment of infantry with entrenching tools, on the ground that they are too heavy and are sure to be thrown away. Yet, a tool suitably contrived and carried, aided by proper instruction of the men in the great value of the tool, supplemented by historical examples, would for the most part deprive these objections of their force. It is a fact that the Russians were deficient in entrenching tools before Plevner. Unfortunately, the author has no means for ascertaining what the supply of entrenching tools in the hands of the troops was, but the number must have been very small.

At the beginning of the Great Artillery Attack in the early days of September, when emplacements for more than 100 guns had to be constructed, as well as advanced rifle trenches and other trenches in Ria as cover for six divisions, there were issued to the troops from the Field Engineer Park, 1,600 small spades, and several hundred large spades and picks. But the tools issued from the Field Engineer Park formed the bulk of the tools on hand, for Scobileff's three brigades, which received none of these tools, we were almost completely destitute of entrenching tools.

As a matter of comparison, we will state here that in addition to the tools carried by the cavalry, artillery, artillery and trains, the German Army Corps of 25 battalions has immediately on hand for entrenching purposes, 5,000 small spades, 3,000 large spades, 1,000 picks and pickaxes, and 250 hatchets and axes. The 5,000 small spades and part of the hatchets are permanently carried by the infantry. End of Section 15 Section 16 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha.

This Librevox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 13B comments Subsection 4 The Cavalry Some adverse criticisms commenting with some justification on the defective work of the cavalry in the first part of the campaign, remark that the work of the cavalry was all the more unintelligible

since the Russian cavalry was not only proportionally strong, but also superior to the weak Turkish cavalry. Both of these assumptions are wrong. At the beginning of the war, the proportion of cavalry to infantry in the army of operation was one to six, which is about the normal proportion in the German army and may be deemed sufficient and not unusually large. The reinforcements brought to the theatre of war in the course of the campaign amounted to ten infantry divisions, numbering at least 100,000 men. The cavalry of the Guard and Cossacks, numbering not more than 8,000 men, changed the above proportion very much in favour of the infantry.

It is wrong to speak of a great numerical superiority of the Russian over the Turkish cavalry. The so-called regular Turkish cavalry, to be sure, was not more than 8,000 strong, but the 20,000 turkessers formed not only the Russian. the most numerous, but also decidedly the best portion of the Turkish cavalry. The relative strength of the Russian and Turkish cavalry is therefore approximately the same, and at first slightly in favour of the Turks, subsequently slightly in favour of the Russians. Aside from the cavalry of the Guard which had a special formation, the entire Russian cavalry of the line and the 20 Don Cossack regiments in service, were, under the most recent organisation, formed in 15 permanent divisions. 14 divisions were composed each of one dragoon, one Lancer,

one Hussar and one Cossack regiment. Two Cossack regiments did not form part of the divisions. In view of the experiences of the German army in 1866 and 1870, it was deemed advisable not to organise larger bodies. The divisions were to be used independently and closed in one body, and their tactical training corresponded there too. The service with the infantry divisions was to be performed by Don Cossack regiments, which did not belong to any cavalry division. These principles were, however, soon deviated from. At the beginning of hostilities, the 15 cavalry divisions were distributed among the 15 corps, so that each cavalry division became an integral part of an army corps to the exclusion of all independence, and the strategic

usefulness of the cavalry divisions. At the beginning of hostilities, the army of operation numbered seven army corps and as many cavalry divisions, besides the Caucasian Cossack Brigade and ten Don Cossack regiments, which latter, not belonging to any higher unit, were intended to perform the service of divisional cavalry. Immediately upon the passage of the Danube, the divisional organization was wantonly destroyed for the purpose of forming a new and larger unit

for General Gorko's advance across the Balkans. The Caucasian Brigade and three combined brigades formed this corps. The Dragoon Brigade composed of the two Dragoon regiments of the 8th and 9th divisions. The so-called Combined Brigade consisting of the Hussar Regiment of the 9th Division and a Don Cossack Regiment. Lastly, the Don Brigade consisting of two regiments. Three of the ten Don regiments were thus taken up, and but seven Cossack regiments remained for the 14 infantry divisions. This number, of course, proved inadequate at once. A large number of regiments belonged to cavalry divisions, were thereupon taken from their

divisions and attached to individual infantry divisions and brigades. The cavalry division soon disappeared in name also, and their commanders were assigned according to rank to the command of mixed bodies of troops. On the other hand, a large cavalry corps under Krylov was formed at the beginning of September for the purpose of investing Plevna from the west. The strategic task of this corps was mannithold. It was to observe the army of Plevna, reconnoitered the country to the west and south, and oppose any relief coming from these directions as far away from Plevenor as possible.

The task necessitated a repeated division of the Corps and proved that this clumsy mass formation would have entailed difficulties of leading, even had the latter been more vigorous and appropriate than it was. Two or three independent cavalry divisions, with special instructions directly from the commander-in-chief of the West Army, might perhaps have been better able to accomplish the object contemplated by the Supreme Command. The idea of repulsing by cavalry alone any relief coming from the south or west implies an overestimation of the fighting capacity

of the cavalry unsupported by infantry. And although in our above discussion we were bound to find fault with Krylov's retreat with so little fighting, it is doubtful whether the cavalry could have succeeded in keeping an infantry corps of 10,000 men permanently from Plevna. None of the facts or statements point to any plan of giving Krylov's cavalry timely support by infantry.

The tasks imposed on German cavalry in 187071 never implied the carrying through of a decisive action against large bodies of the enemy's infantry. At this point, the following reflection is, perhaps, not out of place. The attitude of Osman-Pascha at Plevner in July and August may have convinced the Russian leaders that, Osman's army was incapable of a sustained vigorous offensive. It was therefore desirable for the Russians to entice the Turks in some way to leave the entrenchments of Plevna and fight the Russians in the open field. Supposing the Russian West Army took post in September not to the east but to the west of Plevna with two strong bridgeheads on the right bank above and below Plevna, perhaps at Medavan and Ribbon, while 4,000 or 5,000 cavalry were watching the

east side, the following would have been the situation. No relief army coming from either the West, Witten, or from the South, or Kani, could join hands with the army in Plevenor without first defeating the Russian army. But the latter, wholly aside from proper entrenchments and a far superior artillery, was strong enough to repulse simultaneous attack by the relief army and the army inside Plevna. Should Osman turn this position of the Russian West Army to account in order to march suddenly eastward and threatened the line of the Jantra, there was the greatest probability that he would be overtaken by the main body of the Russian West Army before reaching the Osmar, and forced to give battle in the open field under very unfavourable conditions. Returning to the actual conditions

before Plevner, we find that the investment on the west side did not become effective until General Gorko took command, and considerable forces of infantry had reinforced the cavalry. Lastly, in casting a glance over the tactical employment of the cavalry, we noticed the exaggerated use of dismounted fighting. Its modern role will certainly place cavalry often in positions where it must fight dismounted, and on that account it should be trained correspondingly. Still, dismounted fighting will and must be an unwelcome expedient and more or less opposed to the nature of the arm. Not so in the Russian cavalry, dismounted fighting there has become a perfect, mania. It is used on almost every occasion and even without cogent reasons. This is no

doubt due to the peace training of the Russian cavalry in which an exaggerated value seems to be placed on dismounted fighting, for exaggerated it must be called, considering that in the grand manoeuvres of 1876 more than once entire cavalry regiments dismounted for village fighting and that cavalry assaulted considerable towns held by strong infantry garrisons. The dragoons are still looked upon in Russia as real double fighters, as in the days of Emperor Nicholas, who sought to realize the centaur combination of infantry and cavalry in the creation of his dragoon corps. Although this creation of the dragoon corps failed completely at the first test in the Oriental War, still the underlying idea has, within narrower limits, been preserved in the Russian army up to this day.

The Dragoon Regiment of each normal Russian cavalry division is to represent, in a certain sense, the infantry elements of that division. Dismounted fighting of the Russian cavalry is an essential factor of its action. The dismounted fighting of the German cavalry is never more than an expedient. The Russian cavalry division, viewed from the ideal standpoint, is intended to be a combination of all three arms, capable of any kind of action, and equipped for the greatest possible celerity of movement. The German cavalry is meant to accomplish all that is possible for cavalry proper, while as a single arm it must renounce complete independence in battle.

These latter requirements are decidedly more in keeping with the law of the equal division of labour, which is becoming more and more predominant in every sphere, and which results in an increased efficiency of the whole. Many features of war, which, according to our ideas, are surprising and bewildering, may be explained by the difference in principle just stated, between the Russian and German cavalry. Subsection 5. The Artillery The Russian Field Artillery was armed with breech-loading guns of two calibers. The so-called four-pounder had a calibre of 3.4 inches

and fired a projectile of 11 pounds. The barrel weighed about 614 pounds, the limber contained 18 rounds, and there were two ammunition wagons for every gun. The so-called 9-pounder had a calibre of 4.2 inches, The projectile weighed 22 pounds, the barrel weighed about 1,250 pounds, the limber contained 12 rounds, and there were three ammunition wagons for every gun. Both these Russian guns surpassed the corresponding calibers of the German field artillery,

as regards weight of projectile and barrel. As regards weight of projectile, the nine-pander was but little inferior to the German 4.7-inch gun. The entire field artillery was provided with wrought iron carriages. A gun was drawn by six horses. The batteries of the foot artillery consisted of eight guns, half of them four, the other half nine-pounders. The horse artillery had four ponderers only, and six guns to a battery. A brigade of six batteries with 48 guns was permanently attached to each infantry division.

There were four guns for each infantry battalion, slightly more than provided in the normal strength of the German Army Corps. Each cavalry division had two horse batteries with 12 guns. In view of the great numerical superiority of the Russian over the Turkish artillery, it was to be expected that its influence in action would be dominant, and that its effect would vigorously prepare and support the attack of the infantry. But we find little of the sort. Most actions give the impression that the cooperation of the artillery had no influence on their course worth mentioning.

There are two reasons for this. First, the method of its tactical employment. Second, the tasks devolving upon it in this war as compared with its inadequate effect. In glancing back over the tactical employment of the artillery in the actions described, we find the following. 1. The available batteries were mostly, from the very beginning, evenly distributed over the line of battle. Part of the artillery was not held back for the purpose of using it en masse at a certain point of the line of battle, in the sense of a corps's artillery. 2. Fire was opened on the enemy's position at very long ranges

and was almost invariably frontal. Seldom do we find an endeavor to flank a position. An exception is the position of the artillery taken by Skoblev's orders on the east side of the Tuchnitsa ravine for the purpose of enfilating the Turkish position on the 3rd Nol. 3. In most cases, the numerically inferior Turkish artillery soon gave up the fight against the Russian artillery and withdrew to cover, only to reappear in efficient condition the moment Russian infantry moved to the attack.

4. The frontal position of the artillery compelled it to cease firing as soon as the infantry attack began. 5. Those cases are exceptions where batteries followed the attacking infantry and endeavored to support it from positions in front. The artillery remained for the most part in its original position and played an inferior role in the second phase of the action, while on the other hand, the inferior Turkish artillery was very much in evidence in that second phase. A vigorous advance of the artillery to support the infantry attack is seldom found except under Skobloff's direction. The battery attached to the Gostroma Regiment on July 20th furnishes an example of that kind,

and so do some of the batteries of the Russian left under Shikovskoi on July 30th. The batteries which advanced with the infantry under the enemy's infantry fire suffered such losses in men and horses as to be put, entirely or in part, out of action in a short space of time. If we investigate the material effect of the Russian artillery, we fail to find any thorough and successful effect in any of the actions, excepting that of TELUS on October 28th. The Russian artillery seldom found an opportunity to fire on troops not undercover. The fire was mostly directed against lines of infantry under natural cover, against rifle trenches, or more or less regular entrenchments,

and the fire had hardly any effect. Despite its preparation, continued for hours, by the fire of a formidable mass of artillery, the infantry attack, invariably, encountered an unshaken opponent. It is a fact that the small effect of the Russian field artillery, in the actions of July and August against the sheltered and entrenched Turkish position shook the confidence of the troops in their field artillery so severely that 2024-pounders from the siege park were used in the preparation of the Great Attack on Plevna in September,

but the latter were likewise unable to produce a result in any way satisfactory. The first fire was opened at an average range of 2,500 yards, at which distance the four-pounders were deemed inefficient, and the nine-pounders alone were used by the side of the heavy guns. Upon approaching within 1,600 yards of the enemy's position, some of the four-pounder batteries took part in the firing. The result of the bombardment of the Turkish position, which was carried on for several days with great energy,

was almost nil, unless the fact of the Russian gun carriage is becoming unserviceable is considered a negative and doubtful result. The effect produced October 24th by the concentric fire of 60 guns on the redoubt of Gorney Dubnick cannot be considered satisfactory. One would have thought that such an overwhelming fire, 60 guns against four, would speedily break any resistance. Having withstood this seemingly terrible fire for several hours, the garrison of the redoubt was still able to repulse several assaults made by superior

numbers. The surrender of the redoubt of Telas is the one success that is to be credited to the artillery alone. Presuming that in the future, extensive field entrenchments will play the same role as in the Russo-Turkish War, the following demands may be made on the artillery. First, demand, an appreciable portion of the field artillery must consist of considerably heavier calibers than are at present numbered among the field artillery, in order to sufficiently destroy the enemy's cover at greater ranges. Second demand, the like calibers of the field artillery will be employed not so much in rearward positions as in direct connection with the attacking infantry. The task of the light artillery is partly to accompany the assaulting infantry in small bodies, partly by skillful and bold manoeuvring in larger bodies,

to take the important points of the enemy's position under a massed fire during a brief space of time. In fulfilling these tasks, great losses in men and horses, perhaps even of guns, become unavoidable, but the responsible leader, if aiming at decisive results, will not shrink from such losses. A battery which fires at the decisive point with destructive effect for five minutes or even one minute and is then lost has done better service to the whole command than ten batteries which from well-chosen rearward positions have maintained a well-aimed but in the end rather useless fire. Subsection 6 Fortresses and Field Entrenchments Ardahan, Nicopolis and Cars, all armed with numerous guns of the heaviest caliber, succumbed to the open attack. The field entrenchments of Plevner, built in the face of the enemy and partly under his fire, armed with comparatively few guns of small calibre held out for five months and ultimately succumbed to hunger alone.

That contrast is naturally the first thought engendered by this war relative to fortifications. To be sure, Ardahan, Nicopolis and Carrs did not fall so quickly because they were real fortresses, but in spite of that fact, Plevner did not offer such protracted resistance because its works were field entrenchments, but notwithstanding that fact, and lastly these instances but serve to furnish additional proof of the old established fact that a fortification receives its importance and value from its defenders alone. It cannot be denied that, as compared with fortresses, field entrenchments played a more important role in this war than formerly, and that the same condition will probably obtain in the next few wars. The principle of fortresses and entrenchments is the same, that is, to form a battleground strengthened by all available means.

The difference lies in the means available in each case. In the construction of fortresses, the limits of these means are fixed by considerations of finance. In the construction of field entrenchments, circumstances vary each case, the amount of available time being a very important item. It is, of course, impracticable to convert into fortresses all points of a country which, under certain circumstances, may become decisive in the conduct of a war. That is rendered impossible, not only by financials, considerations, but by many other conditions, military and non-military.

Such places alone as possess a permanent strategic value under all circumstances can be taken into account, and it is left to fill fortification to supplement the skeleton of defence formed by the fortresses by additional fortifications closely conforming to the situation of the moment. Greater demands than formerly are made on all fortifications in consequence of the great improvements in weapons and means of transportation, rendering it possible to rapidly bring up comparatively heavy guns and enormous supplies of ammunition. In the construction of fortresses in peace, the element of time can easily be satisfied by utilizing all imaginable technical means. But in the construction of field entrenchments, there will invariably be a dearth of time, and in most cases

one of hands, and it will become a question what preparations will best facilitate a suitable and rapid construction of field entrenchments when the moment for doing so arrives. These preparatory measures may be divided into two classes, intellectual and material. To the former belong the preparations of plans of fortification for all such points as may easily become important in certain situations, and the practicing of troops in the construction of large fortifications. The material measures consists in a sufficient equipment of the army with entrenching tools, and the preparation of all wood constructions required in such works, as blockhouses, powder magazines, gun platforms, reveting material, bridges, ramps, and cantonments, the component parts of which should be kept in store in the great

fortresses ready for shipment. End of tactical studies on the battles around Plevna, by Thilo von Trotha, translated by Carl Reichman.