Dan Snow's History Hit - 200 Years of British-Russian Relations

Episode Date: March 25, 2022

Russia and the UK have very different political structures and ambitions, from their alliance at the Battle of Navarino in 1827 to the historic low of their relations now. In this episode of Warfare, James is joined by Lord David Owen, who formerly served as Navy Minister, British foreign secretary, and EU peace negotiator in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. With over two decades of working closely with Russia, Lord Owen takes us through his knowledge of the complex history of dealings.David Owen is the author of 'Riddle, Mystery, and Enigma: Two Hundred Years of British-Russian Relations' published by Haus Publishing.If you'd like to learn more, we have hundreds of history documentaries, ad-free podcasts and audiobooks at History Hit - subscribe today! To download the History Hit app please go to the Android or Apple store.

Hi everyone, I'm Dan Snow. I'm currently in the Antarctic, so we've chosen today to play an episode of one of our sibling podcasts. It's Warfare for People That Love Military History, presented by James Rogers. He's got a great episode for you. Enjoy. Where should we start to look back at the long, turbulent history of British-Russian relations? Well, according to Lord David Owen, the former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, we should look back to the Battle of Navarino. This took place on the 20th of October 1827, when a combined fleet of British, French and Russian vessels worked together to destroy the Ottoman fleet at anchor in Navarino Bay in Greece. This battle is notable for many reasons. It was the last major engagement involving only wooden ships. It was a decisive

step towards Greek independence. But it was also, quite remarkably, a key moment in British-Russian political relations as politicians looked to distance themselves from this very clear British naval victory because it was won in conjunction with the Russians, the Russians who the Wellington government thought were trying to mark their own territory in India at the time. There was deep suspicion of the Russians. Now, I'm your host, James Rogers, and here on the Warfare Podcast, Lord David Owen, who served as Navy Minister, he served as British Foreign Secretary, and as EU peace negotiator in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

Well, he is going to take us through this long history of British-Russian relations. as EU peace negotiator in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s? Well, he is going to take us through this long history of British-Russian relations. He's the ideal person to do this. He's the author of a new book, Riddle, Mystery and Enigma, 200 Years of British-Russian Relations. Seems quite on the nose. And of course, during his over two decades in power, he spent a lot of time working closely with the Russians. Enjoy.

David, welcome to the Warfare podcast. How are you today? I'm fine. Looking forward to the discussion. Yes, me too. And it is an absolute pleasure to have you on the podcast as a former Navy minister and foreign minister. It is good to have you here at a time of growing tensions of conflict in Europe. And in fact, all the more pertinent that we're discussing quite a relevant historical example of a much larger power or powers infringing upon the independence of a much smaller nation. And this is particular today in terms of the Battle of Navarino. So, David, please take us back in history. Where should we begin in order to understand properly the dynamics of this battle?

Well, I was keen to show that there has been a period in our history which we've worked very well with Russia. that there has been a period in our history which we've worked very well with Russia. And in this particular case, it was a very carefully arranged rapprochement between Britain and Russia, and to some extent Britain and France, by Canning, who was then Foreign Secretary.

And he came in in 1822, and he looked around the world, and he saw that the Greeks were wanting independence, and he was favorable to that. And the port, the Ottoman Empire, was totally opposed to it. And a war was starting between the two, and it raged on while he effectively shifted British foreign policy, as he had done towards America. I think he was a great figure, Canning, actually, one of our great foreign secretaries. And what he understood was that if you wanted a settlement with the port, and we did, and you wanted to bring the Greeks and the Ottoman Empire together and stop fighting, you had to have power, and that it was no good just relying on diplomacy,

you had to be able to bring a force which they would listen to. So he assembled really the strategy, some people call it humanitarian war, the first humanitarian war. I don't believe that at all. The Congress system had been breaking down, and it was a good opportunity now with a new foreign secretary. And he went for Russia and began to talk through emissaries, through the Russian ambassador's wife, in particular, the Russian ambassador's wife in London, who was asked to go to Moscow. And she went and spoke to the Tsar. And more importantly, some of his key officials came back, reported to Canning, and he began to see that it would be possible to get Russia on side for a diplomatic presentation to the Ottoman Empire, but it was paying to be backed by force.

And then he spent a whole month in France, in Paris. The ambassador was a friend of his, but his task was to bring the French on board as well, which he did. And so then you started seeing the Russia, Britain, and France putting in the dialogue in Istanbul with the port, a proposal that they should allow proper Greek independence. They started off with just a half and fiddling around and not genuine and not serious. But they began to realize that we were serious about this. And by this time, Admiral Codrington had been agreed to be the British commander of the fleet. And he actually went in to the Bay of Navarino, which is in the Peloponnese in Greece, right down on the southernmost tip. One of the most beautiful natural harbors in the Mediterranean.

In fact, Harbordut was the site of one of the battles between the Spartans and the Athenians. And the only case where the Spartans lost and 300 Spartans gave themselves up in the battle. And when they came back to Sparta, they weren't welcomed. They were decried on the basis of Spartans don't give up, don't resign. Anyhow, so it's a historic place. And he went in at Mount Codrington to talk to the leader of the port, who was camped there. And the port had brought in, effectively, the Egyptian navy, who we now call it. It's an effective and efficient navy. And there were a substantial number of ships, eventually 60 of them, sitting in the Navarino waiting. And Codrington emphasized what was happening. They really knew the diplomatic

proposition. He was politely received, but it was pretty clear that it was not going to be easy anyhow. Then the Russian admiral came and joined him and also the French, and they eventually joined him and also the French. And they eventually sailed into the Bay of Navarino with the Egyptian fleet in a half horseshoe in front of them in the bay. And they went in under the guns. And so they were surprisingly in some respects, but their mission was peace, but peace enforced if need be. And it was perfectly clear that things were getting difficult when some musket fires exchanged. A young lieutenant in a ship that was a small boat that was sent forward was killed. Another person was killed. And before we knew where we were, we were into a major battle. At no stage did either the British, French, or Russian Navy fire first. It

was always the port officers and men. And it turned out to be one of the greatest naval victories under sail ever in British history. We sunk all 60 ships. It was a completely decisive victory, hailed as a great success in London and in Moscow and in Paris, but not by the British government. And they called it the untoward event. And they apologized to the port in Istanbul and effectively walked away from the victory. It was an unbelievable situation. The Russians couldn't understand it. The French were annoyed by it. Admiral Codrington was given all honours by the Russians and the French, and yet he was singled out as the man who was responsible and gave the impression that he

had irresponsibly opened fire and accused them. He is a very fascinating man, and he refused to accept the admiralty decision that they wouldn't pay bounty to his men, and particularly to those who've been injured or killed, or to their widows. And he said, if you don't pay this, I will take it to Parliament. So they wouldn't pay. He stood in Plymouth, Devonport, my old constituency all those years ago, and was given a resounding vote by the constituency. And he said, I'm not going to stay a member of Parliament. I just want one bill to put this injustice to right, and then I'll leave. The bill went to Parliament. The government tried to oppose it.

Duke of Wellington, by which time was Prime Minister, quite the worst Prime Minister, in my view, in our history. He'd be better spent on fighting on land and certainly not political battles. And the government couldn't keep their vote. And they had to give way. And they gave bounty. They gave to the men. Admiral Condton resigned, and he was made Admiral of the Home Fleet. So it was a resounding defeat. But in historical terms, it sent all the wrong messages to the Port Navy, and it diminished this great victory over the port. again where we could have handled Russia better because Russia immediately, seeing that we were two-faced really on this, picked a battle with the Poles and you had the Russian-Ottoman first battle and the Russians won. And we had a second battle of complicated relations with the Ottoman Empire, greatly for Britain. We were dragged in, in my view, to the Crimean War. We should have left the French fight that one, or at least just fought on the sea and brought our naval power into the Black Sea. I don't believe it was necessary for Britain to get involved. We were ambivalent all

this time to the humanitarian horrors of the port, which were considerable, previously being Greece, but started going all around the area. And we had this big eventual battle when Gladstone took the human rights calls and said that we were backing the wrong people and that we should stop backing the port. And, you know, some famous foreign secretaries and prime ministers were involved in this confused strategy, and I try and deal with that in the book. And in the midst of that was the so-called Great Game, which was the Duke of Wellington and his brother, Wellesley, who was one time Viceroy of India, constructed this story that we were in a great struggle with Russia over India. And I must say, I think the whole thing is a myth. over India. And I must say, I think the whole thing is a myth. It's very hard to see that Russia were really interested in taking battle. I mean, there was all this time Afghanistan became very

crucial. Britain was what started the defeats in Afghanistan. An interesting sideway to history, Harold Macmillan said, what's the first rule of British politics? Don't declare war against Afghanistan. And yet we go on doing it. We don't learn from history easily, do we? whites versus the reds. And Churchill was very strong in wanting us to back the whites and to supply them with arms and to try and overturn the Leninists, rightly sensing that they were going to create trouble in the world with their ideology. At one time, it might have just been possible, but the Russian generals and political leaders behind the whites didn't really dissociate themselves enough from some of the Tsar's errors, got linked with the Tsars, pushed by the Leninists into a lot of false steps in terms of winning support amongst Russian people, and gradually lost ground.

Churchill stayed with them right to the end, but eventually Lloyd George, who brought him back into the cabinet against the will of the conservatives in the coalition after the First World War, and getting himself more and more out to a limb, Lloyd George had to tell him, ready to grow up and behave himself. But essentially, there was no wish in Britain or in America, nor in Lloyd George, nor the President of the United States to carry on another war. And we had to pull back and out. And the Communists had won and stayed in power for a long time. So that's the history of that one. Then you come to this

extraordinary moment when, in 1941, the Germans, having had the Molotov-Ribbentrop plan, suddenly turned against Russia. And Churchill had a saying at that time to his staff, don't wake me until eight o'clock in the morning unless we're invaded. So they didn't think this justified really waking him. So he woke up at eight o'clock. He cleared the decks apart from a lunch and a dinner engagement with senior Tory ministers who warned him against building a real alliance with Russia, and he dismissed them. He said, we have got to offer the Russians a real alliance, a real shift. And he made a fantastic speech, which made Pravda the next day. And he said, I don't retract a single criticism I've made of your government and the Bolshevik revolution,

but I'm talking to you, the people of Russia. And you Russians, we have no complaints with you at all. And anyhow, we're going to work with your government, because we have a common enemy. It's a brilliant speech. And he stuck by through thick and thin, and immediately launched the Arctic convoys, which was incredible, really. I mean, the night was day, incredible, really. I mean, the night was day. And so for 24 hours, these ships could be seen. The Germans had airfields in Norway, and they bombed the hell out of these convoys. It's one of the bravest things. The United States came with us. And we put tanks and ammunition and above all food into the Russian ports, Archangel. and that stuff went straight to Leningrad. When I was in business in Russia, after I left the Balkans at the good time with

Gorbachev's revolution and then Yeltsin in power, I used to sometimes speak to people in this iron ore mine and the steel mill I was with. And over 70-year-olds, Russians, remember this. They knew that something important had happened in Britain and Churchill in helping them. And there is still, as this, of course, fading out, that the Russian people have got a relationship with us. We must be very, very careful now when things are looking very bad in relations with Russia, to make a distinction between what we view the Russian government and the Russian people. And this was a constant theme of Churchill's relationship. After he got thrown out of the war, and he made his great speech in Missouri, with actually Truman by his side, Truman had asked him to come and speak in this

because it was in his home state. And the Iron Curtain speech was actually about the potential model of the United Nations of peace, as well as talking about the Iron Curtain. But he always wanted to bridge this gap. And he carried it on when he came back as prime minister in 1951 and he looked all that time for an opening and actually the Americans thought it was too early and Anthony Eden, his foreign secretary, thought it was too early so they stymied him but he would have left to his own devices, gone to Stalin and talked directly to Stalin as he did during the war. So his Stalin-Church relationship is very interesting. I'm Matt Lewis.

And I'm Dr. Alan Orjanaga. And in Gone Medieval, we get into the greatest mysteries. The gobsmacking details and latest groundbreaking research from the greatest millennium in human history. We're talking Vikings. Normans. Kings and popes. Who were rarely the best of friends.

Murder. Rebellions. And crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit. Wherever you get your podcasts. Is it safe to say that as we look through this long history from the Battle of Navarino that there may be instances where Russian and British military alliances may work quite well throughout history but this is always held back by the very different political structures and political ambitions and I suppose to take us back

to the Battle of Navarino why was it that the government separated themselves from such a resounding British naval victory? Was it because of that alliance with the Russians? Was it not something that was seen as politically amenable to the public appetite of the time? I think it was Lord Wellington, basically. I think he had a great steep-seated suspicion of Russia. And with his family link and seeing India, I think he

saw Russia military. He may have been right about Russia's military and maybe some of the Tsars. I just think it was beyond them at that time. They were heavily involved with their fights with the Ottoman Empire. And they were fighting in and around what we would call Bulgaria, Romania, up the Danube, all this area which historically had been at risk and in the Black Sea. And the British problem was that we thought it was better to side with the forces in favor of the Ottoman Empire, and that this would make life easier for us in the Middle East and everywhere else, which I think was wrong. But it's open to argument. And as I say, that section of British relations with the Ottoman Empire, and siding with them against Russia is one in which many books have been written.

I don't claim this is a book that can do justice to it. And I think people have to make their own minds. And if they're interested in it, I give a lot of guidance to some extremely good books written in that era. And I think I'm focusing on British-Russian relations, but the role of the Ottoman Empire, I'm absolutely stagnant that anybody could have thought of defending the Ottoman Empire's refusal to allow Greece independence. Well, take us back into that

history a little bit then, because this had been a struggle for Greek independence that had been bubbling away for a few years from a series of revolts, at least most recently at this time, in the early 1820s. Is that how long the Greeks had been fighting for independence here, or can we take it much further back? I think you can take it further back, but that was when they were certainly fighting. And it's very important when talking about the significance of the Battle of Navarino, which is largely seen as the moment when Greek gained independence.

They had already been fighting and very bravely and actually at times defeated the Port's Navy with their small navy. And there was this great romanticism about Byron. Byron poetry was actually liked by Canning, who was a poet, but he was not a romantic in Byron's military exploits. I mean, he was a sort of pop star, really, in Europe. And why he chose Greece was this strange love, which a lot of us developed for Greeks. The feeling that it was the start of real civilized democracies. It's a country.

It's hard not to feel passionate about. And when the junta came, the military took over Greece, I refused to visit Greece. And then they were in NATO, and young people like me were impatient, and we didn't like the then British government. I was Minister of the Navy under Dennis Healy and grew to be very fond of

him and also of his judgment. And he kept saying, keep them in NATO and their military will form relations with British generals and captains and colonels and Americans likewise. And they'll all tell the military to stop being stupid and get back into democracy. And that's actually what happened. And it was really a fairly peaceful climb down of the junta in Greece. So there are a lot of lessons of history. And I mean, Churchill's great visit in Christmas Day in 1944 to Athens is remembered by many, many. He rather fouled up relations with the Greeks later, because he had to face up to the fact that a civil war was there, and he had to choose sides,

and he chose, I think, the right side. But at that particular time when he went in, the head of the Orthodox Church was agreed to be the chairman of the two civil war fighting sides in Greece. And Churchill had to make up his mind. Did he shake hands with the Greek communists? He decided that he would bow his head. Apparently his head went so low it almost touched the floor, but he never shook hands with them. Wow. So when we look back through, all the way back to the Battle of Navarino,

we can really see it as a turning point in modern Greek history. to the Battle of Navarino, we can really see it as a turning point in modern Greek history. But is it also fair to say that it is a turning point in British-Russian relations? Is this something that has kept in the mind of the Russians? Is it something that Lenin held against the British? I mean, it's a hard one to figure out, of course, because it's the British military, the Navy cooperating with the czar as opposed to you know it moving through to being the bolsheviks and the revolution so how does this play as we move forward into the first world war and the second world war into russian relations with the british does it lay the seeds of mistrust that perhaps are still festering there today? I don't think so, but it may be. I think

that what Lenin held against us is that we entered the First World War with the Russians on our side. And for the first year, 14-15, the Russian troops fought very well, gained a lot of territory, and both France and Britain had been very keen to have the Russians on their side against Germany. Then the troubles at home began to feed through to their capacity of their fighting forces. And they more or less pulled back in order to cope with the trouble at home, the domestic trouble. So they really weren't there as a strong force by end of 1916, early 1917. But I mean, it is perfectly possible to point to the turning point. I mean, had the whites beaten the reds, of course, then it would have been a very, very different thing. And again, you have to hand it

to Churchill. He understood ideology, and he understood what lasts. And he knew that he was dealing with a new political structure with deep roots. And that if you didn't get it out now, it would be very difficult to get it out later, which is, of course, what it proved to be. I think we'll always have conflicting stories about our relationships with Russia, I think. But, you know, look at the royal families, the intermarriage of a great number of people at one stage. And we tend to forget, you know, I mean, Putin came to this country in 2003 and stayed in Buckingham Palace. It was a royal reception. I went to the banquet and I was then doing business with Russia. And I did successful and enjoyable business in Russia up until the moment of the first invasion of Ukraine. And at that time, I decided

you couldn't do business in Russia and hold the values of Britain. And so I pulled out. And so I was not involved the last seven, eight years in business in Russia. But there was a good moment when Yeltsin went on his tank. The first democratic leader in the West to support him was John Major. And Mitterrand in France was hedging his bets, didn't know which side of the civil war really started then, which would win. But by backing Yeltsin, Major ensured that we had very good relations. And Margaret Thatcher had done much the same by backing Gorbachev. So for about 20 years, we had good relations, did good business. A lot of Russians came to this country as students or business. A lot of British people went to Russia and Moscow. And I believe myself relations will

get better. But it will take now a real change of regime in Russia. After the tragic invasion of Ukraine, things will not be the same. As democratic nations, if we value sovereignty, if we value democracy, and we value the continuation of the Western liberal world order, then it is incredibly difficult, of course, for there to be any normalisation of relations with Putin's Russia after the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, both in 2014 and again this year in 2022. So do you really think that this is a point in time now where there will have to be a line drawn over the Putin regime the removal of Putin at some point in the near future in order for there to be any return in relations normality of relations between the West and Russia between

Britain and Russia yes I think it will be impossible while Putin is in control. And even after he goes, whether through illness or whether through a pooch, very difficult to remove him. He's very isolated. I think it will probably be more drawn out. And I think a moment will come again in history. It might be 20 years, it might be 40 years. I don't know. But I think there will be a moment where we will recapture a relationship based on common interests. And that's how most of these relationships in diplomacy are. They're not really friendships.

You can have friendship within a relationship, but fundamentally between governments it's not people to people so much as interest to interest, and when your interests coincide. But we'll see. But you know, there's the other side of Russia, the cultural Russia, and Britain needs no encouragement on this side. We love their ballet, we love their music, we love their literature, their poetry, and I'm paid up on all grounds, you know. I love watching the workshop. I like watching the ballet in St. Petersburg. I went to Russia first to see our Minister of Health in 1974.

I was then, I think, the only living person who was actually negotiating with Brezhnev and with Gorbachev in Russia in 1977. So I've seen the good and the bad. I've done business with them. And I think of the Russians in Stary Oskol, which is a steel tower, which is the main business that we did with them. And it was a terrible mess. And it was a nationalized industry, plus plus, with all the worst possibilities of the state.

And we gave the hospital back to the city. We dismantled all the different add-ons and improved its sufficiency with our Russian partners. We were investors for a British company. It was a huge success. You go back now and you see that city is transformed. So when people also want us to have no economic links, be careful. An economic successful links is a very good way of shaping and from the bottom up changing attitudes of the people to which their governments respond. Maybe it's that sort of thing we've got

to do. But for the moment, we have to pull out investment. We have to take as strong as possible sanctions against Russia, and I hope we don't get into a generalised war. David, thank you so much for your time to talk about this and for framing the current crisis that we live in, in a period back in the 1800s and a battle that maybe people may not know too much about, but does, well, carry some stark similarities to today but also helps us to analyze that specific relationship between britain and russia and how it has well shifted in terms of cooperation and turbulence so much over the last couple of hundred years tell us where can people read more about

this battle in my book riddle mystery and enigma And it's there on the front of the picture. And that is the Battle of Navarino. But it's only a start. It's a taster, if you like. And it goes through the span of 200 years of British relationship. It, of course, is linked to me because it's not a formal history book in a state way. And some people disagree with some of the emphasis on it. But if you want to find out what Russia was, Churchill's famous phrase, riddle, mystery, enigma, I think you can discover it actually just by reading its history and wanting to understand.

Don't approach it if you're still feeling very hostile to the Russian people. But Putin is not representing the Russian people and never will be. Thank you. And I think that that is an important note to finish on, making that distinction between the Russian people and the politics of the Putin Kremlin. David, thank you so much for your time. Thank you.

Well, that, folks, was an episode of Warfare with Dr. James Rogers. We've extended the remit of warfarefare to First and Second World War, but also the Great Wars of the 18th and 19th centuries. So I hope there'll be something in the Warfare feed for you all to enjoy. If you want to subscribe to Warfare, just head over to wherever you get your podcasts, search Warfare, and feel free to give it a rating and a review as well. Thank you.