Dan Snow's History Hit - A History of Iran

Episode Date: January 15, 2026

How does Iran's history underpin today's unrest? Dan traces more than 2,500 years of Iran's story — from the first Persian empires through conquest, dynasties, and revolution — to understand how power, identity, and sovereignty have shaped the country. He's joined by Ali Ansari, Professor of Iranian History at the University of St Andrews, to explore key turning points over the centuries from the Arab conquest to the 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and the 1979 Revolution.A version of this podcast was first released back in 2019. Produced by Mariana Des Forges and edited by Dougal Patmore Dan Snow's History Hit is now available on YouTube! Check it out at: https://www.youtube.com/@DSHHPodcastSign up to History Hit for hundreds of hours of original documentaries, with a new release every week and ad-free podcasts. Sign up at https://www.historyhit.com/subscribe.We'd love to hear your feedback - you can take part in our podcast survey here: https://insights.historyhit.com/history-hit-podcast-always-on.You can also email the podcast directly at [e-mail]. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Hi everybody, welcome to Dan Snow's history hit. Right now, as I'm recording this, Iran is once again at the centre of global attention. For more than a month, protests have spread across the country from major cities to smaller towns and communities. Initially, these protests seem to have been provoked by economic hardship, so Iran's currencies collapsed in value, food prices have surged, and for many families, daily life has become unaffordable. But I so often press, protests that began about prices have turned into something broader and more strategic. They are openly challenging the extremist, the authoritarian political system in Tehran. That government's response has been severe, as you might expect, and authorities have turned

off the internet. It's very difficult, therefore, for Iranians to communicate, to organise with one another or communicate with the outside world. The government's security forces have attacked protesters in the streets. Human rights groups have reported mass arrests and mass casual events. It's believed now that thousands of protesters have been killed, but the exact figures remain hard to confirm. Supreme Leader Harmony has backed the crackdown, and despite the scale of the unrest, it does look for the moment like the Iranian state is still in control. In this podcast, folks, we're going to try and understand why Iran is experiencing another moment of convulsion. We've seen these protests and these crackdowns so many times.

over the last four decades. We're going to ask on this podcast, what are the causes of this instability, of this protest? And we're going to go back into the country's history. Over the last century, Iran's political life really has been shaped by this repeated struggle over sovereignty and dignity and basically who's in charge, the nature of Iran and who gets to make the decisions there. We're going to talk about a key turning point in 1953 when Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mosaddegh, was overthrown a coup backed bar. the UK and the USA, after he moved to nationalize Iran's oil. And for many Iranians, that moment was so formative. It sowed the seed of this idea that foreign powers would never let

a truly independent democratic Iran flourish. And that sense of betrayal, that outrage fed directly into the 1979 revolution, which overthrew the Shah, the retro-ruler of Iran and brought in the Islamic state, the theocracy, which has never enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people of Iran, because there have been many challenges to it. There's been challenges from within, through elections and protests and reform movements. People have taken to the streets. There have been brutal crackdowns. Each time, these attempts to at least to soften the system, but certainly to overturn it, they've been blocked. They've been crushed by unelected institutions loyal to the supreme leader. So today's generation of protesters, they have seen these cycles before. It must take, I think,

incredible bravery to go out and protest against the regime, knowing full well what the consequences will be. In this episode, we're going to go right the way back through Iran's history. We're not going to look at the last few decades of unresolved tension between state power and popular will. We're going to go all the way, folks. We're going to go two and a half thousand years back. We're going to talk about the first mighty Persian Empire, about Alexander Great, on the Romans and then the Arab conquest. We're going to come all. all the turbulent 20th century, and we're going to try and trace that history that still lies the center of Iran's identity and its struggles today. I'm joined by the best, folks,

simply the best. Professor Ali Ansari, he's a historian of modern Iran at the University of St. Andrews. He's been a great friend to me in this podcast, a wonderful man. He is known for his work on Iranian nationalism, the development of the Iranian state. He's been in the media a lot. He'll recognize his voice. We recorded this interview actually back in 2019. when he released his book, Modern Iran, since 1797, Reform and Revolution. And watching the news this week made me think of this episode, which on the biggest episodes we ever broadcast at the time. And I thought it would be great to reshare it for those of you who are not lucky enough to have heard it.

So here, folks, is Ali Ansari talking Iran. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king. No black, white unity, till there is first and black. unit. Never to go to war with one another again. And lift off and the shuttle has cleared the power. Ali, thank you for much for coming to the podcast. It's a mighty subject today. Thank you very much. And I suppose we're going to start with Iran. Yeah, just start with the whole history of Iran. One of the interesting things about Iran, I have to say, compared to say, if we were to look at the history of Britain or the history of France or whatever, is that actually almost as a dual history or a dual historical inheritance. By which I mean, there's a sort of a real historical inheritance, if we can put it that way, a sort of a tradition that's been born from what we would be familiar characters from Greek history and Roman history of people like Cyrus the Great and Darius and Xerxes, you know, but also what the Iranians have inherited is a very very important.

very, very rich mythological history. And that for me is fascinating, because that mythological history in many ways has informed the Iranian mind much more profoundly than the real history. I mean, it's a curious twist in a way. And it reminds us, and I think as me as a historian, it reminds us that these historical narratives are much more complex and mixed than we think. With Iran, it is a place that has been both bigger and smaller than its current borders. Well, where is the Iranian heartland both geographically and historically and where did it begin? Well, interestingly, traditionally and the Iranian's worldview, they have this concept of the empire of the Iranians. Now, Iran itself is basically a cognate term that comes from, and we might as well deal with this, from the term Aryan.

Now, of course, the term Aryan has a lot of very negative connotations today. But traditionally, in the 19th century, as people tended to use the term as a linguistic distinction, and what the Iranians were were basically part of the Indo-European family of tribes that came from Central Asia and moved from that sort of Central Asian basin into what we now know as the Iranian plateau. And the area which they populated, which they considered to be their, if you will, their territory, their core, lay between the rivers of the Euphrates, the Indus, and then the mountains of the Caucasus, and then in the northeast, the oxes. Now this is rather large, you might imagine.

I mean, this is basically the empire of the Aryans or the empire of the Iranians, as they call it, and it's obviously grown and shrunk according to time. But in the traditional historography, that is their sort of area. That would be the area of the sort of Persianate world. Modern scholars refer to it as the Persianate world. This is where the Persian language is relatively dominant, although, you know, one might say even in India, of course. I mean, what's fascinating about India is that India under the moguls was basically Persian-speaking, government was in Persian, which is why, of course, when the East India Company, you know,

went to set up in India, of course, they all learned Persian. I mean, Persian was the dominant. Why? Because it was part of the Persian at world. And this sort of area, which is, I suppose, a sort of maximalist view of what would be the Persian at world, is one that Iranians, in a sort of a literary sense, at least, tend to adhere to, although it has to be said. The Persians themselves, one might say, are basically, if you want to look at Persian as a province, is now in southern Iran, but the current territory of Iran is basically a slightly reduced sort of borderlands of what would be considered the sort of the Iranian heartlands. And the Persian Empire is one of the first significant, very large imperial entities in human history,

isn't it? Well, in the ancient period, there are three essentially Iranian empires or Persian empires. And the reason they're called Persian, by the way, is because the Greeks tended to ascribe to one particular, the dynastic tribe, essentially, the tribe that granted the dynasty or produce the dynasty. So the first Persian Empire, which is founded by Cyrus the Great, who takes Babylon, takes Lydia, takes Egypt, essentially forms this vast, vast conglomerate, stretching essentially from what is now Eastern Afghanistan all the way through to Thrace, you know, up to Greece and then to the north, is the first, what we might term universal empire.

It far exceeds any of the previous ancient empires in its scope and its reach. And interestingly, the German philosopher Hegel says that all history begins with the Persians. The Persian Empire is where the light of sort of enlightenment or the light of conscience begins, but then he says, but then passes away. So obviously after the Persians, it then goes on to the Romans or the Greeks and so on and so forth. In European historography and European identity, the ancient Persian Empire looms large. One of the interesting things about Persia is it's part of the foundation myth of the West. So the West is defined against the ancient Persian Empire. It's because Darius and Xerxes are not able, effectively, to absorb the Greek states into their imperial domain, that as Herodotus then says,

you get this division, you know, this is a fight between East and West. And that, you know, great universal empire, of course, eventually succumbs to the challenge of Alexander, who, of course, at the time Iranians did not consider the great. I mean, this is what I was trying to point out to people. They just, you know, and in fact, in Zoroastrian texts and then the old pre-Islamic religion of Iran, they talk of Alexander as the great destroyer. But in classic Iranian sense, I have to say, over time, they grow to adopt Alexander. So in the mythology, of course, Alexander becomes a Persian prince. So it all becomes very, it's okay then, you know, he's or take over, but that's because he's a Persian prince. And of course, in a practical sense, in many ways,

when Alexander did take over and absorb, he became a Persian king, in actual fact, much to the annoyance of his troops, but he adopted many of the most. So that ancient Persian empire is absolutely central, you know, not only in terms of Iranian identities, certainly as we know today, but far more in a sense to Western identity. For modern Iranians, of course, they tended to, that period of their history was largely lost to the mists of time and replaced by the mythology. And the reason that happens is partly because the second great Iranian dynasty, the Parthians, come in from the East after the brief period of Macedonian rule, and they bring with them a whole host of historical mythologies of their own.

But the Parthians last for enormous 500 years. I mean, think about it. 500 years, it's quite a... And of course, they are the first Iranian dynasty to confront the Romans. So... They do so very successfully. They do. They do.

And the great clash, of course, is the Battle of Kauai, where our good old mate Krasis, you know, ponder's over to the east, to have a bit of fun to try and emulate Caesar and the others and gets a rather bloody nose. And it's a devastating defeat. It's interesting that it's not seen so much in Western historography quite as much as say you find, you know, the battles in Germany and others. But it is a pretty devastating defeat. And Augustus, you know, later takes this great effort to bring the standards back and so on and so forth. And it reminds the Romans that the Parthians are a serious military power that need to be respected.

But at the end of the day, the Parthians are a very, I don't want to, my colleagues will, will criticise me for using the term, but they're not feudal, but we could describe them as sort of feudal. It's a much more tribal monarchy, if I can put it that way, even though it's a powerful monarchy. And ultimately, in the third century AD, they are overthrown by a new dynasty from Persis, from Persia, in the south, the Sasanians. And it's with the Sasanians that the mythological history and the real history finally merges. The confluence of the two rivers meets, you see. And then you get this one narrative. And the Sasanians, we enter the sort of the light of the day in that sense. And the Sasanians rule for about 450 years, and they too are a

major challenge, both to Rome and to the Byzantine Empire. And then how do Iranians think about this catastrophic event of the Arab conquest of the Sassanian Empire, given that they've inherited both of those sort of simultaneous legacies? Well, what's fascinating about it is, of course, here is where you get this clash of two distinct narratives. The Muslim narrative has to tell you that this is a great thing, you know, the decadent, indulgent Sassanian Empire finally collapses against these vigorous, you know, Arab nomads imbued by this dynamic religion. Interestingly, really, in the last hundred years, and even, I would certainly say in the last 20 years, even in the Islamic Republic, but this, of course, reflects the politics of the day. Let's not forget that. There is a

sort of reaction against this, and this view that actually the collapse of the Sassanians in some ways, while they wouldn't want to call it a tragedy, there is a sort of a lament. And And if you look at the Book of Kings itself, of course, the great Persian epic, it ends with the end of the Sassanians. That's the end. Now, if you think about how many Arabs actually invaded Iran in this vast territory, by the way, in the 7th century AD, we're not talking about more than 50,000. And this is where military history comes in rather useful, because historians can often make vast claims without actually thinking, what does it mean for 50,000 men to go traips things through a territory the size of Western Europe? You know, what impact can they have?

you know. And the truth of the matter is, where they had impact was on particular sort of urban areas where they're military encampments, you know, in eastern parts and wherever. But actually, vast tracts of Iran were not touched by it. It now seems apparent that vast tracts of Iran did not convert to Islam for centuries. Yeah. They just maintain their old Zoroastrian religion, Mithraism, all sorts of other things. Gradually, the conversion came in. But even that conversion, people are saying, was somewhat eclecting. And what you see actually is, a much more dynamic interchange between the two cultures. It's actually a successful marriage of different cultures where clearly, you know, Islam and the Arabs who bring it, have an enormous amount to contribute. But it's not, it's not a conquest in that sense. It's not a conquest in the traditional sense. When does, and I really should know this, I've no idea, when does the schism with the caliphate effectively take place? When does Persia then break off and re-establish itself as a separate entity. Is it when the sea to the caliphate moves west towards Europe? Well, what's interesting is a very good colleague of mine always says that the modern Iran

begins with the Mongols, which is a bit depressing, I have to say. But he's got a point. And really what happens by the 10th and 11th centuries, you get a huge influx of Turkic tribes and coming in from Central Asia. They start coming in as military mercenaries. And then they, once they come in, they start to take over. So they come in, they settle in, and then they start to take over, basically. But what you find with two particular dynasties, one is the Seljuk Turkish dynasty comes from Central Asia. It basically establish itself in an Iranian. It becomes a Persian dynasty. And the ministers, the viziers are all Persian. It takes place in the 11th century. And then, so 200 years later, you get the Mongol onslaught.

Were the Mongols a terminal event for Iranian civilization from which that entire part of the world has never recovered? How did it give birth to modern Iran? Well, yes. I mean, there is it. Certainly in the Arab histories, They say this is such a catastrophe and had the Mongols not come and sack Baghdad, you know, the Arab world would now be ahead of the Europeans. This is, you know, fanciful, to be honest, partly because Baghdad at this stage was really a bit of a provincial town. I mean, the power had shifted elsewhere. Moreover, as a number of historians pointed out, we cannot, on the one hand, underestimate the damage that the Mongols did to the area. I mean, they slaughtered on an uncomfortably, you know,

indulgent scale, I have to say. And the tales, I mean, you read the histories by Persian historians at the time, and they talk about it in the most gruesome ways of, you know, wandering over fields where they realise they're just mulching through dead bodies, you know, and they hadn't occurred to them. And the Mongols obviously didn't like cities. They didn't like Urbindu. They thought they were very decadent and all that. And frankly, you know, the sooner we get rid of them, the better. But once they settled down and adapted, whatever, I mean, what someone was saying is that the damage to the agricultural, sort of the sedentary lifestyle of the country, was devastating. But it could recover. For me, the real damage,

in a sense of the Mongol, Turkic Mongol invasion, is not the immediate consequence. It's the fact that they actually altered the nature of the political economy of the country, by which I mean that from the 13th century onwards, Iran becomes less of a sedentary, urban, so agricultural economy. It becomes much more of a nomadic economy. And, you know, these tribal sort of setups in the northern parts of the country become very heavily pastoral. and the sort of the, you know, the large-scale farming enterprises and irrigation in particular were largely neglected. Not entirely, but largely neglected.

What the Mongols did effectively is they, it's not that, you know, that things have been in the kind for many, many years, you know, but they basically confirmed it. They basically put a seal on it. And the thing with the Mongols, really, is that the devastation, really, to the political economy in that sense, or the transformation, I think, the better way of putting it, is that, following on from the Mongols,

you get Tamerlane. Now, you know, you can take a good beating once, but Tamerlane really does really sort of, I mean, he, particularly because his form of conquest was just to repeatedly plunder the same area several times over, you know, you never got tired of it. So Tamer or Tamerlane, as we know, in the West, I think was in many ways really the most destructive element to the political economy. And what it does do is it does change the nature. And I think it's that long-term consequence. So you get much more tribal elements, much more pastoral elements. You get a distinction between the urban and the tribal, which you didn't really have quite so much previously. And obviously the nature of that sort of civilization changes. And Ibn Khaldun makes a statement. He says,

you know, almost all, he's exaggerating, of course, but there's an element of truth in this. He says, almost all the leading intellectuals of the Muslim world have been non-Arabs, and by which he really means they come from Iran and something. And he lists them, you know. And he says, but, you know, ever since, you know, basically Tamerone and whatever, that's, that's, that's, that's ended. You know, it's, now, of course, it's an exaggeration to say that. But there's also an element where that high tide of, of scientific intellectualism that you do get in eastern Iran. And you don't get that again, really, from the 14th, 15th century onwards. And is that timing a little bit awkward because that coincides with the beginnings of European incursions into the Indian Ocean space?

actually European dominance really doesn't come to the late 18th, probably 19th century. And to look at decline going too far back is a bit excessive. But it's certainly, I think there is certainly also a case to be made for the fact, the beginning of European sort of exploration and discovery and whatever, coincides with the time when empires in China and India and also in the Middle East start to basically turn inwards in a way. And are really trying to recover. Now they do obviously recover.

One does, as I said, you know, the main thing one doesn't want to exaggerate is, of course, the Ottoman Empire is extremely powerful. And then in the 16th and 17th century does extend very much. But what is interesting, I suppose, is this, it's not matched by a level of scientific inquiry in the way that we may have had beforehand. And that is interesting. It's one of the great questions, I think, of historians of the Middle East. There's just why that intellectual vibrancy just doesn't seem to pick up again. And certainly in the Iranian case, with the emergence of the Safavid dynasty in the 16th century, the science has become heavily theological, if I can put it that way.

Interestingly enough, Iran right through to the end of the 17th century was viewed in the West as partly because of the sort of biblical inheritance. The Europe didn't approach Iran without enormous amount of cultural baggage, so they tended to view Iran as extraordinarily powerful and rich and so on and so forth. But it still had a reputation for being one commercially fairly wealthy, but also scientifically fairly advanced. You know, there's a wonderful map that a German cartographer has of Persia in the 17th century. It's a beautiful map, and it has a cartouche.

And as friends of mine say, you say, if you look at Western cartographers and they do maps of Russia, for instance, normally the cartouche has a bunch of sort of rather grim-looking individuals. You know, they're seen as on the fringes of civilisation. The Iranian one is rather good. I mean, they look rather dapper. One of them is clearly a carpet salesman of some wealth. And the other one is an astrologer. He has a telescope.

and he's looking to stars, you see. And this is basically this view that Iranians are good at stargazing. It's a sort of, you know, has a long pedigree this imagine. But it's interesting that even in the 17th century, they tended to view Iran as a sort of scientifically and commercially advanced, shall we. So even though in practical terms, actually, that was certainly not the case. How does Iran then involve the incursion of formal empire in a way that the great other great empires of the Middle East and southern Eastern Asia don't. At the beginning of the 18th century, Iran faces yet another of its periodic catastrophes, and that is an Afghan invasion. The Safavids, I should point out, bring Shiasm to Iran. Under the Safavids, Shiism becomes the state religion, effectively, although I wouldn't want to exaggerate

the distinctions, but nonetheless, it does make Iran then quite distinct from the Sunni Arab world. But under the Safavid, you know, there were Christians, there were, you know, Sunnis, there were Sunnis, there were Zoroastrians, and were, you know, it was quite a multi-faith type of empire, or the Shiism was the dominant faith. The Iranian dynasty, the king at the time, is very pious, rather hope-blous, makes a complete mess of it. By 1722, the Afghan rebellion sweeps the Saffir's away. It's a complete fiasco, to be honest. Isfahan collapses.

What's interesting is this sends shockwaves into Europe. Europe has net, what the hell has happened? This enormous happen suddenly collapse to these bunch of vagabonds. And the whole thing is a bit of disaster. What happens is that Iran in the 18th century goes through a period of violent political turmoil with ups and downs on a dramatic scale. The last great Asian conquer, Nardosha, comes in. This is the chap who goes to Delhi in 1739,

knocks out the Mughal Empire just at the time when the British and French are arriving in force on the subcontinent. Interestingly enough, of course, in many European histories, this episode is largely washed over. But it's actually quite central. And of course, Nardashar returns to Iran with something like, in modern terms, $70 billion worth of gyms and jewelry and whatever,

standard operating practice in the period, obviously. I think this conquest and this triumph in India is the period when I think he loses the plot. And as a consequence, you know, to cut a long story short, you know, this great possibility. Nardosha was not a pleasant man by any stretch of imagination, but he was a man, I think, pregnant with all sorts of promise. He was the first person to begin the process of a sort of a military revolution in Iran. He was the first person, for instance, to actually consider having a building a navy and in only the way that a despot can do, you know,

to encourage people to chop the wood down in the Caspian and take it overland down to the Persian Gulf. Only you can only do that on the pain of death. And Nade Shah is assassinated by a number of his officials. The empire breaks up. You get another period of turmoil. And to cut a long story short, basically, by the turn of the 19th century,

you have a new dynasty in Iran, the Rajas, but it coincides precisely with the moment when you have this great new challenge. and it's a European challenge, which is far more severe, profound, intellectually challenging than the Arabs or the Mongols or anything else. And of course, the Iranians aren't really up to it. They're recovering from 100 years of war and turmoil. And this is the time when the Europeans start to engage with Iran in a serious way

during the Napoleonic war. And the French come in. Napoleon sends a very nice letter to the Shah and says, you know, we'd like your support to beat up the Russians and so on and so. then the interesting, then, of course, the British move in very quickly, you know, to avoid any French alliance. But the point is, is that what's interesting is they both approach Iran as potentially a great power. You know, they sort of say, you know, we'd like your help. It's only in that period where they go to war with the Russians, the Iranians do in 1804, and they get absolutely hammered.

It took a long time, actually, for the Iranians to recognize just how far their political power had been out. So in the 19th century, what you get is actually this greater engagement with the European powers, really in the French at a very small level, but then the Russians and the British. So the British in India and the Russians obviously in the north. They always say, you know, the Russians force, Britain politics, i.e. a bit of manipulation just to get your way. And the Americans, when they get their money, you know, they say the Americans are where you can get money from. The British always are a bit conniving. But the interesting thing for me about the Anglo-Iranian relationship is that actually what they're dealing with is not Britain. They're dealing with

British India. And it makes a certain sort of familiarity, accessibility. And for me, it begins to explain why there's this love-hate relationship with the British, because in one sense, they understand each other perfectly well. And the British officials who go to Iran in the 19th century, most of them are very fluent in Persian. And in the 19th century, you begin to see Iranian intellectual certainly absorbing the intellectual achievement of what they see as the West. And for me, what's fascinating about it is that the British in particular are not selling the Iranians this idea that, you know, we have a bigger Navy or we have a bigger army, whatever. What they're selling the Iranians is industry. And when you look at Iranian accounts of Britain in the 19th century,

that's what they're most impressed about. There was some wonderful account. One Persian ambassador who arrives in 1810 is taken to London, it goes from Plymouth to London. And they cross this bridge. And he says, this bridge is the most magnificent bridge. He says it's as big as Damovan. Now, Damovan is the highest peak in Iran, right? It's a volcanic. And James Morier, who's guiding him, says, I think he's talking about Staines Bridge. But they're really impressed by it. You know, for instance, later in the 19th century when the first Persian Shah came to visit Britain, where do they take him? They take him to see the fourth rail bridge. You know, they say, this is what the modern world is. But why is Persia successful where so many other imperial entities right across east, southern,

and Western nations, succumb to formal imperial control by European power. There are several reasons for it in a way. One is that, you know, of the three sort of Middle Eastern powers, Egypt, let's say Egypt formally anyway, and the Ottoman Empire in Iran, Iran is the least integrated into the Western system. So the Egyptians basically are completely beholden to Western banks and get taken over in 1881. But the Iranians are so, you know, I mean, they're just so disconnected from it in that sense. it's on one level, you know, that sort of root in isn't really a possibility.

The other side of it is because there's this sort of competition between the Russians and the British. And the British view is principally to maintain a sort of an Iranian independence as long as the Russians don't get in. So there's a sort of a balance of power. It's a sort of a weapons of the weak, if I can put it that way. And the Iranians play on that very well. The British were quite reluctant to get involved in Iran, even though post-1857, which is the end of the first and last Anglo-Persian War, British influence in Iran was in the ascendancy because they had a very lenient treaty, the Treaty of Paris, and the Iranians were sort of like over the moon. But even then,

when the Iranians were actively in some way seeking to engage with Britain as a sort of the friendly power, the British Indian, particularly, was extremely reluctant. They just didn't want to get involved. Because frankly, they've come to an agreement with the Russians and they don't want to annoy the the Russians. Our interests are primarily in Europe, and we need to keep the Russians on side in Europe. I mean, to my mind, it's one of the great tragedies of British foreign policy there, but it also shows the complexities of that policy that there were so many diverse interests. And the Iranians, of course, could never really comprehend the complexity of that dynamic, that British India and Whitehall had quite different objectives and quite different aims.

And I think the Iranians were able in some ways to play off these diverse pressures, but there was also an element where nobody really wanted to get involved either. I should say, of course, at the end of the day, that in terms of British influence in Iran, from a commercial point of view, certainly in a sort of informal point of view, you know, through the British Imperial Bank of Persia that was set up in 1888, I think. Then, of course, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was formerly incorporated in 1908, they were highly influential in the politics of the country, really, through to the 20th century. But, and this is what I was always saying, and I always say also my students,

never, never forget, really, that the British were always in many ways on the strategic defensive in that area vis-a-vis what they perceive to be Russian threats. So the Iranians were able to play off this in some ways, able to maintain a formal independence, if not a real one, I have to say. And certainly the tragedy of the situation is seen in the First World War. If you look in the First World War, as one Iranian historian put very clearly, it said Iran declared its neutrality, but nobody paid any attention to this neutrality, including the Iranians themselves.

And that's how bad it was, you know, that even the Iranians were busy, you know, mixing it with the Germans and occasionally going off the Ottomans and the right, you know, but foreign armies were basically traipsing over the country. So really by 19, 18, 1919, any sort of formal government in Iran in terms of central government had really come to an end. And that's when you get the next stage, which is the sort of rise of the the Pahlavi dynasty that emerges in the 1920s. In 191919, the Iranian sent a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. And in this peace conference, and they send it as a delegation as one of the victors in the war, which is all a bit jocular, isn't it?

The British and others probably decided that the Iranians were being a little bit over the top by saying they're among the victors. But it's very interesting their mentality. See, what they argued is they said, well, look, we're here in 1919 and our great rivals in the era, the Ottomans and the Russians, well, they're gone. You know, the Russians have collapsed and the Ottomans are collapsed,

and we're here. Therefore, ergo we've won. And they issue this thing. They say, we'd like the peace conference to consider giving us, returning to us, all the territories and the Caucasus that we lost to the Russians, Russians in 1828. All the territories in Central Asia up to the oxes. This is the bit that everyone sort of says, blimey, that's a bit. Plus, most of Eastern Anatolia, because the Kurds, after all,

are Iranians and they would like to return back to the motherland. We're not particularly interested in the Shia centres down south, but we'd like it if you consulted us when you do something about it. I mean, that's also quite interesting. What they were principally interested was a sort of, you know, this sort of empire of Iran, if I can put that way, back to the old school. Now, most people sort of say this is just the flight of fancy. And it is. It is. in an immediate sense. But it also emanates from exactly what I was talking about earlier, that they sort of have this view of this sort of greater Iran that stretches from the oxus, the Euphrates, this, that and the other. And here it is, laid out. And there's a map,

and it draws the boundaries. And it sort of says, I think this should all come back. Needless to say, of course, this was all refused. But what's interesting about it is that I think it's fed into a lot of the ideas that continue to this day. And if you look at what the Iranians are doing, certainly at the moment, since 9-11, since the removal of the Taliban, since the removal of Saddam Hussein, they've suddenly realized they have an opportunity. It's like saying, you know, I have this idea of greater Iran, but wow, it's now become a political reality, you know,

and I can do something about it. And so now you find them basically making claims, really in Mesopotamia, parts of certainly Western Afghanistan, Herat, has always been seen as a Persian city. You know, why the hell shouldn't we have a bit more? Now, I don't want to exaggerate the claim of an iridentism because that would, needless say, cause all sorts of anxieties. It's not that so much.

But it is basically something where the Iranian's say this is our near abroad and, you know, this is our, this is the Persian, the Persian world. And of course we have right. In fairness to them, you know, when the Arabs or the West sort of say, you know, Iran should not interfere in these areas, sort of save them, well, they are sort of, it's part of their hinterland. And why wouldn't they have an influence in these areas?

Of course they would. I mean, if the Saudis feel they can have an influence in Afghanistan and also in Central Asia and certainly in Caucasia, you know, where they think they do. So I think that does feed in. And you don't really get the sense of how important that is unless you, you, you have an appreciation of the history or how they understand their history. You listen to those history covering the long history of Iran more after this. The Iranians turned up to Versailles where the world was going to be reordered,

well, to the peace process following the first war anyway, with a giant map saying this is what we feel Iran should look like. They came in with a number of issues that they wanted to address, not only territorially, but also they wanted help with the rebuilding of the country. And what's interesting is the way in which they approached the whole peace conference. They went in with a lot of preparation. And above all, what they wanted was legal recognition of the country, which was quite interesting. I mean, they went in, became members of the legal nations, and they basically said,

you know, look, we want the territorial boundaries of the state to be recognized, which is, you know, at the very least that they did get. And so in that sense, they scored a few positive points. But on the wider issues, obviously, they were completely turned down on all their vast territorial sort of claims they wanted, you know, most of the Central Asia parts of the Caucasus back, in all these sort of areas that were stripped by the Russians in the 19th century. It's an interesting moment, isn't it, for Iran? Because there are very few non-European-Slas, North American powers present in that process.

So it's a moment on one level of kind of the, it's an indication of the spectacular reach and power of European imperialism. And yet, it's also a moment of great crisis for that imperial system, right? So what does Iran, where does Iran fit into that? Well, it's trying basically to sort of exploit the new legal framework, the whole thing with Woodrow Wilson's 14 points. I mean, it wants to sort of take advantage of what it considers to be a new age in a sense. But at the same time, it comes up against a real sort of practical realities.

And that the practical reality is, is that the British feel that they are basically in the lead position in Iran, the Ottoman Empire's gone, the Russian Empire's gone. So Kersen, who's then foreign secretary, sort of comes out with this sort of wizard idea, And he sort of says that, look, you know, you want all these people to come and help you, which is fine. But we'd rather they didn't. We'd rather we did it all ourselves. So the British make an offer to the Iranians to say that we will come in to assist with the reconstruction of your country. And this is viewed, you know, very controversially among Iranian historians because they sort of see this as an attempt by Kersen to establish a protectorate in Iran.

And that's, you know, a simplistic understanding of it. It's not entirely correct. But it's certainly true that Kersen had a much, much strong. ambition and desire to get engaged with Iran than almost any other British politician. Most British politicians just wanted to get out. They weren't interested. Yes, they had the mandates in the rest of the Middle East. They were obviously focused on India. They didn't want to really extend it even further into Iran. So you get this period between 1990 and 1921, where this Anglo-Persian agreement, as it's known, is still born. It doesn't actually go anywhere. It's not ratified.

Kersen gets more and more annoyed. He gets irritated with British officials who are dragging their feet as far as he's concerned. And finally in 1921, Iranian constitutionalists and others basically decide that they've got to take matters into their own hands. They judge the mood of the British to be quite sympathetic to this because the British, of course, want to leave Iran in a stable but friendly position so they can get out and spend less money. And they find the commander of the Cossack brigade that used to be officered by Russians, but obviously they'd all left after the Russian revolution, so it was now officered by Iranians. And a gentleman by the Nona, Reza Khan, comes with a anglophile journalist by the name of Sayyad Zia,

and they launch what we now know really as a coup in 1921 to overthrow the then-sitting prime minister, not the monarchy or anything, but just the prime minister, and establish a new radically reforming government. And between 1921 and 1925, you see a series of measures brought in to basically restore the central authority in the state, and Reza Khan gradually pushes out all these civil political,

and basically says, I'm going to take control. He's the sore strong man. He's very much supported by all these intellectuals, by the way, because they say, and it's quite interesting, they say, what we really need in Iran, he said, you know, we'd quite like a Napoleon-like figure, but we're not really ready for a Napoleon-like figure because our situation is so bad.

We tried this constitutional revolution, but what's the point of having a constitution when you don't have a government? What we need is a government. So they come in, they say, what we need is a Peter the Great type figure. Now, if you think about Peter the Great, he's not the nicest person.

So basically they sort of think, you know, and people sort of a bit worried about this. You know, is this the right model to be picking, you know, Peter the Great? But anyway, that's the sort of thing they talk about. And they're very explicit about it. And Reza Khan, you know, leader of the Cossack Brigade, basically becomes this Peter the Great type of figure. And with exactly that sort of type of modernising zeal, you know, including reforming dress and, you know, making people shave and this sort of thing. Not dissimilar to what's going on in Turkey across the border. Not dissimilar, actually, not at all.

And, of course, his soulmate, if you look at it. is Mustafa Kamal, you know, and the radical changes taking place there. Of course, we now know, and, you know, previously, you know, historians tended to say that Reza Khan emulated Ataturk, as he became known, but actually it was a much more parallel sort of development. Both of them started from different stages. Iran was way behind Turkey, really, in terms of its development. And in some ways, Iranian revolutionaries were, as a consequence of that,

even more radical in their attempts to push the country forward. So eventually in 1925, I mean, there's a few sort of tussles. This is all an abridgment, by the way, but, you know, but the few tussles. And eventually it's decided that the old dynasty that had been ruling Iran since 1797, they're all, you know, washed out, useless, then spend most of the time in Europe anyway. So Rezachan is invited, and I use invited in a very sort of like loose term, to become king and to become the new, to found a new dynasty, known as the Pahlavi dynasty. He takes a new surname, Pahlavi.

He sort of aspires to the pre-Islamic dynasties and the pre-Islamic. And from 1925 to 41, Reza Shah, as he's then known, with a cohort of ministers, really puts through, I think, one of the most radical transformations and radical projects of state building that certainly we've seen in the Middle East and certainly, you know, in the Iranian case. And many of the things that Reza Shah puts into place, good and bad, are there today. I mean, this is the thing. He's a very controversial figure, that Peter,

the greater of Iran, you know, so it's not exactly, you know. But at the same time, he's the one that builds up a judiciary, a whole new legal code. Very famously, he establishes the University of Tehran. He dramatically transforms the educational structure of the country. A lot of this is, you know, it's beginnings. You don't see the fulfillment of some of these until the next 20 or 30 years. But nonetheless, he lays the foundations of a lot of sort of transformation of the country, social, economic and political. And is it European and its inspiration? It is European in its inspiration. It's what we would call sort of in the language of the time. They're sort of aspiring to a modernisation, which they sort of acquire from the European.

They borrow very heavily from French models of statecraft in terms of the centralisation of the state. But they also, in terms of their political system, at least in lip service, you know, borrowing over sort of a constitutional monarchy as in the British parliamentary system. But in actual fact, really what Reza Shai is, is nothing, I mean, he, interestingly, he definitely believes. himself to be constitutional. But actually, he's an autocrat. I mean, he's an autocrat in every sense, and he's pushing things through. And the thing is that he can't do a lot of things he wants to do without this cohort or intellectuals around him. And eventually they all fall out with him, because, you know, with all these things, you know, the autocrat becomes paranoid and they all get fed up with him. But the fact is, when you look at it in the round, there's a huge amount is achieved.

But the critical factor that isn't, and this is the thing, is that what he does is he builds the state. He builds, you know, one- part the equation in that sense, but they don't actually get round to finishing off that process of reform by building in sort of the rights of the citizen. Do you see? So you have this judiciary, which is very impressive. I mean, they turn this judiciary around in rapid time and the man who sort of actually did all the work eventually sort of dies of exhaustion, I think. But the point is, is that if you look at legal reforms at the time, it's all about the rights of the state. And, you know, you see Jones and what about the rights of the citizen? And they haven't really got

around to that yet. And this is a problem, you see. And I think at the end of the day, and when you look at modern Iranian history, it is the fundamental problem that the reform and the sort of revolution that took place in the early part of the century, and you see this actually broadly in the Middle East, to be honest. What they do is they strengthen the state, but they don't actually get round to really looking at the defence of the rights of the citizen. So, you know, Reza Shah goes through, he's basically, his active period is, I mean, very active period is obviously from the period of the coup, before he's king, really until about 36, 37, after which, you know, most of his intellectual sort of cheerleaders are either, you know, locked up.

Some of them die mysteriously in prison, others that are in exile, so on and so forth. And finally, interestingly, in 1941, he's basically deposed by an Anglo-Soviet invasion of the country. Second World War breaks out. Iran declares neutrality, as is part of the course. And the Nazis invade the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, they're fairly rapid in their sort of like dissent to the Soviet Union in 1944. is then decided that Iran can perform the role of a land bridge to provide supplies to Soviet Union. So I think in August, 1941, the Russians and the British invade from north and south.

Reza Shah's army, which was much vaunted, it was quite modern, so on and so forth, basically collapses. Not, it has to be said, because the ordinary soldier was doing such a bad job, but I don't think the officer collapsed it terribly well. But nonetheless, they go in six days. Rezarsha is deposed. Churchill comes in, who the hell are we going to replace him with? It's quite interesting, actually.

Churchill actually decides, you know, we don't like these Pahlavi people, they're a bit too modern. They're not actually as pro-British as we'd like or, you know, supportive. So what we'd like is let's go back and see if we can find an air from the previous dynasty. And it turns out that the heir to the previous dynasty is actually serving in the Royal Navy and can't speak Persian. So, you know, no chance there. So they then find, obviously, the heir apparent, a young Mohammed Reza Shah, 21. I mean, think about it, 21. In 1941, he's 21. He's got, you know, his father's just been kicked out. The officials bring him and they say, right, take the oath in parliament, you're the new king.

But his first five years of his reign are basically during the Allied occupation. The Allied occupation from 1941 to 46 releases all sorts of political tensions in the country. So there's a period of 20 years when politics is completely repressed. Suddenly the Allies come in and there's a real contest between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans because the Americans come in for the hearts and minds of Iranians. and the key difference here, interestingly, is the Soviets start distributing wireless radios to people. You'd have to be literate. So they send these peasants and they start pumping out radio Moscow telling you that, you know, the workers' revolution is at hand.

So the Anglo-Americans then decide to have to counter that by putting out their own propaganda. And the consequence of that actually is that the Iranian population becomes a lot more politicized, ironically enough. And it's quite interesting. So the Allies finally leave in 1946, the Soviets. fairly reluctantly, as to be said, they sort of hang around there, trying to seize bits of territory, as is half the course. Through various diplomatic means, the Iranians with a bit of help from the Americans eventually get them out of northern Iran. But it's a feebrile atmosphere. I mean, it is a feebrile atmosphere. The Iranians are becoming intensely nationalistic. It's become

highly politicized. They see that they were able to get the Soviets out of northern Iran with a bit of help from the Americans, but a lot of it was actually to do with some pretty mean diplomacy by Iranian officials. I mean, they were fairly sort of like elastic, as they said. And then the Iranians turn their attention. They say, well, you know, we've kicked the Soviets out of the north. Let's turn our attention to the Anglo-Iranian oil company down in the south. Why is this foreign company got this huge concession for our oil resources in the South? And this leads inexorably to the oil nationalisation crisis, which is one of the pivotal and seminal moments, obviously, in modern Iranian history and sadly in the relationship between Britain and Iran. Is it also a moment in which Britain's

weakness beyond Suez becomes apparent? Well, this is the interesting thing. I mean, obviously, Iranians always like to claim that everything starts with them. So, you know, one of the things is that the Cold War, most people assume the Cold War basically starts, not with the Berlin airlift, but with the Azerbaijan crisis

because the Soviets refused to withdraw from Azerbaijan. And there's an element of truth in that. Again, the Iranians will say, well, you know, Suez is a bit of an afterthought. The real crisis comes in this all the nationalization crisis. And I know you've had one of your other speakers here. I mean, James Barr in his excellent book also talks about this. I think he's quite right in saying that normally it's seen as a wonderful example of Anglo-American cooperation. I mean, not much to Iran's benefit, but actually he's quite right in saying it's exceptional.

It is exceptional that what you find is Britain, after the war, obviously one of the victors, wants to reinstate itself, you know, reposition itself, but finds itself fatally weakened by the war. Because much like after the Great War, but worse now, you know, it's financially in a much weaker position. what did the oil resources in Iran mean for Britain? It meant fundamentally that it could source oil in pound sterling, that it had access in a sense to a cheap resource that was absolutely essential for the industrialised world. And the Americans were quite keen in some ways to remove that option from the British.

So it's much better, I think, to see this crisis, not as a sort of a bilateral struggle between the Anglo-Americans and the Iranians, but a trilateral struggle between the three of them, really for power politics. And ultimately, Mossadegh, the prime minister, who I think, you know,

was a child of the constitutional revolution of 1906, was a powerful believer in this rule of law and the constitution. And I think in any other period would have been really someone that, you know,

a lot could have been done with, actually found himself in this sort of power play between the British and the Americans. He, by all accounts, I mean, one could say, certainly overplayed his hand. He probably overestimated the ability,

you know, the willingness of the Americans, willingness of the Americans to come in and help him. He, by the end of 1953, found himself increasingly isolated domestically. People were finding him quite frustrating and became subjected to essentially an MI6, you know, CIA orchestrated coup. But this coup couldn't have succeeded, and here's the very controversial bit, I don't think could have succeeded without a hefty amount of support internally. Now, of course, Iranian nationalist liked to negate that period. But put very simply, if you're paying money to people to bribe them, someone has to take it.

So there was an element there where there's a whole power play and dynamics going on. And ultimately, Mossadegh was overthr. And what was the status of the oil? Well, what happens is, is then relations are re-established between Britain and Iran. There's a wonderful phrase, Sir Dennis Wright, who was later ambassador in Iran, he was sent back to reinstate relations and sort out the oil. And he said Britain and Iran were like estranged lovers. and, you know, now we sort of, it was quite a nice metaphor.

But what actually happens is, whereas this is a British monopoly, Anglo-Iranian oil company, it now becomes a consortium, a new consortium is established, in which Britain has 40% of the stake, but the other 60% is in the hand of American oil companies. So the consortium is actually shared much more why. I mean, Britain is obviously a dominant player, but not in absolute terms.

It's actually the Americans become dominant. And the nationalisation in that sense is reversed, but what you find is the Americans playing a much more pivotal role. So from 53 onwards, Britain ceases to be a really dominant player in Iran. The Russians aren't really there in the same way. It's the Americans who come in. And the Shah is basically restored, in a sense, obviously always been on the throne,

but the whole torrid period, he doesn't out of handle Mossadadip, he goes into exile, he comes back, he claims the people love him. I think really, in actual fact, what he mistakes, is a sort of a deep and profound affection for the monarchy. He interprets that as a deep and profound affection for him, which is not quite the same thing, but he says, oh, my people love me and all this. So in actual, what's quite interesting is the period

in 1953 to 60, the Shah is trying to consolidate his power and the Americans become quite bored with him, actually. They don't think he's strong enough. I mean, what the Americans are really keen on, and if you look at the pattern of politics in the Middle East, the French are always going around setting up republics of one sort of another, the British like to set up constitution,

institutional monarchy. I mean, all this is sort of superficial, but you know what I mean? They all try. And the Americans, for some one reason, are they really into strong men. I mean, what they want, a military strongman. So they sort of looking for a military leader. The Shah, they sort of think, is pretty weak. And actually by the end of the 1950s, there is a rumor, a fairly strong rumor, it has to be said, that the Americans are actually behind another coup to try and unseat the Shah and bring a sort of a military leader in place. And that fails. And the Americans are very, you know, sheepish about it and whatever. But it shows really in that period, that the sort of view we have today that the Shah was America's man and this sort of thing,

it wasn't quite so smooth, you know. So really, by the 1960s, there's a strong argument there that the regime is still very unstable. You get the revolution in Iraq, you know, the Iraqi monarchy is overthrown. You get a coup in Turkey in 1960, so 1958, 1960. There's this argument in Iran that unless we take some serious measures, we're going to be very weak and frustrated to. So the Shah is persuaded to lead what he calls a white revolution. bloodless from the top, land reform, votes for women, so on is hopeful. And this white revolution, which is really officially launched in 1963 by referendum, this referendum is sort of 98% or something of other people sort of say it's all jolly good.

But, you know, it is actually quite transformative, but not in the way the shy expected. So the land reform basically is meant to sort of disenfranchise a lot of land in aristocracy, redistribute with the land to peasants and others. What actually happens is a lot of peasants say, well, because the land that's distributed, It's all done on a sort of political basis or on the economic basis. So the land that they get isn't enough for subsistence. So what they do is they resell the land back, you know, and then off they go to the cities. What you find is abusing the cities.

Now, interestingly enough, the first 10 years of the white revolution, 63 to 73, is massively successful in economic terms. Not necessarily in social, but in economic terms. Economic growth is 10% annually. It's pretty dramatic. Iran is seen as the coming place. Oil money hasn't quite made such a distinct difference yet, but it's building. up. And, you know, everyone thinks the Shah's doing a jolly good job. Now, it masks a certain number of problems, social problems that are clearly coming. One, as I said, the migration, rural urban

migration, but also unbalanced economic growth. You know, some people are becoming extremely wealthy in others. The Shah then has this marvellous, which I'm sure you've seen sort of films of this is marvellous, sort of like celebration of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy and persepolis. It's all great stuff. Interesting, my grandfather loved it. My father hated it. So it was that sort of thing, you know, they sort of thought it was a lot of money was being spent on this. Iranians were invited. Don't go away. Crucial part of the story, folks coming up just after this.

I'm very struck by the tolerance of these societies like Iran to absorb European-slash-Western ideas of political, social, economic reform, whilst having very clear examples of fantastically malign interference by Western. Western powers? And is that a sort of... Absolutely a friction between the two. And what you find, actually, is a lot of Iranian thinkers will tend to aspire to and adapt and adopt Western ideas. Now, Western ideas can be Western liberal ideas or they can be Western Marxist ideas. I mean, the whole range, the whole gamma. What they have less truck for, really, is Western policy. Western policy and politics and the pragmatism of politics often contradicts the high ideals. But that's a sort of

standard narrative of U.S. or British politics around the world in some ways. You know, there is this sort of essence that, you know, there's a lot of synergy, there's a lot of appeal, and there was quite an interesting case of an Iranian left-wing thinker. And basically, you know, if you think about it, his encounter with Britain is either the oil company or the embassy. I mean, there's a very limited, right? He then travels, he's given a visa, and he goes off to Manchester, for some reason,

but Manchester in the 1940s. And he visits, you know, working men's clubs. and he comes away and actually the report he writes from his visit is very striking. He sort of said, I never realized, you know, in a sense that actually ordinary people in this country are actually arguing for the same things we're arguing for, you know. I mean, he suddenly jolted to. And so you see that at all sort of different levels. And I think it goes back to this 19th century absorption of these ideas.

They saw these ideas as much more attractive. They really were taken by, from what of a better word, the Whig narrative of history. I mean, it was about progress. You know, it was about failure. They weren't really taken in by the Soviet model. The Soviet model didn't give them that. you know, but the angry American model did. But they were constantly frustrated by the fact that they think that,

why don't you live up to the ideals? You know, why don't you? And I think that's, and that failure, that gap in a sense is something that the Soviets and the Russians and over were able to exploit, which is what happened. What the white revolution was in a sense was an attempt to try and, you know, what the Shah had this idea, and it was, you know, a flawed idea, obviously, but the idea was, I'm going to push through these ideas of a welfare state, a massive sort of welfare system, a proper economic development,

The Americans were very keen, obviously, on economic as opposed to political development, interesting enough, partly because of their own inheritance. But they push this sort of stuff through. And he said, but we're going to marry it to a very keen sense of political ideas that are Persian. And of course, his idea of that was monarchy. You see what I mean? He said, monarchy is the way we don't want all this democracy stuff. Now, because of the economic growth, he sort of fed this idea and he started to believe it.

Of course, many people weren't really that keen on it, you know, because they said, well, what happened to constitutional monarchy? You know, what happened to this 19 and 6? Now, in 1973, you get a very pivotal moment. For me, the apogee of the Shah's power of 73. And why? Because that's when he's absolutely crucial in the exponential increase in the price of oil. So there's Yonkippur War, the Arab boycott of the West.

The oil price goes up from something like, I think, $1 a barrel, to about $3, I don't know, 14, whatever. Major shock, Western sort of reeling and pain, whatever. Shah doesn't get involved in that, interesting. He says, quite a little, he says, oil should not be used as a weapon, he says, very sort of high. mighty. By December, he goes, he gives a very famous press conference in the palace. And he says, I've decided it's dishonest and not fair that a price of a barrel of oil should be cheaper than a price of a barrel of Perrier water. So he says, so I'm going to increase the price. And he increases the price overnight from $3 so many barrel to 11. This makes a bit of a mess.

What it does, of course, for Iran, and this is the interesting thing. And I've talked to people about this, people who are actually in the plan and budget organisers. The amount of investment, oil investment, going into the Iranian economy between in the fourth development plan was $7 billion. So they had $7 billion of oil revenue to inject into the economy to increase infrastructure and stuff. They had planned in the fifth development plan to start in 1974 to inject $21 billion. It's a threefold increase. The Shah, with his price rise, said, scrap that plan, $70 billion. Now think about it.

Ten times the amount of extra capital liquidity, what happens when the economy can't absorb it? inflation, corruption. And that's basically the story of the 1970s. So Iran becomes the place to be. It's just, you know, you go back, if you look on YouTube, you find some fantastic adverts from the period. You know, all these airlines flying to Iran and Iran is basically the sort of destination of choice. But there are serious problems. And the problem is the economy begins to overheat and the Shah doesn't democratize. So what he does is he takes all this and he says, I'm just the most. successful king ever. You know, I am the new Cyrus the Great, and I'm doing very well. I've given more welfare. I've given more material benefits to my people than anyone else, which to be honest,

in some ways, was probably true, actually. But the fact is, if you're going to educate your public, and there were hundreds and thousands of young Iranians going through university in Iran abroad, many of them on scholarships, full scholarships. I mean, Halcyon days, you know, full scholarships. Of course, what they want are jobs. And what they want is, to get involved in politics. They want to share in the political process. And the Shah said, no, no, no, no, you know, you're not going involved. So I think these created really, really critical tensions, which effectively unraveled in

1978. In 1978, a whole coalition of sort of opposition to the Shah builds up ahead of steam. Revolutions are never predictable. It could have happened earlier. It could have happened later. It may never happen at all. But what happens is coalition of left the religious sort of right in a sense, plus sort of secular nationalists, the secular nationalist from 906, who are now, frankly, just a fraction of their,

old self. They're not really numerous, but they've seen as sort of the intellectual powers. On the one side, Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini, who'd been sent into exile during the period of the white revolution, comes back as a leader of the sort of religious sort of right, if you put it that way, but basically is the symbolic leader of the entire revolution. Then there's a whole left, massive, massive amounts of people on what we might call the Islamic left or the secular left as well. They all push really to force the Shah at once to sort of reform, but really for the overthrow of the monarchy. I mean, that's basically what happens. And ultimately, the reason why, in an interesting way, the Shah falls is because he is so shocked, I mean, honestly, so shocked

by the fact that the people don't love him, that he basically fails to act. He stalls. I mean, the whole machinery of government stalls. And in 1978, And as one person put very right, he said, there's only one thing worse than being a dictator. And that is to pretend to be a dictator. One of the reasons is because he didn't actually like bloodshed. He wasn't keen on it. It's quite interesting when you look at it.

If you can bet it with Assad today and the Shah then, the Shah, to his eternal credit in some ways, wasn't interested in you. You know, he actually said, you cannot build a throne on the blood of your people. And people would say, well, you know, that's very idealistic, Your Majesty, but I think we need to deal with the problem.

You know, I mean, the point was by 1978, really it was too late. There was such a swelling of opposition to him. So that by January, he goes on holiday, which is one of those lovely metaphors for autocrats going off and off he goes. Well, there is an interesting thing about that. You know, and I mean, one of the things about when you look at the monarchy in that sense, it's absolutely right, that there was this sort of sense that being a monarch put certain restrictions on you, that you were bound by certain moral codes. Whereas the Republic, you know, it's much more so. I mean, if you actually look at the French Revolution itself, you know, in terms of what it was doing at the time,

it has much more room for maneuver because the revolution is itself so important, so massive, such a historic event that you can take sort of historic action. It's exactly what you see in the revolution in Iran itself. So the amount of blood, you know, people talk about the casualties and the lead up the revolution. We now have the figures of the people who were killed in the run up to the revolution. And it comes to, in total, 3,183, I think the figure is. And that is from 1963 to the date the Shah left and the vast majority, obviously about 2000 in the year, 1978, 79, with the vast majority in Tehran.

It wasn't really a long. Now, think about that in comparison with a number of casualties that occurred after the Shah left, sort of unifying figure for the revolutionary movement goes, and left and right really go at it. They pile into a sort of civil war. And you get mass executions. I mean, you get a lot of bloodshed. To be fair to the Iranian revolution, it's not as bloody as the French or the Russian revolutions.

The difference is it's on television, though, so everyone sort of watches it. And one of the critical factors in being on television is when they seize the American embassy on November 4th, 1979, it becomes a global event. And as I say to me, you know, the Islamic Revolution in Iran was the first revolution in a sense to be televised. And it obviously magnifies the effect of it. And it was a traumatic event for many, many people. It overturned sort of established order. But in a curious way, as well are my arguments, it didn't actually remove the state.

The Pahlevi state, as built by Reza Shah, is still there. What they did is they replaced all the personnel and sort of developed it in different ways. But if you look at it, you have this new republic, based on the French, Fifth Republic. But on top of that, you then have this religious structure known as the guardianship of the jurist, which is a supreme leader, but that's what gives the game away.

really, doesn't it? So it's the Supreme Leader. So you have the President, Prime Minister, your judiciary, your Parliament, whatever. And then on top of that, they added this layer of the Supreme Leader. And ultimately, this Islamic Supreme Leader had ultimate authority of everything. So, you know, when people say it was the turban replaced the crown, in a way it did. But the first eight years of that revolution were devoted to war. So the war with Iraq took up a huge amount of time. It was a very bloody conflict. They estimate 188 or maybe 200,000 Iranians died. That's in eight years. But it was the first time the Iranians were involved in what, you know, we might call a total war.

I mean, the cities were involved. So, you know, and again, it's one of the founding myths of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic. And so that sort of goes, you know, that goes through to 1988. What it does mean is that the political debate never gets settled. Khomeini is in charge. You know, I tell the Khomeini, he's, you know, very charismatic. He keeps things together. The war continues.

The war ends a year later. Khomeini dies. Not before sending a fatwa against Salman Rushdie, of course, just to keep things on. a bit of a tent to hooks. And the real story of the Islamic public and the Islamic revolution from that time onwards is this contest between the Republic on one side and the Islamic elements on the other side. And in my view, the high tide of the Republican element was between 1997 and 2005 when Khatemi was president. And since that time, we really, unfortunately, I regret to say, have been slipping and sliding into this far more autocrisy,

revolutionary Islamic system, which, you know, I've written in places, has really returned the country, I'm sorry to say, to a sort of autocracy that the 19th century Rajas would have been more familiar with, because the supreme leader has a sort of absolute authority that is divinely ordained. And whereas previous monarchs may have reigned by divine right, they never claim to be actually in a sense, you know, the representative, they might be legitimized by divine authority. But they didn't claim to exercise divine power. You know, I mean, that's the difference.

And I think what you're seeing in Iran today is, unfortunately, the democratic elements that were fought for in the revolution being quashed under the weight of this revolutionary Islamist narrative. Aided and abetted, I have to say, although I want to be very clear on this, I think the West in many ways has mishandled its relationships with Iran. I mean, plus a change. But I think, you know, the central cause of this is internal, not external. So much we could talk about, but let's talk about that sort of the strategic and the standoff with Iran at the moment.

When you look at direction, strategic thinking in Iran before and after the revolution of the late 70s, is what strikes you sort of continuity or was there an abrupt change? Well, all revolutionaries want to claim that there's an abrupt change. You know, they all want to say, well, and there are elements of change. I mean, obviously, there's a much stronger Islamist ideology. If you look at the regional scope they have now, you know, they're in Syria, they're in elements of Yemen. They have obviously Lebanon. And a lot of the way in which they try to justify themselves is justified on certain aspects of revolutionary ideology.

On the other hand, if you look at, for instance, the Persian claims at the peace conference at Versailles in 1919 and what the Iranians are sort of playing around now in, in terms of where they consider to be their near abroad and where they consider to be legitimate areas of interest. There's a lot of continuity. They are the granddaddies of the region. They see themselves as having a particular role to play.

They always say, we've been here longer than anyone else and we'll be here longer than anyone else. And so they sort of feel they have certain rights. So there are strong elements of continuity, by the way. And if you look at, for instance, even in terms of ideology, there's a strong nationalist ideology re-emerging.

Also, they tend to mix a national. match it with religious ideology, but the Shah was severely criticized, for instance, the last Shah for all his praise for Cyrus the Great. Well, I mean, Cyrus the Great is very popular now in Iran, you know. And, you know, they try and obviously claim that he's got some sort of religious aura about him to make him legitimate. But nonetheless, you know, in Iran today, not only are these ancient figures much more popular, but because of the way in which societies develop mass communication, social media, so on and so forth, it's got a much more social base. I mean, that's what's interesting about it. Every year at the place,

Persian New Year, March 21st, Iranians gather, Iranians gather at the Tomb of Cyrus the Great to celebrate the New Year. The two Masaris the Great, some four hours out of the year, it's a bit of a drive. They go there and thousands of people gather. You would have never had that 50 years ago. But now, today, because that sort of passion for Iranian identity in that sense and nationalism, good and bad, but nonetheless that passion for that distinct identity is sort of grounded. It's social rather than political. What do you want Western policymakers want a bit of words to understand about Iranian history? Well, it's in it. First of all, the West needs a clear strategy. And what I've always argued is it needs a long-term strategy. It doesn't. You can't keep reacting to the Iranians. You know, you need to have an endgame in sight. You need to know what you want and you need to know how to, you know, plan it, you know, carefully had to get there. And you need to understand the way in which history plays a role in everyday Iranians' attitudes. And that doesn't mean, as I'm sorry to say, a number of U.S. presidents have done, as say the Iranians are the airs, the great,

culture and then leave it at that, you know, or they're a great civilization and then leave it at that. I mean, you've got to actually say, well, what does that mean? And what I've often said to them, I said, yes, you're right to sort of acknowledge and respect this. But you should also say in some ways, and I think a number of people here have done that is say that, you know, Iranian culture and civilization has got a very, very strong strand of what we would call humanism in it. It's very clear. You know, if you look at classical Persian poetry, if you look at books, of government, mirrors of princes, what they're talking about a lot is, is the way in which you look after, you treat people, you manage society, you govern for the welfare of all and so on and so forth. Sadly, many, you know, rulers in Iran have ignored all this. There's a famous poem that I think Obama quoted. It's a poem by the classical poet Saudi, where he says, you know, we are all branches of all of us are from the Baniardam. We are all sons of Adam. Now, what I think Obama said is he sort of stopped there. He said, we're all sons of Adam, you know. So we're all part of one become.

What actually the poem says is very interesting. And it's basically it's a admonishing, you know, kings. He's basically saying, we're all sons of Adam. And because we're all sons of Adam, when one part hurts, the other cannot but feel the pain. Therefore, you know, take care in what you do, you know, and be sure to treat each side, you know. Well, so, you know, my point, it's actually in some ways the perfect, perfect poem for humanitarian intervention, actually. You know, it's not a poem saying, oh, we're all, you know, part of one happy family and we all need to live together. It's actually a much, much more pointed comment.

Now, Iranians know all this. They know their literature. They're well versed in their culture. They know their history. And if you look at the earlier British diplomats, politicians who operate in Iran, they were well versed in that. They really got in under the skin and they began to understand it. And I think today, one of the problems we have is that we don't have the time anymore to actually really get under the skin. under the skin and understand that cultural sort of context. We don't have enough linguists

and we don't have enough people who understand the cultural context of that language. Well, we're lucky to have you. Thank you very much. Coming back on the podcast, what the book is? The book is now, it's modern Iran since 1797. And you'll get 200 years of history in, oh, very brief time. It's an easy read, I assure you. Excellent. Thank you very much, come on the podcast. Thanks so much, Dan. Well, everyone, that's it. Thank you very much for listening. Thank you very much to Professor Ali Ansari for coming on this podcast and being such a great friend. As I've said in other

podcast, please let me know if you need any more on the historical context for all the events that we're seeing in 2026, hard to believe for many two weeks in. It's certainly all happening. So watch this space, folks, or listen to this space, folks, and we're going to make sure you get all the history you need. Make sure to subscribe and share with your friends if you think this could help someone else make sense. sent to me all. Goodbye for now.