Dan Snow's History Hit - After Nuremberg

Episode Date: January 30, 2022

The 1950s in West Germany saw a sharp decline in Nazi war crimes investigations and trials. Instead, there were campaigns for amnesties and reductions of earlier sentences, many led by former high-level Nazis and supported tacitly by conservative politicians. Prosecutions lacked any serious or systematic effort, and in both German states, the emphasis was more on integration and rehabilitation, with the aim of stabilising their war-torn societies, rather than the rigorous investigation of Nazi crimes. This began to change in West Germany following scandals about former Nazis in prominent positions. As the 50s wore on, several new trials spotlighted the horrors and scale of Nazi atrocities.Rainer Schulze, Professor of Modern European History at University of Essex and Editor of The Holocaust in History and Memory, joins Dan on the podcast for a conversation about the prosecution of Nazi war criminals in post-war Germany. They discuss the turning point of the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann, how the 1963-1965 Auschwitz Trials in Frankfurt brought the Holocaust back into broad public consciousness and the legacy of Nuremberg in the present day with the case of the 100-year-old man who stood trial in Germany in 2021, charged with assisting in the of the murder of 3,518 people as a former SS guard at Sachsenhausen concentration camp.If you'd like to learn more, we have hundreds of history documentaries, ad-free podcasts and audiobooks at History Hit - subscribe today! To download the History Hit app please go to the Android or Apple store

Hello and welcome to Dan Snow's History Hit. This week we have been thinking about the Holocaust on History Hit. We have heard from a Holocaust survivor, a man who survived Auschwitz. We heard from Sir John Chaucer, who wrote a book about the Nuremberg Trials, the attempt to bring the perpetrators of those terrible crimes to justice. And today we're going to talk to Professor Rainer Schulz. He's a professor of modern European history at the University of Essex, and he's editor of the Holocaust in History and Memory, founder of the Dora Love Prize. We're going to talk about what happened after Nuremberg, really, in the 1950s, the kind of half-hearted efforts to pursue justice within Germany,

and how that process really came to a standstill. There were a few trials, but they weren't pursued very rigorously. The 1960s and beyond, thanks to the Eichmann trial, we see renewed energy around this. And then we bring things up to the present day. And recently we saw the case of a 100-year-old man who stood trial in Germany in October 2021 for his role in mass murder. Was that the right thing to do? Was that the right thing to do? We discussed that in this podcast. All fascinating stuff, particularly this week with Holocaust Memorial Day. We should be thinking and talking about these things. If you want to learn more

about the Holocaust, we've got plenty of documentaries and podcasts available at HistoryHitTV. Just follow the link in the description of this podcast. You'll get taken there straight away and you can join the revolution. But in the meantime, folks, in the meantime, enjoy this chat with Professor Rainer Schulz. Rainer, thank you very much for coming on the podcast. Thank you for inviting me. So we've done many podcasts about the Nuremberg trials. I guess it's too easy for people to, the international community, to give themselves a pat on the back and think, well, that was that job done. Very impressive.

A great example of multinational justice seeking and delivery. But what was the situation at the end of those trials? What was the situation with the vast number of people who were responsible for crimes and whose investigations would have to continue beyond the formal length of those trials? Well, I mean, it's important to realize that Nuremberg, the so-called first Nuremberg trial or the trial before the International Military Tribunal, only involved some 22 defendants. So those were the bigwigs, the leaders of the Nazi party and the military, but none of those who were actually doing duty in the concentration camps, in the extermination camps, those who committed massacres on the front line, etc., etc., none of them were involved in this tribunal. So the task was, first of all, by the various war crimes investigation teams set up by the four

occupation powers to identify those who had committed war crimes and then to put them on trial in some form or another. No one was really clear how to do this. The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg was the result of negotiations during the war and immediately after the end of the war leading to the London Charter, the so-called Nuremberg Charter, which introduced three charges that the tribunal could look into. Crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Of these, until 1945, only war crimes, in a very narrow sense, had been in the statute books as part of what could be pursued by the court. So there were two new charges introduced, and they were

introduced retrospectively, i.e. the charges were introduced after the crimes had been committed. And that led to all sorts of problems and uneasiness. Can you really charge people for something that hadn't been a criminal offense at the time the crime was committed. The Allies ruled, yes, you can, and you should, and you must. That's the principle of the Nuremberg trial that was then continued into the investigations that followed. It was legalized by an Allied Control Council law, number 10, of December 1945. But the German judiciary was extremely hesitant about charges that were introduced retrospectively. And presumably that's very important because it's the German judiciary, unlike we might think of the first Nuremberg, it felt like an international convened court with foreign officers of the court.

It was up to the German judiciary to do the hard work, was it now? After the two German states were established. In the interim, the occupation period between 1945 and 1949, the main task was still done by the four occupation powers. was still done by the four occupation powers. The Germans only got the power to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed against Germans and against stateless persons. And that was actually new in the definition of war crimes. The traditional narrow definition of war crimes had always been that war crimes were committed against the enemy nation, against members of the enemy nation, not against your own population. But obviously, the experience of Nazi rule showed that this limitation just didn't work, and that German population, stateless

persons needed to be included. And it was in particular the Americans who pursued this idea. And the German courts, with this Allied Control Council Law No. 10, got the power to pursue war crimes committed against German civilian populations, and they were very hesitant to do so. There was a hesitancy, perhaps you could even call it an outright hostility, to these kinds of war crimes trials and even to these kinds of war crimes investigations. that the victors decreed upon those they defeated, i.e. victors' justice. On the other hand, there was perhaps an honest, a serious hesitancy to introduce retrospectively charges that hadn't existed when the crimes were committed. Some argued, and probably in full conviction, that this was similar to what the Nazis did with their special laws that they introduced in order to pursue political opponents. But overall, the majority, we have to say, were probably very

hesitant because they were still the same people in position that had been in position in the judiciary during the Nazi regime, i.e. they were implicated in some form or another themselves, and they were not necessarily in the mood of investigating that further. Was there a definitional question? Did many of these people just simply not fully agree with the reality that war crimes had taken place or perhaps sympathized with that strategy during the war, be it the clearing of people, the creation of land in the East for the German people, or things like that? Is there a political dimension as well?

Of course, there's a political dimension, but it is not only looking backwards. If you go into the 1950s, when the German courts got much more powers in order to deal with war crimes, and that included also non-German defendants, there was also the fear that going too deeply into war crimes investigations and then putting those people identified in these investigations to trial might undermine the very fragile state of the society post-Nazism. And that is true for the West and the East after the division of Germany into two states, that if you put too many people to court and accuse them and prosecuted them for war crimes, it might actually lead to division rather than to integration. So the Western strategy, especially of conservative politicians in the 1950s, was democratization

through integration. And it was in a way similar in the GDR, the East German state, where it was stabilization or the creation of a socialist society through integration. And too many war crimes trials were not supporting that kind of aim. Was this something that was contested at the time? Yes, it was. There were, of course, also people in the judicial profession who had been persecuted by the Nazis and whose intent was to actually deal with the issues of crimes against humanity and persecution. So that was very much contested.

But overall, you also have to see yet a further political dimension, and that's the dimension of the Cold War. The war crimes trials got kind of entangled into the tension between West and East, into the propaganda war between West and East. Both sides, the West and the East, wanted to make sure to keep their Germans on side. And that meant for the West that pressure from some conservative politicians, former Nazis, however you want to kind of label them, for amnesty or for lenient sentences, were being supported by the Western allies and similar the approach on the Eastern side. At the same time, the Eastern side tried to show that fascism had really been destroyed in the East. It had nothing to do with them. Fascism was something that the other Germany,

Fascism was something that the other Germany, West Germany, was responsible for. And information about involvement of leading politicians or people in leading positions in the economy were leaked, information about the Nazi past, in 1961, some of the most powerful archive of the 20th century, did that bring about a change in Germany as well? Yes, but the change was actually slightly earlier. The change was already in the late 1950s and it was triggered by two very different events. One was, and that was partly through information leaked from East Germany, the realization that leading politicians, the state secretary and the chancellery of Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of West Germany, the minister for refugees affairs and others had had leading positions in the Nazi state or had advised like Globke on the Nazi racial laws, the Nuremberg laws. And about 10, 15 years after the war, the German public was getting more critical of the continued involvement of people who had played some role or another in the Nazi regime in the new West German state.

That was one thing that led to a change of attitude. The other thing was that towards the end of the 1950s, there were three, four, five court cases which actually brought to light the cruelty of the massacres that Germans committed, in particular in the East, massacres that Germans committed, in particular in the East, against foreign slave laborers, etc. And that led in 1958 to the creation of a central office for the investigation of Nazi war crimes by all the justice ministers of the states in Western Germany, which for the first time got money and staff to investigate Nazi war crimes systematically. Until then, everything was kind of haphazardous. It depended on individuals approaching prosecuting authorities saying they knew of someone who had done something or the other in the war and would the prosecutor please investigate this.

From 1958, a systematic approach was introduced with this central office situated in Ludwigsburg, which actually for the first time was staffed sufficiently with judicial staff, but also detectives and those who knew how to read documents, how to gather evidence from right around Europe in order to pursue Nazi war criminals. Speaking as someone fascinated by historiography, journalism, this feels important that as the information picture changes, the mood around prosecution changes as well. As uncontested facts emerge about how horrible the war was, how horrible the occupation in Eastern Europe was, it does change the environment, I suppose, and the German people became more willing to consider

quite punitive prosecutions of those responsible for it. Yes, but you can see my hesitancy in my yes. Again, it's a complex situation. 1945, 1946, the Nuremberg trials, Germans were very much concerned with their own survival. It was a hard winter. There were food shortages, there were fuel shortages, there was no housing, families had been ripped apart, no one knew whether those who had fought on the front were still alive or were prisoners of war somewhere or had actually died. In the 1950s, with the so-called economic miracle happening both west and east, people were now looking more towards what happened in the past. And there was an emerging young generation culminating in the 1968 movement, who was very critical about what their parent

generation had done during the war. And that came together with a more systematic collection of evidence, concrete evidence. So those two or three different developments almost supported each other. And the Eichmann trial was an important part in this because the Eichmann trial was televised widely across the world, internationally and also in Germany. And in contrast to Nuremberg, it met an audience, at least to some part an audience, that was willing to take the information on and that almost for the first time really became aware of what the Holocaust, the name of course didn't exist yet at the time, of what the Jewish persecution was like and how it was organized and what consequences it had. Yeah, I can imagine in 1946, you hear that Stryker and you hear that Ribbentrop have been dragged off and killed. You think, well, that's politics in a way. That's justice. That doesn't feel like a root and branch denazification, does it? I suppose it's

different approach to justice. What I'm very interested in, as we go through the 60s into the modern era, first of all, the statute of limitations seems to change. So you can now, there's no limit on the amount of time that's elapsed, if that's the right legal term. Secondly, the responsibility, I guess, going back as far as the 50s and the early 60s, would normal, not normal, but rank and file SS guards

be tried for war crimes like we've seen in the last few years? These people who worked in concentration, extermination camps, but were not holders of high office within them? The answer is generally no. For one thing, the evidence was not available because it was not systematically collected. It was only available if someone approached the prosecutors and said, this is what I saw, this is what he told me, here is some other

additional information, please look whether you can turn this into a case. That was the basis of prosecutions that took place in the 1950s. The Ludwigsburg Central Office for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes for the first time investigated systematically, but that took time. By the time they could bring cases to court, the statute of limitations was actually hitting them hard because everything, including murder, had a statute of limitations of 20 years. had a statute of limitations of 20 years. And there were very politically divisive debates in West Germany whether that statute of limitations could be lifted.

And in the end, the statute for limitations for murder, but only murder, was lifted first to 30 years. And then in the late 1970s, it was lifted altogether. So from mid to late 1960s onwards, it was basically only murder that could come to trial. earlier in passing, the West German authorities had not accepted crimes against humanities as a viable charge under the criminal code. In fact, in 1956, after the two German states got full sovereignty, the West German Bundestag rejected the charge of crimes against humanities. Bundestag rejected the charge of crimes against humanities. And they had included already in the basic law of the constitution that no one could be prosecuted for crimes that had not been crimes when they were committed. So the only option was murder. But murder, of course, is a very,

you could almost say, individual thing. It is one person for whatever motive, be it sexual, be it avarice, be it whatever, kills another person. This is not how the Holocaust operated. The Holocaust was bureaucratically organized. It was state directed. So the statutory criminal law So the statutory criminal law in West Germany that was used in order to prosecute Nazi war criminals was prosecutors had to link an individual guard with a specific case where he or she murdered something. And that was, of course, relatively difficult. The change in this approach only happened around 10 years ago in the case of John or Ivan Demjanyuk. We'll probably still talk about this case. But in the meantime, it was this very difficult linkage that the prosecution had to make between an individual defendant and a very specific killing. Now, this sounds as if nothing really happened in West Germany,

and nothing actually happened in East Germany, but for very different reasons. But that's not quite true. There were a number of cases, very high-profile ones. The most important one was the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial of 1963 to 1965, where middle-ranking officials of Auschwitz-Birkenau were tried. And that was an important element in the realization in the German consciousness about the nature of what we still called at the time, and I was young at the time, the final solution. The term Holocaust, of course, was introduced much later. So it's not that nothing happened, but it was very limited of what the German

legal system actually allowed or made it possible to happen. You're listening to Dan Snow's History. We're talking about the Nuremberg principles the hunt for Nazi war criminals after the war more coming up have you heard history is going to Antarctica and we're taking you with us I'm going to be part of an incredible expedition to try and locate the missing endurance ship shipwreck, Ernest Shackleton's vessel that was crushed by the ice and sent to the depths during his attempt to cross the vast continent from side to side. Whether you're a Shackleton expert or this story is completely new to you, we've got something special for you. It starts on the 7th of February when

we'll be dropping a captivating mini-series that tells the tale of just how Shackleton and his crew managed to survive months stranded in the coldest place on Earth with no shelter, no ship, and no contact with the outside world. How they made an escape that defies the very limits of human endurance, through the planet's roughest oceans

in a wooden rowing boat, walking across mountains and glaciers, all with not enough food or water. So make sure you subscribe to Dan Snow's History Hit wherever you listen to your podcast to get the full story. Endurance 22, coming February 7th. To be continued... who were rarely the best of friends, murder, rebellions and crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit, wherever you get your podcasts. It's such a confusing and difficult conjunction of the problems of building a society the whole nature of the denazification project is to build a society based around the rule of law

and then having to accommodate this great evil in the past as you're describing sometimes can be at odds with some of the great foundational things of the rule of law, whether it's the statute of limitations or things that were legal at the time. It's very difficult. It is extremely complex. And I mean, there are historians who argue that the failure of denazification and the reintegration of former Nazis into high position in the West German states was perhaps necessary in order to get to some form of a functioning democratization in the 1950s. So there was this kind of almost split nature of West German society that on the one hand, they were very much against what they knew of Hitler's rule, i.e. rejecting Nazism.

But on the other hand, they also rejected Nazi war crimes trials. And to bring this together is, of course, extremely difficult. And it's a discussion that people are having in South Africa and Cambodia in the modern world today. Yeah, absolutely. So tell me about this recent rash of very eye-catching trials of men in the last years of their life into their late 80s and 90s, which began, as you say, with Demyanyuk, who was tried at 89, I think, as a guard.

What changed? Demyanyuk is a really complex case again in that... You surprised me. You surprised me. I mean, all of this is complex and very checkered, of course. Do you have any easy answers for me? Can we get some easy answers? I'm afraid not. We need to turn to a different subject to come to easy answers. But Demyanyuk emigrated. He came to a DP camp, a camp for displaced persons after the war in West Germany,

met a woman, married, got a child, and emigrated to the United States. And at some point in the late 1970s, Israel identified him as one of the notorious guards of Sobibor, the extermination camp. He was extradited to Israel in the 1980s for trial. He maintained his innocence, claimed that it was a case of mistaking identity. And of course, he would, wouldn't he? And in 1993, the guilty verdict was overturned by the Israeli Supreme Court because new evidence cast some reasonable doubt, as they called it, on the identity. He then returned to the States, was allowed to return to the States.

Then later, he was stripped of his American citizenship. And Germany, now the united Germany after unification, demanded his extradition because new documents had come to light that he was Ivan the Terrible, the Sobibor guard. So he was extradited to Germany and he was tried in Munich. And the prosecutors argued for the first time that working as a guard at a camp whose only purpose was the extermination of its prisoners was sufficient for a conviction of accessory to murder. At the time when this was put forward, many expected that the court would say no. But to the surprise of many, the court actually agreed and thus set an important legal precedent, which meant that from then on, anyone who played a part in the running of the machinery of murder in extermination camps

could be put on trial. And that was later extended to all concentration camps, not just the extermination camps in the more narrow sense. And of course, this principle is much more appropriate for the way the crimes were committed at Nazi extermination camps and at Nazi concentration camps, where it is often impossible to pinpoint direct personal responsibility to one person. After the Demjanjuk case, he was in the first instance sentenced as guilty, but died during the appeal. According to German law, he was innocent because the appeal did not come to trial. Following the Demjanjuk trial in 2011, 2011 was the sentence, there was then an attempt, a rushed attempt, prosecutors rushed to bring other people to court who had been in a similar situation, like Oskar Gröning, the so-called accountant of Auschwitz, who was 93 when he was tried in 2015.

He was tried in 2015. Or Johann Regenbogen and Bruno Dye, two concentration camp guards. And then the most recent case of someone who will turn 101 very shortly and whose trial started in October of this year. He had been an SS guard at Sachsenhausen and stands accused of knowingly and wittingly assisting in the murder of 3,518 prisoners at Sachsenhausen camp between 1942 and 1945, almost 80 years earlier. That has been controversial. What's the argument for it? Obviously, the argument against this is you drag old men from their, literally their deathbeds, their nursing homes and try them for crimes 80 years before.

What is the argument for it? Why do you think it's important to do that? Well, let me perhaps first answer to your argument against it. I mean, how would you limit the accountability of people. Is age a reasonable argument to say he or she is not accountable anymore? And where do you set that limit? Is it 80? Is it when someone sits in a wheelchair that they are not accountable for murder or accessory for murder anymore? I think if I put it in this way, as I've just done it now, it becomes very obvious how absurd such an argument is. But there are also positive arguments. I mean, one argument is, of course, that justice

must prevail, no matter how old the defendant is. There is no excuse of old age to escape justice. And I've just told you why I think there is no excuse. And that is very important for the victims, the surviving victims, and also the families of those who were killed. They don't get any absolution from what they experienced just because they are old. So that is the legal justice. But let me go back to Nuremberg that you mentioned at the start of our conversation. The American approach had been that something like the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg served two purposes. One is legal justice, and the other one is a didactic purpose.

It's education. And those two go hand in hand. By introducing evidence, you also educate a wider public about what actually happened. And that is still important today because these cases, even though the defendants are in their 90s, or in one case, even 100 or older, actually remind everyone that these atrocities did happen, that they happened within living memory, and that they did not just happen at Auschwitz, but at a multitude of camps and locations all across Germany and beyond. And they serve as a reminder that everyone actually lived in relative closeness to places where such atrocities took place. And one little sentence that one of the defendants, Bruno Day, said at his trial in Hamburg in 2020, I want to forget and not go over that again.

I think it's the key here, because we must never not want to go over it again. We have to go over it again, because otherwise it opens the door to Holocaust deniers. It opens the door to Holocaust deniers. It trivializes what happened. Or it helps that these events fade almost into insignificance. And that's why I think that these kinds of trials, even though we might pity these old men and women who are wheeled into the court in wheelchairs and are visibly frail and might not even live long enough to serve any sentence. But that's not the point. The point is actually that they are accountable and that they have to be held accountable.

That's why I think that these trials are so important. When the last of these men and women have died and we're able to make a judgment about how Germany has come to terms with its past, how do you think historians like you will judge the German denazification project, the project of punishing criminality on this scale? I mean, I think we need to, again, pick this apart, what you've just put together into this one term of denazification. There are the war crimes trials, and I would say the history of war crimes trials in Germany or by German courts is very checkered indeed. And it is overall characterized, in my opinion, by serious shortcomings, by half-heartedness, and above all, by delays, delays, delays, and very often very lenient sentences. But the war crimes trials are or were only one bit in the puzzle of coming to terms with the past.

There was the formal denazification policy that, in particular, the Americans introduced. The British only followed with some hesitancy. Everyone had to fill in a form and account about what he or she did during the Nazi period. the Nazi period. There was re-education, and that followed an American kitsch soap opera almost, the miniseries Holocaust, which in Germany had an immense importance. And I still remember where I was when I saw it for the first time. This constant, in the 1970ss kind of coming to terms through these kinds of projects leading to the setup of concentration camp memorials with exhibitions. I myself was involved in the setup of Bergen-Belsen concentration camp memorial. All of this together forms part of coming to terms with the past. forms part of coming to terms with the past. And if you only look at the war crimes trials,

it's very easy to say, well, this was insufficient. This was not good enough. This was actually a failure. I wouldn't go as far as that because there were very important trials. I mentioned the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt. But if you look at the whole picture, I think with still shortcomings, Germany as a whole has made a very serious, though perhaps belated, effort to account for its past and not to let it kind of fade into insignificance. kind of fade into insignificance. And yet, at the same time, we see a rise of anti-Semitism and racism and all the other kind of ugly isms that are around. greatest mysteries, the gobsmacking details and latest groundbreaking research from the greatest millennium in human history. We're talking Vikings, Normans, kings and popes who were rarely the best of friends,

murder, rebellions and crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit wherever you get your podcasts. Reiner, I'd like to ask you one more question. Feel free. This may not be a topic that you feel you'd like to talk about, but as a German steeped in this discourse,

living in Britain, what do you make of Britain's current rumblings about atoning for an imperial past? Yes, no, I'm not surprised about your question. I'm not an expert of British imperial history. But what strikes me about the attempts of what you rightly call atonement is that it glosses over the past rather than addressing the past. That it leads to writing the history of one particular group, not of society as a whole. It excludes those who were actually hurt and who suffered because of the imperial past. And we had the same in Germany, obviously. I mean, up until almost the mini-serious Holocaust,

the victims of the Holocaust had been less in focus than the perpetrators. And then it was basically the Jews who were in focus. It took yet another effort to bring into focus all the other groups who were persecuted by the Nazis, the Sinti and Roma, disabled people, the gay men, in particular gay men, less so women. You need to come to a history that includes everyone. And in Britain, of course, it's not the groups that I just mentioned with regard to the Holocaust. It's other groups that need to be included. And an atonement of one particular element of the past excludes other groups. And that is dangerous because it doesn't lead to a broader identity that includes everyone, but it excludes. And exclusion

always leads to problems. Thank you very much, Rainer. That was fascinating stuff. Rainer, before you go, tell me about the Dora Love Prize, which you founded. Well, that is actually addressing some of the issues or trying to address some of the issues that we've discussed. It's named after a Holocaust survivor, Dora Love, who in the 1960s settled in Britain, and she died in Colchester in 2011. And she had always advocated in her Holocaust educational work that we need to look at the situation that we live in today. We need to make the linkage between what happened in the Holocaust and the world we live in today, how much of what made the Holocaust possible is still around us.

And that would include issues of atonement for the British Empire, because exclusion is an important element of what ultimately led to the horrors of the Holocaust. It's a prize for years for year seven to 10 in schools. And what we try the students to do is to develop projects, how they can create on the basis of what they've learned about the Holocaust in inverted commas, a better world, which includes everyone and avoids exclusion and marginalization.

We've got lots of teachers listening to this. How can they enter young students and young people? It's best to contact me because I'm the one who's kind of administering it. It runs every year. And you can just give anyone who might be interested my email and I'd be more than happy to sign them up or inform them about what we're doing.

Yeah, so if you want to Google it and find out more, it's on the Essex website. It's the Dora Love Drive. Exactly, yeah. Fantastic. Otherwise, I'll just tweet your email address out to everyone. You'll get millions of tweets. Yes. Avalanche.

Rainer, thank you very much for coming on. It's always so interesting talking about this kind of stuff. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for having me. I feel we have the history upon our shoulders. All the traditions of ours, have the history on our shoulders all this tradition of ours our school history our songs this part of the history of our country all were gone and finished thanks folks you've met at the end of another episode congratulations well done you i hope you're not fast asleep if you did fancy supporting everything we do history hit we'd love it if you would go and wherever you get these pods give a little rating five stars or it's equivalent a review

would be great thank you very much indeed that really does make a huge difference it's one of the funny things the algorithm loves to take into account so please don't ever do that can seem like a small thing but actually it's kind of a big deal for us so I really appreciate it. See you next time.