Dan Snow's History Hit - Battle of Britain: What Were the Germans Thinking?

Episode Date: September 19, 2020

Victoria Taylor is an aviation historian who is just completing her PhD in the Luftwaffe and its politicisation under the Nazis. She talked to me about how the Germans approached the Battle of Britain. Were they the mighty Goliath to Britain's David or were they in fact more evenly matched? And what on earth was the Luftwaffe's strategy for knocking Britain out of the war.Subscribe to History Hit and you'll get access to hundreds of history documentaries, as well as every single episode of this podcast from the beginning (400 extra episodes). We're running live podcasts on Zoom, we've got weekly quizzes where you can win prizes, and exclusive subscriber only articles. It's the ultimate history package. Just go to historyhit.tv to subscribe. Use code 'pod1' at checkout for your first month free and the following month for just £/€/$1.

Hi everyone, welcome to Ansono's History. I'm sorry that there's a lot of anniversaries coming at you thick and fast. A lot of history happens in September, everyone. Everyone gets back from their summer holiday, their vacation. They decide to make some history. And so this week we've got the 400th anniversary of the departure of the Mayflower from Plymouth. We've got a lot going on on the podcast and on the TV channel about that. We've also this week, however, on the 15th, it's Battle of Britain Day. It's the 80th anniversary of the sort of climax of the Battle of Britain when Hitler launched his last major daytime strike on London. And it was brutally rebuffed by the undefeated Spitfires and Hurricanes of the RAF's Fighter Command. This week we've got lots of programmes going out on History Hit TV. A newly commissioned show with Stephen Bungay, who's written, I think,

one of the best books about the Battle of Britain. He's all about why Britain won. A shortened version of that will be appearing on the podcast this week, so you can check that out here. But today we've got Victoria Taylor. She's an aviation historian. She's just completing her PhD looking at the Luftwaffe before and during the Second World War. And so from Victoria, I wanted to get really the German perspective on the battle. What were they hoping to achieve through the use of air power in the skies above Britain in the summer of 1940? Later on this week, you'll be hearing the British point of view. Now, you know, I don't like doing special offers on this. It drives me crazy because it's just, it kills me. But we've got a special battle of britain offer if you want to see our battle of britain documentaries if you

want to see other documentaries featuring victoria taylor we have got a history channel for you you're going to love it go to historyhit.tv for the next few days only if you use the code battle of britain all lowercase battle of britain you're going to get the first month for free and then you get the next three months, just one pound, euro or dollar for each of those three months. That takes you to Christmas. That takes you to Christmas, people. To mark this big anniversary, we're giving away the World's Best History Channel three pounds, euros, dollars for the next three months if you use the code Battle of Britain. In the meantime, everyone, here is the wonderful Victoria Taylor. Enjoy. The Battle of Britain, it's surrounded by so many myths, aren't they? What state was the Luftwaffe in, in early July 1940? It had taken some catastrophic losses over France and Belgium

and Holland, hadn't it? No, absolutely. I mean, over Dunkirk, you know, the Luftwaffe, even though it had that operational experience that had gone from fighting in the Spanish Civil War and also having those earlier battles against both the French and the Polish air forces, it really had taken some losses due to the RAF, even though the army, of course, the British army, the expeditionary force didn't always see

the contribution that the RAF were making. But they really were struggling in that respect because they weren't expecting the intensity of the RAF were making. But they really were struggling in that respect because they weren't expecting the intensity of the RAF. They had all of this Nazi propaganda coming in and saying, you know, oh, the English are weak-minded, they won't be able to actually put on much of a defence. But they actually ended up taking much more catastrophic losses at Dunkirk than expected.

And so really that sort of fed into that policy of actually wanting to secure peace where possible. So I guess the other issue, you've got very dysfunctional leadership. So the senior decision making organ, say Hitler of the Third Reich, are they getting accurate information about the state of their air force via Goering? Well, the problem is, is that Goering is not getting the accurate information either. There's sort of the problem with the fact that the Luftwaffe feels like it really has to sort of step on eggshells around Göring because of the fact that, you know, he has his mood swings, he wants to be told the good news, he doesn't really want to know the bad news.

So he's not getting the correct numbers either. And of course, you're getting this real blur of different narratives and losses because of the fact that these battles, you know, these dogfights are so disorientating, and you can't always confirm those kills that you think you've made. So really, you know, the leadership aren't getting the numbers that they need and some of that is due to propaganda, but some of it is also just, you know, the fog of war. So having a commander-in-chief who's an overweight, capricious lunatic with a history of drug use isn't a good idea.

Interesting. Anyway, let's not go there. So what decision is made? What are the Germans trying to do in early July 1940? They are sort of adopting a multi-pronged approach because we often sort of think of this idea of the Battle of Britain being really separate. But it's actually part of the approach that's also happening in the Atlantic. You know, you're having the Battle of the Atlantic. The RAF are originally actually having to try and defend Britain's coastlines, not the actual airfields themselves, but in the Canal Kampf, in the Channel Battle, they're having to protect Allied shipping. So really the initial strategy of the Luftwaffe is to try and put that pressure on Britain from different angles in order to try and make Britain sue for peace where possible. It doesn't really want to have to launch Operation Sea Line if it can avoid it. So it's sort of putting pressure on those little points and trying to force that

peace and time before they really have to commit to Operation Sea Line. What has the Luftwaffe got in its, what are the kind of potent tools that it's got to try and force Britain to a negotiating table? The Luftwaffe sort of has this psychological impact that of course has come from seeing blitzkrieg absolutely rage through Poland and France and the low countries. You know, you've sort of got the terror weapons of the Stuka, for instance, with its Jericho's Trump and that sort of psychological terror that's been at Dunkirk. They've got those sort of aspects of having been involved in all of these really historical, terrifying moments of aerial bombing, so over Rotterdam, over Warsaw, over Guernica, way before that, before the Second World War. So really, the Luftwaffe's got lots of different tools at its position.

It's got fits and fighters in the Bf 109s. It's got Stukas. I mean, its bombers are a little bit slower and lumbering, but they can still pack quite a punch. Are they designed, those aircraft that you just talked about, are they designed to try and... You mentioned the early phase of what we call the Battle of Britain is a sort of channel, it's a coastal fight when they're trying to attack coastal convoys. Are those bombers designed to attack ships? Is that what the Germans thought they'd be using them for? Not really. To be honest, the bombers that the Luftwaffe have are affected by the fact that they're a little bit too obsolete

already by sort of 1940. You know, they mainly focus on using the Donya D-17s. They focus on using the Heinkel 111s. And really, they're a bit lumbering. They shouldn't be in that battle. But of course, you know, they are the mainstay of the Luftwaffe's Kampfflieger or bomber crews. And they also have the problem with shipping specifically, that Germany doesn't really have a fleet air arm. It does have its Seeflieger, its sea flyers. but they really do struggle with funding because, of course, you know,

Göring tends to sort of try and take all the money possible from the Kriegsmarine. And so really, it's sort of naval aviation is the real victim of that. So they've got limited tools at their disposal. And then when they move on to the next phase of the Battle of Britain, which is to try and destroy the RAF. What is the plan for that? The plan for the Luftwaffe is ongoing. It's never quite completely static. It's always changing its mind between whether to go for radar stations or whether to go for the airfields and aircraft factories specifically. The plan initially starts with trying to go for that shipping and then moving to those radar installations. But Goering sort of scuppers the Luftwaffe's chances many times in the Battle of Britain because he has this issue of constantly changing his mind between the two.

He gets impatient with the radar stations and said, right, let's leave those alone. So the strategy is more to try and get that superiority. Obviously, they would love air supremacy, but at least air superiority necessary for Operation Sea Lion by subduing the RAF's fighter command. What do they think the best way of doing that? In Poland and the local, just fly around and shoot the only planes you see? I'm being simplistic there. But is that a sort of the plan, the operational idea? The plan is a little bit disorientated from the start. Some of it is just the idea of trying to draw up the RAF in order to take them down, pick them off one by one. But of course, you know, with under Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, you know,

you sort of have this conservation of resources for Fighter Command, which, you know, many historians have credited as actually helping to turn the tide for Britain in that respect. So they're trying to entice them. They don't always manage to do it. And they do go for these different strategies just to see where they can sort of prod and try and find the weak point of the finding the Achilles heel of the RAF, but they never quite find it. And then what about this myth that the Germans were like this might it was just a David and Goliath? What's the truth of that? I think what's important to do with the odds is the fact that Britain felt it was David versus Goliath. And with great reason as well.

You know, you sort of look at the all-conquering power of the Luftwaffe in those sort of early spring months of 1940. And, you know, there was a numerical discrepancy between the two. You know, the Luftwaffe was about twice the size of the RAF. Sometimes some sources say it outnumbered it by four to one. But that's sort of Battle of Britain mythology getting in there. But it's important to recognise that not only does Britain sort of ramp up its aircraft production and starts outnumbering German production by double over the summer of 1940, they also have the fact that it depends on the type of the aircraft as well. Because, you know, you could say that the Luftwaffe has more aircraft, but really how many reconnaissance aircraft does it need, for instance? You know, that sort of thing. And is there the key metric like between good fighter aircraft,

like the 109 and then the Hurricane Spitfire, they're actually not that badly mismatched, are they? No, they're not too badly mismatched, particularly when you put the Spitfire against the BF109. Although that's not just because of the, you know, sort of the glamour that surrounds the Spitfire, you know, it did have an additional boost in agility and power over the Hurricane, which basically made it, you know, it was the top dog in that respect. It did help sort of catch up with the Germans in that respect. The Hurricanes could certainly hold their own, though. And obviously, you know, it's quite often forgotten that Hurricanes made up the majority of British kills during the Battle of Britain. But they were relatively close. I mean, they sort of, the things that leveled it out between them

were things like, you know, so the BF-109s were better armed, but, you know, they flew better above 20,000 feet, whereas normally, you know, the Battle of Britain was between 15,000 and 20,000 feet because the Luftwaffe had to be low to be bombing their targets. So that makes a massive difference in where the battle is fought and how each aircraft performs in that atmosphere and that scenario. The Spitfire and the Hurricanes tended to be a little bit more agile, the Spitfire a bit more so. Of course, you have the benefits with the Bf 109 in terms of, you know,

having their DB 601s being fuel injected, which mattered so much under negative G because it's not cutting out the same way as if you've got a carburettor. Hang on, just for the, let me try and translate that. So it means that, so measurements could do a, you could be flying along and do a vertical dive down, right? Which Spitfire struggled to do. It was able to, basically, it didn't have its fuel cut off under negative G.

So it sort of had, the problem is, is that the fuel in Rolls-Royce Merlin would flood to the wrong place. It wouldn't go into the engine itself. And that's what has sort of caused it to sputter. And sometimes you hear it on early Merlins, you know. But that's the thing, is that the fighter can't get into the battle quite so quickly as if you've got a fuel-injected engine, which sort of makes the necessary adjustments for that.

Sorry for the techie talk. That's great. People love that stuff. And also in terms of the overall numbers of frontline fighters, it wasn't a huge mismatch, I don't think, was it? Yeah, the fighter strength wasn't too different. So, you know, sort of the RAF had a bit over sort of 700 fighters. The Luftwaffe had about 1,100 of single seat fighters, that is. But of course, you know, with that ramp up of British aircraft production, that soon came up. And indeed, as James Hollandander said in the past,

you know, you've got to focus on pilots rather than planes, because at the end of the day, they're the ones that you need to fight. You know, you can replace aircraft, you can't replace pilots quite so quickly. So in those terms, you know, they were quite a bit more matched in terms of the pilots and as well as their planes. land a viking longship on island shores scramble over the dunes of ancient egypt and avoid the poisoner's cup in renaissance florence each week on echoes of history we uncover the epic stories that inspire assassin's creed we're stepping into feudal japan in our special series Chasing Shadows, where samurai warlords and shinobi spies teach us the tactics and skills needed not only to survive, but to conquer. Whether you're preparing for Assassin's Creed Shadows or fascinated by history and great stories, listen to Echoes of History, a Ubisoft podcast brought to you by History

Hits. There are new episodes every week. Now, what's going on with the Germans? Because the Germans, their pipeline for both pilots and machines just doesn't seem to have been as good. Why is that? Is that because they were using new airfields a thousand miles west of where they had been operating until the beginning of the spring offensive? What was going on? Why did the Germans get that wrong? Or did the Brits just get it right? Good question. Well, the Germans did have, obviously, quite a lot of disadvantages of not fighting over home turf. They really had the issue of if they needed to repair their aircraft,

they had to go all the way back to Germany. They couldn't just do it in occupied territory because even in some of even in some of the territories that they had claimed that had, you know, sort of heavy armaments and aircraft production as a possibility, it wasn't the specialized equipment that they needed for their own aircraft. So they sort of had that issue in terms of being not easy to repair in that respect. Of course, these sort of things get changed later on. Of course, these sort of things get changed later on. So, for instance, with the Focke-Wulf on 90 in 1941, it's deliberately designed to be really easily repaired and transferred from beginning to end. So really, I think it's sort of,

it depends on the logistics of the situation. The Germans were clearly at a great disadvantage in that respect, whereas the British, you know, they sort of had that better system for keeping their aircraft in the game. And what about pilots? Is it me or were there just fewer German pilots coming available, frontline squadrons? And is that connected with the losses they'd suffered in the Battle of France? They hadn't been expecting this huge demand for new

pilots. Germany sort of had the issue of, you know, it had to replace the pilots that it lost at Dunkirk. But it did actually have in the early years of the war, it did have a very effective pilot training programme. Obviously, its hours dropped by about, you know, sort of half towards the end of the war. But at the beginning, you know, it's, they've not yet introduced the system of trying to train their pilots on the front line a little too late, you know. And so they sort of, at the beginning, have a very thorough training. And of course, some have had experience in the Spanish Civil War. So they're already up to date with certain techniques and tactics that the British, of course, aren't particularly fair with. So you sort of have, you know, the German Schwarm of flying in pairs, you know,

flying in a rotter rather than flying in a vic as the British were still doing, and sort of flying in this, in what the Germans called these Idiotenreihen, or these idiot rows, because of the fact they were so easily picked out. So actually, you know, the German pilots were actually well trained at the beginning of the Battle of Britain, but it was just this issue of they constantly had this frustration of not knowing where to go, where to attack, and just having these absolute sort of catalogue of errors

that really sort of changed the tide of the Battle of Britain. Yeah, I mean, you mentioned the frustrations there. I mean, it must be so fascinating. You've looked at all the primary sources and things. Tell me what the German experience of that battle was. The Germans were outraged in some ways that even over Dunkirk, they'd had this really fierce reception that they hadn't been expecting. I know Adolf Galland was, you know, one of the most famous Luftwaffe fighter aces was particularly angry at that, and thinking that sort of the National Socialist cause was getting in the way a little bit in terms of actually being properly prepared for the battle. They sort of

have this sense of triumph going into the battle. They actually feel this sort of sense of honour, not just with the men that are actually in the sort of the fighter pilots and the bomber crews, but also just in the anti-aircraft divisions. You know, you sort of have these different aspects of the Luftwaffe that feel as if they've fought in this really, really, you know, pivotal moment, this really important battle over Dunkirk. And so they're actually, you know, riding on a high, they recognise obviously, that it would be better if Churchill does accept Hitler's so-called peace offer. But on the whole, they're feeling relatively optimistic early on. And that's despite the fact that, you know, really, the first week, proper week for the Germans during the Adlerangriff,

the eagle attack, it actually goes wrong so many times for the Germans. Do they know it's going wrong? If you're an individual bomber crew or pilot, do you know it's going wrong? Because it's such a... We talked to British pilots. It's just, you know, hit-and-run attacks, swirling. You don't know what the numbers are and you know, hit and run attacks, swirling. You don't know what the numbers are and what's being hit and what's not. They did certainly have an idea of how it was

going because of the reception they had when they got back, especially when they were talking to Goering. So there's reports that he would go on tirades for hours, hours and hours to the German fighter pilots because they weren't brave enough, because they weren't engaging enough, because they weren't thankful enough for their aircraft. You know, they sort of had this issue of constantly coming back, having risked their lives and then having that sort of lowering and morale of having their leader, who they once respected, absolutely having a go at them, even though they're risking life and limb for Germany. So they do recognise that it is a difficult situation, that it's not always going well. And really, it's only towards the end of August that they actually start to feel a proper

surge of success. Oh, so that you do think, because they're aware that they are putting airfields out of action? What's the metric? How do they know they're enjoying some success? Because they're sustaining less losses. It's not really quite so much about the fact that they are taking down so many British aircraft, although of course this is propaganda, but the thing is, of course, they were suffering. You think of sort of the hardest day, for instance, you know, they suffered catastrophic casualties and sort of going into the 70s and that sort of thing. Whereas, you know, sort of towards the end, I mean, OK, you know, they're still sustaining losses,

but they also are hitting more keenly and downing more British aircraft. And of course, they can see that for themselves and verify that. And when you think of that first week of the Eagle attack and how often it goes wrong there and they have, you know, sort of Black Thursday, which is one of the really bad days. It's more the levelling out of losses that makes them feel that actually, you know, they've probably got a chance now to secure it. Reminded of what there are several types of aircraft in the sky, but for bomber crews, it must have been brutal, particularly when they switched their attack to London. You know the route that they're going to come,

the RAF can just stay and ambush you. Slow moving, terrifying to be just victims, really. It must have been very damaging for their morale to go day after day and do that. Yeah, no, definitely, absolutely. And it only gets worse for them during the Blitz. You know, you sort of have the story of the fact that they are not used to this foreign sort of area. They've not really had to participate quite so much in such a prolonged bombing offensive. And, you know, in the past, it's sort of been one city, whereas, of course, when they start moving into the Blitz and before then, when they're attacking different airfields, there's so many different sites they've got to go for. when they're attacking different airfields,

there's so many different sites they've got to go for. And this is the thing is that, of course, the British with the sort of the sophistication of the doubting system, with the systems in place with the observer call, there is that early warning, there's ground to airs communication for the British. And so it is much easier for the British to be able to scramble and get to the right place.

And of course, Luftwaffe bombers, if they're caught by themselves, they have next to no defence against a Spitfire. You know, they sort of had on Eagle Day itself, they had the issue of some of the bomber crews had not actually got the word that they'd called off the attack because of the weather. And so there was sort of this story of the fighter pilots desperately trying to get into contact with them and say, you know, don't go. And of course they do. And they get absolutely massacred. So, yeah, it's incredibly, I mean, obviously, obviously you know we think so often about the dangers for bomber command but of course those dangers are very much for the Kampfliga for the Luftwaffe as well. And what about the fighter

pilot morale you hear about the the obsession with the channel you know that maybe talk a little bit about how difficult it is to operate at the very extreme end of your range if you're you know your the fuel allows you to operate at I mean it must have been it must have been and they must have been exhausted as well. Absolutely. Well, this is the thing. I mean, you sort of think of the constant scrambling for the RAF, but, you know, the Luftwaffe are also launching even many more raids than the RAF.

You know, they're the ones that are sort of going in for that constant offensive round the clock. And the problem is with the fighter pilots as well is that they've got the issue of not only trying to protect themselves but of course the bombers they're escorting so they're really really drawn in lots of different places and it's often made even more confusing by the changes in targets so you know it really is an incredibly stressful situation for them in trying to make sure that they come back in one piece but also that they sort of achieve all these different objectives that have been flung at them day by day.

Okay, well, you've mentioned that a couple of times. So before we go back down to the museum to finish this off, let's just kind of finish on this, ask you this. Who was in charge of working out how the Le Foff was going to win the Battle of Britain? And why did they keep changing their mind? The issue with changing their minds tended to come from impatience, you know, and sort of poor intelligence on the Germans' perspective as well, because you sort of had this issue of the Germans often thinking that the RAF was at a certain level

where it wasn't. You know, at one point, they thought they were only down to about 300 serviceable fighters. It turned out that they weren't. And so that's why they've sort of, in some parts, they kind of relented a little bit because, you know, they needed breaks just as much as, you know, the RAF needed breaks. And so some of that was that incompetence from the top, but also sometimes some of the changes in objectives could just occur from raid to raid, you know, sort of wires getting utterly crossed, conditions of the weather across the channel could also impact where it was logical to attack as well. And of course, you have the issues as well of having inexperienced crews, you know, inexperienced bomber crews that sort of might panic and drop bombs somewhere else.

And it's not having the impact that they want. So, of course, they have to change tactics again. So there's lots of different variables in that respect of how the German strategy is carried out and why it keeps changing. Yeah, because all Britain had to do was defend its airspace. And I say all Britain had to do, but Britain had to defend its airspace and have an attritional impact on any bombers that came over British airspace and i say all i do but britain that defense airspace and have an attritional impact on any bombers that came over british airspace which germans could like work out how to win that world's first air battle you know to get a strategic result out in in a way that's never been done before actually you've never knocked a nation out only through air power alone some days they're attacking like low level airfields then they attack different airfields from high level then they attack ships and then they attack Spitfire factories.

And then, of course, they just attack civilian areas towards the end of the battle, famous in September. So they try a lot of different stuff. They do. That's the thing. And that's why the frustration starts building is, you know, from the earliest days, you know, they start to report that surely this must be the end phase of the war. This is the logical step. You know, this is the last country that really needs to be conquered in this sphere of Europe. So it really does cause that.

And you do keep getting this renewed hope of, you know, even when the blitz starts, the German propaganda magazines are all saying, you know, the isolation of England is bringing the end. And this view is also shared across the world. You know, you look at Swiss military journals of the time, and they also say similar things. They think, surely this must be the end for England. So, you know, that's why this frustration builds, is that really there shouldn't be any reason why they shouldn't be securing it in their eyes. But of course,

you know, there's just so many complicated factors that are impacting that outcome. Thank you very much for coming on the podcast. Hi everyone, it's me, Dan Snow. Just a quick request. It's so annoying, and I hate it when other podcasts do this, but now I'm doing it, and I hate myself. Please, please go onto iTunes, wherever you get your podcasts, and give us a five-star rating and a review.

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