Dan Snow's History Hit - Bonnie Prince Charlie

Episode Date: December 27, 2023

In August, 1745, Bonnie Prince Charlie led a rebellion that brought the Jacobite cause closer to seizing the throne than any other. He had landed with only a handful of his most trusted supporters, but a mixture of gold, charisma and old loyalties soon brought a large number of followers to his side as they attempted to overthrow the British crown. The rebellion grew in momentum with early successes on the battlefield and marched south reaching as far as Derby before turning back north. However, the noose around the Bonny Prince Charlie and the Jacobite rebels was tightening, and in April 1746 they were decisively defeated by superior British forces at the Battle of Culloden.Guiding Dan through the 1745 uprising is Professor Murray Pittock from the University of Glasgow. Murray provides a comprehensive overview of what the Jacobites wanted, the events of the revolt and the fate of its leader Bonnie Prince Charlie.Discover the past with exclusive history documentaries and ad-free podcasts presented by world-renowned historians from History Hit. Watch them on your smart TV or on the go with your mobile device. Get 50% off your first 3 months with code DANSNOW sign up now for your 14-day free trial.We'd love to hear from you! You can email the podcast at [e-mail] can take part in our listener survey here.

Hi everybody, welcome to Dan Snow's History Hit. This is the story of Britain's last civil war. The last time, for example, that London, the capital, fell under the shadow of conquest and occupation. This is the story of the 1745 Jacobite uprising. It began when Charles Edward Stuart, son of the Jacobite, the Stuart claimant to the throne of Britain, landed in the Western Isles. And it ended, well, it ended with a savage counterinsurgency

in the highlands of Scotland, but it climaxed and was effectively ended on the battlefield of Culloden in spring 1746, where the Jacobite army was annihilated by British government forces. But the months that intervened between that start and finish were tumultuous, were dramatic. Bonnie Prince Charlie, as he's known to history, gathered an army around him, advanced south, captured Edinburgh, invaded England, got as far as Derby, had various members of the ruling class in London, packing up their stuff and booking passages on ships heading abroad. Then, however, he made the fateful decision to turn round.

He headed back north. There were further battles and skirmishes, but eventually the Duke of Cumberland, George II's favourite son, caught up with him at Culloden, and the result was bloody slaughter. To talk about this absolutely astonishing moment in British history, the last time our rulers faced a significant challenge from another branch of the royal dynasty, I'm talking to Murray Pittock.

He's very brilliant. He's a professor at the University of Glasgow. There is absolutely nothing about this period that he does not know. This is the story of the Jacobite uprising and the last great battles fought on British soil. Enjoy. T-minus 10. Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king. No black-white unity till there is first and black unity. Never to go to war with one another again. And lift off, and the shuttle has cleared the tower. Murray, thank you very much for coming on the podcast. Pleasure. Good to chat with you, Dan.

Jacobites, it's a word steeped in history. Take us back to Bonnie Prince Charlie's grandfather. Just remind us quickly, who were they and what did they want? Well, the Jacobites technically wanted to restore the main Stuart line, that is James VII and II and his successors, his son, grandson, which was who was Bonnie Prince Charlie, and his other grandson later on, who was Henry, though there weren't many left by that time. But the key issue really was that was the least of what they wanted, that actually Jacobites from England, Scotland, and Ireland all tended to want rather different things. Those from Scotland and Ireland had desires that were more or less compatible. Those from England were not compatible with either of

them. So there were significant issues about what the Jacobite agenda really was. In England, it was linked to xenophobia, distrust of a German royal house, the exclusion of the Tauris from public office, and what you might call country values, dislike of finance and the metropolis, which is certainly with us still. And in Scotland and Ireland, it was really in its different ways linked to the restoration of the multi-kingdom monarchy under the later Stuarts and the greater autonomy that Scotland had enjoyed before the Acts of Union in 1707 and Ireland had before the promulgation of the Crown and Parliament Doctrine, which subordinated the Irish Parliament in 1720. And 45 is the most famous Jacobite uprising, but in a way it wasn't an uprising

that looked like it would have much chance of success when it began. Tell me, this young prince, how did he manage to put together this expedition and head to Scotland? And why was it something of a terrible gamble? Charles Edward was seen as the best hope of the Jacobite movement from the 1730s onwards, because he was clearly outgoing, charismatic, and had early military experience. In fact, it's 1734 when he was only 13 or 14. So he was the obvious candidate to lead any rising.

France prepared a major rising in 1744. But there were plenty of leaks about that rising. There was good espionage and intelligence for the British government. And indeed, the French ambassador seems to have leaked details of the rising himself because he wasn't very keen on it. So the French invasion of 1744 collapsed. An infuriated Charles, who had been waiting around for months for it to sail, decided to launch a rising himself using money which was provided by a Jacobite banker in Paris, Aeneas MacDonald. And he got two ships, the Elizabeth and the Dutelle, and sailed in them to Scotland with originally 200 men in the Irish brigades. And those 200 men in the Irish brigades are important because it

was probably a French crown deniable special op rather than a purely private venture. Otherwise, there wouldn't have been French regulars going with him. But the ship, the Elizabeth, with all the men in and all the guns in, was so damaged in an exchange with a British man of war, HMS Lion, that it had to go back to France. So Charles actually arrived with only the legendary seven men of Moidart, a few of these commanders and senior advisors, no guns and no men. And for a while, it really looked as if people would not fight for him. But he overcame that partly by charisma, partly by appealing to youthful supporters and partly by early military success. So by the time the standard was raised at Glenfinnan on the 19th of August 1745, there had already been two

successes in Skirmish's small military engagements with British forces in the north of Scotland. And the Jacobites were feeling that confidence that comes from being on a roll. And that roll, of course, carried them right through to Edinburgh, to victory at Prestonpans, and to Derby, where they turned back, although even in retreat, and after the Jacobite army had retreated, further victories at Falkirk and Inverurie showed that they remained a formidable fighting force. But Derby was, of course, the critical moment and is still one of the great what-ifs of 18th century history. We'll come on to that extraordinary what-if in a second.

But, Murray, can I just ask, was considerable sympathy for the Jacobites, for the Stuart family across the three kingdoms? Well, it was by that stage two kingdoms, Ireland and Britain. But there was this sense that they would only rise if a French army arrived to help. And yet the French were like, well, we're not going to go and help unless there's a significant domestic rebellion. So it's just a weird catch-22 situation. That certainly was a significant element in weakening the Jacobite cause that the French wanted to see the colour of Jacobite money

before they would come. And the Jacobites wanted to see the color of Jacobite money before they would come, and the Jacobites wanted to see the color of French money before they would rise. The French government was on the brink of sending forces in 1745, and largely the retreat from Darby combined with poor intelligence on behalf of the Jacobite army led the French not to invade. Had the French invaded, it was always the French intention to use the Scottish and Irish troops in the French service as the main regulars who would land. I'm not sure they were entirely right in their assumptions that Irish troops in the French service would be entirely welcome in Essex, but they thought that would be preferable to French regulars. Talk to me about the young man himself, Charles Edward Stuart. It was a very, very daring move to arrive in Scotland at all.

And why did he go to the west coast of Scotland? And how, when he got there, was it personal charisma? Was it money? How did he persuade those first few men to come over to his side? He landed on Eriskay in July 1745, largely because the west coast has got more islands and it's more difficult for the Royal Navy to patrol. The sheer strength of the Royal Navy is a major factor in the rising, which is often overlooked, and evading them was a big challenge for the Jacobites. So he landed there. Initially,

he was told to go home. Traditionally, Rannach MacDonald, the younger of Kinloch Moidart, who was a younger brother of the chief of the sect, not the chief of the whole name of MacDonald, but the chief of that particular group, said that he would draw his sword even if no one else would, which shamed his brother into agreeing to fight for Charles. That gave him a couple of hundred men. A few more hundred came in, especially after his forces won those early two victories against Geyser's and Swetnam's regiments in the north of Scotland. And at Glenfinnan in August 1745, there were about 500 or 600 men, and they waited and waited. And late in the afternoon,

Cameron of L'Ochille arrived with two battalions of Camerons. Charles had talked him into this beforehand, but it was still 50-50 whether he would come or not. And what Charles offered him has always been unknown, but probably what he actually got subsequently, which was command of a regiment in the French service in the case that the Rising should fail. Anyway, when two battalions of Camerons arrived towards the end of the afternoon, that was a signal for the start of the Rising with about 1,200 men at that point. Charles moved rapidly southwards, a move which he was helped in by the fact that Wade's roads, which had been built in the 1720s and 30s to make it easier for British troops to reach the north of Scotland,

actually were also very useful to helping Jacobites reach the centre and south of Scotland. They cut both way, those roads. That's the problem with roads. Loch Eel is said to be one of the last great Highland lairs, and you say he arrived with two battalions. Why were the Highlands still an area in which private military companies could still be maintained deep into the 18th century? Well, it's certainly true of the north of Scotland, the Highland parts of Scotland, but it's also true of other parts of Scotland too, Scotland too, that there is a tradition which was in retreat by this period, but had not disappeared to effectively commute cash rents for service to the major subtenants in time of war that was widespread throughout Scotland. Effectively, a feudal settlement with considerable power in the hands of the feudal overlord, rights in terms of their powers of regality of life and death over their dependents.

And figures such as Athol, the Duke of Athol, had a fighting tail, a total military force, probably between 3,000 and 4,000 men, and that was the largest they got. The Duke of Argyll, chief of the name of Campbell, had about the same. And then there were chiefs of the name, I use the term because rather than saying chief of a clan, the Duke of Athol is chief of the name of Murray, but is not normally thought to be a clan family, even by people who think of clans. And there were plenty of other Scottish noblemen, for example, Lord Lewis Gordon, who in no way were ever thought of as clan clan leaders who brought people out on this kind of hold over them, like feudal hold over them. But they also raised significant numbers of volunteers

in the fishing ports and the East Coast boroughs. So the total number of men who at one point or another fought for the Jacobites is about 14,000, of whom about 1,000 were recruited in England. Roughly 1,000 to 1,500 were troops in the French service and the remainder were Scots. And was taking up arms on behalf of your feudal, I use the term carefully, but your feudal lord, was that still the norm in this period? Was there still internecine violence?

No, there wasn't internecine violence because it's quite possible to have a feudal system without internecine violence. But there was the relics, if you like, of a feudal system. And I have to say that helped subsequently to recruit the Highland regiments in the British service from the Seven Years' War onwards, because the tradition of local magnate power, the tradition of men volunteering in return for considerations of land, that was taken advantage of by those who recruited in the 1750s. So for example, we see Simon Fraser, Lord Lovett, who was executed in 1747. He raised 1,200 men, three battalions, the whole of the fighting tale of the House of Lovett

in 1745-6. And his son, who was present at Culloden but retreated to Inverness and prompted defected to the victorious British forces when they entered Inverness, he raised a similar number of men, slightly less, 1,100, but almost the same number of men to fight in his regiment in the Seven Years' War at Ticonderoga and on the Plains of Abraham and elsewhere. So it's actually a structure which, although the British government had changed the law, had removed rights of regality, those traditional loyalties still held in the later 18th century. They were very useful to the extensive recruitment of Scots into the British army all the way up to the end of the Napoleonic War. So you've got this force now, there's some early successes in the north west of Scotland.

When is the first big test? Is it outside Edinburgh at Prestonpans? Prestonpans is the first major battle. So the Jacobites enter Edinburgh, probably the gate is left open for them at the Lord Provost Archibald Stuart's connivance. He was certainly tried for it and acquitted on the not proven verdict. And then they know they're going to face British forces very shortly. And they do at Prestonpans on the 21st of September, four or five days later. I think what happened there is that General Cope took up a very strong defensive position. The Jacobites were able to make their way into a position where they could compromise that defensive position and render it a bit of a death trap, especially since they were seriously underestimated as a force.

You have observers from the British Army noting the Jacobites' advance of Preston Pans, eyewitnesses saying that they're advancing in line, they're advancing on a drill pattern, and they're not just having a wild rush with sword and hands as expected. So they underestimated them, which led them to actually commit the cavalry too early and to fire the artillery too soon. So in committing the cavalry, they thought the cavalry would drive them away, and it didn't. And they committed the artillery. And by the time they'd fired one round, the Jacobites were on them. And that was it. I mean, this is pretty shocking stuff. It had been thought that modern musket and bayonet

armed infantrymen fighting in close-packed ranks would be able to deal with irregular troops, so to say. I mean, what is it about the Jacobites in this and subsequent battles that makes them so potent? Well, if they say that actually the battlefield archaeology shows, as indeed the records show, that more Jacobite musket balls were fired at Culloden ahead of their army than were fired by the British army of that day. So I think one of the things is that there's still a popular view, which isn't really accurate, that the Jacobites fought with swords against guns. They didn't. They were pretty well armed. Not as well armed at Prestonpans as they became subsequently, but they were armed with musket and frequently musket and pistol too. The front rank carried swords because they were the officers leading their men. And that's exactly what would

have happened in the British army until considerably later. So actually, there were, generally speaking, fewer swords in circulation in Jacobite units than there were firearms. First of all, so they're better armed. They're actually drilled. Quite clearly, some Jacobite units had been domestically drilled anyway, but they received largely French drill training. There's some mixed drilling later on in the campaign because Chelsea Pensioner Arbroath does some drilling, which includes the British drilling system. But they largely drilled on the French pattern. But with that, they combined the last minute rush and onslaught, having loosed a volley at about 50 meters before the final charge with pistol and, if in the front ranks, sword in hand. So they were very effective. And they acted like

a quasi-regular unit while having some surprising tactics, which made them very difficult to deal with. Also, the British Army changed its whole tactical system for musketry in 1748, part in response to the 1746 Rising, because Bland's military regulations, previously, the battalion you fought in was not the battalion you fired in. the battalion you fought in was not the battalion you fired in. Companies between battalions were mixed to create what were called firings, so that different firings lined up in different parts of the line from mixed battalions to fire at the advancing forces. First of all, that was something which actually diluted the effectiveness of units. And secondly, it was used to being used in a firefight situation with continental forces, not a dynamic situation where you get one body fired at you and then there's a charge.

We could talk about mid to late 18th century musketry drill all day here, you're among friends. I've got to ask you, I can't move on sadly. Speaking of continental warfare, just quickly remind us all that part of the problem is that there was a war going on, and this was extremely inconvenient for the British government at this point, and Britain was somewhat denuded of troops. Well, it was. And of course, the reason for striking in 1744, and indeed in 1745, was to take advantage of the fact that the War of the Austrian Succession meant that a large number of troops were on the continent, And some of them had to be

brought back. And as a result of them being brought back, the French were able to capture Brussels. So Marshal Sachs' capture of Brussels netted France about five times more in booty than they actually spent on the Jacobite Rising. So on a pure cash return basis, it was a really good deal, 1745, for the French government. So yes, it was a situation where there were many troops being deployed on the continent. And of course, one has to remember that the armies at this time, if I say the British army, that is what it was, but armies at this time were not national forces in the way they became. There were a large number of Hessians, Hanoverians at some point, so that they later withdrew Dutch in the British service.

And these forces were regarded potentially as less reliable and more vulnerable. And in fact, the Hessians decided they wouldn't fight with Cumberland at the latter stage of the campaign because he refused to have a prisoner exchange system set up with the Jacobites because they were to be treated outright as rebels and the Hessians wouldn't have it. So it's a more complex coalition than a single military force. And in a way, the rising in 45 replays some of the aspects of the war of the Austrian succession because at Fontenoy in January 1745, when a last minute attack by the Irish brigades had led to French victory, many of those in Cumberland's first line at Culloden had fought at Fontenoy, and many of those facing them had fought at Fontenoy on the French side. You listen to Dan Snow's history here, talking about the Jacobite uprising of 1745.

More coming up. I'm Matt Lewis. And I'm Dr. Alan Orjanaga. To be continued... kings and popes, who were rarely the best of friends, murder, rebellions and crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit, wherever you get your podcasts. so cumberland the younger son of george ii and i think probably favorite son he's rushed back to britain is he with his forces yes he is because wade who is at newcastle is very old he's got a lot of men but generally speaking whenever he leaves newcastle he finds the weather's a bit adverse and decides to go back there he was not the right person to combat a dynamic rising. And it's getting quite dynamic because what happens after Preston Pan? So

Scotland is now sort of under Jacobite control, though amazingly Edinburgh Castle holds out, doesn't it? It does hold out because fundamentally it starts bombarding the city. The commander threatens to carry on doing that to the Jacobites' attempt to take it. So they pull back. So there are pinpricks which governments retain control, but Scotland is effectively Jacobite. Now, at this point, there's a big decision to make, isn't there?

Is this with the tension between the Stuart family who wants to regain the thrones of all Britain, Ireland, Scotland, England, the whole works, and some of the Scottish supporters who said, look, just be happy we've retaken Scotland? Is this a period of difficult politics now? It is a period of politics, though it has to be said that on the 10th of October, Charles Edward announced

that the union between Scotland and England was null and void and this is a standard part of Stuart policy. So in that sense, they're all on the same page. But the issue is that Charles always sees the restoration of the three kingdoms, as were ruled by Charles II, as the key goal. And he also sees that Charles I failed in the conflict of the 1640s by not taking London, not advancing on London after Edge Hill was a fatal error. And Charles really thinks you have to advance on London. A lot of his supporters, they don't think so. And it's widely feared the British government that they'll

recall the Scottish Parliament, declare a separate Scottish kingdom, and ask for a French army, as indeed had happened in the late 1540s and early 1550s when England invaded Scotland, a French army was brought in precisely to protect the country. But Charles has his way by one vote and they march into England. Strategically, he's absolutely correct. There isn't any way that they would have been able to hold out in Scotland because the sheer amount of credit that the sophisticated financial markets of London could generate could keep on bringing more troops till the cows came home, and they'd come home pretty quickly if you didn't try and take London.

In desperate straits, the boldest plan is usually the best. And so Bonnie Fitzgerald was probably right, I guess. Now, he chooses, unsurprisingly, the other side of the country from where Wade is in Newcastle. He moves down to the west of the country. And Lancashire was thought to be quite jacobite. But are they disappointed with the number of English volunteers they received? Yes, a lot of the commanders are disappointed. and Charles possibly is himself, though he leaves no record. Rather, more than we now identify joined, probably there were about 300 on the prisoner lists or known in the regimental list, we think probably up to 1,000 joined. But the important thing was that people didn't realise that England was not nearly so militarized a country as Scotland

was. The numbers that Charles got were actually very similar to the numbers that Charles II got on the way to Worcester in 1651. In other words, the major problem for English Jacobitism was really that people didn't want to fight. And that was what you might call a great English habit that went back all the way to Bosworth, because Richard III couldn't get anyone to turn out either. Except in periods of serious ideological conflict like the 1640s, people in England just didn't want to fight. And they had a good survival instinct in that respect. Well, there was that wonderful expression from later in the 18th century, isn't it? Somebody said the Brits are prepared to fight for death for the last Austrian or something like that.

So they arrive, very impressively, they march down against the Midlands. They manage to wrong foot the British army and they arrive in Derby. And what happens there? Well, in Derby, Charles wants to go on and most of his council of war want to go back because they haven't received assurances from the French. We know the French were very close at this point. But as I say, the intelligence wasn't good enough to bring the two efforts together in a way which synchronized them. And they're concerned about lack of recruits. And they fear that there are more forces facing them, again, poor intelligence,

than there actually are. So at the point at which they retreat, there are approximately 1,000 to 1,500 men at Finchley, a mixture of the train bands and a few regulars, the Black Watch being the most significant force, but the Black Watch being kept down there because it's not trusted, because of its mutiny in 1743. So there's not much doubt they would have walked into London and defeated the force at Finchley had they marched on. The question is what happens next. It's such an amazing counterfactual. Now, is this one of those occasions in history

where everyone always wants spies to play an important role, and often they don't, but is this a moment where disinformation, deliberate disinformation, does play a role in the decision of the Jacobites to start marching back to Scotland? Well, there is this line that it did. I have to say one has reason to be sceptical because the Dudley Bradstreet line that he persuaded when there was a third army between them and London

is something that he put to the Duke of Newcastle in order to try and get more money out of him when he felt he wasn't being appreciated a few years later. There's not very good evidence for it except what he says himself. So you can't rule it out. But I know some historians have put a great deal of weight on that. And I think the evidence doesn't really support it. They were definitely anxious that there might be forces facing them. But whether they were critically moved by Bradstreet or Bradstreet was even in the Council of War, that's a different matter.

I'm glad to hear that, Murray. I've always found that story of the double agent who rocks up and tells him it's a secret English army and everyone goes, it's too neat, it's too James Bond, doesn't quite work for me. So, okay, good. I'm glad you say that. Now, so Bonnie Fitzgerald reluctantly at Derby, they head north. How reluctant? Is he furious, outvoted? This can't be pleasant.

I mean, you know, the Stuarts always had an off-lamented proclivity for divine right monarchy. This can't have been an easy thing for him to have to swallow. No, and he doesn't like it. I'm not sure he's a divine right monarchist. Charles is rather more of an enlightenment figure, one of those that Voltaire was one of his key supporters. But yeah, he doesn't like it. He doesn't like it one little bit, because after all, whether or not he's an Enlightenment figure, not only is he the heir to the throne, but he thinks a critical mistake is occurring. And also, unsurprisingly, they know that forces have landed in Scotland, and those forces are exaggerated. So there is a second Jacobite army building in Scotland, partly recruited locally, partly coming in with Lord John Drummond's Écosse Royale and Irish forces who land in Montrose in late autumn of 1745

and subsequent French reinforcements, again using their Irish troops. But it's not nearly as many as people think when they talk about it at Derby. The march north, what is there left to do now than try and escape the encircling British troops all arriving back from the continent? What's the plan at this point? The plan is to return to Scotland and regather there. You see, the tragedy is that although many people have supported and think great things of Lord George Murray, Lord George Murray was a very, very good tactician and was terrific at retreating the army. But Charles was a better strategist. So a lot of his commanders, including Lord George Murray, think that somehow it'll be like 1715. You can just clear off home and everyone won't bother

too much. Or if you have to fight, there'll be some possibility of reaching an arrangement. In other words, they're looking to get closer to home because they feel more comfortable there. They feel more comfortable fighting on home soil, and they feel that should they lose, they can go home. But by this time, he'd already said this at Macclesfield, Cumberland was determined that they shouldn't go home. Charles does his best, if that's what you would call it. He gets them to delay from marching out of Preston to try and get Cumberland to catch up with them so he can fight them. But in the end, he's forced further north. The advance guard of Cumberland's army does make contact with the Jacobites at Clifton, and there's a skirmish, which is really a score draw, probably, but in which there's

a lot of conspicuous bravery. And Cumberland's cavalry commander, Oglethorpe, can probably catch up with the Jacobites at other points. But Oglethorpe has got two Jacobite sisters, is a closet Jacobite himself, and was not the right man for a very, very speedy cavalry chase of the Jacobite army. I'm Matt Lewis. And I'm Dr. Eleanor Janaga. And in Gone Medieval, we get into the greatest mysteries.

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wherever you get your podcasts. Yeah, the Clifton Moor skirmish. It's a trick question to what was the last battle on English soil. It's often said we sedged Moor in the 1680s, but I think Clifton Moor seems to tick all the boxes. So they head back. They arrive back in Scotland. What happens now?

There's a curious period of jostling in Scotland before the final showdown. Initially, Charles wants to control central Scotland. He gets, though they don't enjoy giving him it, quite a bit of material support from Glasgow in the new year. And then two weeks later, in central Scotland, he forces the largest Jacobite force to take the field in the 45, face the British army under Henry Hawley and win again. That appears to be a critical moment where despite the fact they're not successful in their siege of Stirling Castle, despite the fact that Edinburgh's back in government hands, the Jacobites have won at Falkirk and Charles wants

to consolidate his grasp on central Scotland. At this point, Murray starts to exaggerate the number of desertions and claims that only by retreating north will people come back to the army. They do retreat to Creef. And at that point, Charles stops trusting Murray altogether because he finds out the desertions are much fewer than advertised. This is when the last stage of the campaign begins. And effectively, the Jacobites move further north. Some of their units carry out guerrilla raids in Aberdeenshire, as far south as Perthshire, designed to discomfort

and dislodge British forces in those areas. But Cumberland spends a long, leisurely time in Aberdeen drilling his army, and then moves slowly north. There's a popular argument his bayonet drill was critical, but actually there are far more important things he does, ranging from the fact that he knows when he gets to Culloden to hold his cavalry back, not to deploy them too early. He knows the importance of cavalry on the wings, and from the beginning, he always wants to encircle the Jacobite army using those cavalry. Instead of providing a very long front, he produces strength in depth by having overlapping regiments cover the regiment in front in case

they're broken by the Jacobites. And even when advancing to Culloden, he uses the innovation, relative innovation, stage of the kettledrum by having 235 kettledrummers announce this march from Nairn as a kind of riposte to the pipes, thundering the announcement of the British army who can be heard for an hour before they reach Culloden and therefore meant to be a weapon of terror. In other words, he's thought it through very carefully. Before we get to the famous incident about Nairn and the battle itself, just quickly, let's just deal with the myth. Or is it a myth? You mentioned that the people of Glasgow

were pretty unwilling to provide support and succour to the Jacobite army. Is it anachronistic to think of this in terms of a Scotland-England match-up? To what extent is identity part of this? And were there vast numbers of Scottish troops fighting on the British government's side? That's a very important question.

There are certain things which are very interesting about it. One is that it was widely viewed as a Scotland-England conflict. In fact, if you look at regimental histories, I was just looking at the Hampshire regiments the other day, saying among our successes would be in the involvement of our troops in the defeat of the Scottish army at Culloden. It was viewed as a Scotland-England conflict. The monument at Culloden says a monument to the Highlanders who fought for Scotland and Prince Charlie. Even a film like the

1948 Prince Charlie with David Niven has a clear Scottish message. Alastair MacDonald of Kepoche speaks to David Niven and says the country's dying. He dies under a salt tire, all the rest of it. Very, very clear. And then in the 1960s and 70s, there's a really a move towards describing it as a civil war, which has intensified. I have to say that there's a very interesting correspondence between the traditional narrative, which is the belief that it was the battle that cemented the union, it ended a particular phase of Scottish history, and it created a unified Britain, which is the old narrative, with the fact that this narrative becomes rather difficult to sustain if there's a live movement in Scotland for constitutional

change or independence, which means that the Civil War narrative starts to rise up because that's the way of reinterpreting it. Because if you start with a Scotland v England fight, help, you're allowing it to be taken over by Scottish nationalism. So that's the history of how the battle's been remembered. What is it in fact? Well, it's a conflict where there are quite a number of Scots who oppose Charles Edward, though there are not more Scots who fight in the British Army at Culloden than on his side, there are about half as many, we have the muster rolls, but there are clearly quite a lot of Scots who oppose him. On the other hand, the Jacobites are committed to changing the constitution arrangements between Scotland and England, ending the 1707 Union, and we don't have

a single record of the Jacobite forces carrying the Union flag at any time. So it's pretty clear that they saw themselves. There's a contemporary map by a French officer, probably in the Irish brigades, Irish pickets, which just says l'armée écousoire, l'armée angloise. They saw themselves as a Scottish army. They paid under the old Scottish army rates prior to 1707. They raised taxes under the old pre-union tax system. They saw themselves as a Scottish army. Some Scots did not agree with that. But it's not a dynastic conflict. It's a constitutional conflict which has dynastic elements. And that's why it's not like the Wars of the Roses. That's why it's still very powerful, reverberating myth history to this day.

Well, we've arrived at Culloden. We've already gone way over time here because it's a wonderful story. We may have to do a separate whole episode on Culloden itself. But is Inverness the last significant city in Jacobite control? Is there an element of Prince Charles not wanting to become a kind of guerrilla force, but wanting to maintain an army in the field with territory and a base of supply? Yes, I mean, I think it's very important. Not enough good military history about Culloden. And quite simply, Charles's army was not, as I've indicated earlier, quite as able to carry out guerrilla campaigns as

people might think. It was, in many respects, as quasi-regular and sometimes a fully regular force in terms of the units it had at its disposal. It had got its remaining supplies at Inverness. It needed to protect Inverness as its base. It didn't really have an option. It couldn't pay its troops. And it was in serious straits. People were not going to forage on the land in order to have a romantic heather and mist campaign in the summer of 1746. It wasn't an option. Again, interestingly, you mentioned Charles being a better strategist. In a way, he launches a night attack on the British army at Nairn, which in a way was probably his best chance of success, right? Because they were heavily outnumbered and outgunned by this

point. Hungry, perhaps slightly demoralized. Was that his idea to launch that very risky night attack? It wasn't solely his idea. It was an idea that he was supported in because it broke a potential impasse between where Sullivan wanted to fight the battle and where Murray wanted to fight the battle, which was fundamentally a retreat over the Nairn. And also because, as you say, it seemed the best chance. One of the things that went wrong was they set out too late. And one of the reasons they set out too late was not because they were lousy timekeepers, but because it was the middle of April and the Royal Navy was sitting in the Mar-a-Farf with telescopes and they could see the Jacobite army. So not until

it got dark could the Jacobites effectively leave where they were lined up, which wasn't actually where they fought the next day, but where they were lined up at Culloden. And whereas some of them almost made it, the French regulars in particular, and some of the other troops found the way hard going and just couldn't cover the ground. So really, without street lighting and roads, it was always going to be highly risky. And of course, neither of those were in evidence. And I guess the problem with those kind of attacks is you risk everything on this night attack. If it fails, like a funnily enough moment with Sajan Warrant, we just mentioned earlier, you end up with a misfiring night attack. None of you have slept and your enemy can engage you in battle the following day, which is exactly what happens. Exactly what happens. And most of the men,

many of them don't even get back. And some of them are killed while they're still asleep by Cumberland's forces in the advance. But they gather around Culloden House, because that's where most of the food is and where the command post is, and they fall asleep in its grounds. And then when they line up on the field, they have to line up relatively quickly. They don't line up where they'd been mustered the previous day. And the right cannot see the left because there's a significant upward and then downward slope there. And the large front that they put out, and they only had a very thin second line, which is one of the problems, but the large front they put out meant that the command on the right couldn't see the command on

the left. We'll just quickly talk about the battle. There's a most extraordinary charge on the southern flank. The Jacobite army smashes through the first line of the British army. Is there a point at which it could have gone the other way, or was it very one-sided, despite this temporary crisis in the south of the line? It probably couldn't have gone another way on the day. It wasn't, however, a Turkish shoot. The two things are, first of all, one of the things that the second line of the British army did when Barrels was broken by the Jacobite attack was to fire co-horn mortars into the front line. So quite a number of barrels forces died of friendly fire, quite probably. And the casualty figures are probably lower, almost certainly lower

than those who were actually killed on the day. On the other hand, Jacobite units got clean away if they stayed in order. That happened. Both battalions of the Forfisher Regiment and the McGregors both kept full order and they got off the field. Nobody wanted to tackle them. In fact, nobody tackled the McGregors all the way back to Prathshire. And on the other hand, the British Army wasn't able to encircle the Jacobite forces. They failed to actually envelop them. So there were a number of failures on the day, but the basic problem was that the Jacobites were outnumbered two to one. They were extremely tired and they couldn't coordinate the charge across the front line because the right hand and the left hand couldn't see each other.

And their second line was nugatory. They did some sterling fighting. There was a prolonged firefight carried out by Franco-Irish and other troops in the latter stages of the battle. But basically, it was simply allowing people to get away. Once the front line had failed to carry the day, there wasn't any way the Jacobites could win. And there wasn't any way the front line was going to carry the day because that front line was outnumbered by the troops facing them by three to one. And the cavalry advantage carried by the British army was even more

substantial in proportional terms. Donald Cameron, with the Lockheel that we mentioned at the beginning, the great Laird, whose support was so vital, was carried off the field by his men, shot through both ankles, one of his descendants once told me. What was the fate that awaited many of those that escaped? Tell me about the vicious counterinsurgency that the British then launched across the Highlands. Pacification is the euphemism that the British launched across the Highlands. Cumberland had already planned to just simply kill people in order to intimidate them. And there's good evidence of that in the Cumberland papers. For some, it was obviously in the heat of the moment, revenge of fallen comrades and whatnot. But in Cumberland's own mind,

there's plenty of evidence he'd been planning this for some time. So about a thousand Jacobites were killed on the day. The day afterwards, people were shot and bayoneted on the field. Deserters were shot on the battlefield. There was a later event when a number of deserters were shot in the middle of London, about two dozen of them, to warn any potential English Jacobites. A number of Jacobites, including a colonel in the French service who got involved in the wrong unit, were burnt alive in a barn. And there followed extensive harrying of the countryside and Jacobite areas. And following that, Cumberland initially thought it would take six weeks. But the very interesting thing about it is that the army required to be in Scotland for more than 10 years, and also were engaged in the whole of Scotland. There's a really interesting story to be told there, which I'm in the middle of beginning to tell about things like the

introduction of cricket and the rotation of troops and places like Linlithgow and Parth. It was a longstanding problem, which didn't in the end go away until the War of 1756-63. And Jacobite units remained in the field, particularly in parts of the north of Scotland. So repeated references to Highland thieves and raiders in army records are often, if you look at other records, references to significant bands or bodies of armed troops attacking positions. So it's a very interesting and compelling story. One of the things that needs to be said, though, straight away, is that Cumberland wanted to transplant the populations, and that was frowned on by Pelham and Newcastle and Westminster. It was actually in England, in London,

that Cumberland was first remonstrated with at a mass ball in May for why there had been no wounded among the prisoners, among the Jacobites, also very few wounded. Most of those, again, were in the French service and therefore were going to be released on cartel in exchange for French prisoners. The Butcher's Company cartoon of Cumberland as the Butcher first appeared in December 1746 in London. So actually, it's in London, the first signs of real, I mean, of course, people hated it in Scotland too, but the signs of public distaste are there from a very early stage. And Cumberland, although he kept credit in the army and in some areas of politics, is significant that apart from being Chancellor of Trinity College Dublin, Cumberland really held

no significant governmental office ever after Culloden. He was tainted goods. And I have to say that that was something which was a situation created in London and also by British officers in Scotland. There was an officer of one of the regiments who went to the Scots magazine offices in Edinburgh and gave them significant evidence of atrocities. So it wasn't normal for the time. And it wasn't something that England backed against Scotland. Cumberland was an outlier, and people did find him too savage. What one can say, though, is because he maintained his credit in the army, the Grand Arrangement, the forcible deportation of the Acadian populations in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and Maine,

the French Canadians, to stop them presenting a military threat to British forces in Canada, although most of them were peaceful farmers anyway. That population transplantation came out of and was executed by some of the same officers who supported the transplantation of Scots in 1746. So there is a legacy in the British Empire to what Cumberland planned to do. But in Scotland in 1746, it was quite speedily seen by a number of governmental authorities in London as just too much. And as Duke of Newcastle said, the Scots deserve the protection of the laws as well as everybody else. And then Cumberland unfortunately went on to command an army that began a seven years war

and made an absolute balls up against the French at the outbreak of that war in Hanover. Anyway, let's just quickly finish off Bonnie Prince Charlie for me. He escapes in a highly romantic and exciting way across the Highlands, gets onto a French ship and makes it back to France. It's all a bit sad, though, the rest of his life, isn't it? And is that now the end of the Stuart claim, is it? It is, fundamentally. It should be said that France intended in 1759, the attack at Quiberon Bay and the battle at Quiberon Bay was with a view to restoring the Stuarts. And as late as 1795, the Directory proposed to the United Irishmen that Henry be landed in Ireland to be king in Ireland in the event of French troops as they did, joining the 1798 Rising. But the United Irishmen told to get lost.

Basically, the Stuarts ceased by the middle of the 18th century to be a realistic proposition. But it had a huge effect on global history because had the Stuarts won, then there would have been a rapprochement like under Charles II between Great Britain, which would be a multi-kingdom monarchy once more, and France. There wouldn't have been a fight to the death in 1756-63. Therefore, the American colonies might not have become independent because they'd have been surrounded by French troops. France wouldn't have been so financially extended, so able to deal with the agricultural crises of the 1780s and avoid the revolution better. And that meant, of course, there would have been no

Napoleon. We might still have a Holy Roman Empire. Crikey, crikey. That's pretty good. Look, if you take away the 1756-63 war, and of course, British victories were significantly down to the use of Scottish troops, particularly in North America. The British victory over the Jacobites made a huge difference to world history. But a Jacobite victory could have made even more because of the significance of the 1756-63 conflict, everything that came came after and the fact that France didn't have the financial instruments to run the kind of national debt that Great Britain could run under Pitt. I could not agree more. The Seven Years' War, everyone, you've heard me say it

before. It is the crucible of the modern world fact. Murray, that was an absolute tour de force. Thank you so much for coming on. Tell everyone what your book is called. It's Culloden, published by OUP in 2016. It's currently in Amazon for £13.65 or less for the Kindle. And I'm sitting in front of the illustrated version, which the Folio Society are bringing out later this year. Brilliant. I have a copy. I'm looking at it on my shelf, on my 18th century set of shelves now. It's a beautiful book. And please come on to talk about your next book. Of course, it sounds like it's fascinating as well. So please come back on when that publishes and tell us all about that.

Great. Okay. Thanks. you