Dan Snow's History Hit - D-Day: Britain and America's 'Special Relationship'

Episode Date: June 5, 2023

The 6th of June, 1944 was the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany and the pinnacle of the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States. Hundreds of thousands of Allied troops stormed the beaches of Normandy on D-Day and fought side by side to liberate Europe. But in the decades since the world has changed drastically - great powers have risen and fallen, and geopolitical realities have shifted along with them. How has the relationship fared through these tumultuous years? And just how special was it in the first place?Dan is joined for this episode by Sam Edwards, an expert in Anglo-American relations and the memory of war. By discussing D-Day and the commemoration of it, they try to make sense of the fabled special relationship and figure out if it has stood the test of time.Discover the past on History Hit with ad-free original podcasts and documentaries released weekly presented by world-renowned historians like Dan Snow, Suzannah Lipscomb, Lucy Worsley, Matt Lewis, Tristan Hughes and more. Get 50% off your first 3 months with code DANSNOW. Download the app or sign up here.We'd love to hear from you! You can email the podcast at [e-mail].

Hi everybody, welcome to Dan Snow's History Hit. June the 6th, 1944, one of the most famous days in history, the Day of Days, D-Day. The day on which the Allies, led by the UK and the US, but including contingents from many other nations, assaulted the beaches of Normandy. It was the start of the liberation of Northwest Europe, and it was another nail in the coffin of the Third Reich. Over the years, I've made many D-Day podcasts. I've interviewed veterans. I've talked to James Holland. I've talked to other historians about what happened that day. I've reported from the beaches on the various anniversaries that I've attended. But this year, we decided to do something a little bit different. I want to talk to Sam Edwards. He's a historian at Loughborough University. He specialises in transatlantic

relations and the commemoration of 20th century warfare. I wanted to ask him about the fabled special relationship. As he points out, D-Day was the special relationship in action. British and American troops disembarking from British and American vessels, storming the coast of Europe side by side. But that special relationship has come to mean so much more. Does it still exist, or was it a matter of wartime contingency? Well, Sam's been thinking about this his whole professional career, and he's here to share some thoughts with us. Enjoy. T-minus 10. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. God save the king. No black-white unity till there is first and black unity. Never to go to war with one another again. And lift off,

and the shuttle has cleared the tower. Sam, thank you very much for coming on the podcast. Thank you very much for having me. One of the interesting things about the American-British-led coalition invasion of Northwest Europe on D-Day in 1944 is that a couple of years earlier, it was definitely not a settled issue that the USA would be joining the war in Europe against the Germans. I mean, until Hitler's somewhat crazy declaration of war against America in 1941, I mean, they had diplomatic relations. I mean, they weren't close, but America was certainly not a combatant power, was it? We're so familiar with that phrase now, special relationship, and it's been around for, what, sort of eight decades or so, that it's kind of useful to remind ourselves that pre-World War II, yes, there's some close connections between the

US and UK and there's a diplomatic relationship, but the idea of some kind of close, natural, kind of really intense bond, it's not there. It's born of the Second World War. And I guess the answer to the question, Adolf Hitler declared war. I mean, we Brits sort of like to pretend it's sort of Churchill's inspiring rhetoric, the kind of Anglo-Saxon links of language and culture that inevitably brought Americans to war. And of course, there is an element of that, isn't there? But actually, Adolf Hitler declared war on the USA. Yeah, it's one of the fascinating things. We think that, you know, that close historical

connection, those linguistic ties, the fact that we fought together as two powers in the First World War, all of that, you know, suggests that America is going to join us in this conflict eventually. But as you say, it's the German response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which actually will draw around the United States into the conflict. Although Churchill, as you said, has been doing lots of stuff in the background to try to cultivate American support in the months and years before that. Let's get on to the, why the decision to invade Europe in 1944? Why not earlier? Why not later? What was the thinking and are the differences between the British and American points of view? Absolutely. I think there's a bunch of things here. Certainly, Churchill is keen to go back to Europe, even in the immediate aftermath of

Dunkirk back in 1940. At the same time, he's a little bit uncertain, a little bit cautious, a bit wary. He has in his head the dark memories of Gallipoli in 1915, the challenges presented by an amphibious operation. That's certainly something which is going to be a cause of worrying concern for the British military. The Americans, they want to get back in. Certainly, once they've joined the company, they want to be invading Europe as quickly as possible. There are various ideas offered as to when best to do that. Ultimately, though, this strategy kind of flexes over the two or three years before D-Day, and the Allies go for a slightly different tack rather than straight into northwestern Europe with invasions of North Africa and then Sicily and Italy. And eventually, though, it gets round to, okay, let's now launch this invasion of northwestern Europe, France itself.

But that's a huge logistical operation. This is going to be the biggest amphibious invasion in history, and that's going to take a lot of planning. There's a lot of choreography to work out here. There's also a lot of politics, isn't there? You've got Eisenhower is given the top job, Supreme Commander in Northwest Europe. British General Montgomery is given the job of overseeing D-Day itself and the battle for Normandy. Did everyone get along or was there some tricky personalities and different national perspectives? get along? Or was there some tricky personalities and different national perspectives? We've got some egos there, haven't we? We've got some egos there. Monty, one key marker of that.

I think for the likes of Churchill, though, there's something in the command arrangement, which is kind of the special relationship made real. You've got an American in overall charge, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and I think he's probably the best guy for the job. He is a consummate diplomat. He's good at bringing people together. And ultimately, that is his role. That's his task. All his subordinate commanders, though, land, sea, and air are fulfilled by Britain. So an American in charge, Britain's running subordinate commands. But that's a challenging thing as well to work through those different personalities and egos. You've got the famous disputes and disagreements between the likes of Monty and Patton and other American generals. So it's a complex operation. Ike does it well. And I think that's probably a good reason as to why he then shows himself to be a consummate politician and a successful president as well.

The landings on June the 6th, 1944, known as D-Day. They are genuinely a mixed effort, aren't they? Most of the naval assets were British. I think more than half of the soldiers landing on D-Day were British and Commonwealth or Imperial. Although America would come to dominate the war in the West by 1945, they were still real partners at this point. Yeah. And again, I think for the likes of Churchill, when he's celebrating the idea of a special relationship a couple of years after the conflict in March of 1946, that big famous speech at Fulton in Missouri, I think it's things like D-Day that he's got in mind, because D-Day is the operation, this huge endeavor, which is genuinely Anglo-American in command, but also in the detail of who's involved in the day itself as well, with

something in the region of 50,000 to 60,000 Americans, 75,000 British and Canadians serving under British command, massive Royal Naval component, and of course, the combined forces of the US Army Air Force and Royal Air Force as well. This is almost like the special relationship made real in this operation in this moment. And the kind of why it's such a big thing for the British in particular is because it's the last time that happens. That's so interesting, Sam. I mean, is the moment of the birth of the so-called special relationship, is that also its apotheosis? It's been downhill ever since then. I think that's the perfect word for it. This is the apotheosis. This is its birth, and it's kind of fizzing out almost as well at the same moment in time. Yeah.

Because really, from every day that passes from June 6th, 1944, the American contribution gets bigger and bigger in proportion to the British, not just in France and Western Europe, but sort of everywhere, right? The handing of the superpower baton kind of accelerates for every day, every moment from those landings onwards. Absolutely. Once British military forces are committed in Northwestern Europe, their manpower is only going to be depleted. You must have this sense that in the 24, 48 hours and a couple of months after D-Day, the story of the next eight decades is set. And that's in terms of military, economic, and power relative US and UK, it's one of growing American preponderance and declining British power.

So the idea of a special relationship, it was a wartime contingent. I remember actually in the First World War, I read naval history the other day, that when American warships kind of arrived in Ireland in 1917, after they entered the war, they shouted across to British sailors, listen, man, we could have been fighting you. Don't think this was inevitable. And so what looks like this match made in heaven, for reasons we talked about earlier, language and culture and history and things, it was quite contingent on this war. And does it mean anything after the defeat of the Third Reich?

As Palmerston or whoever said, does a nation really have friends or just got interests? I think you're right. I think when we think of a special US-UK relationship, there are those linguistic, historical, cultural things which take us back to the revolution, to the 1770s, if not beyond. At the same time, as a kind of diplomatic relationship, as a political bond, it's contingent on the experience of the Second World War and on those geopolitical realities at that point in time. And of course, those geopolitical realities have now profoundly shifted eight decades later. And so you could ask the question, you know, is the special relationship just of World War II and its immediate aftermath? And has it gone with the disappearance of those geopolitical realities? And scholars have been saying this for the best part of 40 or 50 years

now. The special relationship has been pronounced dead more times than I can recall now. The obituaries have been written since at least the 1960s. At the same time, I think you could, and I think we can, make a reasonable case for whilst today is very different from 44 or from 46, there are still some echoes, some things lingering into the present, suggestive of something that we can reasonably call special, connecting the United States and the United Kingdom, especially in terms of military intelligence, but also in terms of culture, I think, as well. I mean, you talk about the special relationship after all, you talk about the 60s. I mean, Eisenhower was involved in one of the great moments that was

deeply unspecial in that relationship when he partly forced the British to abandon their ambitions in Suez against Nasser, the Egyptian leader in the Suez crisis. You have to really squint to feel that there was a special relationship or a kind of alignment between Britain and the US. Did America actively pursue the collapse of the British Empire, do you think? That's a good one and a toughie. It's certainly there in the things that FDR was saying in the 1940s, that he wants a world that looks very different to that of the 1930s, a world which he hopes isn't going to involve lots of great power, imperial rivalry, national self-determination, all of that sort of thing.

And clearly, there are elements of even how the US-UK relationship has worked out in the early stages of the war, suggestive in an American attempt to kind of replace the British Empire basis for destroyers, all that kind of stuff. And so, yeah, I think you could say that a key objective of US foreign policy from entering the Second World War that runs right through the next few decades is to reduce, replace what had been its predecessor imperial entity, the British Empire. And I suppose opposing the Soviet conquest of Western Europe, it wasn't hard to come to some alignment on that. It may prove a lot more tricky if Donald Trump wins the next election, or indeed any Republican who is wary of engagement in Ukraine. That relationship will prove trickier to maintain if American interests

start to diverge very seriously from those of Britain and the other countries of Western Europe. Yeah, absolutely. That will be the case. And at the same time, though, history tells us that there have been plenty of times over the last half century or so where American and British interests have maybe kind of drifted at times and then realigned themselves and drifted and realigned. And that's why D-Day, not now just as historical event, June 44, but also as something that American and British culture goes back to on an annual basis, especially for anniversaries, why it's really interesting. There's almost a mechanism to read what is the interest at that point in time? What are people

saying about the Atlantic Alliance at that moment? What are Americans and Britons thinking and feeling about the extent to which that kind of transatlantic bond still has relevance and meaning for them? And some of the anniversaries are a useful kind of cipher for almost to read what are people thinking and feeling about the special relationship at that moment? Let's talk about the term itself. Was it coined by Churchill? So it seems to emerge in diplomatic correspondence, and Churchill is absolutely involved in that in 41, 42, 43, that kind of territory. The famous speech, though, which popularizes it is Fulton, Missouri, March of 1946, where Churchill goes to this old place, Westminster College,

out in Missouri. He's been invited there by Harry Truman. By this point in time, Churchill was out of office, of course. And Truman knows that, and he's quite interested in that fact, because it means that Churchill has leeway. He has scope to say things that maybe might be useful to Truman, just to get a sense as to what Americans and people in Europe are thinking and feeling about the big Cold War challenge at the moment. So Churchill comes over to Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, and gives this famous speech. And it gives us two phrases, which then enter the kind of lexicon of diplomatic discourse.

One, the special relationship. The other, the iron curtain. He's a skillful orator. He's good with the words, and he knows how to pitch a phrase which will be remembered. You're listening to Dan Snow's History Hit, talking about D-Day and the special relationship.

More after this. I'm Professor Susanna Lipscomb, and throughout June on Not Just the Tudors from History Hit, I'm marking the 400th anniversary of the publication of Shakespeare's first folio. It would be hard to think of Shakespeare without plays like Julius Caesar, The Tempest, Antony and Cleopatra, Macbeth, As You Like It and A Winter's Tale. But without the first folio, none of these would have survived. This is not a book designed to be carried around. This is a book which establishes itself in the library, in the study, and that physicality tells us something about how the plays are being rebranded, reframed for a new generation.

Throughout this month, I'm delving deep into the first folio, how it was produced, who made it, and to what extent it has ensured Shakespeare's enduring legacy. So do join me on Not Just the Tudors from History Hit, wherever you get your podcasts. I'm Matt Lewis. And I'm Dr. Alan Orjanaga. Thank you. who were rarely the best of friends, murder, rebellions, and crusades. Find out who we really were by subscribing to Gone Medieval from History Hit, wherever you get your podcasts. Churchill had an American mother and he made that joke to the US Congress when he was addressing them that if his father had been born the other way around he might way well have been addressing them as the US President instead of the British Prime Minister what was he thinking when he's

trying to embed that idea of a special relationship in the late 40s is he looking at the world thinking crikey the era of British hegemony is gone. The next best thing is a kind of American hegemony that we can exercise some influence over, like the ancient Athenians like to sort of bring Roman emperors to Athens and sort of teach them how to grow beards and talk about philosophy. And you could have thought in some way, at least we're still in the game. Is that where Churchill was going in the mid to late 1940s? I think that's exactly what he's doing. And I think that's where the oratory and the speech writing and the memorable phrases, I think that's part of the plan here, part of the strategy. In lieu of the hard currency of real power, battleships and aircraft carriers

and great fleets of aircraft, what can Britain offer? What can Churchill do? What he can offer is a phrase, something that will catch attention and maybe even get people going back to it on a regular, almost ritualistic basis. I often think that what he's almost doing there is setting up the idea of a US-UK connection as something of a political faith, something that you pay homage to, something that you worship that. Because if it's an act of faith, it doesn't necessarily require evidence. It doesn't necessarily require the hard currency. It's just something you believe. If you can get the Yanks to believe in it, maybe that's useful for our foreign policy going forward.

I think the figure of Churchill, the reputation, the legacy of Churchill himself has become a kind of a bond for the US and Britain. The Churchill industry in the US is almost bigger than it is here in the UK. And I think, ironically, he's come to embody that in a way, I'm often going and attending or giving a speech or something at the Churchill Society, and most people in the room seem to be Americans, you know, like it's perhaps unintentionally, but he has come to symbolize this thing. Yeah. I think it's interesting how he's perceived differently on either side of the Atlantic. And we know that on our shores, the figure of Churchill, of course,

has recently been the subject of discussion and debate, controversy over questions of empire and things that he did and said in relationship to the British Empire. But I think taken to an American context, and he becomes a less problematic figure because now he is the celebrant of Anglo-American connection. Now he is the advocate for democracy. Now he is the political leader which joined the United States in that great campaign for freedom in the 1940s. And some of those complexities that we rightly must contend with on this side of the Atlantic maybe just fall away a little bit when he's explored in an American context. Absolutely. Let's talk about remembrance, because I've attended, frankly, a worrying number of D-Day anniversaries. Now I'm getting a bit old. And I'm always very struck by the opportunity for high politics. And they've fallen at some very interesting times.

We had Trump for the 75th. And we had in 2004, which during the Iraq War in America, Bush went and at Omaha Beach, there was a very ostentatious Franco-American commemoration emphasizing that despite short-term disagreements, there was a kind of deep long-term alliance. Of course, in the case of the French, stretching back right to the beginning of the USA itself. This has always been an occasion for big diplomacy, hasn't it? Absolutely has. And you could trace it back to kind of 1950. So the 10th anniversary of 1954 is a really interesting one. It's the moment where what we now understand to be the general form of a D-Day commemoration gets kind of laid out. That

is, there's going to be a bunch of stuff in the British invasion sector and a bunch of stuff in the American invasion sector that's kind of already worked out by 1954. But it's in the decades that follow that it then becomes this kind of moment of televisual political theatre. And I think that really starts to kick off with the famous trip made by Ronald Reagan in 1984, which is a carefully planned, carefully choreographed event, and a really telling moment in the story of D-Day and how that's been commemorated. Just to go back to 64 quickly, de Gaulle didn't want anyone to come to D-Day. De Gaulle found the whole thing too painful. He didn't want to remind people that there had been, I mean, there was a very small

French contingent on D-Day, but effectively it was a British-American allies liberation of France. And he didn't want to commemorate that. He didn't. That's not a good story for de Gaulle. He's right there in these 1960s. He's trying to reassert French sovereignty. He's got this mission to rebuild French grandeur. The story of France being liberated by the hated, inverted commas, Anglo-Saxons, that doesn't play with that foreign policy objective. And there's lots of kind of disagreement and dispute and fallout in and around 1964 over what should the ceremony look like? What should the occasion look like?

De Gaulle refuses to go. Now, we should nonetheless note that in 64, we are still before the era in which the heads of state turning up, heads of government turning up for the occasion. That's yet to happen. So the fact that de Gaulle isn't there, other key figures, American and British, likewise aren't there. Nonetheless, there is a bit of diplomatic fallouts around D-Day in 1964. And it's a part of that moment where the Franco-American relationship is becoming a little bit more tense and difficult connected to the foreign policy of de Gaulle. It's just a couple of years later that de Gaulle will even ask all NATO, that is American troops, to leave French soil. That's going to happen in 66, 67.

D-Day 64 sits right in that tense moment in the Franco-American relationship. Let's talk about 84 with Reagan. Suddenly, it's being used as a stage when an era of television news, of international travel. So this is a kind of recognizably modern commemoration. I think it is. I think this is the anniversary which lays out a framework, especially for American politicians, for American presidents, which all those that have followed have sought to pick up on. So it's 1984. We're right in an era where Reagan and his administration are trying to do various things. One is Cold War

tensions are ramping up a little bit. We've got the new Cold War. He wants to roll back communism. At the same time, he's keen to rebuild a sense of American purpose in the world post-Vietnam. And he's also got an eye on an upcoming election. We're in an election year. That's happening in November. This is an opportunity to do the thing that Reagan is awesome at. He's famously on record as saying he didn't understand how anyone other than an actor could be president because so much of the role is theatrical, is ceremonial. And so D-Day, June 1984, Reagan finds his moment and it gives us one of not just the great D-Day, June 1984, Reagan finds his moment, and it gives us one of not just the great D-Day speeches, but I think one of the great speeches of his political career.

Also, it's a particular moment because it's an era where vast chunks of the American people were still watching the TV, the network news at night, right? So that is a pipeline into millions of American homes. It absolutely is. And you look at the sort of the detail of how the ceremonies worked out, and his team even makes certain requests, certain demands. So he gives two speeches, one at the American Battle Monuments Commission Cemetery overlooking Yamaha Beach, but the other at the Ponderhove Memorial, which is the landscape fought over

and won by American Rangers. Famously, we get a showing of it in that great film, The Longest Day, 62. So that's where he's going to give this speech. But the timing of the speech is very purposeful, very deliberate. He's going to give it just so that it will try and be ready for the American breakfast television networks. Politics, man. Politics. It's a weird old game, isn't it? It is. 94. It was a big deal, 94, obviously, 50th. That's the one that sticks in my mind. That's probably the time that I became aware and conscious and really interested. The D-Day anniversary is of 1994, and it's a biggie. Now

you've got presidents and prime ministers turning up. So Bill Clinton's there, and he's going to try to replicate, even in the very format of the thing, so two speeches, Ponderho and the ABFC Cemetery at Omaha Beach, what Reagan did a decade earlier. Other prime ministers are in attendance as well. But for me, it's probably most memorable as the anniversary which sees the descent on Normandy of thousands of veterans, because we're at that moment, it's the 50th anniversary, veterans are sadly declining in number. So it's almost the anniversary for me where you get a sense of living memory starting to recede and we're entering the age of history. Yeah, when we stop taking them for granted. 2004, like I said earlier, I found that so

interesting. One of the reasons I found it very interesting is I was there and I attended lots of events and there was a big emphasis in the British zone. But then on the French and American news that night, which I was monitoring a bit, it was all about this Franco-American entente and a very grand, do you remember that enormous red carpet that Bush, I think was it Sarkozy at the time? Yeah, yeah, yeah. They walked on this massive thing at Omaha.

It was like imperial setting. And that wasn't really covered in the British coverage. And I thought that's so classics of special relationship stuff, isn't it? The British people were told that the great focus of commemoration had been Bayeux or the British sectors and the British events. But elsewhere in the world, the images were very much of Bush. The American-French axis was emphasized.

Yeah. And over the last sort of few anniversaries, that's one of the tensions you can see emerging, that you've got the British, which were always keen to use D-Day as an opportunity to celebrate a special relationship. But at the same time, this is an event happening in France. The French are going to control them at some level, how the commemoration unfolds. And for the French at various points, in 2004 is an important one. It's an opportunity to assert their relationship with the United States. And in 2004, to kind of rebuild a sense of Franco-American connection. It's been strained, it's been put under pressure by war on terror, French disagreements with the foreign policy of George W. Bush. D-Day 2004 sits in that moment, and the French are going to use it as an opportunity to

say something about their connection with Washington and with the United States, which happens again in 2009 as well. So where are we? The special relationship, you hear British politicians talking about it or whining about it, and the new incoming American ambassador to the court, St. James, has to sort of say some things about it each time. It's just, I find it quite embarrassing, actually. Where is it today, man? Where is it today? I know what you mean about a bit embarrassing. It can seem at times a little bit cloying, a little bit. Tell us we're special. Tell us we're special. I know. At the same time, I think we can still legitimately, reasonably talk about something

of a special US-UK connection. But we need to get some stuff out of the way. The geopolitical realities of now are profoundly different to those of 44 or 46. It's not that moment. It's very different. If D-Day 44 gives us this symbol of Anglo-American parity of power, If D-Day 44 gives us this symbol of Anglo-American parity of power, that day is done, and that's not coming back. At the same time, there's still clear evidence of very close US-UK connection around intelligence, around military, which, if not unique, is special. And I'm taking here, the example that comes to mind is the recent deployment of US Marine Corps F-35s to the depths of the Queen Elizabeth

aircraft carrier, not to the decks of the Charles de Gaulle, but to the decks of the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier. Intelligence sharing as well. And then the other area, culture. I think US-UK culture, American British culture over the last century or so has become so interlocked and interconnected and interpenetrating with one another that whilst there are distinct things, absolutely, there's a lot of crossover and a lot of connection there as well. Not unique, but I think special. And I think that's what we need to remember here. When we talk about special relationship, I don't think we're saying it's unique. The US has close connections with Ireland, with Germany, with Korea, with Japan. I think we're saying there's something a little bit special here.

And I think that's still reasonable, at least in some particular areas. So yeah, it's a mixture of F-35s and Diana Ross playing at the Queen's Jubilee last year. That's it. It's not uniquely relationship, but it is pretty special. And actually, I've got a friend who's just deployed as Deputy Task Force Commander

in the Pacific, second in command of a US fleet down there. So you're right. We shouldn't dismiss it. But I guess it's just not special in the way that perhaps Churchill first intended, but it has evolved. I think that's fair. Yeah, I think that's absolutely fair. It's not as Churchill intended or envisaged back in 46. It's different. It's shaped by the realities of now. But there's still something a little bit special there at times. Right there again you

show me anything that is as intended by a politician 80 years before you know it's uh that's not the nature of the beast i tell you what we're still talking about it aren't we we're still discussing and deciding whether his phrase still works he's a clever man he is a clever man sam edwards that was very interesting thank you very much for coming on the podcast if people want to follow you and all your work how can they do that so you can follow me on twitter historian underscore sam and you can find me on the web pages of loughborough university where i work thank you very much for coming on fantastic thank you very much dan really appreciate it you